IR 05000010/1978014
| ML19340A877 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1978 |
| From: | Julie Hughes, Knop R, Parker J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340A872 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-78-14, 50-10-78-14, 50-237-78-12, 50-249-78-14, NUDOCS 8009040697 | |
| Download: ML19340A877 (8) | |
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I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-010/78-14; 50-237/78-12; 50-249/78-14 Docket No. 50-10; 50-237; 50-249 License No. DPR-2; DPR-19, DPR-25 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted: April 5, 6, 18, 19, and 24-26, 1978 fl f-M'7[
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Inspectors:
J. L. Barker f
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$' AS* 70 3. Hughes b M'
N. J.7 hri sotimos Approved By:
R. C.
op C 8-2.3-78-Reactor Projects Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on April 5, 6, 18, 19, and 24-26, 1978 (Report No. 50-010/78-14; 50-237/78-12; 50-249/78-14)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of calibration of Units 2 and 3 instrumentation, review of plant' operations, inoffice review of LER's, onsite review of LER's, and IE Bulletin followup. The inspection involved 95 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the five areas inspected, there were no items of noncompliance or deviations in four areas; two apparent items of noncompliance were iden-tified in one area (infraction - failure to follow an approved procedure -
Paragraph 7; infraction - failure to have an adequate procedure for preven-tative maintenance operations - Paragraph 7).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- B.
Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- B.
Shelton, Assistant to the Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Lead Operating Engineer
- D.
Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor
- G. Reardanz, Quality Assurance Coordinator E. Budzichowski, Unit 1 Operating Engineer C. Sargent, Unit 3 Operating Engineer
J. Kolanowski, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
- R. Kyrouac, Quality Control Engineer
- D.
Santanna, Technical Staff
- J.
Brunner, Technical Staff
- J. Philon, Technical Staff
- G.
Frankovich, Master Electrician The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foreman, and
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j maintenance personnel.
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- denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Calibration of Units 2 and 3 Instrumentation The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for Units 2 and 3 calibrations to determine whether the calibration of components and equipment associated with safety-related systems and/or
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functions identified in the Technical Specifications as requiring calibration at a specific frequency are calibrated. The review consisted of verifying the frequency of calibration, acceptance values, detailed stepwise instructions, and review of procedures used to calibrate the components. The Technical content, component trip points, and calibration instruments appeared adequate. The
inspector also witnessed calibrations in progress at the time of the inspection.
i No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Review of Plant Operations Prior to Startup af ter Refueling Outage (
The inspector verified that plans exist to test the primary cooling system, nuclear instrumentation system, feedwater system, control rod i
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l drive system, and emergency core cooling systems which underwent
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maintenance or were disturbed during the refueling outage and that
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the plant startup procedures require adherence to the licensee's
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Technical Specifications and commitments, as they pertain to startup testing and power operation prerequisites, i
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Review of Plant Operations (Units 1, 2, and 3)
The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations of the control room log books, routine patrol sheets, shift engineer log book, equipment outage logs, special operating orders, and jumper and tagout logs.for the period of April 1 through Apri1~ 26, 1978. The inspector also made visual observations of routine surveillance and functional test and progress during this period.
This review was conducted to confirm that the facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical i
Specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures. A review of the licensee's deviation reports for this time period was conducted to confirm that no violations of the licensee's technical specifi-
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cations were made. The inspector also observed several shift changes f
during the inspection in the month of April to determine the adequacy
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j of transfer of information. The shift changes appeared to be adequate and a definite improvement over the month of March.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Plant Tour The inspector conducted a tour of the Units 1, 2, and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings throughout the month of April, and noted that the monitoring instrumentation was recording as required, I
radiation control was properly established, fluid leaks and pipe
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vibrations were minimal, seismic restraint oil levels appeared
' adequate, and. equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control
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room records..
