IR 05000010/1996016

Insp Repts 50-010/96-16,50-237/96-16 & 50-249/96-16 on 961208-970124.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Operation,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20140B910
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	03/03/1997
From:	Hiland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140B909	List: IR 05000010/1996016 ML20140B904
References
50-010-96-16, 50-10-96-16, 50-237-96-16, 50-249-96-16, NUDOCS 9704010473
Download: ML20140B910 (17)

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U.S. NUCLE \R REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III  !

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Docket Nos: 50-10; 50-237; 50-249 i License Nos: DPR-2; DPR-19; DPR-25 l

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Report No: 50-010/96016; 50-237/96016; 50-249/96016 ;

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! . Licensee: Comed I

l Facility: Dresden Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 l f

Location: 6500 N. Dresden Road Morris, IL 60450 i t

i Dates: December 8, 1996, through January 24, 1997 :

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Inspectors:  !

C. Vanderniet, Senior Resident Inspector !

J. Hopkins, Project Engineer l J. Hansen, Resident Inspector  !

D. Roth, Resident Inspector C. Settles, Inspector Illinois Department of 1

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Nuclear Safety  !

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Approved by: P. L. Hiland, Chief ,

Reactor Projects Branch 1 g

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9704010473 970303 PDR ADOCK 05000<MLO i G PDR l

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Dresden Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3  :'

NRC Inspection Report 50-10/96016; 50-237/96016; 50-249/96016 Areas inspected this period included aspects of licensee operations,  ;

maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 7-week l period of resident inspectio j Qperations

_ e Overall, the conduct of operations was safe and in accordance with procedures. The inspectors observed that the control room operators were attendant to the panels, knowledgeable of the reasons for lit ,

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annunciators, and aware of activities in the plant '(Section 01.1). '

e Operators used a conservative approach to evaluate a turbine control

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valve (TCV) which was stuck closed. The plant operations review committee (PORC) performed a thorough review of the TCV test plan <

(Section 02.1).

The licensee's assessment of the acceptability of scaffolding in the j reactor building near the Unit 3 spent fuel pool following /

identification by the in psctors on January 8 was not timely. No engineering assessment had been performed when the action request was i generated in December 1996. Also, the failure to generate a performance l

improvement form (PIF) was not in accordance with management expectations (Section 08.1).

Maintenance e Several surveillance activities were observed with no significant concerns with operator performance, equipment operation, or test data identified (Section Hl.1).

e Control room ventilation project personnel completed significant repairs with good coordination between the ventilation group and those involved in other plant activities. Also, personnel involved in the repair and testing of the ventilation system were knowledgeable of the system operation and design and work documents. All observed work was performed well (Section M2.3). ,

• The thoroughness of the licensee's review to identify potential conflicts among emergency diesel generator surveillance tests was weak and the licensee's corrective actions concerning an earlier violation were narrowly focused. Additionally, training conducted to ,

reemphasize the need for attention to detail was not entirely effective !

(Section M3.1). <

e All four pressure switches for the Unit 2 turbine first stage pressure 45 percent scram bypass switches were identified by the licensee as

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being miscalibrated due to personnel error. The inspectors' preliminary

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review indicated the licensee's initial response, immediate corrective actions, and prompt investigation were good (Section M3.2).

Repair of the reactor recirculation pump motor was completed successfully. The inspectors concluded that the licensee performed the repair of a major piece of equipment in a well controlled manner (Section M2.4).

Enaineering

• The inspectors reviewed several open operability evaluations for both units with licensee management. The evaluations, equipment status, and schedule to restore the system or component to fully operable appeared reasonable (Section El.2).

