Letter Sequence Other |
---|
|
|
MONTHYEARML20058M4021993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards TIA,93TIA006,interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058L6931993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards TIA 93TIA006,interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058L0091993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards NRR 931102 Response to Region IV 930413 Request for Interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Identified During Performance of Surveillance Testing Project stage: Other ML20058K9811993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards NRR 931102 Response to Region IV Request for Interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Identified During Performance of Surveillance Testing for Info Project stage: Other ML20058K6001993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia,Interpretation of Reporting Requirements, 93TIA006 Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058K5961993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia,Interpretation of Reporting Requirements - 93TIA006,re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058K5801993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia,Interpretation of Reporting Requirements - 93TIA006,re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058K5611993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia:Interpretation of Reporting Requirements, 93TIA006.Guidance Provided in Response to Region 5 Request for Interpretation of Reporting Requirements for safety- Related Components Project stage: Other 1993-12-08
[Table View] |
|
---|
Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEAR1CAN109906, Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 11999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 1 ML20217J4971999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Addl Info Re Results of Util Most Recent Steam Generator Insp at ANO-2 & Util Methodology Used to Predict Future Performance of SG Tubes ML20217J3871999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 0 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure 2CAN109902, Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs1999-10-15015 October 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs ML20217J3601999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Integranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 1 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure 2CAN109903, Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp1999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp ML20217D1721999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re 990729 Request for Amend to TSs Allowing Special SG Insp for Plant,Unit 2.Questions Re Proposed Insp Scope for Axial Cracking Degradation in Eggcrate Support Region Submitted.Response Requested by 991015 1CAN109905, Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included ML20212L0621999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation & Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability 1CAN099908, Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria1999-09-30030 September 1999 Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria 2CAN099902, Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,20001999-09-29029 September 1999 Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,2000 1CAN099903, Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.31999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.3 1CAN099907, Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative1999-09-26026 September 1999 Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative 1CAN099906, Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data1999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data 2CAN099901, Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 9908271999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 990827 2CAN099904, Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR ML20212F5031999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards SER Granting Relief Requests 1-98-001 & 1-98-002 Which Would Require Design Mods to Comply with Code Requirements,Which Would Impose Significant Burden Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) 1CAN099905, Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments1999-09-17017 September 1999 Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments ML20212D9961999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Completed Midcycle PPR of Arkansas Nuclear One.Nrc Plan to Conduct Core Insps at Facility Over Next 7 Months.Details of Insp Plan Through March 2000 Encl 1CAN099902, Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld 2CAN099905, Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested1999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested 1CAN099901, Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments1999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) 0CAN099906, Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs1999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs ML20211L4901999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-12 & 50-368/99-12 on 990711- 0821.No Violations Noted ML20211J2351999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant, Unit 1 ML20211E6161999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Amend 15 to ANO Unit 2,USAR,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6).Summary of 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Associated with Amend 15 of ANO Unit 2 SAR Will Be Provided Under Separate Cover Ltr with 30 Days 0CAN089905, Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 19991999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 1999 ML20211F4181999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 980603 & 990517 Requests for Approval of risk-informed Alternative to 1992 Edition of ASME BPV Code Section Xi,Insp Requirements for Class 1, Category B-J Piping Welds ML20211G0731999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Applications for Renewal of Operating License for Kw Canitz & Aj South.Without Encls 1CAN089904, Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl 0CAN089903, Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves1999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves IR 05000368/19990111999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313//99-11 & 50-368/99-11 on 990719-23.