IR 05000010/1978010
| ML19340A884 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1978 |
| From: | Barker J, Knop R, Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340A875 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-78-10, 50-10-78-10, 50-237-78-09, 50-237-78-9, 50-249-78-09, NUDOCS 8009040703 | |
| Download: ML19340A884 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION III,
Report No. 50-d10/78-10; 50-237/78-09; 50-249/78-09 Docket No. 50-10, 50-237, 50-249 License-No. DPR-2, DPR-19, DPR-25 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted: March 2, 3, 7, 8, 14-16, 22, 23, 27 and 28, 1978 67c R w Inspectors W. D. Shafer
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J. L. Barker U 7[
Approved By:
R. C. Knop Chief Reactor Projects Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on March 2, 3, 7, 8, 14-16, 22, 23, 27, and 28, 1978 (Report No. 50-010/78-10; 50-237/78-09; 50-249/78-09)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings (Units 1, 2 and 3), preparation of Unit 3 refueling, refueling activities (Unit 3), review of Units 2 and 3 sur-veillance, rcview of licensee's special reports to RIII office, review of IE Bulletins, review of licensee commitments (Unit 1), review of Unit 2 design changes, review of Unit 2 loss of reactor building 250 VDC, review of licensee's out-of-service program (Units 1, 2 and 3),
review of maintenance activities during Unit 3 refueling outage, review of licensee event reports, review of plant operations (Units 1, 2 and 3), plant tour, inoffice review of licensee event reports (Units 1, 2 and 3) and a review of safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting conditions for operations (Units 2 and 3).
The inspection involved 160 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
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Results: Of the sixteen areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or
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deviations were identified in thirteen areas. Two apparent items of noncompliance (infraction - failure to properly control the gland steam leakoff pump control room switch in accordance with out of service pro-gram - Paragraph 12); (infraction - exceeding the Unit 1 Technical Specification allowable heatup rates - Paragraph 16); and one apparent deviation - failure to meet a commitment - Paragraph 2 were identified in three areas.
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s DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted a.
Exit. Interview Conducted on March 8, 1978
- B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- B. Shelton, Assistant to the Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Lead Operating Engineer
- D.
Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the Technical and Engineering staf fs, reactor and auxiliary operators, and maintenance personnel.
- denotes those attending the exit interview.
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Exit Interview Conducted on March 16, 1978
- B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
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- D.
Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor
- R. Kyrouac, Quality Control Engineer
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The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees.
- denotes those attending the exit interview.
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Exit Interview Conducted on March 23, 1978
- B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- A. Roberts, Assistant Station Superintendent
- B. Shelton, Assistant to +.he Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Lead Operating Engineer
- D. Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor
- G. Reardanz, Quality Assurance Operations The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees.
- denotes those attending the exit interview.
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Exit Interview Conducted on Nbrch 28, 1978
- B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- B. Shelton, Assistant to the Station Superintendent l
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- E. Budzichowski, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
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- R. Kyrouac, Quality Control Engineer
- D. Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor The inspector also talked with and interviewed'several other licensee employees.
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o 2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Units 1, 2, 3)
(Closed) - Noncompliance (010/77-33; 237/77-29; 249/77-27): Failure to properly control modification packages. The inspector determined that the licensee has initiated a modification status form for control of modifications onsite.
With the implementation of this form the inspector determined that the licensee identified several modifications that have been com-pleted; however, no records are available to determine the extent of work that was accomplished with these modifications. The licensee informed the inspector that effective March 31, 1978, all missing modifications not completed or reviewed will be cancelled. Further-
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more, all modifications having work completed and having no records available will be reviewed by the onsite review function in order
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to assure that all procedures and drawings are brought up to date.
The licensee informed the inspector that this review process will be accomplished by onsite review by June 15, 1978. The inspector informed the licensee that this issue will remain an unresolved item.
