Text

Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control.
	ML18100B304
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	04/10/2018
From:	Emily Larson; Entergy Operations
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	GNRO-2018/00007
	Download: ML18100B304 (223)
	v • d • e

Entergy Operations,Inc.

P.O. Box 756 .

Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Tel: 601-437-7500 Eric A. Larson Site Vice President Grand GulfNuclear Station GNR0-2018/00007 April 10, 2018 10 CFR 50.90 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, -OC *20555..;0001

SUBJECT:

Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-542, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control" Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy Operations, Inc. is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

The proposed change replaces existing TS requirements related to "operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel" (OPDRVs) with new requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires reactor vessel water

-1evel to *be greater than the top of active *irradiated "fuel.

Attachment 1 provides a description and assessment of the proposed changes. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked to show the proposed changes. Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) TS pages. Attachment 4 provides existing TS Bases pages marked to show the proposed changes for information only.

Approval of the proposed amendment is requested by April 10, 2019. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented within 120 days following issuance of the amendment.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the designated Mississippi Official.

If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Douglas Neve -

Manager, Regulatory Assurance at 601-437-2103. This document contains no commitments.

GNR0~20t8/00007 Page 2 of 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 1'0th day of April 2018.

Sincerely, EAL/rn Attachments: 1. Description and Assessment of the Proposed Changes

2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Ups)

3. Revised Technical Specification Pages (Clean)

4. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (Mark-Ups) (For Information Only) cc: with Attachments Mr. Siva Lingam U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop OWFN/8 B1 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 cc: without Attachments Mr. -Kriss Kennedy Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 NRC Resident Inspector Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Port Gibson, MS 39150 Dr. Mary Currier, M.D., M.P.H State Health Officer Mississippi Department of Health P.O. Box 1700 Jackson, MS 39215-1700 Email: mary.currier@msdh.ms.gov

Attachment 1 to GNR0-2018/00007 Description and Assessment of the Proposed Changes (11 pages)

GNR0-2018/00007 DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT

1.0 DESCRIPTION

The proposed change replaces existing Technical Specifications (TS) requirements related to "operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel" (OPDRVs) with new requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires reactor vessel water level to be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel.

2.0 ASSESSMENT 2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) has reviewed the safety evaluation provided to the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) on December 20, 2016, as well as the information provided in TSTF-542., Entergy has concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-542 and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1 (GGNS) and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the GGNS TS.

The following GGNS TS reference or are related to OPDRVs and are affected by the proposed change:

3.3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2, Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.7.1, Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System Instrumentation

-3:5:2, -ECCS - -shutdown 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment 3.6.4.2, Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) 3.6.4.3, Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System 3.7.3, Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System 3.7.4, Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System 3.8.2, AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5, DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.8, Distribution Systems - Shutdown 2.2 Variations Entergy is proposing the following variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-542 or the applicable parts of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's safety evaluation. These variations do not affect the applicability of TSTF-542 or the NRC staff's safety evaluation to the proposed license amendment.

GGNS is a BWR/6 plant. The proposed variations are based on the TSTF-542 markup of NUREG-1434 without a Setpoint Control Program. The GGNS TS do not contain a Surveillance Frequency Control Program. , Therefore, the references to a Surveillance Frequency Control Program for Specifications 3.3.5.2 and 3.5.2 are not included in the proposed TS.

Page 1 of 11

GNR0-2018/00007 Attachment 1 2.2.1 Administrative Variations 2.2.1.1 The GGNS TS utilize different numbering and titles than the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) on which TSTF-542 was based. The following table relates the admin-istrative differences *between the TS described in TSTF--S42 and the GGNS TS:

/tStF;s42:::t,}f;'/i:.'('/,,) >TSJF;.542,)'.\:/_.<<,:::-_>:{):'. ;.'GGNS:'.Nilmber:::\/:J>f /GGNS'j%'/'.\*:::}::'~t\*_-.,.

-Number* ..*:*;,-**-.':*_ Nomenclature**_*:-**.. _.-.*.*-.\::*-<:.~.-.--_*,'- Norrie'ncla'ture*:*(

,>*:,,, . /. ,;;:,::- ;,::*; ,-,. : , *:.

i,;,;~.'.(n ;;\..,, . ..,..,,: :,..,,:, .\. *. '-** ,*.:':< ,,~~\:-,,,,' ; "t, '* ... ,:;(<-)_***(.".*\::\>r,:; /\*. :,: ;°3:\ ::i_,.. ;:i, ,::(:,,,: )~\'.:::;*

TS Table 3.3.5.1-1 Reactor Steam Dome TS Table 3.3.5.1-1 Reactor Vessel Functions 1.d and 2.d Pressure - Low Functions 1.d and 2.d Pressure - Low

_(l_nje.ction .Permissive.) _ _(Lnje.c.ti.on .Permis_sive.) _

TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, Footnote (c) TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, Footnote (d)

Function 3.d Function 3.d TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, Footnote (d) TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, Footnote (e)

Function 3.d Function 3.d The wording of the

- footnote *is *slightly different, but has no impact on the re-designation.

TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, Footnote (e) TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, Footnote (c)

Function 3.d Function 3.d TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, Footnote (f) TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, Footnote (d)

Functions ) Functions 4.a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h and 4.a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h and Because of 5.a/b/c/d/e/f/g 5.a/b/c/d/e/f/g preceding changes to footnote designations, no change to Footnote

- -(d)-was -required.

TS Table 3.3.5.2-1 Reactor Steam Dome Proposed TS Table Reactor Vessel Functions 1.a and 2.a Pressure - Low 3.3.5.2-1 Function Pressure - Low*

(Injection Permissive) 1.a and 2.a (Injection Permissive)

TS 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment TS 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation and Drywell' Isolation Instrumentation Instrumentation TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 Footnote (b) TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 Footnote (c)

Function 2.g Function 2.g TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 Function 5.c TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 Function 5.b Page 2 of 11

GNR0-2018/00007 Attachment 1 ri1,~ttlJ,,f;~ *:\'.:tf?

3

, :: *i.,:!!;::~alure-}'

,:/?';,~,*

.;t ;; . YG.NS Nu~;~rc .* ;L .~:!:n:~l~t~~ *.* . / *:

.:':>'./, . * ,\;';,: . i';?> .. /:':; \\:\:;}:\.(:/. :\::j ..:::'.//'.,,.;\)/\/-', /;};.\ ;*,,'.,:::,*.:*'.*::

TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 Shutdown Cooling TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 RHR System

-Function -5

System *Isolation

Function -5 Isolation TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 Footnote (c) TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 Footnote (e)

Function 5.c Function 5.b TS 3.5.2 LCO Note Low Pressure TS 3.5.2 LCO Note low pressure coolant Coolant Injection injection TS 3.8.5 Required Actions

TS 3.8.5 Required Actions 8.2.3 and B.2.4 C.2.3 and C.2.4 TS3.8.10 Distribution Systems TS 3.8.8 Distribution Systems

- Shutdown - Shutdown 2:2. L2 The GGNS TS do not contain some ofthe STS on which TSTF-S42 made changes.

The following table dispositions the TSTF-542 TS changes that are not applicable to GGNS:

Table _3._3._5.1-1 ECCS Re_sponse . Removal of this SRs applicability to Modes 4 Functions 1.a, 1.d, Time testing and 5 from Table 3.3.5.1-1 Functions 1.a, 1.d, 2.a, and 3.a invoking 2.a, and 3.a are not applicable to GGNS.

SR 3.3.5.1. 7 TS Table 3.3.5.1-1, These footnotes are The footnotes for the SRs associated with Functions 1.a/b, related to setpoint as- these functions are not applicable to GGNS, 2.a/b, 3.a/b/c/e/f/g, found and as-left and so the change that re-assigns and 4.a/b/d/e for SRs

tolerances for designations to Footnotes *"(b)" and *"{c)" for 3.3.5.1.3/ 3.3.5.1.5, Function SRs. these SRs, and to the footnotes themselves, containing Footnotes have not been incorporated.

c and d Table 3.3.7.1-1 CRFA System This table was deleted with License Instrumentation Amendment 145, and so is not applicable to

. GGNS (altholJgh the TS 3.3. 7.1 Applicability i~ modified, as described in Section 2.2.1.3).

Page 3 of 11

GNR0~2018/00007 TS 3.5.2 Actions LCO 3.0.4.b is not This is a Note in NUREG-1434 that is not in

-Note applicable to RC-IC. * -the *GGNS TS. As -it -is -being -deleted by TSTF-542, there will be no resulting difference.

TS 3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown GGNS does not have this TS, and so is not applicable.

2.2.1 :3 The GGNS TS contain certain requirements not *included *in the STS that were not addressed by TSTF-542, but are affected by the proposed change. The following table dispositions these TS changes that are considered to be administrative in nature:

Table .3 ..3 ..5.1-1 . LPC.1.8/C . NU.REG-1434 doe.s .n.ot .have a .requirement Function 2.d Subsystems Reactor for this function in Modes 4 and 5 and so was Vessel Pressure - not addressed in TSTF-542. However, this Low (Injection Function is similar to Function 1.d that was Permissive) during deleted by the traveler. BecalJse Function 2.d Modes 4 and 5 will be included as new Table 3.3.5.2-1 Function 2.a, it is appropriate to delete the Function 2.d Applicability during Modes 4 and

s from Table *3:3.5.1-1.*

Table.3.3.6.1-1 Reactor steam dome With Footnote (e) deleted per TSTF-542, the Function 5.b pressures relative to subsequent footnotes (which are not in the Footnotes (f) and (g) the RHR cut-in traveler for this Function) are re-designated permissive as Footnotes (e) and (f).

TS 3.3.7.1 . OPDRVs is included License Amendment 145 implemented the in the TS Applicability Alternative Source Term, which no longer of CRFA System credited automatic CRFA System actuation to Instrumentation mitigate the radiological consequences of design basis accidents. However, a manual isolation capability was retained in the revised TS for defense-in-depth. Deletion ofOPDRVs from the TS 3.3.7.1 Applicability is

-functionally equivalentio -deleting Footnote (a) from Table 3.3.7.1-1 in TSTF-542.

Therefore, this change is considered to be administrative in nature.

Page 4 of 11

GNR0-2018/00007 Attachment 1 2;2.1.4 The term "recirculation line" is replaced with "test return line" in proposed SR 3.5.2.6 and associated Bases. This is the proper GGNS terminology, and is changed to avoid confusion with the Reactor Recirculation piping. This change is an administrative variation from TSTF-542 with no impact on the NRC's model safety evaluation.

2.2; 1.5 The following administrative changes are made:

The TS Table of Contents are licensee-controlled and are not included.

Changes to the Drain Time definition formatting are made in conformance with GGNS TS numbering convention.

Due to the insertion of the new definition, the new TS 3.3.5.2, and the revised TS 3.5.2, text moved to subsequent pages requiring further formatting. Also, due to the technical variations described in Sections 2.2.2.2, 2.2.2.5, and 2.2.2.6 the text on subsequent pages are consolidated to previous pages. As a result, the words "Text Deleted" are added to TS pages 3.3-52, 3. 7-8, and 3. 7-1 O and the following new pages are added, pages 3.3-43a through 3.3-43e, 3.3-58a, and 3.5-6a, as shown in Attachment 2. Clean typed TS pages (Attachment 3) are updated to be consistent with NUREG-1434, Revision 4 format and to establish consistency between GGNS TS pages. The resulting formatting changes are shown in Attachment 3 and are administrative variations from TSTF-542 with no impact on the NRC's model safety evaluation.

2.2.2 Technical Variations 2.2.2.1 Proposed Table 3.3.5.2-1 is revised to reflect the GGNS design. Function 3, High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, Function 3.a, "Reactor Vessel Water Level -

High, Level 8," and Function 3.e, "Manual initiation," that appear in TSTF-542 are not included in the proposed Technical Specifications. This corrects an error in TSTF-542 that affects the BWR/5 and BWR/6 ECCS instrumentation requirements.

The purpose of the manual initiation function is to allow manual actuation of the ECCS subsystem required *by TS 3.5.2 to mitigate a draining event. The Reactor Vessel Water Level .:. High, Level 8 signal prevents overfilling of the reactor vessel into the main steam lin.es by closing the HPCS injection valves when the water level is above the Level 8 setpoint. Therefore, if HPCS is the required ECCS subsystem and the water level is above Level 8, manually actuating Function 3.e will not inject inventory into the reactor vessel. This is not the desired response. If the Level 8 function is retained in proposed Table 3.3.5.2-1, the function would need to be rendered inoperable *in order-to *injectwaterwhen above the Level *8 water level. This-would *not be consistent with including the function in proposed Table 3.3.5.2-1.

GGNS has the capability to manually start the HPCS pump and to open the HPCS injection valve if needed, not utilizing Functions 3.a and 3.e. If desired to inject water into the RPV using the HPCS, the reactor operator can follow procedural steps to take manual control of the pump and injection valve to add inventory. If the water level is above Level 8, then manual override of the Level 8 function can be performed to allow the HPCS injection valve to be opened. These actions can be p~rformed from the Page 5 of 11

GNR0~201*a100007 control room and can be accomplished well within the 1-hour minimum drain time specified in TS 3.5.2, Condition E. Consequently, the Function 3.a and 3.e instrumentation functions are not needed to actuate the HPCS subsystem components to mitigate a draining event.

The ability to override the HPCS Level 8 isolation is already part of the GGNS Emergency Operating Procedures and is practiced during Operator training. SR 3.5.2.8 is revised to assure that the HPCS manual start capability (including the HPCS Level 8 isolation override feature) is tested.

HPCS Function 3.a is the only function resulting in TSTF-542 TS 3.3.5.2 Condition E.

Therefore, the removal of Function 3.a results in the deletion of Condition E and the re-designation o-f Conditions F and G.

SR 3.5.2.8 is revised to read:

Verify the required LPCI or LPCS subsystem actuates on a manual initiation signal, or the required HPCS subsystem can be manually operated.

The SR 3.5.2.8 Bases are revised to read:

The required ECCS subsystem is required to have a manual start capability. This Surveillance verifies that a manual initiation signal will cause the required LPCI subsystem or LPCS System to start and operate as designed, including pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. The HPCS system is verified to start manually from a standby configuration, and includes the ability to override the RPV Level 8 injection valve isolation.

This variation was also proposed by Clinton Power Station in a TSTF-542 submittal Supplement dated November 15, 2017, Columbia Generating Station in their TSTF-542 submittal dated October 23, 2017 (as Supplemented on November 15, 2017),

LaSalle County Station in their TSTF-542 submittal dated December 13, 2017, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 in a TSTF-542 submittal Supplement dated December 27, 2017, Perry Nuclear Power Plant in their TSTF-542 submittal dated December 6, 2017, and River Bend Station in their TSTF-542 submittal dated November 15, 2017.

2.2.2.2 TS 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation," Required Action (RA) J.2 that states: "Initiate action to isolate the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System suction from the reactor vessel," will be deleted (and subsequent RAs renumbered). The direction to initiate action to close the RHR shutdown cooling (SOC) isolation valves in Mode 3 is in direct conflict with TS 3.4.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown," that requires two RHR SOC subsystems to be operable, and if not, to take immediate action to restore an RHR SOC subsystem to operable status (RA A.1). Therefore, RA J.2 should be deleted.

Removing RA J .2 is also appropriate to protect plant safety. As discussed in the Bases to Function 5.b, the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function Page 6 of 11

GNR0-2018/00007 associated with the RHR SOC subsystem is not directly assumed in the safety analyses because a break of the RHR SOC subsystem is bounded by breaks of the reactor recirculation system and main steam lines. Specifically, for the RHR SOC jsolation valves to be open in Mode 3, reactor steam dome pressure would need to be

-below the HHR cut..:in permissive pressure. Should a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) occur inside primary containment, TS 3.5.1, "ECcs* - Operating," explicitly credits the

manual closing of the RHR SOC isolation valves and alignment of RHR in the LPCI mode. -Similarly, if the break is on the RHR SDC subsystem outside primary containment, credit can still be given for manual closing of the RHR SDC isolation valves and alignment of an intact LPCI loop. In either case, core uncovery would not result and radiological consequences are bounded by the LOCA and main steam line

-break accidents. For these reasons, *it-is not critical to immediately-initiate action to close the RHR SDC isolation valves (RA J.2) if Function 5.b is inoperable, -

I '

This .variation was also proposed by Perry Nuclear Power Plant in their TSTF-542 submittal dated December 6, 2017.

2.2.2.3 The following plant-specific TS are being deleted:

Table 3.3.6.1-1, Function 5.b, Footnote (h), "Not applicable when the upper containment reactor cavity and transfer canal gates are removed and SR 3.3.6.1.10 is met." Footnote (h) is affixed to the Mode 5 Applicability of Function 5.b (RHR System Isolation - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3) that is being deleted by TSTF-542.

SR 3.3.6.1.10, "Verify the water level in the Upper Containment Pool is ~ 22 feet, 8 inches above the react9r pressure vessel flange." This SR is modified by the Note:

"Only required to be performed when Function 5.b is not Operable as allowed by Note (h) of Table 3.3.6.1.1." With the deletion of Footnote (h), this SR is no longer required.

These TS requirements were introduced with License Amendment 163. The objective of this amendment was to create an exceptio,n for requiring the Operability of the RHR System Isolation function on low reactor water level duriryg Mode 5 provided there was sufficient RPV water inventory (as demonstrated by having the upper containment reactor cavity and transfer canal gates removed and upper containment pool water level being surveilled as acceptable every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ). The basis for this exception was an analysis of a hypothetical drain down event through the RHR shutdown cooling piping. This analysis is superseded by the RPV vessel water inventory control requirements in TSTF-542. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to transfer Footnote (h) to the new proposed Table *3,3.S:2-1 Function 4.a with the associated performance of SR 3.3.6.1.10. Footnote (h) and SR 3.3.6.1.1 O are therefore being deleted.

2.2.2.4 The following plant-specific TS are being deleted which are not deleted by TSTF-542:

TS 3.6.1.3 Applicability, "Modes 4 and 5 for RHR Shutdown Cooling System suction from the reactor vessel isolation valve when associated isolation Page 7 of 11

GNR0-2018/00007

. Attachment 1 instrumentation is required to be Operable per LCO 3.3.6.1, 'Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation,' Function 5.b."

TS 3.6.1.3 Condition G, "Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met for PCIV(s) required to be Operable during Mode 4 or 5 or during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)."

With the deletion of Footnote (h), as described previously in Section 2.2.2.2, and the TSTF-542 deletion of the Mode 4 and 5 Applicability for Table 3.3.6.1-1 Function 5.b, the TS 3.6.1.3 Applicability requirement is no longer needed and is being deleted. In turn, with the deletion of this Mode 4 and 5 Applicability requirement, there are no other Operability requirements for PCIVs during Modes 4 or 5, or during OPDRVs.

Therefore Condition G is no longer needed and is also being deleted.

2.2.2.5 The following plant-specific TS are being deleted which are not deleted by TSTF-542:

TS 3. 7 .3 Condition D, "Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during OPDRVs."

TS 3.7.3 Condition F, "Two CRFA subsystems inoperable during OPDRVs. OR One or more CRFA subsystems inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary during OPDRVs."

License Amendment 145 implemented the Alternative Source Term, which no longer credited the CRFA System to mitigate the radiological consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident. This amendment removed the movement of irradiated fuel from the attributes of LCO 3.7.3 Applicability, and Conditions C and E (which were re-designated as D and Fin a subsequent license amendment). With the TSTF-542 additional deletion of OPDRVs from the LCO 3.7.3 Applicability, and Conditions D and F, these Conditions are no longer needed and are being deleted. Condition E is being re-designated as Condition D.

2:2:2:6 The following plant-specific TS are *being deleted which are not deleted *by TSTF..;542:

TS 3. 7.4 Condition D, "Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during OPDRVs."

TS 3.7.4 Condition E, "Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met during OPDRVs."

License Amendment 145 implemented the Alternative Source Term, *which no longer credited the Control Room AC System to mitigate the radiological consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident. This amendment removed the movement of irradiated fuel from the attributes of LCO 3.7.4 Applicability, and Conditions D and E. With the TSTF-542 additional deletion of OPDRVs from the LCO 3.7.4 Applicability, and Conditions D and E, these Conditions are no longer needed and are being deleted.

Page 8 of 11

GNR0-2018/00007

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis Entergy Operations, Inc., (Entergy) requests adoption of TSTF-542 "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," which is an approved change to the Standard Technical Specifications, into the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment replaces the existing requirements in the TS related to "operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel" (OPDRVs) with new requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires reactor vessel water level to be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel.

Entergy has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment(s) by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 C.FR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed amendment in.volve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change replaces existing TS requirements related to OPDRVs with new requirements on RPV WIC that will protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Draining of RPV water inventory in Mode 4 (i.e., cold shutdown) and Mode 5 (i.e., refueling) is not an accident previously evaluated and, therefore, replacing the existing TS controls to prevent or mitigate such an event with a new set of controls has no effect on any accident previously evaluated. RPV water inventory control in Mode 4 or Mode 5 is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. The existing OPDRV controls or the proposed RPV WIC controls are not mitigating actions assumed in any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change reduces the probability of an unexpected draining event (which is not a previously evaluated accident) by imposing new requirements on the limiting time in which an unexpected draining event could result in the reactor vessel water level dropping to the top of the active fuel (TAF). These controls require cognizance of the plant configuration and control of configurations with unacceptably short drain times.

These requirements reduce the probability of an unexpected draining event. The current TS requirements are only mitigating actions and impose no requirements that reduce the probability of an unexpected draining event.

The proposed change reduces the consequences of an unexpected draining event (which is not a previously evaluated accident) by requiring a.n Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem to be operable at all times in Modes 4 and 5. The current TS requirements do not require any water injection systems, ECCS or otherwise, to be Operable in certain conditions in Mode 5. The change in requirement from two ECCS subsystems to one ECCS subsystem in Modes 4 and 5 does not significantly affect the consequences of an unexpected draining event because the proposed Actions ensure equipment is available within the limiting drain time that is as capable of mitigating the event as the current requirements. The proposed controls provide escalating Page 9 of 11

GNR0-2018/00007 compensatory measures to be established as calculated drain times decrease, such as verification of a second method of water injection and additional confirmations that

containment and/or filtration would be available if needed.

