Text

Insp Repts 50-313/86-02 & 50-368/86-02 in Jan 1986.Violation Identified:Qc Procedures Re Seismic Pipe Support Section Not Followed
	ML20153D451
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	02/14/1986
From:	Craig Harbuck, Hunnicutt D, Johnson W; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20153D417	List: ML20153D416; ML20153D423; ML20153D451;
References
	RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.1, TASK-TM 50-313-86-02, 50-313-86-2, 50-368-86-02, 50-368-86-2, NUDOCS 8602240150
	Download: ML20153D451 (11)
	v • d • e

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APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/86-02 Licenses: DPR-51

50-368/86-02 NPF-6

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Dockets: 50-313

50-368

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Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L).

P. O. Box 551 ' "

Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 -

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Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclea'r One (ANO),-Units 1'and 2-

Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas .

Inspection Conducted: January 1-31, 1986 ~

Inspectors: /2/ D h/o/8d

W. D. Jp)fhson, Senior Resident Date'

Reactor' Inspector

(pars.4,6,7,8)

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arbuck,RespentReactor Date

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D. M. Hunnicutt, Acting Chief, Date '

Project Section B, Reactor Project

Branch

(par. 9)

Approved: kj l////[gg

D. M. Hunnicutt, Acting Chief. Date

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Project Section B, Reactor Project

Branch

8602240150 860218

PDR ADOCK 05000313

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Inspection Summary

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Inspection Conducted January 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-313/86-02) *

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced _ inspection including operational safety.

verification, maintenance, surveillance, . seismic pipe ~ support review, condensate

storage' tank construction, and followup on Three Mile Island Action Plan

requirements.

The inspection involved 99 inspector-hours (iL:luding 16 backshift hours) onsite:

by three NRC inspectors.

Results: Within the six areas inspected, one tiolation was identified (failure

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to follow a quality control procedure in seismic pipe support inspection,

paragraph 7).

j Inspection Summary

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l Inspection Conducted January 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-368/86-02)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspectior, including operational safety

verification., maintenance, surveillance, followup on a previously identified

item, followup on a licensee event report, condensate storage . tank construction,

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and followup on Three Mile Island Action Plan requiremen;s.

The inspection involved 62 inspector-hours (including 12 backshift hours) onsite

l by three NRC inspectors. .

'

Results: Within the seven areas inspected, one violation was identified (pump l

test procedure did not meet requirements of ASME Section XI, paragraph 5)..

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted *

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J. Levine, ANO General Manager ,

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P.. Ashcraft, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor .

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B. Baker, Operations Manager .

M. Bolanis, Health Physics Superintend 5nt '

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e M. Browning, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer >

P. Campbell, Licensing Engineer i

T. Cogburn, General Manager, . Nuclear Services "

A. Cox, Operations Technical . Support

E. Ewing, Engineering-& Technical Support !!anager

G. Fiser, Radiochemistry Supervisor _

M. Frala, Assistant Radiochemistry Supervisor

-B. Garrison, Operations Technical- Support

M. Goodson,-Civil Engineer ~ -

L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent

C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor

H. Hollis, Security Coordinator

D. Horton, Quality Assurance Manager

R. Howerton, Manager; Civil Engineering.

L. Humphrey, Administrative Manager

D. Johnson, Licensing Engineer -

H. Jones, Field Construction Manager.

D. Lomax, Licensing Supervisor

B. Lovett, Electrical Maintenance Engineer

J. McWi'liams, Unit 1 (>,.u. ations Supervisor

J. Orlicek, Field Engineering Supervisor

V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent

R. Poole, Assistant Radioch.emistry Supervisor

D. Provencher, Quality Engf9eering Supervisor

P. Rogers, Plant Licensing Engineer

L. Sanders, Maintenance Manager

L. Schempp, Nuclear Quality Control Manager

C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent

R. Simons, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor

. C. Taylor, Operations . Technical. Suppo.rt

B. Terwilliger, Operations Assessment Supervisor

R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent

D. Wagner, Health. Physics Supervisor

>

R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager

G. Woolf, Operations Technical Support

G. Wrightam, I&C Supervisor-

S. Yancy, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor .

C. Zimmerman,' Operations Technical Support ~

'

Present at exit interview.

