IR 05000282/2001019
| ML020720563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/2002 |
| From: | Lanksbury R NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Nazar M Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| IR-01-019 | |
| Download: ML020720563 (32) | |
Text
rch 13, 2002
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/01-19; 50-306/01-19
Dear Mr. Nazar:
On February 14, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on February 14, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. During this inspection, Temporary Instruction 2515/145, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, for Unit 2 and 2515/146, Hydrogen Storage Location, were closed.
No findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, Original signed by Roger D. Lanksbury Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-282/01-19; 50-306/01-19
REGION III==
Docket Nos: 50-282, 50-306 License Nos: DPR-42, DPR-60 Report No: 50-282/01-19; 50-306/01-19 Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Location: 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Dates: December 30, 2001, through February 14, 2002 Inspectors: S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector S. Thomas, Resident Inspector D. Karjala, Resident Inspector S. Burton, Senior Resident Inspector, Monticello D. Kimble, Resident Inspector, Monticello R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst D. Jones, Reactor Engineer M. Mitchell, Radiation Specialist Approved by: Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000282-01-19; IR 05000306-01-19, on 12/30/2001-2/14/2002; Nuclear Management Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2, Resident Inspector Report.
This report covers a 7-week routine resident inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, region-based emergency preparedness, radiation protection and inservice inspection specialists. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation.
A. Inspector-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period except that power was briefly reduced to about 40 percent on January 19-20, 2002, for turbine valve testing. Unit 2 was operated at or near full power until January 18, 2002, when the operators began a gradual coastdown in power. Power had decreased to 88 percent on February 1, 2002, at which time Unit 2 was shutdown for a refueling. Unit 2 remained in a refueling shutdown for the remainder of the inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed walkdowns of risk significant equipment trains to verify that the redundant train was in the correct lineup while the opposite train was unavailable.
The inspectors used the checklists and drawings listed at the end of this report to determine the correct lineups. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders (WOs) and condition reports (CRs) associated with each train to verify that these documents did not reveal issues that could affect train function. Significant WOs and CRs reviewed are listed at the end of this report. The inspectors used the information in the sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and Technical Specifications (TS) listed at the end of this report to determine the functional requirements of the systems. During the walkdowns, the inspectors also observed the material condition of the equipment to verify that there were no significant conditions not already in the licensees work control system. The inspectors also reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the walkdowns were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
Walkdowns were conducted on the following trains:
! the D6 diesel generator while the D5 diesel generator was unavailable for preventive maintenance, and
! the Unit 1 containment spray system while the 13 containment fan coil unit inlet valve was unavailable for corrective maintenance.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Area Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and on the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. The inspectors used the documents listed at the end of this report to verify that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use, that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits, and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the walkdowns were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
The following areas were inspected:
! Fire Area 59: Unit 1 Auxiliary Building, 715 foot elevation; and
! Fire Area 74: Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, 715 foot elevation.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/146: Hydrogen Storage Locations a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed the inspection requirements of the TI to confirm that distances between any hydrogen storage capacity and ventilation intakes or risk significant tanks, systems, structures, or components were greater than 50 feet. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed heat exchanger performance testing on the 21 and 22 component cooling heat exchangers, performed in accordance with the procedure listed at the end of this report. The inspectors reviewed the testing to verify that it was performed with the maximum practical heat load on the heat exchangers, that the test acceptance criteria appropriately considered the difference between the test conditions and design conditions, that the test results met the pre-established acceptance criteria, and that the design assumptions were consistent with the actual condition of the heat exchangers with respect to tube plugging. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI)
program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary and the risk significant piping system boundaries. Specifically, the inspectors observed in-process ultrasonic and magnetic particle inspections of feedwater weld 24 (2-ISI-49) and conducted a record review of the ultrasonic examination of RHR weld 18 (2-ISI-51) to verify that these activities were conducted in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements. The inspectors also conducted a review of work packages and radiographs of the pressurizer spray valve (CV 31228 and CV 31229) replacement and reviewed inservice inspection procedures and personnel and equipment certifications.
The inspectors reviewed the NIS-2 forms for Code repairs performed during the last outage (Refueling Outage No. 20) to confirm that ASME Code requirements were met.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed condition reports concerning inservice inspection issues to verify that an appropriate threshold for identifying issues had been established.
The inspectors also evaluated the effectiveness of the corrective actions for identified issues.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed systems to verify that the licensee properly implemented the maintenance rule for structures, systems, or components (SSCs) with performance problems. This evaluation included the following aspects:
! whether the SSC was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
! whether the performance problem constituted a maintenance rule functional failure;
! the proper safety significance classification;
! the proper 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification for the SSC; and
! the appropriateness of the performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).
