ML20199A099

Informs That on 981202,NRC Staff Completed Insp Planning Review (Ipr) of WCGS & Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Ipr.Forwards Historical Listing of Plant Issues,Referred to Plant Issues Matrix

ML20199A099
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	12/29/1998
From:	Graves D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Maynard O WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9901120352
Download: ML20199A099 (27)

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, UNITED STATES -

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. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1V-

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' ARLINGTON TEXAS 76011 8064 l DEC 2 9 1998- 1 L ,

,, Lotto' L.' Maynard, President and - .I Chief Executive Officer-LWolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

+ ' P.O. Box 411 '

Burlington, Kansas 66839

SUBJECT:

z INSPECTION PLANNING REVIEW (IPR) - WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION o

Dear Mr. Maynard:

On December 2,1998, the NRC staff completed a unique inspection Planning Review (IPR) of L l Wolf. Creek Generating Station.1The staff normally conducts Semiannual Plant Performance

< Reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety L performance and adjust inspection resources.' However, due to the suspension of the

Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance process, we implemented an abbreviated Inspection Planning Review for plant issues and to develop inspection plans. The IPR for Wolf -

i Creek Generating Station' involved the participation of both the Reactor Projects and the

- Reactor Safety divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance trends for the p[ ,  ; period April 23 to October 28,1998.- -

1 e H Based on this review, inspection resources have been prioritized and scheduled. No l inspections other than core inspection activities have been scheduled for your facility.

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~ Enclos'ure 1 contains an historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues l Matrix (PIM), that was considered during this IPR process to arrive at an integrated view of ,

" licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports and other l z docketed correspondence between the NRC and Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation. 1 1The IPR may also have considered some'predecisional and draft material that does not appear w ' in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred

. since'the' last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and : 1 i

consideration.- Enclosure 2 is a general description of the PIM table labels. This material will

'be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

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m This letter also advises you.of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Wolf Creek d Generating Station IPR. It is provided to minimize the resource icnpact on your staff and to

. allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector i

.l arrival _onsite.. Enclosure 3 details our inspection plan for Wolf Creek Generating Station over

' the next 8 months. Resident ' inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous (nature. We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan.-

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If you have any questions, please contact me at (817) 860-8148. .

Sincerely, .

W Da * . Graves / Acting Chief ~  !

Project Brarx:h B .

Division of Reactor Projects ,

Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42 1

Enclosures:

[1. Plant lasues Matrix .

2. General Description of PIM Table Labels

3. inspection Plan cc w/ enclosures:

Chief Operating Officer l Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. 3 P.O. Box 411  !

Burlington, Kansas 66839 -

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.. Jay Silberg, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, NW -

Washington, D.C. ' 20037 Supervisor Licensing -

Wolf. Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.

P.O. Box 411 '

Burlington, Kansas 66839.

Chief Engineer L Utilities Division Kansas Corporation Commission 1500 SW Arrowhead Rd.

-Topeka, Kansas 66604-4027 j Office of the Governor

' State of Kansas .

Topeka, Kansas 66612 c , _ _ _ . , _

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. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation ^

fAttorney Gsneral

. Judicial Center

. 301 S.WL10th'. '

2nd Floor '

, . Topeka, Kansas 66612-1597

. County Clerk .

- Coffey County Courthouse l I Burlington, Kansas 66839-1798

. Vick L. Cooper, Chief I Radiation Control Program )

' Kansas Department of Health and Environment '

Bureau of Air and Radiation -

Forbes Field Building 283

' Topeka, Kansas 66620 I

4 Mr. Frank Moussa' Division of Emergency Preparedness

2800 SW Topeka Blvd

Topeka, Kansas 66611-1287 l

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E-Mail report to Ti Frye (TJF)

' E-Mail report to D. Lange (l.3.'t.)

E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)

E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)

E Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)

E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT)

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bec distrib. by RIV:

Regional Administrator - Resident inspector DRP Director SRI (Callaway, RIV)

Branch Chief (DRP/B) DRS-PSB Project Engineer (DRP/B). MIS System

- Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) - .

RIV File

'The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15) Records Center, INPO Deputy Regional Administrator Carol Gordon Commissioner Dicus ' B. Henderson, PAO Commissioner Diaz C. A. Hackney Commissioner McGaffigan SRis at all RIV sites -

Commissioner Merrifield B. Murray, DRS/PSB W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21) -

Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP. Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)

W. H. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-E-16)

'C.- Posiusny, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-E-16) 1 I

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPDIR\lyR\WC l

. To receive copy of document. Indicate in bcut: "C" = Copy without enclosures *E' = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy j RIV:AC:DRP/B D:DRSd d

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OFFICfhL RECORD COPY 90030

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' E Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)' l

E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL) -

E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)  !

E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)  !

. E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)

E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT)  ;

L bec to DCD (IE01)  !

, ~ bec distrib. by RIV:

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Regional Administrator- Resident inspector l

. DRP Director -  : SRI (Callaway, RIV)

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l l - Branch Chief (DRP/B) . DRS-PSB  !

' Project Engineer (DRP/B)- MIS System  !

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) RIV File i The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15) . Records Center, INPO - e iDeputy Regional Administrator Carol Gordon -

Commissioner Dieus B. Henderson, PAO Commissioner Diaz - C. A. Hackney i

- Commissioner McGaffigan SRis at all RIV sites ,

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Commissioner Merrifield B. Murray, DRS/PSB ' '

W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21) '- t Associate Dir for Projects, NRR .  !

- Associate Dir, for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR - 4 SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)

W. H. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-E-16)

C. Poslusny, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13 E-16) i 1

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' To receive copy of document, Indicato in tM s: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy  ;

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ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE _

10/15/98 NCV IR 9819 SELF OPS 3A The clearance order established for the inspection and lut f eation of the fuel building emergency exhaust absorber unit tornado damper was inadequate, and was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. The clearance order did not provide isolation from all sources of high volumetric air flow and did not include special conditons or precau* ions on the clearance order summary sheet, as was required if positive boundaries were not established. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

10/03/98 POS 1R 98-17 LIC OPS 3B The licensee identified and responded to an increase in component misposition events. The licensee's response provided techniques for use by site personnel to prevent component misposition events and raised the level of awareness and attention for this issue to site management and personnel.

10/03/98 NCV IR 98-17 LIC OPS 3A The licensee failed to ensure that turbine trip instrumentation surveillance tests were performed during the LER 97-022 required modes of operation as required by Technical specifications. This nonrepetitive licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was identified by the licensee in LER 9722-00.

08/22/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC OPS 1A 3A The licensee failed to comply with Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 when the containment outer personnel airlock LER 97-023 door was found open with the plant in Mode 4. This nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vli of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This condition occurred on November 23,1997.

08/22/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC OPS 1A 2B The licensee failed to compare excore power indication to a calorimetric when reactor power was greater than LER 97-011 15 percent during a plant startup as required by Technical Specification Table 4.3-1. This nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation occurred on May 25,1997.09/25/98STRIR 98-18NRCPS1CPerformance in the physical security and access authorization areas was very good. An excellent access authorization program had been established to grant individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas. The securit; alarm stations were redundant and well protected. Some minor problems were identified with the security radio communication system. Installation of a new radio trunk system in 1999 should improve the communication capability. A very good program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was maintained. Assessment aids were very good and provided complete assessment of the perimeter detection zones. Changes to security plans were reported within the required time frame and properly implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p). A very good security event reporting program was in place. Senior management support for the security organization was very good as demonstrated by ongoing support for improved equipment and facilities. Audits of the security, access authorization, and fitness-for-duty programs were effective, thorough, and intrusive.

