IR 05000010/1985015

Insp Repts 50-010/85-15,50-237/85-35 & 50-249/85-30 on 851101-860107.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Previous Findings,Operational Safety,Maint/Mods, Surveillances,Events,Lers & Refueling Activities

ML20137K933
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	01/15/1986
From:	Boyd D, Rescheske P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137K923	List: IR 05000010/1985015 ML20137K917
References
50-010-85-15, 50-10-85-15, 50-237-85-35, 50-249-85-30, 50-249J-85-30, NUDOCS 8601240279
Download: ML20137K933 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION III

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Reports No. 50-010/85015(DRP); 50-237/85035(DRP); 50-249/85030(DRP)

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Docket Nos.50-010; 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-02; DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690 i

Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection At:

Dresden Site, Morris, IL

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Inspection Conducted:

November 1,1985 thru January 7,1986 Inspectors:

L. G. McGregor S. Stasek

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E. A. Hare

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R. A. Hasse ckz9

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affe d Approved By:

D. C. Boyd, Ch f

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Projects Section 20 Date

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Inspection Summary i

l Inspection during the period of November 1,1985 thru January 7,1986 (Reports No. 50-10/85015(DRP); 50-237/85035(DRP); 50-249/85030(DRP))

Areas Inspected:

Routine unannounced resident inspection of previous findings, operational safety, maintenance / modifications, surveillances, events, licensee event reports, refueling activities, refueling surveillance, and report review.

The inspection involved a total of 458 inspector-hours onsite by five NRC inspectors including 59 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no violations were identified.

8601240279 860

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company

• D. Scott, Station Manager J. Wujciga, Production Superintendent

• R. Flessner, Services Superintendent

• T. Ciesla, Assistant Superintendent, Operations

R. Zentner, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance

• J. Brunner, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services

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R. Christensen, Unit 1 Operating Engineer

J. Almer, Unit 2 Operating Engineer

J. Kotowski, Unit 3 Operating Engineer W. Pietryga, Unit 3 Operating Engineer for Recirc. Piping Replacement J. Achterberg, Technical Staff Supervisor

• D. Adam, Compliance Administrator

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J. Doyle, Q.C. Supervisor D. Sharper, Waste Systems Engineer S. Mcdonald, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor J. Mayer, Station Security Administrator J. Schrage, Radiation Protection Supervisor

• P. Lau, Q.A. Supervisor R. Stobert, Q.A. Inspector The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operatcrs, shift engineers and foremen, electrical,

mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personnel.

• Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on January 7,1986 and informally at various times throughout the

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inspection period.

2.

Followup on Previeus Inspection Findings

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(Closed) Violation (50-237/84015-07(DRS); 50-249/84014-07(DRS)):

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Failure to improve suitability of application reviews on vendors as required by Quality Requirement 4.0, Section 4.1.

The required reviews for the auxiliary relay and strip chart recorders have been performed by the licensee. The spare motor for the auxiliary oil pump had been placed under hold tag control pending a decision to replace the motoi or perform the suitability review.

Changes have been made to procurement procedures to better define the necessity

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to include this requirement in procurement documents. The inspector was satisfied that the specific hardware involved was acceptable or

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under adequate control and that the procedure revisions should l

prevent recurrence of the problem.

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b.

(Closed) Violation (50-237/84015-08(DRS); 50-249/84014-08(DRS)):

Failure to perform a required seismic evaluation for a substitute motor for the HPCI auxiliary oil pump. The motor has been placed under hold tag control pending a decision to perform the seismic evaluation or replace the motor. Revisions have been made to procurement procedures and station procedures that should prevent recurrence of this problem.

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c.

(Closed) Violation (50-237/85016-01(DRS)): A number of procedures were not properly implemented.

The licensee has taken the following actions to correct the deficiencies and to clarify the instructions:

(1) revision of the computer generated data sheet used to perform Procedure DIP 700-6, (2) revision of Procedure DTS 8233, and (3)

revision of the computer program used to perform Procedure DOS 300-4. The inspector reviewed the revised procedures and data sheets, and verified that full compliance was achieved by the specified dates.