The NRC. inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including

.

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operators, technicians, . craft, and administrative personnel:. ..

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2. Followup on Previously-Identified Items (Unit 2) y

(Closed) Violation 368/8517-01: Ca'.egory 'E' valve found out of its

required position.

The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions which were to

(a) review this violation with Operations personnel, (b) revise procedures

as necessary, and c(c) conduct detailed operator training on _all procedures

related to category 'E' valves. All actions were , verified to-have been ,

. completed. In conjunction with this review, the NRC inspector reviewed the

licensee's. actions taken in response to Licensee Event Report (LER)

'

84-018-00, " Category 'E' Valve Improperly Aligned,"- for Unit 2. The viola-

tion and the LER are similar in that botn ydives were in the Unit 2 contain-

ment spray system and were improperly positioned because of personnel error;

However, the violation was identified approximately a year after-the'issu-

ance of the LER. Additionally, corrective actions for the violation were

more extensive than for the LER, specifically items (b) and (c) noted above.

The NRC inspector concluded that the completed actions in response to-the

violation appeared to be adequate to prevent recurrence of category 'E'

valve mispositioning. Therefore, viol; tion 368/8517-01 and LER 84-018-00

are considered closed. '

3. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (Unit 2)

Through direct observation," discussions with licensee personnel, and review

of records, the following event report was reviewed to determine that

reportability requirements were~ fulfilled, immediate corrective action was

accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been

accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

~

. 84-018-00 " Category 'E' Valve Improperly Aligned." This was reviewed

in conjunction with the licensee s actions in response to violation

368/8517-01. See paragraph;2-of this report.

No violations or deviations were identified.-

4 Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2) f

'

The NRC inspectors observed control rcom operations, reviewed applicable

logs, and conducted discussions with' control room operators. The inspec- '

tors verified the operability of selected'energency systems, reviewed

tagout~ records, verified proper return to service of affected components,

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and ensured that maintenance ' requests had been initiated for equipment in

need of maintenance. The inspectors made spot checks to verify that the

physical security plan was being implemented nin accordance with the station

security plan. The inspectors verified implementation of radiation

protection controls during observation of plant activities.

The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant

equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid . leaks, and

excessive vibration. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and '

cleanliness conditions during the tours.

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The NRC Linspectors walked down portions of the Unit i electrical

distribution system using Procedure 1107.01 and single-line Drawings ES,

E8, E15, E16,.E17,~E18, E19, E22,.E23, and E24. This walkdown included

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review of approximately 600 breakers. Label problems such as no breaker

label or an erroneous label were noted on about-7 percent of the breakers.

In most cases, the listing in Procedure 1107.01 was correct. An exception

was discussed with licensee operations department personnel. They had

identified this procedure error and a procedure revision,was being prepared.

The licensee is in the process of developing a means of controlling the

breaker. lists which are mounted on the doors of the 120 volt AC and DC

distribution panels. The licensee's ongoing plant labeling improvement

program includes a review of labels on motor control centers, and this pro-

gram is expected to result in addition or correction of labels on 480 volt

breaker cabinets.

Most of the single-line electrical drawings reviewed contained errors.

Most of the errors appeared to result from a . failure to update 'the drawings

to reflect design changes. A review of the drawing control log for Drawing

E15 indicated that four design change packages (DCPs) had not yet been

reflected on the latest revision of this drawing. The licensee is involved

in a major effort to eliminate the backlog of DCPs which have been

implemented but not closed out.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility .

operations were in conformance with the requirements established under

Technical Specificttions,10 CFP,, and administrative procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Surve'.llance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification-required surveillance

testing on the Unit 1 penetration room emergency ventilation lead system

and on the Unit 2 motor driven emergency feedwater pump 2P7B. Except as

noted below, it was verified that testing was performed in accordance with

adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting condi-

tions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected

components were accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifi-

cations and procedure requirements, test results were reviewed by perscnnel

other than the individual directing the test,. and any deficiencies identi-

fled during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate

management personnel .

