BECO-88-033, Responds to Sj Collins Re Util Power Ascension Program & Forwards Confirmation of Agreements Made During 880211 Telcon W/Sj Collins,Nrc Managers & Staff
| ML20147F885 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1988 |
| From: | Bird R BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| BECO-88-033, BECO-88-33, NUDOCS 8803080062 | |
| Download: ML20147F885 (20) | |
Text
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eosa msw Pdgrim Nuclear Power Station Rocky Hill Road Plymouth. Massachusetts o2360 - ,
Ralph G. Bird Senior Vice President - Nuclear February 29,1988 BECo Ltr. 88 033 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C. 20555 Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35
Subject:
Resoonse to NRC Ouestions and Concerns on the Pilarim Power Ascension Program Plan and Confirmation of Agreement Durina 2/11/88 Telechone Conference.
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is Boston Edison Company's response to Mr. S.J. Collins letter of January 28, 1988 regarding the Pilgrim Power Ascension Program. 'Also enclosed is Boston Edison's confirmation of agreements made during our telephone conversation with Mr. Collins, other Senior NRC Hanagers and staff personnel on February 11, 1988 at approximately 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />. As discussed in the above conversation, Boston Edison considers that a discussion between NRC and Boston Edison personnel interested in this matter, would be beneficial in assuring full understanding of the basis for the Power Ascension Program.
.G. B PJH/b1
Enclosure:
Enclosure 1 and 2
Attachment:
Attachment A and B cc: Mr. Hilliam Russell Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Rd.
King of Prussia, PA 19406 Hr. Samuel J. Collins b Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j I
475 Allendale Rd.
King of Prussia, PA 19406 SR. Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Station 8803000062 880229 gDR ADOCK 0500g3 I737 /W,124
1 I
Boston Edison Company .
Docket No. 50-293 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-35 Enclosure I - Resoonse to NRC Ouestions and Concerns on Pilarim Power Ascension Proaram Plan
Background:
Questions #2 and #3 appear to be related to the technical issues raised in Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 86-10. The pre-startup corrective actions to address the CAL 86-10 issues have been completed. These corrective actions were reviewed by NRC Region I Inspectors on September 21-25, October 5-9 and October 12-23, 1987 at Pilgrim Station. The results of these reviews are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-293/87-46 pages 11 & 12, dated December 7,1987 and in Boston Edison's exit meeting minutes for Inspection 87-46.
A list of the Boston Edison submittals to the NRC and the NRC Inspection Reports that address CAL 86-10 is provided (Attachment A).
NRC Question #1.
How will management assessment of performance at each plateau in the power ascension program be documented?
Response to Question #1 Hanagement assessments of performance will be documented on a standard form entitled, "Assessment Summary" to be completed by the Oversight and Assessment Team and signed by the team members. This form is being issued as part of a training module for training of the Oversight and Assessment Team.
NRC Question #2.
How will it be demonstrated that major plant transients (such as scrams from high power and flow) will not induce HSIV closures, since the cause for previous MSIV closures has not been conclusively determined?
Response to Question #2 The spurious closures of the HSIVs which have been the subject of intensive evaluation did not occur during high power or high flow conditions. In both events HSIV closures occurred with the mode switch in the startup/ hot standby position. Plant testing with the mode switch in the run position would not address the HSIV closure issue observed in April 1986.
The potential contributors to the inadvertent HSIV closures were identified as:
(1) Mode switch (2) Hater level instrumentation (3) Loose grounding connections of PCIS relays.
Page 1 of 4
Bosten Edisen Company Docket No. 50-293 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-35 Boston Edison believes that the cause of inadvertent MSIV closures has been corrected by:
' 1. Replacement of the mode switch
- 2. Replacement of water level instrumentation
- 3. Repairing the neutral connections on the PCIS relays.
To demonstrate that future reactor start up and shutdown transients will not induce HSIV closures, a test (TP 86-81) will be conducted as part of the Power Ascension Program. Conduct of this test will attempt to duplicate, under controlled conditions, the plant power and flow conditions of 4/4/86 and 4/12/86 when the HSIV's unexpectedly closed. The test will utilize General Electric . Transient Analysis Recording equipment to monitor the trip sigrals which may have led to the original MSIV closures in April 1986. If the HSIVs do not close under the duplicate conditions, then we will have demonstrated that the actions taken to resolve the problem were successful and corrected the problem.
