ML20128K391
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| ML20128K391 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1985 |
| From: | Panciera V, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128K328 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-85-21, NUDOCS 8507100555 | |
| Download: ML20128K391 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1985021
Text
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. ' sMr UNITED STATES
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o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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j- 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
, , ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:. 50-302/84-21
Licensee: Florida Power' Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
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St. Petersburg, FL 33733
L- Docket No.:' 50-302 License No.: DPR-72
Facility Name: Crystal River 3
Inspection Dates: April 26 - May 24,1985
Inspector: [M [[ Mj d U
T.F.Stetka,SeniorResidentf(spectof7 Date Signed
Accompanying P rsonn . E. Tedrow, Resident Inspector
Approvedby:k .Il . i Amech
V. W. Pariciera, Chief, Project Section 2B,
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U/te/Figned
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine inspection involved 128 inspector-hours on site by two
resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, security, radiological
controls, Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility
modifications, and licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous
facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these
tours and observations were conducted on backshifts. This inspection also
surveyed the licensee's response to the steam binding in the auxiliary feedwater
pump and mispositioned control rod issues.
Results: One violation and one deviation were identified (failure to have two
members of the plant management staff approve a temporary procedure change,
paragraph 5.b.(8); and failure to rreet the FSAR commitment to maintain emergency
diesel generator air start pressure, paragraph 3.).
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REPORT DETAILS
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1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees-
W. Bandhauer, Nuclear Safety Supervisor
*C. Bennett, Nuclear Operations Planning Supervisor
*G. Boldt,. Nuclear Plant Operations Manager
.J.
* Bufe, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
M. Culver, Senior Nuclear Reactor Specialist
*L. Floyd, Nuclear Document Control Supervisor
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E. Howard, Director, Site Nuclear Operations
*W. Johnson, Nuclear Plant Engineering Supt.
P. McKee, Nuclear Plant Manager-
*R. Murgatroyd, Assistant Nuclear. Maintenance Supt.
*W. Pittman, Senior Nuclear Maintenance / Bldg. Service Sup.
*V. Roppel Nuclear Plant Engineering Technical Services Mgr.
*W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Plant Engineering Technical Services Mgr.
*D. Smith, Nuclear Maintenance Supt.
*S. Sullens, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Sup.
*R. Thompson, Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Sup.
K. Wilson, Supervisor ~ Site Nuclear Licensing
, ' *R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Technical Advisor
Other_ personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, main-
tenance, chem / rad and corporate personnel.
* Attended exit interview
2. Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at
the conclusion of the inspection on May. '24,1985. During this meeting, the
inspector sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are
detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the violation, deviation
and inspector followup items.
Also during this meeting, the inspector discussed his observations from a -
-walkdown conducted on the' Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System.- The following
- < items were identified:
- There is no identification tag for valve DHV-117 located on top of the
Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST);
f - Several DHR system valves in the reactor building are missing iden-
tification tags; and,
- . The operating area for valve DHV-68 (the BWST drain valve) is flooded,
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, which could result-in accelerated corrosion of this valve.
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The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as
proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors
during this inspection.
3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/83-10-04): The licensee has completed
their investigation into the ASV-5 failure as documented in revision 1 to
LER 50-302/83-009. This investigation concluded that the failure was caused
by a sticking motor contactor. This contactor was cleaned and the valve
returned to service.
(Closed) Inspector Follwup 1...m (302/82-28-10): The licensee has revised
the affected drawing and has resolved the Field Problem Report by initiating
a Modification Approval Record (MAR) 82-11-13-01 to install a check valve in
the applicable air line to prevent recurrence of this event. The drawing
revision and the MAR installation was reviewed by the inspector and action
on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/84-21-04): Procedure MP-123, Disassembly and
reassembly of Nuclear Service Closed Cycle Cooling Water Pumps SWP-1A, IB,
and 1C, was revised to allow sufficient time to take the required readings
and procedure SP-104, Hot Channel Factors Calculations, was revised to
assure that the data sheet agrees with the body of the procedure. In
addition, procedure SP-442, Special Conditions Surveillance Plan, was
revised to ensure that the verification of the average flux / flow / delta-flux
trip setpoint is accomplished as required. These changes should prevent
recurrence of this violation.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (302/85-19-02): The licensee has been unable to
determine the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) minimum air start pressure
required to satisfy the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) consnitments.
The FSAR states that starting system air pressure will be maintained between
225-250 psig and that this air pressure will be sufficient to provide for
six successive start attempts.