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program & Observation of Requalification Exam Activities at Unit 1 2CAN089901, Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 9907291999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 990729 1CAN089902, Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License1999-08-0505 August 1999 Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License 2CAN089902, Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested1999-08-0404 August 1999 Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams 0CAN089902, Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified1999-08-0202 August 1999 Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified 0CAN089901, Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 9906031999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 990603 ML20210L3581999-07-29029 July 1999 Ltr Contract,Task Order 43, Arkansas Nuclear One Safety System Engineering Insp (Ssei), Under Contract NRC-03-98-021 1CAN079903, Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks ML20216D8131999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant,Unit 1 ML20216D3561999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses non-cited Violation Identified in Insp Rept 50-313/98-21,involving Failure to Have Acceptable Alternative Shutdown Capability for ANO-1 ML20210C2191999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-08 & 50-368/99-08 on 990530-0710 at Arkansas Nuclear One,Units 1 & 2,reactor Facility.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities at Plant Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations ML20209H5251999-07-15015 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Licensee 980701 & 990311 Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 RAI, Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 1CAN079901, Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages1999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages 0CAN079902, Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl ML20209E5551999-07-0808 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Rv Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217J4971999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Addl Info Re Results of Util Most Recent Steam Generator Insp at ANO-2 & Util Methodology Used to Predict Future Performance of SG Tubes ML20217J3871999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 0 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20217J3601999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Integranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 1 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20217D1721999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re 990729 Request for Amend to TSs Allowing Special SG Insp for Plant,Unit 2.Questions Re Proposed Insp Scope for Axial Cracking Degradation in Eggcrate Support Region Submitted.Response Requested by 991015 ML20212L0621999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation & Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability ML20212F5031999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards SER Granting Relief Requests 1-98-001 & 1-98-002 Which Would Require Design Mods to Comply with Code Requirements,Which Would Impose Significant Burden Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML20212D9961999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Completed Midcycle PPR of Arkansas Nuclear One.Nrc Plan to Conduct Core Insps at Facility Over Next 7 Months.Details of Insp Plan Through March 2000 Encl ML20211L4901999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-12 & 50-368/99-12 on 990711- 0821.No Violations Noted ML20211J2351999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant, Unit 1 ML20211F4181999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 980603 & 990517 Requests for Approval of risk-informed Alternative to 1992 Edition of ASME BPV Code Section Xi,Insp Requirements for Class 1, Category B-J Piping Welds IR 05000368/19990111999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313//99-11 & 50-368/99-11 on 990719-23.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program & Observation of Requalification Exam Activities at Unit 1 ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML20210L3581999-07-29029 July 1999 Ltr Contract,Task Order 43, Arkansas Nuclear One Safety System Engineering Insp (Ssei), Under Contract NRC-03-98-021 ML20216D8131999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant,Unit 1 ML20210C2191999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-08 & 50-368/99-08 on 990530-0710 at Arkansas Nuclear One,Units 1 & 2,reactor Facility.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities at Plant Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations ML20209H5251999-07-15015 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Licensee 980701 & 990311 Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 RAI, Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 ML20209E5551999-07-0808 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Rv Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 ML20209D8521999-07-0707 July 1999 Responds to Util 990706 Request That NRC Exercise Discretion Not to Enforce Compliance with Actions Required by TS 3.7.2, Auxiliary Electrical Sys. NOED Warranted & Approval Granted for Extension of Allowed Outage Time to 14 Days ML20209A8561999-06-25025 June 1999 Refers to Investigation Rept A4-1998-042 Re Potential Falsification of Training Record by Senior Licensed Operator at Arkansas Nuclear One Facility.Nrc Concluded That Training Attendance Record Falsified IR 05000313/19990071999-06-21021 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-313/99-07 & 50-368/99-07 Issued on 990514.Adequacy of Min Staffing Levels May Be Reviewed During Future Insps ML20196D4241999-06-21021 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp of License SOP-43716 Issued on 990325.Believes That NRC Concerns