. Question #3 and #4:
How will it be demonstrated that plant response to MSIV closure transients is still in accordance with design? (Your response should address any procedures and personnel responses necessary to safely accommodate the transient.)
How will it be demonstrated that the dynamic response of the plant to a Loss of Offsite Power event, at power, is in accordance with design? (Your response should address whether procedures and personnel training are appropriate to safely accommodate this transient.)
Response to Questions 3 and 4 The questions relate to plant response after HSIV closures and loss of offsite power. During the events of April 4 and April 12 the plant transient response to the inadvertent MSIV closures was in accordance with design. Loss of offsite power was not associated with the April 4 or April 12 events. The loss of power event that occurred on November 12, 1987 was with the reactor shutdown and therefore did not exhibit any unexpected plant dynamic response.
Review of the original startup test program showed that:
(1) The HSIV response was in accordance with the design.
(2) The plant response to loss of offsite power was in accordance with the design. i A review of past plant history has identified transient events which I demonstrated that the HSIV's responded in accordance with the design. The same review also identified loss of offsite power events where the plant responded according to design. He therefore believe that the original startup testing, the pit.nt transient history, and loss of offsite power events have ;
adequately demonstrated that the plant responds according to design. l Page 2 of 4 c _ - -
Boston Edison Company Docket No. 50-293 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-35 Additionally, when unplanned events occur during plant operation, the actual plant response is evaluated and examined for indications of abnormal behavior per procedure 1.3.37 "Post Trip Review". This procedure was reviewed by the NRC as part of NRC's audit of BECo's response to Generic Letter 83-28.
You further inquired about procedures and personnel training necessary to safely accommodate plant transient responses from these events. These transients are treated in operating procedures and are covered by existing routine training and by special simulator refresher and E0P training.
NRC Question #5 How will the test program demonstrate and/or evaluate the extent to which Rosemount 1153 transmitters are sensitive to pressure oscillations during major transients, and whether "ringing" of the output will cause unnecessary actuations of safety systems?
Response to Question #5 No special actions for Rosemount Transmitters are planned based on the following:
(1) Rosemount, based on it's industry wide investigation, has advised Boston Edison that occurence '
- a. is not wide spread
- b. has never happened simultaneously to two transmitters in a plant
- c. is random (2) a single transmitter failure would not actuate a safety system when redundant channels are in service (3) adequate controls exist to detect transmitter performance abnormalities.
The Rosemount transmitters installed at Pilgrim this outage that could be susceptible to sensitivity problems are part of the Analog Trip System. In this system, the circuit logic requires a coincident transmitter signal from redundant trip channels to actuate a safety system. Therefore a single transmitter failure would not challenge a safety system when redundant channels are in service, nor would it preclude actuation if needed.
The surveillance program for these transmitters is a once per day channel check which compares the redundant channels for each parameter. The surveillance provides a direct indication of transmitter performance and is adequate to detect a small on-scale shift.
NRC Question #6 What will be the administrative controls for conduct of testing and review of test results, including control of the performance of testing, methods for recording, evaluating, reviewing and approving test data and results, and the methods for identifying and correcting deficiencies noted in systems and procedures?
Page 3 of 4
1 Boston Edison Company Docket No. 50-293 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-35 Additionally, when unplanned events occur during plant operation, the actual plant response is evaluated and examined for indications of abnormal behavior per procedure 1.3.37 "Post Trip Review". This procedure was reviewed by the NRC as part of NRC's audit of BECo's response to Generic Letter 83-28.
You further inquired about procedures and personnel training necessary to safely accommodate plant transient responses from these events. These transients are treated in operating procedures and are covered by existing routine training and by special simulator refresher and E0P training.
NRC Question #5 How will the test program demonstrate and/or evaluate the extent to which Rosemount 1153 transmitters are sensitive to pressure oscillations during major transients, and whether "ringing" of the output will cause unnecessary actuations of safety systems?