As stated in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/85-19, the inspectors found that
the air starting pressure for EDG-3A was at 200 psig on March 29, 1985, and
that surveillance procedures SP-300, SP-301, and SP-354A/B allowed a minimum
air pressure c7 215 psig. Failure of the licensee to justify the use of the
lower air starting pressures to meet the six successive start criteria is
contrary to the commitment made to one NRC in the FSAR and is considered to
be a Deviation. For record purposes this Unresolved Item is considered to
be closed. Followup on this item will be tracked by Deviation
(302/85-21-01).
Deviation (302/85 ^1-01): Failure to meet the FSAR commitment to maintain
EDG air starting pressure at 225-250 psig and to provide for six successive
start attempts.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/85-11-03): The licensee has revised
procedure SP-421, Reactivity Balance Calculations, to include a requirement
to submit the computer generated data sheets with the completed procedure
data sheets to ensure this data is retained in the procedure record system.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (302/85-19-04): The licensee has developed a
test to check the integrity of the SBM switch contacts. This test consists
of a five pound pull exerted on a contact. If the contact remains intact
after this test, contact integrity is considered to be acceptable. This
test will be applied to a sampling of SBM switch contacts (approximately 312
contacts) to provide a representative sample.
During the test conducted on May 21, 1985, that was observed by the resident
inspector, a fracture of the cam follower (constructed of a Lexan material)
that holds the contact assembly occurred. As a result of this occurrence,
the licensee inspected other cam followers and determined that cracking was
evident. This cracking was not caused by the testing and appears to be
caused by aging of the material. The licensee has stopped testing of these
switches and is reviewing the situation to determine what additional actions
need to be taken.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/83-30-02): The licensee has finalized
the list of qualified reviewers and has implemented the use of this list.
The inspector has reviewed this list and the reviewer certification sheets
and considers action on this item to be complete.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (302/84-21-06): The licensee has revised the Plant
Review Committee (PRC) charter to clarify the use of the alternate members.
Review of this revision by the inspector indicates that alternates could
still be used to replace a full member during a lor.g absences by the member.
This finding was discussed with licensee representatives at which time the
inspector stated that for a person to replace a full time member that person
must assume, in total, the job responsibilities of the member that is being
replaced. The licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's comments
and stated that the charter would be revised to reflect this total job
position philosophy. This item remains open pending the additional revision
to the PRC charter.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/82-24-06): As a result of the
engineering study, the licensee developed modification packages (MARS)
numbers 79-7-4-2 and 79-7-4-3 to install restraints on the Once Through
Steam Generator (OTSG) blowdown lines. These restraints are being installed
during the current refueling outage.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (302/84-33-02): The licensee has conducted a
review of operating cycle records and determined from this review that any
adjustments made to the curves were acceptable and not contrary to Technical
Specification (TS) requirements. The inspector has reviewed the results of
this review and has no further questions on this item.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/84-33-03): The licensee has had their
consultant, Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), complete the re-analysis on the boron
concentration curve. This re-analysis was reviewed by the inspector and
discussed with NRC Region II personnel. The inspector has no further
questions on this item.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/84-33-05): The licensee has revised
procedure PM-100, Preventive Maintenance Program, to ensure that "as found"
conditions are not affected by the performance of preventative maintenance.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/85-04-04): The licensee counseled
personnel to be more aware of clearance order releases and subsequent system
restoration to ensure proper return to service. In addition, the procedure
that controls equipment clearance issuance, CP-115, was revised to clarify
and enhance the proper procedure to be used to return a system to service.
(Closed) Violation (302/84-16-01): The inspector verified that procedures
SP-333 and SP-321 were properly completed. In addition the inspector
verified that the principle procedure reviewers, i.e., the shift supervisors
and assistant shift supervisors, were counseled to ensure that a thorough
review of data from completed procedures is conducted. The inspector also
verified through document review and observation of on-going activities that
the second level review of completed data was being performed.
4. Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations. No unresolved items were identified during this inspection
period.
5. Review of Plant Operations
The plant was shutdown with the reactor vessel de-fueled for the duration of
this inspection period,
a. Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with
operations personnel to verify compliance with the TS and the
licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-of-
Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log;
Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request
Log; Short Term Instructions (STIs); selected Chemistry / Radiation
Protection Logs, and Outage Shift Manager's Log.
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In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently
verified clearance order tagouts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b. Facility Tours and Observations
Throughout -the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some
operations and maintenance activity observations were' conducted during
backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings
were attended by the inspector to observe planning m management
activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
Security Perimeter Fence; Control Room; Emergency Diesel Generator
Room; . Auxiliary Building; Intermediate Building; Battery Rooms;
Electrical Switchgear Rooms; and Reactor Building.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation was
observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance
with the TS for the current operational mode:
Equipment operating status; Area, atmospheric and liquid radiation
monitors; Electrical system lineup; Reactor operating parameters;
and Auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of
the decay heat removal (DHR) system to verify that the lineups
were in accordance with licensee requirements for system opera-
bility and that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflect
"as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
, (3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift i staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control
- room operations were being conducted in an orderly and profes-
cional manner. In addition, the inspector observed shift
!- turnovers on various occasions to varify the continuity of plant-
status, operational problems, and ot'n er pertinent plant informa-
tion during these turnovers.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components
and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the
facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire
hazards existed. ,
No violations or deviations were identified.