Have Been Adequately Addressed at Present ML20207H3551999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-05 & 50-368/99-05 on 990411-0529.No Violations Noted ML20195G3481999-06-0909 June 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Transmitting Changes to Facility Emergency Plan,Rev 25,under Provisions of 10CFR50,App E, Section V IR 05000313/19993011999-06-0909 June 1999 Discusses Arrangements for Administration of Licensing Exam During Wk of 991213,per Telcon of 990602.As Agreed,Exams Repts 50-313/99-301 & 50-368/99-301 Will Be Prepared Based on Guidelines in Rev 8 of NUREG-1021 ML20195F1631999-06-0808 June 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-06 & 50-368/99-06 on 990524-28.Violation Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violation ML20207G3111999-06-0707 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Changes to ANO EP Implementing Prcoedure 1903.010,Emergency Action Level Classification,Rev 34 PC-2, Received on 981218,under 10CFR50,App E,Section V Provisions. No Violations Identified ML20207G7951999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Notice of Violation Re Investigation Rept A4-1998-042 Re Apparent Violation Involving Initialing Record to Indicate Attendance at Required Reactor Simulator Training Session Not Attended ML20207E7131999-06-0202 June 1999 Discusses EOI 990401 Request for Alternative to Requirements of Iwl for Arkansas Nuclear One,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B) & ASME BPV Code Section XI & Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative ML20207B9521999-05-26026 May 1999 Discusses GL 98-04, Potential for Degradation of ECCS & CSS After LOCA Because of Const & Protective Coating Deficiencies & Foreign Matl in Containment. Staff Will Conduct Limited Survey in to Identify Sampling ML20207B4171999-05-24024 May 1999 Forwards Corrected Cover Ltr to Insp Repts 50-313/99-07 & 50-368/99-07 Issued 990514 with Incorrect Insp Closing Date ML20207A7771999-05-24024 May 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/98-21 & 50-368/98-21 on 981116-990406.One Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violation,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20206U4541999-05-17017 May 1999 Discusses Util & Suppl Re Changes to License NPF-06,App a TSs Bases Section.Staff Offers No Objection to These Bases Changes.Affected Bases Pages,B 202, B 2-4,B 2-7,B 3/4 2-1,B 3/4 2-3 & B 3/4 6-4,encl ML20206S4721999-05-14014 May 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-07 & 50-368/99-07 on 990426- 30.No Violations Noted.However,Nrc Requests That Util Provide Evaluation of Licensee Provisions to Maintain Adequate Level of Response Force Personnel on-site ML20207B4271999-05-14014 May 1999 Corrected Ltr Forwarding Insp Repts 50-313/99-07 & 50-368/99-07 on 990426-30.No Violations Noted.Areas Examined During Insp Included Portions of Physical Security Program ML20206R4741999-05-13013 May 1999 Informs That Staff Reviewed Draft Operation Insp Rept for Farley Nuclear Station Cooling Water Pond Dam & Concurs with FERC Findings.Any Significant Changes Made Prior to Issuance of Final Rept Should Be Discussed with NRC ML20206N7011999-05-12012 May 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization, Division of Licensing Project Management Created ML20206M7581999-05-11011 May 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Relief Request from ASME Code Section XI Requirements for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20206S1761999-05-11011 May 1999 Responds to Informing of Changes in Medical Condition & Recommending License Restriction for Senior Reactor Operator.No Change Was Determined in Current License Conditions for Individual ML20206N4161999-05-11011 May 1999 Discusses Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-related Logic Circuits, for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20206S4211999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-04 & 50-368/99-04 on 990228- 0410.Four Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20206H1031999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards Results of Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam, Administered on 990407,to Nominated Employees of Facility. Requests That Training Dept Forward Individual Answer Sheet & Results to Appropriate Individuals.Without Encl ML20206F0611999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee Re ISI Plan for Third 10-year Interval & Associated Requests for Alternatives for Plant,Unit 1 ML20205R6331999-04-20020 April 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Transmitted Rev 39 to ANO Industrial Security Plan,Submitted Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).No NRC Approval Is Required,Since Util Determined Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan ML20205P4641999-04-15015 April 1999 Forwards for Review & Comment Draft Info Notice That Describes Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 2,Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 & Ja Fitzpatrick NPP ML20205N7251999-04-13013 April 1999 Forwards Summary of 990408 Meeting with EOI in Jackson, Mississippi Re EOI Annual Performance Assessment of Facilities & Other Issues of Mutual Interest.List of Meeting Attendees & Licensee Presentation Slides Encl ML20205M6881999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation on Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Request Relief 96-005 ML20205L7711999-04-0909 April 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-03 & 50-368/99-03 on 990202- 17.No Violations Noted ML20205K7681999-04-0606 April 1999 Forwards RAI Re risk-informed Alternative to Certain Requirements of ASME Code 11,table IWB-2500-1 ML20205G8871999-04-0202 April 1999 Forwards RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs, for Plant, Units 1 & 2.Response Requested within 60 Days of Date of Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] |
Text
.
I g$a Rtc Uf6tTED STAVES
. .y, ?g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f 't )g j REGloN (V o ~8 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SulTE 400 ,
Y, y [ AR LINGTON, T EXAS 76011-8064 >
- Dockets: 50-313 50-368 Licenses: DPR-51 NPF-6 Entergy Operations, Inc.