Response to Question #5 No special actions for Rosemount Transmitters are planned because:
(1) industry investigations have not demonstrated a generic problem, (2) a single transmitter failure would not actuate a safety system, and (3) adequate controls exist to detect transmitter performance abnormalities.
The Rosemount transmitters installed at Pilgrim this outage that could be susceptible to sensitivity problems are part of the Analog Trip System. In this system, the circuit logic requires a coincident transmitter signal from redundant trip channels to actuate a safety system. Therefore a single transmitter failure would not challenge a safety system nor would it preclude actuation if needed.
The surveillance program for these transmitters is a once per day channel check which compares the redundant channels for each parameter. The surveillance provides a direct indication of transmitter performance and is adequate to detect a small on-scale shift.
NRC Question #6 i
What will be the administrative controls for conduct of testing and review of l test results, including control of the performance of testing, methods for recording, evaluating, reviewing and approving test data and results, and the methods for identifying and correcting deficiencies noted in systems and procedures?
- Page 3 of 4 l
l l
l Boston' Edison Company Docket No. 50-293 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-35 Response to Question #6 The details of the administrative controls for conduct of testing and review of test results during the Power Ascension Program are documented in an internal BECo memorandum of January 29, 1988 from the Plant Manager to managers in the Nuclear Organization.
While this memorandum is an internal document which would not ordinarily be forwarded to the NRC, we are providing this (see Attachment B) in accordance with your specific request during the 2/11/88 telephone conference.
Page 4 of 4 i
Boston Edison Company Docket No. 50-293 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-35 Enclosure 2 - Confirmation of Aareements Durina 2/11/88 Teleohone Conference On 2/11/88 a telephone conference between managers from NRC Region I, NRR, NRC Resident Inspectors and Boston Edison was conducted. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the technical basis for Boston Edison's response to the NRC's letter of January 28, 1988 which transmitted questions and concerns on the Pilgrim Power Ascension Program.
AGREEMENTS
- 1. During the Power Ascension Program Boston Edison will release Pilgrim for New England Power Exchange dispatch as soon as the reactor reaches full power.
- 2. When Pilgrim reaches 100% reactor power, Boston Edison will conduct its final assessment of the Power Ascension Program at Assessment Point 4.
The results of this final assessment will be recorded, documented and submitted to the NRC to document closure of the Power Ascension Program.
Page 1 of 1
$ w
Boston Edison Company Docket No. 50-293 Pilgria Nuclear Power Station ' License No. DPR-35 Attachment A Boston Edison Submittals and NRC Insoection ReDorts P Addressino Technical Issues Raised in Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 86-10 5; DAIE DESCRIPTION LETTER NO./ REPORT NO.
5-15-86 BECo's first response _to NRC LTR. #86-062 Confirmatory Action Letter
- 86-10.
5-16-86 Augmented Inspection Team RPT #86-17 (AIT) Report 6-16-86 BECo's second response to LTR #86-079 to NRC Confirmatory Action Letter #86-10.
8-29-86 BECo's supplemental response to LTR #86-128 NRC Confirmatory Action Letter
- 86-10.
9-17-86 BECo's submittal of additional LTR #86-141 information as committed in Letter #86-128.
3-1-87 BECo's response to NRC letter LTR #87-039 concerning Management Meeting 50-293/86-41.
7-30-87 BECo's transmittal of the LTR #87-130 Restart Plan (Rev. 0).
10-15-87 BECo's transmittal of the LTR. #87-163 Power Ascension Program.
10-26-87 BECo's transmittal of LTR. #87-172 Volume 2. Rev. 1 of the Restart Plan.
12-1-87 NRC Inspection Report RPT. #87-42 (closure of 86-17-04).
12-7-87 NRC Inspection Report RPT. #87-46 (closure of 86-17-02)
(update of 86-17-01).
Page 1 of 1
ATTACilMENT B OFFICE MEMORANDUM BOSTO?! EDISON COMPANY b.w TO: Distribution FROM: R. J Barrett Record Type A4.08 DATE: January 29, 1988 Dept Doc. PM 88 062
Subject:
DESCRIPTION OF POtfER ASCENSION TEST PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION:
R. G. Bird K. L. Highfill R. N. Swanson R. A. Ledgett E. J. Howard D. L. Gillispio R. J. Barrett All Section Managers I. PURPOSE:
The purpose of this document is to define and establish the following in the temporary Post-Refueling / Outage Test Organization:
A. Define +he relationship of the Test Organization to Operati organization.
B. Definition of the organization and description of the
duties and responsibilities of personnel assigned.
