Letter Sequence Other |
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MONTHYEARML20058M4021993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards TIA,93TIA006,interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058L6931993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards TIA 93TIA006,interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058L0091993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards NRR 931102 Response to Region IV 930413 Request for Interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Identified During Performance of Surveillance Testing Project stage: Other ML20058K9811993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards NRR 931102 Response to Region IV Request for Interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Identified During Performance of Surveillance Testing for Info Project stage: Other ML20058K6001993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia,Interpretation of Reporting Requirements, 93TIA006 Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058K5961993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia,Interpretation of Reporting Requirements - 93TIA006,re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058K5801993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia,Interpretation of Reporting Requirements - 93TIA006,re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058K5611993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia:Interpretation of Reporting Requirements, 93TIA006.Guidance Provided in Response to Region 5 Request for Interpretation of Reporting Requirements for safety- Related Components Project stage: Other 1993-12-08
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEAR05000482/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl 05000482/LER-1994-014, Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl ML20217F7481999-10-14014 October 1999 Informs That Based on Approval of Core Assessment Damage Guidance in WCAP-14696,rev 1 for Westinghouse Nuclear Power Plants,Licensee May Use WCAP-14696,rev 1 at Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20217F8701999-10-13013 October 1999 Provides Summary of Meeting on 991007 with Representatives of Wolf Creek Nuclear Station in Burlington,Kansas Re Status of Licensee Radiation Protection Program.List of Meeting Attendees & Licensee Presentation Encl ML20217C1721999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-09 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted.Purpose of Insp to Perform Routine Operational Status Insp of Emergency Preparedness Program & to Resolve Questions Re Revised Emergency Plan ML20217A4881999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Plant Data Point Library,Iaw 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a.ERDS Point Affected Is RDS0001 ML20216H9291999-09-29029 September 1999 Informs That Licensee Responses to GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals Acceptable & Did Not Identify Any New Concerns with Condition of SG Intervals at Plant ML20212G1681999-09-24024 September 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Status of Licensed Individual at Plant,Per 10CFR50.74.RL Acree Holds License OP-42654 at Plant,But Has Been Permanently Reassigned from Position for Which Plant Has Certified Need for RO License ML20216F9591999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Withdrawal of Amend Request Re Ultimate Heat Sink Temp for Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20212G5641999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-13 on 990725-0904.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations 05000482/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I1999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I 05000482/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util1999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util ML20212D9381999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of WCGS on 990818.Areas of EP & Engineering Warranted Increase in NRC Action.Nrc Plan to Conduct Add Insp Beyond Core Insp Program Over Next 7 Months to Address Listed Questions 05000482/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20212C9211999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operating Licensing Examination Data, in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03 ML20216F1641999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-12 on 990816-20.No Violation Noted.Determined That Solid Radwaste Mgt & Radioactive Matls Transportation Programs Were Properly Implemented 05000482/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER ML20212A5651999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of & Encl Objectives for Wolf Creek Generating Station 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 991117.Determined Exercise Objectives Appropriate to Meet EP Requirements 05000482/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER1999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER ML20211M7151999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Wolf Creek Generating Station Data Point Library.Emergency Response Data Sys Points Affected Are EJL0007 & EJL0008 ML20211N0081999-09-0202 September 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Has Reviewed Submittals & Concluded Util Adequately Addressed Actions Requested in GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power- Operated Gate Valves ML20211K8301999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards marked-up TS Page Deleting Inequality Signs from Trip Setpoints in SR 3.3.5.3 & Reflecting Info on Calibr Tolerance Band,Per 990708 Application to Amend License NPF-42 ML20211K1941999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 31 to WCGS Physical Security Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20211H1491999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-16 on 990809-13.