Plant Suonort

Briefs given to personnel performing work in high radiation and high contamination areas were thorough. Personnel working in the radiation protectio'n area had a good understanding of radiation work permit requirements (Section Rl.1). ,

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REPORT DETAltS l

Summarv of Plant Status Unit 2 (U-2) began the period at full power. On December 21 power was reduced for routine surveillance tests. During the testing, the Number 1 turbine control valve (TCV) failed to reopen on demand. The unit was maintained at 40 percent power pending resolution. The TCV was repaired, and on January 6, the unit was returned to full power. The unit remained at full power during the remainder of the period, except for short duration load drops to support routine surveillance tests and to switch the operating condensate booster pump .

Unit 3 began the period in a forced outage (3DF23) for repair of the 3B recirculation pump motor. Following repair of the motor, the unit remained shut down while the licensee evaluated an engineering concern with the net positive suction head (NPSH) for the low pressure emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump I. Joerations

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01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. Overall, the conduct of operations was safe and in accordance with procedures. During control room tours, the inspectors assessed operator performance. The inspectors observed

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reasons for lit annunciators, and aware of activities in the plant, j During the inspection period, several events occurred, some that required prompt notification of the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72. The events are listed below: 1

December 20 The licensee reported that the head-loss across the low pressure emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump suction strainers was larger than assumed. (Section El.1) I December 21 During testing, a Unit 2 TCV failed to reopen on deman j (Section 02.1) )

January 17 On January 9 a technician erroneously adjusted the Unit 2 setpoint for the 45 percent reactor power bypass for the '

load reject and turbine trip signal to a non-conservative setting. On January 13 the licensee identified the error

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and re-adjusted the setpoint to the correct valu )

(Section M3.2) '

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02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

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02.1 Number 1 Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Stuck Closed (Unit 21 l Inspection' Scope (71707. 61726. 62707)

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! The inspectors assessed the licensee's investigation into the stuck No.1 l TCV. The inspectors reviewed Special Procedure (SP) 96-12-02, " Unit 2 Main Turbine No.1 Control Valve Test," and Dresden Operating Surveillance (DOS) 0500-09, " Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (Load Reject) Scram Functional Test." The inspectors also assessed the plant  ;

operations review committee (PORC) review of the special procedure, observed the performance of the special procedure on the Dresden simulator, and observed performance of the procedure in the plan ; Observations and Findinas On December 21 during performance of DOS 0500-09 on Unit 2, the No.1 TCV l failed to open after releasing the test push button as part of the fast

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closure test. Procedure DOS 0500-09 was being performed to satisfy requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 4.1. Because the TS surveillance test failed, the reactor power was limited to 45 percen i

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Immediate corrective actions included installinc a jumper (Temp Alt 11-36-96) to provide a close signal to the TCV, effectively electrically gagging the valve. Mechanical inspection of the servo, solenoid, and disk dump revealed no discrepancies. Testing was done to verify correct electrical operation of the fast acting solenoid valve (FASV).

The licensee considered several options to continue testing the valve and developed a special procedure based on DOS 0500-09. The inspectors observed portions of the PORC reviews of the special procedure (SP).

The PORC appropriately delayed review of the SP when it was determined that the on site review and investigation function (OSR&IF) review had not been completed. When the OSR&IF review was complete and the SP signed, the PORC conducted a thorough and critical review. The review considered the possibility of exceeding TS allowed power during performance of the SP and the impact of a sudden unexpected TCV openin The PORC also identified that guidance for troubleshooting was unclea The PORC rejected the SP and requested that these and other issues, including simulator validation, be addressed before the SP was presented agai The inspectors observed validation of the SP on the Dresden simulato The SP was clear and the crew performing the validation was alert. For example, an operator identified that the value specified for the load limit (110 percent) was beyond the range of the control panel indication. Subsequent to the validation, PORC approved the revised S The inspectors observed the SP performance and noted a good pre-job brief and : proper implementation of the procedur . . - - . . - .-. .

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l l This was a noted improvement from last year, when a violation was identified for performance of a special procedure before documentation of a complete OSR&IF review. (Ref. Inspection Report (IR) 50-249/96009

for additional information.)