October 28,1998 1 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 08/21/98 NEG IR 98-17 NRC OPS 5A The lack of a policy to verify the restoration of systems or components on which work or testing was not ful!y complete contributed to the failure of the reactor coolant system makeup control valve to operate as expected.

Operators did not verify that the control valve was appropriate >j restored before it was retumed following the suspension of a calibration procedure by maintenance technicians.

08/02/98 POS IR 98-15 NRC OPS 3A SA Excellent attention to detail and questioning attitudes on the part of the control room operators resulted in the detection of a smail reactor coolant letdown system leak inside containment before the leak was detectable on the control board indicators. This enabled plant operators to locate and isolate the leak before the leak rate increased, whicl* presented the radiation levels inside containment from increasing and limited the spread of contamination to the local area.

C3/29/98 NEG IR 98-14 NRC OPS 1B 2A Operators made reasonable preparations for anticipated severe weather, but discovered during the storm that other actions, such as closure of the turbine building roll-up doors, would have provided improved protection of plant structures and equipment.

06/05/98 WK IR 98-13 NRC OPS SA Two audit reports contained executive summary conclusions that generally agreed with the assessments described in the audit reports, but also contained notable deficiencies. The reports did not clearly and consistently present all audit activities and conclusions. One executive summary conclusion could not be supported by the assessment and one report described two weaknesses without describing adequate corrective actions.

06/05/98 POS IR 98-13 LIC OPS 1A Good operator attention to detailled to prompt identifcation and termina: ion of an inadvertent reactor coolant system leak which occurred following a malfunction of the postaccident sampling system. The operators noticed that the reactor coolant drain tank level increased and the volume corcrol tank level decreased at a rate higher than expected and this prompted an effective evaluation that identified and stopped the leak.

04/18/98 NEG IR 98-10 NRC OPS SA SC An operations self-assessment on the use of the operations evolution checklist identified that the checklist was not being used consistently and in its entirety each time, yet did not identify this as a problem. The self-assessment team's recommended actions to reduce the scope and level of detail of the checklist was implemented, and this made the checklist less effective.

04/18/98 WK IR 98-10 NRC OPS SA SC Licensee personnel had not been monitoring telephone calls to the Quality First hotline between September 13, 1997, and April 1,1998.

04/18/98 VIO IR 98-13 NRC OPS 1C Contrary to the requirements of the clearance order procedure and Technical Specircation 6.8.1.a. two SLIV IR 98-10 clearance orders relie'1 on administrative controls outside of the clearance order to provide personnel and equipment protection. The cause of this violation (50-482/9813-01) was procedural noncompliance. This closed Unresolved item 482/9810-10.

October 28,1998 2 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 -

PLANTISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 03/07/98 NCV IR 98-04 LIC OPS 3A Appropriate questions in late 1997 resulted in the identification of an historical failure of operations and LER 94-014 engineering personnel to set refueling machine load settings as required by Technical Specifications between 1988 and 1994 due to an inappropriata procedure and a mind set that failed to question the setting methodology.

03/07/98 VIO IR 98-04 LIC OPS 2B When appropriate questions in 1996 resulted in the identification of surveillance tests on the auxiliary feedwater SLIV LER 96-009 pumps that were not being performed on a staggered test basis, the initial corrective action to identify additional examples was not effective. The LER supplement reported a similar failure for the emergency diesel generators.

03/07/98 VIO 1R 98-04~ NRC OPS 1A 3B Operators did not recognize that during survei!!ance testing, inserting shutdown control rods below the rod SL IV insertion limit required them to enter into Technical Specification Action Statement 3.1.5.1.a. The surveillance procedure also failed to prompt operators to recognize the applicab!ity of the Technical Specification. The operations department had to overcome the mind set that the exception contained in the action statement precluded the need to comply with the Limiting Condition For Operation during the surveillance test.

03/06/98 POS 1R 98-08 Nf'.C OPS 5A SB A review of a sample of quality assurance organization audits and surveillances found the audits and surveillances to be comprehensive and sufficiently critical. A review of the followup of some findings revealed that licenses personnel were property evaluating the findings. The licensee was on schedule for performing all audits as required by the Technical Specifications.

03/C3/98 POS IR 98-08 NRC OPS SA The program for identifying and resolving problems was good. A review of a sample of the licensee's followup of problems revealed that line organization personnel were properly implementing tne program. A review of a sample of self assessments performed by the line organization found the assessments to be comprehensive and sufficiently critical.

03/06/98 NEG IR 98-10 NRC OPS 3A 4B A shift supervisor made an appropriate, but inadequately supported operability determination associate with abnormal noises from an essential service water traveling screen.

01/24/98 STR 1R 97-23 NRC OPS 1A 3A Safe and effectively controlled plant evolutions were supported by the consistent use of three-way communications. Effective tumovers were consistently noted.

01/15/98 STR IR 97-23 NRC OPS 1B in general, operators responded well to a containment atmosphere process radiation monitor fai!ure that caused a containment purge and control room ventilation isolation.

01/15/c8 VIO IR 97-23 NRC OPS 1A 3A 3B When changing the charging pump lineup, several operating practices did not meet management expectations, SLIV including an operator failure to make plant announcements, an operator failure to monitor pressurizer level long enough to assure adequate controller performance after placing it in automatic, and the discovery of a general practice of reactor operators failing to wait for nuclear station operators to complete assigned procedure steps before continuing with subsequent procedure steps.

October 28,1998 3 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANTISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 12/23/97 NEG IR 97-23 NRC OPS 5B A plant safety review committee considered an unreviewed safety question determination without the benefit of pertinent reference information omitted by the issue presenter.

12/13/97 POS IR 97-22 NRC OPS 1A 3A Safe and controlled plant evolutions were effectively supported by consistent use of three-way communication, positrve operator control of plant operations, and appropriate operator management of the control room at the controls area.

12/13/97 NEG IR 97-22 NRC OPS 1C 3C More than 20 of approximately 35 action request Lags hanging on the control boards were associated with work packages that were comp!ete.

11/29/97 VIO IR 97-22 NRC OPS 3A 5B The inspector noted an error irxficating that the posttrip review was not thorough. The posttrip review failed to SL IV , identify that the initial 10 CFR 50.72 report contained an inaccurate reason for the start of the motor-driv 6a auxiliary feedwater pumps.

11/24/97 LER LER 97-023 LIC OPS 1A 2A 3A The containment outer personnel airlock door was found open with the plant in Mode 4. Technical specifications required that both inner and outer doors be closed with the plant in Modes 1 through 4, except that one doo- may be open while being used for normal transit into and out of containment. The cause was Inatiequate communication with the containment coordinator due to lack of complete understanding of the specification requirement.

11/18/97 NEG IR 97-22 NRC OPS 1A The shift supervisor made an adequate, but inadequately documented operability determination when a fuel oil transfer pump flow failed to meet a survenlance test acceptance criterion.

11/13/97 VIO 1R 97-22 NRC OPS 1A 1C Operators' control of the approach to and operation at midloop was well controlled. However, licensee SLIV preparations for midloop operation had weaknesses in several areas.