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Low as Is Reasonably Achievable Program,Training Program for Contract Radiation Protection Personnel & Radiation Protection QA Program ML20211A8581999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-08 on 990316-0724.One Violation Being Treated as Noncited Violation ML20211G2201999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Exam Rept 50-482/99-301 on 990726-29.Exam Evaluated Six Applicants for SO Licenses & Three Applicants for RO Licenses ML20210U0991999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-11 on 990712-16.No Violations Noted.Insp Was to Review Radiological Environ Monitoring Program ML20210U9751999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That Licensee Identified That Answer Key for One Question on 990720 Written Exam & Event Classification for on Job Performance Measure Required Mod.Description & Justification for Proposed Mod,Including Technical Ref,Encl ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210R5621999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station,Per TS 6.9.1.8 & GL 97-02.Revised Repts for Apr,May & June 1999,correcting Number of Hours Reactor Critical,Encl ML20210P7491999-08-0909 August 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Which Transmitted Wolf Creek Radiological Emergency Response Plan 06-002,Rev 0,under Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section V ML20210N0061999-08-0303 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990401 RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Motor-Operated Gate Valves ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML20210H2551999-07-29029 July 1999 Provides 180-day Response to NRC Request for Info Re GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20210J1371999-07-29029 July 1999 Requests NRC Approval of Methodology for Determining RCS Pressure & Temp & Overpressure Mitigation Sys PORV Limits. Attachment I Provides Proposed Changes to Improved TS ML20210F5931999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data Rept for Wcnoc,Per 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Period of 990101- 0630 ML20210F5881999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operator Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, ML20210B8191999-07-20020 July 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Which Transmitted Wolf Creek EP Implementing Procedure 06-005,Rev 1.Implementation of Changes Will Be Subj to Insp to Confirm That Changes Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of EP ML20209H5411999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-07 on 990614-18.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Radiation Program During Normal Operating Conditions ML20209H0441999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990326 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs. Summary of Util Commitments Provided in Attachment 2 ML20209H0751999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station,Per TS 6.9.1.8 & GL 97-02.Max Dependable Capacity Has Been Updated from 1163 to 1170,as Determined by Calculations Based on Capacity Test Results of July 1998 ML20209G9871999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs of Changes Affecting Wolf Creek Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Encl Provides Description of Changes & Justification for Changes ML20209E3581999-07-12012 July 1999 Discusses Util 980925 Response to GL 92-01,Rev 1,Suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity, Issued on 950519 to Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20209E0611999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Addl Pages to Rev 12 of USAR & Commitment Changes, Inadvertently Omitted from 990311 Submittal ML20196K8231999-07-0606 July 1999 Submits Kansas Electric Power Cooperative,Inc Ltr Pursuant to Commission Direction in Memo & Order CLI-99-19.Addresses Disposition of Existing Antitrust Conditions Attached to License for Wolf Creek Unit 1 Re Proposed License Transfer ML20209C6031999-07-0606 July 1999 Provides Applicants View as Result of 990618 Memo & Order Directing Parties to Address Proper Disposition of Existing Antitrust License Condition Attached to OL for Facility Due to Planned Changes in Ownership of Facility.With Svc List ML20196K0501999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-06 on 990502-0612.Three Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violations, Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20209B7131999-07-0101 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC Request for Info Re GL 98-01, Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Response on Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Was Requested by 990701.Disclosure Encl ML20209A7461999-06-29029 June 1999 Informs of Changes in Project Mgt Staff Assigned to Wcgs. Effective 990628,J Donohew Will Assume PM Responsibilities ML20209B5151999-06-29029 June 1999 Informs That Util Completed Analyses & Modifications to Address Items Discussed in GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions 1999-09-03
