IR 05000010/1997017
| ML20211J838 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211J826 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-97-17, 50-10-97-17, 50-237-97-17, 50-249-97-17, NUDOCS 9710080312 | |
| Download: ML20211J838 (2) | |
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U.5. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION lil
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Docket Nos:
50 010; 50 237: 50 249 License Nos:
DPR 2: DPR 19; DPR 25 Report Nos:
50 010/97017(DRS); 50 237197017(DRS);
50 249/97017(DRS)
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
Facility:
Dresden Nuclear Station, Units 1,2 and 3 Location:
R.R.No.1 Morris, IL 60450 Dates:
Between August 4 and 20,1997 inspector:
T. Madeda, Physical Security inspector Approved by:
James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Heports 50 010/97017;50437/97017;50 249/97017
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This inspection included a review of plant support activitles relating to the physical protecticn of your facility. This report reviewed the effectiveness of security management j
control activities, verified the performance of protected area security equipment, reviewed
security training and qualification activities, and follow up on previous inspection findings.
Also reviewed were 1.icensee Security Event Reports regarding a failure to control personnel access to the protected area and tampering with a vital area locking device. The inspection was conducted between August 4 and 20,1997.
Overall, security performance was acceptable. Security force members generally
demonstrated'a'n apprepriate working knowledge of security requirements.
s Management activities to support security requirements regarding equipment effectivenest, and problem resolution were sound.
The inspector identified a violation regarding a failure to control unsearched
packages in the protected area. The ever't was caused by plant personnel misinterpretation of security package control requirements. The significance of this violation was that previous corrective action for a similar evt.nt had not prevented recurrence. (Section S4.1)
The inspector identified a minor violation when a cecurity officer fa.,ed to properly
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search a storage compartment on the undercarriage of a vehicle. The event was caused by cognitive personnel error. The significance of the event was reduced because it was an isolated personnel error. (Section S4.2)
The licensee identified a violation when a security officer assigned to control access
at a protected area control point f ailed to detect the unauthorized access of an individualinto the protected area. The event was caused by weak attention to duty.
The significance of the event was reduced because the unauthorized access was immediately detected by plant personnel. (Section S4.3)
The licensco identified a violation when a contractor supervisor's failed to report the
arrest of a subordinate to licensee personnel, due his misinterpretation of the licensee's arrest reoorting policy. (Section S4.4)
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