The-proposed change-reduces or eliminates some-requirements-thatwere determined-to be unnecessary to manage the consequences of an unexpected draining event, such as automatic initiation of an ECCS subsystem and control room ventilation. These changes do not affect the consequences of any accident previously evaluated since a draining event in Modes 4 and 5 is not a previously evaluatedaccident and the requirements are not needed to adequately respond to a draining event.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change replaces existing TS requirements related to OPDRVs with new requirements on RPV WIC that will protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. The proposed change will not alter the design function of the equipment involved. Under the proposed change, some systems that are currently required to be operable during OPDRVs would be required to be available within the limiting drain time or to be in service depending on the limiting drain time. Should those systems be unable to be placed into service, the consequences are no different than if those systems were unable to perform their function under the current TS requirements.

The event of concern under the current requirements and the proposed change is an unexpected draining event. The proposed change does not create new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators that would cause a draining event or a

new or different kind of accident not previously evaluated or included in the design and licensing bases.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant r~duction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed change replaces existing TS requirements related to OPDRVs with new requirements on RPV WIC. The current requirements do not have a stated safety basis and no margin of safety is established in the licensing basis. The safety basis for the new requirements is to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. New requirements are added to determine the limiting time in whicthhe RPV water inventory could drain to the top of the fuel in the reactor vessel should an unexpected draining event occur. Plant configurations that could result in lowering the RPV water level to the TAF within one hour are now prohibited. New escalating compensatory measures based on the limiting Page 10 of 11

GNR0-2018/00007 drain time replace the current controls. The proposed TS establish a safety margin by providing defense-in-depth to ensure that the Safety Limit is protected and to protect the public health and safety. While some less restrictive requirements are proposed for plant configurations with long calculated drain times, the overall effect of.the change is to improve plant safety and to add safety margin.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Entergy concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION The proposed change would chang~ a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveiHance requirement. However, the proposed change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be p~epared in connection with the proposed change.

Page 11 of 11

Attachment 2 to GNR0-2018/00007 Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-ups)

(52 pages)

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 be those listed.in Federal Guidance Report {FGR)

(continued) 11, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concent.ration and Dose Conversion Factors for pnsert 1 r~---------=:>::..:Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion," 1989.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM (ECCS)* RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS TIME initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial movement of the (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE associated turbine stop valve or the turbine TIME control valve to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured, except for the breaker arc supp.ression time, which is not measured but is validated to conform to the manufacturer's design value.

INSERVICE TESTING The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee PROGRAM program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).

ISOLATION SYSTEM The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shaTl -be that RESPONSE TIME time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. The response time (continued)

GRAND GULF 1.0-3 Amendment No. H§., -+/--8-8-, H-+/-

Page 1 of 52

DRAIN TIME The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel {RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (T AF) seated in the RPV assuming:

a. *The wate(inventory above the 1AF-is divided-by the limiting drain rate:

b. The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate. or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure {e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error), for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except: *

1. Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, blahk flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths:

2. Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation: or

3. Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task, who is in continuous communication with the control room, is stationed at the controls, and is capable of closing the penetration flow path isolation devices without offsite power.

c. The penetration flow paths required to be evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated. and no water is assumed to *be subsequently added to the RPVwater*inventory:

d. No additional draining events occur: and

e. Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used.

A.bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated Page 2 of 52

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.1 The ECCS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.5.1-1.

ACTIONS

~NOTE-- -----------------------------------

Separat~ Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

~--------~--------------------------~-------------------

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.I Enter the Condition Immediately channels inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 for the channel

_8_. .As _r_e_q_uj_red .by . 8.* .1 --------NOTE&--------

Required Action A.I 1. Bn~, app~ i eat;~ e and referenced in in H9BES 1, 2, Tab1e 3. 3*5.1-1. and 3.

--0nly applicable for Functions I.a, l.b, 2.a and 2.b.

Declare supported 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from feature(s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant loss of feature ECCS initiation initiation capability capability for 1.s :i.no_per.able. f.e_ature_(_s) .tn both divisions AND

\

v (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-32 Amendment No.~

Page 3 of 52

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1

\ . ACTIONS u CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

8. (continued) 8.2 --------NOTES--------

1. enly ap~lieah~e iR M9BES 1, 2,

-anEI a.

-e.:--only applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b.

Declare High Pressure 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from

-Core -Spray {HPC-S} - -di-scovery of System.inoperable. loss of HPCS initiation capability AND 8.3 Place channel in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months trip.

\ .

u C. As required by C.l --------NOTE,&,.-------

Required Action A.I 1. BnlY applieablc and referenced in iR M99ES l, 2, Tab1e 3. 3. 5 .1-1. HEI 3.

-2T-Only appl -ic-abl-e for Functions l.c, l.d, 2.c, and 2.d.

Declare supported, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from feature(s) inoperable discovery of

-when its redundant. 1-os-s -of feature ECCS initiation initiation capability capability for is inoperable. feature(s) in both divisions (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-33 Amendment No. +2e-Page 4 of 52

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1

'\.__) ACTIONS -C continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

As required by E.l * --------NOTES--------

Required Action A.I l. en~y app~iieah~e and referenced in iA H99E§ 1, 2,

rabl e 3. 3 .-s .1-1. aAEI 3.

--0nly applicable for Functions 1*e, 1. f, and 2.e.

~-------------

Declare supported I *hour from feature(s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant loss of feature ECCS initiation initiation capability capability for is inoperable. feature(s) in both divisions AND E.2 Restore channel to 7 days OPERABLE status.

F. As required by F.l Declare Automatic 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from Required Action A.I Depressurization discovery of and referenced in System {ADS) valves loss of ADS Table 3.3.5.1-1. inoperable. initiation capability in both trip systems AND

{continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-35 Amendment No. i-2'&

Page 5 of 52

ECCS In-st r ume ntati-on 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.j.1-1 (page 1 of 5)

Emergen~y Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDlTlONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION t;0NU1T1UNS fUNCT ION ACTION A.l- REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A CLPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray CLPCS)

Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 .... B SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ -152.5 Level - Low Low Low, +fucb) 54} SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches Level 1 I SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Drywe 11 Pressure-High B SR 3.3.5.1.1 :s; 1.44 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR _3_.J_ *.5.. 1_. 6

c. LPCl Pump A l c SR 3.3.5.1.2 :s; 5.25 Start- nme SR 3.3.5.1.4 seconds Relay SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. 1,2.3 3 c SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 452 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.3 :s; 534 psig SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 1<a>.s<a> 3 B §R :UL§.L;i: i?: Hi~ f,!4§

§R a.3. 5. ~ .£! '8118 SR 3.3.5.L3 S: §;)1 ~Sig 5A 3.3.5.!L5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. LPCS Pump Discharge 1,2,3... 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 1285 gpm Flow-Low (Bypass) 4Cal 1 ::;(a)

SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. LPCI Pump A Discharge 1,2,3.,. 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 1133 gpm Flow-Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.2 4Ca),5C~) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5

SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. l~anua 1 In1ti ati on 1,2,3~ 1 c SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA l!f!,~).:;,~~

(continued)

~ Also required to initiate the associated diesel generator.

GRAND GULF 3.3-39 Amendment No. +io, ~

Page 6 of 52

ECCS fnst rumentati on 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1*1 (page 2 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A. I RFOUI REMENTS VALUE

-2. LPCI *s and LPCI c Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2+e+ B SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ -152.5 Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches Level 1 4W 5.W1 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Drywel l Pressure-High B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.44 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3. 5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. LPCI Pump B 1 c SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 5.25 Start-Time Dela SR 3.3.5.1.4 seconds Relay SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. 1,2,3 3 c SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 452 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.3 s 534 psig SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

-4Cal,5£a> 3 8 SR 3 .3.5. :1:. ! HS2 !J3i§

§R ~.iUUd Sri el 5~ 3.3.5.L3 J 534 !331~

s~ 3.3.S.t.S SR 3.3.5.1.6 LPCI Pump Band LPCI 1,2,3, 1 per pump E SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 1133 gpm Pump C Discharge Flow SR 3.3.5.1.2

- Low {Bypass) 4Ca>,s<a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR .3 ... 3-.5 .. 1 ...6

f. Manual Initiation 1,2 .3, 1 c SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA

-4la), 5 Ca)

(continued)

~ Also required to ,initiate the associated diesel generator.

GRAND GULF 3.3-40 Amendment No.~. ~

Page 7 of 52

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5. M (page 3 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE* CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS r'UNCTION ACTIONA.1 *REQUtREMENTS VALUE

3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System

a. Reactor Vessel 1, 2, 3; B . SR 3.3.5.1.1 :!! -43.8 Inches Water Level - Low 4(a). 5{e) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. D,vwell B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.44 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. 2 c SR 3.3.5. 1 .1 s 55. 7 inches SR 3.3.5. 1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 1, 2. 3. 2 D ~4.7ft 4(C), 3(C:)

1 Suppression Pool 1. 2, 3 2 s .. 5.1.1 Water Level - High R 3.3.5.1.2

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. HPCSPump 1, 2, 3.. E SR 3.3.5.1.1 Discharge SR 3.3.5.1.2

-Pressure~HiglJ ~ -SR 3.3.5.1.3 (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. HPCS System Flow E Rate - Low (Bypass) h: Manual Initiation NA (cont nued) tr the as- ct channel setpoint is outside Its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to veriry that it* ctioning as required before returning the channel to service.

he Instrument channel setpcint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance: otherwise. the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable _provided that the as-found and as-left tolerance.s apply to the actual setp_oint implem.ented in .the

Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The NTSP and the methodologies used to detennin~ the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified In the Technical Requirements Manual.

GRAND GULF 3.3-41 Amendment No. 4-69, 484, +85-Page 8 of 52

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.2

The RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.5.2-1.

ACTIONS

NOTE----------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for the channel.

B. As reguired by Reguired 8.1 Declare associated Immediately Action A.1 and penetration flow path(s) referenced in incapable of automatic Table 3.3.5.2-1. isolation.

AND 8.2 Calculate DRAIN TIME. Immediately C. As reguired by Reguired C.1 Place channel in trip. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

GRAND GULF 3.3-43a Amendment No.

Page 9 of 52

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As reguired b~ Reguired D.1 Declare HPCS s~stem 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and inoperable.

referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. OR D.2 Align the HPCS pump 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months suction to the suppression pool.

E. As reguired b~ Reguired E.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Action A.1 and OPERABLE status.

referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

F. Reguired Action and F.1 Declare associated ECCS Immediate!~

associated Completion injection/spra~ subs~stem Time of Condition C 1 D1 inoperable.

or E not met.

GRAND GULF 3.3-43b Amendment No.

Page 10 of 52

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12-hours SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.5.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months GRAND GULF 3.3-43c Amendment No.

Page 11 of 52

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 {page 1 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A {LPCI} and Low Pressure Core SQray (LPCS} Subsystems

. a. Reactor Vessel 1i..§ 3{a) g_ SR 3.3.5.2.1 < 534 QSig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 (Injection Permissive}

b. LPCS Pumg Discharge Flow - 1i..§ 1(fil g SR 3.3.5.2. 1 ::::: 1285 ggm Low (Bygass} SR 3.3.5.2.2

c. LPCI PumQA ~ 1(fil g SR 3.3.5.2. 1 ~ 1133 gQm Discharge Flow - SR 3.3.5.2.2 Low (ByQass}

d. Manual Initiation 1....§. 1(fil g SR 3.3.5.2.3 NA

2. LPCI 8 and LPCI C Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel 1....§. 3{a) g_ SR 3.3.5.2. 1 ~ 534 QSig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 (Injection Permissive}

b. LPCI PumQ 8 1....§. 1.Qfil g SR 3.3.5.2. 1 ::::: 1133 gQm and LPCI Pumg C gum12<a} SR 3.3.5.2.2 Discharge Flow -

Low {Bygass) ]

c. Manual Initiation 1...§ 1(fil g SR 3.3.5.2.3 NA (a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem reguired to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water lnventoiy Control."

GRAND GULF 3.3-43d Amendment No.

Page 12 of 52

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 {page 2 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTIONA.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. High Pressure Core Sgray (HPCS). System

a. Condensate Storage 4(b) 5(b) Q

.1!fil SR 3.3.5.2.1 24.7 ft Tank Level - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2

b. HPCS Pumg 1....Q 1(fil g SR 3.3.5.2.1 2 108 gsig and Discharge Pressure SR 3.3.5.2.2 ~ 1282 gsig

- High (Bygass)

c. HPCS System Flow 1....Q 1(fil g SR 3.3.5.2.1 2 1124 g12m Rate - Low

SR 3.3.5.2.2 and (Bygass) ~ 1327 912m

4. RHR System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel .(m 2 in one ~ SR 3.3.5.2.1 2 10.8 inches Water Level - Low, trig system SR 3.3.5.2.2 Level3

5. Reactor Water Cleanu12 (RWCU} System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel .(m 2 in one ~ SR 3.3.5.2.1 2 -43.8 inches Water Level - Low trig system SR 3.3.5.2.2 Low, Level 2 (a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem reguired to be OPERABLE b~ LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water lnvento!Y Control."

(b} When HPCS is OPERABLE for com121iance with LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water lnvento!Y Control," and aligned to the condensate storage tank.

(c) When automatic isolation of the associated 12enetration flow gath(s) is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

GRAND GULF 3.3-43e Amendment No.

Page 13 of 52

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.! Reacior Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation e RCIC System instrumentation for each Function i ab .3.5.i-l shall be OPERABLE. 1 APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with e > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE--- ---------

-separate -condition entry is allowed for each channe-

CONDITION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.I Immediately i noperab1 e.

for

8. As required by - Declare RCIC System 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from Required Action .1 inoperable. di scover_y of and reference in loss of RCIC Table 3.3.5.~-1. initiation capability Place channel in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months trip.

C. As required by C.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

Requ~red Actio OPERABLE status.

and referent in Table 3.3 .5.f-1.

fcontinued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-44 Amendment No.~

Page 14 of 52

RCIC System Instrumentation 3 3.5;te

/I u ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION -

/ REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As *required b ~ D.l --------NOTE---------

Required Action .1 Only applicable if and reference n RCIC pump suction is Table 3.3.5.-2-. not aligned to the suppression pool.

~--~---~~----~-~

Declare RCIC System 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from inoperable. discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability ANO D.2.1 Pl ace channe1 in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months trip.

OR 0.2.2 Align RCIC pump 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months suction to the suppression pool.

E. Required Action and E.l Declare RCIC System Immediately, associated Completion inoperable.

Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.

GRAND GULF 3.3-45 Amendment No. +ee- -

Page 15 of 52

i

. ...r**

I*

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.

\ *'.-\}t';, .

(<., :.;:. /):? . . *\* ~. ** R~f-er

:~: :=~:.:::~::~::_- --------

t~ ;Tabie'

-NOTES- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -"- - - - - - - - -~ -*-

3. 3 .. 5 .. ~-1 to det*ermine which SRs apply for each RCI .

~ .

I{-it?Iff.i/:. ;;:;:;~:::!i~~a:~::~de!:r/ *!::p::::~{a~::t~:~::!:!:s ::/:\:=:ce of

'. / *:."***\:\***::.:./ *. * *Actfons may be. delared as ;Eoll~

f (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for. Fuhctions 2

.': _._; :. >.: * * . -an4. S.; and ... (b) *for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Functions 1, 3, and 4. ovided the t\\.{}:':::::H * .associated ~Ction maintains Rcic

tiation capability.

.............. ~* .. *. SURVEILLAN~E FREQUENCY

... .-... ::* : .~ ..- :.. : ., ... *.

. : .. ~. . '

orm CHANNEL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

__ )* *. :=-* *:**_*: * :', ..

_ ... :_:.* ... :.. SR*

,, ... *. . . ... 92 days units. 92 days

'SR CHANNEL CALIBRATION . 24 months

. . . . . . :. .*.r.:

<;***'.\<\*

/>::~:: :*. :::SR Perfqrm LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL' TEST. 24 months*

'i' .. *

.. :" ~* . : .. ..

1

, I: * :,, ,_-*; 11 I

' :. ;: .. .':? .*....GRAND .GULF 3.3-46 Amendment No. 4-26,* ~

.*::'.; },

Page 16 of 52

. ~- . ...

RCIC *system Instrumentation 3.3.5:2*

Table 3.3.5.2.-1 ,page 1 of 1)

Reactor Core Isolation Coo System Instrumentation CONDITIONS REFERENCED REQUIRED FROM CHANNELS REQUIRED ALLOWABLE FUNCTION PER FUNCTION ACTIONA.1 VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 4 B Level-Low Low. Level 2

2. Reactor Vessel Water 2 c Level -High, Level e

3. Condensate Storage Tank 2 D Level-Low

4. Suppression Pool Water 2 D Level-High

5. Manual Initiation c NA (a) If the as-found channel setpolnt is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.

(b) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The NTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as..found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Technlcat Requ.irements Manual.

GRAND GULF 3.3-47 Amendment No.~. 484, 465-Page 17 of 52

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation

. 3.3.6.l ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. As required by H. l Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action C.l and referenced in AND Table 3.3.6.l-l.

H.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F or G not met.

I. As required by I.I Declare associated l hour Required Action C.1 Standby Liquid and referenced in Control subsystem Table 3.3.6.1-1. inoperable.

OR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months I.2 Isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup System

J. . As required by J.l Initiate action to Immediately Required Action C.l restore channel to and referenced in OPERABLE status.

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

-&R-d.2 Initiate ae,~aA ~a Immediately t,a~ate ~he Resi~~a~

U@at: Remtn al (RUR)

Slnatds'4.'R Cool ~ Ag 5-y3tem Sijetian f16m the reaeta, r,essel.

QR (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-50 Amendment No. i!8-Page 18 of 52

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS 0 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME J. (continued) J.3-.1 Initiate action to Immediately restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

AND Initiate action to Immediately restore one standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem to OPERABLE status.

AND J *.a-. 3

Initiate action to Immediately restore isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path u not isolated.

K. As required by K.l Isolate the affected Immediately

-Required Action -C.l penet-ratlon -flow

~nd referenced in pathCs).

Table 3.3.6.l*l.

OR K.2~ Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel* assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

~

, G9R:t~ suae~}

GRAND GULF 3.3-51 Amendment No. '%'21,_:!!9-SST 2 9 1999 Page 19 of 52

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION Tit-iE K. ( cou t I .. ueo~ K.2.2 lRitiate aeti&R to Jmme~iately suspeRd spe,at4eA&

~.*aR a ,ehAth1 fff-

~rai Ri Ag the ,eaa;e~

veaael.

GRAND GULF Amendment No. 4-r0,"i99-

&eT 2 8 1339 Page 20 of 52

..*. 'Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE B.EQUIREMENTS. (continu.ed)

S*URVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3. 3. 6. 1. 9 ------ ----------*NOTE-----------------

Channel sensdrs may be excluded .

Verify.the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 24.months on a for the Main Steam Isolation Valves is STAGGERED TEST within limits." BASIS SR 3.3.e.1.19 HOJ:.PE

~ly r9~w.irea :ee ee fi_erfsrH1sEi HRSI-1:

Function S. b iEi l'l6E OPER".133:.~ as alhH ss.

SJ NOIPE (h) esf Table J. J. 6 .1 1.

TJcrif:y the wate:e lei. el hi t'ke g~f!!JSI' 4 R9HlFS 66l'lt:aiF1mene Pssl is ~ 66 fsse, ~ iRg!;.)2&.

abaue the FeasteF ~¥SS~Fe .essel flsR~*

GRAND GULF 3.3-53a Amendment No. +63-, 9?-

Page 21 *of 52

Primacy Containment and' Di"ywell Isolation Instrumentation

. 3.3.6.1

\

. Table 3.3.6.1-1 {pa-g.e 2 of 5)

Primary'Cootairunent and* Drywell Isolation Instrumentation

' ' ...__,, .:' * * * * ~. I * * ,l *: **

APPLICABLE CONDITIONS*

MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCEO.

OTHER CHA'"NNELS FROM

.: ' . .") .:* *:..-:-. :* .. SP.ECIFIBD PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWAB°LE CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTlON C. l REQUIREMENTS VALUE

'.::/:/:*}*:*_~::*-:~~~;;entaDd

.*.-.* * .:* * : *. *.* * (continued) * *

.:; ;-..::. :*: .. :. **b:

Drywell Pr.ess.ure

High .. 1,2,3 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 ~ 1.43 psig

.. *:* _':..' .:*' *", .. *: . .. . SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3

... * . . :'.'. :. ::*/;**<: .. ::* SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3~6.I.8 = I

>. i )_\ ~:- :.., * ... \. _: Reactor Vessel Water. 1,2,3 F SR 33.6.1.1 ~ -152.5

-y.-:::/:;*:~*.=::- * *. *:*.**.: LeveJ-I.:pwLow'Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 inches

i ': ..-:..; :- ::*. *. *.: *:* . : .* .Lt?v~l. l (ECCS

SR 3 .3 .6.1.3

=*<::_--/ *. . *:. * . .

D,1v1sions 1 and*2) SR 3.3.6.1.7

.. ~R .3..3.*.6..l.8 .(

.*.**:. d. Di:yw.ell Pressure - High 1,2,3 .2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ;51.44 psig

.'> (ECCS Divisions 1

SR 3.3.6.1.2

. . arid 2) . SR 3.3 .6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7

.* ..: . SR 3.3.6.1:8

** e.

Re~~tor Vessel Water 1,2,3 4. F

SR 3.3.6.1.1 ~ -43.8 inches

. .* . * *Level - Low Low, Level SR 3.3.6.1.2

, . *...: . 2 (~CS)' . SR 3.3.6.1.3

....* SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1:8

.. f. Dl)'Well Pressure - High 1,2,3 4 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ::5 1.44 psig

.: *(HPCS) SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

.*..< ***J *: :.- *: .g:* containment and . 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 $ 4;0 mR/hr

* . .'). *:, :. . * . * . . . Drywell Ventilation ... SR 3.3.6.1.2*

,:-- .'.*.:'.*/' .: .** :* * * ; _..

_Exhaust Ra~iation:.. Hi~h SR 3.3.6.1.5

. ~*:. .*'*. SR 3.3.6.1.6

.(c) 2 K SR 3:3.6.l.l $4:0mRJhr SR 3.3.6.1.2

. * *1

. SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

h. .Manual Initiation 1,2,3 G ~R 3.3.6.1.8 NA

. *. . : . (c) .G SR 3;3.6.1.8 "NA (contmued) **

.. (b) . Also *required*to initiate the associated drywell isolation function.

(. c). **:puring i:novement: of recently irradiated fuel ass.em blies in primacy or secondary containment ens ap~r&tisns .. ith

~ f)Stsatu~I fsf a;:ai~n'ig t&s FSS~~n*

S§Sel. .