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Inoffice Review of Licensee Event Reports (Units 1, 2, and 3)
The inspector conducted an inoffice review of the following licensee
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event reports to verify that the details were clearif reported to
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the NRC as required by technical specifications, licansee conditions, or regulations and that the reporting requirements were met; the i
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report was adequate to aseess the event, the causa appeared accu-
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rate and was supported by the report details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, and the generic applicability to other components, similar systems, or activities within the facility or licensed operation was considered. The following will be a listing of those LER's which were reviewed inoffice.
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Unit 1 LER 78-008, Contaminated Liquid Spill in the Radwaste Control Room and on the Outside Gravel LER 78-010, Failure to Make Hourly Fire Inspections of D1 Scram Solenoid Circuitry LER 78-014. Improper Level in the Emergency Condenser Unit 2 LER 78-006, Primary Containment Oxygen Content in Excess of Technical Specifications
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LER 78-011, Setpoint for Reactor Level Switch in Excess of
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Technical Specifications Limit Unit 3 LER 78-001, Instrument Drift of IRM No. 15 and No. 16 LER 78-002, Valve MO-3-1501-5C, Failure to Reopen After Performing a Routine Surveillance
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (Units 1, 2, and 3)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following licensee event reports were reviewed to determine that reporting requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence have been accomplished in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
Unit 1 LER 78-017, Resin Storage Tank Overflow of Contaminated Liquid
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Unit 2
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LER 78-006, Primary Conta'inment Oxygen Content in Excess of Technical Specifications LER 78-008, Inoperable Torus to Reactor Building Vacuum Breakers LER 78-012, Main Steam Line Isolation Valve (MSIV) Pilot Valve Temperature in Excess of Technical Specifications LER 78-024, Loss of Isolation Condenser Regarding LER 78-006, the inspector determined that the cause of low pressure in the calibration gas bottle was a leaking fitting on the calibration gas bottle hookup. The plant equipment operator makes a shift inspection of the pressure in the calibration gas
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bottle. The calibration gas bottles and the sar.ple station for determining primary containment oxygen content are on different levels of the reactor building. Therefore, tha operator calibrating the oxygen content instruments was unaware that the gas bottle had insufficient pressure to perform an adequate calibration. During
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the next routine shift inspection, the equipment operator found the calibration gas bottle apparatus had insufficient pressure and a
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leaking fitting. The fitting was repaired, calibration gas was restored, and the oxygen analyzer was properly calibrated. At this time the licensee determined that the primary containment oxygen content exceeded Technical Specificatioc3 limitations. The cause of the oxygen leakage into primary contaim ent was determined by the licensee to be a A0-1601-20B, a 20" butterfly valve. The mal-function in the valve was subsequently repaired. This item is considered a licensee identified item of noncompliance.
Regarding LER 78-008, the inspector determined that this item is not reportable to the NRC since the incident was not less conser-vative than the most conservative aspect of the licensee's limiting ccndition for operation in their Technical Specifications.
Regarding LER 78-012, the inspector determined the cause of MSIV pilot air temperatures in excess of Technical Specifications was caused by an inadequate procedure. DMP 233 did not delineate how the thermocouples on the MSIV pilot valves were to be removed, or how they were to be replaced following the completion of preven-tative maintenance on the MSIV's.
This is contrary to Technical.
Specifications requiring that procedures for preventative and corrective maintenance operations which could have.an effect on i-5-
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the safety of the plant be prepared, approved, and adhered to.
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This item is, therefore, considered an item of noncompliance.
The licensee has approved a new instrumentation procedure, DIS 250-8, which requires the functional testing and. inspection of the thermocouples associated with the MSIV's prior to the recovery from a refueling outage and primary containment closeout.
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DMP 233 is also being revised to delineate specifically how the mentioned thermocouples are to be both removed and replaced after the completion of maintenance. The inspector determined corrective action to be adequate and no response is necessary from the licensee on this item.
Regarding LER 78-024, the inspector determined the cause of loss of feed to the Unit 2 Reactor Building 250VDC MCC No. 2 bus was an operator failing to follow an approved procedure, DOP 6900-B.
Details of the event are delineated in inspection report No. 50-237/
78-09.
