IR 05000266/2024011

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Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000266/2024011 and 05000301/2024011
ML24256A032
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/18/2024
From: April Nguyen
NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To: Durbin M
Point Beach
References
EPID I-2024-011-0038 IR 2024011
Download: ML24256A032 (1)


Text

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2024011 AND 05000301/2024011

Dear Michael Durbin:

On September 10, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at Point Beach and discussed the results of this inspection with Kim Locke, Principal Engineering Analyst. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight process can continue to be implemented.

The team also evaluated the stations effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach.September 18, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, April M. Nguyen, Team Leader Palisades Restart Team Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000266 and 05000301

License Numbers: DPR-24 and DPR-27

Report Numbers: 05000266/2024011 and 05000301/2024011

Enterprise Identifier: I-2024-011-0038

Licensee: Nextera Energy

Facility: Point Beach

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Inspection Dates: July 15, 2024, to September 10, 2024

Inspectors: M. Garza, Acting Team Lead J. Masse, Resident Inspector R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer A. Price, Resident Inspector

Approved By: April M. Nguyen, Team Leader Palisades Restart Team Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Point Beach, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Program Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.1] - 71152B Systems FIN 05000266,05000301/2024011-01 Resources Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to follow the Corrective Action Program procedure, PI-AA-101-100, Condition Reporting, to correct a procedural deficiency on Environmental Qualification (EQ) engineering change reviews.

Specifically, corrective actions to update the EQ program procedure, ER-AA-112, to include a detailed standard for more comprehensive EQ engineering change reviews, and to brief the engineering staff on the issue, were not initiated per the corrective action program procedure.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)

(1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
  • Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a 5-year review Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS). The corrective actions for the following non-cited violations were evaluated as part of the assessment: NCV 2022003-01, NCV 2022011-01, NCV 2022404-06, NCV 2023010-03, NCV 2023401-01, and NCV 2023404-02
  • Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
  • Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
  • Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 71152B Corrective Action Program

Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensees implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.

Effectiveness of Problem Identification:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and was appropriately entering these issues into the CAP. The team determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP in a timely manner and with adequate information.

The team noted that issues were being identified by all levels of the organization and with varying degrees of safety significance. Some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, and they were subsequently entered into the CAP for resolution. The licensee also utilized a number of CAP support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit processes and the Operating Experience (OE) Program. Any identified deficiencies or improvement opportunities were entered into the CAP for resolution.

The team performed a 5-year review of the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS). As part of this review, the team reviewed plant health reports, selected corrective action and condition evaluation documents, and interviewed the system engineer. The team also performed a system walkdown to assess the material condition of system piping, selected components, and surrounding areas. The team concluded that, in general, deficiencies and concerns were identified and entered into the CAP at a low threshold.

Corrective actions appeared to be adequate and timely, commensurate with their safety significance.

The team determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues of significance in problem identification.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. The issue screening team and the management review committee meetings were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing issues and prioritizing actions. In addition, the team observed a healthy dialogue between the members of these committees and the members challenged each other when dispositioning issues.

The inspectors also did a selective review of issues identified by the NRC either documented as observations, or for which findings or other enforcement was issued. These issues were properly documented and screened in the CAP. In general, the licensee thoroughly evaluated issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of condition evaluations commensurate with their safety, security, and radiological significance in accordance with their CAP procedure.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems requiring the performance of evaluations were resolved in accordance with CAP requirements. The team sampled assignments associated with violations and issues that were previously identified by the NRC. The team determined that the corrective actions sampled were generally effective and timely.

During their inspection, the team identified two issues related to implementation of corrective actions that needed to be dispositioned in the significance determination program because they potentially constituted more-than-minor safety significance. The evaluation of these issues are described in more detail in the section below.

Assessment 71152B Use of Operating Experience

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensees performance in the use of operating experience (OE) was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC OE information for applicability to the station. When applicable, condition reports were written, and actions were developed and implemented to prevent similar issues from occurring. Overall, OE lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues of significance with the use of operating experience.

Assessment 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensees performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and Quality Assurance audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The team did not identify any issues of significance in the area of self-assessments and audits.

During the inspection, the team identified one issue related to corrective actions as a result of a self-assessment identified deficiency that that needed to be dispositioned in the significance determination program. The evaluation of this issue is described in more detail in the section below.

