IR 05000282/2001018
| ML020170480 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/2002 |
| From: | Lanksbury R Division Reactor Projects III |
| To: | Nazar M Nuclear Management Co |
| Ray S | |
| References | |
| IR-01-018 | |
| Download: ML020170480 (25) | |
Text
January 17, 2002
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/01-18; 50-306/01-18
Dear Mr. Nazar:
On December 29, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on December 27, 2001, with Mike Werner and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No findings of significance were identified.
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories, and although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of your response to these advisories and your ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat (DBT). From these audits, the NRC has concluded that your security program is adequate at this time. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, Original signed by Roger D. Lanksbury Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-282/01-18; 50-306/01-18
REGION III==
Docket Nos:
50-282, 50-306 License Nos:
50-282/01-18; 50-306/01-18 Licensee:
Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Location:
1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Dates:
November 16 through December 29, 2001 Inspectors:
S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector S. Thomas, Resident Inspector D. Karjala, Resident Inspector D. McNeil, Senior Operations Specialist Approved by:
Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000282-01-18; IR 05000306-01-18, on 11/16-12/29/2001; Nuclear Management Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2, Resident Inspector and Licensed Operator Requalification Program Report.
This report covers a 6-week routine resident inspection and an inspection of the licensed operator requalification program. The inspections were conducted by resident inspectors and a senior operations specialist. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation.
A.
Inspector-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period except that power was reduced to about 40 percent on December 2-3, 2001, for quarterly turbine valve testing. Unit 2 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns and document reviews to verify that the risk significant systems were adequately protected against impending cold weather. The residents concentrated on the condensate storage tank (CST) heating system, the instrument air compressor cooling system, and the ventilation systems for the emergency and security diesel generator rooms. The inspectors used the licensee checklists and procedures listed at the end of this inspection report to verify that the systems were lined up as required. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition reports (CRs) and work orders (WOs) listed at the end of this report to verify that the licensee had entered problems identified with cold weather operations into the corrective action system and was taking the appropriate compensatory actions.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a walkdown of the 21 shield building ventilation train to verify that the redundant train was in the correct lineup while the 22 shield building ventilation train was inoperable due to a failed surveillance test. The inspectors used the checklist and drawing listed at the end of this report to determine the correct lineup. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding WOs and CRs associated with the 21 train to verify that these documents did not reveal issues that could affect train function.
Significant WOs and CRs reviewed are listed at the end of this report. The inspectors used the information in the sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and Technical Specifications (TSs) listed at the end of this report to determine the functional requirements of the system. During the walkdown, the inspectors also observed the
material condition of the equipment to verify that there were no significant conditions not already in the licensees work control system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Area Walkdowns a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and on the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed at the end of this report, the inspectors walked down the areas to verify that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use, that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits, and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition.
The following areas were inspected:
!
Fire Area 41: screenhouse ground floor, elevation 670';
!
Fire Area 41: plant screenhouse, elevation 695';
!
Fire Area 35: 21 battery room, elevation 695'; and
!
