IR 05000010/1993002

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Insp Repts 50-010/93-02,50-237/93-19 & 50-249/93-19 on 930607-10.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Effectiveness,Protected & Vital Area Barriers,Detection Aids & Alarm Stations & Communications
ML20045H418
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/12/1993
From: Creed J, Madeda T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20045H406 List:
References
50-010-93-02, 50-10-93-2, 50-237-93-02, 50-237-93-2, NUDOCS 9307200190
Download: ML20045H418 (2)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-10/93002(DRSS); 50-237/93019(DRSS); 50-249/93019(DRSS)

Dockets No. 50-10; 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-02; DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515

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Facility Name:

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection At:

Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois

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Inspection Conducted:

June 7-10, 1993 Date of Previous Physical Security Inspection:

Between April 7 and 13,1993

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N//93 Inspector:

T.J.padda Date ' '

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Physisfal Security Inspector Approved By:

/ James R. Creed, Chief Date V Safeguards Section

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Inspection Summary Inspection on June 7-10. 1993 (Reports No. 50-10/93002(DRSS):

50-237/93019(DRSS): 50-249/93019(DRSS))

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Areas Inspected:

Routine, announced physical security inspection involving:

Management Effectiveness; Protected and Vital Area Barriers, Detection Aids, and Assessment; Protected and Vital Area Access Controls-Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Testing, Maintenance, and-Compensatory Measures; Followup of Previous Inspection Findings; and Review of a Containment Access Control Issue.

Results:

Licensee overall performance in implementing the security program was good. Tracking and trending of personnel and security equipment performance issues, implementation of day-to-day duties by contractor security personnel, and management support at the site and corporate security level were shown to be positive aspects of the security program.

Site security management was knowledgeable of program implementation requirements and provided good support for the program, A weakness was identified in the Enokuuro Contains

SAFE E 4DS INFORV..ATION Upon Separation This I8

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licensee's security training program regarding personnel implementation of positive access controls to containment.

This weaknc>s resulted in plant personnel violating security containment requiremcats and identification of a violation.

The actual violation did not impact on plant safety.

However, its root cause demonstrated weak security managemert overview of training requirements.

In addition, review of the training program identified a potential reduction in the effectiveness of the security response program.

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JLATION kuntation Thie Pade IS Dooontrolled

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