IR 05000010/1982021
| ML20028E946 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1983 |
| From: | Jordan M, Stasek S, Tongue T, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028E935 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-82-21, 50-10-82-21, 50-237-82-29, 50-249-82-30, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8301280289 | |
| Download: ML20028E946 (9) | |
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S U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
i Report No. 50-010/82-21(DPRP); 50-237/82-29(DPRP); 50-249/82-30(DPRP)
Docket No.50-010, 50-237, 50-249 License No. DPR-02, DPR-29, DPR-25 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted: October 30 through December 1, 1982 f$
f A. M. Tongu/s.
Inspectors:
e p - 7 83
[M h J. Jordan-7-85 i.
f$.Yf 6. Stasek i-1 - 83 Y4 Approved By:
R. D. Walker, Chief
/ b ~63 Projects Section 2C Inspection Summary l
Inspection on October 30 through December 1, 1982 (Report No. 50-010/82-21(DPRP);
l 50-237/d2-29(DPRP); 50-249/82-30(DPRP))
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Areas Inspected: Routine unannounted resident inspection of Followup on Previous Inspection Findings; Operational Safety Verification; Monthly Main-tenance Observation; ilonthly Surveillance Observation; Unusual Events; I.E.
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Bulletin Followup; Plant Trips; Receipt of New Fuel; and Inspection During Long Term Shutdown. The inspection involved a total of 189 inspector-hours
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onsite by 3 NRC inspectors including 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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l 8301200289 830110 PDR ADOCK 05000010
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Scott, Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Operations Assistant Superintendent J. Eenigenburg, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent
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Farrar, Administrative Services and Support Assistant Superintendent J. Brunner, Technical Staff Supervisor T. Ciesla, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor R. Rybak, Assistant Techaical Staff Supervisor J. Wujciga, Unit 1 Operating Engineer J. Almer, Unit 2 Operating Engineer M. Wright, Unit 3 Operating Engineer T. Blackman, Procedures Coordinator D. Nelson, Assistant Lead Nuclear Engineer D. Sharper, Acting Waste Systems Engineer G. Myrick, Radiation-Chemistry Supervisor B. Saunders, Station Security Administrator L. Williams, Quality Assurance Coordinator
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Stobert, Quality Assurance Auditor The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personnel.
- Denotes those attending one or more of the exit interviews conducted on November 10, 19, December 1, 1982, and at various other times throughout the period.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliances (10/79-19-02(DPRP), 10/79-25-01(DPRP) and 10/80-09-01(DPRP)): Eating, Smoking, Drinking, or Chewing in a Con-taminated Area. The licensee has taken steps to inform all personnel, including contractors, through the radiation protection training program, of the seriousness of preventing ingestion of redioactive materials.
Further specific instructions were sent out through the station news letter and guard patrols were used to curtail offenders. This resulted in several contractors' employees being dismissed.
These actions have i
apparently been effective in that routine observations by the inspectors l
have not revealed any recurrences. Contamination controls will continue to be observed as part of the routine resident inspection program.
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(Closed) Noncompliances (10/80-09-02(DPRP) and 10/80-09-03(DPRP)):
Failure to Have Adequate Contaminated Clothing Recepticles and Routine Pickup of Used Contaminated Clothing. The licensee has implemented a more active program whereby used Special Work Permit (SWP) clothing is picked up during each shift. The licensee has also placed appropriate
recepticles for used SWP clothing at step-off. pads.
Control of contam-inated clothing will continue to be reviewed as part of the routine inspection program.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (10/80-09-04(DPRP)): Combustible Material Left in the Unit 1 Reactor Building (Sphere). The licensee has taken actions including steps to increase perscnnel awareness to improve plant clean 11-ness as well as control flammable materials.
Subsequent inspections of the Unit I reactor building has shown an excellent improvement in the areas of cleanliness and painting. Plant cleanliness and combustible materials controls will continue to be observed as part of the routine resident inspection program.
(Closed) Noncompliance (249/81-02-01(DPRP)): Failure to Adequately Control Changes to an Outage. The licensee conducted specific retraining to the individual involved in this violation as well as adding this specific instruction to the routine six week training cycle for all shift personnel.
Subsequent observations by the inspectors have identified no recurrences.
(Closed) Noncompliance (249/81-08-01(DPRP)): Failure to Notify the Control Room When Sampling the Suppression Pool (Torus) Causing an Unexplained Alarm on the Reactor Panel 903-3.
The inspector verified that signs have been placed on sample valves directing the individual to inform the control room prior to sampling.
(Closed) Open Item (249/81-08-02(DPRP)): Different Procedures and Sample Locations for Sampling Suppression Pool Water. Discussions with licensee personnel indicate that differences in specific piping exist on each unit.
In order to acquire a representative sample from either unit, different procedures and sample points were devised.
(Closed) Noncompliance (237/81-17-01(DPRP)): Suppression Pool Maximum Allowable Level Exceeded During High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Testing. Technical Specification 3.7. A.1.f was changed to allow a six hour period to correct the Torus level when it is found out of its required range. This also applies to Unit 3.
