ML20196E472

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Special Rept 88-005:on 881105,emergency Light Inoperable for Longer than 24 H Period.Caused by Depleted/Dead Battery. Maint Personnel Replaced Dead Battery Under MWO-2-88-4353
ML20196E472
Person / Time
Site: Hatch Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/02/1988
From: Hairston W
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-005, 88-5, HL-175, NUDOCS 8812120004
Download: ML20196E472 (6)


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  • i, ' Georg 4 Ne ! Cvcany 335 PreGrrOrt Ae%*

, 44'1.1. beerg:a 303C6 Tqettone C4 506-365 UN.og Adtess 40 Irn,erness Cecter Pmwaf Nst Off ce Box '295 BerWrgham. A!atama 3rJCf ie'ephere 205 60s 5tSt t*vy& wrA.trctwer.

W. G. Haltston, lit Semot Pce hesdert Nsetear Cwistes HL-175 0541I E X7GJ17-H540 ,,

.6 December 2, 1988 <

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornission '

ATTN: Document Control Desk i Washington, D. C. 20555 '

PL'iT HATCH - UNIT 2 '!'

4 NRC DOCKET 50-366 OPERA 11NG LICENSE NPF-5 i SPECIAL REPORT 88-005 1 EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN A 24 HOUR PERIOD RESULTS IN A SPECIAL REPORT ,

AS REOUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT  ;

4 Gentlemen: ,

In accordance with the requiremente of the Plant Hatch Unit 2 ' '!

Technical Specifications Secticte 6.9.2, and the Fire Hazardc Analysis

, (FHA) Appendix B, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed  :

Special Report (SR) concerning an event where an emergency light was i inoperable longer than 24 hotfrs. This event occurred at Plant Hatch -

Unit 2. ,

t Sincerely,

. . Y/ A '

H. G. Hairston, III i

I DPR/ct j

Enclosure:

SR 50-366/1988-005  !

c: (see next page)  !

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December 2, 1988

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1li c: Georaia Power Comoany I' Mr. H. C. Nix, General Manager - Plant Hatch Mr. L~. T. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing GO-NORMS i

.. . e - U. S. Nuclear Reaulatorv Commission. Washinaton. D. C.

? fl, Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - hatch (L.J. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Reaion II Dr. M. L. Ernst,' Acting Regional Administrator '

Mr. J. E. Menning, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch >

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ENCLOSURE l PLANT HATCH - UNIT 2  !

NRC DOCKET 50-366  !

, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5 SPECIAL REPORT 88-005 li EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN  !

A 24 HOUR PERIOD RESULTS IN A SPECIAL REPORT  !

AS REOUIRED BY FIREJAZARDS REPORT  !

I A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT j Thi eport is required per the Unit 2 Technical Specifications  !

se- :n 6.9.2. This section of the Technical Specifications ,

for fire protection equipment st , that special reports, c: ting and surveillance requirements, shall be submitted as '

rt . red by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B -

. requirements.  !

The FHA Appendix B section 1.9.1 requires that all sel f-contained, battery-powered emergency lighting units ,

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. required to support unit shutdown in the event of a fire and l coincident loss of offsite power shall be operable at all 1

times. The action statement allows for the lights to be f l inoperable for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If this time period is exceeded,  !

a special report is required.

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t I, . UNIf(s) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENTS a (

i On 11/5/88 Unit 2 was in the run mode at an approximate power j level of 2436 MHT (approximately 100 percent of rated thermal

] power),

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! 0541I E-1 12/02/88 i HL-175  !

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ENCLOSURE (Continued) .

EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERA8LE FOR LONGER THAN l A 24 HOUR PERIOO RESULTS IN A SPECIAL REPORT i AS REOUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT l

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT f

On 11/5/88 at approximately 0400 CST, plant operations personnel >

determined that an emergency lighting unit (2R42-E092) would not i work. The unit's lights were not illuminating after completion .

of the monthly survelliance conducted per procedure  !

42SV FPX-003-05, "Emergency Lighting Surveillance". Deficiency  !

Card 2-88-4065 was written to document the status. Limiting  !

! Condition for Operation (LCO) #2-88-629 was written to track the  ;

! status of the emergency lighting unit. l By 0400 CST on 11/6/88, the emergency lighting unit had not been

( repaired and returaed to operable status.

The repair work was performed under Maintenance Work Order (MHO) [

, #2-88-4353. The battery in the lighting unit was replaced and i 1 the unit was returned to operable status by approximately 1330  !

l CST on 11/6/88.  ;

This lighting unit is located in the southeast diagonal of the .

Reactor Building, elevation 93 feet. The primary function of this light is to provide access illumination in case of {

t loss-of-power and to illuminate the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

J Heat Exchanger "B" Tube-to-Shell Differential Pressure t j Indicating Switch (2E11-N0038).

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0. CAUSE OF Lit"! i r

l The event occurred as a result of a depleted / dead battery. The replacement of the batter) returned the emergency light to operable status.

1 0541I E-2 12/02/88

! FL-175 i

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ENCLOSURE (Continued)

EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN A 24 HOUR PERIOD RESULTS IN A SPECIAL REPORT AS REOUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT This emergency light illuminates the remote indication for the pressure  ! witch measuring the tube-to-shell differential pressure for the RHR Loop B Heat Exchanger. This indication is necessary whes placing the RHR system into the suppression pool cooling or shutdown cooling mode. In these two modes, suppression pool water or reactor coolant, respectively, are cooled via the transfer of heat in the two RHR Heat Exchangers to the RHR Service Water (RHRSH).

In the event it is necessary to perform a remote shutdown of the i reactor (the main control room becomes uninhabitable), procedure requires the use of this remote indication. RHRSH to RHR differential pressure is required to be at least 20 psid to assure only in-leakage occurs from RHRSH to RHR, thus preventing the potential spread of radt active contamination into the RHRSH.

In this event with this emergency light inoperable, operations personnel had access to six volt lanterns with lamp heads, which could have provided sufficient illumination for access, had the need arisen. In addition, the redundant equipment of RHR Loop A would have been available to perform the same functions.

Based on the above infortaation, it is concluded that this event had no adverse impact on plant safety. This analysis is applicable to all power conditions.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS On 11/5/88, Engineering Support Fire Protection personnel I verified tnat emergency lighting unit 2R42-E092 was inoperable, t

0541I E-3 12/02/88 ,

HL-175

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I ENCLOSURE (Continued)

EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN A 24 HOUR PERIOD RESULTS IN A SPECIAL REPORT l AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT On 11/6/88, the maintenance personnel replaced the dead i battery under MH0-2-88-4353.

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On 11/6/88, licensed operations personnel verified that the i 4

emergency lighting unit 2R42-E092, was functional and ,

i returned to service. The LCO was terminated at 1330 CST.

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