C. Describe the scheduling of testing.
D. Describe the conduct of testing.
E. Describe the independent review of completed test data.
II. BACKGROUND:
Experience from the testing program after RFO-6 and prudence dictate that the conduct of post-outage testing be carefully planned and controlled in order to ensure completeness, safety and effectiveness. The following sections of this program description document define the scheduling, conduct, and review of testing to be accomplished during startup from RFO-7.
UMdNT Page 1 of 12 g N FEB 5t388 FOR USE 4 7 Rot., GT ATIO" ,
Attachment B con't.
~
Page 2 . Date: January 29, 1988 III. BRTATIONSHIP OF THE TEST ORGANIZATION TO THE NUCT.RAR WATCH ENGINRRR (NNE) AND HIS SECTION CREW The NWE is tha senior licensed operator on watch and has complete responsibility for. operation of the plant. The Test Organization is subordinate to the NWE. The NWE's concurrence and permission must be obtained for the conduct of all tests. Direction must not be given to watch section operators for operation of plant equipment except as it pertains to conduct of previously authorized tests. The Shift Test coordinator (STC) must work closely with the NWE, may advise him, but must exercise exceptional care to not interfere with the NWE and his operators in discharge of their license and operational duties.
IV. STARTUP TMST ORGANIZATION The following are descriptions of the duties and responsibilities of defined positions in the Startup Test Organization. The Startup Test Manager may assign additional personnel to perform specific taska in addition to the positions described herein. An organizational diagram of the Startup Organization showing the relationship of the temporary startup test organization and the permanent station ,
organization is shown in Figure 1.
Page 2 of 12
ATTACHMENT B con't.
STARTUP TEST ORGANIZATION POSITION RESPONSIBILITIES A. STARTUP TEST MANAGER (J. A. SEERY)
Major duties and responsib'ilities of this position are:
- 1. Development of the Power Ascension Schedule.
- 2. Development and staffing of the Startup Test Program.
- 3. Development of a master power ascension test procedure.
- 4. Ensuring all test procedures required for the startup and testing are approved.
- 5. Day to day management of the Power Ascension Program keeping the Plant Manager informed of progress and problems.
- 6. Approval of completed startup test reports.
- 7. Recommendations to the Plant Manager when the plant is ready to ascend to the next test plateau.
- 8. Scheduling of testing and promulgation of the test schedule.
- 9. Interface with the Operations Section Manager to ensure testing and normal plant operations are efficiently scheduled.
- 10. Direction of the Shift Test Coordinators.
- 11. Ensuring complete test data review.
- 12. Approve a waiver of a discretionary test in TP 87-114.
B. ASSISTANT STARTUP TEST MANAGER (K. R. NICHOLAS)
This position reports to the Startup Test Manager and is responsible to him for the following duties:
- 1. Development of test reports, as necessary.
- 2. Technical advice in development of the schedule and necessary changes.
- 3. Assistance in development of a startup test organization and position responsibilities.
Page 3 of 12
l ATTAONENT B con't.
4.- Assistance in development of a master power ascension !
procedure. I i
- 5. Assistance in the day to day management of the Power l Ascension Program as necessary.
- 6. Ensuring that test da,ta is reviewed for acceptance'by the proper technical review group.
- 7. Technical and completeness review of completed test reports and submission to the Startup Test Manager for approval.
{ C. BEPORT WRITERS 4 This position reports directly to the Assistant Startup.
j, Manager. Their duties are as follows:
j 1. On a daily basis,. collecting completed tests from the i Shift Test Coordinator i
!, 2. Reviewing test for completeness
- 3. Preparing test reports for the Assistant Startup.
Manager's review i
- 4. Assisting the Assistant Startup Manager as required D. 3)i1ZT_ _TEEE_._CQORDINA'IVRS (P. SMITH, J. .BELLEFEUILLE, P.