The above aspects were evaluated by using the maintenance rule scoping and report documents listed at the end of this report. For each SSC reviewed, the inspectors also reviewed significant WOs and CRs listed at the end of this report to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered in the licensees corrective action system.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the following SSCs:
! the main turbine electro-hydraulic (EH) systems;
! the D5 diesel generator starting air system; and
! the nuclear instrumentation (NI) system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities or activities during a time when more than one significant system or train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration, where practical, and that contingency plans were in place, where appropriate. The licensees daily configuration risk assessments, observations of shift turnover meetings, observations of daily plant status meetings, and the documents listed at the end of this report were used by the inspectors to verify that the equipment
configurations had been properly listed, that protected equipment had been identified and was being controlled where appropriate, and that significant aspects of plant risk were being communicated to the necessary personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance activities:
! repair of the D5 diesel generator 1A starting air compressor while the D6 diesel generator was out-of-service for preventive maintenance;
! troubleshooting and recovery from a high crankcase pressure problem on the D6 diesel generator following preventive maintenance; and
! risk assessment, work controls, and protected equipment controls during periods of yellow risk rate categories on January 31 and February 1, 2002, when a relatively large amount of equipment was out of service simultaneously.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated plant conditions and selected CRs for risk significant components and systems in which the operability issues were questioned. These conditions were evaluated to determine whether the operability of the components and systems was justified. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and USAR to the licensees evaluations presented in the CRs below and documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were necessary to maintain operability, the inspectors reviewed the documents listed at the end of the report to verify that the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were properly controlled. The inspectors reviewed records to verify that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
The conditions evaluated were:
! the licensees action to bring four 1000-gallon propane tanks into the protected area;
! the licensees investigation into whether the high crankcase pressure experienced on the D6 diesel generator could be generic to the D5 diesel generator; and
! the licensees investigation into whether the safety injection accumulators could be considered operable after it discovered that not all inservice testing program requirements had been met.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating and support systems to ensure that the testing adequately verified system operability and functional capability with consideration of the actual maintenance performed. The inspectors used the appropriate sections of TS and the USAR, as well as the documents listed at the end of this report, to evaluate the scope of the maintenance and verify that the post-maintenance testing performed adequately demonstrated that the maintenance was successful and that operability was restored. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
Testing subsequent to the following activities were observed and evaluated:
! the D5 diesel generator after 18-month preventive maintenance;
! the D5 diesel generator after governor control repairs; and
! the D6 diesel generator after an investigation of high oil pressure.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and/or observed activities associated with a Unit 2 refueling outage. The inspectors reviewed the outage plan and schedule to verify that risk had been appropriately considered and observed the unit shutdown, cooldown, establishment of residual heat removal, and reactor coolant system (RCS) draindown activities. The inspectors also observed portions of the fuel handling operations in containment to verify that the activities were performed in accordance with TS and approved procedures, and to verify that the locations of fuel assemblies were properly tracked. The inspectors also observed and/or reviewed several other miscellaneous outage activities. The inspectors regularly reviewed the licensees shutdown risk assessment classification and its control of protected equipment when defense-in-depth equipment was unavailable, especially electrical power sources. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the outage were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance testing and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment tested using the surveillance procedures (SPs) met TS, the USAR, and licensee procedural requirements, and also demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety functions. The activities were selected based on their importance in verifying mitigating systems capability. The inspectors used the documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the testing met the TS frequency requirements; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the procedures, including establishing the proper plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test acceptance criteria were met; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded. In addition, the inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
The following tests were observed and evaluated:
! SP 2218, Monthly 4KV [kilovolt] Bus 25 Undervoltage Relay Test; and
! SP 1093, D1 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Modifications (71111.23)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a temporary modification to install a tent and heater around the cooling water dump-to-grade line outside the plant. The purpose of the modification was to prevent ice buildup in the line. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification screening form and the 10 CFR 50.59 screening form listed at the end of the report to ensure that they were completed in accordance with licensee procedural guidance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the sections of the USAR and TS listed at the end of this report to verify that the installation did not affect the specified design function or operability of the system. The inspectors also reviewed installation and removal work orders listed at the end of this report and walked down the installation to insure that the temporary equipment was installed in accordance with the plan.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed Revisions 22 and 23 of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan to determine whether changes identified in Revision 23 reduced the effectiveness of the licensees emergency planning, pending onsite inspection of the implementation of these changes.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)
.1 Plant Walkdowns and Radiation Work Permit Reviews a. Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector conducted walkdowns of selected radiologically controlled areas within the plant to verify the adequacy of radiological boundaries and postings during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Specifically, the inspector walked down several radiologically significant work area boundaries (high and locked high radiation areas) in the Unit 2 containment building and auxiliary buildings, and performed confirmatory radiation measurements to verify that these areas and selected radiation areas were properly posted and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, licensee procedures, and theTSs. The inspector also reviewed the radiological conditions within those work areas walked down to verify adequate radiological housekeeping and contamination controls.