.:*... ,_. <- '. : *.~ .:. . .*: ...

~*:

~

- - ,:*/_:<**'*:::,

... * ,i:

GRANDQULF 3.3-55 Amendment No. -H-9, +*

Page 22 of 52

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 5)

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP RE~UIRED . SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACT ONC.I REQUIREMENTS VALUE

5. RHR System Isolation

a. RHR EquipmentRoom -1~2,1 l per room F *sR 3.3.6.1.-J $l7l°F Ambient - SR .3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3:6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.8

b. Reactor Vessel Water 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ~ 10.8 inches Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6."1.3 SR 3.3.6.l.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8 2~ J -SR 3.3.6.1.-1 ~ l0;8 inches SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1. 7 SR 3.3.6.1.8 SR 3.3.6.1.10

c. Reactor Steam Dome 2 F SR 3.3.6. l.1 $150 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6. J.3

sR 3.3.6.1.7

SR 3.3;6.L8

d. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3 6.1.1 $1.43 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

e. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.8 NA 1th reactor steam dome pressure greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive pressure.

~ With reactor steam dome pressure less than the RHR cut-in permissive .pressure.

(~ )!st si;r3liseels wksFl tks ~fi~sr ssRff!iH~sRt rsastsi" se .it:,* aREI treRaisr eaHal gatsa ars Fs~s. s" snel ER ~.s .~. UQ is

~

GRAND GULF 3.3-58 Amendment No. ~ ' ~

Page 23 of 52

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 u Table 3.3.6.2*1 (page 1 of 1)

Secondary Contatrwnent Jsolation lnstrunentation APPLICABLE HODES AND REQUJRED OTHER CHANNELS SPECIFIED PER TRIP SURVEILLANCE ALLOIJABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE

,. Reactor Vessel Water Level - low Low, Level 2 1,2,3~ 2 SR SR 3.3.6.2. 1 3.3.6.2.2

~ *43 .8 Inches SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 SR 3.3.6.2.6

2. Drywe l l Pressure - HI gh 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.2. 1' $ 1.43 psig SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR -3;3.6.2.~

SR 3.3.6.2.5 SR 3.3.6.2.6

3. Fuel Handling Area 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2. 1 s 4.0 nt/hr Ventilatfon Exhaust Ca)~ SR 3.3.6.2.2 Radiation.- High High SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.6 SR 3.3.6.2.7

4. Fuel Handling Area Pool 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 $ 35 ldt/hr sweep-Exhaust (8)~ SR -3;3.-6.;2.;2 Radiation- High High SR 3.3.6.2.4 u 5. Manual lnft;ation 1,2,3, 2 SR SR 3.3.6.2.6 3.3.6.2.7 SR 3.3.6.2.6 NA (a~

\urlng - n t of recently Irradiated fuel assent,lies In the primary or secondary containment.

~

GRAND GULF 3.3-62 Amendment No. +21,~

961' 2 e 1G99 Page 24 of 52

CRFA System Instrumentation 3.3.7.l 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7.l Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7.l The CRFA System i~strument~tion for manual isolation shall be OPERABLE. .

APPLlCABlllTY: 'MODES 'l, 2, and 3 Jdtifi ns oJHnatiam~ ~ith a peteAth1 far ElrahrlA§ the ,ueteF

, Uiel ( 6P5ftVs).

ACTIONS

........ : .......*..... ~---~*-***-**-*-NOTE-***-*****-----**---~-----*-----*---*

separate Condition entry is a11owed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.l Pl ace channel in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months i-noper-able. *t*rip.

B. Required Action and B.l Close associated l hour associated Completion isolation d~mpers.

Time not met.

GRAND GULF 3.3*73 Amendment No * .;.45, ~

APR t 3 ZJ89

Page 25 of 52

, RPVWATER INVENTORY CONTROL, ECCS-Operating 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) ANO REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING CRCIC) SYSTEM I 3.5.1 3.5.1 ECCS-Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of eight safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.~

- - - - - - - - - - - - -*-* - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE durfng alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the residual heat removal cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except ADS valves Jre*not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressures 150 psig.

ACTIONS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to ~PCS.

CONDIT ION REQUIRED ACT ION COMPLETION TIME A. One low pressure ECCS A. l Restore low pressure 7 days injection/spray ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.5-1 Amendment No. +e-9-, -rr.5-Page 26 of 52

I RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, EGGS Sl'lt4telewR

!RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AND REA,CTOR CORE ISOLATION COO LI NG CRCIC) SYSTEM Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) 3

5

2

ECCS Sl11:1tele,ffl ---water Inventory Control LCO 3.5.2 ~=Fw-e ECCS injection/spray subsystem& shall be OPERABLE.

jOnej ---------------------~-- ---NOTE-------------- ---------------

9fte low pr~ssure coolant injection CLPCO su*bsystem may be

_ ~considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay

~ heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

APPLICA3ILITY:

!1 MODE i j ~ ~

_,/jand 5 I MO~E 5 exee~t with c~e ~~~eP eeAtaiRmeRt PeaeteP eavity aA~

ti arufe1 etHHil §fltes I e1neH:el a1;el ~ate1 leuel il :n H g i Rst:l@§ S'!@r tl:ie tg~ gf t!:le reistgr pre~rnre oessel rflafi§e.

ACTIONS

~~c_o_N_o1_r_1_o_N_______,_____~*-R_-E_ou_.1_.R_E_o_.A_c_r1_o_N__~--~-C--O-M_PL_-E_T_10_-N__ TI_-M_E~---------,

~ e q u i red ECCS A. l Restore required ECCS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Initiate injection/ spray injection/ spray action to subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE establish a statu,s. method of njection B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate aetieR te associ~ted Completion s~B~eA~ a~ePatiaAs capable of Time of Condition A t.'it~ a '~eteRtial feF operating not met. a1 Biiiili§ tlie I eaeto1 without

~eHel COPBRVs). offsite

;~-------------;---------telectrical power.

i Rj eeti eA/51:):Pa*y s~~system ts QP~RAgb'

&tat1Hi.

Insert 1 !<continued)!

GRAND GULF 3. 5- 6 Amendment No. ~ ~

DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the top of active fuel (TAF) shall be :?!:36 hours Page 27 of 52 I

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 ACTIONS ( continued)

CONDITION

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2 Verifv each secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months containment 12enetration

flow*12ath *is -ca12able of being isolated in less than the DRAIN TIME.

AND C.3 Verif~ one standb~ gas 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months treatment subs~stem is ca12able of being 12laced in 012eration in less than the DRAIN TIME.

D. DRAIN TIME < 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . 0.1 ------~----NOTE---------------

Reguired ECCS injection/s12ra~ subs~stem or additional method of water injection shall be ca12able of 012erating without offsite electrical 12ower.

Initiate action to establish Immediate!~

an additional method *of water injection with water sources ca12able of maintaining RPV water level

> T AF for ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

AND 0.2 Initiate action to establish Immediate!~

secondary containment boundary.

AND (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.5-Sa Amendment No.

Page 28 of 52

IRPV Water Inventory Control ~ ESS§ &hutdeWR 3.5.2

-"'-._) ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I

B. Re~~i,~d Aetian C.2 9.1 Iit'itiate aetiaa ts iffimed i a-t-e1 y aAd assssi atee- restare seeafida:yy eampl et1 an Time net eant&inment ts

~ SPERABlE stab13.

B.2 Initiate setisR ts 1mmediats1y FestsPe aAe staR~hy gas t1 eatimmt SYhsystem ta 9PERABLE s:ta\YS.

laitiats aetteR ts Immediately restare* isalatian sapability iR g~slr required seeaada1, seAta'inmeAt r,eAStFati SR fl et'I patl:I Ast h:slates.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3*5. 2.-l- Verify, for required 1ow pressure ECCS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 7' injection/spray subsystem, the suppression pool water -1evel is ~12 ft-~ inches.

eJ (continued)

\

u GRAND GULF 3.5-7 Amendment No.~

Page 29 of 52

~BCCS Sltatae.J'9'l-

!RPV Water lnventorv Control

3. 5. 2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3. 5.2 .~ Verify, for the required High Pressure Core 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Spray {HPCSJ System, the:

Iel a.

b.

Suppression pool water level is

~ 12 ft 8 inches; or Condensate e tank water level is

?: 18 ft.

SR 3. 5.2 .'3- Verify, f o r ~ required ECCS injection/ 31 days

spray _subsystem, J..o.cati_ons .s.uscepti.bl_e to i1 gas accumulation are sufficently filled with water.

SR 3.5.2.tt- -------------------NOTE---------------- ---

Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

'1"'21el"'el"i::;'lT" required ECCS inj.ection/spray 31 days manual, power operated, and alve in the flow path, that is

, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, *sin the correct position.

!, each! (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.5-8 Amendment No. ~ , ~ , ~

Page 30 of 52

IRPV Water lnventorv Control j--7' EGGS St-lt.taewfl-

3. 5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS continued SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 9.5.2.5 'lcrif) eaeh reqt1irea EGOS j3~Fni3 tie .. elaj3s t~e sjSeeifiea IR SSSSFSSASS t:.iitt.l fie:;; ,ate witR u~e s~eeifiea tatal elevelej3ea l=leaa. the INSER'IIOE-TESTIPm T6fAl PROCRAP.+

SYSTEM, FLO'l\'RATE DEVELOPED I IE.AD LPOS ~ 2ee 19sia LPSI iia 125 19eh!I

ires SR 3.5.2:S -------------------NOTE ------------------

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

~----------------------------------------

!LPCI or LPCS I

' Verify eaeft required EGOS iRjeatiaR$S~Fey ubsystem actuates on aA setl:Cal eF siFRYlate~ awte~etis iRitiatieR

~-

\

a manual initiation signal, or the 24 months required HPCS System can be manually operated GRAND GULF 3.5-9 Amendment No.~' -l-9+, ~

Page 31 of 52

TS 3.S.2 -inserts Insert 1 TS 3.5.2 Page 3.5-6

-C. DRAIN TIME - -C.1 Verify-secondary-containment - 4hour-s

< 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months and boundary is capable of being

~ 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . established in less than the ORAi N TIME.

-1nsert*2 TS 3.5.2 Page 3.5-7 D. (continued} D.3 Initiate action to isolate each secondary Immediate!~

containment penetration flow path or verifv .it .can _be manuall~ .is.olated _fr.om the control room.

AND D.4 Initiate action to verify one standb~ gas Immediate!~

treatment subs~stem is capable of

-being placed in operation.

E. Reguired Action and E.1 Initiate action to restore DRAIN TIME Immediate!~

associated Completion to ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

Time of Condition C or D not met.

OR DRAIN TIME< 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Insert 3 TS 3.5.2 Page 3.5-7 SR 3.5.2.1 Verify DRAIN TIME ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Page 32 of 52

Insert 4 TS 3.5.2 Page 9 SR 3.5.2.6 Operate the required ECCS injection/spray 92 days subsystem through the test return line for?!

10 minutes.

SR 3.5.2.7 Verify each valve credited for automatically 24 months isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

\

Page 33 of 52

I, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) ~rm REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

3. 5. 3 *RClC S-y-s-tem LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be O~ERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1,

~OOES *2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure> 1~n psig.

ACTIONS

- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCIC System A.1 Verify by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable. administrative means High Pressure Core Spray System is OPERABlL AND A.2 Restore RCIC System 14 days to OPERABLE status.

8. _R_e_q_u i r_e_d .Action .and 8.1 . He in MO.DE .3_. .12 _h_our_s associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Reduce reactor steam 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months dome pressure to

~ 150 psig.

GRANO GULF 3.5-10 Amendment No. -l.a.G-, ,#§,-,

Page 34 of 52

PC IVs 3.6.1.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

LCO 3.6.I.3* Each PCIV shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES l, 2, and 3, HSBES 4 an~ S fEH RHR Shtrl:Etaun GaeH A§ §y3tem stteti SA ff'Sffl the 1 eaete1 ves3e1 hal ati sR ;*al ves \SheA assseiated isehtian instrumentati9n is required to be OPERABLE per bGQ *3.3.6.1, "Primary tentaiRment aAd Drywe11 Isslati-oo Inst,umentatiaH," F6aetisfl §.h.

When associated isolation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1 Function 2.g.

ACTlONS

~------------------------~-------NOTES---------------~--------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

\. .. 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

u 3. Enter appl i cable Conditions and *Required Actions for systems. made inoperable by PCIVs.

4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," when PCIV leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria in MODES l, 2, and 3.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.6-9 Amendment No. if&-

Page 35 of 52

PClVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued) u ' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.l Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion \

Time of Condition A, AND 8, C, or D not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months I

F. Required Action and F.l -----*--NOTE---------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A, app1i cable.

B, C, or D not met for PCIV(s) required )

~~---------~

to be OPERABLE during Suspend movement of Immediately movement -of -recently -rec-ently i-rradlated -I irradiated fuel fuel assemblies in assemblies in the primary and secondary primary or secondary containment.

containment.

G. *Re*qui*red Ast i en *aAd asssciaied Csmpleti&n

- *G.I hri-ti *ate *aeti an *ta suspend OP9R\'s.

'I Time af Cenditian A, 8, C, er D net met fsr GR-PCIV(-s) required ts be OPERABLE during M09E 4 .-2 Initiate aetian ta immediately e-r- 5 er during r~stere ~alve(s) ta eperatiens*with a OPERABLE STATUS-.

peteAtial far draining

the reacter vessel

.(OP9R'!s).

GRAND GULF 3.6-13 Amendment No.~,~

OCT 2 9 1899 Page 36 of 52

Secondary Containment 3:6.4.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment LCO 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment~

Bt!Fift§' s~eFst:ieRs uH.J:l. s. !!J81H!!R1eia.l far ei:Felli.R.iR§ i:l-le .U5S1ei!F

.esssl (9P9Wts).

ACTION-S CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment A.1 Restore secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable in MODE 1, containment to 2, or 3. OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 --------NOTE------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is not Time of Condition A applicable when not met. entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

{continued)

GRAND GULF 3.6-42 Amendment No. ~,H ~

Page 37 of 52

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME u

I C. Secondary containment C.1 --------NOTE---------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not movement of recently applicable.

irradtated fuel assemblies in the

.p.rimary .or secondary .Suspend mo.vement .of Immedi-ately containment ap ~YfiRg recently irradiated 9PBR'Js. fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

IRitiate astisR ta I nmied i atel J SHSf)elul 9PBR'Js.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all auxiliary building and* 31 days

.enclosure building equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed.

SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one auxiliary building and 31 days enclosure building access door in each access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.6-43 Amendment No * .J..3.g,~

JUM 3 9 2009

.. . . . Page 38 of. 52

SCI Vs 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

\.._,,) 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

LCO 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment7 Ba1ing opeaatians with a patential sfer dF&iAiA§ the ,eaete,

.,esse1 l9PBR~:f).

ACTIONS

-------------NOTES-- -------~--------------- -----------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. *separate Condition entry is allowed for eac*h penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIVs.

COND.ITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.l Isolate the affected 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months

_penetration flow paths pe~etration flow path with one SCIV by use of at least inoperable. one closed and de-activated automatic va1ve or damper,*

closed manual *valve or damper, or blind flange.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.6-45 Amendment No.~'~

OCT 2 9 1999 Page 39 of 52

-*- -----*..._~.,._..... - .. - .

SCI Vs 3.6.4.2 ACTIONS (continued) u CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action.and - D.1 --------NOTE---------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A applicable.

or B not met during ------**------------- _I movement -of .recently irradiated fuel Suspend movement of Immediately assemblies in the recently irradiated I primary or secondary fuel assemblies in containment SP dHFiRg

-0PBR\'§-.

the primary and secondary I

containment.

ANB B.2 ln4tiste aet4en ~a lmmedia,ely 3t13p2iUt arBRVs.

GRAND GULF 3.6-47 Amendment No. ~, ~

SeFFeeted ~Y NRG letter datet:l-9ctahet 27, 1999 Page 40 of 52

SGT System 3.6.4.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO_ 3 . 6. 4 . 3 Two SGT-subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment.p B11:eifl§ s~e.Ea:eieRs .tith a ~eten:eial fer eiFahtifl.§' Hie eee.aeeF oessel ( 6Pl3RVs) .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SGT subsystem A. l Restore SGT subsystem 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 -------NOTE---~---

associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is not Time of Condition A applicable when not met in MODE 1, 2, entering MODE 3.

or 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months C. Required Action and -------------NOTE------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A not met during movement of recently C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT Immediately irradiated fuel subsystem in assemblies in the operation.

primary or secondary containment SF e~Fis~ *QR MBlhs.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.6-49 Amendment No. ~,H,,g. ~

Page 41 of 52

SGT System

3. 6. 4. 3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

.c. (-continued-) C.2-:4- Suspend movement -o-f Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

e.2.2 D. Two SGT subsystems D.l/ --------NOTE------

inoperable in MODE 1, LCO 3.0.4.a is not 2, or 3. applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months E. Two SGT subsystems E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable during recently irradiated movement of recently fuel assemblies in irradiated fuel the primary and assemblies in the secondary primary or secondary containment.

containment sl!' ehuing EH?Bz\Va.

E.2 Initiate aetien ts Ittuttcaiately GRAND GULF 3.6-50 Amendment No. ~'~ ~

Page 42 of 52

CRFA System 3.7.3 3.7 PL.ANT SYSTEM 3.7.3 control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) system LCO 3.7.3 TWO CRFA subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILiiY-: *MODES 1, 2, and 30 B~Pi A§ s~ei=s.tisn:; ~.h:h s 13ater1ti al feF ~Fa.ini 11§ the reaetsF

2usl (QP9RHe).

ACTIONS

NOTE--------------------------------------

The Control Room Envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A, one CRFA subsystem A.l Restore CRFA 7 days inoperable for subsystem to OPERABLE reasons other than status.

condition B.

B. one or more CRFA B.l Initiate action to Immediately subsystems inocerable implement mitigating due to inopera le CRE actions.

boundary in MODE 1, 2, or 3. AND B.2 verify mitigating 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months actions ensure CRE occupant ex~osures to

radi*olo~i-ca* *chemical

and smo e hazards will not exceed 1 imits.

~

B.3 Restore CRE boundary 90 days to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.7-6 Amendment No. ~ . ~

Page 43 of 52

CRFA System 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

c. Re qui-red Action -and C.1 -------NOTE-------

associated Completion \ LCO 3.0.4.a is not Time of Co_ndition A or applicable when B not met in MODE 1, entering MODE 3.

or 2. ------------------

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

s. Re!::!tti~eel ~lliSiE~S!Fl ase\ B.l E-'3:!!!ee SfB~:Esr:~ EikFJ:.. Inuacdia tcly

~eeeeie.l:!ee 9eu!f!le l!ie~ ~~~s,seeM i~

'!l~!US "£ e"nd+/-t:+/-on ~ issle.tiel'l fftese.

fl6'E Wt@:!: eh1:'fiF.~ 9P~RVs

-eR-B.~ ~Aieieee 8E!~i8A es L.aaeaiatel:9

~~51E3ena 9P8R~ls.

(eeFJ:tim1eel.)

'GRAND GULF 3.7-7 Amendment No. 14§, ~ ~

\

Page 44 of 52

CRFA system

3. 7. 3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Two CRFA subsystems -------NOTE-------

inoperable in MOD LCO 3.0.4.a is not 2, or 3 fo applicable when othe entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months F F.1 N8:P8 i~s~sEeels B~FiN~ he9 s.9.3 sass nee Sf'Bih s. aF'@ly Initiate aetieH 'es enc sz me.l'e GRF.A. 6t!!Sf,iiel ElFSRVs.

6~6S}6e@ffl6 iRS~SFSSl@

e~e e iRs~eFablc 8RS lsse1:HaaFJ s~FiR§'

OP9i;I.Us.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Operate each CRFA subsystem for~ 15 31 days continuous minutes. .I SR 3.7.3.2 Perform required CRFA filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP).

SR 3.7.3.3 Verify each CRFA subsystem actuates on an 24 months actual or simulated initiation signal.

SR 3.7.3.4 Perform required CRE unfiltered air In accordance inleakage testing in accordance with the *with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Control Room Program. Envelope Habitability Program GRAND GULF 3.7-8 Amendment No. H-8-, -+/--9-+, ~ , ~

Page 45 of 52

Control Room AC System 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System LCO 3.7.4 Two control room AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, _and ~

BaFifl§' Si3SFl!i;@Jt8RS *.1ieH a f,Si:9REial fen;: eEa.iF!:iR~ i.R9 F9i!H,t9Jf VeSSEl (8EB~os).

ACT TONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room AC A.*1 Restore control room 30 days subsystem inoperable. AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Two control room AC B.1 Verify control room Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months subsystems inoperable. area temperature~

90°F.

AND 7 days B.2 Restore one con~rol room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 -------NOTE-------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is not Time of Condition A or applicable when B not met in MODE 'l, entering MODE 3.

2, or 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

( SSHEiPl:eH::el)

~ [)~~bl~ ~Ii~~;~

~,.---..........-,.-....

1 GRAND GULF 3.7-9 Amendment No. ~ , H..§.r ~

Page 46 of 52

Control Room AC System 3.7.4 ACTlON-s Cconti nued) u I

CONDITI9N REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION. TIME D. Re~~ired Aetian and -B-:-1 Place OPERABLE !mined i ately -I assaeiatea Completion cemt>> ol room AC Time ef Canditian A subs;y stem m Aat met a~ring OPDRVs. opera ti on.

im tiate act i uii to Immediately

-sttS""jX:nd OPDR\'s.

( G9Rthuaea)

GRAND GULF 3.7-10 Amendment No. i-2-9,~

MAR 1 t! feat Page 47 of 52

Contra I Room AC System *

3.7.4 REQU.IRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Re*qu 11 .ed. Aet i ei"i ana IRitiatc actiaR =to ~mmcaiately associa=tea CamplctiOR suspeRd OPDR'Js.

T\me e¥ CeRai~iOR B

.n_ot* me~. '..I

9pnn,,

uUF.l.fl§ :<D.Kv.S ..

yerify each control room AC subsystem has 24 months

the *capability to remove the assumed*heat load. *

. .' (: :: -.. ::.

'I*

. . .:: : *..i . ~:

.* :,Fill'/**. /

: ... -~ ... ' . .. ..

": \\-:f: :' >: <:.