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217F7481999-10-14014 October 1999 Informs That Based on Approval of Core Assessment Damage Guidance in WCAP-14696,rev 1 for Westinghouse Nuclear Power Plants,Licensee May Use WCAP-14696,rev 1 at Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20217F8701999-10-13013 October 1999 Provides Summary of Meeting on 991007 with Representatives of Wolf Creek Nuclear Station in Burlington,Kansas Re Status of Licensee Radiation Protection Program.List of Meeting Attendees & Licensee Presentation Encl ML20217C1721999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-09 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted.Purpose of Insp to Perform Routine Operational Status Insp of Emergency Preparedness Program & to Resolve Questions Re Revised Emergency Plan ML20216H9291999-09-29029 September 1999 Informs That Licensee Responses to GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals Acceptable & Did Not Identify Any New Concerns with Condition of SG Intervals at Plant ML20216F9591999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Withdrawal of Amend Request Re Ultimate Heat Sink Temp for Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20212G5641999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-13 on 990725-0904.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20212D9381999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of WCGS on 990818.Areas of EP & Engineering Warranted Increase in NRC Action.Nrc Plan to Conduct Add Insp Beyond Core Insp Program Over Next 7 Months to Address Listed Questions ML20216F1641999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-12 on 990816-20.No Violation Noted.Determined That Solid Radwaste Mgt & Radioactive Matls Transportation Programs Were Properly Implemented ML20212A5651999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of & Encl Objectives for Wolf Creek Generating Station 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 991117.Determined Exercise Objectives Appropriate to Meet EP Requirements ML20211N0081999-09-0202 September 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Has Reviewed Submittals & Concluded Util Adequately Addressed Actions Requested in GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power- Operated Gate Valves ML20211H1491999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-16 on 990809-13.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Low as Is Reasonably Achievable Program,Training Program for Contract Radiation Protection Personnel & Radiation Protection QA Program ML20211A8581999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-08 on 990316-0724.One Violation Being Treated as Noncited Violation ML20211G2201999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Exam Rept 50-482/99-301 on 990726-29.Exam Evaluated Six Applicants for SO Licenses & Three Applicants for RO Licenses ML20210U0991999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-11 on 990712-16.No Violations Noted.Insp Was to Review Radiological Environ Monitoring Program ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210P7491999-08-0909 August 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Which Transmitted Wolf Creek Radiological Emergency Response Plan 06-002,Rev 0,under Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section V ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML20210B8191999-07-20020 July 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Which Transmitted Wolf Creek EP Implementing Procedure 06-005,Rev 1.Implementation of Changes Will Be Subj to Insp to Confirm That Changes Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of EP ML20209H5411999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-07 on 990614-18.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Radiation Program During Normal Operating Conditions ML20209E3581999-07-12012 July 1999 Discusses Util 980925 Response to GL 92-01,Rev 1,Suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity, Issued on 950519 to Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20196K0501999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-06 on 990502-0612.Three Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violations, Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20209A7461999-06-29029 June 1999 Informs of Changes in Project Mgt Staff Assigned to Wcgs. Effective 990628,J Donohew Will Assume PM Responsibilities ML20195G3451999-06-0909 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Ltr Dtd 990105,which Transmitted Wolf Creek Emergency Plan Form Apf 06-002-01 Emergency Action Levels, Rev 0,dtd 990105,under Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section V.No Violations of 10CFR50.54(q) Identified During Review ML20195D5111999-06-0202 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Authorizing Inservice Inspection Program Alternative for Limited Reactor Vessel Shell Weld Exam & Relief Request from Requirements of ASME Code,Section XI for Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20207E2791999-05-25025 May 1999 Announces Corrective Action Program Insp at Wolf Creek Reactor Facility,Scheduled for 990816-20.Insp Will Evaluate Effectiveness of Activities for Identifying,Resolving & Preventing Issues That Degrade Quality of Plant Operations ML20207A8681999-05-25025 May 1999 Informs That NRC Ofc of NRR Reorganized Effective 990328. as Part of Reorganization,Division of Licensing Project Mgt Created ML20207A3491999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-03 on 990321-0501.Four NCVs Noted ML20206H3901999-05-0707 May 1999 Informs That on 990407,NRC Administered