ML20059G313

Special Rept 90-004:on 900810,fire-rated Assembly Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days.Caused by Component Failure.Hourly Fire Watch Maintained & Fire Damper Replaced

ML20059G313
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	09/04/1990
From:	Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-004, 90-4, NUDOCS 9009120250
Download: ML20059G313 (6)

Text

_.

Geatga Power Company  ;

. 4 333 Pis4mont Atenue i Atlanta. Georg a 30308

, , ,Tecnhone 404 526 3195 j

, Ma ..eg Acaress 40 inverre:,s Center Parkway f Post 04ce Box 1?95 Brmerigham. Alabama 35201  ;

. Tetepbone 205 068 5581

• Ine sow!vn ekvina systcm W. G. Heirston, Ill l Senior vice Prescent  ;

Nooar Operadons  ;

HL-1264 000981 September 4, 1990  :

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

ATTN: Document Control Desk i Washington, D.C. 20555

?

PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2  :

NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERA, TING LICENSES DPR-57, NPT-5  ;

SPECIAL REPORT 90-004 i FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14 DAYS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS RE0VIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS .

Gentlemen: i In accordance with the requirements of the Unit 1 Technical ,

Specifications and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), Appendix B, Georgia j Power Company is submitting-the enclosed Special Report concerning an event

, where a fire rated assembly was inoperable for longer than 14 days. .This  !

event occurred at Plant Hatch-Unit 1.  ;

Sincerely,.

W. G.

h.WW airston, III

[

JKB/eb q

Enclosure:

Fire-Rated Assemblies Inoperable for Greater than 14 Days [

Resulting in Special Report as Required by Fire Hazards Analysis  ;

l c: (See next page.)

l 9009120250 900904 PDR S

ADOCK 05000321 PDC g j .

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r ,- . ___________._l-

Georgialbwerkh U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 4, 1990 Page Two c: Georaia Power Company Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant Mr. J. D. Heidt, Manager Engineering and Licensing - Hatch NORMS U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission. Washinoton. D.C.

Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U.S. Nucigar Reaulatory Commission. Reaion 11 Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch 000981 l

c. i ENCLOSURE PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 -

NRC DOCKET 50-321 AND 50-366 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 AND NPF-5 1 SPECIAL REPORT 90-004 FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR GREATER THAN 14 DAYS l RESULTING IN SPECIAL REPORT.AS REOUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS i

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This special report is required by the Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical.

Specifications (TS), Section 6.9.2, and the Plant' Hatch fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1. Specifically, TS Section 6.9.2 states:

"Special reports for fire protectionL equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as -

required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its -

Appendix B requirements."

FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, states:

" Fire-rated assemblies and sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations separating portions of safety-related fire areas or separating redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area shall be OPERABLE."

Furthermore, Action Statement (a) of Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, allows the fire rated assembly and/or sealing devices te be inoperable for up to 14 days provided, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, a continuous fire watch on at least

• one side of the affected assembly (s) and/or sealing device (s) is '

established, or another barrier is demonstrated operable on at least.

one side of the inoperable barrier and an hourly fire watch patrol is established. Action Statement (b) states that,.if the 14-day time limit is exceeded, a special report must be submitted to the NRC within 30 days. .

0. UNIT (S) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT On 8/10/90, at approximately 0210 CDT, Unit 1 was in the Run mode'at an approximate power level of 2436 MWt (approximately 100 percent of rated thermal power), and Unit 2 was in the Run mode at an ap)roximate power level of 2436 MWt (approximately 100 percent of rated tiermal power).

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ENCLOSURE (Continued)

SPECIAL REPORT 90-004  ;

FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR GREATER THAN 14 DAYS RESULTING IN SPECIAL REPORT AS RE0VIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS l

, 1 C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT  !