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l The licensee evaluated the results of the testing, and concluded that the FASV movement was " sluggish." The sluggish movement prevented I seating of the disk dump valve before applying control pressure via the servo valve. The licensee determined that use of a jumper would provide positive control of the sequence of valve and servo movements. A

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revision to DOS 0500-09 was initiated to allow use of the jumper during weekly testing, and the TCV was successfully tested. Final repair of the " sluggishness" was planned to be accomplished using Work Request .,

960119291 during an outage of sufficient duratio I l

c. Conclusions The licensee responded appropriately to a failed TCV. Prompt corrective !

action precluded an unexpected opening of the valve. Interim corrective l actions and procedural changes provided positive control, of the valve l during testin The PORC review of the SP was conservative and thorough i 03 Operations Procedures and Documentation i

0 Implementation of Upgraded Technical Specifications (71707) I The licensee completed the Technical Specification Upgrade Program (TSUP) and implemented the new TS on January 13. However, due to the inability of the control room (CR) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system to perform adequately, implementation of new TS for CR HVAC was delayed until January 1 The inspectors previously assessed TSUP progress and concluded that the licensee was adequately prepared (see IR 50-237/249-96009). No concerns were identified during the initial implementatio Operator Knowledge and Performance 0 Field Performance (71707)

On January 21 the inspectors identified that a small steam leak in the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system drain line in the reactor building was not adequately contained. Some condensate was traveling down the pipe insulation and dripping onto the floor. The inspectors informed radiation protection and were advised that

. Operations personnel were monitoring the leak during routine round The inspectors considered the failure of Operations personnel to note the poorly contained leakage to be a minor weaknes .

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08 Miscellaneous Operations Issues

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08.1 Scaffolding _Ahqyg_the U-3 Spent Fuel Pool -

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a. Inspection Scope (71707'. 61726. 62707)

During routine rounds, the' inspectors looked for equipment that was not properly assigned and staged for work, or that might be a seismic concer b. Observations and Findinos

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_, On January 8 the inspector identified a large, metal scaffold near the Unit 3 reactor cuilding ceiling. The metal scaffolding appeared to be resting on the building framework. No scaffolding authorization tag was visible, and there was no obvious method of adequate attachment to the framework. The scaffolding was not directly over the Unit 3 spent fuel pool, but had the potential to damage spent fuel if dislodged. The inspector informed the Shift Manager of the concern. Follow-up by the i inspector on January 22 revealed that a performance improvement form 1 (PIF) had not been generated, and documentation for evaluating and i authorizir.g the installation of the scaffolding could not be found. An entry was made on January 22 in the Shift Manager's Log indicating that )

i Engineering and Action Requests had been generated to evaluate the !

scaffolding. Action Request 970008482 was initiated to remove i

" Scaffolding at Ceiling Above Fuel Pool Skimmer On West Refuel Floor Wall . "

An engineering evaluation performed on January 28, 1997, (after the end of the report period) indicated that the scaffold was welded to the building framework and would pose no immediate problems. Subsequent '

review by the engineer determined that the scaffolding was not shown on l design drawings. During subsequent reviews, the licensee identified :

that an action request had been generated on December 17, 1996, to

" Remove Scaffolding, West Wall at Ceiling," but had not been complete c. Conclusions Licensee assessment of the acceptability of the scaffolding following l identification by the inspectors was not timely. No engineering ;

assessment was performed when the action request was generated in !

December 1996. Also, the failure to generate a PIF was not in '

accordance with licensee management expectation l

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II. Maintenance

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M1 Conduct of Maintenance l

M1.1 General Comments '

a. Inspection Scope (61726)

The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillance tests from the control room or in the plant, reviewed the test procedures and applicable TS, and interviewed operators and technicians performing the '

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$ e Dresden Operating Surveillance (DOS) 1500-10, Revision 28, "U-3 i Quarterly TS Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System Pump Run i and Inservice Testing (IST) Surveillance."