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. Monthly and Quarterly 2P7B Test, Procedure 2106.06, " Emergency

Feedwater System Operations," Revision 15 of December 12, 1985,

Supplement II. '

The test procedure was revie.ad and it appeared to meet the Technical

' Specification acceptance criteria of minimum flow of 485 gpm at a

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minimum discharge pressure of 1200 psig for both 2P7A and 2P78

(T.S . - 4.7.1.2.a.2) . However, TS requirement 4.0.5 for inservice

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inspection and testing also requires that this pump be tested in

accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressurc Vessel

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Code 1974 Edition, and Addenda through' Summer 1975. ' Article IWP-3000,

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" Inservice Test Procedures," ~of Section XI of the Code requires thati

refererce _ values be defined for differential pressure (dP) and flow

rate (Q). The resistance of the systeni is then varied until either -

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the reference dP or Q is reached. The corresponding Q or dP, respec-

tively,-is then recorded and compared to the acceptance' criteria,

defined as an acceptable range of values for that quantity. The code

further defines an " Alert Range" and a " Required Action Range." . Con-

trary to the code requirements, the test procedure does.not contain .

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reference values of dP or Q and the corresponding acceptable range of

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val ues.

This is an' apparent violation of Technical Specification surveillance

requirement 4.0.5 for the emergency feedwater pumps 2P7A and 2P7B.

(50-368/8602'01)

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. ' Lead system monthly test, Procedure 1104.43, " Penetration Room

Yentilation System," Revision 4 of May 3,1984, Supplement I'..

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, The NRC ' inspector reviewed the procedure and found that.it appeared to

meet the testing requirements of the Technical Specifications. How-

ever, the following items were observed during the test which raised a

concern about the' design of the system.

During the test it was noted that the North Penetration Room (NPR) was

at a higher pressure, essentially 0" WC (zero inches water column) of

vacuum,: than the South' Penetration Room (SPR) which was at 0.3" WC

vacuum. ^ The ventilation lines from each room are in parallel, coming

together into a single suction line to the system fan. The lines from

each of the three levels of each room have check valves to prevent

backflow. Based on the observed differential pressure (dP) between

the rooms, the NRC inspector postulated that either all of the flow-

was coming from the NPR, with the SPR check valves seated due to the

dP, or that all the flow was coming from the SPR with the NPR check

valves stuck shut.

The NRC inspector also noted that the Penetration Room Low Vacuum

alarm was set at a~ higher vacuum (0.5" WC) than was attained during

the surveillance (0.3 WC). It remained to be determined if this

implied that the system was designed to be able, under accident condi-

tions, to attain a vacuum of greater than 0.5" WC. Pending further

review, these concerns will remain as an open item. (50-313/8602-02).

The NRC inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

. Reactor tri

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breakertest

portion

(Unitof1,the

J.0.reactor protection system

706161).

. CEA Exercise Test, Appendix 'A' to Procedure 2105.09, "CEDM Control

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System Operation."

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Monthly-Maintenance Observation' (Units 1 and 2)'

Station ' maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components

listed below were observed to ascertain that they were cc.9ucted in accord-

ance with approved ' procedures, Regulatory ~ Guides, and industry codes orn

standards; and in conformance with Technical Specifications.- -'

The following items were considered during this review: ' the limiting

conditions for operation were met while compJnents or systems were removed

from service; approvals were obtained prior to ' initiating the work; activi-

.

ties were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as

applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to

- returning components or systems to service; quality control records were '

maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;' parts and

materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were. .

implemented;.and fire prevention controls were implemented.

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Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and"to- ~

ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance -

which may affect system performance.