11/02/97 STR IR 97-19 NRC OPS SA Problems were clearly identified with acceptable determinations of causes and corrective actions.

1%/02/97 NEG 1R 97-19 NRC OPS 3A 3B The licensee's response to an undefined problem with the rod contro! system did not meet with NRC or management expectations. Operators demonstrated a lack of a questioning attitude and lack of system knowledge when responding to repeated unexpected occurrences of outward control rod demand signals and a step counter tod-position indication misma,ch.

11/02/97 NEG IR 97-19 NRC OPS SC The licensee has implemented a detailed site-wide program for tracking and evaluating human performance errors. The success of the program was highly dependent on the accuracy with which identified items were coded, which was not performed accurately for the first 6 months of data. No comprehensive action plan had been generat.Ni to review, evaluate, or implement the recommendations from the first common cause analysis of human performance errors.

11/02/97 VIO IR 97-19 NRC OPS SC Reviews of the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions were not performed as required for a SLIV number of performance improvement requests.

October 28,1998 4 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANTISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 11/02/97 STR 1R 97-19 NRC OPS 3B The licensee had conducted extensive training regarding human error reduction and personnelinterviewed acknowledged a heightened awareness of human error prevention techniques.

11/02/97 POS IR 97-19 NRC OPS 3C The licensee had initiated a number of programs in order to assess human performance on a real-time basis.

These programs were very recent!y implemented and their effectiveness has yet to be determined.

11/02/97 POS IR 97-19 NRC OPS SA The observed licensee meetings demonstrated an aggressive focus on safety with a good questioning attitude.

11/02/97 VIO 1R 97-19 NRC OPS 1A The inspector noted operators using a plant drawing with uncontrolled handwTitten information to provide SLIV necessary information in support of plant operations.

11/02/97 POS IR 97-19 NRC OPS 1A 3A Safe and controlled plant evolutions were effectively supported by consistent use of three-way communications by all operators. -

10/16/97 WK IR 97-19 NRC OPS 3A 4B The licensee performed an adequate but inadequately documented operability evaluation of a centrifugal charging pump drain flange that appeared to be inadequately supported during an engineering and maintenance field review.

10/07/97 NEG 1R 97-19 NRC OPS 3A SA Nonticensed operators assigned to monitor extended emergency diesel generator operation demonstrated inadequate attention to detail by not noting two material condition issues.

10/03/98 twV 1R 98-17 LIC MAINT 3A The licensee failed to property test Pressurizer Pressure Permissive P-11, because of an inadequate design.

LER 97-010 This nonrepetitive licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Entercement Pohey. This item was identified by the licensee in LER 9710-00.

08/22/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC MAINT 28 The licensee failed to comply with Technical Specification surveillance requirements in that the feedwater LER 97-021 isolation surveillance procedures did not completely test all of the required circuitry. This nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was identified in November 1997.

08/2PJ98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC MAINT 2B The licensee failed to comply with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1 in that three LER 97-010 surveillance procedures, related to several slave relays and the disabling of the manual block of safety injection, did not adequately test all of the required circuitry. This nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vli of the NRC Enforcement Policy. These items were identified by the licensee in June through September 1997.

08/22/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC MAINT 2B The licensee determined that a 10-year interval inspection requirement for a VT-3 visual examination of the LER 97-015 pressurizer safety valves had not been conducted during the first 10-year interval as required by Technical Specification 4.4.2.2. This nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was identified in August 1997.

October 28,1998 5 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 08/03/98 POS IR 98-15 NRC MAINT 3A During emergent work on a weekend to repair a leak in the letdown sysiem inside containment, welding technicians stopped work and asked for help in the face of delaying tirne-sensitive work to resolve a minimum pipe wall thickness issue at one of the weld locations. This was a good oxample of plant personnel placing safety, procedural, and program adherence before other concems and beensee management's support of this philosophy when working on plant equipment.

06/30/98 NEG IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 4C Some of the rcensee program procedures were in conflict and not well integrated, which had resulted in minor inconsistencies in program implementation performance. The Maintenance Rule program data base did not yield consistent data when queried by the rcensee staff.

06/30/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC MAINT SA 5B SC While some early assessments had significant findings, the more recent audit findings provided the licensee with current information on important deficiencies in the program. The ss:f-assessment and audit scopes were appropriate, and the findings provided meaningful feedback to management.

06/30/98 VIO IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 5A A violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was identified for the reensee's failure to establish performance measures SLIV that were sufficient to demonstrate that the performance of the emergency diesel generator, excore neutron NCV monitoring, and process radiation monitoring systems were effectively controlled by the licensee's preventive maintenance efforts. Pursuant to Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, a noncited violation of to CFR 50.65(a)(2) requirements was identified for the licensee's identification of the failure to initially establish appropriate performance measures for monitoring the containment isolation function.

06/30/98 VIO IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 3B The licensee's program scoping, in general, was adequate and met the intent of the Maintenance Rule.

SLIV LIC Pursuant to Section Vll.B.1 cf the NRC Enforcement Po! icy, a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)

NCV requirements was identified for the licensee identification of the failure to include three functions (auxiliary feedwater flow for a faulted steam generator, isolation between Class /nonClass 125 voit de power, and reactor coolant system pressure limit following anticipated trip without scram) in the program scope. Two NRC-identified examples of failure to scope applicable functions into the program were identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b) requirements.

06/30/98 WK IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 4C The lcensee's approach to performing safety significance determination of structures, systems, and components for the Maintenance Rule program was considered to be a weakness due to their use of three poor practices. Downgrading the safety significance of structures, systems, and components that (a) were in cut sets less than 0.1 percent of the total core damage frequency (i.e., structures, systems, and components in cutsets) cumulatively accounting for 62 percent of the core damage frequency considered risk significant) and (b) did not meet two or more of the performance measure was a poor practice. Also, the use of old data for the probability risk assessment quantification was a poor practice. In addition, the use of generic instead of plant-specific data for this purpose was a poor practice.

03/30/98 VIO IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 3B The licensee's guidance for performing a Maintenance Rule program periodic evaluation was adequate.

SLIV However, the failure to perform a periodic assessment for the interval of February 1996 to May 1998 was a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3), which requires a periodic evaluation at least every refueling cycle.

October 28,1998 6 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 06/30/08 VIO IR 98-05 NRC MAINT SA Generally, the licensee's programmatic m';nitcring of performance measures and goals was appropriate.

SLIV However, a violation of 10 CFR 50.' 5(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to identify maintenance preventsole functional failures associated with the containment isolation system and the main steam system.

These f ailures would have impacted the licensee's monitoring had the failures been identified earlier as perfor nance measures that had been exceeded.

06/30/98 STR IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 4C 3C Tbc n m 5 process for assessing plant risk resulting from equipment out-of-service in Mode 1 was a vgh. T .e licensee's use of the safety monitor to requantify the orobabilistic risk assessment model for o.. J. configurations and produce risk profiles for a work week was t;aneficial. The process used by the licenstee for risk assessments during outages was acceptable.

C3/26/98 NEG IR 98-12 NRC MAINT 1C 28 A faulty relay in the engine start circuitry resulted in the failure of the diesel fire pump engine to start during post-maintenance testing. The failure to perform inspection and periodic replacement of the relays was identified as a weakness in the preventive maintenance program.