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e DOS-1500-02, Revision 24, "U-3 Quarterly TS Containme,nt Cooling Service Water Pump Operability and IST."

e DOS 1500-05, Revision 22, "U-3 LPCI Quarterly Flow Rate Test."

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e DOS 6600-01, Revision'45, "U-2 Diesel Generator Surveillance ,

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, o DOS 6600-14, Revision 02, " Quarterly Diesel Oil Transfer Pump Test

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for IST Program." (Section M3.1)  !

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b. Observations and Findinas  !

For the surveillance tests observed, control room and field operators !

correctly followed procedures, were knowledgeable of the purpose of the ;

overall test and the individual steps in the test, and practiced good !

3-way communications. No significant concerns with operator performance, equipment operation, or test data were identifie Except >

for one issue with a prerequisite step in the U-2 Quarterly Diesel Oil Transfer Pump Test for IST Program (Section M3.1), no significant concerns with the adequacy of the procedures were identifie c. Conclusion

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No significant concerns with operator performance, equipment operation, or test data were identifie M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment H2.1 General Material Condition (62707) i

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The inspectors identified scaffolding material (picks, poles, couplings, l etc.) just inside the west corner room watertight door in the torus I basement of U-2 with no " equipment in use" tags. The licensee contacted !

station laborers to clean up the are l l

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M2.2 Unit 2 Number 1 Main Turbine Control Valvt_(TCV) Renair (62707)

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The inspectors observed portions of the Unit 2 No. 1 TCV repair and  ;

testing and reviewed work request (WR) 960119111, " Remove Temp Alt II-36-96" (previously discussed in Section 02.1). The performance of'

maintenance personnel observed in support of operations and testing personnel was good. A cautious approach was used to trouble shoot and test the valv M2.3 Control Room Heatino Ventilation and Air Conditionina (HVAC) Repair Inspection Scone (62707)

• f The inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activity associated with the repair of the Control Room ventilation system, interviewed engineering and maintenance personnel, and reviewed work packages including:

i WR 970002558 Reseal Control Room Overhead  !

WR 970006893 Install Fire Barrier Control Room Back Wall  ;

WR 970006969 Seal Various Leaks in the Control Room WR 970006975 Repair Miscellaneous Leaks in B HVAC Train  :

WR 970007386 "A" & "B" Train Flows and Adjustments ' Observations and Findinas

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The effort to seal the control envelope was successful in restoring the Technical Specification required control room differential pressure of

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greater than 1/8 inch water gage to adjacent areas and the design basis  ;

control room in-leakage requirement of less than 263 standard cubic feet '

per minute. All work observed was performed in accordance with the appropriate work packages. One concern was identified by the system engineer on the possibility of the silicon sealant loosing the sealing capability following any over pressurization of an area or ductin Plans to address this concern included covering accessible sealant with a "hard cast" tape that would not fail during an over pressurization event and scheduling monthly differential pressure testing to identify any areas where the seal could have been los Conclusions The control room ventilation project personnel completed repairs with good coordination between the ventilation group and those involved in other plant activities. Also, personnel involved in the repair and testing of the ventilation system were knowledgeable of the system operation and design and work documents. All observed work was '

performed wel l

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M "3B" Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor Repair (62707)

On October 26, 1996, the 3B reactor recirculation pump tripped, causing the licensee to enter a forced outage (3DF23). The inspectors previously assessed the repair efforts and determined the jobs were well managed and skillfully performed (see IR 50-237/249-96014, Section M2.1). On December 23 the 3B recirculation pump was returned to service. No problems were identified by the inspectors regarding the observed work during this report period. The inspectors concluded that the licensee performed repair of a major piece of equipment in a well controlled manner. Following repair of the motor, the unit remained '

shut down while the licensee evaluated an engineering concern with the net positive suction head (NP.S.H) for the low pressure ECCS pumps (Section E1.1).