*** 1,*

3. 7-11 Amendment 'No. -3:4 ,* . ~

Page 48 of 52

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS

*--*----------------------~-----NOTE--- ----------------------------------

LCO 3~0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LCO Item a not met. ------------NOTE-------------

Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.8, when any required division is de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.l Declare affected Immediately required feature(s) with no offsite power available from a required circuit I

inoperable~ ~

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently.irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary .and secondary containment.

A.2.3 h1itiate aetiaR ta -immeEliately

§Y§pSAS a~ePa\iaAS

~ith a ~eteRtial feP ePaiAiAg tke feaetaF

~3el (0PBRVs).

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.8-19 Amendment No.~.~

MAR 14 2oot Page 49 of 52

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2

.3 ACTIONS CONDITION* REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME*

A. (continued) w A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required offsite power ~ircuit to OPERABlE .st.atus .*

B. LCO Item b not met. 8.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. .

ANO B.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in primary and secondary containment.

I JJJ.9-B.s h1hhie aethA ts al-mMe 8ia te 1Y EYSf)SRS 9PBR'/3.

AND el" ~4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

c. LCO Item c not met. C.1 Declare High Pressure 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Core Spray System inoperable.

GRAND GULF. 3.8-20 Amendment No. +2-9, l~a Page 50 of 52

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 ACTIONS u

I CONDITlON REQUIRED ACTION~ COMPLETION TIME C. Ccontinued) C.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

C.2.3 lAitiste aetia~ te I,m11ed i a tElY SYS~@Ra 6~fStiefl3 ui t~ a f)SteRti al fsF

~FaiAiR§ ~he reaateP

-v-essel.

eh AND

~ Initiate action to Immediately restore required DC electrical power

\ . subsystems to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILL~NCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8 .. 5.1 - * * .. - * * - * - - - .. -* * - * -.- NOTE - - - - ~ - - - - - - .. - - - - .. - -

The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.4.4, SR 3.8.4.6.

SR 3.8.4.7, and SR 3.8.4.8.

For DC sources required to be OPERABLE, the In accordance following SRs are applicable: with applicable SRs SR 3.8.4.1 SR 3.-8.4.4 SR 3.8.4.7 SR 3.8.4.2 SR 3.8.4.5 SR 3.8.4.8.

SR 3.8.4.3 SR 3.8.4.6 GRANO GULF 3.8-33 Amendment No. -ii-a,~

+.Y-tR 1 1 ,ng1 Page 51 of 52

Distribution Systems-Shutdown 3.8.8 u ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.3 Initiate ae~;an ta "fflmediately suspeRd epePatfsR&

w4th a ~a,eAt4a1 ~SP dpaiA1A§ the Feaeter t.*eesel *

~

Initiate actions to Immediately restore required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status.

Declare associated Immediately '

required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in

\j operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I

SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and 7 days voltage to required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems.

GRANO GULF 3.8-41 Amendment No. +e&

Page 52 of 52

Attachment 3 to GNR0-2018/00007 Revised Technical Specification Pages (Clean)

(56 pages)

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions DOSE EQUIVALENT *1-131 be those *listed *in *Federal Guidance Report (FGR)

(continued) 111, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion," 1989.

DRAIN TIME* The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel .(TAF) seated in the RPV Jassuming:

a. The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate;

b. The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow-rate, or the -sum -of the *drain -rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode

failure (e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error), for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except:

1. Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths;

2. Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite p.qwer .prior .to .th.e .RPV water .level .being .e.qual .to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation; or

3. Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the T AF by a dedicated operator trained in the task, who is in continuous communication with

the *control room, *is stationed -at-the *controls, and is capable of closing the penetration flow path isolation devices without offsite power.

c. The penetration flow paths required to be evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneou~ly and are not subsequently isolated, and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory; GRANO GULF 1.0-3 Amendment No. 44-G, 488, ~ , _ _

Page 1 of 56

Defin-itiohs 1.1 1.1 Definitions DRAIN TIME d. .No additional draining events occur; _and (continued)

e. Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used.

A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated value.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM(ECCS)RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS TIME initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e.,

the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial movement of the associated turbine (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM valve or the turbine stop control valve to complete RESPONSE TIME suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts _of the recirculation pump circuit-breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured, except for the breaker arc suppression time, which is not measured but is validated to conform to the manufacturer's design value.

INSERVICE TESTING The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee PROGRAM program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).

ISOLATION SYSTEM The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RESPONSE TIME time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. The

re*sponse *time -may *be-measured *by-means of any *series *of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, La, shall be 0.682% of primary containment air weight per day at the calculated peak containment pressure (Pa),

(continued)

GRAND GULF 1.0-3a Amendment No. 444, 44-a, _ _

Page 2 of 56

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.1 The ECCS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.5.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTE--------------------------------*-------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more ~equired A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately channels inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 for the channel.

B. As required by Required 8.1 ----------NOTE----------------

Action A.1 and Only applicable for I referenced in Functions 1.a, 1.b, 2.a Table 3.3.5.1-1. and 2.b.

Declare supported 1 hou[ from discovery

-feature(s)-inoperable -of -loss .of -initiation when its redundant feature capability for ECCS initiation capability feature(s) in both is inoperable. divi~ions AND (continued)

\

GRAND GULF 3.3-32 Amendment No. -1, __

Page 3 of 56

EGGS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

8. (contin~ed) 8.2 -----------NOTE-------------.

Only applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b.

Declare High Pressure 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery Core Spray *(HPCS)

of loss of HPCS System inoperable. initiation capability AND 8.3 Place channel in trip. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months C. As required by Required c. 1 -----------NOTE---------------

Action A.1 and Only applicable for referenced in Functions 1.c, 1.d, 2.c, Table 3.3.5.1-1. and 2.d.

Declare supported 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery

-feature(s) -inoperable of -loss -of -initiation when its redundant feature capability for ECCS initiation capability feature(s) in both is inoperable. divisions AND (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-33 Amendment No. 4,gQ, _ _

Page 4 of 56

EGGS *instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. As required by Required E.1 ------------NOTE--------------

Action A.1 and Only applicable for referenced in Functions 1.e, 1.f, and Table 3.3.5.1~1. 2.e.

Declare supported 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery feature(s) inoper~ble of loss of initiation when its redundant feature capability for ECCS initiation capability

feature(s) in both is inoperable. divisions AND E.2 Restore channel to 7 days OPERABLE status.

F. As required by Required F.1 Declare Automatic 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery Action A.1 and Depressurization System of loss of ADS

-referenced -in (ADS) valves -inoperable. -initiation -capability -in Table 3.3.5.1-1. both trip systems AND (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-35 Amendment No. 420, __

Page 5 of 56

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 I

Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 1 of 5) 1 Emergency Core Cooling System lns~rument~tion APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER . CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS *VALUE

1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2<a) B :SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ -152.5 Level - Low Low Low, iSR 3.3.5. 1.2 inches Level 1 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Drywell Pressure - 1,2,3 2(a) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.44 psig High .SR 3.3.5.1.2

SR 3.3.5.1.3 1

SR 3.3.5.1.5

SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. LPCI Pump A 1,2,3 c SR 3.3.5.1.2 S5.25 Start - Time Delay ;sR 3.3.5.1.4 seconds Relay I SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3 3 c SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 452 psig and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 534 psig (Injection Permissive) .SR 3.3.5.1.3

SR 3.3.5.1.5 1

SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. LPCS Pump 1,2,3 1 E :sR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 1285 gpm Discharge Flow - Low :SR 3.3.5.1.2 (Bypass) :SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. LPCI Pump A 1,2,3 E . ISR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 1133 gpm Discharge *SR 3.3.5.1.2 Flow- Low (Bypass) i SR 3.3.5.1.3

'SR 3.3.5.1.5

SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 c :SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA I

\

(continued)

(a) Also required to initiate the associated diesel generator.

GRAND GULF 3.3-39 Amendment No. ~ ' 4e9, _ _

Page 6 of 56

ECCS -instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTIONA:1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. LPCI B and LPCI C

subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 la) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 :::: -152.5 Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches Level 1 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Drywall Pressure - 1,2,3 2(a) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.44 psig

-High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. LPCI Pump B 1,2,3 c SR 3.3.5.1.2 S5.25 Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.4 seconds Relay SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3 3 c SR 3.3.5.1.1 :::: 452 psig and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 534 psig (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. LPCI Pump B 1,2,3 1 per pump SR 3.3.5.1.1 :::: 1133 gpm and LPCI Pump C E SR 3.3.5.1.2 Discharge Flow - Low SR 3.3.5.1.3 (Bypass) *sR 3:3:5.1 :5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 f., Manual Initiation 1,2,3 c SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA

3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System

a. Reactor Vessel *water 4<a) H SR 3:3.5.1.1 :::: -43.8-inches 1,2,3 Level - Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 (continued}

-(a) -Also-required-to initiateihe *associated *diesel generator.

GRAND GULF - 3.3-40 Amendment No. 420,-1-eQ., __

Page 7 of 56

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3'.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. HPCS System (continued)

b. Drywall Pres~ure - 1,2,3 4(a) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.44 psig High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 c SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 55. 7 inches Level - High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. Condensate Storage 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 4.7 ft Tank Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3Cb)Ccl SR 3.3.5.1.5Cb)Ccl SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. Suppression Pool 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 7.0 inches Water Level - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. HPCS Pump 1,2,3 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 108 psig and Discharge Pressure - SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 1282 psig High (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR -3_-3.5.1.-S SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. HPCS System Flow 1,2,3 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 1124 gpm Rate - Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and 1327 gpm SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 (continued)

(a) Also required to initiate the associated diesel generator.

(b) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.

(c) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise the channel shall be declared inoperable.

Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The NTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual.

GRAND GULF 3.3-41 Amendment No.439, 484-, 4-8&, __

Page 8 of 56 ,

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 4 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTIONA.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. HPCS System (continued)

h. Manual Initiation *1,2,3 c *SR 3.3:5:1 :6 *NA

4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1 2(d) 3<d) 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 :::-152.5 l I Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches Level 1 -sR 3:3:5.1 :3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Drywell Pressure - 1 2(d) 3(d)

I I 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.44 psig High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. ADS Initiation Timer 1,2(d),3(d) G SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 115 seconds SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. Reactor Vessel Water 1id\3(d) F SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 10.8 inches Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.2 (Confirmatory) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. LPCS Pump 1,2(d),3(d) 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 125 psig and Discharge Pressure - SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 165 psig High SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. LPCI Pump A 1 2(d) 3(d) 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 115 psig and I I Discharge Pressure SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 135 psig

-High SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

{continued}

(d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

GRAND GULF 3.3-42 Amendment No. ~ ' ~ ' _ _

Page 9 of 56

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 5 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTIONA.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

4. ADS Trip System A (continued)

g. ADS Bypass Timer 1,2(d),3(d) 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.2 s; 9.4 minutes (High Drywell SR 3.3.5.1.4 Pressure) SR 3.3.5.1.6

h. Manual Initiation 1,2(d),3(d) 2/system G SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA

-5_ ADS Trip System -B

a. Reactor Vessel 1,2(d),3(d) 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ -152.5 Water Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches Low Low, Level 1 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Drywell Pressure - 1 2(d) 3(d) 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 s; 1.44 psig I I

-High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. ADS Initiation Timer 1,2(d),3(d) G SR 3.3.5.1.2 s; 115 seconds SR 3.3.5. 1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. Reactor Vessel 1,2(d),3(d) 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 10.8 inches Water Level - SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.3 (Confirmatory) SR 3,..3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. LPCI Pumps B & C 1,2(d) ,3(d) 2 per pump G SR 3.3.5.1.1 ~ 115 psig and Discharge SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 135 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. ADS Bypass Timer 1,2(d) ,3(d) 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.2 s; 9.4 minutes (High Drywell SR 3.3.5.1.4 Pressure) SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. Manual Initiation 1 2(d) 3(d) 2/system G SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA I I (d) With reactor steam dome pressure> 150 psig.

GRAND GULF 3.3-43 Amendment No. ~ , 2-07, __

Page 10 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3;3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.2 The RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.5.2-1.

ACTIONS

.-----------------------NOTE--------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for the channel.

I

8. As required by Required 8.1 Declare associated Immediately Action A. 1 and penetration flow path(s) referenced in incapable of automatic Table 3.3.5.2-1. isolation.

AND 8.2 Calculate DR~IN TIME. Immediately C. As required by Required C.1 Place channel in trip. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-43a Amendment No.

Page 11 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 Declare HPCS system 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and inoperable. \

referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. OR D.2 Align the HPCS pump 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months suction to the suppression pool.

E. As required by Required E.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Action A.1 and OPERABLE status.

referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

F. Required Action and F.1 Declare associated ECCS Immediately associated Completion injection/spray subsystem Time of Condition C, D, inoperable.

or E not met.

GRAND GULF 3.3-43b Amendment No.

Page 12 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE-- ------------------------------ .------------------

R.efer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.5.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months GRAND GULF 3.3-43c Amendment No.

Page 13 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 1 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTIONA.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Low Pressure Coolant lnjection.:A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel 4,5 3(a) c SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~ 452 psig and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 $; 534 psig (Injection Permissive)

b. -LPCSPump Discharge Flow - 4,5 1(a) E SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~ 1285 gpm Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.2.2

c. LPCI Pump A 4,5 1(a) E SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~ 1133 gpm Discharge Flow - SR 3.3.5.2.2 Low (Bypass)

d. .Manual .Initiation 4,.5 1(a) E .SR .3.3.5.2.3 NA

2. LPCI Band LPCI C Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel 4,5 3(a) c SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~ 452 psig and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 $; 534 psig (Injection Permissive)

b. LPCI Pump B 4,5 1 per E SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~ 1133 gpm and LPCI Pump C pump(a) SR 3.3.5.2.2 Discharge Flow -

Low (Bypass)

c. Manual Initiation 4,5 1ca) E SR 3.3.5.2.3 NA (continued)

(a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control."

GRAND GULF 3.3-43d Amendment No.

Page 14 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control lnstru'mentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 2 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTIONA.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. High Pressure Core Spray {HPCS) System

a. Condensate Storage 4(b), 5(b) 1<a) D SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~4.7 ft Tank Level - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2

b. HPCS Pump 4,5 1<a) E SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~ 108 psig and Discharge Pressure SR 3.3.5.2.2 ~ 1282 psig

- High (Bypass)

c. HPCS System Flow 4,5 1<a) E SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~ 1124 gpm Rate - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 and (Bypass) ~ 1327 gpm

4. RHR System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel (c) 2 in one B SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~ 10.8 inches Water Level - Low, trip system SR 3.3.5.2.2 Level.3

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel (c) 2 in one B SR 3.3.5.2.1 ~ -43.8 inches Water Level - Low . trip system SR 3.3.5.2.2 Low, Level 2

{a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control."

(b) When HPCS is OPERABLE for compliance with LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Control," and aligned to the condensate storage tank.

(c) When automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path{s) is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

GRAND GULF 3.3-43e Amendment No.

Page 15 of 56

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.3 The RCIC System instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.3-1 I shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome:_pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE------ --------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1 for the channel.

-S. As required *by Required * -S. 1 Declare RGIC System 1 *hour from discovery Action A.1 and inoperable. of loss of RCIC referenced in initiation capability Table 3.3.5.3-1. I AND 8.2 Place channel in trip. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months C. As required by Required C.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Action A.1 and OPERABLE status.

referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-44 Amendment No. 420, _._

Page 16 of 56

RCIC System *instrumentation 3.3.5.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by D.1 --------------NOTE-------------

Required Action A.1 Only applicable if RCIC and referenced in pump suction is not Table 3.3.5.3-1. aligned to the suppression pool.

Declare RCIC System 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery inoperable. of loss of RCIC initiation capability AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR D.2.2 Align RCIC pump suction 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to the suppression pool.

-E. -Required -Action -and E.1 Declare -RCIC -System - -Immediately associated Completion inoperable.

Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.

GRAND GULF 3.3-45 Amendment No. 420, __

Page 17 of 56

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

*-----------NOTES---------------------------------------- *-----------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.3-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.

2. *when a channel *is placed in an inoperable status so*1e1y for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 2 and 5; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 3, and 4 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability.

SURVEILLAN.CE FREQ-UENCY SR 3.3.5.3.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.5.3.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 day$

SR 3.3.5.3.3 Calibrate the trip units. 92 days SR 3.3.5.3.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3.3.5.3.5 Perform -LOGIC -SYSTEM-FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24-months GRAND GULF 3.3-46 Amendment No. 4-2Q., 497, __

Page 18 of 56

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 Table 3.3.5.3-1 (page 1 of 1)

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation CONDITIONS REQUIRED REFERENCED CHANNELS FROM PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 4 8 SR 3.3.5.3.1 ~ -43.8 inches Level - -Low *Low, -Level 2 -SR 3.3:5.3.2 SR 3.3.5.3.3 SR 3.3.5.3.4 SR 3.3.5.3.5

2. Reactor Vessel Water 2 c SR 3.3.5.3.1 s 55.7 inches Level - High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.3.2 SR 3.3.5.3.4 SR 3.3.5.3.5

3. Condensate Storage Tank 2 D SR 3.3.5.3.1 ~ 3.7 ft Level- Low SR 3.3.5.3.2 SR 3.3.5.3.4(a)(b)

SR 3.3.5.3.5

4. Suppression Pool Water 2 D SR 3.3.5.3.1 s 7.0 inches Level- High SR 3.3.5.3.2 SR 3.3.5.3.4 SR 3.3.5.3.5

5. Manual Initiation c SR 3.3.5.3.5 NA I (a) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.

(b) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.

Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The NTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual.

GRAND GULF 3.3-47 Amendment No. ~ ' 484, ~ , __ 1 Page 19 of 56

Primary Containment and Drywe11 *1so1a*tion *1nstrumen*tation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. As required by Required H.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Action C.1 and referenced in AND Table 3.3.6.1-1.

H.2 Be in MODE4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F or G not met.

I. As required by Required . 1.1 Declare associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action C.1 and Standby Liquid Control referenced in subsystem inoperable.

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

OR 1.2 Isolate the Reactor Water 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Cleanup System. \

J. As required by Required J.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately Action C.1 and channel to OPERABLE referenced in status.

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

OR (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-50 Amendment No. ~ ' __

Page 20 of 56

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation *1nstrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME J. (continued) J.2.1' Initiate action to restore Immediately secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

AND J.2.2 -Initiate action -to restore -Immediately -I one standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem to OPERABLE status.

AND J.2.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.

K -As required-by - K1 -Isolate the affected Immediately Required Action C.1 penetration flow path(s).

and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. OR K.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel p assemblies in the primary and secondary containment. I GRAND GULF 3.3-51 Amendment No. 42-Q, 4d9, __

Page 21 of 56

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation

. 3.3.6.1 Text Deleted GRAND GULF 3.3-52 Amendment No. ~ , 439, _ _

Page 22 of 56

Primary Containment and -Orywe11 *1solation *instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS continued SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.9 -----------------------------NOTE-----------------------------

Channel sensors may be excluded.

Verify the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 24 months on a for the Main Steam Isolation Valves is within limits. STAGGERED TEST BASIS GRAND GULF 3.3-53a Amendment No. 493, 497, __

Page 23 of 56

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 1 of 6)

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Main Steam Line Isolation

-a. Reactor-Vessel Water *1,2,3 2 -0 *SR 3.3:6.1.1 ~ -152.5 Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 inches Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8 SR 3.3.6.1.9

b. Main Steam Line 1 2 E SR 3.3.6.1.1 ~ 837 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1.2

-sR -3.3:6.1 :3 SR 3.3.6.1. 7 SR 3.3.6.1.8 SR 3.3.6.1.9

c. Main Steam Line 1,2,3 2 per MSL D SR 3.3.6.1.1 ::;; 255.9 psid Flow- High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8 SR 3.3.6.1.9

d. Condenser Vacuum - 1,2(a)I 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 ~ 8.7 inches Low 3(a) SR 3.3.6.1.2 Hg vacuum SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

e. Main Steam Tunnel 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 ::;; 191°F Ambient Temperature SR 3.3.6.1.2

- High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.8

f. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.8 NA (continued)

(a) With any turbine stop valve not closed.

GRAND GULF 3.3-54 Amendment No. 494-, 497, __

Page 24 of 56

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 2 of 6)

Primary Containment and Drywall Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Primary Containment and Drywall Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2(b) H SR 3.3.6.1.1 ~ -43.8 inches Level - Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1. 7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

b. Drywall Pressure - 1,2,3 2(b) H SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.43 psig High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

c. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2(b) F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ~ -152.5 Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 inches Level 1 (ECCS SR 3.3.6.1.3 Divisions 1 and 2) SR 3.3.6.1. 7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

d. Drywall Pressure - 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.44 psig High (ECCS SR 3.3.6.1.2 Divisions 1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 and 2) SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

-e. *Reactor Vessel *Water 1,2,3 4 F -SR 3.3:6:1.1 ;2: -'43:8inches Level - Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 2 (HPCS) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

f. Drywell Pressure - 1,2,3 4 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.44 psig High (HPCS) SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8 (continued}

(b) Also required to initiate the associated drywall isolation function.

GRAND GULF 3.3-55 Amendment No. 439-,497, __

Page 25 of 56

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 3 of 6)

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation (continued)

g. Containment and 1,2,3 2(b) F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 4.0 mR/hr Drywell Ventilation SR 3.3.6.1.2 Exhaust Radiation - SR 3.3.6.1.5 High SR 3.3.6.1.6 (c) 2 K SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 4.0 mR/hr SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

h. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 2(b) G SR 3.3.6.1.8 NA (c) 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.8 NA

3. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation

a. RCIC Steam Line 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 64 inches Flow- High SR 3.3.6.1.2 water SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

b. RCIC Steam Line Flow 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 ;;:: 3 seconds Time Delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 and SR 3.3.6.1.8 s 7 seconds

c. RCIC Steam Supply 1,2(d) ,3(d) F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ;;:: 57 psig Line Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6. 1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8 (continued}

(b) Also required to initiate the associated drywell isolation function.

(c) During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in primary or secondary containment.

(d) Not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 or 3 with reactor steam dome pressure less than 150 psig during reactor startup.