Assessment 71152B Safety Conscious Work Environment

Based on a review of documents and interviews with licensee staff, the team did not identify any impediment to the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment. The team reviewed the results from recent safety culture self-assessments and had a discussion with the site Employee Concerns Program (ECP) Coordinator. The team also conducted one-on-one interviews with 25 licensee staff concerning the effectiveness of the CAP, the ability to raise issues, and the freedom from potential retaliation for raising issues. In general, the licensees staff was aware of and familiar with the CAP and other processes, such as the ECP, to raise nuclear safety concerns. Licensee staff indicated they could raise safety concerns without a fear of retaliation. Through the interviews and document reviews, the team did not identify, nor were any examples provided, of retaliation for raising nuclear safety concerns. The staff interviewed believed that operational issues and issues with high safety significance were being appropriately addressed in a timely manner. The team did not identify any issues of significance in the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment.

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Program Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.1] - 71152B Systems FIN 05000266,05000301/2024011-01 Resources Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to follow the Corrective Action Program procedure, PI-AA-101-100, Condition Reporting, to correct a procedural deficiency on Environmental Qualification (EQ) engineering change reviews.

Specifically, corrective actions to update the EQ program procedure, ER-AA-112, to include a detailed standard for more comprehensive EQ engineering change reviews, and to brief the engineering staff on the issue, were not initiated per the corrective action program procedure.

Description:

During a review of the Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program for subsequent license renewal in 2022, the licensee identified that their EQ testing and analyses for the safety-related instrument cables to/from five EQ transmitters did not bound the postulated high energy line break conditions in all areas where these cables were routed. The licensee took immediate and long-term corrective actions to address the specific cabling issues.

However, during their evaluation of the deficiency, the licensee Organizational Effectiveness Investigation (OR) identified that the current EQ engineering change review process was too narrow and only focused on components installed in their specific locations. Specifically, licensee procedure, ER-AA-112, Environmental Qualification Program, did not provide a detailed standard for EQ engineering change reviews to consider respective power, control, or instrument cables potentially impacted by the change.

Per procedure PI-AA-101-100, Condition Reporting, Attachment 4, Guidance on the Classification of Condition Reports, a gap in program design or implementation of a 10 CFR 50 Appendix B or other regulatory required program, is a condition adverse to quality and is required to be corrected. To correct this specific procedural gap, which was a condition adverse to quality, the licensee prescribed corrective actions (CAs) to review the OR investigation as a case study with the fleet EQ engineering group and to update the program procedure, ER-AA-112, to include a detailed standard for more comprehensive EQ engineering change reviews. The licensees Management Review Committee, whose primary function was to provide oversight of corrective action program implementation, which included the review of new corrective actions, approved the OR and the CAs on February 15, 2023. However, the two prescribed CAs were not initiated in the Corrective Action Program and, as such, no actions were implemented to correct the procedure deficiency or to share the case study until the inspectors inquired about the status of these items on August 6, 2024.

Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated a condition report to correct the procedure deficiency, share learnings in a case study, and to conduct an extent of condition review for proper initiation of corrective actions.

Corrective Action References: AR 2492210

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to follow the Condition Reporting procedure, PI-AA-101-100, to correct a condition adverse to quality related to safety-related EQ engineering change reviews.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the lack of a detailed standard for safety-related EQ engineering change reviews to consider respective power, control, or instrument cables of EQ components for potential impacts from engineering changes could result in safety-related cables not being able to withstand postulated environmental conditions along their routing.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened to Green because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.

Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that procedure, ER-AA-112, Environmental Qualification Program, for EQ engineering change reviews was adequate to support nuclear safety since it lacked a detailed standard for safety-related EQ engineering change reviews to consider respective power, control, or instrument cables of EQ components for potential impact from engineering changes, and this could result in safety-related cables not being able to withstand postulated environmental conditions along their routing.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Minor Performance Deficiency 71152B Work Request Was Not Performed

Minor Performance Deficiency: On November 30, 2022, emergency diesel generator (EDG)

G-04 experienced a lock-out while in standby and was declared inoperable. The cause of the lock-out was due to spurious actuation of a differential current relay. The relay was replaced with a spare, and the old relay was sent to the vendor for analysis. The analysis found no anomalies and concluded that the actuation was an isolated incident. After reviewing the issue, the station generated work requests (WRs) to replace the differential current relays on both the G-03 and G-04 EDGs with newly manufactured relays. These work requests were generated as a conservative enhancement. They were not generated to correct a condition adverse to quality nor were the work requests necessary for EDG reliability. Specifically, the installed differential current relays at the time of the failure, along with the newly installed spare relay, were not at the end of their vendor recommended life; however, the corrective action was generated to ensure that aging issues would not be a concern. The inspectors reviewed the WRs associated with the replacement of these relays and noted that the WRs were marked completed. However, the workers only validated the date the relays were last replaced but did not replace them. The G-01 and G-02 EDGs do not have these relays installed as a part of their design and did not require a similar relay replacement.