The followin~g maintenance activities were observed:

. Replacement nf drain valve MS-1053 (J.0. 706697)

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.. In:,tallat%n of check valve MS-272 (J.0. 707125)

. Post-maintenance performance test of 'A' emergency diesel generator

(Work Plan ~ 1409.06)

. Mechanical portion of Design Change Package 86-1005 (J.0.707469)

. Replacement of power packs and bearings on 'B' emergency diesel

generator (J.0. 707279)

. Packing leak repair on Unit I high pressure injection flow transmitt'er'

(PDT-1210) isolation valve (J.0. 705145)

. Replacement of discharge accumulator for charging pu'mp 'A' -

(Procedure 2406.32, J.0. 524969) i

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No violations or deviations were identified. -

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7. Seismic Pipe Support Review *

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The purpose of this part of the report is'to document problems noted,by the !

HRC inspectors concerning pipe support installation activitie's on the i

Unit 1 emergency feedwater (EFW) system. ,

During the safety system functional inspection of the EFW system, a '

walkdown of the system was performed. ' Deficiencies found that 'are not

related to pipe supports will be documented in NRC Inspection

Report 50-313/86-01,

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a.- The NRC inspector.found that pipe support 3EFW-116-H20 had

approximately six concrete expansion anchors (CEAs) that had less than

the minimum imbedment depth required. On one CEA, the nut had no -

bearing on the washer, and was apparently torqued to the end of the i

bolt thread travel . Licensee Field Inspection Procedure G-6, "Inspec-

tion, Examination and Test Control, Arkansas GSA 11306," Revision 2 of: -

January 23, 1981, paragraph 3.6, required in part, that the quality ,

control inspection verify that the dimensions and general workmanship

were as specified in the governing specifications and drawings. The-

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NRC inspector determined that the QC ~ inspection of this pipe support

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was not performed properly because the QC inspection report (Quality

Control Inspection Record 72930-84, completed March 27, 1985) had

documented no deficiencies. This failure to follow a-QC inspection

procedure is -an apparent violation (50-313/8602-01). Based upon.a

licensee engineering evaluation, the deficiencies noted for this' pipe

support did not impact the operability of the EFW system.

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b. The NRC inspectors observed concrete expansion anchor installation

l activities for the EFW System Design Change Package 86-1005 to verify

the adequacy of in'-process quality control . Based upon the observed

problems listed'below, the NRC inspectors concluded .that craft person- '

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nel were either inadequately trained, had inadequate guidance to

perform the task' assigned, or both.

. The guidance provided on how deep to drill the holes for the

Phillips Wedge Anchors (PWAs) for support 1-MS-118-H11 was not

based on criteria in the applicable specification (C-2408).

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. The epidance provided for placing grout under the base plate of

the kickcr to support 1-HS-5-H1 did not include:

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The requirement to repair two unused anchor bolt holes ,

beneath the base plate before placing grout on ~ top of them;

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The specifications regarding the mixing of "Bonderete-

Acrylic' Adhesive" with grout.

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The importance of beveling the grout from the bottom of the

baseplate instead of from the top.

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The proper technique for packing the grout beneath the base

i pl ate.

. The guidance provided for torquing the PWAs for support

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1-MS-118-H11 was in error (160 ft-lbs instead of.85 ft-lbs).

Subsequent guidance on how ~to correct this (loosen and retorque

i at the correct value) was also in error. The licensee issued

Non-Conformance Report 86-005-1 after this determination,

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redrilled the holes, and installed the next-larger size PWAs at.

the proper torque. , .

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These activities are governed by the'f'ollowing ' licensee Technical

r Specifications:

APL-C-2406 " Technical Specification for Forming, Placing,

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Finishing, and Curing'of Concrete," approved June 27, 1980.-

i _. . APL-C-2408 " Technical Specification for Installation of Seismic

Category I and Non-Category 'I Concrete Expansion Type Shell Wedge

or Stud Anchors Type 10 Grouted' Anchors, and Undercut Anchors,"

Revision'3 of August 14, 1984.

The NRC inspector found that these specifications lacked guidance on

F the following points:

L .. C-2406 provides no description of. the acceptable techniques for

placing grout beneath a pipe support base plate. Additionally,

concerning the repair of unused anchor bolt holes which are less

than the minimum spacing from adjacent anchor bolts, it is unclear

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how long the repair must be allowed to set before torquing the

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anchor bolts.