GRAND GULF 3.3-56 Amendment No. 494, 497, __

Page 26 of 56

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 6)

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. RCIC System Isolation (continued)

d. RCIC Turbine 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 20 psig Exhaust Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1.2

,Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1. 7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

e. RCIC Equipment 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 191°F Room Ambient SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.8

f. Main Steam Line 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 191 °F Tunnel Ambient SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.8

g. Main Steam Line 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 s 30 minutes Tunnel Temperature SR 3.3.6.1.4 Timer SR 3.3.6.1.8

h. RHR Equipment 1,2,3 1 per room F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 171°F Room Ambient SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.8

i. RCIC/RHR Steam 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 43 inches Line Flow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 water SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

j. Drywell Pressure - 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.44 psig High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1. 7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

k. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 G SR 3.3.6.1.8 NA (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-57 Amendment No. ~ . 497, _ _-

Page 27 of 56

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 6)

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

4. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation I

a. Differential Flow - 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ::;; 89 gpm High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1. 7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

b. Differential Flow - 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 ::;; 57 seconds Timer SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR -3:3;6.1 :8

c. RWCU Heat 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ::;; 126°F Exchanger Equipment SR 3.3.6.1.2 Room Temperature - SR 3.3.6.1.5 High SR 3.3.6.1.8

d. RWCU Pump Room 1,2,3 1 per room F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ::;; 176°F Temperature - High SR 3.3.6, 1.2 SR 3.3.6:1:5 SR 3.3.6.1.8

e. RWCU Heat 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 141°F Exchanger Room SR 3.3.6.1.2 Valve Nest Area SR 3.3.6.1.5 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.8

f. Main Steam Line 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 191°F

runnel Ambient -sR -3,-3;6. 1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.8

g. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ?:: -43.8 inches Level - Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

h. Standby Liquid Control 1,2 SR 3.3.6.1.8 NA System Initiation

i. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.8 NA (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-58 Amendment No. ~ , 497, ___

Page 28 of 56

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 6 of 6)

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM

SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

5. RHR System Isolation

a. RHR Equipment 1,2,3 1 per room F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 171°F Room Ambient SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.8

b. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3(e) 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 ~ 10.8 inches Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8 3<f) 2 J SR 3.3.6.1.1 ~ 10.8 inches SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3,3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

c. Reactor Steam Dome 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 150 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

d. Drywell Pressure - 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.43 psig High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

e. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.8 NA (e) With reactor steam dome pressure greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive press,ure.

(f) With reactor steam dome pressure less than the RHR cut-in permissive pressure.

GRAND GULF 13.3-58a Amendment No.

Page 29 of 56

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Table 3.3.6.2-1 (page 1 of 1)

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

(

I APPLICABLE MODES AND REQUIRED OTHER CHANNELS SPECIFIED PER TRIP SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 ~ -43.8 inches

Low, *LevEW2 *sR 3:3:6:2:2 SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 SR 3.3.6.2.6

2. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 s 1.43 psig SR 3'.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 SR -3.3.6.2.6

3. Fuel Handling Area Ventilation 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 S4.0 mR/hr Exhaust Radiation - High High (a) SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.6 SR 3.3.6.2. 7

4. Fuel Handling Area Pool Sweep 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 s 35 mR/hr

-Exhaust -Radiation -- -High-High -(a) SR 3.3,6.2.2 -I SR *3:3:6:2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.6 SR 3.3.6.2.7

5. Manual Initiation 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.6 NA (a)

(a) During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment.

GRAND GULF . 3.3-62 Amendment No. 420,439, _ _

Page 30 of 56

CRFA System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7.1 Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7.1 The CRFA System instrumentation for manual isolation shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTIONS

.--- .---NOTE---------------------------------------------------

Sepa rate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Place channel in trip. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inoperable.

8. Required Action and 8.1 Close associated isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months associated Completion dampers.

Time not met.

(

GRAND GULF 3.3-73 Amendment No. 44a,-4a+, _ _

Page 31 of 56

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of eight safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE----------------------------------------------

Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the residual h~at removal cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressures 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE----------------------------------------------------------

Lco-3.0.4:b-is not applicable to HPCS.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. -one *1ow pressure - A.-1 Restore *1ow pressure 7 days ECCS injection/spray ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.5-1 Amendment No. 469, ~ , __

Page 32 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPVWATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control LCO 3.5.2 DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the top of active fuel (TAF) shall be ~36 hours One ECCS injection/spray subsystem shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE---------------------------------------------

A low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required ECCS A.1 Restore required ECCS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months injection/spray injection/spray subsystem to subsystem inoperable. OPERABLE status.

r,_

8. Required Action and 8.1 Initiate action to establish a Immediately associated Completion method of water injection Time of Condition A not capable of operating without met. offsite electrical power.

C. DRAIN TIME < 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C.1 Verify secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and ~ 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . containment boundary is capable of being established in less than the DRAIN TIME.

. AND (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.5-6 Amendment No. ~ , 4&9-, __

Page 33 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2 Verify each secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months containment penetration flow path is capable of being isolated in less than the ORAi N Tl ME.

AND C.3 Verify one standby gas 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME.

D. DRAIN TIME< 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . D.1 -----------NOTE---------------

I Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem or additional method of water injection shall be capable of

-operating without *offsite electrical power.

Initiate action to establish Immediately an additional method of water injection with water sources capable of maintaining RPV water level

> T AF for ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

AND D.2 Initiate action to establish Immediately secondary containment boundary.

AND (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.5-6a Amendment No.

Page 34 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

(

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.3 Initiate action to isolate each Immediately secondary containment penetration flow path or verify it can be manually isolated from the control room.

AND D.4 Initiate action to verify one Immediately standby gas treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation.

E. Required Action and E.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately associated Completion DRAIN TIME to~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

Time of Condition C or D not met.

OR DRAIN TIME < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify DRAIN TIME ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.5.2.2 Verify, for a required low pressure ECCS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months injection/spray subsystem, the suppression pool water level is~ 12 ft 8 inches.

. (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.5-7 Amendment No. 420 1 Page 35 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control . *1 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.3 Verify, for the required High Pressure Core Spray 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (HPCS) System, the:

a. Suppression pool water level is ~ 12 ft 8 inches; or

b. Condensate storage tank water level is ~ 18 ft.

SR 3.5.2.4 Verify, for the required ECCS injection/ spray 31 days subsystem, locations susceptible to gas "'

accumulation are sufficently filled with water.

SR 3.5.2.5 -------------------------------N()TE------------------------------

Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

Verify for the required ECCS injection/spray 31 days subsystem, each manua*1, power operated, and I automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.5-8 Amendment No. ~ ' 4e9, ~ ' __

Page 36 of 56

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.6 Operate the required ECCS injection/spray*, 92 days.

subsystem through the test return li,ne for~

10 minutes.

SR 3.5.2.7 Verify -each valve -credited for automatically -isolating 24 months a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

SR 3.5.2.8 -------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify the required LPCI or LPCS subsystem 24 months actuates on a manual initiation signal, or the required HPCS System can be manually operated.

GRAND GULF 3.5-9 Amendment No. 420, 497, ~ ' _ _

Page 37 of 56

RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: -MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE----------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTIONS COMPLETION TIME A. RCIC System A.1 Verify by administrative 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable. means High Pressure Core Spray System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC System to 14 days OPERABLE status.

8. Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AND 8.2 Reduce reactor steam 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months dome pressur~ to s 150_psig.

GRAND GULF 3.5-10 Amendment No. ~ , 4-+a, __

Page 38 of 56

PCIVs*

3.6.1.3

- 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

Leo 3.6.1.3 Each PCIV shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3,

\ When associated isolation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1 Function 2.g.

ACTIONS

NOTES---------------------------------------------

-1. *Penetrationilow*pathsmay*be*unisolated*intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by PCIVs.

4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment,"

when PCIV leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

(continued),

GRAND GULF 3.6-9 Amendment No. 42-Q, _ _

Page 39 of 56

PC IVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I

I E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, AND C, or D not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. E.2 Be in MODE4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months F. Required Action and F.1 -----~----~-NOTE-------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A, applicable.

B, C, or D not met ----------------------------------

for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE Suspend movement of Immediately I

durin_g movement of recently irradiated fuel recently irradiated fuel assemblies in primary and assemblies in the secondary containment.

primary or secondary containment.

GRAND GULF 3.6-13 Amendment No. 42Q.,439, __

Page 40 of 56

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 3;6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 _ Seconda.ry Containment

-LcO -3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall -be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment.

I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment A.1 Restore secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

inoperable *in MODE 1, containment to 2, or 3. OPERABLE status.

8. Required Action and 8.1 -----~--~-~NOTE-~----------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is not Time of Condition A not applicable when entering

_met _MODE3_.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.6-42 Amendment No. 420,.~, 2:Q-1., _ _

Page 41 of 56

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Secondary containment C.1 ---------~---NOTE-------------~

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the Suspend movement of . Immediately primary or secondary recently irradiated fuel containment. assemblies *in *the *primary *I and secondary containment.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all auxiliary building and enclosure building 31 days equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed.

SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one auxiliary building and enclosure building 31 days access door in each access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being U$ed for entry and exit.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.6-43 Amendment No._ 39,~, _ _

Page 42 of 56

SC IVs 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

Leo 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV Shall *be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment.

ACTIONS

.* --------------------------------------------------------NOT ES---------------------------------* ----------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIVs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Isolate the affected 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months penetration flow paths penetration flow path by with one SCIV use of at least one closed inoperable. and -de-activated automatic valve or damper, closed manual valve or damper, or blind flange.

(continued)

\

GRAND GULF 3.6-45 Amendment No. 420, 439, __

Page 43 of 56

SGIVs 3.6.4.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 -------------NOTE--------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time .of Condition A applicable.

or B not met during movement of recently irradiated fuel Suspend movement of Immediately assemblies in the recently irradiated fuel primary or secondary assemblies in the primary containment. and secondary containment.

GRAND GULF 3.6-47 Amendment No.~'~' _ _

Corrected by NRG letter dated October 27, 1999 Page 44 of 56

SGT System 3.6.4.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) Syst~m LCO 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or

secondary containment.

\

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION , COMPLETION TIME A. One SGT subsystem A.1 Restore SGT subsystem to 7 days

\

inoperable. OPERABLE status.

I B. Required Action and 8.1 --------------NOTE---------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is not Time of Condition A not applicable when entering met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. MODE 3.

"Be *in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months C. Required Action and -------------------NOTE-----~-------------

associated qompletion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A not ---------------------------------------------

met during movement of

.recently .irradiated .fuel C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT .Immediately assemblies in the subsystem in operation.

primary or secondary containment. OR (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.6-49 Amendment No.~,~,~' __

Page 45 of 56

SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS CONDITION .REQUIRED.ACTION COMPLETION TlME

c. *(continued) C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

I D. Two SGT subsystems D.1 --------------NOTE---------------

inoperable in MODE 1, LCO 3.0.4.a is not 2, or 3. applicable when entering MODE 3.

\

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months E. Two SGT subsystems E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable during recently irradiated fuel movement of recently assemblies in the primary irradiated fuel and secondary containment.

-assemblies *in the primary or secondary containment.

GRAND GULF 3.6-50 Amendment No. 420, 439-, ~ , __

Page 46 of 56

CRFA System 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEM 3.7.3 Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System LCO 3.7.-3 Two-CRFA subsystems shall-be-OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTIONS

-------------------------------- I\JOTE------------------------------------------------------------

The Control Room Envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CRFA subsystem A.1 Restore CRFA subsystem 7 days inoperable for reasons to OPERABLE status.

other than Condition B.

B. One or more CRFA 8.1

Initiate action to Immediately subsystems implement mitigating inoperable due ,to actions.

inoperable CRE \

boundary in MODE 1, AND 2, or 3.

8.2 Verify mitigating actions 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

-ensure -GRE occupant exposures to radiological chemical and smoke hazards will not exceed limits.

AND 8.3 Restore CRE boundary to 90 days OPERABLE status. I (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.7-6 Amendment No. ~ , 73, __

Page 47 of 56

CRFASystem 3.7.3 ACTIONS. (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

c. Required Action and C.1 -------------N O*TE---------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is not Time of Condition A or B applicable when entering not met in MODE 1, or 2. MODE 3.

Be in MODE3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months D. Two CRFA subsystems D.1 --------------NOTE--------------

inoperable in MODE 1, LCO 3.0.4.a is not 2,.or 3 for reasons other applicable when entering than Condition B. MODE 3 .

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Operate each CRFA subsystem for ~ 15 continuous 31 days minutes.

SR 3.7.3.2 Perform required CRFA filter testing in accordance* In accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). the VFTP SR 3.7.3.3 Verify each CRFA subsystem actuates on an actual 24 months or simulated initiation signal.

SR 3.7.3.4 Perform required CRE unfiltered air inleakage testing In accordance with in accordance with the Control Room Envelope the Control Room Habitability Program. Envelope Habitability Program GRAND GULF 3.7-7 Amendment No. 44-a, 473, ~ , __

Page 48 of 56

CRFA System 3.7.3 Text Deleted GRAND GULF 3.7-8 Amendment No. 478, ~ , ~ , ~ ' - -

Page 49 of 56

Control Room AC System 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3. 7.4 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System tCO 3.7.4 Two control-room AC subsystemsshall*be*OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room AC A.1 Restore control room AC 30 days subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Two control room AC B.1 Verify control room area Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months subsystems inoperable. temperatures 90°F.

AND

. 8.2 Restore .one .control .mom 7 day.s AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 --------------NOTE~------~-----

associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is not Time of Condition A or B not applicable when entering met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months GRAND GULF 3.7-9 Amendment No.~,~'~, __

Page 50 of 56

Control Room AC System 3.7.4 Text Deleted GRAND GULF 3.7-10 Amendment No. 420, ~ ' __

Page 51 of 56

Control Room AC System 3.7.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

-SURVE-1-LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Verify each control room AC subsystem has the 24 months capability to remove the assumed heat load.

GRAND GULF 3.7-11 Amendment No. 44§, 497, _ _

Page 52 of 56

AC *sources~Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS

.---------------------, -----NOTE------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LCO Item a not met. --------------------NOTE-------------------

Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.8, when any required division is de-energized as a result of i~

Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected required Immediately feature(s)-with *no *offsite power available from a required circuit inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary

.containment.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.8-19 Amendment No. 4-20, 440, __

Page 53 of 56

AC Sources__;Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

B. LCO Item b not met. 8.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND 8.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies -in -primary -and .

secondary containment.

AND 8.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately required DG to OPERABLE status.

c. LCO Item c not met. C.1 Declare High Pressure 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Core Spray System inoperable.

GRAND GULF 3.8-20 Amendment No. 420, 44&, _ _

Page 54 of 56

DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 ACTIONS CONDITION _REQUlRED ACTION COMPLETION TlME C. (continued) C.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

-1 C.2.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.5.1 -------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------

The following SRs are not required to be performed:

SR 3.8.4.4, SR 3.8.4.6, SR 3.8.4.7, and SR 3.8.4.8.

For DC sources required to be OPERABLE, the In accordance with following SRs _are _appUcable: applicable SRs SR 3.8.4.1 SR 3.8.4.4 SR 3.8.4. 7 SR 3.8.4.2 SR 3.8.4.5 SR 3.8.4.8.

SR 3.8.4.3 SR 3.8.4.6 GRAND GULF 3.8-33 Amendment No. ~ , 44&, __

- Page 55 of 56

Distribution Systems_;Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.3 Initiate actions to restore Immediately required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status.

A.2.4 Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to 7 days required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems.

GRAND GULF 3.8-41 Amendment No.~, __

Page 56 of 56

Attachment 4 to GNR0-2018/00007 Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (Mark-ups)

(For Information Only)

(98 pages)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND Diesel Generators (continued)

Feature (ESF) buses if a loss of offsite power occurs.

(Refer to Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1.)

APPLICABLE The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety SAFETY ANALYSES, analyses of References 1, 2, and 3. The ECCS is initiated LCO, and to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting APPLICABILITY the post LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits.

ECCS 'instrumentation satisfies Cri t,erion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. Certain instrumentation Functions are retained

'for other reasons and are described below in the individual.

Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the ECCS instrumentation. is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints set within the setting tolerances of the trip setpoint, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each ECCS subsystem must also respond within its assumed response time. Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. For Function 3.d, Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low, the nominal trip setpoint and methodologies for calculation of the as-left and as-found tolerances are described in the *Technical *Requirements Manual. "The trip setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints remain conservative to the as-left tolerance band between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. After each calibration the trip setpoint shall be left within the as-left band around the nominal trip setpoint. Table 3.3.5.1-1 is modified by a-1::-we footnoteo which. Footnote (a) is added to elarify that the assoeiated funetions are required to be OPBR.7\. .BLE in HODES 4 and 5 only when their supported EGGS are required to be OPER.7\.1.BLB per LGO 3. 5. 2, EGGS Shutdown. Footnote (b) is added to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions also perform DG initiation.

Nominal trip setpoints are those predeterminetj values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-93 LBDCR 11047 Page 1 of 98

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.a, 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Lev~l 1 SAFETY .ANALYSES, . ( continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level.transmitters that sense the difference between.the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure.due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allow~ble Value is ~hosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to activate and provide adequate cooling.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function per associated Division are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE, to, ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. (Two channels input to LPCS and LPCI A, while the other two channels input to LPCI Band LPCI C.) Per Footnote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1 1, lhis EGGS function is only required to be OPER..7\BLE in HODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPERABLE per LGO 3.5.2. Refer to LGO 3.5.1 and LGO 3.5.2, "EGGS-Shutdown," fo.r Applicability Bases for the '1ow pressure EGGS subsystems; LGO 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating"; and LCO 3. 8. 2, "AC Sources G Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

1.b, 2.b. Drywell Pressure-High High pressure in the drywell could.indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. Negative barometric fluctuations are accounted for in the Allowable Value.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-95 LDC 06007 Page 2 of 98

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.b, 2.b. Drywell Pressure - High (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Drywell Pressure - High Function is required to be APPLICABILITY OPERABLE when the associated ECCS and DGs are required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels of the LPCS and LPCI Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation.

(Two channels input to LPCS and LPCI A, while the other two channels input to LPCI Band LPCI C.) In MODES 4 arid -S, the Drywell Pressure~High Function is not required since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the primary containment to Drywell Press~re-High setpoint.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems and to LCO 3.8.1 for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

1.c, 2.c. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump A and Pump B Start - -Time -Delay -Relay.

The purpose of this time delay is to stagger tne start of the two-ECCS pumps that are in each of Divisions 1 and 2, thus limiting the starting transients on the 4.16 kV emergency buses. This Function is only necessary when power is being supplied from the standby power sources (DG).

However, since the time delay does not degrade ECCS operation, it remains in the pump start logic at all times.

The LPCI *Pump Start-'Time Delay Relays are assumed to be OPERABLE in the accident and transient analyses requiring ECCS initiation. That is, the analysis assumes that the pumps will initiate when required.

There are two LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relays, one in each of the RHR "A" and RHR "B" pump start logic circuits.

The Allowable Value for the LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relay is chosen to be short enough so that ECCS operation is not degraded.

Each LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relay Function is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated LPCI subsystem is required to be OPERABLE. Per Footnote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1 1, this EGGS function is only required to be OPER.7'rBLE in HODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPER.~BLE per LGO 3.5.2. Refer to LGO 3.5.1 and LGO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the LPGI subsystems.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-96 LDC06007 Page 3 of 98

-ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.d, 2.d. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (Injection SAFETY ANALYSES, Permissive)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Low reactor vessel pressure signals are used as permissives (continued) for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. This ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' maximum design pressure. The Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the

Eccs during the transients analyzed in ~ef erences 1. and *3.

In addition, the Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2). The core cooling function of the ECCS, al6ng with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor pressure.

The four pressure transmitters each drive a master and slave trip unit (for a total of eight trip units).

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressurizing the equipment in the low pressure ECCS, but high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents the v fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

~hree channels of Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low Function per associated Division are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. (Three channels are required for LPCS and LPCI A, while three other channels are required for LPCI B and LPCI C.) Per Footnote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1 1, this EGGS function is only required to be OPER..7\1BLE in HODES 4 and § whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPER.~BLE per LCO 3.5.2. Refer to LCO 3.§~1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Basco for the low pressure ECG£ ouboyotem.s.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-97 LDC 06007 Page 4 of 98

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.g, 2.f. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and instrumentation. There is one push button for each of the APPLICABILITY two Divisions of low pressure ECCS (i.e., Division 1 ECCS, LPCS and LPCI A; Division 2 ECCS, LPCI Band LPCI C).

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the Function is retained for the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this -Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function (one channel per Division) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Per Footnote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1 1, this EGGS function is only required to be OPER}\rBLE in HODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPERABLE per LGO 3.5.2. Refer to LGO 3.5.1 and LGO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure EGGS subsystems.

High Pressure Core Spray System 3.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the HPCS System and associated DG are initiated at Level 2, after a confirmation delay permissive to maintain level above the top of the active fuel.

A nominal 1/2 second confirmation delay permissive is installed to avoid spurious system initiation signals. This confirmation delay permissive is limited to a maximum of a 1 second delay to support the HPCS System response time of 32 seconds assumed in the accident analysis. To insure that the confirmation delay permissive does not drift excessively it is calibrated as part of the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST required for this Function by SR 3.3.5.1.2. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating HPCS during the transients and accidents, analyzed in References 1, 2, (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-99 LDC 06007 Page 5 of 98

ECCS Instrumentation

a 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.d. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low (continued)

SAFETY*ANALYSES, LCO, and HPCS injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the APPLICABILITY water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes.

This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the HPCS pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes. The *Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCS) since the analyses assume that the HPCS suction source is the suppression pool.

Condensate Storag~ Tank Level-Low signals are initiated from two level transmitters. The logic is arranged such that either transmitter and associated trip unit can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close. The Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function All.owable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of the Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS swap to suppression pool source.

Thus, the Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the Function is required to be OPERABLE only when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to fulfill the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, HPCS is aligned to the CST and the CST water level is not within the limits of SR 3.5.2.3~. With CST water level within limits, a sufficient supply of water exists for injection to minimize the consequences of a vessel draindown event. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

3.e. Su~pression Pool Water Level-High Excessively high suppression pool water level could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the S/RVs. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of HPCS from the CST to the suppression pool (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-102 LBDCR09009 Page 6 of 98

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.h. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and if required (i.e., if the water level reaches the low water APPLICABILITY level initiation setpoint).

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the UFSAR. However, the Function is retained for the HPCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Arlowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push button. One channel of the Manual Initiation Function is only required to be OPERABLE when the HPCS System is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LGO 3.§.1 and LGO 3.§.2 for HPGS Applicability Bases.