The inspectors reviewed selected radiation work permits (RWPs) used to access radiologically significant work areas (radiation areas (RAs) and high radiation areas (HRAs) during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Work activities in those areas included reactor head work, reactor cavity flood-up, ISI and corrosion inspection, steam generator manway removal and nozzle dam installation, and selected valve work. The inspector reviewed the RWPs to verify that they contained adequate work control instructions. In the case of HRA access, the inspector reviewed the RWP controls to verify that the licensee was in compliance with the specific requirements contained in the TSs. The inspector also reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm setpoints and compared them to area radiation levels and expected personnel exposures to verify that the alarm setpoints were adequately determined. Finally, the inspector evaluated established work controls to determine if worker exposures were maintained As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA).
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls a. Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector reviewed the licensees controls for HRAs and very high radiation areas. In particular, the inspector reviewed the procedures for posting and controlling HRAs to verify compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 and the TSs.
The inspector also reviewed records of HRA boundary and posting surveillances during the outage and performed walkdowns to verify the adequacy of boundaries, controls, and postings. In addition, the inspector reviewed the controls for highly irradiated material that was stored in spent fuel storage pools to verify that the licensee had implemented adequate measures to prevent inadvertent personnel exposures from these materials.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
.1 Job Site Inspections and ALARA Control a. Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector selected a number of refueling outage high exposure or high radiation area work activities to evaluate the licensees use of ALARA controls for each activity.
The inspector reviewed ALARA plans for each activity and observed work associated with each activity to verify the use of proper engineering controls to achieve dose reductions. The inspector conducted walkdowns of the areas to determine if workers were utilizing the low dose waiting areas for each activity and whether the first-line supervisor for each job ensured that the jobs were conducted in a dose efficient manner. The inspector made job site observations and reviewed individual exposures of selected work groups to determine if there were any significant exposure variations which may exist among workers and to verify that multiple dosimetry was employed during jobs that involved significant dose gradients.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Source Term Reduction and Control Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector evaluated the source term reduction program to verify that the licensee had an effective program in place, and was knowledgeable of plant source term and techniques for its reduction.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Radiological Work Planning a. Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector selected high collective dose refueling outage job activities to assess the adequacy of the radiological controls and work planning. For each job activity selected, the inspector reviewed ALARA evaluations including initial reviews, in-progress reviews, and associated dose mitigation techniques and evaluated the licensees exposure estimates and performance to assure that the licensee was using the established work planning procedures and tools. The inspector also assessed the integration of ALARA requirements into work packages to evaluate the licensees communication of radiological work controls.
The inspector reviewed the exposure results for the selected activities to evaluate the accuracy of exposure estimates in the ALARA plan. The inspector compared the actual exposure results with the initial exposure estimates, the estimated and actual dose rates, and the estimated and actual man-hours expended to assess the accuracy of planning estimates. The inspector reviewed each of the selected activity exposure histories to determine if management had reviewed the exposure status of each activity, in-progress ALARA job reviews were needed, additional engineering/dose controls had been established, and required corrective action documents had been generated.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71121.01 and 71121.02)
a. Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector reviewed self-assessments and audits conducted since the last outage, as well as selected outage generated action requests, which focused on ALARA planning and Access Controls. The inspector evaluated the effectiveness of the licensees self-assessment process to identify, characterize, and prioritize problems. The inspector evaluated the licensees ability to identify repetitive problems, contributing causes, the extent of conditions, and corrective actions which would achieve lasting results.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the PI data listed below for completeness and accuracy for the Safety System Unavailability PIs in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. For each PI, the inspectors compared the data reported by the licensee to the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 1. The inspectors reviewed licensee computer databases to gather information regarding unavailable time for the systems, and compared those times to the data reported by the licensee. The inspectors also reviewed the CRs and WOs listed at the end of this report to identify unavailable time for the systems. The inspectors reviewed the following PIs:
! High Pressure Injection System for the first three quarters of 2001; and
! Heat Removal System (Auxiliary Feedwater) for the first three quarters of 2001.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees assessment of its PI for occupational radiation safety to determine if indicator-related data was adequately assessed and reported. Since no reportable elements were identified by the licensee for the last four quarters, the inspectors compared the licensees data with CRs to verify that there were no occurrences concerning the occupational radiation safety cornerstone.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup (71153)
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 2-01-05: Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2, Initiated in Response to a High Differential Pressure Between the Turbine Steam Condensers, Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak This event was discussed in Inspection Report 50-282/01-17; 50-306/01-17, Sections 1R14 and 4OA3.1. As described in the LER, the inadvertent venting of one condenser was the result of an inadequate stress calculation for a leak sealing job and an inadequate contingency isolation procedure for the air ejector system. The inadequacies resulted in a reactor trip initiating event with the loss of the normal condenser as a heat sink. All other mitigation systems performed as expected. At the time of the event, it was screened by an NRC risk analyst and determined to be of very low safety significance. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action
system as CR 200185657. The inspectors reviewed the LER and no new significant issues were identified. This event did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements because the condenser air ejector system did not fall under the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, quality assurance requirements.
40A5 Other
.1 Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (Temporary Instruction 2515/145)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a review of the licensees activities in response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, to verify compliance with applicable regulatory requirements.