ATTN: J. W. Yelverton, Vice President ;
Operations, Arkansas Nuclear One Route 3, Box 157G Russellville, Arkansas 72801
SUBJECT:
TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT: INTERPRETATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS - 93TIA006 (TAC N0. M86339)
The purpose of this letter is to provide for your information a copy of the guidance recently issued by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in their Memorandum of November 2,1993, to Region IV (see enclosed). This guidance was provided in response to a Region IV request for interpretation of -
reporting requirements related to multiple failures of safety-related components that are identified during the performance of surveillance testing.
We plan to implement this guidance during out future inspections at your facilities. Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact Tom Westerman of my staff at 817-860-8145.
i C rector Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure:
(as noted) cc w/ enclosure: ,
Entergy Operations, Inc. t ATTN: Harry W. Kr'ser, Executive :
Vice Pret. dent & Chief Operating Officer 1 P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 l Entergy Operations, Inc. j ATTN: John R. McGaha, Vice President i Operations Support ,
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 3C36 .j 9312160097 931200 PDR ADOCK 05000h 3 P PDR ([
'l
Entergy Operations, Inc. Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway ATTN: Robert B. McGehee, Esq.
P.O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Honorable C. Doug Luningham County Judge of Pope County Pope County Courthouse Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Winston & Strawn ATTN: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq. ,
1400 L Street, N.W. l Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 Arkansas Department of Health ATTH: Ms. Greta Dicus, Director Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management 4815 West Markham Street Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3867 B&W Nuclear Technologies ATTN: Robert B. Borsum Licensing Representative 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525-Rockville, Maryland 20852 Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, USN (Ret) 214 South Morris Street Oxford, Maryland 21654 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power ATTN: Charles B. Brinkman Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 l
l I
l
i Entergy Operations, Inc. 1 l
bcc to DMB (IE51) g bcc distrib. by RIV: l l
J. L. Milhoan Resident Inspector l Section Chief (DRP/0) Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 l MIS System DRSS-FIPS ;
RIV File Section Chief (DRP\TSS)
Project Engineer (DRP/D) E. Adensan, NMSS 4 E4 W. Reckley, NRR 13 HIS i
i r
I RIV:C:ES* DD:d) ,- D;D k # k D:DRS m TFWesterman A h oyell [ dBek N SJ[obs ;
12/2/93
- Previously Concurred kfbd kN93 / ,/93 140084 P
4 E'ntergy Operations, Inc. !
f bec to DMB (IE51) bec distrib. by RIV: ;
J. L. Milhoan Resident Inspector ,
Section Chief (DRP/D) Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: HNBB 4503 '
MIS System DRSS-FIPS RIV File Section Chief (DRP\TSS)
Project Engineer (DRP/D) E. Adensan, NMSS 4 E4 W. Reckley, NRR 13 H15 i
i l
[
f RIV:C:ES* DD:ds) / D 0'Rh M( D:DRS ,
TFWesterman A[Hoyell [ AYBe'a&I N SJ h M s 12/2/93 'k/MI @[bf93 /k93
l 1
l l
I
, c- ;
~
pa arc ;
7 ?t UnilTED STATES
[ W
~
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !
i3 '; WASHINGTON, D.C. 20SbOOO1 ,
5 .
t
% *,' , ,+ # November 2. 1993 '
MEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel J. Collins, Director Division of Reactor Safety Region IV .
FROM: Elinor G. Adensam, Assistant Director for Regions IV and V Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT: INTERPRETATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMEN1S - 93TIA006 (TAC NO. M86339)
In response to your request dated April 13,199S, we have reviewed the ,
available guidance associated with the reporting requirements related to multiple failures of safety-related components that are identified during the performance of surveillance procedures. The specific examples cited in your questions regarded the outage surveillances related to primary or secondary safety relief valves and the discovery that the as-found setpoints were outside the allowable cachnical specification setpoint tolerances. Please note that the Public Document Room (PDR) has been included on the distribution for this response.