(Closed) - Noncompliance (010/77-33; 237/77-29; 249/77-27): Failure to conduct proper management review of modifications prior to imole-mentation of work. With respect to this noncompliance, the licensee's corrective action to avoid reoccurrence was to conduct a training session for all persons involved with the review and authorization of modifications. This training session was to have been completed-by March 1, 1978.
The inspector determined that the training session had not been accomplished to date, and that on March 8, 1978, the licensee formally requested the training session be deferred until June 1, 1978.
(Letter B. B. Stephenson to J. G. Keppler, dated March 8, 1978). For response to this request see Paragraph 6.
The inspector informed the licensee that failure to conduct the proper training program regarding mcdification authorizations is a deviation from a commitment.
No additional noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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(Closed) - Noncompliance (010/77-33; 237/77-29; 249/77-27): Failure to maintain records of normal plant operation.
The inspector reviewed
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the licensee's action in this area and determined that it appears that
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the licensee is controlling plant operation records adequately.
The licensee has implemented a transmittal sheet for transferring used records or recorder charts to the central file. No further concerns were identified.
(Closed) - Noncompliance (010/77-24; 237/77-22; 249/77-22): Failure to maintain attendance records for mandatory training lectures. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action for this noncom-pliance and determined that the licensee has complied with all commitments.
(Closed) - Noncompliance (50-10/77-32): Failure to properly make temporary changes to procedures. The inspector found that the licensee appeared to be making temporary procedure changes in accordance with their Technical Specifications and approved procedures.
(Closed) - Noncompliance (50-10/77-32): Failure during September, 1977 to adhere to approved procedure.
The inspector found that the shif t engineer /shif t foreman appeared to be properly reviewing operating and surveillance procedures.
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(Closed) - Noncompliance (50-237/77-26): Failure to adhere to an approved procedure. The inspector found that the control of personnel on the refueling floor area appeared to be adequate.
3.
Preparation of Unit 3 Refueling The inspector verified that the licensee had approved procedures for new fuel receipt and inspection, fuel transfer and core verification, and fuel sipping operations. The inspector also verified through direct observation and record review that the new fuel route was received and inspected in accordance with the licensee's procedures.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure DFP800-1, " Master Refueling Procedure Units 2 and 3," DFP800-S3, " Refueling Pre-requisites Checklist," DFP800-2, "New Fuel Receiving," DFP800-3,
" Nuclear Fuel Receiving Inspection and Core Preparation of Fuel Bundle," DFP800-S2, " Fuel and Channel Inspection Checklist," DFP800-4,
" Transfer of New Fuel from Either the New Fuel Storage Vault or the New Fuel Inspection Stand of the Fuel Fool," DFP800-7, " Fuel Handling Inside the Reactor," DFP800-9, " Fuel Movements from the Spent Fuel Storage Pool," bFP800-10, " Fuel Movements from the Reactor to the Storage Pool," DFP800-15, " Neutron Source Removal and Reinstallation,"
DFP800-18, " Placement of Sipping Head for Incore Sipping," DFP800-20,
" Reactor Building 125/5 Ton Overhead Crane," DFP800-21, " Fuel Handling i
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Grapple Operation," DFP800-23, "Use of Core Loading Chambers (Dunkers),"
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and DOS 800-1, " Refueling Interlock Checklist." Procedures reviewed appeared to be technically adequate and satisfactorily inclusive.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identif'ied.
4.
Refueling [ Activities (Unit 3)
The inspector verified that surveillance testing involving Technical Specification requirements, refueling machine operation and indexing, ventilation requirements in the fuel storage area, refueling inter-locks, crane testing, refuel floor radiation monitors, and communication-systems had been completed prior to fuel movement in the vicinity of the reactor. By direct observation of the fuel handling activities, the inspector verified that area monitoring was in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS), that containment integrity was in accordance with Technical Specifications, that removal of fuel bundles was in accordance with established procedures, that fuel accountability methods were in accordance with established procedures, that core internals and supportive material storage appeared adequate, that housekeeping on the refueling deck was adequate, that the licensee requirements on the refueling crew was in accordance with TS, that
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vessel level was in accordance with TS requirements, that the reactor
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mode switch was in accordance with TS requirements and that control blade checks were conducted in accordar:e with established procedures.