Generic Fundamentals Exam Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam.Licensee Facility Did Not Participate in Exam,However Copy of Master Exam with Answer Key Encl for Info.Without Encl ML20206H5941999-05-0505 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-04 on 990405-09.No Violations Noted.Scope of Inspection Included Review of Implementation of Licensee Inservice Insp Program for Wolf Creek Facility Refueling Outage 10 ML20206H2891999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.60, Acceptance Criteria for Fracture Prevention Measures for Lightwater Nuclear Power Reactors for Normal Operation, for Wcgs.Exemption Related to Application ML20205L8541999-04-0909 April 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-02 on 990207-0320.Five Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20205J3371999-04-0606 April 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Wolf Creek Generating Station IPEEE & 971208 Response to RAI from NRC Re Ipeee. RAI & Schedule for Response Were Discussed with T Harris on 990405 ML20205K4451999-04-0303 April 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-482/98-05 & of Need for Larger Scope of Review for Planned C/As for Violation 50-482/98-05,which Requires Extending Completion Time ML20205H7091999-04-0202 April 1999 Discusses 990325 Meeting at Plant in Burlington,Ks to Discuss Results of PPR Completed on 990211 ML20205G5851999-04-0101 April 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee 960214 Submittal of 180-day Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Plant. Response Requested within 120 Days of Receipt of Ltr ML20205C2101999-03-26026 March 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Reviewed WCNOC 960918,970317 & 980429 Responses to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design- Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs. Forwards RAI Re MOV Program Implemented at Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20204H7571999-03-23023 March 1999 Discusses WCNOC 990202 Proposed Rev to Response to GL 81-07, Control of Heavy Loads, for Wcgs.Rev Would Make Reactor Building Analyses Consistent with TS & Change Commitment Not to Allow Polar Crane Hook Over Open Rv.Revs Approved ML20205A4221999-03-19019 March 1999 Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Wolf Creek Plant Performance Review for Period 980419-990125. Historical Listing of Plant Issues & Details of NRC Insp Plan for Next 8 Months Encl ML20207L5941999-03-0404 March 1999 Informs That Staff Accepts Util 981210 Requested Approval for Use of ASME Code,Section III Code Case N-611, Use of Stress Limits as Alternative to Pressure Limits,Section III, Div 1,Subsection NC/ND-3500, for Certain Valve Components ML20207F3121999-03-0303 March 1999 Informs That Info Provided in Entitled, Addl Info Requested for Topics Discussed During Oct 14-15 Meeting, from Wcnoc,Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) ML20207F4491999-03-0303 March 1999 Forwards Signed Copy of Updated Computer Access & Operating Agreement Between NRC & Wcnoc,Per ML20207F0411999-02-26026 February 1999 Informs That KM Thomas Will Resume Project Mgt Responsibilities for Wcngs,Effective 990301 ML20206U6131999-02-0202 February 1999 Forwards Draft SER on Proposed Conversion of Current TSs for Wolf Creek Generating Station to Improved Tss.Encl Draft SER Being Provided for Review to Verify Accuracy & to Prepare Certified Improved TSs ML20202B7391999-01-26026 January 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-01 on 990111-14.No Violations Noted.Nrc Understands That During 990114 Exit Meeting,Vice President,Operations/Chief Operating Officer Stated That Util Would Revise Security Plan ML20199H4671999-01-15015 January 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/98-20 on 981115-1226.No Violations Noted.Conduct at Wolf Creek Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations & Sound Maintenance Activities ML20199B0591999-01-11011 January 1999 Forwards Y2K Readiness Audit Rept for Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station.Purpose of Audit Was to Assess Effectiveness of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp Programs for Achieving Y2K Readiness ML20199A0991998-12-29029 December 1998 Informs That on 981202,NRC Staff Completed Insp Planning Review (Ipr) of WCGS & Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Ipr.Forwards Historical Listing of Plant Issues,Referred to Plant Issues Matrix IR 05000482/19980121998-12-18018 December 1998 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-482/98-12.NRC Have Withdrawn Violation 50-482/98-12-02 for First Example Re Procedure AP 05-0001 ML20198B2701998-12-16016 December 1998 Informs That Staff Has Incorporated Rev of Bases for TS 3/4.7.1.2, Afs Into WCGS Tss,Per 981108 Request.Rev Specifies Essential SWS Requirements for turbine-driven Afs. Overleaf Pages Provided to Maintain Document Completeness ML20196K0321998-12-0808 December 1998 Informs That Staff Has Incorporated Rev of Bases for TS 3/4.4.4, Relief Valves, Requested by .Rev Clarifies Bases to Be Consistent with Amend 63 to Wolf Creek TSs .Rev Acceptable.Bases Page Encl 1999-09-29
[Table view] |
Text
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, ##fCu UNITED STATES -
/jk _ -
pg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'~ 'l REGION IV
.o 8 611 RY AN PLAZA DRIVE, SulTE 400 ;
<< [ AR LINGTON, TE XAS 760118064
i Docket: 50-482 .
License: NPF-42 .;
I Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation ATTN: Neil S. Carns, President and !
