IR 05000010/1978017

IE Insp Repts 50-010/78-17,50-237/78-15 & 50-249/78-17 on 780508 & 09.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Commitments Re Items of Noncompliance Associated w/761228 Event at Unit 2 & Short Period Events at Quad Cities

ML19338E342
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	06/05/1978
From:	Creswell J, Streeter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19338E341	List: IR 05000010/1978017 ML19338E340
References
50-010-78-17, 50-10-78-17, 50-237-78-15, 50-249-78-17, NUDOCS 8009250528
Download: ML19338E342 (4)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOP.Y COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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REGION III

Report No. 50-10/78-17; 50-237/78-15; 50-249/78-17 Docket No. 50-10; 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-02, DPR-19, DPR-25 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Ct,1cago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, 3 Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted: May 8 and 9, 1978 T

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Inspector:

J. S. Creswell

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Approved By:

J. F. Streeter, Chief

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Nuclear Support Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on May 8 and 9, 1978 (Reports No. 50-10/78-17; 50-237/78-15; 50-249/78-17)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of commitments made with regard to items of noncompliance associated with the December 28 short period event which occurred at Unit 2 and commitments made in association with short period events that occurred at the Quad-Cities facility. The inspection involved seven inspection-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted

• A.

Roberts, Assistant Station Superintendent

• D.

Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor

• G.

Readanz, QA Coordinator

• T. Rausch, Lead Nuclear Engineer

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• Donates those attending the exit interview.

2.

Corrective Actions Associated With The Dresden Unit 2, December 28, 1976 Event The inspector reviewed corrective p7tions as delineated in a CECO response to items of noncompliance-is.c:d as a result of the aforementioned event. Corrective actions associated with the commitments to revise procedures were reviewed. The following procedures were inspected for compliance with the com=itments:

DGP l-1 Unit 2/3 Normal Unit Startup DGP 3-4 Control Rod Movements - Control Rod Sequences

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DCA 7 Unplanned Reactivity Additions

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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during the review.

3.

Corrective Actions Associated With The Quad-Cities May 4 and 7, 1977 Events Theinspectoryeviewedcorrectiveactionsasdelineated'ina

CECO response-to items of noncompliance issued as a result of the aforementioned events. The area reviewed was the commitment to review and reevaluate all station procedu;es involving control rod movement to determine the distinction between responsibilities of supervision, technical direction, and operators. As a result

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of the licensee's review and reevaluation the following procedures were revised:

DTP 8271 Rev. 1, Guidelines for Control Rod Sequence Development DTS 8250 Rev. 2, Nuclear Engineer's Pre-startup Surveillance DGA 7 Rev.1, Unplanned Reactivity Additions i

DGP 3-4 Rev. 3, Control Rod Movements - Control Rod Sequences 1/

Ltr, Bolger to Thornburg, dtd 7/7/77.

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Ler, Bolger to Thornburg, dtd 8/16/77.

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DGP l-1 Unit 2/3 Normal Unit Startup

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DOP 300-14 Control Rod Drive System Drive Replacement

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.DFP 800-1 Rev. 1, Master Refueling Procedure DTS 300-1 Rev. 2 Technical Staff Responsibility;for Control Rod Drive Maintenance and Testing DTS 300-2 Rev 3, Control Rod Drive Scram Testing and Scram Valve Timing Test Unit 1 DTS 300-3 Control Rod Drive Friction and Scram Test Calibration and Equipment Set-up DTS 300-5 Rev. 2, Control Rod Drive Timing Test (W/0 Process Computer)

DTS 300-6 Rev. 2, Control Rod Drive Friction Testing Unit 1 DTS 8101 Rev. 1, Verification of Control Rod Blade Drive Following Unit 1 DTS 8104 Rev. 1. D-1 Shutdown Margin Demonstration Unit 1 DTS 8105 Rev. 1, Moderator Temperature Coefficient Checklist

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Unit 1 DTS 8106 Rev. O, Development of Control Rod Drive Movement

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Unit 1 DTS 8108 Rev. 1, S.R.M. Response Unit 1 DTS 8111 Rev. 1, Shutdown Margin Verification DTS 8134 Rev. 3, Units 2/3 Shutdown Margin Demonstration DTS 8137 Rev. 1, Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity DTS 8141 Rev. 1, Initial Critt ality Comparison D 2/3 DTS 8154 Rev. 1, Control Rod Following and LPRM Operability Verification DTS 8250 Eev. 1, Nuclear Engineer's Pre-Startup Surveillance DGP 1-2 Rev. 9, March 1978 Unit 2/3 Startup to Hot Standby DGP 3-1 Rev. 2, Routine Power Changes DOS 300-1 Rev. 2, Daily / Weekly Control Rod Drive Exercise Procedure DGA 7 required the following subsequent operator actions to be taken following an unpredicted reactivity addition:

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Conduct an investigation of the unpredicted reactivity addition

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prior to resuming normal operation. The investigation should

include:

a.

Tht cause of the reactivity addition.

b.

Any abnormal increase in offgas activity which resulted from the unpredicted reactivity addition.

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c.

Corrective action to be taken to avoid any similar unpre-dicted reactivity addition when resuming normal operation.

d.

Review the reactivity addition and subsequent transient for possible Technical Specification violations.

Procedure DTS 8134, Units 2/3 Shutdown Margin Demonstration, did not include specification of who decides the method to be used to demonstrate the shutdown margin and if criticality is to be attained during the demonstration. In addition, the procedure did not address informing the operator if criticality was to be experienced.

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Exit Intervirg

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The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the inspection findings. The following items were discussed.

a.

The delineation of responsibilities in Procedure DGA 7 with regard to actions to be taken after unpredicted I

reactivity additions (Paragarph 3).

b.

The delineation of responsibilities in Procedure DTS 8134 with regard to methods to be used.

The licensee stated they would revise Procedure DGA 7 to assign the review of unpredicted reactivity additions to the proper technical function. In addition, the licensee stated that Procedure DTS 8134 would be revised to (1) specify the individual responsible for deciding which shutdown margin demonstration method will be used, (2) address whether criti-cality is planned, and (3) require informing the operator if criticality is planned.

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