The inspector also verified by direct observation that the individual directing fuel handling activities held a senior operating license and was present, directly supervising fuel handlers when work was being conducted which could have affected core reactivity; and that
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a licensed operator was present in the control room and in constant direct communication with a member of the fuel handling crew when
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work was being performed that could affect core reactivity.
5.
Review of Units 2 and 3 Surveillance The inspector reviewed the surveillance program on Units 2 and 3 to determine whether the surveillance of components or equipment asso-ciated with safety-related systems is being conducted as required by Technical Specifications an in accordance with prescribed procedures.
The review consisted of verifying that each surveillance test was accomplished in accordance with properly approved procedures, and the procedures included prerequisites, functional tests, acceptance criteria, and operational checks prior to returning the equipment to service. The inspector examined the procedure technical content and the test results to determine conformance with the Technical Specifi-cation requirements.
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S The inspector witnessed surveillances in progress and examtaed per-
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sonnel qualifications of those conducting the surveillance. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee's Special Reports to RIII Office The inspee' tor reviewed the following special reports sent to the regional office by the licensee.
Letter dated January 31, 1978, from B. B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent, to Mr. James G. Keppler. Report entitled
" Followup report to letter concerning excessive leakage through rubber seated valves."
Letter dated March 8, 1978, from B. B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent, to Mr. James G. Keppler.
The letter requested
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an extension to June 1, 1978, for the training classes for all persons involved with the review and authorization of modifi-cations.
With respect to the latter letter identified above the inspector informed the licensee that this commitment was made on November 30,
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1977, in response to an item of noncompliance issued at that time.
The licensee had a period of 90-days to conduct this training pro-
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gram and failed to do so.
Furthermore, the inspector informed the licensee that any request for an extension of time relating to a previous commitment must be made prior to the expiration date iden-tified in the commitment. The inspector informed the licensee that failure to conduct a training program is a deviation from a commitment (see Paragraph 2).
7.
Review of IE Bulletins A review of the following bulletins was conducted to verify that, licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management representatives, information dis-cussed in the licensee's reply was accurate, corrective action was affected as was described in the reply, and the licensee's reply was prompt and within the time period described in the bulletin.
IE Bulletin 77-05 and 77-05A, Electrical Connector Assemblies IE Bulletin 78-01, Flammable Contact Arm Retainers in CE CR 120A Relays IE Bulletin 78-02, Terminal Block Qualifications l-7-
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The following concerns were identified.
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With regard to IE Bulletin 77-05 and 05A, the inspector determined
that the licensee's response to this bulletin with respect to Unit 1 l
was inadequate and unacceptable.
The licensee stated that the nuclear instrumentation which is located in the containment has
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connectors?that were not qualified. Furthermore they stated that these instruments are only information systems following a LOCA and do not perform a safety function.
Since they are passive no action is planned to qualify or replace these connectors.
The inspector informed the licensee that the licensee's Technical Specifications for Unit 1 require that the neutron monitoring system be available for post LOCA conditions and as a result of this requirement the licensee must address the problem in this light.
In addition to the above requested response, the inspector questioned the licensee as to whether the Units 2 and 3 main steam line radiation monitor connectors have been determined to be qualified. The licensee was requested to submit a plan for qualifying or replacing the existing
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connectors and to identify when this will be accomplished. The inspector requested the licensee to resubmit their response to IE
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Bulletin 77-05 and 05A within 30 days.
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Regarding IE Bulletin 78-01, Flammable Contact-Arm Retainers in GE
CR 120A relays, the licensee stated that a best effort attempt will be made_to replace these retainers: for Unit 3, during the present outage and for Unit 2, retainer replacement will be conducted during any unit shu'.down with the provision that no unit will be delayed as a result of replacing these retainers.
