ML20196F018
| ML20196F018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1988 |
| From: | Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 88-008, 88-8, HL-178, NUDOCS 8812120180 | |
| Download: ML20196F018 (7) | |
Text
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Georg a lher Company 333 hwt Awse
- 5 At:arta. Georia 303C0
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W. G. Hairston, Ill
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0548I X7GJ17-H540 December 7, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D. C.
20555 PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 I
NRC OCKKET 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 SPECIAL REPORT 88-008 FIRE HATCH NOT ESTABLISHED AND FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY NOT RESTORED TO OPERABLE CONDITION HITHIN 14 DAYS AS REQUIRED BY THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REPORT Gentlemen:
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In accordance with the requirements of the Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) Appendix B.
Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed I
Special Report (SR) cone.erning an event where a fire rated assembly was t
inoperable for longer than 14 days and a fire watch was not established within one hour of identification of the condition.
This event occurred dt Plant Hatch - Unit 1.
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Sincerely, r
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j H. G. Hairston III
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Enclosure:
SR 50-321/1988-008 l
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(see next page)
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i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 7, 1988 Page Two I
i c: Georaia Power Comoany h
Mr. H. C. Nix, General Manager - Plant Hatch i
Mr. L. T. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing i
GO-NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Washinaton. D. C.
Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch 1
U. S. Nuclear Rtgulatory Commission. Regic3_11 i
Mr. M. L. Ernst. Acting Regional Administrator Mr. J. E. Menning, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch j
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I ENCLOSURE i
PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 i
l SPECIAL REPORT 88-008 FIRE HATCH NOT ESTABLISHED AND FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY NOT l
RESTORED TO OPERABLE CONDITION WITHIN 14 DAYS AS REQUIRED i
BY THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REPORT l
A.
REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This report is required per the Unit 1 Technical Specifications l
section 6.9.2.
This section of the Technical Specifications states that special reports for fire protectiore equipment t
operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.
1 Appendix B of the FHA states that, in general, a special report
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is required when the FHA mir.imum operating requirements and/or l
required actions are not met.
In the event described in this i
i r* port, a fire watch was not established within one hour of i
l 1 ntification of an itioperable fire barrier as required by I
< Sn Statement 'a' of FHA, Appendix 8. Section 1.1.1.
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... tion Statement
'b' of Section 1.1.1 requires restoration i
3.moperable fire rated assembly (s) and/or sealing devices I
opei sle status within 14 days of identification of the
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l onditic,'i or a special report is required within the next 30 i
l Ays.
T;.e subject inoperable fire barrier was not returned to l
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- perale status within the 14 days.
I B.
UNIT (s) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENTS On 11/01/88 and on 11/15/88, Unit I was in the refueling mode at approximately ambient pressure and temperature.
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HL-178 l
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' Georgia Power sh l
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ENCLOSURE (Continued)
FIRE HATCH NOT ESTAb ISHED AND FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY N T RESTORED TO OPERABLE CONDITION WITHIN 14 DAYS AS RFQUIRED BY THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REPORT C.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT This report describes events involving a degraded fire rated cable tray enclosure on safety-related cable tray TCK8-01.
On 11/01/88, at approximately 1530 CST, non-licensed personnel discovered a crack in the cable enclosure insulating material of cable tray TCK8-01.
Thrt crack extended the full deptn of the insulating material.
Ine deficient condition was documented on Deficiency Card (DC? 1-88-505) and taken to the licensed Unit 1 Shift Supervisor as required by plant procedure.
The Shift Supervisor them reviewed the DC
- and, without further investigation, incorrectly determined that the deficient condition did not affect operability of the fire barrier.
The DC was then routed to the Nuclear Safety and Compliance (NSC) Department for processing as required by plant procedure.
NSC department personnel reviewed the DC on 11/04/88.
Questioning the operability of the affected fire barrier, NSC personnel conferred with a fire protection system engineer who confitned that the deficient condition did, in fact, render the fire barrier inoperable.