Licensee procedure MA-AA-201, Minor Maintenance Process, section 4.0, step 7.A, states in part, performance of work will be in accordance with the Minor Work Request.

WR 94248769 states a replacement of the 87/G-04 relay should be performed with a new more recently manufactured relay to prevent any potential issues related to aging of the relay. WR 94248770 states a replacement of the 87/G-03 relay should be performed with a new more recently manufactured relay. Neither the 87/G-04 nor the 87/G-03 relays were replaced, and the inspectors determined that the failure to follow the WR instructions was a performance deficiency. There were no violations of regulatory requirements associated with this issue. The licensee wrote AR 2491823 to generate new work requests to replace the relays.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors answered no to all of the more-than-minor questions in IMC 0612 Appendix B.

Minor Performance Deficiency 71152B Corrective Actions Did Not Address Drivers Found

Minor Performance Deficiency: In August 2022, the licensee performed an assessment of a number of catastrophic large electric motor failures across the NextEra fleet, including failure of the steam generator feed pump motor at Point Beach. The motor failure at Point Beach caused a plant scram and subsequently reduced power operations for about a week. The self-assessment identified two drivers (deficiencies) for the gap: 1. vendor quality on motor refurbishment/repairs, and 2. station monitoring of motor parameters such as temperature and insulation resistance.

The licensee assigned four corrective actions to address the identified deficiencies. These included establishing and validating critical characteristics for motors undergoing refurbishment or repair, reviewing the procedure for motor parameter trending, reviewing preventive maintenance strategies to increase motor reliability, and conducting electrical maintenance refresher training focusing on performance of insulation resistance testing and polarization index acceptance criteria. However, these four corrective actions created do not specifically address the deficiencies identified in the self-assessment as required per licensee procedure PI-AA-101-1001, Level 1 Core Business Assessments, step 4.2.I, which states include any actions to address drivers and close gaps as applicable. The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program as AR 2492210, and plans to reassign more specific and deliverable actions to address the drivers of the gap.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors answered no to all of the more-than-minor questions in IMC 0612 Appendix B.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On September 10, 2024, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Kim Locke, Principal Engineering Analyst.
  • On August 8, 2024, the inspectors presented the preliminary biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Michael Durbin, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71152B Corrective Action Security CDAS Outside the PA Not Meeting E5 Controls 06/04/2024

Documents 2038281 Assumption For Consideration to be Added to 09/26/2022

Calc 2014-0007

299091 WO 40583984 Did Not Address Eccentric Pulley 01/24/2019

2334120 W-13B1 Failed to Auto Start 11/03/2019

2357821 Westinghouse NSAL-20-1 OE Evaluation 06/24/2020

2375662 Glycol Leak on HX-38B, CR AC Unit, Piping 11/15/2020

2385966 WEC Tech Bulletin TB-19-5 Thermal Shield Bolt OE, 03/04/2021

Revision 1

2386179 ANI Information Bulletin 11-01 (Rev.1) 03/8/2021

2393356 Discrepancy Between 0-SOP-VNCR-002 and Posted 05/15/2021

Information

2418343 Phone Issues Identified with Quarterly Communications Test02/09/2022

20177 1C-76 RCP Vibration Display is Erratic 03/01/2022

20483 W-14B Backdraft Damper VNCR-04856B Found Open 03/03/2022

23644 Update Site Response to NRC Bulletin 2011-01 04/04/2022

24060 NRC Identified: Alpha Characterization 04/07/2022

27224 Satellite Phones Are Not Functioning 05/10/2022

27363 Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel 1Q22 05/09/2022

28406 Typo Found on Paperwork 05/25/2022

29445 2022 TFP Inspection EC 292093 Did Not Evaluate Cable 06/08/2022

Routing

2431209 Boric Acid Residue at Packing on 2SI-870A 07/03/2022

2432355 Rework Required on Monthly Communications Drill 07/20/2022

2432448 1AF-4000, 1P-29 AFP DISCH SG B INLET MOV 07/21/2022

Fails to Open

2432448 Apparent Cause Evaluation for AFP Discharge SG B Inlet 07/21/2022

MOV Fails to Open

2433749 G-04 Crankcase Oil Level Low 08/07/2022

2435191 2022 PBN PI&R - WO Associated with OE Action Not 08/25/2022

Scheduled

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2435364 Tech Spec Station Battery Surveillance 08/29/2022