No further concerns were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Commitments (Unit 1)
In a previous inspection report (50-010/77-16), the licenses com-mitted to monitor the area remperature around the amplifiers on the
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incore and excore instrumentation behind the Unit 1 control panel.
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Through visual observations the inspector determined that the licensee is monitoring the area temperatures and the problem of instrument
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drift resulting from high temperature has not reoccurred. No concerns were identified, t
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9.
Review of Unit 2 Design Changes
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The following design changes were reviewed to verify that each change
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(N review and approval, equipment. performance tests were conducted
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where appropriate, operating procedures were revised and as built drawings were changed to reflect the modifications as necessary.
M12-2-77-4, Install 2 reuter stokes LPRM strings in Unit 2 reagtor M12-2-77-13, Replace stems on M02-1402-25A and 25B M12-2-77-19 Install resistoreim close light circuit for Unit 2 circuit breaker remote control switches M12-2-77-40, Install piping for torus pump back system delta P transmitter No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Special Review of Unit 2 Loss of Reactor Building 250VDC on March 21, 1978, the licensee reported to the Regional office that during routine performance of Dresden operating procedure (DOP)
6900-8, station battery isolation and return to normal for discharge testing, the Unit 2 reactor building 250VDC supply was taken out of service for a period of approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. As a result of this, the Unit 2 isolation condenser was inoperable for this same period.
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Through discussions with licensee representatives, and by visual observation the inspector determined that 2 personnel errors had taken
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place during this incident. The first error occurred when the licensee failed to follow procedure DOP6900-8 in a step-by-step fashion. The equipment operator was immediately informed of the error and returned the Unit 2, 250VDC reactor building to normal. The equipment oper-ator then called upon the shift foreman and 20 minutes later the shif t foreman opened the 250VDC breaker from the Unit 3 turbine building to the Unit 2, 250VDC reactor building motor control center.
Once again the reactor building supply was lost.
The licensee then spent the next 35 minutes realigning the system and returning it to normal.
In discussions with the licensee rer--sentatives, the inspector determined that the licensee's inves-tig.a_on into the incident has not been completed. In order to give the licensee the opportunity to properly identify all areas of con-cern, the inspector informed the licensee that thia incident would remain an unresolved item.
11.
Review of Licensee's Out-of-Service Program The inspector conducted a review of the licensee's ongoing out-of-service program to determine that equipment taken out-of-service vas being properly controlled in accordance with established pro-
'l cedures. A review of nut-of-service card numbers III-288, III-499,
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(T III-508, III-509, and III-510, indicates that the licensee's program
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appears to be functioning adequately.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Review of Plant Operations (Units 1, 2, and 3)
The inspectors reviewed the plant operations including examinations of the control room log books, routine patrol sheets, shift engineer log books, equipment outage logs, special operating orders, and jumper and tag out logs for the period of January 1 - March 28,1977.
The inspector also made visual observations of routine surveillance and functional tests in progress during this period.
This review was conducted to confirm that facility operations is in conformance with the requirements established in the Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures. A review of the licensee's deviation reports for this time period was conducted to confirm that no vio-lations of the licensee's Technical Specifications were made.
The inspector made a visual observation of the licensee's shif t change on the morning shift for March 15, 1978, and determined that an adequate turnover of shif ts was being conducted by the licensee.
In discussions with licensee representatives the inspector determined
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that the shif t engineer on duty at this time was the only shif t engineer to conduct a meeting with operations personnel prior to the
beginning of this shift. Further discussions with licensee represen-tatives indicates that other shift engineers while not performing a formal meeting, do transmit operational information by visiting the specific site where operating personnel are working. No signif-icant concerns were identified.