Fire Area 36: 22 battery room, elevation 695'.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Fire Brigade Drill a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the performance of a fire brigade drill in the Unit 1 hydrogen seal oil area. This area was considered risk significant because a fire could cause a unit trip initiating event. The inspectors observed the initial response of the control room operators to the fire alarm, the brigade turnout and organization in the brigade dressing area, and the establishment of communications between the brigade and the control room. The inspectors also observed the fire brigades response to the simulated fire, the brigade leaders command and control, and the brigades use of fire fighting
equipment. At the conclusion of the drill, the inspectors observed the licensees drill critique to ensure that any weaknesses noted during the drill were addressed and/or entered into the licensees corrective action system. In addition to the NRC inspection procedure listed above, the inspectors used the licensees Fire Drill Criteria Checklist and other documents listed at the end of this report for the evaluation.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)
.1 Facility Operating History a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the plants operating history from January 2000 through November 2001, to assess whether the Licensed Operator Requalification Training (LORT) program had addressed operator performance deficiencies noted at the plant.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Licensee Requalification Examinations a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a biennial inspection of the licensees LORT program. The inspectors reviewed the annual requalification operating and written examination material to evaluate general quality, construction, and difficulty level. The operating portion of the examination was inspected during December 3 - 7, 2001. The operating examination material consisted of two dynamic simulator scenarios and five job performance measures (JPMs). The biennial written examination was administered between September 28 and November 2, 2001. The biennial written examination material included approximately 35 open reference, multiple-choice questions on each examination. The inspectors reviewed the methodology for developing the examinations, including the LORT program two-year sample plan, probabilistic risk assessment insights, previously identified operator performance deficiencies, and plant modifications. The inspectors assessed the level of examination material duplication during the current year annual examinations with last years annual examinations. The inspectors also interviewed members of the licensees management and training staff and discussed various aspects of the examination development.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Licensee Administration of Requalification Examinations a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the administration of the requalification operating test to assess the licensees effectiveness in conducting the test and to assess the facility evaluators ability to determine adequate performance using objective, measurable performance standards. The inspectors evaluated the performance of one operating shift crew and one administrative crew during two dynamic simulator scenarios and five JPMs in parallel with the facility evaluators. The inspectors observed the training staff personnel administering the operating test, including pre-examination briefings, observations of operator performance, individual and crew evaluations after dynamic scenarios, techniques for JPM cuing, and the final evaluation briefing for licensed operators. The inspectors noted the performance of the simulator to support the examinations. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees overall examination security program.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Licensee Training Feedback System a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the methods and effectiveness of the licensees processes for revising and maintaining its LORT program up-to-date, including the use of feedback from plant events and industry experience information. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel (operators, instructors, training management, and operations management) and reviewed the applicable licensees procedures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensees quality assurance/quality control oversight activities, including the licensees training department self-assessment reports, to evaluate the licensees ability to assess the effectiveness of its LORT program and to implement appropriate corrective actions.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Licensee Remedial Training Program a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of the remedial training conducted during the annual requalification examinations to ensure that the training addressed weaknesses identified in licensed operator performance. The inspectors reviewed the licensees current examination cycle remediation packages for unsatisfactory operator performance on the written examination to ensure that
remediation and subsequent re-evaluations were completed prior to returning individuals to licensed duties.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Conformance with Operator License Conditions a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the facility and individual operator licensees' conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55. The inspectors reviewed the facility licensees program for maintaining active operator licenses to assess compliance with 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f). The inspectors reviewed the procedural guidance for tracking on-shift hours for licensed operators and designating which control room positions were granted credit for maintaining active operator licenses. The inspectors also reviewed 20 licensed operators medical records maintained by the facility to ensure the medical fitness of its licensed operators and to assess compliance with medical standards delineated in ANSI/ANS-3.4 and with 10 CFR 55.21 and 10 CFR 55.25. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensees LORT program to assess compliance with the requalification program requirements as described by 10 CFR 55.59(c).
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Written Examination and Operating Test Results a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the pass/fail results of individual written tests, operating tests, and simulator operating tests (required to be given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2))
administered by the licensee during calender year 2001.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed systems to verify that the licensee properly implemented the maintenance rule for structures, systems, or components (SSCs) with performance problems. This evaluation included the following aspects:
!
whether the SSC was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
!
whether the performance problem constituted a maintenance rule functional failure;
!
the proper safety significance classification;
!
the proper 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification for the SSC; and
!
the appropriateness of the performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).
The above aspects were evaluated by using the maintenance rule scoping and report documents listed at the end of this report. For each SSC reviewed, the inspectors also reviewed significant WOs and CRs listed at the end of this report to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered in the licensees corrective action system.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the following SSCs:
!
!