Furthermore, revisions are in progress to clarify

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a number of other procedures in which the inspector had identified similar problems.

The inspector has no further concerns in this area.

d.

(Closed) Violation (50-237/85016-02(DRS)): Quality Procedure Q.P.

No.17-51 was not properly implemented. A similar failure to follow Quality Assurance Requirements was identified in Inspection Reports No. 50-237/85008 and No. 50-249/85007; corrective actions were identified and taken in response to that inspection report. The licensee has taken the following actions to correct the above deficiencies:

(1) discussing the need for attention to detail and proper documentation at management and station personnel meetings, and (2) a letter was distributed to all station personnel, dated June 20, 1985, emphasizing the importance of following procedures and increasing efforts in attention to detail. The inspector has no further concerns in this area.

e.

(Closed) Violation (237/84012-03(DRP)):

Recurrence of Corner Room Submarine Door Being Left Open.

Licensee has posted signs by all I

appropriate submarine watertight doors specifying the requirement l

to maintain them closed, issued a memo to Station Construction to allow proper training of contractors, and included instruction on watertight doors into the initial Nuclear Generation Employee Training (N-GET) and yearly N-GET requalification training programs.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found them acceptable, f.

(Closed) Violation (237/84015-01(DRP); 249/84015-01(DRP));

Failure to Follow Procedures for Control Room Alarm Response, Log Keeping,

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and Panel Walkdowns.

Licensee corrective actions took place during the original inspection period and were found to be acceptable by the inspector at that time. Therefore, no formal response or subsequent actions to this violation were required of the licensee.

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g.

(Closed) Violation (249/85009-01(DRP)):

High Pressure Coolant

Injection (HPCI) System Room Cooler Found Inoperable.

Licensee has locked all appropriate valves open for all Emergency Core Cooling System related room coolers and added these valves to the associated i

procedures.

In addition, training sessions were held with plant personnel discussing the event and importance of contacting operating l

supervision prior to any valve manipulations.

Sargent & Lundy conducted an analysis of the HPCI room heat balance without benefit of the room cooler and found the area temperature rise due to the operation of HPCI was gradual enough to provide a significant period of time where the equipment would still remain operable. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found them acceptable.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

3.

Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from November 1, 1985 to January 7, 1986. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the Unit 2 reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests i

had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.

During the inspection period while Unit 3 was in an outage for refueling and replacement of recirculation system piping, the inspectors verified that surveillance tests were conducted, containment integrity require-ments were met, and emergency systems were available as necessary.

Throughout the entire inspection period, Unit I remained in a long-term shutdown condition with all fuel removed from the vessel. The inspectors verified that all applicable requirements for linit I were met during this period.

The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrated.

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a.

Unit 2 Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (both loops)

Core Spray System (both loops)

Emergency Diesel Generator Portions of the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System b.

Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator c.

Unit 2/3 (Common)

J Standby Gas Treatment System Swing Emergency Diesel Generator The inspectors reviewed new procedures and changes to procedures that were implemented during the inspection period. The review consisted of

a verification for accuracy, correctness, and compliance with regulatory requirements.

During review of Dresden Operating Surveillance DOS 6900-5 (Revision 2)

"24/48 Volt Station Battery Capacity Test," the inspector determined the procedure to be deficient in that the current draw specified for the discharge was approximately 85% of the manufacturer's rated discharge current for an eight hour test.

I.E.E.E. Standard 450-1975 as referenced by the procedure specifies that degradation of battery capacity can be detected via a discharge test where the battery bank is drained to a predetermined voltage level. The time of discharge is then compared to the original time of discharge and a percentage of rated capacity can then be determined. This assumes the current utilized for the discharge remains constant from test to test. However, in this case, DOS 6900-5 required the current draw to be at a level substantially lower than the original (baseline) test specified and would have had a direct effect on the battery discharge time.

Therefore, a comparison of test discharge

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times under these conditions would not accurately reflect a thange in

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battery capacity.

The inspector notified licensee personnel of the discrepant condition and they agreed to correct the procedure prior to its usage.

During review of prior capacity tests that were conducted for the 24/48 volt batteries, the inspector determined that no procedural deficiencies previously existed and that the current procedure revision that was found to be discrepant had not been used to date.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

4.

