HL-1691, Special Rept:On 910526,fixed Water Spray Nozzles Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days Identified During Insp of Fire Sprinkler Sys.Cause Indeterminate.Conduits Routed Away from Vicinity of Spray Nozzles

Special Rept:On 910526,fixed Water Spray Nozzles Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days Identified During Insp of Fire Sprinkler Sys.Cause Indeterminate.Conduits Routed Away from Vicinity of Spray Nozzles

ML20079C886
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	06/21/1991
From:	Beckham J GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HL-1691, NUDOCS 9106260264
Download: ML20079C886 (5)

Text

. .(. Gw>va Thw Company j

Q 40 (nverness Center Pwkway

• - - Port Off,ce fio< 1295 Samngham, Alabama 35001 Teiechor'e 705 a? 7 72 79

'J. T. Beckham, J,. Georgia '

Power-via newent-,Nuctear PF f ' AtSt V! F (Ml/ C T GI(;M yQfgh hey;4a({

HL-1691 001823 June 21, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk .

Washington, D.C. 20555 PLA)(T HATCH - UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321 AND 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES-DPR-57 AND NPF-5 SPECIAL REPORT l-91-006 FIXED WATER SPRAY N0ZZLES INOPERABLE FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN 14 DAYS Gentlemen:

In- accordance with Plant Hatch Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2 and Appendix B of the Fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report concerning fixed water spray nozzles which were inoperable for a period greater.than 14 days.

Sincerely,

'W J. T. Beckham, Jr./

SRP/sp

Enclosure:

Special Report 1-91-006 -

cc: Seoraia Power Comoany Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear P1 ant Mr. J. D. Heidt, Manager Engineering and Licensing - Hatch NORMS

l. U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Washinoton. D.C.

l Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch -

l U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Reaion II l- Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch 9106260264 910621 PDR ADOCK 05000321 5 PDR [)/

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ENCLOSURE PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321 AND 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57 AND NPF-5 SPECIAL-REPORT l-91-006 FIXED WATER SPRAY N0ZZLES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14 DAYS RESULTS IN A SPECIAL REPORT AS RE0VIRED BY THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS A. REQUIEMENT FOR REPORT This report is required by Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2 which states, "Special Reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by' the Fire Hazards Analysis and its Appendix B requirements."

Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) Appendix B, section 1.4.1, states, "The spray and/or sprinkler systems in Tables 1.4-1 and 1,4-2 in Appendix B shall be OPERABLE." Action b of section 1.4.1, allows the spray and/or sprinkler ' systems to _ be inoperable for 14 days. If this timeframe is exceeded,_ a Special Report is required. The deficiency addressed herein-was corrected within 14 days of identification. However, it was concluded from the investigation 'of this event the condition had existed for greater than 14 days prior to its identification.

Therefore, a Special Report is required.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT On 5/26/91 at approximately 1535 CDT, Unit I was in the Run mode at an approximate power level of 2430 CMWT (approximately 100 percent of rated thermal power). Unit 2 was in Cold Shutdown with preparations in progress for startup following a refueling outage.

C. _ DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On 5/26/91 at approximately 1535 CDT, nonllcensed personnel were

( conducting an inspection of fire sprinkler. systems in accordance with Department . Instruction DI-ENG-02-0684N, " Pre-Startup System Inspection Walkdowns," which requires plant systems be inspected prior to. unit startup.- The inspection revealed the spray oattern for fixed water spray nozzles 1Y43-N006T and lY43-N006V was obstructed by electrical conduit.

Spray ' nozzles lY43-N006T and 1Y43-N006V are located in the plant's l" Intake Structure and provide fire suppression capability on the east g side of Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump motors I

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ENCLOSURE (Continueo)

SPECIAL REPORT l-91-006 FIXED WATER SPRAY N0ZZLES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14 DAYS-RESULTS IN A SPECIAL REPORT ISRE0VIREDBY-THEFIREHAZARDSANALYSIS 2 Ell-C001A and 2 Ell.0001C. With the spray pattern of the two nozzles obstructed, the fire suppression capability for the east side of RHRSW pump motors 2E11-C001A.C and the adjacent area was degraded. ,

Therefore,-the subject nozzles were declared inoperable. ~

Deficiency Card 2-91-2620 was written to document the inoperability of the; spray nozzles,'and licensed personnel were notified. Subsequently, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 2-91-440_ was initiated on 5/26/91-at approximately 1600 CDT. A continuous fire watch was established, as_ required by FHA Appendix B, section 1.4.1,' Action a.

l D. CAUSE OF EVENT.