(5) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were observed to
verify proper identification and implementation. These observa-
tions included selected licensee conducted surveys, review of
step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and
ares posting. Area postings were independently verified for
accuracy through the use of the inspector's own radiation
monitoring instrument. The inspector also reviewed selected
radiation work permits and observed personnel use of protective
clothing respirators, and personnel monitering devices to assure
that the licensee's radiation monitoring policies were being
followed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(6) Security Control - Security controls were observed to verify that
security barriers are intact, guard forces are on duty, and access
to the Protected Area (PA) is controlled in accordance with the
facility security plan. Personnel within the PA were observed to
ensure proper display of badges and that personnel requiring
escort were properly escorted. Personnel within vital areas were
observed to ensure proper authorization for the area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(7)' Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and equip-
ment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
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appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment,
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and fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that
l approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were
conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment
operability; calibrated equipment, as required, were utilized; and
TS requirements were followed.
! The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed: i
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SP-210, ASME Class 3 Hydrostatic Testing;
- SP-326B, Toxic Gas Detection System (Semi-Annual);
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SP-354A, Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Quality and Diesel
Generator Monthly Test; and,
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SP-602, ASME Section XI Relief Valve Testing.
On Pay 14, 1985, while observing surveillance testing in
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accordance with procedure SP-354A, the inspector noticed that step
6.2.2 of procedure SP-354A, which requires that either air
handling fan AHF-22A or AHF-228 be operating, was not completed by
the operator. Instead, the operator noted at the bottom of the
page that AHF-22A was tagged for an equipment clearance and that
the control switch for AHF-22B was in the '" Normal After Stop"
position. The inspector verified that neither fan was operating
and questioned licensee representatives about this apparent
deviation from the requirements of the procedure. The inspector
was informed that neither fan was operable and that the fans were
not necessary for diesel generator operations. The inspector
noted that this deviation from the procedure constituted a
temporary change to the procedure.
TS 6.8.3 allows temporary changes to be made to facility proce-
dures provided the intent of the procedure is not altered and that
the change is approved by two members of plant management staff,
at least one of whom holds a Senior Reactor Operators (SR0)
license. The licensee has a method for implementing a temporary
change, called an Immediate Temporary Change (ITC), and delineates
this change method in Administrative Instruction AI-401.
This change was made without the approval of two members of the
plant management staff, at least one of whom holds an SR0 license,
and is considered to be a violation. This appears to be a
recurrent and uncorrected violation since similar violations were "
identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/85-08 on February 8,
1985 and NRC Inspection Report 50-302/85-11 on March 9, 1985.
Violation (302/85-21-02): Failure to have two members of the
plant management staff, at least one of whom holds an SR0 license,
approve a temporary procedure change to SP-354A as required by TS
6.8.3.
(9) Maintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance
activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in
effect; Work Requests and Fire Prevention Work Permits, as
required, were issued and being followed; Quality Control
-personnel were available for inspection activities as required;
and TS requirements were being followed.
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Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
- Inspect, repair, and set Nuclear Services Closed Cycle
Cooling relief valves SWV-373, 374, and 384 per procedure
MP-119;
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Repack feedwater valve FWV-38 in accordance with procedure
MP-111;
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Installation of the control switch for the "B" Emergency
Diesel Generator output breaker;
- Surveillance Specimen Holder Tube (SSHT) bolt replacement in
accordance with procedure MP-522 and modification
MAR-84-03-11-02A;
- Troubleshooting and repair of the "A"
Sulfur Dioxide (S02)
Toxic Gas Monitor (AH-653-CE);
- Contact testing of SBM control switches; and,
- Lower grid shell forging to core barrel bolt replacement in
accordance with MAR-84-03-11-01.
On review of modification MAR-84-03-11-01, Lower Core Barrel (LCB)
Bolt Replacement, the inspector noted that only 60 out of the 108
LCB bolts were replaced. The remaining 48 LCB bolts could not be
replaced due to their location near guide blocks which interfere
with the bolt removal tool. Discussions with licensee represen-
tatives revealed that an ultrasonic test of the LCB bolts showed
that seven bolts had indications of possible cracking and that
only two of these bolts had been replaced. The inspector
questioned the effect that five potentially cracked LCB bolts
would have on the lower core barrel support. Although licensee
representatives stated that approximately 15 LCB bolts were needed
to ensure adequate core barrel support, no documentation could be
produced to support this position. The licensee will locate the
necessary documentation that will identify the minimum number of
lower core barrel support bolts required for safe operation.