(Closed) Noncompliance (237/81-13-01(DPRP)): Failure to Have Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (CRDH) Valves Positioned as Stated on Outage Form and Outage Tag.
The licensee immediately corrected the valves that were identified in the wrong position and admonished the individuals involved for failure to properly conduct a hands on verification.
Sub-sequent routine spot check observations by the inspectors have verified that safety related outages are as stated on the Outage Forms and Tags.
(Closed) Noncompliance (237/81-28-01(DPRP) and 249/81-21-01(DPRP)):
Failure to Follow Jumper and Lifted Lead Procedure. The licensee immediately corrected the items identified by the inspector and re-viewed the jumper and lifted lead log for further discrepancies. Some corrections were needed and made. No subsequent discrepencies have been identified.
(Closed) Open Items (237/81-28-02(DPRP) and 249/81-21-02(DPRP)): Lifted Electrical Leads from Modifications were not Taped to Prevent Confusion
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with Leads to be Reused. The licensee has taped and/or removed the lugs from lifted leads that are not intended for reuse.
(Closed) Open Items (237/81-28-03(DPRP) and 249/81-21-03(DPRP)): Failure to Shut a Valve Tagged Out of Service as Shut on a Nonsafety Related System. The corrective actions for this item are similar to corrective actions for Noncompliances 237/81-13-01(DPRP) and 249/81-02-01(DPRP),
except that non-safety systems do not require management verification.
Subsequent observations by the inspectors have revealed no further occurrences.
(Closed) Open Items (237/81-37-03(DPRP) and 249/81-29-03(DPRP)):
Licensee Investigations of Events Should be Conducted in Sufficient Depth to Address Generic or Related Affects. This matter was discussed during an NRC-CECO management meeting on December 23, 1981. Review of subsequent licensee event investigations has shown adequate depth. The example identified in the origional Open Item (Licensee Event Report 50-249/81-40) will be addressed in a subsequent inspection.
(Closed) Noncompliances (237/81-38-01(DPRP) and 249/81-31-01(DPRP)):
Combustible Materials Left in Diesel Generator Rooms Following Maintenance.
The licensee placed a "No Smoking" sign at the entrance of the Unit 2/3 diesel generator room and maintenance personnel were reminded of the station commitment to housekeeping / cleanliness requirements.
Subsequent review by the inspector has not revealed any recurrences. Combustible material controls will continue to be observed as part of the routine inspection program.
(0 pen) Noncompliances (237/82-06-01(DPRP) and 249/82-06-01(DPRP)):
Failure to Calibrate Rotometer for Standby Liquid Control System Pump Flow Surveillance.
The licensee wrote a temporary procedure and completed a one point flow calibration check on the rotometers for Units 2 and 3.
The long term corrective actions and permanent procedures are still under development.
This item remains open until the permanent corrective actions are imple-mented.
(Closed) Noncompliances (237/82-06-04(DPRP) and 249/82-06-04(DPRP)):
Failure to Address Training Related to NUREG-0737 Item II.B.4 on Mitigating Core Damage for Radiation Chemistry Technicians, Chemists,
and Instrument Machanics.
By letters dated June 18, 1982, and August 27, 1982, the licensee stated that training of those types of personnel
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l was completed by May 28, 1982. This was verified and found acceptable by the inspectors.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (237/82-08-03(DETI)): Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) Check Valve Slamming Evaluation. The Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) verified that licensee procedure DOS 1500-3, Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Test, was modified to lessen the impact of check valve slam by only running one CCSW pump at a time in a cooling
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loop. The SRI discussed licensee corrective actions with the Division of Engineering and Technical Inspection (DETI) inspector who identified the item. Final determination of the acceptability of the repair will be made by a piping specialist.
(Closed) Open Items (237/82-09-02(DPRP) and 249/82-10-02(DPRP)):
Pro-cedures Found with Errors, Unexplained Terms and Incorrect Formulas.
The licensee generated a station memoranda dated October 25, 1982, that upgraded the " Originator's Minimal Instructions Concerning Procedure Writing" which addresses the inspectors concerns. This document is to be placed in the Technical Staff Handbook for guidance in future procedure writing.
3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of October 30 through December 1,1982.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Units 2 and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. By observation and direct interview the inspectors verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
During the inspection period, the licensee reported several security related events to the inspector where evidence was found associating several individuals working at the Dresden station with the possession, use or sale of drugs.
In all cases, the findings occurred offsite and there was no indication of drug abuse, sale, or possession onsite. Some of the findings involved evidence of the use of marijuana found through urine tests during routine physicals. The tests are part of the li-censecs' drug awareness program that was implimented following allegations that were made by a Chicago television station in 1981 and subsequent NRC investigations at the Dresden and Zion stations.
The individuals involved were either placed in a drug rehabilitation program, suspended and reinstated following an investigation or ter-minated.
In each case, the security access to the site has been denied until each individual case is resolved.
In another case, an individual was arrested for involvement in a sale of drugs and marijuana and the
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case is presently unresolved. As each of these issues was raised, they were reported to the NRC Region III office by the inspector and some were reviewed through a special inspection by Region III inspectors.
There has been some news media interest generated over the events.