On 7/20/90 at approximately 1440 CDT, plant maintenance and engineering

! personnel were conducting a surveillance of fire-rated assemblies in i accordance with plant Procedure 42SV-FPX-006-OS, " Fire Damper Surveillance." This surveillance requires each fire damper to be '

cycled to verify it is capable of closing completely. During the s surveillance, fire damper IZ41-FD-F103, located in a duct that serves ]

chemistry laboratory ventilation hoods, would not close completely dua -

to corrosion on the closure springs and slide assembly. Due to the j extent of corrosion, repair of the damper. was required. - However. l replacement compon,ats ( i.e., closure springs) were not available from  !

warehouse stock. '

To ensure the damper would perform its' intended function and serve as an operable fire barrier, maintenance personnel manually closed the damper, thereby placing it in a safe position. In accordance with  !

plant administrative controls, Deficiency Card I-90-4923 was initiated to document the fact the damper would not close automatically. l Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 1-90-429 was initiated to track l the repair, and replacement components were ordered.. '

On 7/27/90, at approximately 0210 CDT, the damper was intentionally opened to allow use of the vent hoods in the chemistry laboratory.

Since the open damper could no longer be considered an operable firt barrier, the tracking LC0 was terminated and replaced with active LC0 1-90-435 to ensure compensatory actions required by the FHA were carried out. Fire detection systems in the main control room (HCR)  !

were verified operable, and an hourly fire watch was Woun in accordance with FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, Action Ecatement a. i On 8/6/90, maintenance personnel attempted to install the new parts.

However, the new parts differed in some respects from the old ones.

Therefore, engineering assistance was requested on 8/8/90. At that time, it became apparent that a complete replacement of.the damper was j required to ensure reliable performance. Therefore, a replacement damper was ordered.

Although the procurement of a new fire damper was expedited, the new 1 damper was not received and installed prior to the expiration of the 1 14-day time limit. On 8/10/90, at approximately 0210 CDT, the subject  ;

fire damper had been inoperable for 14 days, thereby necessitating this I report. I 1

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. e ENCLOSURE (Continued) .;

SPECF REPORT 90-004 i FIRE-RATED Adantsuts INvPERABLE FOR GREATER THAN 14 DAYS r RESULTING IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS ,

1

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On 8/10/90, at approximately 1615 CDT, a new fire damper was installed  !

and successfully functionally tested per plant Procedure  ;

42SV-FPX-006-05, " Fire Damper Surveillance." LCO l-90-435 was  :

terminated at that time.  ;

i D. 'AUSE OF EVENT  !

The root cause of the event is component failure. The accumulation of corrosion on the subject fire damper prevented it from performing.its '

function. It should be noted that all fire dampers at Plant Hatch are surveilled every 18 months, and that the subject damper passed the previous surveillance. Since, as a result of the current surveillance, no other damper failure was attributed to corrosion, this event is considered to be isolated.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT In this event, licensed plant operations personnel declared a. fire ,

damper inoperable. The damper, which is in an exhaust ventilation duct ,

that serves the Control Building and passes through the MCR, is located at the floor level of the MCR, separating fire. zones.0024A and 0024C. ,

At the time of the event, the MCR fire detectors were verified to be r operable, and the required fire watch was established to ensure- t compliance with the FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, Action Statement a which states: ,

...within I hour establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly (s):and/or sealing i device (s) or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on l at least one side of the inoperable assembly (s) and ,

sealing device (s) and establish an hourly fire watch  !

patrol."

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This action ensured that, if a fire had occurred, it would have been promptly detected and extinguished.

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Based on the above information, it is concluded that this event had no j adverse impact on nuclear safety. The above analysis is applicable to I i all power levels.

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,, s l ENCLOSURE (Continued) 9 SPECIAL REPORT 90-004 FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR GREATE'n THAN 14 DAYS RESULTING IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS -

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  !

The corrective actions for this event included the following:

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1. Limiting Conditions for Operation were initiated. i

2. An hourly fire watch patrol was maintained during the entire

, time the damper was open and inoperable.

3. The fire damper was replaced with a new one and demonstrated to be operable.

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