In accordance with the guidance of NRC Bulletin 2001-01, the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant was characterized as belonging to the sub-population of plants (Bin 3) that were considered to have a moderate susceptibility to primary stress corrosion cracking based upon a susceptibility ranking of more than 5 but less than 30 effective full power years of operation from that of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 condition. As a result, the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant responded to NRC Bulletin 2001-01 by performing a direct visual examination of the reactor vessel head.
The inspectors interviewed inspection personnel, reviewed procedures and inspection reports, including photographic documentation, to assess the licensees efforts in conducting an effective visual examination of the reactor vessel head.
b. Evaluation of Inspection Requirements 1. Were the licensees examinations performed by qualified and knowledgeable personnel?
The inspectors reviewed records to verify that the examinations were performed by an individual certified as a Level II in the VT-1, VT-2, and VT-3 Methods. In addition, the licensees procedure required a review of the specific guidelines described in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Visual Examination for Leakage of PWR Reactor Head Penetrations.
2. Were the licensees examinations performed in accordance with approved and adequate procedures?
The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that the examinations were conducted in accordance with an approved plant procedure, Unit 2 RV Head Canopy Seal Weld Inspection, WO 0107685, and the guidelines established in EPRI Document 1006296
"Visual Examination for Leakage of PWR Reactor Head Penetrations. The inspectors determined that the procedure was appropriate for the examinations.
3. Were the licensees examinations adequately able to identify, disposition, and resolve deficiencies?
The inspectors determined through a review of post-examination records, discussions with the personnel that conducted the examinations, and a review of the procedure, that the examinations were sufficient to identify any deficiencies. The licensees examinations did not identify any deficiencies; therefore, the inspectors did not assess the licensees efforts to disposition or resolve deficiencies.
4. Were the licensees examinations capable of identifying the primary stress corrosion cracking phenomenon described in the Bulletin?
The inspectors determined through interviews with inspection personnel, and reviews of procedures and inspection reports, including photographic documentation of the examinations, that the licensees efforts were capable of identifying the phenomenon described in the Bulletin. The inspectors determined that the inspection personnel had access to all the head penetrations, 41 in total, with no obstructions or interferences.
5. What was the condition of the reactor vessel head (debris, insulation, dirt, boron from other sources, physical layout, viewing obstructions)?
The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant pressure vessel head had block contoured vessel head insulation, consisting of mirror panels fabricated of 4-inch thick perforated metal block insulation with viewing ports cut into the insulation. The inspectors determined that the licensee had complete viewable coverage. The inspectors also determined through discussions with the inspection personnel and review of the inspection photographs that the as-found pressure vessel head condition was clean.
(A small amount of debris in the form of metal shavings from the cutting of the viewing ports was noted; however, this did not obstruct the exam.)
6. Could small boron deposits, as described in the bulletin, be identified and characterized?
The inspectors verified, through interviews with inspection personnel and review of the photographic record of the examination, that small boron deposits, as described in the Bulletin, could be identified, given the cleanliness and accessibility of the pressure vessel head penetrations. However, no indications were found on the 41 penetrations.
7. What materiel deficiencies (associated with the concerns identified in the bulletin) were identified that required repair?
Through a review of the examination records, the inspectors determined the inspection personnel did not identify any materiel deficiencies associated with any of the 41 pressure vessel head penetrations.
8. What, if any, significant items that could impede effective examinations and/or ALARA issues were encountered?
The inspectors conducted reviews to verify that there were no impediments to the examinations. The inspection ports eliminated the need for insulation removal and the radiation dose that would have been received. Collective radiation dose received as a part of the examinations was approximately 40 millirem.
c. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meeting(s)
Exit Meeting The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on February 14, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
Interim Exit Meetings Senior Official at Exit: M. Werner, Plant Manager Date: February 7, 2002 Proprietary: No Subject: Biennial Inservice Inspection Senior Official at Exit: M. Nazar, Site Vice President Date: February 8, 2002 Proprietary: No Subject: Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas, ALARA Planning, and Occupational Radiation Safety Performance Indicator
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee P. Blaylock, ISI Coordinator T. Breene, Manager Nuclear Performance Assessment B. Jefferson, Director Site Operations A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry R. Lingle, Operations Manager J. Maki, Production Planning Manager L. Meyer, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance M. Nazar, Site Vice President S. Redner, NDE Consulting Specialist J. Waddell, Superintendent Security M. Werner, Plant Manager D. Whitcomb, ISI Engineer L. Williams, Director of Engineering LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None.
