IR 05000010/1997022

Insp Repts 50-010/97-22,50-237/97-22 & 50-249/97-22 Between 971014 & 17.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Plant Support,Which Reviewed & Evaluated Quality of Security Related Audits

ML20198Q175
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	11/04/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198Q157	List: IR 05000010/1997022 ML20198Q152
References
50-010-97-22, 50-10-97-22, 50-237-97-22, 50-249-97-22, NUDOCS 9711120131
Download: ML20198Q175 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlll Docket Nos: 50-010; 50-237; 50 249 License Nos: DPR 2; DPR 19; DPR 25 Report Nos: 50-010/97022(DRS); 50 237/97022(DRS);

50 249/97022(DRS)

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)

Facliity: Dresden Nuclear Station, Units 1,2 and 3 Location: R. R. N Morris,IL 60450 Dates: Beiweeri October 14 and 17,1997

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Inspector: T Madeda, Physical Security incpector Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Reports 50-010/97022; 50 237/97022; 50 249/97022 This inspection included a review of plant support activities relating to the physical protection of your facility. This inspection effort reviewed and evaluated the quality of security related audits, verified the performance of the security alarm stations and communications, evaluated the effectiveness of security equipment testing and maintenance support activities, and followed up on previous inspection findings. The Inspection was conduced between October 14 and 17, 199 .

Security force members performed competently and demonstrated a working knowledge of security requirements, except as noted in Section S1.1. Performance and maintenance support activities for security related equipment were appropriate to meet regulatory requirements. Security managers generally demonstrated sound problem resolutio .

Licensee auditors identified on two occasions that security officers failed to detect prohibited items during unannounced search drills, and on one other occas!on an auditor observed that a security officer failed to conduct a proper search of a vehicle's cargo compartment. These inadequacies showed poor search techniques !nvolving skill-based errors. (Section S1.1)

• The licensee's security force identified six occasions that unsearched packages stored in the protected area were not adequately contro!Ied by non security personnel. These findings resulted from initial licensee corrective action in response to an inspector identified violation identified during our last inspection. These findings confirmed that the inspector's finding was not an isolated occurrence, and inat cognizant non-security personnel were not aware of their responsible to control unsearched packages in the protected area. (Section S1.2)

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I Egoort Detalls IV. Plant Support S1 Conduct of Security and S4 feguards Activities Si.1 Snarch Drill Deficiencies Insoectiod Scoce (81700. 81070. 81072 and 81074)

The inspector reviewed audit records / reports conducted by the licensee's Quality and Safety / Assessment Department and interviewed cognizant licensee and security contractor personnel regarding audit results. Inspector review included review of Audit Report No.12 97-08, an interview with a cognizant licensee audit department manager, and interviews with liconi,ee and contractor security managers. The inspector also observed search activities to review the effactiveness of the licensee's security search program, Observations and Findings During our review of licensee security Audit Report No.12 97-08, the Inspector noted that the auditors identified three drill failures by security personnel to conduct proper searches. One of the failures was identical to a drill failure from the last audit. The auditors also determined that the failures could have a negative impact on both plant and personnel safety because they demonstrated that undetected prohibited items could be introduced in to the protected area. Because of the audit findings the inspector conducted an evaluation of the effectiveness of the licensee's security search program, inspector review of licensee Audit Report No.12 97-08 noted that when officers were challenged during two unannounced drills they failed to identify simulated contraband items during the searches of a hand-carried package and a person. An identical package drill failure had also occurred in the previous audit conducted in 1996, in addition, the auditors identified that a vehicle search officer had failed to search a portion of a vehicle's cargo compartment until the auditor questioned the officer, inspector interview WRh the Assistant Station Security Administrator showed that the facts presented in it'e audit were correct. The assistant administrator attributed the failures to the officers not following procedural guidance, attention to detail and not self-checking. The . inspector concluded that officer complacency was a key factor in the failures. To prevent recurrence the administrator detailed actions taken and planne Those actions included disciplinary measures implemented in accordance with the contractor's work policy and re-training of the specific officer's, establishment of a security management / employee " task force" to evaluate the root causes of the failures, conduct re-training on security standards and licensee search program expectations, require first lina security supervisors to attend " error reduction" training class, and require supervisors to observe actual searches and interview personnel on searching techniques to identify skill-base error )

