Letter Sequence Other |
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MONTHYEARML20058M4021993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards TIA,93TIA006,interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058L6931993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards TIA 93TIA006,interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058L0091993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards NRR 931102 Response to Region IV 930413 Request for Interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Identified During Performance of Surveillance Testing Project stage: Other ML20058K9811993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards NRR 931102 Response to Region IV Request for Interpretation of Reporting Requirements Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Identified During Performance of Surveillance Testing for Info Project stage: Other ML20058K6001993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia,Interpretation of Reporting Requirements, 93TIA006 Re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058K5961993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia,Interpretation of Reporting Requirements - 93TIA006,re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058K5801993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia,Interpretation of Reporting Requirements - 93TIA006,re Multiple Failures of safety-related Components Project stage: Other ML20058K5611993-12-0808 December 1993 Forwards Tia:Interpretation of Reporting Requirements, 93TIA006.Guidance Provided in Response to Region 5 Request for Interpretation of Reporting Requirements for safety- Related Components Project stage: Other 1993-12-08
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217L0421999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-20 on 990815-0925 & Notice of Violation.Two Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20217N2111999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-14 on 990913-17 & 1004-08.No Violations Noted.Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Effective,Utilized Systems Approach to Training & Showed Continued Improvements Over Previous Insp Findings ML20217L0101999-10-18018 October 1999 Provides Update of Waterford 3 Effort for Review of Ufsar. Info Listed Includes Background Mgt Expectations,Review Status & Results,Clarifications Re Review & Conclusions ML20217L0141999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Update to NRC Staff Re Circumstances & Plans for Submitting Certification Rept on Waterford 3 Plant Specific Simulator ML20217G7051999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Comments on Four of NRC RO Examination Questions for Exam Administered During Week of 991004 05000382/LER-1999-014, Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal ML20217D5151999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Application for Renewal of SRO License for C Fugate License SOP-43039-3,IAW 10CFR55.57.Without Encls ML20217C6251999-10-0505 October 1999 Informs That NRC Reviewed Util Ltr & Encl Exercise Scenario Package for Waterford 3 Emergency Plan Exercise Scheduled for 991013.Based on Review,Nrc Determined That Exercise Appropriate to Meet Objectives ML20212J6921999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-18 on 990830-0902.One Noncited Violation Identified Re Failure to Follow Procedural Instructions to Ensure That Members on Fire Brigade Shift Were Qualified ML20216G2441999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-19 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted 05000382/LER-1999-013, Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form IR 05000382/19993011999-09-21021 September 1999 Informs That NRC License Exam Previously Associated with NRC Insp Rept 50-382/99-301 Will Be Incorporated Into NRC Insp Rept 50-382/99-14 ML20212D8761999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of Waterford 3.During Assessment Period,Number of Personnel Errors Occurred,Which Demonstrated Lack of Attention to Detail by Plant Personnel.Historical Listing of Issues,Encl ML20212C2471999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Five Final Applications for RO Licenses for G Esquival,Jm Hearn,Md Lawson,Re Simpson & PI Wood.Written Exam & Operating Test to Be Administered,Is Requested. Encls Withheld ML20212C2391999-09-16016 September 1999 Requests Cancellation of SRO Licenses for Bn Coble,License SOP-43835,due to Job Assignment Location & CA Rodgers, License SOP-43537-1,due to Resignation from Company, Effective 990901 ML20212C5881999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-15 on 990719-23 with Continuing in Ofc Insp Until 0819.No Violations Noted ML20211Q4421999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-07 on 990601-11.