2435397 1W-3B CRDM Shroud Fan Tripped Off, Motor Overload Light 08/29/2022

Lit

2436859 Security Timeline Administrative Error 09/15/2022

2437178 Drawing Error Identified 09/19/2022

2437479 1P-10A RHR Pump P1H Vibration Point was Elevated 09/22/2022

2438281 2023 CETI: 1SI-897A Weak Link Analysis and Part 21 01/26/2023

Review

2439267 Inadequate Y System Maintenance Rule Performance 10/12/2022

Criteria

2439315 NA Finding - Physical Plant Changes Made Not Per CMP 10/12/2022

2439667 2022 PBN Cyber - E5 Controls for Warehouse 6 10/17/2022

2439668 2022 PBN Cyber NRC Question CDA Status of Switchstack6 10/17/2022

UPS

2439881 2022 PBN Cyber Warehouse Xray Mitigations Not 10/19/2022

Implemented

2440339 Unexplained Level Rise in Unit 1 PRT 10/26/2022

2440412 2022 UHS Observation 10/26/2022

2441138 T3 - NSCMP Meeting Minutes 11/02/2022

2441157 Notebook Entry Does Not Meet OM 3.13 Requirement 11/04/2022

2441203 SEL (4-22-06) Equipment Condition Affecting CCTV 11/06/2022

2441409 South Control Room Door-61 Not Latching Properly 11/08/2022

2441987 Degraded Inboard Fan Bearing 11/16/2022

2442066 New Radios Present Multiple Challenges 11/18/2022

2442792 Received Unexpected C02E 1-10 G-04 Diesel Trip or 11/30/2022

Lockout

2443786 SAMG SAG-7 Review Documentation Missing 12/13/2022

2444014 CR Backup URI Laptop Not Functioning 12/15/2022

2444039 HELB Reanalysis Impacts on EQ Cables (EQCK Open 12/15/2022

Items)

2444690 OE: Information Notice 2022-02: Operating Experience 12/27/2022

Related

2445800 2023 CETI - Document Analysis for IN 2016-06 01/12/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2446862 2023 CETI - DBD-02 Lacks Clarity on CCW License Basis 01/26/2023

2446907 2023 CETI - FO-3983A Identified Not Included in IST 01/26/2023

Program

2447003 CETI 2023: OM 4.3.8 Time Critical Action 12 Methodology 01/27/2023

2448032 2023 - 2024 CNRB North Action Items 02/09/2023

2449366 CR 2449366 Level 3 PCE 02/24/2024

2449833 Generate GDRs for Off Color Engineering Indicators 03/01/2023

2450312 T1 - PBN NSCMP Meeting Minutes 02/24/2023

2450559 2P-1B No. 2 Seal Leakage RCDT Level Increase 03/09/2023

2450753 AOP-25 Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip Unit 2 03/11/2023

2451012 2PIPE CH 0601R-01, RMI Insulation End Caps Loose 03/13/2023

245123 OE: NRC Information Notice 2023-01 03/15/2023

2454009 Unit 2 Feedwater Flow Oscillations 04/10/2023

2454872 U2 B MRFV Not Controlling as Expected 04/18/2023

2455516 Very Unsafe Condition - Safety Concern 04/24/2023

2455535 RMS Trailer Smoke Pit Butt Canister Potential Combustion 04/24/2023

2459924 SW-776 Packing Leak and Corrosion 06/13/2023

2460008 2RH-626 Flow Control Valve Did Not Function as Expected 06/14/2023

2460182 Cyber: IDS Inspection Results Gap 06/15/2023

2461016 U2 RCS IN Failed Fuel Action Level 1 06/26/2023

2461971 Fire Inspection Found E-Lights Not on Batt Power 07/10/2023

2462588 CRs Not Yet Screened by MRC 07/18/2023

2463303 MDAFW Discharge Piping Vibration Assessment 07/27/2023

2464138 AOP-12A Current Revision is Technically Incorrect 08/08/2023

2465051 Very Warm Conditions in EOF Front Foyer and 08/21/2023

IT Equipment Rm

2465214 Reduction of Effectiveness Identified in EC 08/23/2023

2465342 WANO Peer Review in Contrast Statements - FP 08/23/2023

2466345 Procedure Step Not Written to Standard 09/06/2023

2467670 Seal Leakage on P-12A, SFP Pump 09/22/2023

2469130 1RH-720, BA Active Leak During 1R41 As-Found 10/10/2023

2469361 Unexpected G-05 Alarm 10/12/2023

2469748 NEO SCRFS Not Allowed on PMCRs for Some Reason 10/16/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2469753 1CC-753 Valve Liner is Worn 10/16/2023