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O Our inspection showed an increase in security supervisory oversight of search activities from previous inspections. Inspector obr orvatiori and interviews with search officers identified no problems. To verify that the above licansee corrective action is effective to prevent reoccurrence, the search program will be enluated during the next security inspection. This Nding was identified as an inspectico Follow up item (IFl 50-10/97022-01: 5N37/97022-01; 50 249/97022 01). Conc!usions The inspector concluded that the licensee self identified drill search failures were caused by skill-based errors resulting from officer complacency in conducting searches and less than effective oversight of search programs. Inspector observation of search activities, which included our observation of increased oversight activity, identified no search problems. Failure to conduct proper searches demonstrated a fundamental deficiency in ensuring positive access control to the protec.ed area.

i S Package Control Deficiencies lDSoection ScoDe f81700 and 81072)

The inspector reviewed documentation and interviewed cognizant personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's program to maintain positive control of packages within the protected area. The review included security !ncident reports, loggable events, problem identification forms (PlFs), interviews with cognizant security personnel and lospector observation, Observations and Findings During the review of the documents referenced above, the inspector noted that on six occasions since August 13,1997, unsearched factory sealed packages were found to be improperly secured. On each of those occasions, security personnel had identified that sealed packages were stored in an unlocked and unattended are Inspector interviews with the Assistant Station Security Administrator showed that he has been working with station management to establish measures to ensure that non-security personnel implement package control requirements in accordance with sacurity plan requirements. Those measures were being developed during the course of this inspection and were not available for our revie During cur last inspection, we identified a violation that factory sealed packages in one location were not being properly controlled in initial response, the licensee secured the area, and implemented security oversight activities to evaluate the scope of the proble Results of the initial oversight activities demonstrated to the assistant administrator that corrective action in the area of employee awareness to control packages was also necessary, in the licensee's response to our violation that was referenced above,

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security personnel assigned security package control tasks are sufficiently trained and are held accountable to properly implement packago control security requirements.

' ConcluslQnQ The inspector noted that security oversight activities were effective in identifying

additional package control problems, in response to those f.'ndings licensee corrective action will be implemented to heighten the awareness of responsible plant personnel to

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ensure proper package controls. The inspector will evaluate those measures during a future inspection.

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S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards lasues S8,1 (Ocen) V!clation.(fiO 10/97017 01(DRS): 50 237/97017 01(DRS): 50 249/97017-01 (DRS)): The violation involved a failure to control unsearched packages in the protected area.

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Inspector review showed that the inillal corrective action, which included securing the storage area where the packages were maintained and establishing security oversight of the package control program, was effective. The inspector noted that the increased

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oversight resulted in the licensee's security force identifying six further examples of unsecured packages. Based on those findings, the licensee determined that the inspector's finding was not an isolated occurrence. The licensee is in the process of conducting a comprehensive evaluation of their on site package control program. (Note:

Licensea response to our violation is due by November 1,1997.) Section S described specific inspector findings and licensee corrective measures to be implemented to prevent recurrenc .

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V. Management Meeting X1 Exiting Meeting Summarv The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 17,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented,

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. Abrell, NRC Coordinator P. Laird, Corporate Security Manager R. Morely, Jr., Nuclear Security Administrator J. Perry, Site Vice President B. Quick, Acting Station Security Administrator C. Richards, Audit Supervisor of Quality and Safety Assessment D. Winchester, Manager of Quality and Safety Assessment Burns International Security Serv;ces. In J. French, Regional Manager F. Sadnick, Security Force Manager D. Tielbur, Operations Coordinator Nuclear Reculatorv Commission B. Dickson, Resident inspector K. Riemer, Senior Resident inspector D. Roth, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81700 Physical Security Program For Power Reactors IP 81034 Security Program Audit IP 81070 Access Control- Personnel IP 81072 Access Control- Packages IP 81074 Access Control Vehicles ITEMS OPENED, CLOSilD AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-10;237;249/97022-01 IFl Search drill deficiencies Discussed 50-10;237;249/97017-01 VIO Failure to control packages within the protected are .