Closed 2-01-05 LER Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2, Initiated in Response to a High Differential Pressure Between the Turbine Steam Condensers, Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak (Section 4OA3)
2515/146 TI Hydrogen Storage Locations (Section 1R05)
2515/145 TI Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (Section 4OA5.1)
Discussed None.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USES ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System AFW Auxiliary Feed Water ALARA As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report DRS Division of Reactor Safety EH Electro-Hydraulic EPRI Electric Power Research Institute ERCS Emergency Response Computer System HRA High Radiation Area IMC Inspection Manual Chapter IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IR Inspection Report ISI Inservice Inspection IST Inservice Testing KV Kilovolt LCO Limiting Conditions for Operation LER Licensee Event Report NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NI Nuclear Instrumentation NMC Nuclear Management Company NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PARS Publicly Available Records PI Performance Indicator PINGP Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant PM Preventive Maintenance RA Radiation Area RCA Radiologically Controlled Area RCS Reactor Coolant System RWP Radiation Work Permit SDP Significance Determination Process
SP Surveillance Procedure SSC Structure, System, or Component TCN Temporary Change Notice TI Temporary Instruction TS Technical Specifications USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report WO Work Order
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1R04 Equipment Alignment D6 Diesel Generator Integrated Checklist D6 Diesel Generator Valve Status Revision 11 C1.1.20.7-13 Integrated Checklist D6 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Local Revision 5 C1.1.20.7-14 Panels and Switches Integrated Checklist D6 Diesel Generator Main Control Room Revision 4 C1.1.20.7-15 Switch and Indicating Light Status Integrated Checklist D6 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and Revision 6 C1.1.20.7-16 Panel Switches CR 200186994 D6 Stop Jack Partially Actuated Due to Overspeed Trip Device Leaking Air WO 0111705 D6 1B Starting Air Compressor Not Functioning Properly WO 9912495 Repair Oil Leak on D6 1B Starting Air Compressor WO 0200070 D6 1B Air Dryer Has a Low Limit Reading for Hygrometer USAR Section 8.4 Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems Revision 23 TS 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems Revision 160 Unit 1 Containment Spray Drawing NF-39237 Containment Internal Spray System Revision AC Operations Manual Containment Spray System Revision 4 Section B18D USAR Section 6.2 Safety Injection System Revision 22 USAR Section 6.4 Containment Vessel Internal Spray System Revision 23 TS Section 3.3 Engineered Safety Features Revision 161 CR 20018150 Temporary Suction Strainers CR 200200531 Criteria for Determining Locked Versus Blocked Not Clear and Not Clearly Controlled by a Process CR 200200523 Drawing NF-39237 Denotes CS-15 and CS-45 as Locked Open - They are Maintained in a Blocked Open Condition
1R05 Fire Protection Plant Safety Procedure F5 Fire Fighting Revision 27 Plant Safety Procedure F5 Fire Hazard Analysis Revision 12 Appendix F Plant Safety Procedure F5 Fire Strategies Revision 10 Appendix A IPEEE NSPLMI-96001 Internal Fires Analysis Revision 2 Appendix B F5 Appendix D Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room Revision 7 TI 2515/146 Hydrogen Storage Locations CR 200200274 Hydrogen House/Waste Gas Storage Area is Not Identified in the Fire Strategies CR 200200473 Resolution of NRC Resident Concern of Possible Transient Combustibles in Auxiliary Building 1R07 Heat Sink Performance WO 0101382 SP 2304, Unit 2 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Performance Test CR 200201141 21 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Performance Test Indicates ERCS
[emergency response computer system]
Point 2T2703A Reads Low 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation General 2000 Equipment Performance Annual April 20, 2001 Report Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Revision 3 Volume 1A Quarterly Equipment Performance Report - February 2002 4th Quarter 2001 NUMARC 93-01 Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline Revision 2 for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.160 Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance Revision 2 at Nuclear Power Plants EH Systems CR 19991123 EH Control System Year 2000 Testing