The on-shift Unit 1 Shif t Supervisor was promptly notified of the determination.
Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 1-88-587 was issued.
On 11/04/88, at approximately 1320 CST, the operability of the appropriate fire detectors was verified and an hourly fire watch was established.
Maintenance Work Order (MMO) 1-88-6842 was written on 11/04/88 to repair the fire barrier.
- However, the barrier was not repaired within the 14 day period which ended on 11/15/88, due to the unavailability of the materials needed to repair the barrier.
0548I E-2 12/7/88 HL-178
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GeorgiaPower A ENCLOSURE (Continued)
FIRE HATCH NOT ESTABLISHED AND FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY NOT t
RESTORED TO OPERABLE CONDITION HITHIN 14 OAYS AS REQUIRED BY THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REPORT D.
CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause of the failure to establish a fire watch within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of identifying the condition was personnel error.
Specifically, licensed personnel fatted to investigate fully the condition or to initiate an investigation of the candition by qualified personnel prior to making a determination on the operability of the fire rated barrier.
No previous similar events have occurred at Plant Hatch; therefore, this event is I
considered to be an isolated case.
1 The root cause of the second event was deficient design.
The l
cracking had occurred in the area of the expansion joint between the Unit 1 Control Building and the Unit 1 Turbine Building.
At this location, cable tray TCK8-01 uses an expansion joint to allow for relative movement of the two buildings.
Hodever, the fire barrier enclosure was not designed to accommodato the relative movement.
Thus, relative movement between the two batidings ultimately resulted in overstressing the fire barrier assembly causing cracking in the insulation material.
The design of the fire barrier at the expansion joint was changed to preclude recurrence of the cracking.
At the time of the event.
materials needed for repair of the enclosure were not readily l
available; therefore, the barrier was not repaired within the 14 i
day time limit.
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The defittent design is considered to be an isolated case since there are no other fire rtted cable trays with expansion i
joints. A representative sampling of cable trays with expansion joints was conducted which confirmed this conclusion.
0548I E-3 12/7/88 HL-178 i
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.t Georgia Power b i
ENCLOSURE (Continued)
FIRE HATCH NOT ESTABLISHED AND FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY NOT RESTORED TO OPERABLE CONDITION HITHIN 14 DAYS AS REQUIRED BY THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REPORT E.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT In the event, licensed personnel declared the fire rated assembly inoperable on 11/04/86.
Appropriate fire detectors were verified operable and an hourly fire watch was established to comply with Action dtatement
'a' of Section 1.1.1.
Action Statement 'a' requires that:
Hith on6 or more of the above required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices inoperable, within I hour establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly (s) and/or sealing device (s) or verify the operability of fire detectc's on at least one side of the inoperable assembly (s) and sealing device (s) and astablish an hourly fire watch patrol.
These actions ensured that if a fire had occurred, it would have been promptly detected and extinguished.
It is not known exactly when the fire barrier became degraded, i
- However, a review of the cable tray circuitry potentially impacted by the inoperable fire barrier disclosed that the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) provide for adequate compensatory actions should the circuitry's operation have been affected by a fire.
Based on the above information, it is concluded that this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety.
The above analysis is j
applicable to all power levels.
l F.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The corrective actions for these events include:
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Counseling the involved licensed personnel.
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.4 GeorgiaRnver A i
i ENCLOSURE (Continued) i FIRE WATCH NOT ESTABLISHED AND FIRE RATED ASSEltBLY NOT RESTORED TO OPERABLE CONDITION HITHIN 14 OAYS AS REQUIRED BY THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REPORT l
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Emphasizing to operations shift supervisors that a
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thorough investigation of a deficient condition is necessary in order to determine correctly the operability status of the affected equipment.
This will be accomplished by December 30, 1988 via a
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l departmental memo.
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Modi fying the affected cable tray enclosure at the cable tray expansion joint to acccmmodate relative movement at the joint.
The modification was completed 4
i and the barrier declared operable on November 29, 1988.
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