05000029/LER-1987-004, Forwards LER 87-004-00

Forwards LER 87-004-00

ML20205E647
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	03/20/1987
From:	St Laurent N YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 8703300652
Download: ML20205E647 (1)

LER-2087-004, Forwards LER 87-004-00

Event date:
Report date:
0292087004R00 - NRC Website

text

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YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY r.i.onon.t<,s><2<.s2e:

Star Route, Rowe, Massachusetts 01367

. YANKEE .

March 20, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Attention: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 50-29/87-04 Inadvertent ECCS Actuation

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), the attached Licensee Event Report is hereby submitted.

Very truly yo rs

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Normand N. St. Laurent Plant Superintendent DAR/nm Enclosure cc:

3] NSARC Chairman (YAEC) 1] Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 0703300652 070320 PDR ADOCK 05000029 S PDR ili wu

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

PAGE 53i DOCKET NUMetR (23 PACILsTV NA886 til Yankee Nuclear Power Station 015l010101ol9lq 1 lOFl n l 9 TIT LE lot Inadvertent ECCS Actuation tytNT DAf t (Si Lan NUMetRtal REPORT DATE (7) oTMER F ACILifits INVOLVED (St Day pace .irv mAuss DOCKET NUMetnisi vtAm vtAR sa ,o p,A ' MONTH vtan MONTM DAv 0ISl01010 1 I I

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On 2/18/87 at 1124 hours0.013 days <br />0.312 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.27682e-4 months <br /> with the plant in Mode 3, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and the Vapor Container Isolation System (CIS) were inadvertently actuated when Main Coolant Pressure Channel 100 (MC-P-100), (TS 3.3-2.1.a.1) was being removed from service to perform maintenance on the channel test switch, MC-TS-100. The event occurred when the technicians lifted the Main Coolant pressure transmitter signal lead. The resultant zero pressure indication actuated ECCS and non-essential CIS. The technicians performing the work immediately restored MC-P-100 to operable status, and the Control Room operators verified that: 1) all Engineering Safeguards Systems (ESS) responded as required for loss of Main Coolant pressure indication and 2) actuation of ECCS and non-essential CIS was inadvertent. Upon verification of 1) and 2) at 1128 hours0.0131 days <br />0.313 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29204e-4 months <br />, the operators reset ECCS and non-essential CIS. The NRC was notified via ENS at 1154 hours0.0134 days <br />0.321 hours <br />0.00191 weeks <br />4.39097e-4 months <br /> 2/18/87.

The root cause of the event has been attributed to personnel error in the failure to perform an adequate review of the system design and Tech. Spec.

requirements. This is the first occurrence of this nature. The I&C Department Supervisors and Technicians have been instructed to thoroughly review all aspects of work to be performed, during pre-job discussions. Additional.

training in the proper completion of the Temporary Change Request (TCR) process and form will be given to appropriate personnel. This is expected to be completed by April 17, 1987. There was no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION EXPIR ES. 8/31/85 PACILiiv NAME (1) DOCKET NUMSER (21 LER NUMSER (6) PAGE(3)

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0l0 0 l2 oF 0 l2 TEXT IM more wace ne requeef use . NRC form 366Ks)(tn On 2/18/87 at 1124 hours0.013 days <br />0.312 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.27682e-4 months <br /> with the plant in Mode 3, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and the Vapor Container Isolation System (CIS) were inadvertently actuated when Main Coolant Pressure Channel 100 (MC-P-100), (TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-2) was being removed from service to perform maintenance on the channel tut switch, MC-TS-100. The event occurred when the technicians lifted the Main Coolant pressure transmitter signal lead. The resultant zero pressure indication actuated ECCS and non-essential CIS.

The technicians performing the work immediately restored MC-P-100 to operable status, and the Control Room operators verified that: 1) all Engineering Safeguards Systems (ESS) responded as required for loss of Main Coolant pressure indication and 2) actuation of ECCS and non-essential CIS was inadvertent. Upon verification of 1) and 2) at 1128 hours0.0131 days <br />0.313 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29204e-4 months <br />, the operators reset ECCS and non-essential CIS. The NRC was notified via ENS at 1154 hours0.0134 days <br />0.321 hours <br />0.00191 weeks <br />4.39097e-4 months <br /> 2/18/87.

The root cause of the event has been attributed to personnel error in the failure to perform an adequate review of the system design. The review should have identified that the Safety Injection Auto Start / Auto Cutout switch for Train A should have been placed in the Auto Cutout position; and to not do so would result in actuation of Train A. The work was initiated using a Temporary Change Request (TCR). The TCR provided: 1) information necessary to isolate MC-P-100 electrically, and 2) authorization by I&C supervision and Operations Department Control Room Operator (CRO) and Shift Supervisor (SS) to perform the work. It did not identify that ECCS and non-essential CIS would be actuated when MC-P-100 pressure indication went to zero.

Two additional factors contributing to this event are: 1) the TCR did not provide complete information regarding ECCS and CIS Tech. Spec. operability requirements, and 2) the TCR was not properly reviewed by the CR0 and the SS in that they did not identify that the performance of the TCR would place the plant in the Action Statement of TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-2. The plant Tech. Specs, were reviewed only to the extent of determining that MC-P-100 was required to be operational in Modes 1 and 2 per TS 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1. A later, complete review of the Tech. Specs, identified the requirement that MC-P-100 also be operational in Mode 3 per TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-2.

t This is the first occurrence of this nature. A review of Plant Procedures has determined that adequate guidance was in place regarding document review prior to completion of the TCR, and for administrative review prior to beginning work.

The I&C Department Supervisors and Technicians have been instructed to thoroughly review all aspects of work to be performed, during pre-job discussions. Additional training in the proper completion of the TCR process and form will be given to appropriate personnel. This is expected to be completed by April 17, 1987.

There was no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public as a result j of this event.

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