D1 and D2 emergency diesel generators.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities or activities during a time when more than one significant system or train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration, where practical, and that contingency plans were in place, where appropriate. The licensees daily configuration risk assessments, observations of shift turnover meetings, observations of daily plant status meetings, and the documents listed at the end of this report were used by the inspectors to verify that the equipment configurations had been properly listed, that protected equipment had been identified and was being controlled where appropriate, and that significant aspects of plant risk were being communicated to the necessary personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance activities:
!
planning and actions to monitor and increase the seal leakoff flow from the 22 reactor coolant pump, and
!
planning and work control associated with the work on breaker for MV-32238.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors selected CRs for risk significant components and systems in which the operability issues were discussed. These CRs were evaluated to determine whether the operability of the components and systems was justified. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and USAR to the licensees evaluations presented in the CRs below and documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were necessary to maintain operability, the inspectors reviewed of the documents listed at the end of the report to verify that the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were properly controlled.
The CRs evaluated were:
!
CR 200186696, Lineshaft and Suction Bell Float Switches for the 12 Diesel-Driven Cooling Water Pump Are Stuck in the 90-100 Percent Flow Position - No Alarm Will Sound on Loss of Flow, and
!
CR 200186163, Evaluate Westinghouse 9 November 01 Letter for Effect on Plant.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)
.1 Review of Selected Workarounds a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed an operator workaround associated with the safety injection mini recirculation line flowmeters being out-of-service. This review was performed to determine whether a mitigating system function of the operators ability to implement abnormal operating procedures was affected. This workaround was selected because with the flowmeters out-of service, the safety injection mini-recirculation line Lo/No flow alarms were also out-of-service. This workaround represented a potential increase in the possibility of safety injection pump damage because of the resultant increased reliance on operator actions to identify that adequate pump discharge or bypass flow existed, subsequent to a pump start, and to secure the pump before pump damage occurred.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Cumulative Effects of Operator Workarounds a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect of all identified operator workarounds to determine whether the cumulative conditions had a significant impact on plant risk or on the operators ability to respond to a transient or an accident.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating and support systems to ensure that the testing adequately verified system operability and functional capability with consideration of the actual maintenance performed. The inspectors used the appropriate sections of the TSs and the USAR, as well as the documents listed at the end of this report, to evaluate the scope of the maintenance and verify that the post-maintenance testing performed adequately demonstrated that the maintenance was successful and that operability was restored. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
Testing subsequent to the following activities was observed and evaluated:
!
2RX bus fault repair; and
!
operational testing of MV-32085 [Motor-Operated Valve for Refueling Water Storage Tank to 12 Residual Heat Removal Pump] subsequent to planned maintenance on its electrical supply breaker.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance testing and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment tested using the surveillance procedures (SPs) met TSs, the
USAR, and licensee procedural requirements, and also demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety functions. The activities were selected based on their importance in verifying mitigating systems capability. The inspectors used the documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the testing met the TS frequency requirements; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the procedures, including establishing the proper plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test acceptance criteria were met; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded. In addition, the inspectors conducted reviews to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
The following tests were observed and evaluated:
!
SP 1112, Steam Exclusion Monthly Damper Test, and
!
SP 2088B, Train B Safety Injection Quarterly Test.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a.
Inspection Scope On December 4, 2001, the inspectors observed licensee requalification examinations in the control room simulator. During the examinations, the inspectors observed the licensee make three event classifications and three notifications. Protective action recommendations were not required nor made. The inspectors attended the licensee evaluators critique of the examinations to ensure that any weaknesses were documented and addressed.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed for completeness and accuracy the PI data submitted by the licensee for the Emergency AC [alternating current] Power Systems PI in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors compared the data reported by the licensee to the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 1. The inspectors reviewed the computerized Limiting Conditions for Operation Log, Control Room Log, and Hold and Secure Card Log to gather information regarding unavailable times for the
emergency diesel generators, and compared those times to the data reported by the licensee.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup (71153)
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 2-01-03, Revision 1 and (Closed) LER 2-01-03, Revision 2: Technical Specification Required Shutdown of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of Both Emergency Diesel Generators.