Chief Executive Officer i P.O. Box 411 Burlingten, Kansas 66839 ,
SUBJECT:
TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT: INTERPRETATION OF REPORTING ;
REQUIREMENTS - 93TIA006 (TAC NO. M86339) j i
The purpose of this letter is to provide for your information a copy of the l guidance recently issued by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in their
- Memorandum of November 2,1993, to Region IV (see enclosed). This guidance was provided in response to a Region IV request for interpretation of- :
reporting requirements related to multiple failures of safety-related {
components that are identified during the performance of surveillance testing.
t We plan to implement this guidance during out future' inspections at your - -l facility. Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact Tom ;
Westerman of my staff at 817-860-8145.
l i
a l rector ivision of Reactor Safety _ .
4
Enclosure:
(as noted) ,
t cc w/ enclosure:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. ,
ATIN: Otto Maynard, Vice President :
Plant Operations :
P.O. Box 411 :
Burlington, Kansas 66839 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge .
ATTN: Jay Silberg, Esq. !
2300 N Street, NW '
. Washington, D.C. 20037 l
[
9312150318 931200 W PDR P
ADOCK 05000482 fj PDR
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Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating .
Corporation ,
i Public Service Commission ,
ATTN: C. John Renken !
Policy & Federal Department P.O. Box 360 i Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 :
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
ATTN: Regional Administrator, Region III t 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 l
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
ATTN: Kevin J. Moles Manager Regulatory Services P.O. Box 411 ,
Burlington, Kansas 66839 _
Kansas Corporation Commission ;
ATTN: Robert Elliot, Chief Engineer Utilities Division i 1500 SW Arrowhead Rd.
Office of the Governor i State of Kansas Topeka, Kansas 66612
^
Attorney General 1st Floor - The Statehouse Topeka, Kansas 66612 i
Chairman, Coffey County Commission Coffey County Courthouse ,
, Burlington, Kansas 66839-1798 Kansas Department of Haalth !
and Environment Bureau of Air & Radiation ATTN: Gerald Allen, Public :
Health Physicist 't Division of Environment Forbes Field Building 283 :
Topeka, Kansas 66620 t
t
. _~ . .
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating ,
Corporation bcc to DMB (IESI) bec distrib. by RIV:
J. L. Milhoan Resident Inspector Section Chief (DRP/A) DRSS-FIPS ,
Section Chief (RIII, DRP/3C) RIV File SRI, Callaway, RIII MIS System ;
Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: HNBB 4503 Project Engineer (DRP/A)
Section Chief (DRP/TSS) E. Adensan, NMSS 4 E4 i W. Reckley, NRR 13 HIS i
i i
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r I RIV:C:ES* DD;DRS D:DR b ! M k dab TFWesterman A[Hobil/ ABB'e k [ / SJCc11 ins / f 12/2/93 h /jd b
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i UNITED STATES f.;
- Q NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 1 )?' ' '
WASHINGTON. D.C. 21sb4001 November 2. 1993
\> * .". . . / ;
MEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel J. Collins, Director Division of Reactor Safety ;
Region IV FROM: Elinor G. Adensam, Assistant Director for Regions IV and V '
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ;
SUBJECT:
TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT: INTERPRETATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS - 93TIA006 (TAC NO. M86339)
In response to your request dated April 13, 1993, we have reviewed the :
available guidance associated with the reporting requirements related to multiple failures of safety-related components that are identified during the performance of surveillance procedures. The specific examples cited in your questions regarded the outage surveillances related to primary or secondary safety relief valves and the discovery that the as-found "tpoints were outside the allowable technical specification setpoint too 'ances. Please ,
note that the Public Document Room (PDR) has been included on the distribution for this response. I Licensees were stated to have presented interpretations of the reporting rules -
(10 CFR 50.72/50.73) and the related guidance provided in NUREG-1022, which supported the conclusion that the discovery of sa0ty valve setpoint drift was .
not reportable. Specifically, question 2.3 of NUWEG-1022, Supplement 1 had l been used to argue that the condition was not reportable, because the !
condition could be assumed to have occurred at the time of discovery. Another ;
argument presented by licensees was stated to involve analyses or evaluations ~
which determined that the degraded setpoints d4d not result in the plant operating outside its design basis, and therefore supported a conclusion that i the condition was not reportable.