Automatic Depressurization System 4.a, 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capa~ility to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accidents analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ~ccs, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. (Two channels input to ADS trip system A w~ile the other two channels input to ADS trip system B). Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-105 Revision No. 0 Page 7 of 98

'~

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued) untripped, and the -completion Times started concurrently for 1

the channels in both Divisions, this results in the affected portions in both Divisions of ECCS and DG being concurrently declared inoperable.

For Required Action B.2, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.a or two Function 3.b channels are inoperable and untripped in the same trip system. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of -Required Action B.3 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable, untripped channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . As noted (Note 1 to Required Aetion B.1 and Required Aetion B.2), the two Required

}'.tetions are only applieable in HODES 1, 2, and 3~ In HODES 4 and 5, the speeifie initiation time of the EGGS is not assumed and the probability of a LOGA is lower. Thus, a total loss of initiation eapability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (as allowed by Required Aetion B.3) is allowed during HODES 4 and 5.

Notes are -a.-1-s-e-provided (the Note~ to Required Action B.1 and Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable. This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that a redundant feature in both Divisions (e.g., any Division 1 ECCS and Division 2 ECCS) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the, same variable as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCS System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Fupction in the same trip system. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-111 Revision No. 0 Page 8 of 98

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) and LPCI Bj respectively. For Functions 1.d and 2.d, the affected portions of the Division are the low pressure ECCS pumps (Divisions*l and 2, respectively).

In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action C.2 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Ao noted (Note 1), the Required Aotion is only applioable in HODES 1, 2, and 3. In HODBB 4 and 5, the opcoifie initiation time of the EGGS is not assumed and the probability of a LOGA is lower. Thus, a total loss of automatio initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (as allowed by Required Aotions B.3 and G.2) is allowed during HOBBS 4 and 5.

The Note~ states that Required Action C.1 is only applicable for Functions 1.c, 1.d, 2.c, and 2.d. The Required Action is not applicable to Functions 1.g, 2.f, and 3.h (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they arc the Manual Initiation Functions and arc not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss.of manual initiation capabilit~ for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed. Required Action C.1 is also not applicable to Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 4 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed by Required Action C.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repai~ any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins

~pon discovery that the same feature in both Divisions (e.g., any Division 1 ECCS and Division 2 ECCS) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same variable as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowi-ng time fo-r restoration o-f channels.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-113 Revision No. 0 Page 9 of 98

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued)

-rn this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 7 day allowance of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with each inoperable channel must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of loss of initiation capability for feature(s) in both Divisions. As noted (Hate 1 to Required

~ction E.1), Required Action E.1 is only applicable in PmDES 1, 2, and 3. In HODES 4 and 5, the speeific initiation tim.e of the low pressure EGGS is not assumed and the probability of a LOGA is lower. Thus, a total loss of

. initiation capability for 7 days (as allowed by Required

.7\1etion E. 2) is allmrnd during HODES 4 and 5. A Note is a-1-s-e-provided (the Note~ to Required Action E.1) to delineate that Required Action E.1 is only applicable to low pressure ECCS Functions. Required Action E.1 is not applicable to HPCS Functions 3.f and 3.g since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function ( one-out-of-one logic*) .

This loss was considered during the development of Reference*4 and considered acceptable for the 7 days allowed by Required Action E.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action E.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that three channels of the variable (Pump Discharge Flow-Low) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss. of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

If the instrumentation that controls the pump minimum flow valve is inoperable such that the valve will not automatically open, extended pump operation with no injection path available could lead to pump overheating and failure. If there were a failure of the instrumentation such that the valve would not automatically close, a portion of the pump flow could be diverted from the reactor injection path, causing insufficient core cooling. These consequences can be averted by the operator's manual control of the valve, which would be adequate to maintain ECCS pump (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-116 Revision No. 0 Page 10 of 98

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded."

The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3 in LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation," or LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation".

With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. Under the definition of DRAIN TIME, some penetration flow paths may be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation if they will be isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation.

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.

5.2 BACKGROUND

(continued}

The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation is to support the requirements ofLCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control,"

and the definition of DRAIN TIME. There are functions that are required for manual initiation or operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3 .5 .2 and other functions that support automatic isolation of Residual Heat Removal subsystem and Reactor Water Cleanup system penetration flow path(s) on low RPV water level.

The RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation supports operation of low pressure core spray (LPCS), low pressure coolant injection (LPCD. and high pressure core spray (HPCS). The equipment involved with each of these systems is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.2.

APPLICABLE With tne unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV waterinventory control is not required SAFETY to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV ANALYSES, LCO, water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect and APPLICABILITY Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur.

A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ductile piping systeins. Instead, an event is postulated in which a single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error). It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually initiated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore.RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Permissive and interlock setpoints are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation

. B 3.3.5.2 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function .basis.

Low Pressure Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems 1.a, 2.a. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive)

Low reactor vessel pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. This ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' (

maximum design pressure. While it is assured during Modes 4 and 5 that the reactor vessel pressure will be below the ECCS maximum design pressure, the Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low signals are assumed to be operable and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS.

The Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor vessel pressure. The four pressure transmitters each drive a master and slave trip unit. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic for each Division.

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equipment in the low pressure ECCS.

Three channels ofReactor Vessel Pressure - Low Function per associated ECCS Division are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when ECCS Manual Initiation is required to be OPERABLE, since these channels support the manual initiation Function.

In addition, the channels are only required when the associated ECCS subsystem is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2.

l .b, 1.c, 2.b. Low Pressure Coolant Injection and Low Pressure Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow is sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump.

One flow transmitter per ECCS pump is used to detect the associated subsystems' flow rates. The logic is arranged such that each transmitter causes its associated minimum flow valve to open. The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for 10 seconds after the switches detect low flow. The time delay is provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling mode (for RHR A and RHR B).

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The Pump Discharge Flow - Low Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump.

One channel of the Pump Discharge Flow - Low Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when the associated LPCS or LPCI pump is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 to ensure the pumps are capable of injecting into the Reactor Pressure Vessel when manually initiated.

1.d, 2.c. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the appropriate ECCS logic to provide manual initiation capability. There is one push button for each of the two Divisions oflow pressure ECCS (i.e., Division 1 ECCS, LPCS and LPCI A; Division 2 ECCS, LPCI B and LPCI C}. The only the manual initiation function required to be OPERABLE is that associatedwith the ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

High Pressure Core Spray System 3 .a. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Low level in the CST indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source. Normally the suction valves between HPCS and the CST are open and water for HPCS injection would betaken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, firstthe suppression pool suction valve automatically opens, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the HPCS pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low signals are initiated from two level transmitters.

The logic is arranged such that either transmitter and associated trip unit can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close.

The Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function Allowable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

One channel of the Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to fulfill the requirements of LCO 3.5.2 and HPCS is aligned to the CST.

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 3.b, 3.c. HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) and HPCS System Flow Rate -

Low (Bypass)

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the HPCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The

.minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow and high pump discharge pressure are sensed, and the valve is automatically dosed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump or the discharge pressure is low (indicating the HPCS pump is not operating).

One flow transmitter is used to detect the HPCS System's flow rate. The logic is arranged such that the transmitter causes the minimum flow valve to open, provided the HPCS pump discharge pressure, sensed by another transmitter, is high enough (indicating the pump is operating). The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. (The valve will also close upon HPCS pump discharge pressure decreasing below the setpoint.)

The HPCS System Flow Rate - Low and HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High Allowable Value is high enough to ensure that pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core.

The HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure that the valve will not be open when the pump is not operating.

One channel of each Function associated with one pump is required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 in MODES 4 and 5.

RHR System Isolation 4.a - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low. Level 3 The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being automatically isolated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated RHR penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters (two per trip system) that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

This Function isolates the Group 3 valves.

Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation 5 .a - Reactor Vessel Water level - Low Low, Level 2 The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being automatically isolated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RWCU System.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 is initiated from two channels per trip system that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low, Level 2 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

This Function isolates the Group 8 valves.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel.

Required Action A. I directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3 .3 .5 .2-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent.

Each time a channel is discovered inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 andB.2 RHR System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level- Low Level 3, and Reactor Water:

Cleanup System, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 functions are applicable when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating Drain Time. If the instrumentation is inoperable, Reguired Action B.1 directs an immediate declaration that the associated penetration flow path(s) are incapable of automatic isolation. Reguired Action B.2 directs calculation of DRAIN TIME. 'The calculation cannot credit automatic isolation of the affected penetration flow paths.

Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual initiation functions. If this permissive is inoperable, manual initiation ofECCS is prohibited. Therefore, the permissive must be placed in the trip condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . *With the permissive in the trip condition, manual initiation may be performed. Prior to placing the permissive in the tripped condition, the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to inject water into the RPV.

The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate any discovered inoperabilities and to place the channel in trip.

D.1 andD.2 Reguired Actions D.1 and D.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within the same Function result in a loss of automatic suction swap for the HPCS system from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool. The HPCS system must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or the HPCS pump suction must be aligned to the suppression pool, since, if aligned, the function is already performed.

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes the risk ofHPCS being needed without an adeguate water source while allowing time for restoration or alignment ofHPCS pump suction to the suppression pool.

If an LPCI or LPCS Discharge Flow - Low.bypass function or HPCS System Discharge Pressure - High or Flow Rate - Low bypass' function is inoperable, there is a risk that the associated ECCS pump cou'ld overheat when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. In this condition, the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to ensure the pump does not overheat. If a manual initiation function is inoperable. the ECCS subsystem pumps can be started manually and the valves can be opened manually, but this is not the preferred condition.

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time was chosen to allow time for the operator to evaluate* and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The Completion Time is appropriate given the ability to manually start the ECCS pumps and open the injection valves and to manually ensure the pump does not overheat.

With the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions C, D, or E not met, the associated ECCS injection/spray subsystem may be incapable ofperforming the intended function, and must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPV Water REQUIREMENTS Inventory Control instrument Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1.

SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more :frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.

SR 3.3.5.2.3 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3 .5 .2 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on operating experience that has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES 1. Information Notice 84-81 "Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup," November 1984.

2. Information Notice 86-74, "Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment ofRHR Valves," August 1986.

3. Generic Letter 92-04, "Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F). "August 1992.

4. NRC Bulletin 93-03, "Resolution oflssues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs." May 1993.

5. Information Notice 94-52, "Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone l," July 1994.

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.3~

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.3~ Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation BASES

/

BACKGROUND The purpose of the RCIC System instrumentation is to initiate actions to ensure adequate core cooling when the reactor vessel is isolated from its primary heat sink (the main condenser) and normal coolant makeup flow from the Reactor Feedwater System is unavailable, such that initiation of the low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) pumps does not occur. A more complete discussion of RCIC System operation is provided in the Bases of LCO 3.5.3, "RCIC System."

This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RCIC instrumentation, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance. -

Technical Specifications are required by TO CFR S-0.36 to include LSSSs for variables that have significant $afety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.

However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

The t-rip -s-etpoint -is -a -predete-rmined s-etting -f-o-r a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the trip setpoint accounts for uncertainties in setting the channel (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the channel might actually perform (e.g.,

repeatability), changes in the point of action of the.

(continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.3 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) channel ove-r time (-e .-g., -drift during -surve-ill-ance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the trip setpoint ensures that SLs are not exceeded. Therefore, for Function 3, Condensate Storage Tank_ Level- Low, the trip setpoint meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 2).

The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.3~-1 serves as the LSSS such that a channel is OPERABLE if the trip setpoint is found not to exceed the Allowable Value. As suchr the Allowable Value differs from the trip setpoint by an amount primarily equal to the expected instrument loop uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will still meet the LSSS definition and ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as

" ... being capable of performing its specified sqfety f1,lnction(s) ." Relying solely on the trip setpoint to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protection channel setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and correc~ive actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ens~re safety. For example, an automatic protection channel with a setting that has been found to be different from the trip setpoint due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE because drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the trip setpoint and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as-found" setting of the protection channel. Therefore, the channel would still be OPERABLE because it would have performeg its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the channel within the established as-left tolerance around trip setpoint to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval. Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under 'these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a-value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the (co;ntinued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation .,

B 3.3.5.3 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).

However, there is also some point bey.end which the channel may not be able to perform its function due to, for example, greater than expected drift. This value needs to be specified in the Technical Specifications in order to define OPERABILITY of the channels and is designated as the Allowable Value. -rf the actual setting (as-found setpoint) of the channel is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, the channel is OPERABLE, but degraded. The degrade condition will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the trip setpoint (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channel response. If the channel is functioning as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is *oPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance.

After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.

The RCIC System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2. The variable is *moni*tored by -four transmitters ;that a-re connected to -four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic arrangement. Once initiated, the RCIC logic seals in and can be reset by the operator only when the reactor vessel water level signals have cleared.

The RCIC test line isolation valves close on a RCIC initiation.signal to allow full system flow.

The RCIC ~ystem also monitors the water levels in the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool, since these are the two sources of water for RCIC operation.

Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon reqeipt of a RCIC initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the pump suction from the suppression pool valve is open. If the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. Two level trans~itters are used (continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5 ..J_l BASES BACKGROUND to detect low water level in the CST. Either switch can (continued) cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction.valve to close. The suppression pool suction valve also automatically opens and the CST suction valve closes if high water level is detected in the suppression pool (one-out-of~two logic similar to the CST water level logic). To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes.

The RCIC System provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel watet level reaches the high water level (Level 8) trip (two-out-of-two logic), at which time the RCIC steam supply valve closes (the injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valves) to prevent overflow into the main steam lines. The RCIC System restarts if vessel level again drops to the low level initiation point (Level 2).

APPLICABLE The function' of the RCIC System is to provide makeup SAFETY ANALYSES, coqlant to the reactor in response to transient events.

LCO, and The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature APPLICABILITY System and no credit is taken in the safety analysis for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, however, the RCIC System, and therefore its instrumentation, are included as ,required by the NRC Policy Statement. Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.3~-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints set within the setting tolerance of the trips setpoints where appropriate.

The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time.

Allowable Values are specified for each RCIC System instrumentation Function specified in Table 3.3.5.3~-1. For Function 3, Condensate Storage Tank Level- Low, the nominal trip setpoint and methodologies for calculation of the as-left and as-found tolerances are described in the Technical Requirements Manual. The trip setpoints are selected t ensure that the setpoints remain conservative to the as-left (continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.J.2-BASES APPLICABLE tolerance band between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. After each SAFETY ANALYSES calibration the trip setpoint shall be left within the as~

LCO, and left band around the nominal trip setpoint. Nominal trip APPLICABIITY setpoints are those predetermined values qf output at which (continued) 1 an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water

.level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g.,

trip unit) changes state. The analytical limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety ana-lysis. The ATlowa:ble Values are derived from the analytical limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The nominal trip setpoints are then determined, *accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR S0.49") are accounted for.

Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned as-found criteria).

(continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.J:2-BASES APPLICABLE The individuai Functions are required to be OPERABLE in SAFETY ANALYSES, MODE 1, and *in MODES 2 and 3 -wi-th -reactor *steam dome LCO, and pressure> 150 psig, since this is when RCIC is required to APPLICABILITY be OPERABLE. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for Applicability Bases (continued) for the RCIC System.)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that normal feedwater flow is insufficient to maintain reactor vessel water level and that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV ,water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the RCIC System is initiated at Level 2 to assist in maintaining water level above the top of the active fuel.

Reactor *vessel -water -Level --Low *Low, -Leve-1 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable .leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is set high enough such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the RCIC System flow (with high pressure core spray assumed to fail) will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Level 1.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation.

Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal closes (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-126 Revision No. 2 Page 25 of 98

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.Ji BASES APPLICABLE 2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and the RCIC steam supply valve to prevent overflow into the APPLICABILITY main steam lines (MSLs).

Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 signals for RCIC are initiated from two level transmitters from the narrow range water level measurement instrumentation, which sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Allowable Value is high enough to preclude closure of the steam supply valve of the RCIC system during normal operation, yet low enough to close the steam supply valve prior to water overflowing into the MSLs.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases. -

3. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Low level in the CST indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source.

Normally the suction valve between the RCIC pump and the CST is open and, upon receiving a RCIC initiation signal, water for RCIC injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls below1a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens and then the CST suction valve automatically 6loses. This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the RCIC pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Two level transmitters are used to detect low water level in the CST. The Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-127 LDC 03027 Page 26 of 98

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.J1 BASES APPLICABLE 3. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure adequate pump APPLICABILITY suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source.

Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

4. Suppression ~ool -water Level - Eigh Excessively high suppression pool water level could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the safety/relief valves. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of RCIC from the CST to the suppression pool to eliminate the possibility of RCIC continuing to provide additional water from a source outside primary containment. This Function satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy.Statement. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Suppression pool water level signals are initiated from two level. transmitters. The Allowable Value for the -suppression Pool Water Level-High Function is set low enough to ensure that RCIC will be aligned to take suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression design loads would be exceeded.

Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no sj_ngle instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source.

Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

(continued)

GRAND GULF LBDCR09009

RCIC *system I11strumentation B 3.3.5.Ji BASES APPLICABLE 5. Manual Initiation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Manual Initiation push button switch introduces a signal APPLICABILITY into the RCIC System initiation logic that is redundant to (continued) the automatic protective instrumentation and provides manuai initiation capability. There is one push button for the RCIC System.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the Function is retained for the RCIC function as required *by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push button. One channel of Manual Initiation is required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RCIC System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channel.

A.1 Requ:;i:red Action A.1 di-rects entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.3+/--1 in the accompanying LCO. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for t~ansfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-129 Revision No. 0 Page 28 of 98

-RCIC -system Instrumentation B 3.3.5.J~

BASES ACTIONS B.l and B.2 (continued)

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic initiation capability for the RCIC System. In this case, automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 1 channels in the same trip system are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action B.2 is not appropriate, and the RCTC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the 1 normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action B.1, the Completion I,

Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC Sygtem cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 channels in the same trip system. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable' out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-130 Revision No. 0 Page 29 of 98

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.}1 BASES ACTIONS C.l (continued)

A risk based analysis was performed and determined.that an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (Ref. 1) is acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status (Required Action C.1). A Required Action (similar to Required Action B.1), limiting the allowable out of service time if a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability exists, is not required. This Condition applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Function, whose logic is arranged such that any inoperable channel will result in a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability. As stated above, this loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability was analyzed and determined to be acceptable. This Condition also applies to the Manual Initiation Function. Since this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, a total loss of manual initiation capability (Required Action C.1) for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed. The Required Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in the safe state for the *channel in all events.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that"appropriate actions are taken if multiple inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic component initiation capability being lost for the feature (s). -For Reqµired Action D.1, the RCIC System is the only associated feature. In this case, automatic component initiation capability is lost if two Function 3 channels or two Function 4 channels are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability. As noted, Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the RCIC pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool since, if aligned, the Function is already performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any*discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-131 Revision No. 0 Page 30 of 98

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.Ji BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued)

Fo-r Required Action D. 1, the Completion Time onl-y begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the BCTC -System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1, which performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the suppression pool). Alternatively, Required Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended function. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2, Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

E.1 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE ; As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC REQUIREMENTS System instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.3~-1.

The Surveillances .are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-132 Revision No. 0 Page 31 of 98

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.Ji BASES SURVEILLANCE Conditions and Required Actlons may be delayed as follows:

REQUIREMENTS (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for FGnctions 2 and 5; and (b) for up (continued) to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 3, and 4 provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to. OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entereti I and Required Actions taken.

This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 1) assumption of the average t~me required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not kignificantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will inltiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.5.3-2-.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation*has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-133 Revision No. 1 Page 32 of 98

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.J~

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.3-2-.2

-REQTJTREMENTS (cohtinued) A CHANNE,L FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

I The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysi~ of Reference 1.

SR 3. 3. 5. 3-2-. 3 The calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.3-2--1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be re-adjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 1.

SR 3.3.5.3-2-.4 I CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based on the assumption of the magnitude *o*f equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.5.3-2-.4 for Function 3, Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low, is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.5.3~-l. The first Note require evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-134 LBDCR 1104}

Page 33 of 98

RCic-system Instrumentation*

B 3.3.5.J;!

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.3~.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.

Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to

-be OPERABLE but degraded after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.

~he second Note applied to SR 3.3.5.3~.4 for Function 3, Condensate Storage Tank Level- Low, requires that the as-left setting for- the channel be within the as-left tolerance of the Nominal Trip ~etpoint (NTSP1. Where a setpoint more conservative than the.NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Ana'lytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left toler~nce of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable. The second Note also requires that the NTSP and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the TRM.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-134a LBDCR 11047 Page 34 of 98

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.J;.!

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.3-:2-.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the,24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES 1. NEDE-770-06-2, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.

2. Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," Revision 3.

GRAND GULF B 3.3-135 LBDCR 13043 Page 35 of 98

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not SAFETY ANALYSES, exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATION$.

LCO, and Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the APPLICABILITY nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is (continued) acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic.limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g.,

drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

Certain Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and RCIC valves (e.g., minimum flow) also serve the dual function of automatic isolation valves. The signal~ that isolate these valves are also associated with the automatic initiation of the ECCS and RCIC. Some instrumentation and ACTIONS associated with these signals are addressed in LCO 3.3.5:1, "ECCS Instrumentation," and LCO 3.3.5.3~, "RCIC Instrumentation," and are not included-in this LCO.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 consistent with the Applicability for LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," and LCO 3.6.5.1, "Drywell," as applicable. Functions that have different Applicabilities are discussed below in the i*ndi-vidual 'Functions discuss-ion.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-140 Revision No. 0 Page 36 of 98

-Primary Containment and Drywell lsolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.l BASES APPLICABLE 2.g. Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust SAFE1rY ANALYSES, Radiation - Bigh *( continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Four channels of Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. Two upscale-Hi Hi, one upscale-Hi Hi and one downscale, or two downscale signals from the same trip system actuate the trip system and initiate isolation of the associated containment and drywell isolation valves.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly,detect gross failure of the fuel cladding and to ensure offsite doses remain below 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 50.67 limits.

The Function is required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)

-a-FrEi-movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uneovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure offsite dose limits are not exceeded. Due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to isolate primary containment during those fuel handling accidents involving the handlini of recently irradiated fuel (i.e.,

fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

This Function isolates the Group 7 valves.

2.h. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the primary containment and drywell isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability.

There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push buttons per trip system~ There is no (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-148 LDC 01050 Page 37 of 98

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 5.a. Ambient Temperature - High (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to APPLICABILITY ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm.

The RHR Equipment Room Ambient Temperature-High Functions are on-ly required to -be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, insufficient pressure and temperature are available to develop a significant steam leak in this piping and sign1ficant water leakage is protected by the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function.