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) ML20211M8391999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Rev 25 to EP-001-020,rev 24 to EP-001-030,rev 25 to EP-001-040,rev 30 to EP-002-100,rev 22 to EP-001-010,rev 27 to EP-002-010,rev 26 to EP-002-102 & Rev 16 to EP-002-190.Listed Proprietary Revs to Epips,Encl ML20211L3681999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Five Preliminary Applications for Reactor Operator Licenses for Individuals Listed,Iaw 10CFR55.31.Encls Withheld ML20211K9741999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-16 on 990704-0814.Two Severity Level IV Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy 05000382/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20211M3641999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Written Examination,Operating Tests & Supporting Ref Matl Identified in Attachment 2 of ES-210,in Response to NRC .Encl Withheld ML20211G5751999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards RAI Re IPEEE Submittal.Please Provide RAI within 60 Days of Receipt of Ltr,Per Util Response to GL 88-20,suppl 4 ML20211E3281999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Period of 990101-0630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Ltr Does Not Contain Commitments 05000382/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately 05000382/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20211F5421999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Proposed marked-up TS Page Xviii, Index Administrative Controls, Correcting Page Number Re TS Change Request NPF-38-220.Editorial Changes for TS Change NPF-38-221 Discussed ML20211F3561999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards CTS Pages & TS Proposed marked-up Pages for Insertion Into TS Change Request NPF-38-207 Re Efas, Originally Submitted on 980702.Original NSHC Determination Continues to Be Applicable ML20211F4611999-08-24024 August 1999 Informs That NRC Reviewed Ltr & Encl Objectives for Waterford 3 Emergency Plan Exercise Scheduled for 991013.Exercise Objectives Appropriate to Meet Emergency Plan Requirements ML20211G1731999-08-23023 August 1999 Informs That Info Submitted in ,B&W Rept 51-1234900-00,will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20210T9791999-08-18018 August 1999 Discusses Which Responded to Reconsideration of Violation Denial (EA 98-022) Enforcement Action Detailed in .Concludes That Violation Occurred as Stated ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210S0561999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Voluntary Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, for NRC Fys 2000 & 2001 for Waterford 3 ML20210Q6161999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Corrected Copy of Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Waterford 3.Original Rept,Submitted with ,Contained Typos ML20217F2661999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Copy of 1999 Waterford 3 Biennial Exercise Package to Be Performed Using Waterford 3 CR Simulator ML20210R9231999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-10 on 990719-23.Violations Noted.Nrc Has Determined That One Severity Level IV Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams 05000382/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl ML20210H4291999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Rai,Associated with TS Change Request NPF-38-208,proposing to Replace Ref to Supplement 1 with Ref to Supplement 2 of Calculative Methods for CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model, in ACs Section of TSs ML20210F9451999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Version of Rev 29 to EPIP EP-002-100, Technical Support Ctr Activation,Operation & Deactivation. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210D3171999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Proposal for Final Resolution of Reracking Spent Fuel Pool at Plant,Per License Amend 144,issued by NRC in .No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr 05000382/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached ML20210D8701999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Plan Requests for Relief ISI-018 Through ISI-020 for Entergy Operations,Inc,Unit 3 ML20210B1521999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-13 on 990523-0703.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20209G9771999-07-13013 July 1999 Forwards Objectives & Guidelines for Waterford 3 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 991013.List of Objectives cross-referenced Where Applicable to Relevant Sections of NUREG-0654 IR 05000382/19990081999-07-12012 July 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/99-08 Issued on 990503 ML20209E5231999-07-0909 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL-92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2.This Closes Staff Efforts Re TAC MA0583 ML20209D4051999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Revised TS Pages to Replace Attachment C,Entirely in Original TS Change Request NPF-38-207,per 990519 Discussion with C Patel of Nrc.Changes to Action 20 Delete Word Requirement & Revise Word Modes to Mode 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217L0421999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-20 on 990815-0925 & Notice of Violation.Two Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20217N2111999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-14 on 990913-17 & 1004-08.No Violations Noted.Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Effective,Utilized Systems Approach to Training & Showed Continued Improvements Over Previous Insp Findings ML20217C6251999-10-0505 October 1999 Informs That NRC Reviewed Util Ltr & Encl Exercise Scenario Package for Waterford 3 Emergency Plan Exercise Scheduled for 991013.Based on Review,Nrc Determined That Exercise Appropriate to Meet Objectives ML20212J6921999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-18 on 990830-0902.One Noncited Violation Identified Re Failure to Follow Procedural Instructions to Ensure That Members on Fire Brigade Shift Were Qualified ML20216G2441999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-19 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted IR 05000382/19993011999-09-21021 September 1999 Informs That NRC License Exam Previously Associated with NRC Insp Rept 50-382/99-301 Will Be Incorporated Into NRC Insp Rept 50-382/99-14 ML20212D8761999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of Waterford 3.During Assessment Period,Number of Personnel Errors Occurred,Which Demonstrated Lack of Attention to Detail by Plant Personnel.Historical Listing of Issues,Encl ML20212C5881999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-15 on 990719-23 with Continuing in Ofc Insp Until 0819.No Violations Noted ML20211Q4421999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-07 on 990601-11.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211K9741999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-16 on 990704-0814.Two Severity Level IV Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20211G5751999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards RAI Re IPEEE Submittal.Please Provide RAI within 60 Days of Receipt of Ltr,Per Util Response to GL 88-20,suppl 4 ML20211F4611999-08-24024 August 1999 Informs That NRC Reviewed Ltr & Encl Objectives for Waterford 3 Emergency Plan Exercise Scheduled for 991013.Exercise Objectives Appropriate to Meet Emergency Plan Requirements ML20211G1731999-08-23023 August 1999 Informs That Info Submitted in ,B&W Rept 51-1234900-00,will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210T9791999-08-18018 August 1999 Discusses Which Responded to Reconsideration of Violation Denial (EA 98-022) Enforcement Action Detailed in .Concludes That Violation Occurred as Stated ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210R9231999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-10 on 990719-23.Violations Noted.Nrc Has Determined That One Severity Level IV Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML20210D8701999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Plan Requests for Relief ISI-018 Through ISI-020 for Entergy Operations,Inc,Unit 3 ML20210B1521999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-13 on 990523-0703.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations IR 05000382/19990081999-07-12012 July 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/99-08 Issued on 990503 ML20209E5231999-07-0909 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL-92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2.This Closes Staff Efforts Re TAC MA0583 ML20196E6931999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Corrected Ltr Re Changes to Rev 19 to Emergency Plan.Original Ltr Had Error in Subject Line ML20196E0831999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-12 on 990524-27.No Violations Noted.Purpose of Insp Was to Conduct Assessment of Emergency Preparedness Program ML20196D9941999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-11 on 990524-28.No Violations Noted ML20195J8091999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaulation Re First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Relief Request for Plant,Unit 3 ML20196C8711999-06-15015 June 1999 Discusses Insp Rept 50-382/99-08 & Forwards Notice of Violation Re Unescorted Access Which Was Mistakenly Granted to Individual Whose Background Investigation Indicated That He Had Failed Prior Drug Screening with Another Employer ML20196F3721999-06-0909 June 1999 Corrected Ltr Forwarding Rev 19 to Emergency Plan ML20195G3711999-06-0909 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Ltr Dtd 981223,which Transmitted Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan,Rev 24,under Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section V.No Violations of 10CFR50.54(q) Identified During Review ML20207E8541999-06-0303 June 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 990114 Submittal of one-time Request for Relief from ASME B&PV Code IST Requirements for Pressurizer Safety Valves at Plant,Unit 3 ML20207G3441999-06-0303 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-09 on 990411-0522 & Notice of Violation.One Violation Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violation C ML20207D3771999-05-27027 May 1999 Ack Receipt of 990401 & 0504 Ltrs Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/99-01 on 990303 ML20207A5121999-05-24024 May 1999 Refers to Which Responded to NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Sent by .Violations A,B & E Withdrawn & Violations C & D Changed to Severity Level IV ML20206U7851999-05-18018 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-06 on 990405-09.Three Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations ML20206N6961999-05-11011 May 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization, Division of Licensing Project Management Created ML20206S4411999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-05 on 990228-0410.Three Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20206H3841999-05-0707 May 1999 Informs That on 990407,NRC Administered Generic Fundamental Exam Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam.Licensee