IR 05000010/1999002

Insp Rept 50-010/99-02 on 981218-990129.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Mgt & Control

ML20203G368
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	02/10/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203G366	List: IR 05000010/1999002 ML20203G363
References
50-010-99-02, 50-10-99-2, NUDOCS 9902190292
Download: ML20203G368 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlli

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Docket No: 50-010 License No: DPR-2 Report No: 50-010/99002(DNMS)

Licensee: Comme- : tith Edison Company Facility: Dresden Station Unit 1

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Location: 6500 N. Dresden Road Morris,IL 60450 l

Dates: December 18,1998 - January 29,1999 Inspector: William G. Snell, Health Physics Manager Approved By: Bruce L. Jorgensen, Chief Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety l

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I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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! Dresden Station Unit 1  !

NRC Inspection Report 50-10/99002(DNMS)

This routine decommissioning inspection covered aspects of licensee management and control, decommissioning support activities, and radiological safet Facility Manaaement and Control

• - Good housekeeping practices were observed in the Turbine Building, the Spent Fuel ,

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Building, the Rad Waste Yard, and within the Sphere. No concerns were identified with l

the preparation and lock-up of the Sphere for safe storage dormancy. (Section 1.1). i Decommissionino Suppod Activities e The licensee was taking adequate actions to ensure safety-related systems were being protected against extreme cold weather. (Section ll.1)

Radioloaical Safety e Good as-low-as-reasonably-achievable work practices were observed in conjunction with a diver cutting pipes while working in the Transfer Pool. An incident occurred in which a worker was working in a Locked High Rad Area without a properly functioning electronic personal dosimeter (digi). The licensee's response to the occurrence was excellent. (Section 111.1).

• The licensee continued to make progress .in the removal of radioactive waste from the

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radwaste vaults and tanks. Radiological controls associated with those activities appeared to be adequate. (Section ll1.2)

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l Report Details Summary of Plant Activities 1 9 licensee completed closure and lock-up of the Unit 1 Reactor Sphere for safe storage J (6FSTOR) dormancy. Work began to remove all extraneous material from the Transfer Pool l portion of the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). Waste removal activities for Radwaste Vaults 2 l and 3 were restarted following the issuance of a new vendor contrac . Facility Manaaement and Control i

i Decommissionino Performance and Status Review l Scooe (71801)

Decommissioning activities were evaluated to verify the licensee and its contracted work force were conducting decommissioning activities in accordance with licensed ,

requirements. Plant tours were conducted to evaluate the materialintegrity of l'

structures, systems, and components necessary for the conduct of safe decommissioning and to evaluate plant housekeepin Observations and Findinos The inspector conducted tours of the Unit 1 Turbine Building, the Spent Fuel Building, the Rad Waste Yard and the Sphere. The tour of the Sphere was conducted shortly before it was closed and locked for SAFSTOR dormancy in late December 1998. Good I housekeeping practices were noted in all areas. No problems were noted with the j material integrity of structures, systems, and components observed that could be i considered adverse to safet Since 1993 considerable effort has been expended on preparing the Sphere for SAFSTOR. In 1998, this effort included removing approximately 98.5 tons of radioactive material and debris from the Sphere. In most areas of the Sphere the dose rates were less than 10 millirem per hour (mrem /hr), however there were five Locked High Rad Areas (LHRA) (dose rates greater than 1000 mrem /hr at 30 centimeters (cm)), and fourteen High Rad Areas (dose rate greater than 100 mrem /hr). The five LHRA areas were the A and B Reactor Equipment Drain Tank (REDT) rooms, the A Reactor Water Cleanup Demineralizer, the Control Rod Drive Platform ladder, and the two entrances to the Reactor Cavity. The Reactor Cavity was the only area in the Sphere where cleanup activities were not conducted. Factors that contributed to the decision to not clean up the Cavity were it was highly contaminated, there was a minimum amount of combustibles in the Cavity, and there were concerns related to ensuring a safe means of getting workers in and out of the Cavit '

During the tour of the Sphere the inspector observed new wiring being installed. This was necessary to ensure an adequate power supply was available to power the components that were to remain functional during SAFSTOR, which included the Reactor Area Sump, the REDT Pumps and Heaters, and lighting to essential area .