CR 200185746 Turbine Did Not Ramp to 1800 Revolutions Per Minute as Expected During Turbine Roll 11/3/2001 During Unit 2 Startup Operations CR 200186203 Review Problems Associated with Turbine Rollup and Human Performance with Regard to the Use of Diverse Indication CR 20012102 Unit 1 Turbine Control Valves; 3 of 4 Dump Valves Needed to be Cleaned and New O-Rings Installed WO 0013459 21 EH Unloader Valve Has Small Leak WO 0101661 EH Controller Checkout WO 0104128 Excessive Oil Leakage at 21 EH Oil Pump D5 Starting Air System WO 9405349 Replace D1 1A Air Compressor 2nd Stage Head Gasket WO 9704550 D5 Compressor 1A Wont Pump to Pressure WO 0007523 Repair D5 1A Air Compressor, Lifting Relief Valve WO 0104228 Repair D5 1A Air Compressor, Lifting Relief Valve WO 0109312 D5 1A Air Compressor Has Blown Head Gasket WO 0200881 D5 1A Starting Air Compressor Head Gasket Blown NI System CR 20014786 2N51 Source Range Counts and Log Power Range Indication Cycles With Bank C Pressurizer Heaters CR 20017503 Evaluate Source Range 1N32 Failure and NI System Source Range Trending CR 200185685 Noisy Source Range Channel CR 200185707 2N32 Went From 400 Counts Per Second to 100 Counts Per Second CR 200186240 N51 Power Range Log Scale ERCS Indication Failing Low CR 200201534 Source Rance 2N31 Failed During Refueling Outage - High Indication (10E4 Counts Per Second) Due To Suspected Noise
CR 200201571 From 2/14/02 NRC Exit: Are N51 and N52 in Scope of Maintenance Rule? Appears They Should Be WO 0106959 Test the Source Range Preamplifiers WO 0107493 2N42B Was Spiking During SP 2006C WO 0107673 Check Bank C Heaters Effect on 2N51 WO 0108161 Erratic Response on 1N-41 Digital Meter WO 0111297 Loud Buzzing Sound Coming From 2N35 WO 0111706 Power Range N42 Giving Alarms WO 0113937 2N41 Upper Detector Current Display Problem WO 0115413 2N31 Spiking During SP 2035A WO 0200141 2N52 Excessive Ripple Voltage on PS1 WO0201487 2N31 Reading 10E5 Counts With No Change In 2N32 WO 0201490 Replace 2NE-31 Source Range Detector WO 0201580 Assist CHAR Services in Performing Cable Testing For the Unit 2 NI System WO 0201602 Observed Noise Spike on N52 During Fuel Shuffle 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control D5 Starting Air Compressor Repair CR 200200633 D5 1A Starting Air Compressor 213-031 Blown Head Gasket Caused Excessive Run Time and Receiver Less Than 510 Pounds Per Square Inch WO 0200881 D5 1A Starting Air Compressor Head Gasket Blown D6 High Crankcase Pressure CR 200200734 Aborted SP 2307 D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Test Due to Increasing Crankcase Pressure During 18-Month PM
[preventive maintenance] Run SP 2305 D6 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Revision 16 Test SP 2307 D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Revision 16 Test Work Schedule D6 Recovery Schedule January 25, 2002
Memorandum of Call Between Prairie Island Nuclear January 25, 2002 Telephone Generating Plant and Wartsila Nuclear Communication Service Draft Root Cause D6 Oil Issue January 23, 2002 Memorandum WO 0111015 Complete Mark-up of SP 2307 and SP 2335 Memorandum Resolution of D6 Emergency Diesel January 26, 2002 Post-Overhaul Issues Yellow Risk Condition on January 31-February 1, 2002 Risk Assessment for Proposed Work for Week of 2B04 WO 0112378 23 Charging Pump Quarterly Check WO 0200065 23 Charging Pump Will Only Run in Minimum Speed WO 0104351 22 Battery Charger Inspect/Test/PM
[Preventative Maintenance]
WO 0112390 22 Cooling Water Strainer Annual Inspection WO 0112386 122 Safeguards Traveling Screen Annual Inspection WO 0201056 12 Charging Pump Has a Leak Rate of
.5 Gallons Per Minute WO 0108190 Breaker Electrical 10-Year PM - 122 Cooling Water Traveling Screen WO 0111993 SP 1305 - D2 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test WO 0112364 D2 Diesel Generator 6-Month Inspection WO 0104848 PM Breaker 26-1 - Bus Tie WO 0104850 Overhaul Breaker 26-17 - Cooling Water Bus 27 Feed WO 0113418 SP 2093 - D5 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test WO 0200974 CV-31133 Failed to Open on Signal WO 0107413 PM Breaker 24-4 - 23 Condensate Pump CR 200200735 D5 1A Starting Air Receiver and D5 Engine 1A Overspeed Detector Removed from Service Due to Air Leakage
CR 200200887 D6 Overspeed Detector Has Air Leak Indicating that the Device is Failing -
Isolated D6 2B Air Start System WO 0201073 Isolate Overspeed Trip Device or Field Flash Speed Switch Temporary Modification D5 Field Flash Speed Sensor Bypass 02T113 1R15 Operability Evaluations Propane Issue CR 200200085 Quantity of Temporary Liquid Propane Exceeded Nuclear Management Company Guidelines as Directed in D14.9, Section 4.0