C3/26/98 POS IR 08-12 NRC MAINT 2A 38 The material condition of the control room ventilation system was good, and the operators were very know'edgeable regarding system operation 06/16/98 NCV IR 98-14 LIC MAINT 3B An electrical maintenance technician and quality control technician lacked sufficient knowledge regarding diode bias orientation, resulting in incorrect insta!!ation and quality control verification of diodes which led to a failed postmaintenance test. The licensee promptly identified the error and took aggressive corrective actions; therefore, this issue was teated as a noncited violation as allowed t,y Section Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy.

06/05/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 28 Maintenance department management and supervisory oversight for the removal and replacement of the air oil pump on Main Steam isolation Valve AB HV0011 was not effective for work on a safety-system component that invoked a short duration Technical Specification action statement. As a resJll of delays which could have been minimized or prevented, the operations department came within 4 minutes of exceeding the 4-hour time limit allowed by limiting conditions for operation, which would have required a forced shutdown of the reactor.

06/04/98 VIO IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 3A SA Maintenance technicians stored a heavy, unrestrained door and frame in the control room near the Train A SLIV prTection system logic cabinets contrary to Precadure AP 21J-001 with the permission of the shift supervisor.

This issue was cited as a VIO of TS 6.8.1.a for act following the procedure goveming such activities.

04/18/98 NEG IR 98-10 NRC MAINT 2A The material condition of those plant systems and components evaluated during this inspection period was good, with few equipment deficiencies. The inspectors noted an increase in the number and severity of boric acid leaks in the auxiliary building and that an oil leak caused an unplanned inoperability of a centrifugal charging pump.

October 28,1998 7 Wolf Creek Generating Station l

ENCLOSURE 1 l PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 03/07/98 STR IR 98-04 NRC MAINT 2A 3A The material condition of those plant systems and components evaluated during this inspection period were good, with few equipment deficiencies. Effective coordination between operations, maintenance, engineering, and other groups resulted in the licensee achieving a condition where no annunciators were illuminated with very few instrument out of service tags on annunciators.

02/06/98 STR IR 98-02 NRC MAINT 3B Maintenance, engineering, and emergency preparedness training effectively addressed evaluation of trainee mastery and program feedback.

01/24/98 STR 1R 97-23 NRC MAINT 2A The material condition of those plant systems and components evaluated during this inspection period were good with few equipment deficiencies.

01/07/98 VIO IR 97-23 NRC MAINT 28 3A Instrumentation & control technicians

• willingness to proceed with a surveillance test despite their uncertainty in SLIV lifting leads led to failures to comply with survei!!ance procedure instructions and caused the test equipment power source ground fault interrupter to trip.

12/18/97 LER LER 97-025 LIC MAINT 2B Testing requirements for three breakers were found to have not been met regarding sample size and rotating frequerre of performance. The breaker surveillances were current at time of discovery, but past instances of noncompliance were identified.

12/13/07 NCV IR 97 22 NRC MAINT 2B The inspectors and the licensee identified numerous instances where maintenance workers Siled tc remov9 action request tags from components as required during the work package completion and closeout.

12/13/97 STR IR 97-22 NRC MAINT 1A 3C *C Licensee management demonstrated appropriate control of maintenance activities by issuing stop work o ders immediately following the discovery of significant maintenance issues in order to identify and implement immediate corrective actions. This demonstrated that worker and plant safety was more important to licensee ,

managers than outage schedule progress.

12/13/97 POS IR 97-22 NRC MAINT 2A The performance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feodwater pump improved markedly following Refueling Outage 9.

12/13/97 NEG IR 97-22 NRC MAINT SB While the licensee properly identified and corrected the cause of the reactor trip on November 29,1997, at the end of the inspection period, the ricensee had not yet understood the phenomena that caused the intermediate range nuclear instrument spiking, and had therefore not implemented any corrective actions to prevent resetting compensating voltage back to the range that caused the spiking.

11/21/97 LEFT LER 97-022 LIC MAINT 2B The technical specification requirement to perform surveillance testing on turbine trip instrumentation prior to entering Mode 2 (startup) was not being met. Testing had previously been performed after entering Mode 2.

The cause was determined to be personnel failure to thoroughly consider the literal wording of the technical specifications.

October 28,1998 8 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 11/19/97 LER LER 97-021 LIC MAINT 2B 1C 5A The testing design supplied by the vendor did nc,1 fully verify prr peryr uation of circuits in the SSPS for the feedwater isolation on hi-hi steam generater level or safety ir action. The cause was determined to be inadequate information supplied from the vendor.

11/09/97 LER LER 97-020 LIC MAINT 2A Several snubbers found inoperable during Refueling Outage 9 were likely to have been inoperable during previous operation. Several failure mechanisms were identified including corrosion, vibration, and potential overloading.

11/02/97 NEG IR 97-19 NRC MAINT 3A The inspectors noted that ineffective housekeeping in containment provided the potential for migration of small pieces of debris into plant systems. In addition, maintenance conducted in the higher radiation areas around the reactor coolant system loops was performed without regard for housekeeping such that clean-up efforts could have resulted in unnecessary radiation exposure.

10/14/97 NCV LER 97-019 llc MAINT 2A 2B 38 Centrifugal pump and residual heat removal pump casings had not been vented as required by technical IR 98-10 specifications. The initial surveillance procedure writers failed to clearly understand the technical specification requirements.

10/12/97 VIO 1R 97-19 llc MAINT 1A 3A The failure of maintenance personnel to reinstall a shield hatch cover over a radwaste filter prior to closing out SLIV the filter replacement procedure led to operations personnel operating the filter without adequate shielding, and resulted in an unposted locked high radiation area.

10/10/97 POS IR 97-17 NRC MAINT 2B 3A A few maintenance activities were reviewed, and the planning was found to be proper and effective.

10/10/97 STR IR 97-17 NRC MAINT 2A 3A 3B Nondestructive examinations observed were performed in accordance with procedures and by knowledgeable contractor nondestructive examination personnel.

10/10/97 STR 1R 97-17 NRC MAINT 2B The licensee had established a well developed inservice inspection prngram plan in that all components to be examined, including augmented inspection requirements, were clearly delineated by component identification, period to be inspected, and the method of the nondestructive examination.

10/06/97 NEG IR 97-19 NRC MAINT 3A One team of electricians performed a very c:fective inspection of a safety-related battery and identified two conditions that warranted quarterly monitoring in the future. Another team performing the same inspection failed to identify similar conditions that were present.

10/03/97 LER LER 97-010 LlO MAINT 2A 2B 3A Following receipt of information from another facility, the license's review determined that 3 surveillance procedures did not provide complete circuit testing for the P-11 interlock. Additionally, one set of contacts from Relay K634 (Containment Spray Actuation) was found to not be tested under the current surveillance procedure. This LER was revised on 10/3/97 to ine'ude the failure to include testing of contacts that block the non-safety start signals of several safety-related pumps during safety bus load shedding and load sequencing.

Procedures were revised and testing completed satisfactorily. The LER was revised on 8/28/97 to include the identification of the K634 testing deficiency.

October 28,1998 9 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 ~

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM 3 CODE 10/03/98 POS IR 98 NRC ENG 4C Licensee management demonstrated a 4 9stioning attitude durint an engineering presentation on the health of the residual heat removal system by asking challenging questions regarding long-term operability and bearing ,

tube oil volume and demanding adeqt. ate responses.