This event was discussed in Special Inspection Report 50-306/01-13. The event is considered to be of very low risk significance based on the results of a Regulatory Conference documented in NRC letter to Mr. Mano Nazar dated December 11, 2001.
.2 (Closed) LER 1-01-03: Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies.
This event report described a licensee-identified condition where 16 of 17 flood panels, which are installed during a flood condition where water level crest is predicted to exceed 692' elevation, were degraded. The issues included not having the correct gasket materials, inadequate anchor bolt installation capabilities, and the inability to install the panels in a timely manner.
The SDP Phase 1 screening assumed the loss of long-term reactor heat removal capability. Since the plant-specific SDP Phase 2 worksheets do not currently include initiating events related to the licensees Individual Plant Examination of External Events analysis (i.e., external flooding), a Phase 3 risk assessment was completed using information from the IPEEE.
Based on the assessment, it was determined that the issue was of very low risk significance (Green) due to the low probability of an external flooding event that reached the 695' elevation, the use of existing procedures that monitored areas vital to critical plant equipment, and the sufficient amount of time (five days) the licensee had after the external flooding conditions began to successfully complete compensatory actions prior to reaching the 695' elevation. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action system as CR 20015571.
4OA6 Meeting(s)
Exit Meeting The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Werner and other members of licensee management on December 27, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
Interim Exit Meeting Senior Official at Exit:
Mano Nazar, Site Vice President Date:
December 7, 2001 Proprietary (explain yes)
No Subject:
Results of an inspection of the licensees licensed operator requalification program Change to Inspection Findings:
No
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee T. Allen, General Superintendent Plant Operations T. Amundson, General Superintendent Engineering T. Breene, Manager Nuclear Performance Assessment B. Jefferson, Director Site Operations A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry L. Meyer, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance M. Nazar, Site Vice President J. Waddell, Superintendent Security M. Werner, Plant Manager L. Williams, Director Site Engineering NRC S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector, Prairie Island LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None.
Closed 2-01-03 Revision 1 LER Technical Specification Required Shutdown of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of Both Emergency Diesel Generators (Section 4OA3.1)
2-01-03 Revision 2 LER Technical Specification Required Shutdown of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of Both Emergency Diesel Generators (Section 4OA3.1)
1-01-03 LER Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies (Section 4OA3.2)
Discussed None.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USES AC Alternating Current ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System ANS American National Standard ARP Annunciator Response Procedure CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report CST Condensate Storage Tank DRS Division of Reactor Safety DRP Division of Reactor Projects ICPM Instrumentation and Controls Preventive Maintenance IMC Inspection Manual Chapter IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IR
Inspection Report
LER
Licensee Event Report
Licensed Operator Requalification Training
Loss of Coolant Accident
Non-Cited Violation
NOMS
Nuclear Operations Management System