MANDERINO, J. SABINA)
Shift Test coordinators will maintain shift coverage during the testing phase. They will assist the on-shift Nuclear Watch Engineer by . coordinating all testing for that shift and obtaining his permission to conduct testing.
Their duties will consist of, but not be limited to the following:
- 1. Ensuring tests are conducted in a formal and professional manner.
- 2. Ensuring tests are conducted using approved procedures.
- 3. Assisting the NWE in the conduct of pre-test briefings with the shift crew as necessary.
- 4. Keeping abreast of current plant status.
- 5. Ensuring test procedures are properly controlled.
- 6. Maintaining a shift log of the testing status progress on a shift basis.
Page 4 of 12
,- - - , - . , . ..-,y-- -- , , - - . . - - - -
ATTAONENT B con't i-i~ 7. In ' conjunction with.. the Nuclear Watch Engineer, recommendingchangestophg,suggestedcritical~ path schedule when necosnary.
- 8. In conjunction with the Watch Engineer, recommending waiver of discretionary tests in TP87-114.
- 9. Keeping the Startup Tesc Manager informed in a timely.
manner of the status of testing and of problems encountered.
E. REACTOR ENGINWRD_n, (J. A_M LTIN) COMPUTER ENGINEERS. TEST '
KNGINEERS. TURBINE TEST ENGINEERS. AND TEST AND TURNOVER ENGINEERS The generic responsibilities of these positions are.
similar. These are the Test Directors. They are responsible for directing and conducting . their assigned tests. On shift they report to the Shift Test ,
Coordinators.
Their duties will consist of, but not be limited to, the -
following:
I
- 1. Directing performance of their approved test after NWE concurrence and permission has been obtained.
J'
- 2. Keeping the Shift Test Coordinator and Nuclear Watch Engineer informed of test status and af fects on plant conditions.
- 3. Assisting in pre-test briefings.with the shift crew'as necessary and directed by the NWE. ,
V. NUCIAAR ORGANIZATION SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS L The restart from RFO-7 will be achieved with the normal plant support functions, e.g., Nuclear Engineering, Quality Assurance / Quality Control, Security, Fire Protection, Planning / Scheduling and cost control, Technical support, and other nuclear organization groups.
A. Due to the complexity of this outage, there will be a Shift Maintenance Representative, as shown and described in BEco ;
Ltr.87-163.
B. Quality Assurance coverage, although functioning through normal channels will be expanded during the preparation and testing phases of power ascension. Around the clock .
coverage will be provided by approximately 9 dedicated inspectors. A QA checklist developed specifically for power ascension will be used. Dedicated coverage of chemistry will also be provided.
Page 5 of 12
ATTAClf1ENT B con't VI. CONDUCT OF TESTING A. This section descr.bes the mechanism for the conduct of testing during the Power Ascension Program.
B.
REFERENCES:
(Latest revision unless otherwise indicated)
- 1. ANSI N.18.7-1976 Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Pover Plants
- 2. ANSI N.45.2.6-1978 Qualifications of Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants
- 3. ANSI N. 4 5. 2.11-1974 Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants
- 4. BECo Quality Assurance Manual, Volume II,Section II
- 5. PNPS Technical Spacifications, Section 6.8
- 6. Procedure 1.3.4 - Procedures
- 7. Procedure 1.4.5 0 PNPS Tagging Procedure
- 8. Procedure 1.5.3 - Maintenance Request C. DEFINITIONS:
- 1. PDC - Plant Design Change ,
- 2. ORC - Operations Review Committee
- 3. DCC - Document Control Center l
- 4. SRO - Senior Reactor Operator l
S. MR - Maintenance Request
- 6. RWP - Radiation Work Permit l
- 7. TP - Temporary Procedure
- 8. TD/TE - Test Director / Test Engineer. The TD/TE is the individual responsible for coordinating the performance of a test after permission of the NWE has been obtained.
Page 6 of 12
ATTACINENT B con't.
- 9. STC -
Shift Test Coordinator. The STC is the l individual who is responsible for management of all testing conducted on his abift. An STC can have several Test Engineers reporting to him. The STC reports to the Startup Test Manager.