Licensees were stated to have presented interpretations of the reporting rules (10 CFR 50.72/50.73) and the related guidance provided in NUREG-1022, which supported the conclusion that the discovery of safety valve setpoint drift was ,
not reportable. Scecifically, question 2.3 of NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, had ,
been used to argue that the condition was not reportable, because the _
l condition could be assumed to have occurred at the time of discovery. Another argument presented by licensees was stated to involve analyses or evaluations which determined that the degraded setpoints did not result in the plant .
1 operating outside its design basis, and therefore supported a conclusion that the condition was not reportable.
A review of 50.72 and 50.73 identifies several reporting criteria which might be relevant to the discovery of safety valves outside the setpoint tolerances i given in the Technical Specifications. These criteria and a discussion of their applicability is provided in Enclosure 1. ,
The assessment can be summarized as follows: -
- The use of question 2.3 to NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, is not appropriate !
to justify a decision to not report many conditions found during refueling outage surveillances. Other guidance in Supplement 1 is clear i that if conditions are discovered during an outage, but are believed to have existed during operation, they are reportable so long as an ,
applicable threshold for reporting is reached.
h}-l)(0fL3 y
P W
Samuel J. Collins November 2, 1993 *
- A licensee may determine that a condition such as safety valve setpoint drift, does not constitute operation outside the design basis of the ;
plant, and therefore not report such events in accordance with those criteria in 50.72 and 50.73. However, as discussed below, the condition ,
may be reportable as a result of other criteria.
- 50.73(a)(2)(vii) is deemed the most relevant criterion for the reporting of primary or secondary safety valves found to be outside the acceptable setpoint tolerance. This is due to the fact that this criterion is based on the train or channel level and does not require the loss of a safety function but only the inoperability of multiple channels of a safety system. Some latitude might be given in light of the number of secondary safety valves; but, for most instances of setpoint drift, this criterion '
would result in the conditions being reportable.
- Note that we currently expect to include guidance along these lines in 4 the forthcoming Revision 1 to NUREG-1022; if so, that specific guidance should be consulted in the future in determining reportability.
Elinor G. Adensam, Assistant Director for Regions IV and V Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation e
Enclosure:
Criteria l cc w/ enclosure. )
W. Hodges, Region I ;
A. Gibson, Region II j G. Grant. Region III j K. Perkins, Region V ;
'l
)
l 1
l l
\
l l
l ENCLOSURE I
l ASSESSMENT OF VARIOUS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICABILITY TO PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SAFETY VALVES FOUND OUTSIDE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACCEPTABLE SETPOINT TOLERANCE BAND 50.72(b)(1)(ii) Any event or condition during operation that results in the 50.73(a)(2)(ii) condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or results in the nuclear power plant being:
(A) In an unanalyzed condition that significantly ,
compromises plant safety; '
(B) In a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant; or (C) In a condition not covered by the plant's operating ,
and emergency procedures. -
Discussion: The applicability of these criteria is determined by an evaluation of the situation by the licensee. Upon ;
determining that the setpoints were outside the allowable i range of the technical specifications, the licensee would be expected to follow the required actions of the technical specifications and assess the plant condition in regards to ;
~
equipment operability and required corrective actions.
Guidance related to the evaluation of degraded and nonconforming conditions is provided by Generic Letter 91-18. As stated in the second draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, it is expected that licensees may use engineering judgement and experience in determining whether a condition meets these reporting criteria. The ability of a licensee to justify that a given condition is neither unanalyzed nor outside the design basis is dependent on the as-found condition of the equipment and the degree of analyses performed. ;
50.72(b)(2)(i) Any event, found while the reactor is shut'down, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal I safety barriers, being seriously degraded or being in an <
unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant j safety. j Discussion: The arguments are very similar to those above and again can '
support either a reportable or non-reportable conclusion I based on the licensee's assessment of the significance of the condition. However, this criterion was intended to capture potential proDiems which might be discovered only during refueling outage surveillances. Question 7.10 in NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, is considered relevant guidance in regard to the reportability of equipment found to be inoperable during outage surveillances. 1
I V
Question 2.3 of NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, and the second draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, state that failures should be assumed to occur at the time of discovery unless there is firm evidence to believe otherwise. It seems appropriate to classify setpoint drift as a mechanism which would occur some time (usually indeterminable) during the period between calibration and subsequent surveillance unless some factor, such as an extended outage or testing conditions, could be identified as a likely cause. if testing conditions or other causes are identified such that reporting is deemed unnecessary, the licensee would still be expected, under other programs and regulatory requirements, to evaluate the adequacy of the surveillance program to ensure that the activity is ensuring the operability of the safety valves or other components. A voluntary report may still be useful as a means of distributing the information related to the problem and its cause to the industry. Please note that although question 2.3 may be deemed an insufficient' reason to determine safety valve drift is not reportable, the licensee may determine that the significance (see above) of the condition does not satisfy the reporting threshold.