NEI
Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Publicly Available Records
Performance Indicator
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
PITC
Prairie Island Training Center
Reactor Coolant Pump
Systems Approach to Training
Small-Break Loss of Coolant Accident
Significance Determination Process
Surveillance Procedure
Senior Reactor Operator
Structure, System, or Component
Temperature Controller
TCN
Temporary Change Notice
Test Procedure
TS
Technical Specification
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Updated Safety Analysis Report
Work Order
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1R01
Adverse Weather Protection
TP [Test Procedure] 1637
Winter Plant Operation
Revision 28
System Prestart Checklist
C28-11
CST Winter Operation
Revision 8
Operating Procedure
C28.6
Condensate Storage Tank Freeze
Protection System
Revision 9
TC [temperature controller]-26300 is not
Working
121 Spent Fuel Pool Makeup Air Handler
Snow Buildup
Fabricate Metal Cover for Control Switch
CR 20010134
11 Condensate Recycle Pump Found in
Auto/Off Rendering CST Freeze Protection
Out-of-Service
CR 20011227
C28.6 Condensate Storage Tank Freeze
Protection System Does Not Address Unit
1/Unit 2 CST Temperature Control Valves
CV-31959 and 31957
CR 20010022
Auxiliary Building and Spent Fuel Pool
Makeup Air Handlers Regularly Build Up
With Snow During Winter and No
Procedures for Dealing With It
1R04
Equipment Alignment
Integrated Checklist
C19.2-6
Shield Building Ventilation System Unit 2
Revision 9
Drawing NF-39602-2
Reactor Building Unit 2 Ventilation Flow
Diagram
Revision AP
Operating Procedure
2C19.2
Containment System Ventilation Unit 2
Revision 7
Operations Manual B19
Containment Systems
Revision 5
USAR Section 5.3
Secondary Containment System
Revision 22
Shield Building Ventilation System
Revision 91
Emergency Charcoal Filter Systems
Revision 126
Humidity Sensor Not Working
Status Panel Lights Lit Unexpectedly
CR 20001580
Auxiliary Building and Shield Building
Ventilation System Charcoal Ignition
Temperature Stated in the USAR is
Incorrect
CR 200185163
During lCPM [Instrumentation and Controls
Preventive Maintenance] 2-018 Found the
Unit 2 Shield Building Ventilation Particulate
and Charcoal Filter Humidity Sensor Not
Working - No Spares - They Are Obsolete
1R05
Fire Protection
Area Walkdowns
Plant Safety Procedure
F5
Fire Fighting
Revision 25
Plant Safety Procedure
F5 Appendix F
Fire Hazard Analysis
Revision 12
Plant Safety Procedure
F5 Appendix A
Fire Strategies
Revision 8
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001
Appendix B
Internal Fires Analysis
Revision 2
F5 Appendix D
Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room
Revision 6
Fire Brigade Drill
Fire Drill 2001-04
Unit 1 Hydrogen Seal Oil Area
Plant Safety Procedure
F5
Appendix J
Fire Drills
Revision 7
Plant Safety Procedure
F5
Appendix A
Fire Detection Zone 4
Revision 7
CR 200186895
Conduct of Fire Drill
1R11
Licensed Operator Requalification
PITC Q-96
Job Performance Measure Summary Sheets
(10 Operators)
Revision 7
PITC Q-203
Training Cycle Simulator Team Evaluation
(2 Crews) plan
Revision 1
Meeting Minutes
Operations PAC Committee Meeting Notes
Various
Simulator Guide
NIS Failure/Charging Pump Trip/RCP Seal
Failure/RPS Failure/SBLOCA
Revision 13
Simulator Guide
Steam Generator Tube Rupture w/Loss of
1R Transformer
Revision 0
Simulator Guide
Loss of Bus Duct Cooling/Accumulator
Inleakage/Loss of All AC/SBLOCA
Revision 4
Job Performance
Measures
Thirty Job Performance Measures of
Various Titles Used for this Examination
Various
Written Examinations
Written Examinations Administered to All
Licensed Operators During Examination
Weeks
Various
Medical Records
Medical Records for Twenty Randomly
Selected Operators
Various