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Two stainless steel process tubs on the 565' elevation containing radioactively j contaminated acid were left as found. These tubs were posted as a hazard and a surveillance was to be developed to periodically check their condition. Sphere )

entries to check these tubs and entries for other reasons were to be controlled by '

Procedure DDP 22, Unit 1 Sphere Entry and Closeout Requirements After Lock-U c. Conclusiong 1 l

Good housekeeping practices were observed in the Turbine Building, the Spent Fuel Building, the Rad Waste Yard and within the Sphere. No concerns were identified with the preparation and lock-up of the Sphere for SAFSTOR dormanc II. Decommissionina Support Activities 1 Cold Weather Preparations l

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a. Scooe (71714)

The Inspector reviewed licensee procedures and conducted a plant tour to verify the implementation and effectiveness of actions to ratect safety-related systems against extreme cold weathe b. Observations and Findinas Technical Specification 6.8.A.8 requires that the licensee establish, implement and maintain procedures for a Winterization Program applicable to the safe storage and handling of irradiated fuel. The licensee had two procedures pertaining to the pi@aration and initiation of cold weather activities for Unit 1, DOS 0010-19, Preparation for Cold Weather for Unit 1, and DOS 0010-20, Initiation of Cold Weather Operations for Unit 1. DOS 0010-19 was required to be initiated in September and completed by I October 15, and DOS-0010-20 was required to be initiated on or about November 1 and completed by Nowmber 15. Checklist A of required actions for each of these procedures was reviewed for 1998. The actions were completed as required and within the time frames specifie Three heaters are maintained in the Unit 1 Sphere, with remote read out at the entrance to the Sphere. These heaters are located in the A and B REDT Rooms and the Subpile Room. During a tour of the Turbine Building on January 28,1999, the remote readout was checked and all three rooms indicated temperatures in excess of 50 Fahrenhei c. Conclusions The licensee was taking adequate actions to ensure safety-related systems were being protected against extreme cold weathe . . ._ _ _ -- - . - _ -

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Two stainless steel process tubs on the 565' elevation containing radioactively contaminated acid were left as found. These tubs were posted as a hazard and a l surveillance was to be developed to periodically check their condition. Sphere j entries to check these tubs and entries for other reasons were to be controlled by .

Procedure DDP 22, Unit 1 Sphere Entry and Closeout Requirements After Lock-U c. Conclusions j Good housekeeping practices were observed in the Turbine Building, the Spent Fuel Building, the Rad Waste Yard and within the Sphere. No concerns were identified with l the preparation and lock-up of the Sphere for SAFSTOR dormanc I 11. Decommissionino Support Activities 11. 1 Cold Weather Preparations a. Scone (71714)

The inspector reviewed licensee procedures and con lucted a plant tour to verify the implementation and effectiveness of actions to protJa safety-related systems against extreme cold weathe b. Observations and Findinos Technical Specification 6.8.A.8 requires that the licensee establish, implement and maintain procedures for a Winterization Program applicable to the safe storage and handling of irradiated fuel. The licensee had two procedures pertaining to the preparation and initiation of cold weather activities for Unit 1, DOS 0010-19, Preparation for Cold Weather for Unit 1, and DOS 0010-20, Initiation of Cold Weather Operations for Unit 1. DOS 0010-19 was required to be initiated in September and completed by October 15, and DOS-0010-20 was required to be initiated on or about November 1 and completed by November 15. Checklist A of required actions for each of these procedures was reviewed for 1998. The actions were completed as required and within the time frames specifie Three heaters are maintained in the Unit 1 Sphere, with remote read out at the entrance to the Sphere. These heaters are located in the A and B REDT Rooms and the Subpile Room. During a tour of the Turbine Building on January 28,1999, the remote readout was checked and all three rooms indicated temperatures in excess of 50* Fahrenhei c. Conclusions The licensee was taking adequate actions to ensure safety-related systems were being protected against extreme cold weathe o

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lit. Radioloalcal Safety 111. 1 Occupational Radiation Exoqsrg Scope (83750)