50.72(b)(2)(iii) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the 50.73(a)(2)(v) fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, t (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or ,
(D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Discussion: The second draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, provides safety valve drift as an example of a common mode problem which may be reportable under this criterion. The example was added to the case described in Information Notice 85-27 which dealt with multiple inoperable control rods. Although l certain occurrences of multiple safety valve drift problems should be determined to be reportable under this criterion, it should not be assumed that all cases of one or more safety valves exceeding the technical specification tolerance band need be reportable in accordance with this criterion. As in the previously discussed reporting criteria, the licensee's engineering jud7ement should determine if the condition could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Candidates for reporting ;
include those cases in which the setpoints of multiple i safety valves could have resulted in exceeding the j associated system's design pressure. If experience or engineering. judgement can reasonably estimate the maximum I
l
. 1
. I
)
l I
drift which might occur and determine that the safety !
function would be maintained, the licensee can determine '
that the condition is not reportable.
Although discussed in the various drafts and revisions of NUREG-1022, it warrants repeating that the primary motivation behind evaluating plant conditions such as safety valve drift should be to ensure safety and only secondarily to determine reportability. If engineering assessments identify a problem and determine that plant equipment was not and reasonably could not be rendered inoperable by a phenomenon such as setpoint drift, the licensee can then also justify a determination that the condition is not reportable. Voluntary reports are appreciated if the licensee feels the information might be helpful to others.
The staff thould, as always, be cautious in recommending that a licensee make a " voluntary" report.
50.73(a)(2)(vi) Events covered in paragraph (a)(2)(v) of this section may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies. However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant to this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety function.
Discussion: (See above) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least I one independent train or channel to become inoperable in '
multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to:
(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Discussion: This criterion may be the most relevant to the specific example of safety valves found outside the technical specification tolerance band. As stated in the second draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, the reporting threshold for this part of 10 CFR 50.73 is lower than for other parts since it is at the train or channel level rather than the system and function levels. Valves found outside the technical specification setpoint tolerance band can reasonably be considered to have been inoperable during operation unless a licensee determines that testing is not representative of conditions during operation (see item 50.72(b)(2)(i)). This -
criterion was developed with general consideration given to the normal two train design level of redundancy. Given that most plants can satisfy pressure relief requirements with several main steam safety valves unavailable, a rigid interpretation of this criterion regarding the secondary safety valves (i.e., any case with more than one safety valve outside the tolerance band) may be overly conservative. However, the licensees are considered to have the weakest argument if they determine that this criterion is not applicable, and therefore the condition is not reportable, when finding multiple safety valves outside the acceptable range.
50.73(a)(2)(i.8) Any operaticn or condition prohibited by the plant's technical specifications.
Discussion: Available guidance regarding operability and technical specification requirements generally have licensees enter the allowed outage time and associated action statements upon discovery of equipment inoperability unless a definite time of inoperability can be established. Technical specifications are considered satisfied provided the allowed outage time and associated action statements are satisfied.
Therefore, provided that licensees restore compliance prior to returning to power operation, reporting of safety valve drift in accordance with this criterion would not be necessary. However, it is expected that upon identification of a problem scch as safety valve setpoint drift, licensees should take actions to prevent recurrence or pursue a change in the technical specification requirements (such as increasing the acceptable tolerance range of the setpoints). e If a licensee determines, through industry experience, information from a vendor, or self assessments, that a component may be inoperable during operation, appropriate actions should be taken in accordance with the technical j specifications (reduce power or shutdown). This reporting '
criterion may be applicable if a licensee fails to satisfy the required action or can determine that a limiting condition of operation had not been satisfied for longer than the allowed outage time following a specific cause for a component becoming inoperable.
l 1