2470427 1RH-706A Pressure Seal Leak 10/23/2023

2470515 MILSTONE OE - PTN AR2470431 - 68% RCP Seal Face 10/24/2023

Mismachined

2470612 Non-Active Leak with Residue Identified on 1CC-764A 10/25/2023

2470891 T2 PBN NSCMP Meeting Minutes 10/06/2023

2471266 Nonconformance with IST PMT Criteria 10/31/2023

2471727 ISI Inspection Potential Violation App B Criterion V 11/06/2023

2471776 Fire Gear Missing from Storage Location 11/07/2023

2473217 CA Untimely Due to Inappropriate Closure of PMCR 11/28/2023

2473454 AOP-31 Cart Electrical Connection Not Reading Properly 12/01/2023

2475136 KINETRICS (AES) Notification of Potential Part 21 Concern12/21/2023

2475233 1HX-90 Has a Steam Leak 12/22/2023

2475435 T3 PBN NSCMP Meeting Minutes 11/10/2023

2475463 Missing Spare Extinguisher 12/28/2023

2476782 IR Zones Require Maintenance 01/17/2024

2477285 NRC FTS Phone Line Issues 01/23/2024

2477288 NRC Identified: 2W-1B1 ACC Fan Discharge Temperature 01/23/2024

Trend

2477787 Fleet Cyber Security Supply Chain Controls Radios 01/30/2024

2477854 Temperatures in EOF IT Equipment Room Very Warm 01/31/2024

2478169 Non-DEP ERO Notification Would Have Been Late 02/02/2024

2478192 Security Officer Not in Assigned Location Per Procedure 02/02/2024

2478731 PS-6352C Failed to Auto Start K-4C, G03 Diesel Air Comp 02/08/2024

2478838 Calculations Impacted by Vendor Software Defect 02/06/2024

2479238 1D-205 Cell 57 Below Acceptance Criteria 02/15/2024

2480755 Identified a Leak 03/07/2024

2480769 RHR Pump Test Line Flow Indicator Transmitter Leakage 03/07/2024

2481393 Station Battery Pilot Cell Thermometers 03/14/2024

2481755 EQ Field Verification Identified Equipment as Non-EQ 03/19/2024

2481896 Reactor Coolant Tavg Deviation Alarm During 2ICP 03/20/2024

2.001WH

2482296 EQ Program Data Issues at PBN, SBK, and PSL. 03/25/2024

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2482467 Opening Radioactive Material Outside the RCA 03/27/2024