The inspector observed several shift changes during the inspection in the month of March to determine the adequacy of transfer of information. The following concern was identified:
During a routine inspection of Unit 2 day-shift plant operations on March 22, 1978, the inspector noted that the gland seal leakoff drain pump switch associated with the HPCI system was in pull-to-lock. The inspector questioned the NSO as to the reason for the switch being in pull-to-lock. The NSO indicated that there was no apparent reason for the occurrence and placed the switch in auto-matic. Further investigation revealed that the switch apparently had been placed in pull-to-lock during the mid-shif t and this information was not turned over during shift change. In accordance with QP 14-51, " Inspection, Test and Operating Status for Operations
- Tagging," and DAP 3-5, " Implementation Procedure for Commonwealth Instructions 1-3-A-1 and 1-3-A-29 (Out-of-Service and Personnel
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( 'T Protection)" any equipment removed from service shall have an out-of-
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service card affixed. Also in accordance with DAP 7-2, " Conducting
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of Operating Shift Routine," this type of item shall be turned over during shift changeover. This item is another indication of.inade-quate control over equipment out-of-service status and is considered an item of, noncompliance.
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13.
Plant Tour The inspectors conducted a tour of the Units 1, 2, and 3 reactor buildings and turbine building throughout the month of March, and noted that monitoring instrumentation was recording as required, radiation control was properly established, fluid leaks and pipe
vibrations were minimal, seismic restraint oil levels appeared adequate, and equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control
room records. No significant concerns were identified.
14.
Maintenance Activities During a Refueling Outage, Unit 3 The inspector verified that maintenance activities procedures during a refueling outage included administrative controls for removing the system from service and returning it to service, holdpoints for inspection / audit and signoff by QA or other licensee personnel, pro-visions for testing following maintenance, provisions for assuring
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that system valves, breakers, and switches were aligned for normal l
service, provisions for the removal of jumpers, and assigned respon-
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sibility for reporting to licensee management details concerning design or construction-related deficiencies identified during main-tenance; that maintenance activities were performed in accordance with these approved procedures; and that maintenance activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
The inspector reviewed licensee procedures DAP 4-2, " Conduct of Maintenance," DAP 15-1,
" Work Requests," QP 3-52, " Design Control for Operations - Plant Maintenance," and Dresden QAM, Section 4.1.
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The inspector also personally observed maintenance activities con-cerning the CRD return nozzle and the cleanup system flow control valve removal and replacement. The activities appeared to be con-ducted in accordance with approved procedures and by qualified
personnel.
I No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
15.
Inoffice Review of Licensee Event Reports (Units 1, 2, and 3)
An inoffice review was conducted on the following licensee event reports. No concerns were identified.
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Unit 1
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LER No.77-041, Unit 1 Leakage from Waste Collector LER No.78-002, Failure of 2/3 diesel fire pump to start LER No.78-003, Core Spray Restraint Snubber inoperable Unit 2
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LER No.77-034, Group 1 Isolation from Main Steam Line Temperature Strips LER No.77-037 (Update report), Failure of Recirculation Suction Valve 202-4B to close LER No.77-038, Packing Leak found on MSIV 203-2B LER No.77-050, Drywell personnel airlock failed LLRT LER No.77-057 (Update report), Single rod withdrawal in refuel mode failure LER No.77-065, LPCI pump room flooded LER No.77-068. Failure of turbine first stage pressure switch LER No.77-069, Failure of IRM #13 LER No.77-070, Failure of No. 2 diesel generator LER No.77-071, Failure of No. 2/3 diesel generator LER No.77-072, Failure of Unit 2 diesel generator
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LER No.77-073, Breaker 2871 found in test position
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LER No.77-074, Failure of IRM #13
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LER No.77-075, Failure of Unit 2 diesel generator LER No.77-076, Nitrogen storage tank supply out of Tech Spec limits LER No.77-077, Failure of torus to drywell vacuum breaker #2-1601-32B LER No.77-078, Unit 2/3B relief valve failed to open LER No.77-082, Failure of pressure switch No. 1632A-1 LER No.77-081 Failure to properly calibrate flow converters LER No.78-001, Unit 2 diesel generator failure LER No.78-002, SBLC System inoperable LER No.78-003, Tip Ball Valve failed to close LER No.78-004, Improper Unit 2/3 125VDC cable separation LER No.78-007, Failure to perform standby gas treatment system surveillance adequately Regarding LER No.77-065, the licensee was found in noncompliance in inspection report No. 50-237/77-32.