The cause of: the_ event was indeterminate. A review of maintenance history records failed to yield any _ evidence to indicate conclusively the origin of the condition. Also, maintenance reconds did not indicate work which could have resulted in the inoperable condition had -

been -performed on~the RHRSW system or the fire. sprinkler system since the performance of the last fire sprinkler system surveillance. This 18-month surveillance is required by FHA Appendix B, section 2.4.1, and is implemented by plant procedure 42SV-FPX-016-IS, " Sprinkler System Surveillance Safety-Related Areas." The procedure in part requires the spray _ patter'n of each system nozzle be inspected to- ensure its integrity. During the last surveillance of the Intake Structure sprinkler system performed on 5/24/90, the condition _ was -not

, identified. It is assumed the condition existed at the time of the -

l 1990 surveillance and-was inadvertently missed during that inspection.

• E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT Licensed personnel declared the affected spray nozzles inoperable and L_ established a continuous fire watch with- backup fire suppression L equipment, as required by FHA Appendix 8, section 1.4.1, Action a.-

l Active- fire protection' in the Intake Structure (fire area 0501),is provided by: .

1. A~ complete thermal- detection system that provides reasonable assurance of early fire detection and response by the plant fire brigade.

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e ENCLOSURE (Continued)

SPECIAL REPORT l-91-006 F'JED WATER SPRAY N0ZZLES IN0PERABLE FOR LONGER llAN 14 DAYS RESULTS IN A SPECIAL REPORT AU RE0VIRED BY THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

2. The water spray system located above the ) ump motors, in this event, one of the two spray nozzles for eac1 of the Unit 2 RHRSW pump motors 2 Ell-C001A and C was inoperable. Each pump motor is served by two spray nozzles. One nozzle provides automatic file suppression capability for the east half of the pump motor and adjacent area, while the second nozzle provides automatic fire suppression capability for the west half of the pump motor.

Passive protection in the Intake Structure is provided by:

1. Physical separation of redundant divisions by open spaces without intervening combustibles.

2. Partial height barriers to protect the safety componer.ts.

3. Complete 1-hour fire rated barriers.

The redundant divisions of the Unit 2 RHRSW system are separated oy a partial height barrier. RHRSW pump motors 2 Ell-C001A and C are in the same division and are separated from the redundant division's RHRSW pump motors, 2 Ell-C00B and D, by the partial height barrier.

Fire loading in the Intake Structure is low. Storage of any transient combustible materials is procedurally controlled. The primary combustibles are cable insulation in trays and oil in pump sumps. The majority of the cables are provided with fire resistant wrap specifically for the purpose of reducing the combustible loading.

Ignition of the oil in closed sumps is extremely unlikely. If the combustibles were totally consumed, they would produce a fire which corresponds to a fire severity of less than 15 minutes.

Therefore, if a fire occurred in the Intake Structure, it would not be significant and would not breach the protection provided by the physical fire barriers until the fire self-extinguished or was suppressed by the plant fire brigade. Hence, a fire in this area will not affect the ability to achieve safe shutdown or result in any release of radioactivity.

Based on this information, this event had no adverse affect on nuclear j safety.

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ENCLOSURE (Continued)

SPECIAL REPORT l-91-006 FIXED WATER SPRAY N0ZZLES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14 DAYS RESULTS IN A SPECIAL REPORT AS RE0VIRED BY THE FIRE HA7ARDS ANALYSIS F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. On 6/6/91, the subject conduits were routed away from the vicinity of spray nozzles lY43-N006T and lY43-N006V so as not to obstruct their spray pattern. The work was performed under Maintenance Work Order 2-91-2724.

2. Sprayer nozzles lY43-N006T and lY43-N006V were declared operable per procedure 42SV-FPX-016-IS. ISO 2-91-440 was terminated on 6/6/91 at approximately 1945 CDT.

3. The spray nozzles for other pump motors located in the intake Structure, including those for Unit 2 RHRSW pump motors 2 Ell-C001B and D, were inspected. No similar conditions were identified.

4. The individual who performed the surveillance on 5/24/90 was counseled.

5. The 18-month sprinkler system surveillance is currently scheduled to be completed by 1/31/92.

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