M3 Surveillance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 U-2 Emeraency Diesel Generator (EDG) Surveillance Activitie a. Inspection Scope (61726)

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The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance tests, reviewed the procedures, and interviewed the operators performing the surveillance

activities and the system enginee b. Observations and Findinas On January 24 during the EDG monthly surveillance test, the licensee .

performed vibration monitoring on the diesel fuel oil transfer pump in I accordance with Dresden Operating Surveillance (DOS) 6600-14. One procedure step was to operate the EDG at full load (2600 kilowatts (kW))

for 60 minutes. The purpose was to ensure that enough fuel was used so the transfer pump would operate long enough to obtain vibration dat However, the monthly EDG surveillance test, DOS 6600-01, specified an ,

operating load range of 2470 to 2600 kW. While the exact load on the EDG was not critical to the successful completion of the vibration test, the inspectors were concerned with possible conflicts between procedures being performed concurrently. When this concern was brought to the attention of the Unit Supervisor, a procedure change was initiated and a PIF was written to document the discrepanc In February 1996 the inspectors identified a concern with a conflict between the monthly EDG surveillance test and the EDG fuel consumption test. A Notice of Violation was cited for failure to follow procedure (See IR 50-237/249-96002 for additional information.) Part of the licensee's corrective actions was to revise the EDG fuel consumption test, reemphasize procedural adherence to Operations and Engineering department personnel, and reemphasize the need for attention to detail where multiple procedures were in use. The licensee's corrective

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actions were completed in June 199 *

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Based on the discrepancy between the monthly EDG surveillance test and

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the transfer pump vibration test, the inspectors were concerned with the thoroughness of the licensee's review of EDG surveillance tests to identify potential conflicts between procedures. Based on the inspector's review of a sample of the IDG surveillance procedures, no other examples of conflicts between EDG surveillance procedures were identifie < Conclusion The thoroughness of the licensee's review to identify potential conflicts between EDG surveillance tests was weak. While the individual example was not significant and would not have effected the results of

, the vibration test, the licensee's corrective actions for the violation were narrowly focused. Additionally, the training conducted to reemphasize the need for attention to detail was not effective in this

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cas M3.2 Miscalibration of the Unit 2 Turbine First Staae Pressure 45 Percent d

Scram Bypass Switches

. Inspection Scope (617261 The inspectors performed an initial follow-up inspection of a miscalibration identified by the licensee on January 13 during surveillance testing. The miscalibration was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.7 i Observations and Findinas While performing Dresden Instrument Surveillance (DIS) 0500-07,

"45 percent Rated Core Thermal Power Scram Bypass Pressure Switches Calibration and Functional Checks," Revision 9, to implement new setpoints required for TSUP implementation, the licensee discovered that all four turbine first stage pressure 45 percent scram bypass switches were set above the old Technical Specification limit. This surveillance test was last performed on January 9,1997. Upon discovery, the licensee informed Operations and calibrated the switches to the new Technical Specification limit. During the period that the switches were improperly calibrated, a reactor trip would have occurred as required

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following a turbine trip or load rejec The licensee determined that the surveillance test performed on January 9 was improperly performed. During the surveillance test, the technicians incorrectly recorded the as-found reset value for the pressure switch in the as-found trip setpoint column of the procedur The technicians continued with the surveillance test and incorrectly recorded the as-found trip setpoint (a TS value) as the as-found reset value. Believing the pressure switches needed adjustment, the technicians recalibrated the switches with the result being the TS limit of 395 psig [ pounds square inch gage] was exceeded. This same error was continued on the other three switches which resulted in all four switch

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trip setpoints in excess of TS limits by as much as 10 psig. This error

, was not identified during reviews by a different technician and the superviso c. Conclusion Preliminary review indicates the licensee's initial response, immediate corrective actions, and prompt investigation were good. Failure to l correctly perform procedure DIS 0500-07 is an Unresolved Item (URI)

pending the inspectors' review of the licensee long term actions to prevent recurrence (URI 50-237/96016-01(DRP)).