A review of 50.72 and 50.73 identifies several reporting criteria which might be relevant to the discovery of safety valves outside the setpoint tolerances given in the Technical Specifications. These criteria and a discussion of their applicability is provided in Enclosure 1.
The assessment can be summarized as follows:
- The use of question 2.3 to NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, is not appropriate to justify a decision to not report many conditions found during s refueling outage surveillances. Other guidance in Supplement 1 is clear l that if conditions are discovered during an outage, but are believed to .
have existed during operation, they are reportable so long as an l applicable threshold for reporting is reached. !
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Samuel J. Collins November 2, 1993 j
- A licensee may determine that a condition such as safety valve setpoint drift, does not constitute operation outside the design basis of the plant, and therefore not report such events in accordance with those criteria in 50.72 and 50.73. However, as discussed below, the condition may be reportable as a result of other criteria.
- 50.73(a)(2)(vii) is deemed the most relevant criterion for the reporting of primary or secondary safety valves found to be outside the acceptable .
setpoint tolerance. This is due to the fact that this criterion is based -'
on the train or channel level and does not require the loss of a safety function but only the inoperability of multiple channels of a s:.fety system. Some latitude might be given in light of the number of secondary safety valves; but, for most instances of setpoint drift, this criterion would result in the conditions being reportable. ,
- Note that we currently expect to include guidance along these lines in the forthcoming Revision 1 to NUREG-1022; if so, that specific guidance :
should be consulted in the future in determining reportability.
j Elinor G. Adensam,-Assistant Director 3 for Regions IV and V [
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
i Criteria cc w/ enclosure:
W. Hodges, Region I A. Gibson, RegJon II G. Grant, Region III K. Perkins, Region V 4
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ENCLOSURE ASSESSMENT OF VARIOUS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICABILITY TO PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SAFETY VALVES FOUND OUTSIDE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACCEPTABLE SETPOINT TOLERANCE BAND 50.72(b)(1)(ii) Any event or condition during operation that results in the 50.73(a)(2)(ii) condition of the nuclear power plant, including its ,
i principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or ,
results in the nuclear power plant being: '
(A) In an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety; (B) In a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant; or l (C) In a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.
Discussion: The applicability of these criteria is determined by an evaluation of the situation by the licensee. Upon i determining that the setpoints were outside the allowable j range of the-technical specifications, the licensee would be i expected to follow the required actions of the technical !
specifications and assess the plant condition in regards to i equipment operability and required corrective actions. .
Guidance related to the evaluation of degraded and l nonconforming conditions is provided by Generic Letter . ;
91-18. As stated in the second draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, it is expected that licensees may use '
engineering judgement and experience in determining whether :'
a condition meets these reporting criteria. The ability of a licensee to justify that a given condition is neither unanalyzed nor outside the design basis is dependent on the ,
as-found condition of the equipment and the degree of analyses performed.
50.72(b)(2)(i) Any event, found while the reactor is shut down, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal i safety barriers, being seriously degraded or being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant ,
safety. '
Discussion: The arguments are very similar to those above and again can ,
support either a reportable or non-reportable conclusion based on the licensee's assessment of the significance of the condition. However, this criterion was intended to capture potential problems which might be discovered only during refueling outage surveillances. Question 7.10 in NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, is considered relevant guidance in regard to the reportability of equipment found to be inoperable during outage surveillances. ,
Juestion 2.3 of NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, and the second draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, state that failures should -
be assumed to occur at the time of discovery unless there is firm evidence to believe otherwise. It seems appropriate to classify setpoint drift as a mechanism which would occur some time (usually indeterminable) during the period between calibration and subsequent surveillance unless some factor, such as an extended outage or testing conditions, could be identified as a likely cause. If testing conditions or >
other causes are identified such that reporting is deemed i unnecessary, the licensee would still be expected, under other programs and regulatory requirements, to evaluate the adequacy of the surveillance program to ensure that the activity is ensuring the operability of the safety valves or other components. A voluntary report may still be useful as a means of distributing the information related to the problem and its cause to the industry. Please note that although question 2.3 may be deemed an insufficient reason to determine safety valve drift is not reportable, the licensee may determine that the significance (see above) of the condition does not satisfy the reporting threshold. .f 50.72(b)(2)(iii) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the 50.73(a)(2)(v) fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems R that are needed to:
(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or (D) Mitigate the consequencas of an accident.