Inspector Followup Item (302/85-21-03): Review documentation to
ensure that a sufficient number of LCB bolts are installed for
adequate lower core barrel support.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid Waste Compacting Operations and
selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify that
approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release
approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and
seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were
observed to ensure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage
was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that
anchoring points were not binding.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports
a. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic
impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrected actions
appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported immediately, were
reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs 84-64 and 85-03 were reviewed in accordance with current NRC
enforcement policy. As a result of these reviews, these LERs are
considered to be closed as follows:
(1) LER 83-64, which reported the failure of radiation monitor RMA-6,
was left open in NRC Report 50-302/84-02 pending results of an
engineering investigation. This investigation was completed and
it was determined that the system operated as designed and that no
modification was necessary. This corrective action was discussed
in revision 1 of .this LER dated April 24, 1985. The inspectors
have reviewed the results of this investigation and have no
further questions.
(2) LER 85-03 reported the failure to perform an adequate eddy current
inservice inspection (ISI) of the "B" Once Through Steam Generator
(OTSG) tubes in 1980. Since the licensee cannot perform the
required ISI on some of the OTSG tubes due to tube damage caused
early in plant life, the licensee has proposed an amendment to the
TS to change-the ISI requirement. The licensee's activities will
be tracked by Inspector Followup Item (302/85-17-02) identified in
NRC Inspection Report 50-302/85-17.
b. The inspector reviewed Non-Conforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to
verify the following: compliance with the TS, corrective actions as
identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been
accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are
identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are
reported as required by TS.
All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC enforcement
policy.
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As a result of this review, the inspector noted that NCOR 85-71
reported the finding of a loose contact on a relay that was used in the
control circuit for circuit breaker 3206. This relay, which is
numbered 0213, could have resulted in a failure to trip breaker 3206 if
required. The licensee is evaluating this occurrence to determine if
there is a generic problem.
Inspector Followup Item (302/85-21-04): Review the licensee's
investigation into the loose contact on relay 0213 which is in the
control circuit of circuit breaker 3206.
7. Review of Licensee Activities on Selected Safety Issues
a. Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
. The inspector conducted a special survey of the licensee's activities
in this area to determine that appropriate procedures have been
developed to prevent, detect, and correct backleakage through check
valves and that personnel training to detect such trends is being
accomplished. The licensee was notified of this issue by IE
Information Notice No. 84-06 dated January 25, 1985.
As a result of this survey the inspector noted that while the licensee
had directed operators to check for hot pipes around the Emergency
Feedwater Pumps (EFPs) during their normal rounds, there was no formal
procedure that documented that these activities were being accom-
plished. In addition the inspector noted that the licensee did not
appear to have a procedure that addressed actions to be taken if a pump
became steam bound.
These findings were discussed with licensee personnel and the
inspectors comments were acknowledged. The licensee will make appro-
priate procedure changes that will provide a formal check for hot pipes
during the operator's rounds and will provide instruction for recovery
of a steam bound EFP.
Inspector Followup Item (302/85-21-05): Review procedure changes that
will require operators to check for hot pipes near the EFPs and to
recover from a steam bound EFP.
b. Improper Control Rod Manipulation
The inspector conducted a special survey of the licensee's activities
in this area to determine whether procedural changes have been
initiated and personnel training is being accomplished to cover
mispositioned control rods. The licensee was notified of this issue by
IE Information Notice No. 83-75 dated November 3, 1983.
The results' of this survey indicate that the licensee has developed
appropriate procedure changes and that personnel training in this
regard is being accomplished.
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The inspector has no further questions in this area at this time.
8. Design, Design Changes and Modifications
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the
changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the
changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved
procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria
or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate
drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary. This review
included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.
The following modification approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or
associated testing observed:
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Installation of hard piping on the sodium hydroxide (NaOH) recircu-
lation line in the Reactor Building Spray (BS) system in accordance
with MAR 84-02-03-01; and,
- Installation of a check valve between the instrument air (IA) system
and the fire service (FS) system in accordance with MAR 82-11-13-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. The following inspector followup items (IFIs) were evaluated by the
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch. Based on this
review, these items were determined to require no additional specific
followup and are closed.
IFI Nos. 81-14-58
82-08-01
82-08-02
82-13-03
83-06-01
83-06-03
83-06-06
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