Maintenance / Modification Observation Station maintenance / modification activities involving safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

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The following items were considered during this review:

the limiting

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conditions for operation were met while components or systems were j

removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

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work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality

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j control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of

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outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety i

related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance / modification activities were observed / reviewed:

a.

Unit 2

Modifications to Motor Control Center (MCC) 28-1 for HPCI room cooler logic.

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b.

Unit 2/3 (Common)

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Replacement of insulation on power cable for the Swing Emergency Diesel Generator cooling water pump.

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5.

Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical

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specifications for the Unit 2 Source Range Monitor Rod Block Calibration

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Check and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate a

procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with

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technical specifications and procedura requirements and were reviawed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any

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l deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

t The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

Unit 2/3 (Common)

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Swing Emergency Diesel Generator Standby Gas Treatment System 10 Hour Run No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

6.

Followup of Events During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.

The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee i

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and/or other NRC officials.

In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence. The specific events are as follows:

a.

December 13, 1985, Unit 2.

An Unusual Event was declared at 6:10 a.m., due to both the Unit 2 Diesel generator and swing diesel generator being simultaneously inoperable.

The swing D.G. was declared inoperable at 3:30 a.m., due to damage to the insulation on the cooling water pump power cable. At 6:08 a.m.,

the Unit 2 D.G.

tripped on low water pressure during its required surveillance and was also declared inoperable.

Technical Specifications required the plant to be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, unless corrective measures are completed that satisfy the Limiting Condition of Operation.

The damaged insulation on the power cable for the cooling water pump of the swing D.G. was replaced and successfully tested.

The Unusual Event was terminated at 2:00 p.m.

b.

December 14, 1985, Unit 3.

At 7:00 p.m.,

an employee of the contractor doing work involving decontamination of the torus during the current refuel outage, called the Shift Engineer to report that a worker had been missing for approximately five hours. At about 7:30 p.m., the missing employee's body was found in the torus basement and was confirmed to be dead. An Unusual Event (Fatality)

was declared.

It appears that the worker may have fallen from the catwalk around the outside of the torus about 30 feet above the basement floor. The body was decontaminated onsite and released to the County Coroner.

7.

Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications Unit 2 (Closed) 85-005-01 Inadvertent Group II Isolation.

The supplement LER determined the root cause of the event as operator error.

(Closed) 85-028-01 Reactor Scram From High-High Scram Discharge Volume Level. The licensee, at the recommendation of Fluid Component Incorporated, has lowered the trip setpoint of the instruments to a value below which steam will not spuriously trip the instruments.

(Closed) '5-035-00 Low Condenser Vacuum Scram.

The loss of vacuum was caused by a ruotured expansion joint on the seal steam relief valve discharge line.

To prevent recurrence of event, the licensee has placed

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tags at the seal steam pressure regulators to warn operators of their sensitivity when adjustments are made. A " caution" statement will be added to DOP 5600-2 to further noti fy operators.

(Closed) 85-036-00 Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation from Fuel Pool Rad Monitor Downscale Trip.

This was caused by Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Channel "A" connector being loose.

"B" channel trip point was at low end of tolerance level, resulting in spurious downscale trip signal.

The abnormalities were corrected and reactor t'uilding ventilation system reset.

(Closed) 85-037-00 Standby Gas Treatment System Automatic Start and Reactor Building Ventilation Trip.

This was caused by a Nuclear Station Operator (NS0) removing the wrong fuse to take a valve out of service.

The licensee discussed with the Operations Department the importance of verifying that the correct equipment is taken out of service.

(Closed) 85-038-00 Reactor Vessel Not Vented at Less Than 149 F.

Upon placing valve M0-2-220-2 back in service, it automatically closed due to design interlock circuitry with the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's).

Technical Specifications required that the vessel be vented during the given conditions.

The incident was immediately recognized and promptly corrected. The Technical Specifications are being revised to comply with the current revisions of 10 CFR 50 Appendix G.

(Closed) 85-039-00 Failure to Functionally Test Unit 2/3 Radwaste Tank Farm Level Instrumentation.

