IR 05000282/2020002
| ML21047A239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/2021 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Domingos C Northern States Power Company, Minnesota |
| Shared Package | |
| ML21047A254 | List: |
| References | |
| IR 2020001 | |
| Download: ML21047A239 (18) | |
Text
February 16, 2021
SUBJECT:
REISSUE - PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT -
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2020002; 05000306/2020002; AND 07200010/2020001
Dear Mr. Domingos:
The NRC identified that the inspection report sent to Mr. S. Sharp dated July 30, 2020 (ML20213A880) inadvertently omitted two inspection samples associated with the Mitigating System Performance Indicators for heat sink and high pressure injection, from the report. As a result, the NRC has reissued the report in its entirety with the updated subject. None of these changes affected the technical content of the report.
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. On July 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One NRC-identified Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Hironori Peterson, Chief Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000282; 05000306; and 07200010 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60; and SNM-2506
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000282; 05000306; 07200010
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000282/2020002; 05000306/2020002; 07200010/2020001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0041 and I-2020-001-0143
Licensee:
Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
Facility:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Location:
Welch, Minnesota
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2020 to June 30, 2020
Inspectors:
J. Dalzell, Health Physicist
R. Edwards, Senior Health Physicist
N. Feliz-Adorno, Branch Chief
L. Haeg, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Pusateri, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Hironori Peterson, Chief
Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 7115
List of Findings and Violations
Cask Transport Vehicle Evaluation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable NCV 05000282,05000306/2020002-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 60855.1 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.146,
Design Control for failing to adequately analyze, control deviations, and translate into procedures the design for the interfacing surfaces of the tracked Cask Transport Vehicle (CTV) which affected quality. Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Units 1 and 2 operated at or near full power for the entirety of the inspection period, with the exception of brief power reductions to perform surveillance testing or flexible power operations.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 caustic addition system on 04/16/2020 (2)12 diesel-driven cooling water pump on 05/4/2020 (3)121 safeguards travelling screen on 05/20/2020
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the following:
- (1) Unit 1 control rod system on 06/19/2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire zone 18 relay and cable spreading room on 04/22/2020
- (2) Fire zone 58 Unit 1 charging pumps 11, 12, and 13 on 04/22/2020
- (3) Fire zone 75 plant screen house elevation 695' on 05/20/2020
- (4) Fire zone 74 plant screen house elevation 670' on 06/15/2020
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) 695' elevation turbine building on 04/28/2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Control room observations during a spent fuel loading campaign on 05/26/2020
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator training in the simulator on 05/27/2020
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Component cooling water system on 04/27/2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;
- (2) AR 501000039466; 2A reheater drain level control failure on 04/10/2020
- (3) AR 501000039723; CV-31941 had dual indication on the control board on 04/16/2020 (4)22 diesel-driven cooling water jacket water hose leak availability determination on 05/12/2020
- (5) Maintenance risk during 12 residual heat removal pump breaker replacement on 06/23/2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)23 containment fan coil unit damper past operability review on 05/04/2020 (2)22 diesel driven cooling water jacket water hose leak past operability review on 05/06/2020 (3)22 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump bearing temperature in the alert range on 04/21/2020 (4)11 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump past operability review on 06/04/2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (2) Maintenance on 13 charging pump breaker following instantaneous trip test failure on 04/22/2020
- (4) D5 emergency diesel generator ventilation system testing following damper maintenance on 06/10/2020 (5)22 component cooling water heat exchanger temperature control valve failure on 06/02/2020
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) SP 1856; Bus 26 undervoltage test on 4/28/20
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Licensed operator re-qualification training with DEP Performance Indicator evaluation on 06/19/2020
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06)===
(1)
- (2) Unit 1 MSPI high pressure injection 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/22/2020 Unit 2 MSPI high pressure injection 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/22/2020
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)
(1)
- (2) Unit 1 MSPI heat removal 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/23/2020 Unit 2 MSPI heat removal 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/23/2020
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program during the period of January 1, 2020, through June 30, 2020, for potential adverse trends in maintenance practices that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) RCE 501000036932; Breaker 26-16 undersized on 03/31/2020
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants
- (1) Due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, the inspectors remotely evaluated the licensees Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) cask loading through use of the licensee's in-plant camera system on May 26 - May 29, 2020. To complete this inspection, the inspectors intend to visit the Prairie Island ISFSI before the end of 2020 to evaluate the material and radiological conditions of the site. This site visit is pending further reductions in risk associated with travel during the public health emergency. During the remote portion of the inspection, the inspectors observed the following activities:
- Fuel selection and fuel loading for the third and final cask in the campaign, cask number 47
- Heavy load movement of the cask out of the spent fuel pool to the cask processing area, and movement of the cask in preparation for transport to the ISFSI
- Drying and backfill evolutions
- Closure operations
- Cask transport evolutions
- Radiological field surveys
The inspectors evaluated the following change reviews:
- Selected corrective action program documents
- Selected 72.48 screenings and evaluations
INSPECTION RESULTS
Cask Transport Vehicle Evaluation Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000282,05000306/2020002-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 60855.1 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.146, Design Control for failing to adequately analyze, control deviations, and translate into procedures the design for the interfacing surfaces of the tracked Cask Transport Vehicle (CTV) which affected quality. Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.