- 08/06/98 NEG IR 98-15 LC ENG 3A Support engineering personnel failed to use due caution whiie performing work in the vicinity of safety-related equipment, resulting in the riadvertent misalignment and draining of an oil reservoir level indicator on a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Ttis indicated a lack of sensitMy for the potential to impact safety system configuration while performing work in the plant and did not meet with licensee management expectations 06/26/98 VIO IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4A On three occasions, the licensee made changes to Emergency Management Guidelines (EMG) ES-12 SLIV " Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation," that involved an unreviewed safety question, without prior Commission approval and without performing safety evaluations. The changes to ES-12 constituted changes to procedures l

as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. This was identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.59.

06/26/98 NEC IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4A 58 The evaluations of licensee-identified discrepancies between the Updated Safety Analysis Report and EMG ~

ES-12. " Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation," reported in Performance improvement Request 97-3483 were poorly performed, limited in scope, and ineffective in determiriing the proper priority of the performance improvement request. This resulted in untimely resolution of the issues.

October 28,1998 10 Wolf Creek Generating Station

i . .

I ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE C3/26/98 VIO IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4A The following 5 examples of violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion ill were identified:

SL IV IR 97-201 1. The hcensee failed to properly verify adequacy of design, in that when implementing a plant modification, the licensee failed to revise a Westinghouse design analysis to reflect the new service water flow rate to the component cooling water heat exchangers. This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-01.

2. The licensee failed to ensure that applicable design data was correctly translated into calculations, in that an incorrect initial water temperature was used in Calculation EJ-M-018. "RHR Pump Recire.

Operation vs. Time of Initiation of CCW flow to RHR Heat Exchanger.' This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-03.

3. The licensee failed to ensure that applicable design bases were correctly translated into specifications, in that the effect of density variations due to temperature and boron concentration was not considered in determining the tank level instrument uncertainties. As a result, tank volume available for the operator response could be reduced. This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-15.

4. The licensee failed to ensure that applicable design bases were translated into specifications, in that the "MOV Design Configuration Document

• utilized an incorrect differential pressure across component cooling water motor operated valves. This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-18.

5. The licensee failed to ensure that applicable design basis information was correctly translated into specifications, in that the licensee failed to address the effects of a change in the minimum allowable component cooling water temperature on safety related motor oil temperatures ar.d on the spent fuel pool reactivity. This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-19.

The licensee's subsequent evaluations revealed no operability concerns. The team reviewed the hcensee's planned and completed corrective actions and found them to be thorough and comprehensive 06/26/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC ENG 5B SC The failure to promptly correct a licensee-identified discrepancy conceming when CCW cooling water flow to the SFP hest exchanger during cool-down should be reduced or terminated was identified as a non-cited violation . This ek> sed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-20.

06/26/98 VIO 1R 98-12 NRC ENG 4A SB 5A The following 2 examples of violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B Criterion V were identified:

SLIV IR 97-201 1. The licensee failed to revise Calculation NK-E-003 to reflect two design changes, as required by procedure AP 05-001.

2. Station battery surveillance test procedurt.s were inappropriate to the circumstances, in that the acceptance criteria did not assure that the battery discharge current was consistent with the load profile, that the battery final terminal voltage was greater than the minimum allowable design value, and that a constant discharge rate be maintained during testing. This closes Unresolved items 50-482/201-13 and 14.

The licensee's corrective actions were reviewed by the team and found to be thorough and comprehensive.

No operability concerns were identified.

October 28,1998 11 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANTISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 06/26/98 NEG IR 98-12 NRC ENG 48 3A An inconsistency between the voltage regulation specificatic,n for the purchase of battery chargers and the specification for the purchase of spare battery chargers (which are designated by the USAR as equivalent) was identified as a weaknesses in the licensee's design and procurement processes.

06/12/98 LIC NRR Letter NRC ENG 4C Technical Specification Amendment 117 was issued on an exigent hasis to add a new Action Statement to 5/28/98 Specifcation 3/4.3.2. A supplement to the initial amendment request was needed to address the exigent circumstances surrounding the request.

C3/05/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC ENG 48 5A The engineering, operations, and maintenance departments coordinated efforts effectively to successfully troubleshoot and identify the cause of an unexpected increase in volts-amperes reactive (VARS) during testing on the Emergency Diesel Generator A which resulted in an unplanned entry into a 72-hour Technical Specification action statement. This indicated an improvement in interdepartmental cooperation and planning.

06/05/98 VIO IR 98-13 NRC ENG 2A Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, in 1992, following the failure of the reactor coolant dissolved SLIV IR 98-04 hydrogen analysis instrument in the postaccident monitoring system, the licensee selected the secondary analysis me' hod of performing grab samples which could not be performed within the 3-hour time limit prescribed in the safety analysis. This violation constituted a change to the facility without a safety evaluation having been performed to determine if an unreviewed safety question existed (50-482/9813-02). This closed Unresolved item 482/9804-04.

06/05/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC ENG 4B The shift supervisor declared a main steam isolation valve operable with an identified deficient condition that was expected to reduce the valve's service life and increase the probability of imminent valve failure.

Engineering personr:el acknowledged, but did not bound the expected reduction in the valve's service Irfe. A subsequent failed bench test of the leaking pump demonstrated the concem regarding the decreased service life of the pump. The licensee's subsequent actions to declare the valve inoperable within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for rework was appropriate. The system engineer displayed a deficiency in system knowledge by not knowing the purpose of the hole in the air pump that the air leaked from.

04/18/98 POS IR 98-10 NRC ENG 4A 4B Based on a review of select changes made to the Updated Safety Analysis Report, Revision 11, the project manager determined that the changes at Wolf Creek Generating Station have been appropriately addressed and that the changes to the Updated Safety Analysis Peport have been appropriately addressed by licensing actions,10 CFR 50.59 submittals, etc.

04/18/98 NEG IR 98-10 NRC ENG 1A 1C 48 The review level of the work package and the procedure used to transfer an irradiated specimen was not commensurate with the potential risk to workers involved in the transfer process. No procedure review beyond that of the engineers working on the project was accomplished prior to the inspectors' observations.

October 28,1998 12 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 01/27/98 WK IR 98-04 NRC ENG 28 A 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not performed during preparations to fdter the emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank contents without declaring the emergency diesel generators inoperable. While the plant manager and operations manager raised questions regarding the operability of the diesel generator during this planned work activity, personnelinvolved in the preparation of this work failed to recognize the need for the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation until prompted by the inspector and the Chief Operating Officer.

01/24/98 STR 1R 97-23 NRC ENG 48 4C Overati, the licensee's implementation of its 10 CFR 50.59 program was in accordance with the program requirements. Safety evaluations were performed when required and contained sufficient information to support the conclusion that unreviewed safety questions did not exist. However, procedural guidance existed regarding the corrduct of tests and experiments that is not consistent with 10 CFR 50.59 and one minor weakness in updating the G3AR was identified.

01/09/98 POS 1R 97-201 NRC JG 2A 4A SC With some exceptions as noted in the report, the inspection team determined that the selected systems (Residual Heat Removal, Component Cooling Water, and their support-interface systems) were capable of performing their design basis safety functions and that design and licensing bases were adequately adhered to.