2483050 New NBFD31S Reactor Trip Relay Failed Initial Inspection 04/02/2024

2483905 T1 PBN NSCMP Meeting Minutes 02/29/2024

2484145 TSC/OSC Temp Running High During Normal Ops 04/15/2024

2484197 IA-3051B Relief Valve Replacement Capacity Difference 04/16/2024

2484349 U1 Rod Speed Control Indicating 1.2 Deg F Colder than 04/17/2024

Process

2484694 Approved Design did not Consider Service Level 1 Coatings 04/22/2024

2484868 Security Drills and Exercised Procedure Violation 04/24/2024

2485871 EC 299273 and EC 299358 Require Configurations to be 05/08/2024

Gathered

2485911 X-45 in Need of Repair 05/08/2024

2487093 PB Noncompliance with Operability Determination Procedure 05/24/2024

2487235 Trend Review - 50.59 and Operability Requirement 05/28/2024

2487796 SEL 2-24-11 Environmental Conditions Affecting PIDS 06/05/2024

2488820 Charging Pump Oil 06/18/2024

2490426 Boric Acid Found During Inspection 07/11/2024

2490427 Boric Acid Found During Inspection 07/11/2024

2490429 Boric Acid Found During Inspection 07/11/2024

2490430 Boric Acid Found During Inspection 07/11/2024

2490431 Boric Acid Found During Inspection 07/11/2024

2490432 Boric Acid Found During Inspection 07/11/2024

2490433 Boric Acid Found During Inspection 07/11/2024

2490484 Dry Boric Acid Leak on 1HX-3A in Contact with Bolting 07/11/2024

2491194 Monitor Tank Discharges Challenged by RE-218 Capability 07/23/2024

Corrective Action 2490904 2024 PI&R - Latch on VNCR Door Not Secured 07/18/2024

Documents 2490904 Latch on VNCR Door Not Secured 07/18/2024

Resulting from 2490905 2024 PI&R - Light Left Near Seismic Equipment 07/18/2024

Inspection 2490905 2024 PI&R - Light Left Near Seismic Equipment 07/18/2024

2491821 Replace 87/G-04 Relay Due to Age (ER Checklist Action) 07/31/2024

2491822 Replace 87/G-03 Relay Due to Age (ER Checklist Action) 07/31/2024

2491823 2024 PI&R - WRs Closed Without Performing Work 07/31/2024

2491823 2024 PI&R - WRs Closed Without Performing Work 07/31/2024

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2492210 2024 PI&R - OR Issue Investigation Actions Not Initiated 08/06/2024

Engineering EC-297807 Reroute U2 PORV/Block Valve Cables for Construction 0

Changes Truss EC 292093 Supplementary Information

Miscellaneous Fleet Maintenance Rule Scoping Document - System Y (120) 1

Calc 2014-0007 Allowable Flood Levels 5

Procedures Section 10 CFR 73.55 G.6.I, Errors on Key/Core Practices 05/24/2023

EOP-1.3 Unit 1 Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head 61

Injection

EOP-1.4 Unit 1 Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - High Head 35

Injection

ER-AA-112 Environmental Qualification Program 8

MA-AA-201 Minor Maintenance Process 16

PI-AA104-10000 Condition Reporting 44

Self-Assessments 2432530 L1A RP 1st/2nd Quarter Trend Assessment 07/21/2022

2433588 Operations PU&A Performance 08/04/2022

2433613 Security Cyber Security Assessment 08/18/2022

2435548 Assessment of Recent NEE Fleet Motor Failures 08/31/2022

2437729 LOC EP Training Requirements 09/23/2022

2438367 L1A HRA Monitoring Plan Assessment 09/30/2022

2445989 EP Benchmarking - NRC Notifications 01/16/2023

2446214 L1A 4th Quarter 2022 CR Trending 01/18/2023

2452593 L1A Annual RP Program Review 03/28/2023

2454398 EP Program Assessment 2Q23 04/13/2023

2462850 L1A Leaks/BACC 07/20/2023

2468056 Vehicle Search and Access Control Processes 09/29/2023

2469032 OPs 3Q2023 Trend Report 10/09/2023

2470395 L1A GDAR Risk Mitigating Actions Assess Observations 10/23/2023

2474313 L1A AOV Program 12/12/2023

2474462 NRC Inspection Prep IP 71130.01, Access - IP 71130.08 12/13/2023

FFD

2475838 L1A 4Q23 CR Trend Review for PB Maintenance 01/04/2024

2479547 L1A Fire Brigade Leaders are not Critical of Fire Brigade02/20/2024

2485837 NEE Nuclear Fleet Benchmarking for NDE/ISI/FAC 05/07/2024

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

JNA 24-002 Fleet Engineering Audit 05/08/2024

PBN 22-003 Nuclear Assurance Audit - Emergency Planning 11/30/2022

PBN 23-001 Security 05/09/2023

Work Orders 40293986 1SAF-04067 - Contactor & Thermal Overload Testing 02/14/2014

40647601-05 W-014A PDM Engineering Review of Vibe Data 07/02/2020

40717180-01 18 Month Filter Testing 11/17/2021

40765002-01 OE IN 2007-21 Identity RMI and Inspect Piping for Wear (U2)03/29/2023

40767857-07 1PPG AC 0152N-11/Replace Pipe 10/18/2023

40803149-01 18 Month Filter Testing 07/27/2023

40830518-02 1P-53 / NDE (PT) Welds Discharge Throttle Valve Drains 10/27/2023

40850121-01 NDE Inspect SW Piping After Insulation Removal 07/17/2023

40851738-07 W-13B1 Shaft Repair 07/31/2024

40879155-01 TS-9, Control Room H/V System Checks 02/21/2024

40907176-01 TS-9, Control Room H/V System Checks 05/21/2024

256065 F$IR Zones Require Maintenance 01/17/2024

257711 RCP Seal Injection Filter DPI Controller - Leak 03/07/2024

O-PC-081.4 To Perform the Periodic Verification of OM 4.3.8 Control of 02/09/2024

Time Critical and Time Sensitive Operator Actions

16