Regarding LER Nos.77-070, 071, 072, 075, and 78-001, the licensee is presently conducting an extensive failure analysis and review of the diesel generator program. These licensee event reports are con-sidered closed and the issue will be followed as an unresolved item.
Regarding LER No.77-073, the licensee was found in noncompliance in inspection report No. 50-237/77-35.
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inspection report No. 50-237/77-35.
Regarding LER No.78-002, the licensee was found in noncompliance in inspection report No. 50-237/77-35.
Regarding LER No.78-004, the final fix on the Unit 2 and 3 125VDC cable separation is scheduled to be completed in September, 1978.
For reporting purposes, this LER is closed and the issue will be carried as an unresolved item.
During this review, the inspector determined that the licensee had identified and corrected two areas of concern.
Unit 3 LER No.77-053, Failure of #3 diesel generator LER No.77-054, Failure of Unit 3 and Unit 2/3 diesel generator LER No.77-059, Lockout of Unit 3 Automatic Backup Emergency Power Regarding LER No.77-054, the licensee is presently conducting an extensive failure analysis and review of.the diesel generatur program.
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These licensee event' reports are considered closed and the issue will
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be followed as an unresolved item.
With respect to LER No.77-059, this incident was reviewed onsite
'by the ins;ector at the time of the incident and the licensee was found in noncompliance in inspection report No. 50-249/77-33.
16.
Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (Units 1, 2, and 3)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of the records, the following licensee event reports were reviewed to determine that reporting requirements were ful-filled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent reoccurrence had been accomplished in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
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Unit 1 LER No.77-035, Offgas monitor #2 failed LER No.78-004, Excessive Heatup rates LER No.78-005, Temporary diesel generator failure and transformer 13 lockout LER No.78-006, Failure of Unit 1 temporary diesel generator
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( 'T Regarding LER No.78-004, the licensee identified the cause of the
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excessive heatup rate as a procedure error. The inspector determined that while an inadequate procedure in all probability contributed to the problem, an operator error was made when the operator failed to review or observe the intermediate range instruments during the approach to critical. Conceivably the procedure can be improved to remind the. operator to make the observations however, from discussions with the licensee's operating personnel and from past experience on this unit, the inspector determined that the operator could have prevented the excessive heatup rates by being more attentative. The inspector informed the licensee that a limiting condition for operations was exceeded as a result of an inadequate procedure and contributing personnel unattentativeness and is an item of noncompliance.
The inspector also noted that the licensee had identified and corrected one area of concern regarding Unit 1.
Unit 2 LER No.77-045, Excessive Leakage through B feedwater check valve LER No.77-056, #2A CCHX water sample contaminated LER No.77-058, Torus Air Sample Isolation Valves Failed LLRT
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LER No.77-062, Improper ESS separability identified on wiring for the condenser high water level cire water pump trip
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LER No.77-067, Failure of valve 1601-63 LER No.77-080, Failure of Unit 2 HPCI LER No.78-005, Torus water volume exceeded Regarding LER No.78-005, the licensee informed the inspector that the installation of a redundant level indicator will be completed by the end of the Unit 3 refueling outage.
The inspector also determined that this area of concern has been identified and corrected by the licensee's audit program.
Unit 3 LER No.77-050, cleanup System Inlet Isolated on High pressure LER No.77-051, Reactor level switch setpoint drift LER No.77-052, Isolation Condenser Flow Switch drift LER No.77-056, Flow control on HPCI failed LER No.77-057, LPCI heat exchanger discharge valve failed to open LER No.77-058, Pressure switch 3-263-53A found valved out Regarding LER 77-058, the inadvertant valving out of pressure switch 3-263-53A was identified by the licensee in their routine l
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audit program. The inspector also determined that adequate cor-
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rective action had been implemented and that this area of concern
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was properly corrected.