The licensee implemented appropriate measures to resolve the immediate concems identified by the team, and no immediate operability concerns exist For other issues, the licensee initiated appropriate reviews and evaluations using the corrective action process or took corrective actions such as revising design documents and changing procedures.

01/09/98 URI 1R 97-201 NRC ENG 1A 4A The licensee failed to establish the correct design basis information in surveillanca procedures with regard to the minimum r quired terminal voltages for station batteries. This is contrary to requirements specified in Criterion 111 of '.0 CFR 50, Appendix B, which requires that the design basis be correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions and that design control measures verify or check the adequacy of a design (Unresolved item 50-482/97201-11).

01/09/98 URI 1R 97-201 NRC ENG 4A The licensee assumed a minimum operating voltage of 100 Vdc for components that did not have a minimum operating voltage specified by the vendor. This was an unverified assumption. The licensee's failure to demonstrate the adequa:y of the design is contrary to Criterion ill of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion ill, which requires that design control measures verify or check the adequacy of a design (Unresolved item 50-482/97201-10).

01/09/98 URI 1R 97-201 NRC ENG 4A 4B The licensee failed to adhere to the procedure regarding revision of calculations to account for all direct current electricalload growth. This is contrary to Criteriori V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B , which requires that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings (Unresolved item 50-482/97201-12).

01/09/98 POS IR 97-201 NRC ENG 4A The as-built configurations of the systems (Ressdual Heat Removal Component Cooling Water, and support-interface systems) were generally consistent with the Updated Safety Analysis Report. In general, the availability of the design bases documentation was good, as was the material condition of the areas observed by the team.

October 28,1998 13 Wolf Creek Generating Station

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ENCLOSURE 1 PLANTISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION l

DATE' TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 01/09/98 URI - IR 97-201 NRC ENG 4A The licensee's calculations for maximum cable lengths for some 120 Vac circuits were nonconservative in that l

. the allowable cable length could allow voltage to drop to a value that would prevent the aseociated motor starter coils from actuating (Unresolved item 50-482/97210-04). The licensee's design control measures did

! not meet the requirements specified in Criterion ill of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 regarding verifying or check'.ag l the adequacy of design.

l 01/09/98 URI 1R 97-201 NRC ENG 4A A number of Updated Safety Analysis Report discrepancies were identified and had not been corrected as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e). (Unresolved item 50-482/97201-21) l 12/13/97 NEG IR 97-22 NRC ENG 2A 48- 5B Licensee troubleshooting activities for General Electric Magne-Blast breakers following repeated breaker LER 97-018 failures exhibited significant weaknesses, most notably in the area of preservation of as-found data. Despite these weaknesses, the licensee provided adequate assurance that the breakers were operable.

i 11/02/97 NEG IR 97-19 NRC ENG 48 58 Engineering personnel failed to perform an evaluation they planned to perform in response to inspector l

questions in 1994 on the minimum botting requirements for the containment equipment hatch missile shieki_

As a result, the licensee removed bolts while in Mode 4.

10/24/97 NEG LETTER NRC ENG 48 For Requests for Relief 12R-09 and 12R-16 from the ASME Code, the staff concluded that the licensee did not 10/24/97 provide sufficient justification to support the determination that the code requirements were impractica! or that compliance with the Code requirement would result in hardship. Therefore, in these cases relief was denied.

Requests for Relief 12R-09 and 12R-16 were 2 of 19 requests for relief made by the licensee.12R-16 was denied when the staff determined that the licensee had sufficient time to implement the Code required i training / qualification program for examiners. Although 12R-09 was denied, the request was reasonable (it was approved for the 1st 10 year interval) and may be resubmitted, if necessary fo!!owing examination of the associated components.17 of the 19 requests were approved.

10/07/97 POS IR 97-19 NRC ENG 4B Engineering personnel performed an effective evaluation and provided appropriate recommendations in response to the discovery of eight motor-operated valves which were found to have overthrust conditions during diagnostic testing.

October 28,1998 14 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 10/03/98 NEG IR 98-17 NRC PS 3A 3B Observations by the inspector of poor radiological work practices indicated a deficiency in the knowledge of some radiation workers regarding contaminated area boundary controls and methods of preventing the spread of contamination. The inspector identified maintenance technicians working greater than 8 feet above the floor inside the radiologica!!y controtted area without first contacting health physics. This supported the conclusion in NRC Inspeciion Report 98-15 that there was a deficiency in radiation worker knowledge regarding the requirement to contact health physics before y orking in the everhead in the radiologically contro5ed area.

10/03/98 POS IR 98-17 NRC PS 2A The inspector noted a reduction in the number of storage containers and installed drip bags, and a generally improved appearance inside the radiological centrolled area because of a licensee housekeeping improvement effort directed at reducing the resources required to maintain tools and equipment, and improve surveying capabilities inside the radiological controlled area.

09/20/98 POS IR 98-17 NRC PS 3A Health physics technicians responded appropriately to the discovery of unexpected contamination and elevated levels of airbome radioactivity during reactor coolant system filter sf aring operations.

09/20/98 NEG IR 98-17 NRC PS 3A Weaknesses were identified in the ficensee's stop-work criteria and in identifying the increased potential for airborne radioactivity, known to exist, to workers perfomiing reactor coolant system filter shearing operations.

The stop work criteria was based soley on the dose from the HEPA filtration unit, and a known increased potential for airbome radioactivity was not communicated to the workers.

08/13/98 LIC 08/11/98 NRC PS 1C Wolf Creek Nuclear Operting Corporaton's (WCNOC) August 6,1997, submittal requesting approval of MTNG SUM changes to the Wolf Creek Generating Station Emergency Plan contained errors, and the justification for certain changes lacked depth and completeness. As a result. WCNOC wi!! submit a supplement to their August 6,1997 request in early September 1998.

06/29/98 POS IR 98-14 NRC PS 1C The inspector concluded that security personnel made generally appropriate preparations for anticipated severe weather, and security personnel provided required security contingencies while facing adverse weather conditions. Security management also provided a good review of their activities, identified appropriate weaknesses and initiated effective corrective actions.

C3/26/98 POS IR 98-12 NRC PS 1C The team noted that the licensee had in place only four fire protection impairment control and breach authorization permits that required a compensatory fire watch.

06/05/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC PS 1C An emergency plan drill provided effective training and demonstrated effective interaction and communication between licensM and state drill participants.

06/05/98 POS IR 98-13 LlO PS 1C The security department appropriately responded to a failure of the security diesel generator to pass a weekly surveillance test, taking action to correct the problem while implementing existing contingency plans October 28,1998 15 Wolf Creek Generating Station

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ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 05/11/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC PS 1C 4A The following 2 examples of violations of Operating License NPF-42, Section 2.C.(5)(a) are being treated as L2R 98-002 non-cited violations:

LER 97-016 1. The licensee identified that on numerous occasions during the past 10 years, the fire protection 00,-01 -02 system had been used for non-fire protection purposes, a practice that rendered the fire protecton system temporarily inoperable.

2. On three occasions the licensee identified leakage sites from the reactor coolant pump lube oil system that were not provided with a collection system, as required.

04/18/98 NCV IR 98-10 LIC PS 1A 1C Security personnel inadvertently issued a locked high radiation area key to a radwaste oparator who was not authorized to receive the key. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

04/10/98 VIO IR 98-10 LIC PS 1A 1C Radiation protection technicians improperty posted an area with dose rates of approximately 400 mrem /hr.