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M3.3 Unit 3 Drywell Closeout The inspectors inspected the Unit 3 drywell prior to closeout. Although the condition of the drywell improved from previous closeout inspections, the inspectors still identified some debris, loose main steam isolation limit switch ventilation duct work, and a HPCI system

' motor operated valve that was leaking grease. All items were repaired prior to drywell closure. No fibrous material was identified. (See irs 50-237/249-96002 and 96004 for problems identified during previous drywell closeout inspections.)

M8 Miscellaneous Surveillance Issues (92902)

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M (Closed) Violation 50-237/249-96002-05A: Failure to follow Procedures During U-3 EDG Surveillanc In February 1996, the inspectors

identified a conflict between the load requirements in the monthly U-3 l

EDG surveillance test and the EDG fuel consumption test. Part of the licensee's corrective actions was to revise the EDG fuel consumption test, reemphasize procedural adherence to Operations and Engineering department personnel, and reemphasize the need for attention to detail where multiple procedures were in use. Based on another example of conflicts between EDG surveillance procedures, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were narrowly focused and the

training conducted to reemphasize the need for attention to detail where multiple procedures were in use was not effective in this case. (See Sectica M3.1 for additional information.) While the safety consequences of W issue were not significant, the thoroughness cf the licensee's efforts to prevent recurrence was weak. This example of a violation is l closed.

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III. Engineerinq

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El Conduct of Engineering El.1 UFSAR Commitments Found Contrary to Plant Design (71707)

Drywell Insulation (Unit 3)

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The inspectors identified updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR),

Section 6.1.1.1, indicated only mirror insulation was installed in the drywell . Sections 5.2.3.2.3 and 6.2.2.3.2 of the Dresden UFSAR indicated that non-metallic insulation was installed on the containment and drywell piping which reflected the actual plant configuration. The licensee initiated a UFSAR change to resolve the discrepanc El.2 Operability Evaluations (37551)

The inspectors reviewed open operability evaluations for both units with cognizant licensee management. The evaluations, equipment status, and schedule to restore the system or component to a fully operable condition was previously reviewed and approved by the PORC. The evaluations and equipment status determinations appeared reasonable.

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In addition to the operability evaluations identified above, the inspectors reviewed an evaluation concerning a lower limit for torus )

water temperature. The licensee reduced torus water temperature on both i

units to about 50 F in anticipation of approval of a TS amendment. The i licensee's evaluation concluded that the lower temperature limit for i i

" torus water was 40 F. The licensee discussed the bases for the evaluation with the inspectors on January 23. Based on the review of

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available information, the inspector's concluded that the licensee's initial review of the issue was thorough. The operability evaluation ;

and proposed corrective actions appeared reasonabl j

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E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation E3.1 Drywell Vacuum Breaker Test Reference Material (37551)

i During a review of Dresden Technical Surveillance (DTS) 1600-16,

"Drywell Torus Vacuum Breaker Leak Test," performed on U-3 in September 1996, the inspectors requested the supporting calculation for the test acceptance criterion. The licensee informed the inspectors that Engineering had recently searched for the referenced calculation and concluded it was lost. Engineering was developing a new calculatio On December 10, the licensee informed the inspectors that the calculation was complete. While the acceptance criteria based on the new calculations was slightly more restrictive, the surveillance tests performed in April 1996 on U-2 and September 1996 on U-3 passed with adequate margi .