Failure to follow an approved operating procedure is contrary to the licensee's Technical Specification and is considered an item of noncompliance. The licensee performed a formal and in-depth investigation into this event. Action to prevent recurrence of the event was as follows: A temporary procedure change should be
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written, reviewed, and approved prior to work assignment; shift
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supervisors will be instructed to communicate the work assignments
with the use of procedures and diagrams; in plant switching orders
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will be written by the operator to minimize errors in ide.ntification and operating sequence; labeling of the breakers and valves in these DC buses will be changed to prevent confusion; procedure DOP 6900-8 will be revised to be consistent with the labeling of the breakers; all personnel will be instructed to read labeling on all brcakers, valves, and other plant component 3 '7s11 the labeling is proven wrong; occurrences of this type will be reviewed promptly by the shift engineer with all personnel; shift supervisors will be instructed to review thoroughly with their subordinates all the circumstances involved when dealing with a problem; the shift engineer will review operating orders for work which affects more than one unit and insure that subordinates with primary responsibility for one unit are aware of all work which could affect the unit; and tail-gate sessions will be held by the shif t engineers covering good operating, switching, and trouble shooting practices. The inspector considers the licensee's corrective action to be adequa's and no response to the item of noncompliance is necessary.
No further items of concern were identified.
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8.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins
. l The inspector reviewed the licensee's responses to IE Bulletins 77-05,77-05A, and 77-06, to verify that licensee managemen.t forwarded copies of the bulletins to the appropriate onsite management representativss;
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that information discussed in the licensee's responses was accurate; and that corrective action taken, if any, was done as described in the response. The inspector also determined that copies of the bulletins were forwarded to the Station Superinter_ dent; complete systematic review by the plant was made to determine if any of the connectors or penetrations were those types identified in the IE Bulletins; and the licensee's responses were accurate, based on the inspector's review of applicable electrical drawings, specifications and observations:
Regarding Unit 1, through direct observation and record review, the inspector and licensee determined there were cables supplying equip-ment required to operate during and after LOCA or Steam Line Break Accident have " butt splices" for connections. The material used for these splices is 3M Scotchcast - 82-3A kit with epoxy resin No. 4.
The licensee indicated that through communications with the 3M Company, the mentioned splices could not be environmentally qualified. In
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October, 1978, Dresden Unit 1 will be shutdown for an extended outage to perform system Decon and the complete various ECCS updating.
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Those cables under investigation will be removed and replaced with new cabling which will be qualified to IEEE 279 specifications.
This information will be forwarded to IE:HQ and to NRR for further review and recommendations.
Regarding Units 2 and 3, it was determined that " butt splices" were made on all cables which are required to function during or after a LOCA or Steam Line Break Accident were constructed using American - Pamcor, Incorporated, preinsulated butt connectors (Nylon Window Splice). A letter from General Electric Company to Dresden Nuclear Power Station, dated April 28, 1978, concerning Dresden Units 2 and 3 stated in part, " earlier this year you were sent a letter report entitled, ' Qualification Test for F01 Elec-trical Penetration Assembly,' by R. M. Schuster, dated April 30, 1971. Figure 1 in that report refers to an ' insulated splice'
which was typical of 120 connections which were subjected to LOCA conditions of the qualification test. These devices, which all passed the qualification test, were Thomas A. Betts or equivalent butt splices with nylon covers. The GE supplied butt splices for the wire gauge 10 through 22 for Dresden 2 and 3 were typical of those tested."
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The inspector reviewed documentation for containment penetration assemblies associated with the ACAD/ CAM System modification
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(Sargeant and Lundy specifications K-4036). The certification test results for these two penetrations were not available at the site for the inspectors review. The system has not been placed in oper-
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i ation at this tLae. This iten is, therefore, considered an
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unresolved item.
No items of noncompliance ot deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 26, 1978.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the items of noncompliance discussed by the inspectors.
Mr. J. Barker inform 13 the licensee representatives that he was the Principal Inspector for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station effective April 28, 1978.
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