SLIV After discovery, the technicians properly posted the area, but failed to barricade the area.

04/03/98 WK IR 98-07 NRC PS 1B 1C Crew performance during simulator scenarios was satisfactory. A performance weakness was identified involving one crew that failed to properly assess plant conditions which required upgrading to a general emergency. The second crew properly declared the emergency, but required 18 minutes to assess p! ant conditions, exceeding the 15 minute goal.

04/03/98 NEG IR 98-07 NRC PS 2A Three self-contained breathing apparatus bottles, one in the control room and two in the fire brigade lor,ker had low air pressure. The bottle in the control room had approximately 2000 psi, and the two bottles in the fire brigade locker had approximately 3000 psi. Full pressure for these bottles was 4500 psi, and the surveillance procodure required replacement of bottles with less than 3600 psi.

04/03/98 STR 1R 98-07 NRC PS 1C 5A The emergency preparedness program was property implemented. All events reported to the NRC operations center since July 1996 were property evaluated and classified. The eme3ency preparedness training program was implemented sa'Jsfactority. The emergency planning staff was well trained and maintained good awareness of industry issues. The performance improvement request process effectively tracked resoluton of emergency planning issues in need of corrective actions. The emergency preparedness program audits were performed by qualified personnel and were of proper scope and depth.

03/20/98 VIO IR 98-11 NRC PS 1A A violation was identified involving the failure to property label seven radioactive material containers.

SLIV 03/20/98 NCV IR 98-11 LIC PS 1A 3B A noncited violation was identified involving an unqualified chemistry technician performing the chemistry shift manning responsibilities alone while the station was in Mode 4 in January 1992.

October 28,1998 16 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANTISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 03/20/98 STR IR 98-11 NRC PS 1A 1C Overall, good sohd radioactive waste management and radioactive waste /materiais transportation programs were implemented. Documentation and packages were properly prepared for shipment. Good facihties were maintained for the processing storage, and managernent of solid radioactive wastes and transportation activities. An effective radioactive waste inventory /accountabihty system was maintained. Personnelinvolved in the transfer, packaging, and transport of radioactive matenals and wastes were properly trained and qualified. Procedures and checklists established to implement the solid radioactive waste managemerit and transportation programs provided proper guidance for the handling, processing, and shipping of radioactive waste /meterials. The amount of sclid radioactive wastes generated showed a significant reduction from 1993 to 1995. From 1995 through 1997, the amount of solid radioactive waste generated remained fairly steady at approximately 24 cubic meters. The licensee's 3-year average amount of solid radioactive waste generated showed that the licensee generated less solid radioactive waste than the industry's median and near the industry's best quartile for radioactive waste generated.

03/20/98 NCV IR 98-11 NRC PS 1A A noncited violation was identified involving instrumention used to analyze particulate cir samples which were not calibrated for the type of radiation rneasured.

03/20/98 STR 1R 98-11 NRC PS SA 5B 5C An effective self assessment program of the sohd radioactive waste management and transportation programs was maintained. Timely and effective corrective actions were completed on identified problems.

03'07/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC PS SC Progressively more aggressive corrective actions to address eleven licensee identified instances where radiation workers entered the radiologicaly controlled area without required dosimetry over an eight month period have resulted in more than four months without recurrence.

02/27/98 NCV IR 98-09 NRC PS 3A 5B A noncited violation was identified involving ALARA improvement report reviews and evaluations that did not follow procedural guidance and were not timely.

02/27/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC PS 1A 3B Overall, good performance was observed in the radiation protection prograrr. despite isolated problems in various program areas. Good external radiation exposure controls were implemented. High radiation area controls, radiological area postings, radiological area access controls, and dosimetry use were consistently good, however prejob briefings could be improved. Good training programs were implemented for radiation protection technicians, supervisors, and professionals. Participation was complete, topics were appropriate, instructors were experienced, and facilities were sufficient.

02/27/98 POS !R 98-09 NRC PS SA SB SC Overall, quahty assurance oversight of radiation protection activities was good. An insightful audit and numerous observations of radiation protection field activities were performed Corrective actions improved from January 1997 through February 1998. Early examples of performance improvement requests sometimes did not address the root causes of issues, and suggested corrective actions were vague and ineffective. Later examples of performance improvement requests corrected most of the previous shortcomings but the documentation of proposed corrective actions was unclear, occasionally.

October 28,1998 17 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM '

CODE 02/18/98 VIO IR 98-04 NRC PS 3A A quality control inspector performed a boroscope examination of a containment spray pump room cooler SL IV within 18 inches of two posted hot spots without adequate cognizance of the radiological conditions in the room, and without dosimetry adequate to monitor the highest whole-body dose. The radiation protection program did not require, the quality control inspector did not request, and radiation protection personnal did not provide start-of-the-job coverage, and therefore the quality control inspect .t did not receive guidance on job specific ALARA practices or th 3 intermittent job coverage required by the radiation work permit.

02/06/98 STR 1R 98-03 NRC PS 1C 2A All liquid and gaseous effluent radiation monitoring instrumentation was operable and properly maintained, tested, and calibrated..

02/06/98 STR 1R 98-03 NRC PS 1C 3B Training and qualification programs for chemistry technicians, radwaste operators, and nuclear station operators were properly implemented.

02/C3/98 STR 1R 98-06 NRC PS 1A 1C An effective radiation protection program was maintained including: radiological contro!s and postings, extemal dosimetry, and external exposure controls. Proper total effective dose equivalent /as low as is reasonably achievable evaluations for respirator use were performed. Whole-body counting and intemal dosimetry programs were effectively implemented. Proper radiation surveys were performed and documented. The portable radiaton protection instrumentation program was properly maintained. Radiation protection procedures contained apprepriate detail. An inppropriately staffed radiation protection organization was maintained.

02/06/98 WK IR 98-03 Nf; ' PS 1C Between 1993 and 1996, the licensee wLa in the first quartite (best performance) for airt>ome iodine /particulates and near the median for airbome trit;v for pressurized water reactors; however, the licensee was in the third and fourth quart!!es for airbome ss, liquid mixed isotopes, and liquid tritium.

02/06/98 STR 1R 98-03 NRC PS 1C 2B The engineered-safety feature air cleaning ventilation systems' surveillance testing program was properly implemented.

02/06/98 STR 1R 98-06 NRC PS SC Corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner.

02/06/98 STR 1R 98-03 NRC PS 1C The liquid ano gaseous radioactive waste effluent management programs were effectively implemented. The 1997 effluent data showed a significant reduction in the liquid and airbome effluent curies released and a continuing reduction in the volume of liquid effluents discharged.

i 02/C3/98 STR IR 98-03 NRC PS 1C 5A Effective quality assurance and self-assessment programs were maintained regarding the radioactive waste effluent activities. Program improvement requests were closed in a timely manner.

02/02/98 NCV IR 98-09 LIC PS 3A 3B A noncited violation was identified involving an unqualified individual that wore respiratory protection equipment.

01/16/98 STR IR 98-01 NRC PS 1A 1C The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented.

01/16/98 STR 1R 98-01 NRC PS 1C A proper program had been established foi reporting security events.

October 28,1998 18 Wolf Creek Generating Station

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ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 01/16/98 STR 1R 98-01 NRC PS 1A 1C 2A Effective vital area and protected area bamers and detection systems were maintained.