Discussion: The second draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, provides safety valve drift as an example of a common mode problem which may be reportable under this criterion. The example was added to the case described in Information Notice 85-27 which dealt with multiple inoperable control rods. Although certain occurrences of multiple safety valve drift problems should be determined to be reportable under this criterion, it should not be assumed that all cases of one or more safety valves exceeding the technical specification tolerance band need be reportable in accordance with this criterion. As in the previously discussed reporting criteria, the licensee's engineering judgement should determine if the condition could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Candidates for reporting include those cases in which the setpoints of_ multiple -
safety valves could have resulted in exceeding the l associated system's design pressure. If experience or engineering judgement can reasonably estimate the maximum
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.i drift which might occur and determine that the safety function would be maintained, the licensee can determine that the condition is not reportable.
Although discussed in the various drafts and revisions of NUREG-1022, it warrants repeating that the primary motivation behind evaluating plant conditions such as safety valve drift should be to ensure safety and only secondarily to determine reportability. If engineering assessments identify a problem and determine that plant equipment was not and reasonably could not be rendered inoperable by a phenomenon such as setooint drift, the licensee can then also justify a determination that the condition is not reportable. Voluntary reports are appreciated if the licensee feels the information might be helpful to others.
The staff should, as always, be cautious in recommending that a !icensee make a " voluntary" report.
50.73(a)(2)(vi) Events covered in paragraph (a)(2)(v) of this section may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies. However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant to this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system d w=s operable and available to perform the required safety I function.
Discussion: (See above) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to:
(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Discussion: This criterion may be the most relevant to the specific example of safety valves found outside the technical specification tolerance band. As stated in the second draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, the reporting threshold for this part of 10 CFR 50.73 is lower than for other parts since it is at the train or channel level rather than the system and function levels. Valves found outside the technical specification setpoint tolerance band can reasonably be considered to have been inoperable during operation unless a licensee determines that testing is not representative of conditions during operation (see item 50.72(b)(2)(i)). This
t criterion was developed with general consideration given to the normal two train design level of redundancy. Given that most plants can satisfy pressure relief requirements with several main steam safety valves unavailable, a rigid interpretation of this criterion regarding the secondary safety valves (i.e., any case with more than one safety valve outside the tolerance band) may be overly conservative. However, the licensees are considered to have the weakest argument if they determine that this criterion is not applicable, and therefore the condition is not '
reportable, when finding multiple safety valves outside the acceptable range.
50.73(a)(2)(i.8) Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's technical specifications.
Discussion: Available guidance regarding operability and technical specification requirements generally have licensees enter the allowed outage time and associated action statements upon discovery of equipment inoperability unless a definite time of inoperability can be established. Technical
- specifications are considered satisfied provided the allowed outage time and associated action statements are satisfied.
Therefore, provided that licensees restore compliance prior I to returning to power operation, reporting of safety valve drift in accordance with this criterion would not be necessary. However, it is expected that upon identification of a problem such as safety valve setpoint drift, licensees should take actions to prevent recurrence or pursue a change in the technical specification requirements (such as increasing the acceptable tolerance rtnge of the setpoints). <
If a licensee determines, through indcstry experience, information from a vendor, or self assessments,- that a component may be inoperable during operation, app.opriate actions should be taken in accordance with the tech 7ical specifications (reduce power or shutdown). This reporting criterion may be applicable if a licensee f ails to satisfy the required action or can determine that a limiting condition of operation had not been satisfied for longer than the allowed outage time following a specific cause for a component becoming inoperable. ,
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I WolfCreekNuclearOperating Corporation i bcc to DMB (IE51) s bec distrib. by RIV: s J. L. Hilhoan Resident Inspector Section Chief (DRP/A) DRSS-FIPS ,
Section Chief {RIII, DRP/3C) RIV file ;
SRI, Callaway, RIII MIS System '
Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 Project Engineer (DRP/A)
Section Chief (DRP/TSS) E. Adensan, NMSS 4 E4 W. Reckley, NRR 13 HIS i
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