Description:
A new CTV was procured by the licensee for transporting TN-40/40HT casks between the Auxiliary Building and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad.
Calculation No. 2018-03457, "Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for Loading Associated with New Cask Transport Vehicle," Revision 0, was a safety related analysis that included an evaluation of the stability of spent fuel casks (empty and full) and the CTV (loaded and unloaded). The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) ISFSI was licensed by the NRC in Renewed License SNM-2506, License for Independent Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, Amendment 10. License Condition 9, Authorized Use, of SNM-2506, states, in part, that the basis for this license was submitted in the Safety Analysis Report dated August 31, 1990 and as further supplemented and amended in accordance with 10 CFR 72.70 and 10 CFR 72.48. Calculation No. 2018-03457 utilized the ISFSI design basis to establish the acceptance criteria for factors of safety against sliding and tipping. Specifically, section 6.1 of Calculation No. 2018-03457 states the factors of safety against sliding and overturning shall be 1.1 or greater per References 5a and 6a.
Reference 5a is Revision 18 of the PINGP ISFSI Safety Analysis Report which established 1.1 as the minimum factor of safety to sliding in section 4.2.1, Structures, for postulated earthquake loads. The TN-40/40HT cask is safety-related equipment and the Auxiliary Building slab foundation is considered a safety-related structure.
In Calculation No. 2018-03457, a sliding analysis was performed to assess whether the CTV will slide during a postulated design basis earthquake. The conclusion that the cask would not slide was based on an assumed coefficient of friction of 0.5 between the Auxiliary Building concrete slab and the CTV tracks. This coefficient of friction value was taken from Calculation No. 8708-320, Spent Fuel Storage Cask Transporter for Xcel Energy Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant," Revision 3. In Calculation No. 8708-320, the coefficient of friction was specified as coefficient of friction to road; however, the interfacing surfaces for this value are not described and the CTV travels over multiple surfaces on the haul path towards the ISFSI, including concrete and gravel. Calculation No. 2018-03457 also permits SS [stainless steel] deck plates or plywoods may be placed to protect concrete surfaces if the contact areas between CTV treads and SS deck plates/plywoods are not greater than 8.0 ft2 with maximum thickness of 3/8 in[ch].
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Maintenance Procedure No. D95.10, "Tracked Cask Transporter Vehicle Operations," Revision 0, provided the detailed instructions for the inspection, startup, and operation of the tracked CTV. This procedure did not contain any limitations or guidance regarding the material, size, or placement of the protective surfaces between the Auxiliary Building slab and the tracked CTV. The actual configuration, as remotely observed by the inspectors during ISFSI operations on May 28, 2020, consisted of 1/2-inch-thick high-density plastic sheets placed between the steel CTV treads and the painted Auxiliary Building concrete slab. Since the design for protective surfaces was not translated into a procedure, the installed protective surfaces were not as analyzed in Calculation No. 2018-03457 and deviations to the design were not controlled. Specifically, there were 3 examples where the interfacing surfaces relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was inadequately analyzed, deviations were not controlled, and the installation of these surfaces was not controlled by a procedure to ensure the configuration matched the design:
- The chosen coefficient of friction value of 0.5 for the surface between the Auxiliary Building floor and tracks of the CTV was taken from a haul path analysis where these surfaces differed from the interfacing surfaces in the Auxiliary Building (the Auxiliary Building had relatively smooth, painted, concrete floors).
- To protect the Auxiliary Building floor, Calculation No. 2018-03457 stated up to 8.0 ft2 of 3/8-inch-thick plywood or stainless-steel plates on the Auxiliary Building floor were permissible, but no analysis was provided about how these multiple surfaces impact sliding or tipping. That is, the analysis did not analyze the interfacing surfaces between the floor and plywood/plate, and similarly did not consider the interfacing surface between the plywood/plate and the tracks on the CTV.
- The 3/8-inch plywood or stainless-steel plates were not used. Instead, 1/2-inch-thick high-density plastic sheets were used; however, the change in material and thickness was not analyzed for how it might impact the sliding and tipping analysis.
Corrective Actions: The inspector identified this concern during the transfer of the last cask in the loading campaign. Transfer of the loaded cask to the ISFSI was completed safely and without incident. The concern was placed in the corrective action program, and while corrective actions were still being developed at the conclusion of the inspection, preliminary actions include revising Calculation No. 2018-03457.