- 10. PNPS - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station l D. PREREQUISITES:
The Startup Test Manager will assign Shift Test l' Coordinators (who meet appropriate educational and experience requirements of ANSI N.45.6-1978). He will certify each STC for the appropriate level using the Test Director Qualification Sheet. These certifications will be maintained on file within the Startup Test Organization.
E. TEST PREPARATION:
- 1. Upon authorization by the NWE of tests scheduled for that shift, the Shift Test Coordinator can make preparations to start the test.
- 2. Prior to the actual start of the test, the STC will ensure the following:
- a. That a latest revision of the procedure has .:
been obtained from the DCC.
- b. That the procedure to be used is the same revision as the one in the Control Room and is marked "Working Copy".
- c. That an approved Maintenance Request is ready for use (if needed).
- d. That an RWP has been approved (if needed) and is ready to support the test.
- e. That plant operating conditions and system status required for the test have been set.
- f. That manpower and equipment needed are scheduled and available.
- g. That all prerequisites stated in the prerequisite section of the test procedure are satisfied.
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ATTACINENT B con't.
F. CONDUCT . OF... TESTING:
- 1. During the conduct of the tent, the Test Engineer will ensure that the personnel conducting the test are cognizant of all requirements of the test such as:
- a. All prerequidites listed under Section VI of the procedures "Prerequisites".
- b. All personnel initialing the procedure will sign their full name on a Signature Identification Sheet.
- c. Any calibrated equipment which is part of the Meter and Test Equipment (M & TE) System being l used is listed on an equipment log. If the equipment being used is not part of the M & TE System, a Calibration Data Sheet will be attached as an addendum to the log.
- d. Test procedures, unless specifically stated, do not permit any exceptions. Any changes to the procedure will be in accordance with PNPS l
! 1.3.4.
- 2. If a problem is encountered during the conduct of a /
test the following steps will be taken:
- a. Hardyare oroblems - If a hardware problem is encountered, the TE will stop the test. A trouble shooting MR will be initiated by the TE. All necessary manpower will be obtained for trouble shooting. The scope of trouble shooting will be to the extent of identifying the components affected. Problems identified I will be repaired using normal station repair procedures. After the problems are repaired, the test may again be schedule by the Startup Test Group for completion.
- b. Software oroblems - If the problem encountered is procedural, the Test Engineer will stop the test, obtain the necessary change to the Test Procedure in accordance with Station Procedure 1.3.4. The Test Engineer may resume the test after the changes are made, and witn the approval of the shift Test Coordinator and the NWE.
- c. The TE is responsible for timely notification of the Nuclear Watch Engineer and the STC of any problems encountered and of completion of i the test.
Page 8 of 12
T, h.
ATTAC194ENF B con't.
n _:
. NOTE:
l >
R In sections a. and b. above, _ if the test
,l procedure permits the TE to do other F sections which are independent of the g section being reworked-(hardware) or revised (software), the TE can continue with the '
other indepEldent portions of the test with the concurrance of the STC and NWE.
G. TEST VERIFICATION:
- 1. After the test is complete, the TE will review the test to ensure the following:
- a. That the test was conducted as written without any discrepancies or exceptions. ,
- b. That the acceptance criteria of the applicable steps have been satisfactorily met.
- c. That the QC Group has reviewed all t21eir hold and witness points a.nd has signed off appropriate steps in the procedure.
- 2. When the above steps are completed, the TE can then '
sign Section XI of the procedure for Test Completion. The TE will then submit the test to the STC for his review.
- 3. The Shift Test Coordinator will review the entire test procedure to ensure that:
- a. All aspects of the test have been completed in accordance with station procedures,
- b. All revisions of the procedure used during the test are available and attached to the final revision.
- c. After Sections G.3.a and G.3.b above, are completed the STC will sign Section XI, of the !
procedure if required, of the procedure for the STC. The procedure will now be presented to the Nuclear Watch Engineer for review and approval for completeness.
- d. After the Nuclear Watch Engineer has signed the procedure, the procedure will be sent to the Assistant Startup Manager. ,
Page 9 of 12
[f' ,w ATTACINENP B con't.
y ,
~
4 4 .- The Assistant Startup Manager will coordinateithe independent. review of the test. packages. Submit to the Startup Test Manager a completed test package including the indopendent review results for his
. approval.