- Limit of Less Than 1000 Gallons CR 200200130 Four 1000 Gallon Propane Tanks Were Brought On Site Putting Us in an Unanalyzed Situation for Control Room Habitability CR 200200144 8-Hour Non-emergency Event Notification Due to Propane Tanks Exceeding Toxic Gas Analysis for Control Room Habitability Memorandum Follow-up to Toxic Gas Issue Occurring on January 6, 2002 January 4, 2002 Memorandum Corrective Action Plan for Control Room January 8, 2002 Habitability Regulatory Guide 1.78 Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Revision 1 Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release NUREG/CR-6624 Recommendations for Revision of Regulatory Guide 1.78 Safety Evaluation 50-520 Evaluation of Control Room Habitability Addendum 0 During a Postulated On-site Hazardous Chemical Release Event Report 38609 Discovery that Propane Tanks On Site Report January 5, Exceeded the Volume Assumed in the 2002 and Control Room Habitability Toxic Gas Retraction Analysis January 22, 2002 USAR Section 2.9.4 Toxic Chemical Study Revision 22 D5 Operability Issue Draft Root Cause D6 Oil Issue January 23, 2002 Memorandum
CR 200200734 Aborted SP 2307 D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Test Due to Increasing Crankcase Pressure During 18-Month PM Run SP 2295 D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Revision 22 Test Safety Injection Accumulator Issue CR 200200492 Previous IST [Inservice Testing] of Accumulator Outlet Check Valves Does Not Completely Meet the IST Program Requirements CR 200201278 Inadequate Operability Determination for Safety Injection Accumulator Discharge Check Valve for CR 200200492 NRC Information Notice Detached Check Valve Disc Not Detected 2000-21 by Use of Acoustic and Magnetic Nonintrusive Test Techniques CR 20010025 Detached Check Valve Disc Not Detected by Use of Acoustic and Magnetic Nonintrusive Test Techniques NUREG-1482 Guideline for Inservice Testing at Nuclear April 1995 Power Plants TS 4.2 Inservice Inspection and Testing of Pumps Revision 60 and Valves Requirements 1R19 Post Maintenance Testing CR 200200289 Aborted SP 2295, Fast Start Test of D5 Because of Load Imbalance Between Engines 1 and 2 as Directed by Engineer SP 2295 D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Revision 22 Test PM 3001-2-D5 D5 Diesel Generator 18-Month Inspection Revision 4-Mechanical WO 0200167 D5 Engine 1 Fuel Rack Positioner WO 0200927 Perform Post Maintenance Testing for D6 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities Operating Unit 2 Power Operation Revision 27 Procedure 2C1.4 Operating Unit 2 Shutdown Revision 48 Procedure 2C1.3
Operating Shutdown Operations - Unit 2 Revision 13 Procedure 2C1.6 Operating RCS Inventory Control - Pre-refueling Revision 14 Procedure 2C4.1 (with TCN [Temporary Change Notice] 2002-0025)
Special Operating RCS Reduced Inventory Operation Revision 13 Procedure 2D2 Safety Evaluation 245 Refueling Operations Using One Source Range Detector and One Gamma-Metric Detector Design Change 83Y390 Nuclear Instrumentation Upgrade Final Addendum 0 Package WO 0201537 Install Temporary Modification for Gamma-Metrics Audio Count Rate/Alarm WO 0201538 Pre-Operability Testing on Temporary Modification on Gamma-Metrics Audio Count Rate/Alarm TS 3.8 Refueling and Fuel Handling Revision 151 USAR Section 14.5.1 Fuel Handling Revision 22 Special Operating Reactor Refueling Operations Revision 28 Procedure D5.2 Checklist Prairie Island Fuel Transfer Logs - Fuel Shuffle for Unit 2 Cycle 21 Core 1R22 Surveillance Testing SP 2218 Monthly 4KV Bus 25 Undervoltage Relay Revision 33 Test TS Table 3.5.1, Item 10 4KV Safeguards Busses Voltage Revision 103 Restoration TS 3.5-2B, Item 8 Loss of Power Revision 161 TS 4.1-1B, Item 8 Loss of Power Revision 111 SP 1093 D1 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Revision 72 Test USAR Section 8.4 Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems Revision 23 TS 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems Revision 160 TS 4.6 Periodic Testing of Emergency Power Revision 147 System Integrated Checklist D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status Revision 17 C1.1.20.7-1
Integrated Checklist D1 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Room Revision 8 C1.1.20.7-2 Cooling Local Panels Integrated Checklist Diesel Generator D1 Main Control Room Revision 13 C1.1.20.7-3 Switch and Indicating Light Status Integrated Checklist D1 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and Revision 11 C1.1.20.7-4 Panel Switches CR 200201419 Locate or Prepare Justification for Leaving D1 and D2 Local Vibration Alarm Out of Service 1R23 Temporary Modifications Temporary Equipment Temporary Modification 01T106 Evaluation Screening Form NMC [Nuclear Temporary Modification 01T106 Management Company]
Standard 10 CFR 50.59 Screening 1323 WO 0115718 Install Temporary Tent and Heater on Cooling Water Dump to Grade WO 0115972 Remove Temporary Tent and Heater on Cooling Water Dump to Grade Administrative Work Temporary Modifications Revision 10 Instruction 5AWI 6.5.0 TCN 2001-2066 5AWI 6.5.0, Temporary Modifications USAR Section 10.4.1 Cooling Water System Revision 22 TS 3.3.D Cooling Water System Revision 131 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Revision 22 Emergency Plan Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Revision 23 Emergency Plan 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Revision 1 Indicator Guideline Computer Database LCO [Limiting Conditions for Operation] Log 1/1/01 - 9/30/01 Computer Database Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Room Logs 1/1/01 - 9/30/01 WO 0110640 Solenoid Valve 33493 Did Not Vent Completely Off