Corrective Action References: AR 501000041132; New Cask Transporter Revise Evaluation; May 29, 2020
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors concluded that measures were inadequate to ensure that the design basis was correctly translated into Procedure No. D95.10, the design calculation was accurate, and deviations to appropriate quality standards specified in design Calculation No. 2018-03457 were controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met which resulted in a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance using IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix E, "Example of Minor Issues." Example 3.e was found to be similar in that the licensee failed to establish measures to ensure that the procedures for setting up the CTV in the auxiliary building were in accordance with the design which lead to reasonable doubt whether the seismic sliding and tipping analysis requirements were met for a CTV loaded with spent fuel. In the 3.e example, the design was correct; however, the installed configuration was not. In this case, the design analysis had deficiencies as well as the procedure, which led to a conclusion that the multiple deficiencies was an issue of more than minor concern.
Significance: In accordance with Section 2.2 of the Enforcement Policy, ISFSIs are not subject to the SDP and traditional enforcement will be used for these facilities. Traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.
Enforcement:
Severity: The inspectors determined that the violation could be evaluated, using Section 6.5.d.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, as a violation of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV) because the licensee failed to meet a regulatory requirement that had a more than minor safety significance.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.146, "Design Control," states, in part, that the licensee shall establish measures to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as specified in the license for those structures, systems, and components to which this section applies, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures must include provisions to ensure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from standards are controlled.
Contrary to the above, on May 28, 2020, measures were inadequate to ensure the design basis was correctly translated into Procedure No. D95.10, the design calculation was accurate, and deviations to appropriate quality standards specified in design Calculation No. 2018-03457 were controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.
Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation: Safeguards Breaker Racking Procedure Inappropriate to the Circumstances 71152 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. Procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to this requirement, on January 24, 2020, the licensee identified that a 4.16kV safeguards breaker 26-16 (D6 emergency diesel generator supply to Bus 26) with an incorrect amperage rating had been installed and in service within Bus 26 since October 11, 2019, due, in part, to insufficient acceptance criteria within Operating Procedure C20.5-1, "4.16kV Breaker Rack Out/Rack In," Revision 41.
Significance/Severity: Green. The finding was of very low safety significance because it was a deficiency affecting the qualification of Bus 26 4.16kV safeguards breaker 26-16 (a mitigating SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability.
Corrective Action References: AR 501000036932
Observation: D6 Emergency Diesel Generator Supply Breaker to Bus 26 Undersized 71152 The inspectors reviewed a past operability review and root cause evaluation following the January 24, 2020, identification that Breaker 26-16 (D6 EDG Supply to Bus 26) was installed with an incorrect, undersized amperage since October 11, 2019. This condition was identified by the licensee during troubleshooting following load sequencer modifications for which post maintenance testing was not successful. The breaker was promptly replaced with a correctly-sized breaker prior to restoring operability of D6 and Bus 26. Based on the inspector's review of the licensee's evaluation, the inspectors did not identify any past operability or reportability concerns; however, a Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation of Very Low Safety Significance (Green) was identified and is discussed in this report.
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review 71152 Based on the spring of 2020 COVID-19 public health crisis, the inspectors performed a semi-annual trend review of the licensee's corrective action program during the first and second calendar quarters of 2020. The inspectors focused on whether any adverse trends existed related to human performance, equipment performance, and programmatic effectiveness during this timeframe and did not identify any concerns. For low-level trends that were identified by the licensee, the inspectors did not identify any concerns with the trend inputs, level of evaluation, and planned corrective actions.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. S. Sharp, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 12, 2020, the inspectors presented interim ISFSI cask loading inspection results to Mr. S. Sharp, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