The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the inspection period, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability:
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Unit 2 - Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System'(RBCCW),
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (CRDH), Standby Liquid'
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Control System (SBLC),-Isolation Condenser, Diesel Generator
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(D/G), Core. Spray System (CS), and Low Pressure Coolant
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i Injection System (LPCI),
l Unit 3 - RBCCW, CRDH, SBLC, and D/G,:
Unit 2/3 - D/G, Standby Gas Treatment System and portions of the Fire J
l Protection System.
The inspector also witnessed portions.of the radioactivevaste systems
controls associated with radwaste shipments and barre 11ng.
- These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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l No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry-codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting I
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed
from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; acti-vities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected
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i as applicable; functiinal testing and/or calibrations were performed prior
to returning componen. or systems to service; quality control records
were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological:conttols
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were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were. implemented.
I Work requests were reviewed to determine status of out' standing jobs and~
to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment mainten-ance which may affect system performance.
l The following maintenance activities.were observed / reviewed:
I Unit 2: D/G Starting Air Compressor, RBCCW Heat Exchanger, Local
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Power Range Monitors (LPRM) and SBLC.
Unit 3: D/G
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Unit 2/3: D/G, RBCCW Pump.
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Following completion of maintenance on the Unit 2/3 diesel generator and the Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control System, the inspectors verified that
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these systems had been returned to service properly.
l No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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I 5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspectors observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Unit 2/3 diesel generator and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumenta-
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tion was calibrated, that limiting c,onditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Unit 2 daily and weekly storage battery checks, and the Jnit 3 reactor high pressure scram sensor calibration.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Unusual Events During normal full power operation of Unit 3 at 4:45 a.m. on November 9, 1982, the licensee declared the Units 3 and 2/3 diesel generators in-operable when they failed to meet required surveillances. The licenses declared an Unusual Event, notified the NRC using the Emergency Notifica-tion System (ENS) phone and commenced a controlled shutdown of the reactor.
The licensee also conducted a satiafactory surveillance of the Unit 2 diesel generator as required by Technical Specifications and informed the resident inspectors at this event upon their arrival at the site.
During the event and recovery, communications were established on the ENS phone between the resident inspector in the control room, the Region III Incident Response Center and the NRC Headquarters Operations Center.
Licensee actions and information were relayed, discussed and found acceptable by all parties. The Unusual Event was terminated and reactor power ascension started when the Unit 2/3 diesel generator was repaired, tested and declared operable. The Unit 3 diesel generator was repaired and returned to service within the seven day Technical Specification limiting condition for operation.
A second Unusual Event was declared when the licensee found the concen-tration of boron in the Unit 2 Stand-by Liquid Control (SBLC) system storage tank to be lower than that allowed by Technical Specifications.
This occurred at 5:00 p.m. on November 9, 1982. The licensee declared the Unusual Event, notified the NRC using the ENS phone, notified the SRI at home, commenced a controlled reactor shutdown, and added additional boron to the SBLC storage tank. Following resampling, the boron concentra-tion in the SBLC storage tank was found to be within the specification required. The Unusual Event was terminated and a reactor power increase was commenced about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> later. The SRI was in contact with the station several times throughout the event and found the licensee actions to be acceptable.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletin listed below, the inspectors verified that the Bulletin was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to the facility.
If the Bulletin was applicable the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the Bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the Bulletin and the licensee's response, that the licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information dis-cussed in the licensee's written response was accurate,'and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
(Open) I.E. Bulletin 79-14:
Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety Related Piping Systems. Through a licensee Q.A. audit of a vendor (Elsen Company),
it was found that the vender was unable to adequately show traceability of material supplied to Dresden and Quad-Cities Stations. The materials in question are supports, struts, hangers, etc., for I.E. Bu11etin.79-14 modifications. Since this is related to modifications being added to existing operating systems, no analysis for continued operation is necessary. The Senior Resident Inspectors at Dresden and Quad-Cities-Stations were informed of this matter by Quality Assurance personnel at the stations. Presently the Station Nuclear Engineering and the Opera-tional Analysis Departments are developing a test program for certifica--
tion of the material that has been delivered.
In addition, licensee Q.A. personnel have stated that corrective actions have been taken to insure future deliveries from that vender meet the proper certifications.
This matter was discussed with Region III personnel and will be reviewed.
by members of the Division of Engineering and Technical Inspection.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Plant Trips Following the Unit 3 trips on November 1 and 13, 1982, the inspectors ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel con-corning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communi-cations and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee. All
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systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on November 1 and 13, 1982, respectively.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Receipt of New Fuel The inspectors verified that technically adequate approsed procedures I
were available and followed covering the receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel, observed receipt inspections and storage of new fuel elements and verified these activities were performed in accord-
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ance with the licensee's procedures and, followed up resolutions of
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deficiencies found during new fuel inspections.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Inspection During Long Term Shutdown The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of October 30 through December 1, 1982. The inspectors verified surveill-ance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified applicability of containment integrity. Tours of Unit 1 accessible areas, including exterior areas were made to make inde-pendent assessments of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherer.ce to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness condi-tions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on November 10, 19, December 1, 1982, and at various other times throughout the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection.
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