HL-1941, Special Rept 1-91-009:from 910929-1029,all Fuel Removed from Reactor Vessel & Fire Barriers Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Need to Install Support Plates,Platforms & Conduits.Structural Beams Restored to Operable Status

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Special Rept 1-91-009:from 910929-1029,all Fuel Removed from Reactor Vessel & Fire Barriers Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Need to Install Support Plates,Platforms & Conduits.Structural Beams Restored to Operable Status
ML20086E345
Person / Time
Site: Hatch Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 11/22/1991
From: Beckham J
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
1-91-009, 1-91-9, HL-1941, NUDOCS 9112020021
Download: ML20086E345 (4)


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, -i , o y: S.- I't HL-1941 002544 Novetaber 22, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regu'atory Connission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 SPECIAL REPORT l-91-009 F;RE BARRIER ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14 DAYS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS RE0VIRED BY THE FIRE HAZAF[S ANALYSIS Gentlemen:

In accordar.ce with Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2 and Appendix B of the fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report concerning fire barrier assemblies which were inoperable for a period greater than 14 days.

Sincerely,

h Y-J. T. Beckham, J .

JKB/cr

Enclosure:

Special Report 1-91-009 cc: k atgijLfnwer [gep3ny Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant Mr. J. D. Heidt, Manager Engineering and Licensing - Hatch NORMS r

LS_Jhtc.Le a_r_.Eenablery_Lonm i s s i o n . W a s h i 19 t o n JLL Mr. K. Jabbour, Liter. sing Project Manager - Hatch LS, Nuclear Reaulater.y_fammission. Reaion 11 Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch h

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ENCLOSURE PLANT HAlCH - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-321 OPERAllNG LICENSE DPR-57 SPECIAL REPORT l-91-009 flRE BARRIER ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14 DAYS RESUL15 IN SPECIAL REPOR1 AS RLQUIRED BY THE 11RE HAZARDLANALUIS.

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT 1his report is required by Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2 which states that Special Reports shall be submitted as required by the fire Hazards Analysis (THA) and its Appendix B requirements.

THA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, states that fire rated assemblies and sealing devices in fire rated assemblies separating fire areas shall be operable. Action statement 'b' of FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, allows for the fire rated assembly (ies) or sealing device (s) to be inoperable for up to 14 days. If this time is exceeded, a special report is required.

The subject deficiencies addressed in this report remained inoperable for greater than 14 days to support necessary outage related work.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME Of EVENT On 11/01/91, Unit I was in a refueling outage with the reactor vessel flooded and the core partially loaded.

C. DESCRIPTION Of EVENT On 9/18/91, installatior, of new air handling units commenced in each of the Unit 1 Recirculation Pump Motor Generator (MG) Set rooms in accordance witn Design Change Request (DCR) lH89-243. The work instructions included fabrication and installation of support plates and platforms for the new room coolers, as well as installation of electrical conduits and conduit supports. In order to sopport these work activities, portions of the fire rated structural beams located in the east and west sections of the A and B MG Set rooms had to be stripped of "pyrocrete " a fire retardant material.

In addition, fire doors IL48-lR35 thru -lR38 had to be opened and remained open during the DCR work. The subject fire rated assemblies and fire doors are located in fire areas, 1210 and 1211.

002544 .

HL-1941 E-1

l ENCLOSURE (Continued)

SPECIAL REPORT l-91-009 i flRE BARRIER ASSEMBLIES IN0pERABLE FOR LONGER i THAN 14 DAYS RESULTS IN SPEC'AL REPOR1 l' AS REQUIRED BY THE flRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS l

As required by plant procedures, licensed Control Room personnel were  :

notified prior to the start of work that the DCR work would render the subject fire barrier assemblies inoperable. Subsequently, Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 1-91-528 and 1-91-534 were initiated on  !

9/18/91 and 9/19/91, respectively, by licensed personnel to track the status of the affected fire barriers and ensure compliance with the FHA.

An hourly fire watch was established for the affected fira areas as '

required by FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, Action 'a'.

During the period from 9/29/91 thru 10/29/91, all fuel was removed from the Unit I reactor vessel. In such a condition, it is not possible for a fire to affect safe shutdown capability and thus the time spent in this condition is not enunted against the 14 day time limit-for reportability.

The same conservative actions were taken when the conditions were identified, however, as would have been taken had the fire barriers been required to be operable.

The allowable 14 day time limit for the affected fire assemblies to remain inoperable expired on 11/01/91 for LCO l-91-528. This 14 day period included 11 days prior to the completion of defueling activities on 9/29/91 and three days after the commencement of fuel reload on 10/29/91. The 14 day time limit for LCO l-91-534 expired on 11/02/91. This included 10 days prior to completion of defueling and four days after the start of fuel reload.

By 11/09/91, following completion of work required by DCR IH89-243, the subject fire rated structural beams and the affected fire doors were restored to their operable status. LCO's 1-91-528 and 1-91-534 were ,

terminated at that time.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT Removal of "pyrocrete" from the affected fire rated structural beams and opening of the subject fire doors for personnel and equipment access supported necessary outage related work. This work included installation of support plates, platforms, conduits, and conduit supports for the new air handling units installed in each of the MG Set rooms. Due to the scope of this work the affected fire barriers could not be restored to operable status within the 14 day time period.

002544 HL-1941 E-2

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ENCLOSURE (Continued)

SPECIAL REPORT l-91-009 FIRE BARRIER ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER 1HAN 14 DAYS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS RE0VIRED BY THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT Licensed plant operations >ersonnel declared the fire rated assemblies ino)erable and established t1e required fire watches to ensure compliance witi FHA Appendix 0. Section 1.1.1, Action 'a'. The action statement requires that:

With one or more of the required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices (as stated in section 1.1.1) inoperable, within I hour establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly (ies) and/or sealing device (s) or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly (ies) and sealing device (s) and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

The fire rated assemblies described in this report were breached in a controlled manner following approved administrative control procedures. An hourly fire watch was established and all requirements of the FHA were met.

Thus, had a fire occurred in the affected areas, it would have been promptly detected and extinguished. .

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS By 11/09/91, the fire rated structural beams and the subject fire doors were restored to operable status. LC0's 1-91-526 and 1-91-534 were terminated at that time.

002S44 HL-1941 E-3

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