IR 05000010/1987007
| ML20235Q703 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1987 |
| From: | Creed J, Knicely J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235Q663 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-87-07, 50-10-87-7, 50-237-87-23, 50-249-87-22, NUDOCS 8707210103 | |
| Download: ML20235Q703 (4) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
REGION III
Reports No. 50-10/87007(DRSS); No. 50-237/87023(DRSS); No. 50-249/87022(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-10; 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-02; DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Offica Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
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I Inspection At:
Regional Office and at Dresden Station l
Inspection Conducted: June 22-26, and July 6,1987 Type of Inspection: Allegation Review
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Inspector:
%k Miikk7 n
J. R. Kniceley d Date Physical Security Inspector Approved By: %. (L bla (A Midfl J. R. Creed, Chief Date Safeguards Section Inspection Summary Inspection on June 22-26, and July 6,1987 (Reports No. 50-10/87007(DRSS)1 No. 50-237/87023(DRSS); No. 50-249/87022(DRSS))
Arcas Inspected:
Included a review of an allegation received by Region III of inconsistent application of Background Screening Requirements between various Commonwealth Edison Plants.
Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined during the inspection.
The allegation was partially substantiated.
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8707210103 870717 PDR ADOCK 05000010 G
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DETAILS j
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Key Persons Contacted l
B. Saunders, Nuclear Security Administrator, Corporate i
J. Mayer, Dresden Station Security Administrator l
F. Willeford, Braidwood Station Security Administrator D. Hamilton, LaSalle Station, Acting Station Security Administrator J. Roulo, Nuclear Security Staff, Corporate 2.
EntranceandExitInterviews(IP30703J There were no formal entrance or exit interviews conducted. However, a telephone exit interview was conducted with Mr. B. Saunders on July 6, 1987-
l The licensee was advised and acknowledged that the allegation of l
inconsistent application of Background Screening Requirements was i
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l partially substantiated and the allegation is considered closed. An l
I inconsistency in the use of the Personnel Denied Access (PDA) list was identified.
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Independent Inspection - Allegation Review (IP 92706)
l The following information provided in the form of an allegation was reviewed by the inspector as specifically noted below.
Background:
(Closed) Allegation No. RIII-86-A-0195. On December 8, i
1986, a welder, who allegedly has worked at the Braidwood, Dresden and i
LaSalle Nuclear Station, telephoned Reginn III and expressed a concern i
i that he was denied access at LaSalle for an alleged security incident I
while he was employed at Dresden in 1980.
His concern was in the area of consistency in access controls between Commonwealth Edison plants because he has worked at Commonwealth Edison Nuclear Plants since 1980 and has never previously been denied access.
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Allegation:
Inconsistent application of Background Screening Requirements occur between Commonwealth Edison Company Nuclear Plants.
Review: The inspector telephonically interviewed the station I
security administrators and corporate personnel for the Braidwood, Dresden and LaSalle Nuclear Stations.
The information provided was that the individual had worked at Braidwood, Dresden and LaSalle with dif ferent contractor companies, specifically Tri-City Electric, Foley, Ernst-Comstock, and Newberg during various stages of construction and operation.
The information provided was that the individual was involved in a security incident while he worked at Dresden in 1980.
On January 4, 1980, a security officer observed the individual use a piece of wire
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i to open a vital area door which was being controlled by a cardreader.
An incident report was m rie (Number 80-1-4) and the individual'>
access was denied and his dge was destroyed.
The Dresdes StatQn i
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Security Administrator placed the individual's name on the Commonwealth Edison Personnel Denied Access List (PDA), as a result of the incident.
It is Commonwealth Edison company policy that if a person's name appears on their PDA they should be denied unescorted
access pending further review by the site Security Administrator.
On November 13, 1986, MNR/Foley (contractor) submitted a request for unescorted access for the individual at the LaSalle Station l
facility. The reDest was denied because the individual's name l
appeared on the PuA list and it was the Security Administrator's
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decision not to badge the individual. The individual spoke with the LaSalle Station Security Administrator who explained why his access was denied and 'he individual claimed he had never been I
involved in a security incident at Dresden. The individual requested a copy of the incident report and his request was denied
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I because the report was considered as 10 CFR 2.790(d) information by i
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the licensee.
A copy of the incident report (Number 80-l-4) was retrieved and the inspector reviewed the report which showed that the individual was involved in an incident at Dresden and removed from site and his badge was destroyed. The report indicated that the incident was j
reviewed with the individual at the time of its occurrence.
Records review and interviews showed that the individual has not been badged for unescorted access at the LaSalle Station or at the Dresden Station since the security incident in January 1980.
It is possible that the individual has worked at the sites and was badged
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as a visitor.
This potential was not confirmed during the
l inspection since visitors are continuously escorted while onsite, j
An inconsistency with badging of the individual did occur at the
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Braidwood Station on August 12, 1986, when he was issued a protected l
area badge, even though he appeared on the PDA list. This occurred l
because of an administrative error which was made in entering the i
individuai's social security number.
The PDA list was checked by j
social security number and due to the wrong number being entered,
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it was not identified that he was on the list and therefore he was i
I subsequently badged after background screening requirements were met. The inspector reviewed the individual's background screening forms supplied by the contractor and determined that security plan requirements were met.
The individual was badged at Braidwood from August 12, 1986 until September 19, 1986 whe,n he was terminated as part of a routine lay-off.
Conclusion: The inspector reviewed the Background Screening Requirements for unescorted access to Commonwealth Edison nuclear facilities and found the administration of the requirements was
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consistent for all of their nuclear facilities.
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I The inspector determined.that the licensee uses their PDA list as j
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an administrative aid to identify individual's whose need for unescorted access may need further review.
It is at the Security Administrator's discretion if a person on the PDA list is to be allowed access to the plant.
It is recognized that.at timesLan administrative error may occur, as it did in this case. The PDA list is randomly audited by.the Quality Assurance Department.
This procedure is an attempt by the utility to further control access to their facilities.
It is the inspector's position that i
if any program is to be effective it must be adequately and consistently implemented.
The inspector concluded that the allegation of inconsistent application of Background Screening Requirements was partially substantiated, since there was an inconsistency in the use of the PDA list at the Braidwood Station. -This inconsistency was due to an administrative error caused by using an incorrect social i
security account number to check the PDA list. The PDA. list is an i
administrative aid to assist the site security administrators and not a requirement of the NRC approved security plan. However, while an administrative error occurred and contributed to the problem as alleged, the regulatory requirements of the NRC was not violated in this case. This allegation is considered closed.
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