Prairie Island Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report, Section 14.5.4, Steam Generator
Tube Rupture
Revision 22
SWI-0-43
Operator Qualification Program
Revision 1
SWI 0-39
Operations Training Plan
Revision 6
CR 20000885
Perform a Self-Assessment of Operations
Training
March 31, 2000
Self-Evaluation
INPO Accreditation Renewal Self-Evaluation
Report
September 6,
2001
P9100
Program Description for License
Requalification Training
Revision 17
Training Procedure
NRC Exam Security Training Procedure
3.10
Revision 8
PITC 3.7
License Requalification Examination
Development and Administration
Revision 10
1R12
Maintenance Rule Implementation
General
2000 Equipment Performance Annual
Report
April 20, 2001
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document,
Volume 1A
Revision 3
Quarterly Equipment Performance Report -
3nd Quarter 2001
November 13,
2001
Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline
for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants
Revision 2
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance
at Nuclear Power Plants
Revision 2
Circulating Water
CR 20017973
Intake Approach Canal Indicates Canal Is
Slowly Filling In With Silt That May Affect
Water Intake to the Plant
CR 20017497
MV-32001, 11 Circulating Pump Discharge
Valve Operation
CR 20002892
Problems Identified During Surveillance
Procedure 1293, Flood Preparation Flood
Control Panel Inspection/Installation
24 Traveling Screen Does Not Rotate
Repair Control Valve for 22 Traveling
Screen
Traveling Screens Start and Stop
Independent of Control Switch Position
23 Traveling Screen Making Abnormal
Noises
24 Traveling Screen Wash Water Control
Valve Leaking By
Instrument Block Valve for 13 Traveling
Screen Spray Wash Pressure Switch Needs
Rebuild
Adjust Limit Switches on MV-32005 [1B
Condenser Circulating Water Crossover
Motor Valve], Inspect Seats
21 Traveling Screen Noise
23 Traveling Screen Making Noise
Repair SV-33140 [22 Traveling Screen
Spray Wash Solenoid Valve]
D1 and D2 Emergency Diesel Generators
CR 200186961
D1 Air Start Regulator Diaphragm Seems
To Have Failed When Valved In
CR 20018377
Removal Of Maintenance Resources During
D1 18 Month Planned Maintenance Caused
4 to 5 Hour Delay In Restoration For This
LCO Job
CR 20018181
Eddy Current Testing Located Tubes To Be
Plugged In D1 Oil Cooler And Jacket
Coolant Heat Exchanger
CR 20017414
SP 1093 Completed Unsat Due To Failure
Of Ventilation Fans To Start
CR 20015360
Parts Traceability to End Use Lost Because
They Were Charged To The Wrong Work
Order
CR 20012100
SP 1093 Interrupted Due To Smoke From
Penetration 472 Flammastic On Asbestos
Insulation Smouldered Due To Exhaust
Heat
CR 20003871
Installed New Seals On The Pumps For
Both D1 and D2 Standby Coolant
Recirculation Pumps
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control
Prairie Island Action Plan
Actions To Mitigate Reactor Coolant Pump
Seal Leak Off Rate For 22 RCP
Revision 2
Temporary Instruction 01-
101
Unit 2 Volume Control Alternate Dilute Path
Instructions
Abnormal Operating
Procedure 2C3 AOP3
Failure Of A Reactor Coolant Pump Seal
Revision 8
Operating Procedure
C12.1
Letdown, Charging, And Seal Water
Injection
Revision 27
1R15
Operability Evaluations
CR 200186696
Lineshaft and Suction Bell Float Switches
for the 12 Diesel-Driven Cooling Water
Pump are Stuck in the 90-100 Percent Flow
Position - No Alarm Will Sound on Loss of
Flow
USAR Section 10.4.1
Cooling Water System
Revision 22
Cooling Water System
Revision 131
Temporary Instruction 01-
105
Unit 1 Cooling Water
December 4, 2001
Temporary Change
Notice (TCN) 2001-2010
to Annunciator Response
Procedure (ARP) 47020-
0207
12 Cooling Water Pump (Diesel) Running
Revision 27
TCN 2001-2011 to
Operating Procedure C35
Cooling Water System
Revision 43
TCN 2001-2012 to Prairie
Island Nuclear Generating