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. C-2408 provides no criteria for determining the acceptability of

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concrete expansion anchors that are not normal to 1.he base plate

resulting in the nut not seating flush to the washer. The NRC *

inspector noted numerous examples of this in the EFW system pipe

L supports. Some examples were: -

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The adequacy of seismic pipe supports which use concrete expansion

anchor is dependent upon the quality of the work performed by the

craft persons. The NRC inspectors questioned whether an' adequate

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level of quality is being achieved when it appears that the craft

persons are given inadequate guidance. This concern over the control

of seismic pipe support installation will remain open pending further

review. (0 pen Item 50-313/8602-02).

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8. Followup on Three Mile Island Action Plan Requirements (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector is reviewing, on a continuing basis, the licensee's

actions in response to the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Generic Letter 82-33. The inspector's review of certain of the licensee's actions in

this regard is summarized below. The numbering system and short titles

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correspond to those used in NUREG-0737.

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. II.B.1 Reactor Coolant System Vents (Unit 2)

NRC Inspection Report 50-368/81-16 discussed the installation of the

remotely operated reactor coolant ' system (RCS) vent valves. .In

accordance with its commitment to the NRC, the licensee is currently.

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operating the system with the' key operated powerf switches in the.

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control room in the "on" position. This makes solenoid valve position

indication in the control room operable. The NRC inspector reviewed

the' emergency operating-procedure (EOP) and noted that the vents are

. addressed as -appropriate and that they are procedurally used only as a -

backup to the ECCS vent in'the E0P. The NRC inspector noted that

operability testing of the RCS vent valves is ~ performed every 18 months -

, as required by the Technic:tl- Specifications. (Procedure 2305.06,-

Supplement 3)

. _I_I.B.1'RCS Vents (Unit 1)

,

The NRC .inspec" tor reviewed' design change package DCP80-1004 which was

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used to control the installation of remotely operated vents on the reac-

! tor vessel head, the RCS hot legs, and the pressurizer. This installa- 4

tion was completed and tested in accordance with Procedure 1407.10 in

March 1983. As in Unit.2,gthe licensee is operating this sys. tem with

power available to the solenoid valve handswitches in order to provide

continuous valve position indication in the control room. The NRC

inspector noted that the RCS vents are addressed in the E0P as'appro- -

priate. Testing in accordance with Technical Specification Table 4.1-2 -

is performed using Attachment G of Procedure 1102.02.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Condensate Storage Tank and Tie-Ins (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector observed portions of the excavation for the foundation

j and tie-ins for the proposed seismic condensate storage tank (CST) on

January 14, 16, 17, and 31, 1986. The excavation is the first construction

phase of the CST project. The N(C inspector _ reviewed Design Change Package

(DCP) 82-2086. This DCP covers the foundation, valve' pits, pipe trenches,

pier. support columns, and tornad) missile protection walls for the CST.

Review of the DCP determined the following had been included and was

adequately. covered in the DCP:

a. No special or unusual construction practices are required for this CST.

b. Designs were for seismic Category I structures 'and analyzed for this

l design criteria. The NRC inspector has not completed a detailed

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review of the calculations for all loads discussed in the DCP.

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c. Applicable codes and standards were identified.

d. QA requirements are to be met in accordance with the NUTECH Quality .

Assurance Manual . The latest revision or this Manual is specified.

e. Construction records are specified in the appropriate specifications.

f. The 19 controlled design documents for ANO (civil portion only) are

listed.

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The.NRC inspectors will make observations of the construction . work .in -X '

progress during-its entirety. These observations will include removal tof"

earth and sand from the excavation',! placement of backfill and measurements-' '

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of- backfill ~ density, ' placement of- reinforcement bars, placement of concrete, 'w

forms, placement and sampling of: concrete during scheduled pours, and y, -

reviews _of -records, data, and test results.

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No violations or deviations were identified. ,

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10. Exit' Interview y

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Th'e NRC inspectors met with.Mr. 'J...M. Lesine (ANO General Manager):'and .

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Other members of the APAL staff at' the ~end of this inspection. At this- ,

meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the

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