17.
Review of Safety Limits, Limiting Safety System Settings, and Limiting Conditions f or Operations DInits 2, 3)
The follo ing SL, LSSS, and LCO's were reviewed to determine the licensee's conformance with the Technical Specifications. The review included direct observations, review of recorder charts, surveillance requirement records, and equipment tag out logs.
a.
Intermediate Range Monitors b.
Reactor Vessel Temperatures Reactor Primary Water Flow and Level Instrumentation c.
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LPCI Operability Primary Containment Isolation Valves e.
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Diesel Generator Operability No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
18.
Exit Interviews
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Exit Interview Conducted on March 8, 1978
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The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1.a) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 8, 1977. The inspec-tor summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee
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representatives made the following remarks in response to one item discussed by the inspector:
Acknowledged the apparent item of noncompliance regarding the excessive heatup temperatures on Unit 1 (paragraph 16). Stated they believe the cause of the excessive temperatures was pri-marily as a result of an inadequate procedure and that no operator error was involved. The inspector stated that av additional review of this incident would be conducted and will be discussed at a future meeting.
Exit Interview Conducted on March 16, 1978 The inspector met with licensee representatives noted in paragraph f
l 1.b, at the conclusion of the inspection on March 16, 1978. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee made the following comments.
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(3 Acknowledged the deviation identified in paragraph 2, regarding
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a training program for management control of modification packages. Stated that the training will start on March 27, 1978.
Acknowledged the inspector's comments regarding the inadequacy of the response to IE Bulletin 77-05 and 77-05A. Stated that a sup'plemental report will be sent to the Region III office within 30 days (Paragraph 7).
Exit Interview Conducted on March 23, 1978 The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in para-graph 1.3), at the conclusion of the inspection on March 8, 1978.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee representatives made the following remarks in response to one item discussed by the inspector:
Acknowledged the apparent item of noncompliance regarding the failure to properly control the gland steam leakoff pump control room switch in accordance with the licensee's out-of-service program (paragraph 12). Stated they could not find out who took the pump out of service.
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Notified the inspector that the commitment to implement ccrrective action on the noncompliance identified in inspec-tion report 50-10/77-35, 50-237/77-32, 50-249/77-30, will not be completed by March 31, 1978. The licensee stated that the additional time needed was unknown at this time, however, every attempt will be made to comply with the original com-mitment. The inspector acknowledged the licensee's notifi-cation.
Exit Interview Conducted on March 28, 1978 The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in para-graph 1.b) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 28, 1978.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee representatives made the following remarks in response to certain of the items discussed by the inspectors:
Acknowledged the deviation identified in paragraph 2, relating to the failure to conduct a mod training program. Stated that the training program had been started on March 27, 1978 and would continue until finished.
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i The inspector noted that through discussions with licensee
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representatives, that the training program has been started and informed the licensee that no further response would be required of thi. deviation.
Acknowledged the apparent item of noncompliance regarding the excessive heatup temperatures on Unit 1 (paragraph 16). Stated that the Unit 1 startup procedures have been revised to include cautions to the operator to prevent a reoccurrence of this event.
The inspector informed the licensee that the procedures regarding to Unit 1 startup have been reviewed and the changes noted. As a result of this pre _edure revision, the licensee need not respond further to this apparent noncompliance.
Informed the inspector tt.at as a result of investigation com-mittee delays the licensee will not be able to implement the corrective actions outlined in their January 9, 1978 respense
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to the IE Inspection Report No. 50-10/77-35, 50-237/77-32, 50-249/77-30. As a result of this delay, the licensee stated that a schedule for ir.plementing corrective action will be issued to the inspector by April 15, 1978.
The inspector
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agreed with this request and stated that the schedule for imple-meeting corrective action will be reviewed in a future inspection.
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