This function isolates the Group '3 valves.

5.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

'Low RPV water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in any transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSLBs. The RHR Shutdown

cooling *system* isolation on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draihdown event through the 1E12-F008 and 1E12-F009 valves caused by a leak (e.g.,

pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level

-Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. Ao noted (footnote. (e) to Table 3.3.6.1 1), only two ehannelo of the Reaetor Vessel (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-159 LDC 03033 Page 38 of 98

-Primary *Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 5.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function are required to be APPLICABILITY OPER}'1BLE in HODES 4 and 5 (both channels must input into the same trip system) provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system. When only one trip system is OPER.."1BLE in HOOE 4 or 5, the trip system should be considered inoperable if the associated RHR Shutdown Cooling System"suction from the reactor vessel isolation valve (i.e., the 1E12 FOOS or 1El2 F009) is not associated with an OPER..7\BLE diesel generator. When neither trip system is required to be OPBRABLE in HODB 5, the applicable safety analysis assumes that the RHR shutdown cooling isolation valves are easily recoverable (such as by maintaining at least one valve capable of being remotely closed after reenergizing the valve) such that a drain down event through the shutdown cooling flow path can be terminated prior to reaching Level 3 by closing one or more of the Shutdo\1n Cooling System isolation valves. Based on the analysis of the time available to mitigate all postulated drain dmm events, this condition, in itself, is not considered an OPDRV.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value CLCO 3.3.1.T) since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3 with reactor pressure less than the RHR permissive pressure, ~mDE 4, and HODE 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. This instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 and in MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive pressure to support actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10CFRlOO are not exceeded.

This Function isolates the Group 3 valves.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-160 LDC 03039 Page 39 of 98

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS H.1 and H.2 (continued)

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip, or any Required Action of Condition For G is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

I.1 and I.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem(s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated. Since this Function is required to ensure that the SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystem inoperable or isolating the RWCU System.

The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System.

J.l, ~ J . 2 ~ . 1 , J.2~.2, and J.2~.3 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the RHR Shutdown C~oling System suction from the reactor vessel *flow path should be isolated. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to provide an alternate deeay heat removal capability and subsequently isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem is OPERABLE; and secondary containment isolation capability (i.e., at least one isolation valve and (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-166 Revision No. 1 Page 40 of 98

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS J.l, ~ J . 2 ~ . 1 , J.2~.2, and J.2~.3 (continued) associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability) in each secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to determine if the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillances may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

K.1 7 and K.2.1, and K.2.2 I If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path(s) should be isolated (Required Action K.1). Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable instrumentation. Alternately, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, movement of recently irradiated fue*1 asse:mhlies must *be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Also, if applicable, action must be iHlffiediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission production release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each REQUIREMENTS Isolation Instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The Surveillances are also modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains (continued)

GRAND GULF LDC 99051

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS instrument response times and assure operation of the analyzed instrument loops within acceptable limits.

Reference 7 also identifies that there are rio known channel sensor failure modes identified that can be detected by response time testing that cannot also be detected by other Technical Specification required surveillances. Therefore, when the requirements, including sensor types, of Reference 7 are complied with, adequate assurance of the response time of the ~ensors is provided. ~his assurance of the response time of the sensors when combined with the response time testing of the remainder of the channel ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The calibration shall be performed such that fast ramp or step change to system components during calibrations is performed to verify that the response of the t.ransmi tter to the input change is prompt. Technicians shall monitor for response time degradation during the performance of calibrations.

Technicians shall be appropriately trained to ensure they are aware of the consequences of instrument response time degradation. These items are commitments made per Reference

8. If the alternate testing requirements of Reference 7 are not complied with then the entire channel will be response time tested including the sensors.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests for this instrumentation are conducted on an 24 month STAGGERED -TEST BASIS. This test Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience that shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent.

}'rnalysis has shown that with the upper containment pool cavity flooded and the gates removed, adequate time enists to allow operator action necessary to terminate the inventory loss prior to reaching ~eactor level 3. This analysis takes credit for the pool level being greater than or equal to 22 feet 8 inches above the reactor vessel flange. Verifying the upper containment pool level is greater than or equal to 22 feet 8 inches on a four hour frequency provides-assurance that the operators have enough time to deteet and terminate a drain down event.

( continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-170a LBDCR~

Page 42 of 98

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

, B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude .the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water LevelCLow Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrumentation," and LCO 3.3.5.3-&, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation"), since this could indicate the capability to cool the fuel is being threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function is required to be OPERA"BLE in -MODES 1, '2, and 3 where conside~able energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required. In addition, the Function is also required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) because the capability of isolating potential sources of leakage ffiust be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not meeceded if core damage occurs.

2. Drywell Pressure - High High drywall pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The isolation of high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis.

(continued)

I/

GRAND GULF B 3.3-175 Revision No. 2 Page 43 of 98 j

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE 3, 4. Fuel Handling Area Ventilation and Pool Sweep Exhaust SAFETY ANALYSES, Radiation -High High (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY channels of Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High High Function and four channels of Fuel Handling Area Pool Sweep Exhaust Radiation-High High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The All-owable V-alue-s -are -cho-sen -to -promptly --dete-ct -gros-s failure of the fuel cladding.

The Exhaust Radiation-High High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required. In addition, the Functions are required to be OPERABLE during OPDRVs and movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uneovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded. Due to radioactive decay, these Functions are only required to isolate secondary containment during those fuel handling accidents involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

5. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the secondary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels, and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-177 LDC 00070

-Page 44 of 98

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE 5. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function are APPLICABILITY available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during OPDRVs and movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, since these are the MODES and other specified conditions in which the Secondary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be.inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate,compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

A.1 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation des1gn, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , depending on the Function, has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 3 and 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. Functions that share common instrumentation with the RPS have a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed out of service time consistent with the time provided for the associated RPS instrumentation channels. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-178 LDC 99051 Page 45 of 98

ECCS - Operating 8 3.5.1 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

-9 *3.5.1 ECCS - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The ECCS is designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containment, to -1imit the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods (flooding and spraying) to cool the core during a LOCA. The ECCS network is composed of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)

System, and the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. The ECCS also consists of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The suppression pool provides the required source of water for the ECCS. Although no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank (CST), it is capable of providing a source of water for the HPCS System.

On receipt of an initiation signal, each associated ECCS pump automatically starts; simultaneously the system aligns, and the pump injects water, taken either from the CST or suppression pool, into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) as RCS pressure is overcome by the discharge pressure of the ECCS pump. Although the system is initiated, ADS action is delayed by a timer, allowing the operator to interrupt the timed sequence if the system is not needed. The HPCS pump discharge pressure almost immediately exceeds that of the RCS, and the pump injects coolant into the spray sparger above the core. If the break is small, HPCS will maintain coolant inventory, as well as vessel level, while the RCS is still pressurized. If HPCS fails to maintain water level above Level 1, it is backed up by automatic initiation of ADS in combination with LPCI and LPCS. In this event, the ADS would time out and open the selected safety/relief valves (S/RVs), depressurizing the RCS and allowing the LPCI and LPCS to overcome RCS pressure and inject coolant into the vessel. Alternately, procedures may direct this automatic function be inhibited until subsequently required. If the break is large, RCS pressure initially drops rapidly, and the LPCI and LPCS systems cool the core. *

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.5-1 Revision No. 0

Page 46 of 98

-eccs - Operating B 3.5.1 I

BASES (continued)

LCO Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and eight ADS valves are required to be OPERABLE. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are the three LPCI subsystems, the LPCS System, and the HPCS System. The ECCS

. injection/spray subsystems are further subdivided into the following groups:

a) The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are the LPCS System and the three LPCI subsystems;

b) The ECCS *injection subsystems are*the-three-LPCI -subsystems; and c) The ECCS spray subsystems are the HPCS System and the LPCS System.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

With less than the required number of ECCS subsystems OPERABLE during a limiting design basis LOCA concurrent with the worst case single failure, the limits specified in 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10) could potentially be exceeded. All ECCS subsystems must therefore be OPERABLE to satisfy the single failure criterion required by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10).

LPCI subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal when below the actual RHR cut in permissive pressure in -MODE 3, -if capable ofbeing manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of an RHR shutdown cooling loop when necessary or alignment to allow for the Alternate Decay Heat Removal System (ADHRS) once MODE 4 is reached.

APPLICABILITY All ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In MODES 2 and 3, the ADS function is not required when pressure is # 150 psig because the low pressure ECCS subsystems (LPCS and LPCI) are capable of providing flow into the RPV below this -pressure. EGGS rRequirements for-MODES 4 and -5 are specified in LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory ControleGGS -

Sh1:.1tdo*1m."

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.5-5 LBDCR 14044 Page 47 of 98

r RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS Shutdmvn B 3.5.2 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLIN~ SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL. AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel {RPV) Water Inventory ControleGGS- Shutdo'Nn BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel {TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF.

If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.A description of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, Lo*..., Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System, and IO'N pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal .

(RHR) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "EGGS Operating."

APPLICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is noteGGS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of SAFETY ANALYSES required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment should an unexpected draining event occur.break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis follo'l..'ing a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one EGGS injectiontspray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain the peak cladding temperature below the allm.\*able limit. It is reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgement, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one ECGS subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two EGGS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5. A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses. and ductile piping systems.

Instead, an event is considered in which single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error). It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5. one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

GRAND GULF B 3.5-15 LBDCR 14044 Page 48 of 98

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS Shutdown I B 3.5.2 As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety.

Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).The EGGS satisfy Criterion a of the f)JRC Polioy Statement.

LCO The RPV water level must be controlled in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should occur1 the reactor coolant water level remains above the top of the active irradiated fuel as required by Safety Limit 2.1.1.3.

The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to be;;:;: 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate unexpected draining of reactor coolant. An event that could cause loss of RPV water inventory and result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

One+we- ECCS injection/spray subsystems- isafe required to be OPERABLE and capable of being manually started to provide defense-in-depth should an unexpected draining event occur. At least one of the required-ECCS subsystems must-have a -OPERABLE diesel generator capable of supplying electrical power. An +t-le-ECCS injection/spray subsystems is aFe-defined as either one of the three Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCll subsystems, one tt:le-Low Pressure Core Spray

{LPCSl System, or aru:J-the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCSl System.

The LPC!S subsystems System and the eaGA-LPC§i Systemsubsystem consist of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The HPCS System consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or condensate storage tank (CST) to the RPV. Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

The LCO is modified by a Note which allows a required GRe-LPCI I

.subsystem to may-:be_aligned .for decay he.at_removal .in MODE 4 or _5_and _

considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function, if it can be manually realigned (remote or local) to the (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.5-15 LBDCR 14044 Page 49 of 98

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS Shutdo,Nn B 3.5.2 BASES LCO LPCI mode and is not otherwise inoperable. Because of tew (continued) the restrictions on DRAIN TIME, sufficient time will be available following an unexpected draining event to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to maintain RPV water inventory prior to the RPV water level reaching the T AF pressure and 10,.v temperature conditions in MODES 4 and 5, sufficient time \"Jill bci available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.5-15a Revision No. 1 Page 50 of 98

RPV Water Inventory ControlGGS - Shutdown 8 3.5.2 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY RPV water inventory controh~ required in MODES 4 and 5.

Requirements on water inventory control in other MODES are contained in LCOs in Section 3.3, Instrumentation, and other LCOs in Section 3.5.

ECCS, RPV Water Inventory Control, and RCIC. RPV water inventory control is required to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 which is applicable

whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.OPERABILITY of the EGGS injection/spray subsystems is required in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure adequate coolant inventory and sufficient heat removal capability f.or the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindmrm of the vessel. Requirements for EGGS OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, a

and are discussed in the Applicability section of the Bases f.or LGO 3.5.1. EGGS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE during MODE 5 \Mith the upper cQntainment reactor cavity and transfer canal gates removed, and the water level maintained at~ 22 ft 8 inches above the RPV flange. This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allo'N operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown.

The Automatic Depressurization System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 because the RPV pressure is < 150 psig, and the LPGS, l=IPGS, and LPGI subsystems can provide core oooling 'Nithout any depressurization of the primary system.

ACTIONS A.1 and 8.1 If ~the GAe-required ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, i!

the required inoperable EGGS injection/spray subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . In this Condition, the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME minimize the possibility that an unexpected draining event could necessitate the use of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem, however the defense-in-depth provided by the ECCS injection/spray subsystem is lost.the remaining OPERABLE subsystem can provide sufficient RPV flooding capability to recover from an inadvertent vessel draindown. l=IO'Ne'Jer, overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE subsystem concurrent 'Nith a vessel draindo'NA could result in the EGGS not being able to perform its intended funotion. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time for restoring the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considers the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME ed the availability of one subsystem and the low probability of an unexpected draining a vessel draindo'Nn event that would result in loss of RPV water inventory.

With-!f_the inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem i.§_not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be GRAND GULF 8 3.5-16 Revision No. 1 Page 51 of 98

RPV Water Inventory ControleGGS- Shutdown B 3.5.2 initiated immediately to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems, and must be able to access water inventory capable of maintaining the RPV water level above the TAF for~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the necessary water volume.suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

C.1, C.2, and C.3 With the DRAIN TIME less than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months but greater than or equal to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , compensatory measures should be taken to ensure the ability to implement mitigating actions should an unexpected draining event occur.

Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a* controlled volume in which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action C.1 requires verification of the capability to 1

establish the secondary containment boundary in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to establish the secondary containment boundary are preplanned and necessary materials are available. The secondary containment boundary is considered established when one Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment] with respect to the environment.

Verification that the secondary containment boundary can be established must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. Secondary containment penetration flow *paths form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action C.2 requires verification of the capability to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to isolate the secondary containment penetration flow paths are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Power operated valves are not required to receive automatic isolation signals if they can be closed manually within the required time.

GRAND GULF B 3.5-16 Revision No. 1 Page 52 of 98

RPV Water Inventory Controle-GGS- Shutdm."m *1 B 3.5.2 Verification that the secondary containment penetration flow paths can be isolated must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action C.3 requires verification of the capability to place one SGT subsystem in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to place a SGT subsystem in operation are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Verification that a SGT subsystem can be placed in operation must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 With the DRAIN TIME less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , mitigating actions are implemented in case an unexpected draining event should occur. Note that if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action E.1 is also applicable.

Required Action D.1 requires immediate action to establish an additional method of water injection augmenting the ECCS in.jection/spray subsystem required by the LCO. The additional method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls. water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity:

should an unexpected draining event ocGur. The Note to Required Action D.1 states that either the ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the additional method of water injection must be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The additional method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems. The additional method of water injection must be able to access water inventory capable of being injected to maintain the RPV water level above the T AF for ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources. If recirculation of injected water would occur. it may be credited in determining the required water volume.

Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained. diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a control volume in which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action D.2 requires that actions be immediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary. With the I

GRAND GULF B 3.5-16 Revision No. 1 Page 53 of 98

RPV Water Inventory ControleGGS- Shutdown *1 B 3.5.2 secondary containment boundary established 1 one SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

The secondary containment penetrations form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action D.3 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that each secondary containment penetration flow path is isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room.

One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action D.4 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that at least one SGT subsystem is capable of being placed in operation. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.]

If the Required Actions and associated Completion times of Conditions C or D are not met or if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In this condition. there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF.

Note that Required Actions D.1. D.2. D.3. and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

(continued}

GRAND GULF B 3.5-16 Revision No. 1 Page 54 of 98

RPV Water Inventory ControleGGS - ShutElo'.am B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2, 0.1. D.2. and D.3 (continued)

If both of the required EGGS injection/spray subsystems are inoperable, all coolant inventory mal<:eup capability may be unavailable. Therefore, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindmMn and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.! One EGGS injection/spray subsystem must also be restored to OPERABLE status v,ithin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

If at least one EGGS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status 'Nithin the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem is OPERABLE; and secondary containment isolation capability (i.e., at least one isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other aceeptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability) in each secondary containment penetration flm.,..' path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioaetivity releases. This may be performed as an administrative cheek, by examining logs or other information, to determine if the components are out of serviee for maintenance or other reasons. It is not neeessary to perform the Suiveillanees needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, hotNever, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this ease, the Surveillances may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time to restore at least one EGGS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action 'Nill be taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes any potential fission product release to the environment.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.5-17 Revision No. 0 Page 55 of 98

RPV Water Inventory Control~ - Shutdmrm

~ B 3.5.2 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the T AF is ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate draining of reactor coolant. Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation. A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single, step-wise, or integrated ca~ulation considering the changing RPV water level during a draining event. For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blank flange. the realistic cross-sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube. If the control rod blade will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade, the exposed cross-sectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used.

The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths. A blank flange or other bolted device must be connected with a sufficient number of bolts to prevent draining in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake. Normal or expected leakage from closed systems or past isolation devices is permitted. Determination that a system is intact and closed or isolated must consider the status of branch lines and ongoing plant maintenance and testing activities.

The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system when misalignment issues (Reference 6) have been precluded by functional valve interlocks or by isolation devices, such that redirection of RPV water out of an RHR subsystem is precluded. Further. RHR Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system if its controls have not been transferred to Remote Shutdown. which disables the interlocks and isolation signals.

The exclusion of penetration flow paths from the determination of DRAIN TIME must consider the potential effects of a single operator error or initiating event on items supporting maintenance and testing (rigging, scaffolding. temporary shielding. piping plugs. snubber removal. freeze seals. etc.). If failure of such items could result and would cause a

. draining event from a closed system or between the RPV and the GRAND GULF B 3.5-18 LDC 05013 Page 56 of 98

RPV Water Inventory Control~ - Shutdo'NA *1

B 3.5.2 isolation device. the penetration flow path may not be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation.

Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 requires SRs to be met between performances. Therefore. any changes in plant conditions that would change the DRAIN TIME requires that a new DRAIN TIME be determined.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is sufficient in view of indications of RPV water level available to the operator.

SR 3.5.2.2 and SR 3.5.2.3 The minimum water level of 12 ft 8 inches required for the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the ECCS pumps, recirculation volume, and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit. the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable unless aligned to an OPERABLE CST.

less than the required limit, all lo\"/ pressure EGGS subsystems are inoperable. HPCS is also inoperable if the low CST level suction swap to the suppression pool is enabled with suppression pool level less than the required limit.

With the low CST level suction swap to the suppression pool disabled, HPCS is operable only if the CST level is > 18 ft. This level equates to a volume of approximately 169,000 gallons. Because of vortexing however, the usable volume will be less. At an indicated level of 18 ft with the suction swap disabled the usable volume will be approximately 137 ,000 gallons at 8175 gpm. This is sufficient volume to allow for operators time to attempt to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery. There is no analytical basis for a specific CST volume requirement in response to a draindown event during shutdown. At an indicated level of 22 ft (low CST alarm level) with the suction swap disabled the usable volume will be approximately 174,000 gallons at 8175 gpm.

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency of these SRs was developed considering operating experience related to suppression pool and CST water level variations during the applicable MODES. Furthermore, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool or CST water level condition.

GRAND GULF B 3.5-18 LDC 05013 Page 57 of 98

RPV Water Inventory ControleGGS - Shutem.\*n B 3.5.2 SR 3.6.2.3. SR 3.6.2.5. and SR 3.5.2.6 The Bases provided for SR 3.6.1.1, SR a.5.1.4, and SR 3.6.1.5 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.8, respectively.

SR 3.5.2.4 The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS subsystem will perform properly. This may also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The 31 day Frequency is based on the gradual nature of void buildup in the ECCS piping, the procedural controls governing system operation, and operating experience.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.5-18 LDC 05013 Page 58 of 98

RPV Water Inventory Control-EGGS- Sh1;1tdol.'Vn B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.54.

-REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying th~ correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the required ECCS subsystem flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will be available6*ist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an GRAND GULF B 3.5-18a LDC 05013 Page 59 of 98

RPV Water Inventory ControleGGS- Shuteo\"..'R B 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.5, (continued)

REQUIREMENTS initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as che'ck valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System may operate in the shutdown cooling mode, or be aligned to allow alternate means to remove decay heat and --

sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal.

One LPCI subsystem of the RHR System may be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the RPV and the system is not otherwise inoperable. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent vessel draindown should occur.

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators *in the control room. This *individual Will *have a method to rapidly_

close the system vent flow path if directed.

SR 3.5.2.6 Verifying that the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually started and operate for at least 10 minutes demonstrates that the subsystem is available to mitigate a draining event. Testing the ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the test return line is necessary to avoid overfilling the refueling cavity. The minimum operating time of 10 minutes was based on engineering ,judgement. The performance frequency of 92 days is consistent with similar at-power testing required by SR 3.5.1.7.,

SR 3.5.2.7 Verifying that each valve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated RPV water level isolation signal is required to prevent RPV water inventory from dropping below the T AF should an unexpected draining event occur.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 GRAND GULF B 3.5-19 LDC 14044 Page 60 of 98

RPV Water Inventory ControleGGS- ShYtdm.*.'n B 3.5.2 month Frequency. Therefore. the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.5.2.8 The required ECCS subsystem is required to have a manual start capability. This Surveillance verifies that a manual initiation signal will cause the required LCPI subsystem or LCPS System to start and operate as designed, including pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. The HPCS system is verified to start manually from a standby configuration. and includes the ability to override the RPV Level 8 injectio~ valve isolation.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant iniection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance.

(

GRAND GULF 8 3.5-19 LDC 14044 Page 61 of 98

RPV Water Inventory Control-EGGS- Shutdovm B 3.5.2 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1. Information Notice 84-81 "Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup."

November 1984.

2. Information Notice 86-74. "Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves." August 1986.

3. Generic Letter 92-04. "Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54{f). "August 1992.

4. NRC Bulletin 93-03. "Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs." May 1993.

5. Information Notice 94-52. "Inadvertent Containment Spray arid Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1." July 1994.

6. General Electric Service Information Letter No. 388. "RHR Valve Misalignment During Shutdown Cooling Operation for BWR 3/4/5/6."

February 1983. *

1. UrSAR, Section 6.3.3.4.

2. GNRI 97/00181, Amendment 133 to the Operating License.

GRAND GULF B 3.5-20 LDC 97078 Page 62 of 98

RCIC System B 3.5.3 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS). RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.3 RCIC System BASES BACKGROUND The RCIC System is not part of the ECCS; however, the RCIC System is included with the ECCS section because of their similar functions.