The functional test had not been performed by the required date because the surveillance procedure for the test had not been approved and as a result, was not put on the computerized surveillance tracking system. As a corrective action, prior to approval, the surveillance will be put onto the computerize tracking system.

(Closed) 85-040-00 Potential Fire Protection License Condition Violation.

Resulted in a violation, Severity Level IV as referenced in Inspection Report No. 237/85033(ORS).

(Closed) 85-041-00 Reactor Scram on Greater Than 10% Stop Valve Closure. The licensee investigation indicated that an erroneous high water level signal resulted when an Equipment Attendant (EA) was valving the emergency core cooling system yarway level indicating switch back into service.

Corrective action was to discuss the technique for valving transmitters into and out of service in the six week operator training session.

(Closed) 85-042-00 Fire Doors in Degraded Condition.

During a re-evaluation of the 1978 fire protection SER requirements, three fire doors have existed in a modified form since original installation. A fire watch was established immediately per Technical Specifications and will continue until the doors are replaced.

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Unit 3 (Closed) 85-021-00 Exceeded Technical Specifications for type "B" and

"C" Leak Testing of Nitrogen Makeup Isolation Valves. The licensee investigation found that teflon tape, used on the threads of the pipe connected to the valve had become unwrapped and lodged on the seat of the valve. A Supplemental Report shall be submitted, giving the totals for

"as found" and "as left" leakage for type "B" and "C" leak testing.

(Closed) 85-022-00 Personnel Error Responsible for Spurious Low Low Water Level Signal and Group I Isolation. A diver assigned to hydrolaze the CRD return nozzle, became disoriented and mistakenly hydrolazed a reactor instrumentation yarway, causing a spurious low low water level signal and subsequent Group I, II, and III isolation. The reactor was in refuel mode with all fuel removed from the vessel.

(Closed) 85-023-00 Reactor Scram on Low Water Level. The licensee investigation indicated that reactor operator failed to proper;y balance the demand signal of the master controller with the 3A feedwater regulating valve individual controller output.

Corrective action is to write a procedure describing operation and balance of feedwater controllers.

(Closed) 85-024-00 Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Pcwer to Both RPS Buses, Resulting in Reactor Building Ventilation Trip and Automatic Start of Standby Gas Treatment.

The licensee investigation indicated that miscommunication and misunderstanding contributed to the event.

Operating Order 22-85, " Required Discussion Prior to Complex Plant Evolution" will be discussed in the next operator training session.

(Closed) 85-026-00 Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation and Automatic Initiation of Standby Gas Treatment Due to Fuel Handler Error.

The licensee discussed the event with the fuel handling department head foreman.

The preceding LERs have been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, and when the incidents described meet all of the following requirements, no Notice of Violation is normally issued for that item.

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The event was identified by the licensee, b.

The event was an incident that, according to the current enforcement policy, met the criteria for Severity levels IV or V violations, c.

The event was appropriately reported, d.

The event was or will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence within a reasonable amount of time), and e.

The event was not a violation that could have been prevented by the licensee's corrective actions for a previous violation.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

8.

Refueling Activities The inspectors verified that prior to unloading fuel from the core on Unit 3, all surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications and licensee procedures had been completed; verified that, during the outage, periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by Technical Specifications; verified that good housekeeping practices were maintained in the refueling area; and verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with applicable requirements. Several shifts

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of the fuel handling operations were observed and refueling activities i

were verified to be in accordance with Technical Specifications and approved procedures.

The inspectors witnessed vessel head detensioning and fuel unloading operations.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

9.

Surveillance - Refueling

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The inspectors observed / reviewed Unit 3 Fuel Sipping Operations to verify

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that the test was covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with regulatory requirements, licensee commitments, and administrative controls; that minimum crew requirements

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were met, test prerequisites were completed, special test equipment was

calibrated and in service, and required data was recorded for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel conducting the i

test were adequate; and that the test results were adequate.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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Report Review J

During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's

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Monthly Operating Reports for October and November, 1985. The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.

11.

Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

informally throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on January 7,1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.

The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.

The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection.

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