Plant (PINGP)195
Turbine Building Data - Unit 1
Revision 62
ARP 47020-0608
12 Cooling Water Pump (Diesel) Loss of
Bearing Water Flow
Revision 30
CR 200186163
Evaluate Westinghouse 9 November 01
Letter for Effect on Plant
CR 200186164
Review Need for Changing Annunciator
Response Procedure/Setpoints for
Accumulator High/Low Pressure Based on
Results of CR 200186163
CR 200186166
Implement Interim Controls to Ensure
Accumulator Pressures are Maintained 740
+/- 20 Vice 740 +/- 30 as Allowed by TS
CR 200186167
Review Need to Revise TSs Based Upon
Results of CR 200186163
CR 200186168
Review Past Operating History for
Reportability Due to New Accumulator
Pressure Limits in CR 200186163 Letter and
TS Nonconservatism
Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal
Systems
Revision 161
USAR Section 6.2
Safety Injection System
Revision 22
USAR Section 14.6
Large Break LOCA [Loss of Coolant
Accident] Analysis
Revision 22
1R16
Operator Workarounds
CR 20003741
Safety Injection Mini Recirculation Flow
Failure
CR 20010354
Equipment Problems Were Encountered
During Installation of the Safety Injection
Mini Recirculation Flow Meters
Install New Safety Injection Recirculation
Flowmeters
Install New Safety Injection Mini
Recirculation Line Flowmeters
Replace Safety Injection Miniflow
Transducers
Temporary Instruction
01-08
Safety Injection Mini Recirculation Line
LO/NO Flow Out-Of-Service
The 4th Quarter of 2001 Report on Operator
Workarounds and Aggregate Assessment of
Operator Workarounds
1R19
Post-Maintenance Testing
CR 200185959
Investigation of 2RX Bus Duct Following
Lockout of 2RX Transformer Revealed Fault
and Raises Questions on 2RY Bus Duct
CR 200185890
2RX Transformer Locked Out
CR 200186230
Re-insulate the Outdoor Portion of 2RX Bus
With 15 KV Insulating Sleeve.
CR 200186232
Ensure Moisture Abatement Systems Are
Properly Installed and Functioning on 2RX
Bus Duct
CR 200186233
Ensure Good Electrical Connection at the
Splice Points of 2 RX Bus That Had Been
Disassembled for Insulation System Repair
CR 200186234
Perform Inservice Testing of Plant Busses
Using Radio Frequency Monitoring
Technique
2RX/300 Bus Duct Inspection
2RX Transformer and Bus Duct Post
Maintenance Testing
Test Operability of the 2 RX Bus Duct
Heater
PE-121J-4, Breaker Electrical 5 Year
Planned Maintenance, MV-32085
P32085 12 Residual Heat Removal Pump
Suction From Refueling Water Storage
Tank D70 Inspection
1R22
Surveillance Testing
SP 1112
Steam Exclusion Monthly Damper Test
Revision 40
SP 1117
Monthly Steam Exclusion Check Damper
Test
Revision 8
Steam Exclusion System
Revision 91
TS Table 4.1-1C
Miscellaneous Instrumentation Surveillance
Requirements
Revision 121
Steam Exclusion System
Revision 91
TS Table 3.5-1
Engineered Safety Features Initiation
Instrument Limiting Set Points
Revision 44
Administrative Work
Instruction 5AWI 8.7.0
Foreign Material Exclusion Program
Description
Revision 3
USAR Appendix I,
Section 4.2
Steam Exclusion Boundaries
Revision 23
CR 19992037
Damper Gear Integrity
SP 2088B
Train B Safety Injection Quarterly Test
Revision 0
TCN 2001-2036
Train B Safety Injection Quarterly Test
Revision 0
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline
Revision 1
4OA3 Event Followup
LER 2-01-03
Technical Specification Required Shutdown
of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of
Both Emergency Diesel Generators
Revision 1
LER 2-01-03
Technical Specification Required Shutdown
of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of
Both Emergency Diesel Generators
Revision 2
NRC Letter from G. Grant
to Final Significance Determination for
Preliminary White Finding; (NRC Inspection
Report 50-306/01-13) (Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant, Unit 2)
November 11,
2001
LER 1-01-03
Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood
Panel Deficiencies