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Control and maintenance of calculations were previously identified by

, the NRC (Ref. IR 50-237/249-96201) as a significant weaknesses in the licensee's control of design basis calculations. The inspectors considered the loss of the specific supporting calculation for the torus drywell vacuum breaker test as another example of a known problem that the licensee was addressin IV. Plant Support R1- Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 _ General Comments

The inspectors observed Heightened-Level-of-Awareness briefs given to personnel performing work in high radiation and high contamination areas, such as the drywell, and noted the briefs were thorough. The inspectors also noted that personnel observed in the radiation protection area had a good understanding of the applicable radiation work permit requirements including the work area radiological conditions, dose limitations, and radioactive material requirement RI.2 Site Assembiv Drill (Units 1. 2. and 3) (82701)

On December 13 the inspectors observed an unannounced site assembly dril Documents reviewed included Emergency Plant Implementing i Procedures 0400-01, " Plant Assembly and Accountability." The licensee response to the drill was successfu This was in contrast to the drill of November 26, when accountability was not achieved due to computer and organizational problems (Ref. IR 50-237/249-96014). The licensee demonstrated that weaknesses from a previous drill were correcte VI. Manacement Meetinas

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X1 Exit Meetina Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on January 30, 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie X3 Manaaement Meetina Summary On December 11, Mr. Jim Taylor, the NRC's Executive Director of Operations (ED0), visited the Dresden station. Accompanying him were A. Bill Beach, Region III Administrator; Roy Zimmerman, Associate Director for Projects, NRR; and Robert Capra, Director, Project Directorate III-2, NRR. Mr. Taylor met with NRC personnel and senior station management and toured parts of the station observing the general plant material conditio . ._,_.-e __ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . .. __.._. ._. __ >_.. __

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On December 19, a public meeting was held in the Training Center at the

, Dresden Station. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the actions outlined in the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL), dated November 21, 1996, and other improvement initiative On January 21, Mr. Leonard J. Callan, the newly appointed E00; A. Bill  :

Beach, Region III Administrator; Pat Hiland, Region III Branch Chief and j Brian McCabe, Technical Assistant to the EDO, visited the site for routine observations of plant operation, a plant tour, and meetings witti senior plant managemen i I ~ .

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[ .. PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED -

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'. Licensee I i - *

i i S. Perry, Site Vice President

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J. Heffley, Units 2 and 3 Station Manager  !

C. Howland, Radiation Protection Manager  !

' E. Connell, Design Engineering Superintendent '

T. Foster, Work Control and Outage Manager i i T. Nauman, Unit 1 Station Manager j T. O'Connor, Operations Manager  !-

j P. Swafford, Unit 2/3 Maintenance Superintendent i P. Tzomes, Support Services Director

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j R. Freeman, Site Engineering Manager  !

F. Spangenburg, Regulatory Assurance Manager  !

1 - D. Winchester, Site Quality Verification Director l i

l INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

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IP 37551:

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i On-site Engineering i

! IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and l l Preventing Problems IP 62707: Maintenance Observations j IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 82701

Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program

] IP 83822: Radiation Protection

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IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations IP 92903: Followup - Engineering j IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support

1 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED i

i Opened l 50-237;249/96016-01 URI Miscalibration of U-2 Turbine First Stage

Pressure Scram Bypass Switches 1 Closed i

i 50-237/249-96002-05A NOV Failure to Follow Procedures During U-3 EDG I Surveillance.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS USED

CFR [ Code of Federal Regulations]

CR Control Room DTS Dresden Technical Surveillance DIS Dresden Instrument Surveillance DOS Dresden Operations-Surveillance ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator FASV Fast Acting Solenoid Valve HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

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IST Inservice Test ~~

IR Inspection Report  !

kW kilowatt l LPCI Low Pressure Coolant Injection NPSH Net Positive Suction Head

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NOV [ Notice of Violation]  ;

OSR&IF On Site Review and Investigation Function PIF Performance Improvement Form PORC -

Plant Operations Review Committee psig Pounds Square Inch Gage Special Procedure

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SP TS ~ Technical Specification l TSUP Technical Specification Upgrade Program TCV Turbine Control Valve ]

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UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report i URI Unresolved Item

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WR Work Request '

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