-5. The Startup Test Manager will review .the . test procedure along with the results of the independent review described in Section VII below. After approving the test, he will attach the independent review to the procedure and transmit to Document !
Control ~for capture.
VII. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF TEST RESULTS An independent review of the test results obtained during the Power Ascension Test Program will'be performed by the Systems Group. The support of personnel from ~ the other groups such as NED and Operations will be required as appropriate for their specific expertise.
The review will include but not be limited to the following:
. Verification that the test was performed as written.
l . All data was taken and recorded as required.
r
- . All acceptance criteria were satisfied.
- ~ After completing the independent technical review of a l'
completed test procedure the Systems Group Leader will notify the Startup Test Manager in writing of the findings.
The. Startup Test Manager will review and collect all independent review sheets. After all applicable procedures have been satisfactorily performed and reviewed,- the Startup Test Manager will submit a commitment close-out meno to compliance.
VIII. SCHEDULING OF TESTING A. The Startup Test Manager is responsible for scheduling of testing and promulgation of the test schedule. To discharge these responsibilities he will do the following:
- 1. Schedule testing on a shift basis. When tests are required to be done in a specific sequence, that constraint will be clearly indicated in the schedule. In forming the test schedule the Startup
- Test Organization and the Operations Section will coordinate to ensure safe and efficient plant operation.
Page 10 of 12 i
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.' < I l
- - ATTACINENT B cott't. l
- 2. The Power Ascension Test Schedule will be. approved by the operations Section Manager. This will be
' integrated into a Plan of the Day (POD) .which in i approved by the Plant Manager. The POD will be j issued for a specific period of time, with an j effective date/ time and an expectation date/ time.
- 3. The testing schehule may be extended or changed !
with formal concurrence of the Startup Test Manager
)
and the Operation Section Manager. During periods when either or both of these managers are not on site, the STC may obtain concurrence by telephone from the absent manager and approve test schedule changes for these managers "per telcon" noting the date and time telephone concurrence was obtained.
The absent- manager will sign the appropriate approval during the next day the manager is on site.
IX. COMMUNICATIONS DURING TESTING A. Communications during testing will be conducted in a precise and professional manner. A good model for use in the conduct of testing communications is SI-OP.0006. ,
B. Communications equipment to be used in testing will be tested for operability whenever possible, in advance of '
the start of the test. Use of the plant paging system ;
for routine operational communications during testing '
should be minimized and used only when no other appropriate communications paths are available.
X. TESTING SUPPORT Testing support may be requested from various NUORG organizations by the Startup Test Manager, the Assistant r
i Startup Manager and Shift Test Coordinators. Support may be requested in addition to that specified in this document Any from Engineering, Maintenance and Operations.
difficulty encountered in obtaining added support shall be through the resolved by the Startup Test Manager appropriate chain of command.
XI. SEOUENCING OF THE POWER ASCENSION TEST PROGRAM Conduct of the test program descriptions of major test and schedules and notices for the test program are contained in RFO-7.
Attachment 1, TP 87-114, Restart Test after Attachment 1 shall be the governing document for scheduling and sequencing of testing. Changes to the intent of Attachment 1 shall be made only af ter the approval of the ORC is received, using proper procedures for such changes. ,
Page 11 of 12
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ATTACINENT B con't.
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION STARTUP ORGANIZATION REMANDER PLANT *N NUCLEAROPERATKNS MANAGER DEPARTMOR I I - _
OPERATIONS SHIFT STAR M SECTION TEST MAINTENANCE M ER ER REPRESENTATIVE , ,
I -
assr CHIEF I__ efeer..
oesna1No asse ENGNEER STARTUP w uceR I ,,,,,,,
W^TCH I B GNEERS /
/ 'T'E5 RE[dFiT'7 cOoRomToRs
,,,in I "
asssTmT- 'MnfisY '
WATCH $ N TORS BGNEERj s"" l I I ! l 1- '
M -
////7// /ssisiis
<///////, r#
FO CTOR , CONFUTER TEST $ jTURBNE/ j T' E'ST'& ' -
, b $# b h ,
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INDICATES PERSONNEL ASSIGr@ENT FOR POST-OUTAGE TESTING FIGURE I t
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