An inspection and evaluation were made of the radiation safety program to ensure that l procedures and controls were adequate to minimize occupational exposure to radiological materials and to identify potential problem area Observations and Findings During tours of the Unit 1 Turbine Building, Rad Waste Yard and SFP, the inspector noted that areas appeared to be properly controlled and appropriately posted. Work -

observed in progress included a diver cutting pipes under water in the Transfer Poo Observations of the work, including the removal of the diver from the pool and the subsequent washing down and removal of the divers dive suit, showed that workers were attentive to their work, employed good radiation protection practices, were properly dressed, understood the radiological controls for their work area, and were cognizant of the dose rates. All practices observed were noted to be acceptabl On January 21,1999, two workers were working in the Unit 1 Decant Building vault 2/3 area, which was a LHRA, under the direct coverage of a radiation protection technician (RPT). Twenty-eight minutes into the work the RPT checked the workers electronic dosimeters (digis) and discovered that one of the workers digis was in the * PAUSE" mode. The work was immediately halted and the workers left the vault. The area where the workers had been working was verified to be about 60 millirem per hour. The worker whose digi was active showed about 25 millirem, and it was assumed that both workers received about the same dose since they had been working side-by-side the )

entire time. The root cause was considered to be human error in that neither the worker J nor the RPT verified that the digi was reading zero prior to entering the radiation are j The licensee's response included both a tailgate session and attendance at the site Plan-of-the Day meeting in which the workers discussed their failure to ensure the digi was properly working. Management felt the workers did an excellent job of taking ownership for the incident and making the point to others about the need to avoid complacency. A review of Problem identification Forms generated since October 1, 1998, identified only one other incident where a worker was found to not have a properly activated digi. In this case the worker was in the Rad Waste Yard. Due to the infrequency of these incidents, they are considered isolated occurrences and not indicative of a degradation in the radiation protection program on Unit 1. Licensee response to the January 21,1999, incident was considered excellen Conclusions Good ALARA work practices were observed in conjunction with the diver cutting pipes while working in the Transfer Pool. An incident occurred in which a worker was working in a LHRA without a properly functioning electronic personal dosimeter (digi). The licensee's response to the occurrence was excellent.

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111. 2 RadWaste Treatment. and Effluent and Environmental Monitorina Scoce (84750)

An inspection and evaluation were made of the radioactive waste treatment systems and activitie Observations and Findinos The inspectors toured the radwaste yard and facilities to evaluate activities involving the removal of sludge / water from the radwaste vaults and tanks. Removal of waste sludge from the vaults had resumed after being halted in late 1998 until a fixed cost contract for it's completion could be awarded. The vendor's system for removing and drying the sludge and then depositing it into a high integrity container (HIC) appeared to working well. Observations of work in progress and discussions with vendor personnel and a radiation protection technician covering the work indicated that personnel were knowledgeable of the work requirements and attentive to employing ALARA strategies to minimize dose to workers. The work area contained ample shielding to minimize dose from the HIC and remote readouts of radiation levels from various locations throughout the facility were availabl Conclusions  :

The licensee continued to make progress in the removal of radioactive waste from the )

radwaste vaults and tanks. Radiological controls associated with activities appeared to !

be adequat i

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V. Manar 4 Meetina The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite portion of the inspection on January 29,1999. The licensee j acknowledged the findings presented. The Fcensee did not identify any of the dccuments or l

processes reviewed by the inspectors as proprietar '

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l PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

• B. Christel, Decommissioning Engineering Manager

• F. Krowzack, Nuclear Oversight

• J. N. Leech, Decommissioning Plant Manager Unit 1 J. Limes, Licensing / Compliance Engineer

• C McDonough, Decommissioning Business Services Manager, and the I

Decommissioning Maintenance & Construction Manager B. Rakes, Acting Unit 1 RP Lead Supervisor

• Denotes those attending the exit meeting on January 29,199 The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel in various departments in the course of -

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the inspectio )

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED l IP 71714: Cold Weather Preparations IP 71801: Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shut Down Reactors IP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure IP 84750: Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring DOCUMENTS REVIEWED DDP 22, Unit 1 Sphere Entry and Closeout Requirements After Lock-Up, Rev. 01 DOS 0010-19, Preparation for Cold Weather for Unit 1, Rev. 09 DOS 0010-19, Preparation for Cold Weather for Unit 1, Rev.10 DOS 0010-20, Initiation of Cold Weather Operations for Unit, Rev. 05 DOS 0010-20, Initiation of Cold Weather Operations for Unit, Rev. 06 -

DRP 6020-03, Radiological Surveys, Rev. 06 Dresden Unit 1 Reactor Enclosure SAFSTOR Dormancy End State On-Site Review 98-332 Findings and Recommendations Problem Identification Form (PlF) D1999-00314, Worker Enters LHRA with Digi in Off Position i Unit 1, Facility Operating License No. DRP-2, Amendment No. 39, Appendix A, Technical Specifications, Issued July 8,1997 i

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