CR 20017083 Entered Unplanned LCO Action Due to 22 TDAWF Pump Recirculation Control Valve 34419 Failure to Open During SP-2102 CR 20017776 Replace AFW Pump Recirculation/Lube Oil Cooling Solenoid Valves with Models Having Elastomers Rated for Higher Temperature CR 20017971 Modify AFW System to Remove the Recirculation/Lube Oil Cooling Control Valves Procedure H.33.2 Mitigating Systems Cornerstone Revision 4 Unavailability Performance Indicator Reporting Instructions CR 20010354 Equipment Problems Were Encountered During Installation of the Safety Injection Mini Recirculation Flow Meter CR 20015199 MV-32079, Refueling Water Storage Tank Suction to U1 Pumps Cannot be Locally Operated Due to Handwheel Against Lagging CR 20003741 Safety Injection Mini Recirculation Flow Failure WO 0108070 MV-32079, Reform Lagging to Allow Manual Operation WO 0103294 Safety Injection Recirculation Line Low Flow Alarm 4OA3 Event Followup LER 2-01-05 Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2, Initiated in Response to a High Differential Pressure Between the Turbine Steam Condensers, Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak CR 200185657 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Condenser Vacuum Differential Greater Than 2.5 Inches 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas RPIP 1004 Radiation Protection Implementing Revision 3 Procedures RPIP 1160 ALARA Review Revision 5 RPIP 1121 RWP Issue Revision 16
RPIP 1131 Radiography Revision 6 RPIP 1135 RWP Coverage Revision 12 RWP 22015 ISI and Corrosion Inspection Revision 0 RWP 22022 Steam Generator Primary Manway Revision 0 RWP 22027 Steam Generator Nozzle Dam Revision 0 RWP 22035 Reactor Head Lift Revision 1 RWP 22038 Pressurizer Manway Revision 0 RWP 22118 Replace Pressurizer Spray Valves Revision 0 CR 20018107 Construction Electricians Enter Aux. Bld. October 3, 2001 Without Signing RWP and ED CR 20018286 Radioactive Material Found Outside October 5, 2001 RCA (715' Turbine Bld.)
CR 20018410 Aux. Bld. 715 Material Storage Area Not October 10, 2001 Labeled Ra Material Area CR 200185159 RP Doing Sample Liner #114 Cask October 17, 2001 Decon, Contaminated Pants Pocket CR 200185220 Condition Reports Not Written for All October 19, 2001 Problems (RP Group)
CR 200185319 Lead Shielding Was Not Utilized to October 24, 2001 Lower Worker Dose, U-2 Containment Spray Pump Room CR 200185377 Neutron Reading Taken in Integrate October 25, 2001 Mode, Resurveyed at ISFSI Pad CR 200185460 1R-11 Filter Paper Installed Incorrectly, December 12, 2001 Control Room Alarm for Not in Motion CR 200185753 Contaminated Folding Chair in Aux. Bld. November 4, 2001 Clean Area CR 200185878 Pre-job Brief Improvement Item-Dose November 8, 2001 Rates for Existing Casks at ISFSI CR 200186300 Worker Attempted to Enter Hi Rad Area October 20, 2001 Under Wrong RWP CR 200186530 Lack of Rad Protection Support to November 28, 2001 Complete All Jobs
CR 200186648 Personnel Not Wearing ED Within Hand December 2, 2001 Width of TLD in RCA CR 200186764 Worker Enter U-2 Containment At December 5, 2001 Power Wearing Regular TLD and Neutron TLD CR 200186862 Area Radiation Field at Access Control December 7, 2001 Doubled in 7 Years CR 200200256 Exposure Estimate For RWP#405 January 10, 2002 (Placing Filters in Liner) 43%
Overestimated CR 200200694 Radiography Controls Did Not Meet January 24, 2002 Management Expectations Per RPIP 1131, Radiographing CR 200201060 Engineer Received Dose Alarm February 3, 2002 Inspection Reactor Head CR 20021243 Radiation Dose For Reactor Head February 7, 2002 Disassembly Exceeded Goal by 124%
1R08 Inservice Inspection ISI-ET-1.0 Bobbin Coil Data Analysis January 9, 2002 ISI-NDE-0 Equipment, Personnel and Material Reporting October 18, 2001 ISI-MT-1 Dry Magnetic Particle Examination October 18, 2001 ISI-UT-1A Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Weld January 22, 2001 to Appendix VIII ISI-UT-3 Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Vessels January 5, 2000 ISI-UT-5B Ultrasonic Examination of Steam Generator October 7, 1998 Feedwater Nozzle Inner Radii From the Blend Radius 20.A.100-1989 Radiographic Examination of Welds (General January 22, 1993 Requirements)
20.A.131-1989 Radiographic Examination of Welds March 13, 1993 Unit 2 Inservice Inspection Summary Report, September 1, 2000 Interval 3, Period 2, Refueling Outage Dates 4-29-2000 To 6-7-2000
WO 0103665 Pressurizer Spray Valve (CV 31229) January 18, 2002 Replacement Shop Weld Radiographs (Welds 1-5)
WO 0008645 Pressurizer Spray Valve (CV 31228) February 7, 2002 Replacement Field Weld Radiographs (Welds 1 & 2)
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