01/16/98 STR IR 98-01 NRC PS 1C An effective program was in place to protect safeguards information.

01/16/98 STR 1R 98-01 NRC PS 1C 2A A proper security backup power supply system was maintained.

01/1898 STR 1R 98-01 NRC PS 1C 3B A very good security training program had been implemented.

12/08/97 VIO IR 98-09 NRC PS 3A A violation was identified involving an item contaminated with radioactive material that was unconditionally SLIV re%ased from the radiological controlled area.

12/3/97 POS IR 97-22 NRC PS 1A 3B The training and emergency plan staff conducted an nscheduied, unannounced emergency plan drill using an innovative technique that exercised management control, management decision making, and other aspects of the emergency plan that normally do not get exercised as effectively during typical emergency plan training scenanos.

11/24/97 NCV 1R 98-01 LIC PS 1A A noncited violation was identifted inve" mg the failure to immediately dispatch an officer to investigate a vital sector portal alarm.

11/02/97 POS IR 97-19 NRC PS 3B The licensee provided excellent "just-in-time" training to every radiation worker just prior to the start of Refueling Outage 9.

10/24/97 WK IR 97-20 NRC PS 1A 3A Although radiation work permit package preparation was good, generally, abort criteria was not included in all packages in which it was appropriate. Prejob briefings needed improvement, because requirements were not clearly stated and current survey information was not always used.

10/24/97 STR 1R 97-20 NRC PS 1A 3A Extemal exposure controls were implemented properly, in most cases. Job coverage by radiation protection personnel was good. The response and fonowup by radiation protection personnel to an emergency situation i in the radiological contro!!ed area were excenent.

10/24/97 WK IR 97-20 NRC PS 1C Better procedural guidance was needed with respect to the control and release of radioactive materials.

10/13/97 VIO IR 97-20 LIC PS 1A 3A A violation was identified for the fai!ure to properly post and control a high radiation area with a dose rate SLIV greater than 1000 millirems per heur.

10/12/97 VIO IR 97-20 NRC PS 1A 3A A violation was identified, because accountability was not properly niaintained when radioactive material was SLIV ccnditiona!!y released from the radiological controlled area.

10/10/97 WK IR 97-16 NRC PS SA A weakness was identified involving two security program areas that were not identified in the audit program.

10/10/97 STR 1R 97-16 NRC PS 1C A very good program for searching personnel psckages and vehicles was maintained.

10/10/97 STR 1R 97-16 NRC PS 1C 3A All background investigations screening files were complete and thorough.

October 28,1998 19 Wolf Creek Generating Station

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 10/10/97 STR IR 97-16 NRC PS 1C The alarm stations were redundant and well protected.

10/10/97 STR IR 97-16 NRC PS 1C 2A Assessment aids were exce!!ent and provided effective and complete assessment of the perimeter detection zones.

10/10/97 STR 1R 97 NRC PS 1C 3C Senior management support for the security organization was very good.

10/08/97 NCV IR 98-06 LIC PS 3A A non-cited violation was identified for failure to fo!!ow radiological controlled area egress procedures.

10/05/97 VIO IR 97-19 NRC PS 3A SC A mechanic's inattention to detail resulted in the inadvertent use of a contaminated gauge using a radiation SL IV LIC work permit which did not allow the use of contaminated tools. Three licensee-identified examples of woiers in the radiologically controlled area without dosimetry demonstrated that the licensee had not effectively resolved this repetitive concern.

10/02/97 LER LER 92-017 LIC PS 38 A record review determined that three personnel became chemistry qualified under the Wolf Creek qualification program prior to meeting the one year experience requirement. One of these individuals fulfilled the technical specification shift staffing requirements while the plant was in Mode 4 on two occasions in 1992 for a total of approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

i October 28,1998 20 Wolf Creek Generating Station

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- ENCLOSURE 2 .

' GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF Pite TABLE i ansa e '.

Actual date of an event or segruhcant issue for those items that have a cieer dele of occurrencc, the date the source of the irdormahon was issued (such as the LER date), or, for inspection reports, Dese . the test date of the inspecton penod. If the event date is eerher than the current assessment folant performance revow) period, the document issue dete/end of irwParenn should be used and the '

event date documented a the ITEM DESCRtPTION columrt Type .. The categonzation of the tssue see the Type item Code table.'

SFA SALP Funcional Area Codes: OPS for Operatsons; MAINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engmeenng; and PS for Plant Support.

Sources The document that contains the issue informaten:IR for NRC inspection Report; LER for Licensee Event Report; letter for NRR letter.

D. Identdicaton of who discovered issue: NRC for NRC' Ltc for Licensee; or SELF for Self identdyog (events).

heue DescripWon Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

Template Codes - see table.'

Codse .

TYPE ITEM CODES TEW' LATE CODES

~

EA Enforcement Action Letter with Civa PeneRY 1 Operahonal Performance: A Normal Operatens; 8 - Opershons During Treneents; and C - Programs ED Enforcement Discreton - No Civ8 Penalty OveraN Strong Ucensee Performance 2 Metenal Conditsorc A- Eqispment Condihon or B Programs and Pma==

STR WK' OveraN Week Licensee Performance 3 Performance: A - Work Performance; 5 - Knowledge, Skius, and Abthes ITraining; C - Work -

EEI

• Escalated Enforcement item - Waiting Finet NRC Action 4 Ergneenng/Desegrc A- Design; 8 - Enynooring Support; C - Programs and Processee vio y,oaaten Levoli, u. lu, or fv NCY Noncded Velation 5 Problem identdicehon and Ramah*an: A- Identdicebon; 8 - Analysis; and C - Resoluten DEV Deviaten *rorn Licensee Commdment to NRC NOTES:

M M InWe Finding

• Eels are either. (t) apparent violatons of NRC requuements that are being considerad for ecceleted onic.;coment action irfaccordance POS with the

• General Statement of Pohey and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Erdorcement Policy), NUREG 1600, or (2) issues.

NEG Individual Poor inspection Finding which rney represent a SL IV potenhal volabon, that remain open poneng receigd of the licensee's correove actior4 to determine if an NCV or VIO exists. However, the NRC nas not reached its final enforcement decesen on the issues identdied by the Eels and the PtM :

LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC entries wid be moefied when the Im' al rian=aans are made. Before the NRC makes its deosson for escalated enforcemordtems. the licensee will be provided with an opportundy to edher' (1) respond to the apparent violaten or (2) request a predecrosonal enforcement URI " Unresolved item from inspecten Report conference LIC Licensing issue from NRR

• • URis are unrosoeved items about which more informaton is required to determme wheth w the issue in queshon is an acceptable dem, '

MfSC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP), a deviaten, a .,w n.w Jw.. s or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on tM issues and the PIM entnes -

r)ectared Emergency. MswJw.. Issue. ete- will be modified when the final conclusions are made.

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ENCLOSURE 3 WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION INSPECTION PLAN IP -Inspection Procedure Ti-Temporary Instruction Cora inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)

Safety Initiative - Directed by Program Office INSPECTION TITLE / NUMBER OF DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION / COMMENTS PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS 81700 Physical Security Program 1 1/11-15/99 Core Inspection R17En Ocetinntinnni Antiintinn Fvnnentro 1 4DR 901Q0 Cnro Inenactinn e

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