60855.1
ALARA Plans
Radiation Protection Job Plan 2020 Dry Cask 45, 46, 47
Work
Revision 0
Radiation Work Permit 205000
Revision 0
Calculations
2911.54-SC-10
Design of Buried Electrical Ducts Subjected to Cask
Transporter Loading
Revision 1
2018-03457
Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for
Loading Associated with New Cask Transporter
Revision 0
Calc. No. 03457
Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for
Loading Associated with New Cask Transporter
2/16/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Selected Corrective Action Documents Created Since
April 2018
Issue ID
501000023147
ISFSI Concrete Strength Greater than ISAR
2/14/2019
Issue ID
501000034318
ISFSI Dose Calc Incorrect Berm Height
11/04/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Issue ID
501000041017
ISFSI INS: Question 21 Response Time
05/28/2020
Issue ID
501000041018
Lesson Learned Observation of CASK 47
05/28/2020
Issue ID
501000041059
NRC ID's Steps Not Signed in PE
05/28/2020
Issue ID
501000041074
NRC ID's Signoffs in PM Not Transferred
05/28/2020
Issue ID
501000041132
New Cask Transporter Revise Evaluation
05/29/2020
Miscellaneous
2.48 Evaluation
No. 1146
PINGP ISFSI Expansion Calculation Methodology
Departures
Revision 0
2.48 Evaluation
No. 1150
PINGP ISFSI Expansion: AB-5 Procedure and Dose Scaling
Approach Evaluation
Revision 0
2.48 Screening
No. 5565
Revision 0
2.48 Screening
EC60100001234; PINGP ISFSI New CTV
Revision 0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
No. 5640
2.48 Screening
No. 5641
EC 60100001234; PINGP ISFSI New CTV
Revision 0
2.48 Screening
No. 5652
EC601000002176; Sensitivity Analysis for Drop Eval of
TN40HT
Revision 0
2.48 Screening
No. 5659
EC 601000002232 - Revise Calculation TN40HT-0512
Revision 0
Cask No. 47
Cask Inventory Verification
05/26/2020
D95.1
Cask Inventory Verification
05/26/2020
D95.1 Appendix A Cask Loading Report
05/26/2020
FP-MA-COM-02
Supplemental Worker Oversight Plan
01/17/2020
OP-2014-002
Prairie Island Dry Fuel Storage Project Oversight Plan
Revision 5
Sample ID: SFP
0706 and 0715
Spent Fuel Pool Boric Acid
05/26/2020
NDE Reports
BOP-PT-20-015
and BOP-MT-20-
2008
TN-40 Special Lift Fixture
04/23/2020
Procedures
AB-5
Buried Cask
Revision 3
D95.1
TN-40 Cask Loading Procedure
Revision 32
D95.10
Tracked Cast Transporter Vehicle Operation
Revision 0
D95.3
TN-40 Cask Removal and Storage Procedure
Revision 39
SP 1075.HT
TN-40HT Fuel Selection and Identification
Revision 4
Radiation
Surveys
Survey PI-M-
200521-9
Cask 46 Transferred to ISFSI Pad #41
05/21/2020
Self-Assessments
2019 Nuclear Oversight Prairie Island Nuclear Generating
Plant Audit of Programs
10/01/2019
Master Lessons Learned Cask 41-44
05/03/2018
600000598736
Snapshot 2020 NRC Inspection
2/28/2020
CR No.
603000004605
Fleet Cask Loading Challenge Board
04/09/2020
QF0406
20 ISFSI NRC Inspection Snapshot
2/28/2020
Work Orders
SP1077 Special Lift Fixture TN-40 Cask
04/17/2020
AUX Building Crane Mechanical/Electrical Inspection
2/25/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SP 1057 TN-40 Fuel Selection & Identification
03/17/2020
SP1076 ISFSI Qtr Sfty Status
03/16/2020
Drawings
NF-39252
Flow Diagram, Caustic Addition System, Units 1 and 2
Revision 83
Procedures
C1.1.7-1
Unit 1 Reactor Control Checklist
Revision 10
Procedures
C5-1
Rod Control System Checklist
Revision 10
C6-1
System Prestart Checklist Rod Position Indication System
Revision6
Calculations
ENG-ME-732
Determination of HELB/Flooding Interactions in the Turbine
Building
Revision 1
ENG-ME-759
GOTHIC Internal Flooding Calculation for the Turbine
Building
Revision 1
Procedures
TP 1398
Internal Flooding Walkdown
Revision 10
Miscellaneous
Prairie Island Maintenance Rule Basis Document
04/20/2020
Procedures
FP-E-MR-03
Maintenance Rule Monitoring
Revision 8
FP-E-MR-05
Maintenance Rule Expert Panel
Revision 8
MSIP 5015
Swagelok Compression Tubing Fittings
Revision 4
RPIP 3655
Sampling Unit 2 Pressurizer
Revision 9
Replace Valve and Fittings as Needed
Revision 0
Corrective Action
Documents
501000039494
CFCU Damper Past Operability Review
05/04/2020
501000039494
FCU Damper Did Not Reposition
04/08/2020
501000039981
PMT Planning Issues on 2SM-5-4
04/23/2020
501000040177
DDCLP Jacket Water Hose Leak POR
05/06/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
501000040177
Coolant Leak of 22 DDCLP Jacket Cooling
05/01/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
501000039981
PMT Planning Issues on 2SM-5-4
04/23/2020
Procedures
SP 1089A
RHR Quarterly Pump and Valve Test
05/08/2020
SP 1089A
Train A RHR Pump and Suction Valve From RWST Quarterly
Test
Revision 32
SP 1856
Bus 26 Undervoltage Test
04/28/2020
SP 1856
Monthly 4kV Bus 16 Undervoltage Relay Test (OMICRON)
Revision 9
71151
Procedures
MSPI High Pressure Injection Data 2Q19 through 1Q20
04/22/2020
FP-E-MSPI-01
Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI)
Revision 10