I The RCIC\ System is designed to operate either 'automatically or manually following reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation accompanied by a loss of coolant flow from the feedwater system to provide adequate core cooling and control of RPV water level. Under these conditions, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) and RCIC systems perform similar functions. The RCIC System design requirements ensure that the criteria of Reference 1 are satisfied. '

The RCIC System (Ref. 2) consists of a steam driven turbine pump unit, piping, and valves to provide steam to the turbine, as well as piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line. Suction pipirlg is provided from the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool. Pump suction is normally aligned to .the CST to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the RPV. However, if the CST water supply is low, or the suppression pool level is high, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source ensures a water supply for continuous operation of the RCIC System. The steam supply to the turbine is piped from main steam line A, upstream of the inboard main steam line isolation valve.

The RCIC -system is designed to *provide core cooling-for a wide range of reactor pressures, 150 psig to 1177 psig. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the RCIC turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the RCIC flow increases, the turbine control valve is automatically adjusted to

maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the RCIC turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the CST to allow testing of the RCIC System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.5-21 Revision No. 0 Page 63 of 98 .

RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES BACKGROUND The RCIC pump is provided with a minimum flow bypass line, (continued) which discharges to the suppression pool. The valve in this line automatically opens to prevent pump damage due to overheating when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge line "keep fill" system is designed to maintain the pump discharge line filled with water.

APPLICABLE The func~ion of the RCIC System is to respond to transient SAFETY ANALYSES events b-y providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of 0verall plant risk, however, the system is included in the Technical Specifications as required by the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides adequate core cooling such that actuation of any of the ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity to maintain RPV inventory during an isolation event. Management of gas voids is important to RCIC System OPERABILITY.

APPUCABtLITY The RCIC System is requ-ired to -be OPERABLE -in MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure> 150 psig since RCIC is the primary non-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized. In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressures 150 psig, the ECCS injection/spray subsystem can provide sufficient flow to the vessel. In anEt in MODES 4 and 5, RCIC is not required to be OPERABLE since RPV water inventory control is required by LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Level Inventory Control."the EGGS injectiontspray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the vessel.

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the_application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable RCIC system. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable RCIC system an-d the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the (continued}

GRAND GULF B 3.5-22 LBDCR 14044 Page 64 of 98

RCIC -system 8 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This Surveillance test also ensures that the RCIC System will automatically restart on an RPV low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL-TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.~i, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation," overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability st~ndpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the HPV-is not required during the Surveillance.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 33.

2. UFSAR, Section 5.4.6.2.

3. Memorandum from R. L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC),

"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCO's for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

GRAND GULF 8 3.5-26 LBDCR~

Page 65 of 98

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in the (continued) applicable plant procedures. Purge valves with resilient seals, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment,"

as Type B or C testing.

Valves on the containment airlock bulkhead have a design function as a primary containment isolation when the airlock inner door is inoperable per LCO 3.6.1.2 or during performance of airlock barrel testing or pneumatic tubing testing or at any time the inner airlock door/bulkhead is breached. However, these valves are Primary Containment Isolation Valves as required by LCO 3.6.1.3 at all times.

This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their d~signed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, ~PCIVs are not required to be OPERABLK. .Certain valves .are required to he OPERABLE_7 hmrnver, to prevent a potential flow path (the RHR Shutdown Cooling System suction from the reactor vessel) from lowering reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel.

These valves are those \1hose associated isolation instrumentation is required to be OPER}\-BLE according to LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment and Drywcll Isolation Instrumentation," Function §.b. Additional valves arc required to be OPER.~BLE to prevent release of radioactive material during a postulated fuel handling accident involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e.,

fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ). These valves are those whose associated isolation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE according to LCO 3.3.6.1, "Function 2.g."

(This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-16 LDC 00070 Page 66 of 98

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued) verification that those isolation devices outside primary containment and potentially capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. For the isolation devices inside primary containment, the time period specified as "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3, from MODE 4 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misa-lignment is an un1.ikEHy possfbi1.i ty.

For the primary containment purge valve with resilient seal that is isolated in accordance with Required Action D.1, SR 3.6.1.3.5 must be performed at least once every 92 days.

This provides assurance that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the primary containment purge valve does not increase during the time the -penetration *is -isolated. s-ince *mo-re -reliance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency of once per 92 days was chosen and has been shown acceptable based on operating experience.

E.1 and E.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.l, C.l, and C.2 If any Required Action and associated .Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-20 LDC 99051 Page 67 of 98

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS -F .*1, G .*1, and G. 2 ( continued) secondary containment must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition.

Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to m.inim.ize the probability of a vessel draindciwn and subsequent potential for fission product release. }'rctions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. If suspending the OPDRVs would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to iiflFRediately initiate action to restore the valves to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 . 6. 1. 3 . 1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the 20 inch primary containment purge valves are closed as 'required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of the limits.

The SR is also modified by a Note (Note 1) stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be closed* in MODES 1, 2, and 3. At times other than MODE 1, 2, or 3 when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies) pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open (automatic isolation capability would be required by SR 3.6.1.3.4 and SR 3.6.1.3.7).

The SR is modified by a Note (Note 2) stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or for Surveillances, or special testing of the purge system that require the valves to be open (e.g., testing of the containment and drywell ventilation radiation monitors). These primary containment (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-21 LDC 99051 Page 68 of 98

Suppression Pool Water Level B 3.6.2.2 BASES (

APPLICABLE swell loads for a DBA LOCA, and calculated loads due to S/RV SAFETY ANALYSES discharges. Suppression pool water level must be maintained (continued) within the limits specified so that the safety analysis of Reference 1 remains valid.

Suppression pool water level satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO A limit that suppression pool water level be z 18 ft 4-1/12 inches and~ 18 ft 9-3/4 inches is required to ensure that the primary containment conditions assumed for the safety analysis are met. Either the high or low water level limits were used in the safety analysis, depending upon which is conservative for a particular calculation.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause significant loads on the primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Requirements for suppression pool level in MODE 4 ,.or 5 are addressed in LCO 3. 5. 2, "RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS Shutdo;1n."

ACTIONS A.1 With suppression pool water level outside the limits, the conditions assumed for the safety analysis are not met. If water level is below the minimum level, the pressure suppression and iodine scrubbing function still exists as long as horizontal vents are covered, RCIC turbine exhaust is covered, and S/RV quenchers are covered. If suppression pool water level is above the maximum level, protection against overpressurization still exists due to the margifi in the peak containment pressure analysis and due to OPERABLE containment sprays. Prompt action to restore the suppression pool water level to within the normal range is prudent, however, to retain the margin to weir wall overflow from an inadvertent upper pool dump and reduce the risks of increased pool swell and dynamic loading. Therefore, continued operation for a limited time is allowed. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient to restore suppression pool water level to within specified limits. Also, it takes into account the low probability of an event impacting the suppression pool water level occurring during this interval.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-54 Revision No. 0 Page 69 of 98

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment BASES BACKGROUND The function of the secondary containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident (OBA). In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place tnside primary containment (e.g., during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment), when primary containment ~snot required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment.

The secondary containment is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and those components that may be postulated to contain primary system fluid. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump/motor heat load additions). To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure.

_/

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the secondary containment boundary are a part of the secondary containment barrier. To maintain this barrier:

a. All secondary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE secondary containment automatic isolation system, or (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-83 LDC 99051 Page 70 of 98

-secondary-Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES LCO to the environment. For the secondary containment to be (continued) considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that requ*ire primary conta*inment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be p_o_s_tulated, .s.uch _as during operations.'Nith a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel I assemblies in the primary or secondary containment. Due to radioactive decay, secondary containment is required to be OPERABLE only during

that fuel movement involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e.,

fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

ACTIONS If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 _hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.

If the secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(continued}

GRAND GULF B 3.6-85 LBDCR 14043 Page 71 of 98

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES ACTIONS C.l and C.2 (continued)

Movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment and OPDRVs can be postulated ~o catise significant fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products.to the environment. Therefore, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended i-f the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action m.ust be iHIRl:ediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions m.ust continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not* specify any action. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2 or 3, the 1

fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building equipment hatches, biowqut panels, and one access door in each access opening are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. In this application the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak' tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. No maintenance should be performed that disables the closure/isolation function of (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-86 LDC 99050 Page 72 of 98

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within SAFETY ANALYSES 1-imits *ensure-s *that -fis*sion *products *will -remain trapped (continued) inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The I

SCIV safety function is re-lated to control of o.ffsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operated'automatic isolation dampers and valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits. Additionally, power operated automatic dampers and valves are required to actuate on an automatic isolation signal.

The normally closed isolation dampers and valves, rupture disks, or blind flanges are cbnsidered OPERABLE when manual dampers and valve's are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic dampers and valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, rupture disks or blind flanges are in place. The SCIVs covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, if applicable, are listed in the applicable plant procedures.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and *-s, "the prc5babi"lity and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ). Moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, fnd 3.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-90 LDC 06007 Page 73 of 98

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.l and D.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion *Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, the movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. ~loo, if applicable, action must be iHlffiediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release.

~7\ictions must continue until OPDRVs arc suspended.

Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies each secondary containment isolation manual valve, damper, rupture disk, and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or SCIV manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during I

normal unit operation and verification of.their position is I

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-93 LDC 99051 Page 74 of 98

SGT *system B 3.6.4.3 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these (continued) events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential ror draining the reastor vessel

{OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment. Due to radioactive decay, the SGT System is required to be OPERABLE only during fuel movement involving the *handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that *has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

ACTIONS With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors. as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a OBA occurring during this period.

If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status Will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 8 3.6-98 LBDCR 14043 Page 75 of 98

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES ACTIONS 8.1

.(continued)

Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0A. a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, C.2.1. and C.2.2 During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary .containment or during OPDRVs., wh.en Required Action A.1 .I cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem

{continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-98a LBDCR 14043 Page 76 of 98

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1. and C.2.1. and C.2.2 (continued) should be immediately placed in operation. This Required Action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing a significant amount of radioactive materia-1 to the secondary containment, thus placing the unu-in a Condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission 13rodust release.

This action should be chosen if the OPDRVs could be impacted by a loss of offsite po'Ner. Action must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement -is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

\

lfboth-SGT subsystems are-inoperable-in -MODE -1, -2, or 3, -th-e SGT System may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

{continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-99 LBDCR 14043 Page 77 of 98

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 304a is not applicable When entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 304a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 304b, if applicable, because LCO 304b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate LCO 304 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1 and E.2 When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a componentto a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a* 'Jessel draindown and subsequent potential :for fission product release. Action must continue until OPDRVs are sus13ended.

)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each SGT subsystem from the control room for ;;:: 15 continuous hours ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy available in the system.

SR 3.6.4.3.2 This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations).

(continued GRAND GULF B 3.6-100 LBDCR 16072 Page 78 of 98

HPCSSWS B 3.7.2 BASES (continued)

LCO The HPCS SWS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that the HPCS System will operate as required. An OPERABLE HPCS SWS consists of an OPERABLE pump; and an OPERABLE flow path, capable of taking suction from the U HS basin and transferring the water to the appropriate unit equipment.

The OPERABILITY pf the UHS is discussed in LCO 3.7.1. However, the OPERABILITY ofthe *basin cooling towerfans does not*affect*the OPERABILITY of the HPCS SWS, due to the limited heat removal during its operation.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2 and 3, the HPCS SWS is required to be OPERABLE to 1

support OPERABILITY of the HPCS System since it is required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

in-MODES 4 and*5, the-OPERABILITY requirements ofthe*HPcs-sws and the UHS are determined by the HPCS System.

ACTIONS When the HPCS SWS is inoperable, the capability of the HPCS System to perform its intended function cannot be ensured. Therefore, if the HPCS SWS is inoperable, the HPCS System must be declared inoperable immediately and the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.5.1 "ECCS -

1 Operating," or LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory ControlEGGS Shutdm.vn," entered.

SURVEllLANGE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for each required manual, p'ower operated, and automatic valve in the HPCS service water flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for HPCS service water operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position within the required time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that

{continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.7-9 Revision No. 0 Page 79 of 98

CRFA -system 83.7.3 BASES LCO individual at the opening who is in continuous communication (continued) with the operators in the CRE. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for CRE isolation is indicated.

1 APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CRFA System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CRE Will remain -habitable during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.

Therefore, maintaining the CRFA System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, e*cept during operations 'Nith a potential for draining the i=eactor 'Jessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS With one CRFA subsystem inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary, the inoperable CRFA subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CRFA subsystem is adequate to perform the CRE occupant protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of CRFA System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past the CRE boundary and into the CRE can result in CRE occupant radiological dose greater than the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences (allowed to be up to 5 rem TEDE), or inadequate protection of CRE occupants from hazardous chemicals or smoke, the CRE boundary is inoperable. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE CRE boundary within 90 days.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.7-14 LBDCR 09001 Page 80 of 98

GRFASystem B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued}

(continued)

Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when ente(ing MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment

addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination ofthe acceptability of entering *MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required un"it conditions *from fall power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

D.1. and D.2 During OPDRVs, if the inoperable CRrA subsy.stem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status 'Nithin the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CRrA subsystem may be placed in the isolation mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent actuation 'Nill occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D. 1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimii!es accident risk.

If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindo\"JA and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

If both CRFA subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than an inoperable CRE, the CRFA System may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

{continued}

GRAND GULF B 3.7-16 LBDCR 14043 Page 81 of 98

CRFA *system B 3.7.3 ACTIONS De.1 {continued}

(continued)

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.QA.a is

not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enterMODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable,

'because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment

addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Required Action i;.1 is modified by a note indicating that LCO a.a.a does not apply. During OPDRVs, with t\vo Cl;;ffA subsystems inoperable, or with one or more CRi;A subsy-stems inoperable, aotion must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.

If applicable, actions must be initigted immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindm."JA and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDR\ls are suspended.

{continued}

GRAND GULF B 3.7-16a LBDCR 14043 Page 82 of 98

Control Room AC System

. B 3.7.4 BASES APPLICABLE accidents (e.g., LOCA, main steam line break). Gf-tAe SAFETY ANALYSES. events l.Nhich can occur in Modes 4 or 5, however, only the .

(continued) potential to drain the reactor vessel is postulated to result in significant radioactive releases.

The Control Room AC System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued}

GRAND GULF B 3.7-17a LDC 00070 Page 83of 98

Control Room AC System B 3.7.4

. BASES (continued)

LCO Two independent and redundant subsystems of the Control Room AC System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.

The Control Room AC System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the control room temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers, compressors, ductwork, dampers, and associated instrumentation and controls. The heating coils are not required for Control Room AC System OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Control Room AC System must be OPERABLE to

, ensure that the control room temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room AC System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, e:>mept d1:Jring operations 'Nith a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). I ACTIONS With one control room AC subsystem inoperable, the inoperable control room AC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE control room AC subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining subsystem can provide the required protection, and the availability of alternate cooling methods.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B. 3.7-18 LBDCR 14043 Page 84 of 98

Control Room AC System B 3.7.4 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or a, the fuel mo,,ement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdovm.

During OPDRVs, if Required Action A.1 cannot be completed 'Nithin the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE control room AC subsystem may be placed immediately in operation. This action ensures that the remaining s1:1bsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent actuation '.".'ill occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required _Action D.1 is to immediately Sllspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the 1:1nit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, actions m1:1st be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindovm and s1:1bseqt.1ent potential f.or fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.7-20 LDC 00070 Page 85 of 98

Control Room AC System B 3.7.4 BASES ACTIONS Li (continued)

During OPDRVs if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B is not met, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindo'NA and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The 24 month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room AC System is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.4.

2. FSAR, Section 9.4.1.

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

GRAND GULF B 3.7-21 LBDCR44G43 Page 86 of 98

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 SAFETY ANALYSES and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment ensures that:

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

-b. Sufficient-instrumentation and control capability-is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindo>Nn of the vessel or a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications (TS) requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and -concurrent-toss of all offsite or*loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), which are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3, have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses .

(continued}

GRAND GULF B 3.8-35 LBDCR 00070 Page 87 of 98

AC Sources - Shutdown B3.8.2 BASES LCO support, assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Similarly, (continued) when the high pressure core spray (HPCS) is required to be OPERABLE, a separate offsite circuit to the Division 3 Class 1E onsite electrical power distribution subsystem, or an OPERABLE Division 3 DG, ensure an additional source of power for the HPCS. This additional source for Division 3 is not necessarily required to be connected to be OPERABLE.

Either the circuit required by LCO Item a, or a circuit required to meet LCO Item c may be connected, with the second source available for connection.

Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit(s) and DG(s) ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling ,accidents involving recently irradiated fuel; reactor vessel drain<:tO\".'n). Automatic initiation of the required DG during shutdown conditions is specified in LGO 3.3.5.1, EGGS Instrumentation, aAG-LCO 3.3.8.1, LOP Instrumentation.

The qualified offsite circuit(s) must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESF bus(es),

and accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the plant. The offsite circuit consists of incoming breakers and disconnects to the ESF transformers and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to all 4.16 kV ESF buses required by LCO 3.8.8.

The required DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within 10 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as: DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required ,surveillances, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-37 LDC 06007 Page 88 of 98

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES LCO an integral part of offsite circuit and DG OPERABILITY since (continued) its inoperability impacts the ability to start and maintain energized loads required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8.

It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required AC electrical power distribution subsystems.

As described *in Applicable Safety Analyses, *in the event of an accident during shutdown, the TS are designed to maintain the plant in a condition such that, even with a single failure, the plant will not be in immediate difficulty.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Systems that provide core cooling to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available f.or the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindo,:.m of the reactor vessel;

b. -systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ) are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. *instrumentation and control capability-is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2,

or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued}

GRAND GULF B 3.8-38 LDC 00070 Page 89 of 98

AC .sources - Shutdown

. ,B 3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required ESF division. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, division(s) with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, and movement of recently irradiated fuel mo\'ement, and operations with a potential for draining the.reactor >..'essel. By the.

allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected required feature(s) LCOs' ACTIONS.

A.2.1 _. A.2.2. A.2.3, A.2.4, 8.1. 8.2, ~ n d 8.34 With the offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, and movement of*

recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment, and activities that could potentially result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to initiate action immediately to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-39 LDC 00070 Page 90 of 98

AC *sources - -shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for the Note 1 is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4160 V ESF bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event could co1,:1promise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE.

Note 2 states that SRs 3.8.1.12 and 3.8.1.19 are not required to be met when its associated ECCS subsystem(s) are not required to be OPERABLE. These SRs demonstrate the DG response to an ECCS signal (either alone or in conjunction with a loss-of-power signal). This is consistent with the ECCS instrumentation requirements that do not require ECCS signals when the ECCS system is not required to be OPERABLE.:. per LGO 3.5.2, "EGGS Shutdm.vn."

REFERENCES None.

GRAND GULF B 3.8-41 LDC 06007 Page 91 of 98

DC -Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources --- Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref.

2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE.

The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained *in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events p.o.stulated during .shutdown, _such as an inadvertent draindown of *I the vessel or a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

{continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-60 LDC 00070 Page 92 of 98

DC Sources - Shutdown B3.8.5 BASES LCO 1 or 2 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution (continued) subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown" is required to be OPERABLE. Similarly, when the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System is required to be OPERABLE, the Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem associated with the Division 3 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8 is required to be OPERABLE. In addition to the preceding subsystems required to be OPERABLE, a Class 1E battery or battery charger and the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling capable of supplying power to the remaining Division 1 or 2 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s), when portions of both Division 1 and 2 DC electrical power distribution subsystem are required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8. This ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents involving recently irradiated fuel and inad'lertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Required features to provide core coolingadequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindo'NA of the reactor vessel;

b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ) are available;

c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability-is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.

{continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-61 LDC 00070 Page 93 of 98

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, C.2.3, and C.2.34 (continued)

If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.8, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable battery charger may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, and recently irradiated fuel movement, and operations 'Nith a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

By a-11owing the option to declare required features -inoperable with associated DC power source(s) inoperable, appropriate restriction$ are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts.

Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, and movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies, and any acti¥ities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel)_.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

\

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-63 LDC 00070 Page 94 of 98

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems* is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems~ Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref.

2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can *be maintained *in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during

.shutd.own, such .as an inadvertent draindm.*.m of the vessel or .a .fuel .I handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC and DC electrical power is only (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-80 LDC 00070 Page 95 of 98

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

-Leo Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and compon-ents are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications' required systems, equipment, and components - both specifically addressed by their own LCOs, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,

fuel handling accidents involving recently irradiated fuel and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Systems that provide core cooling to provide adeqt:.mte coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inad*.:ertent draindm.a1n of the reactor vessel;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated 'fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ) are available;

c. Systems necessary to mUigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-81 LDC 00070 Page 96 of 98

Distribution Systems- Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4, and A.2.4a Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE AL TERATIONS, and recently irradiated fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor 'Jessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, and movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment and any acti'Jities that could result in inad>Jertent draining of the reactor \tessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal - shutdown cooling (RHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS (continued}

GRAND GULF B 3.8-82 LDC 00070 Page 97 of 98

lnservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation B 3.10.1 BASES APPLICABLE coolant activity above the limits of LCO 3.4.8, "Reactor SAFETY ANALYSES Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity," are minimized. In (continued) addition, the secondary containment will be OPERABLE, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam *line brea*k outside of primary conta*inment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements will conservatively limit radiation releases to the environment.

In the unlikely event of fil!Y_a large primary system leak that could result in draining of the RPV, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allo'Ning the lo'N pressure core cooling systerns to operate. The make-up~

capability of the lo'N pressure coolant in:jection and lov1 pressuFe core spray subsystems, as required in MODE 4 by LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Controle-GGS-Shutdo'i\'n," would be more than adequate to keep the RPV water level above the TAFcore flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.

For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, co.mpliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply.

special *Operations -LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation at reactor coolant temperatures > 200°F, can be in accordance with Table 1.1-1 for MODE 3 operation without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. This option may be required due to PIT limits, however, which require testing at temperatures

{continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.10-2 Revision No. 0 Page 98 of 98

v t e Letter Sequence Request
EPID:L-2018-LLA-0105, TSTF-542 (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance Supplement, Supplement Administration Questions Answers Results Approval Other:
MONTHYEAR2018-05-08 [Table View]

GNRO-2018/00007, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control.

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GNRO-2018/00007, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control.

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SUBJECT:

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