Facility Did Not Participate in Exam,However Copy of Master Exam,With Answer Key,Encl for Info.Without Encl ML20206K0951999-05-0606 May 1999 Discusses Insp Rept 50-382/99-08 Issued 990503 Without Cover Ltr Documenting EA Number & Subject Line Indicated NOV Which Was Incorrect.Corrected Cover Ltr Encl ML20206F4701999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-08 on 990405-07.One Apparent Violation Re Failure to Review & Consider Derogatory Access Authorization Background Info as Required by PSP Identified & Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action ML20206K1211999-05-0303 May 1999 Corrected Cover Ltr Forwarding Insp Rept 50-382/99-08 on 990405-07.One Violations Noted & Being Considered for Escalated EA ML20205N7251999-04-13013 April 1999 Forwards Summary of 990408 Meeting with EOI in Jackson, Mississippi Re EOI Annual Performance Assessment of Facilities & Other Issues of Mutual Interest.List of Meeting Attendees & Licensee Presentation Slides Encl ML20205M0561999-04-0909 April 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-04 on 990301-19.One Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violation,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20205J8781999-04-0505 April 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-02 on 990117-0227.No Violations Noted.Inspectors Determined That Six Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20205J0901999-04-0202 April 1999 Informs That Info Submitted by & 970313 Affidavit Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(b) (5) ML20205A4681999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-03 on 990308-12.Two Violations of Radiation Protection Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20205A6141999-03-25025 March 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Request to Use Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assemblies (Mnsas) as an Alternative Repair Method,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) for Reactor Coolant Sys Application at Plant,Unit 3 ML20205F3311999-03-19019 March 1999 Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Plant,Unit 3 PPR Review,Which Was Completed on 990211.Performance at Plant,Unit 3 Was Acceptable ML20204E4941999-03-17017 March 1999 Discusses TSs Bases Change Re 3/4.4.1,3/4.6.1.7,3/4.6.3, 3/4.7.12 & 3/4.8.4.Forwards Affected Bases Pp B 3/4 4-1, B 3/4 6-3,B 3/4 6-4,B 3/4 7-7 & B 3/4 8-3 ML20207F1251999-03-0303 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-01 on 990125-29 & 0208-12 & Notice of Violations ML20203H8501999-02-17017 February 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 970701 Submittal of Second Ten Year ISI Program & Associated Relief Request for Plant, Unit 3.Nine Relief Requests Had Been Authorized Previously & Proposed Alternatives Remain Authorized ML20203D7211999-02-11011 February 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Licensee 970317 & 990111 Responses to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves. Response Should Be Provided within 60 Days 1999-09-09
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OfelTE D ST ATES y- pa, afCg%
, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO*d ;
! /]I REGION IV
%[ f 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
$ AR Lt NG TON, T E X AS 76011 8064 ,
DEC 8 093 i
Docket:
50-382 License: NPF-38 Entergy Operations, Inc.
ATIN: Ross P. Barkhurst, Vice President i Operations, Waterford '
P.O. Box B i Killona, Louisiana 70066
SUBJECT:
TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT: INTERPRETATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS - 93TIA006 (TAC NO. M86339) :
The purpose of this letter is to provide for your information a copy of the guidance recently issued by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in their-Memorandum of November 2, 1993, to Region IV (see enclosed). This guidance was provided in response to a Region IV request for interpretation of reporting requirements related to multiple failures of safety-related ,
components that are identified during the performance of surveillance testing.
We plan to implement this guidance during out future inspections at your facility. Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact Tom Westerman of my staff at 817-860-8145.
t a ue . to ns, irector Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure:
(as noted) cc w/ enclosure: 1 Entergy Operations, Inc. '
ATIN: Harry W. Keiser, Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer P.O. Box 31995 ;
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Entergy Operations, Inc.
ATTN: Jerrold G. Dewease, Vice President Operations Support P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286
.i I
9312150329 931208 [
PDR ADOCK 05000382 a P PDR d
1 l
1 i
S Entergy Operations, Inc. i Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway l ATTN: Robert B. McGehee, Esq. .;
P.O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 j Entergy Operations, Inc. >
ATTN: D. F. Packer, General Manager Plant Operations P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 i
' Entergy Operations, Inc. I ATTN: L. W. Laughlin !
Licensing Manager !
P.O. Box B ;
Killona, Louisiana 70066 ;
Chairman Louisiana Public Service Commission !
One American Place, Suite 1630 ;
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825-1697 Entergy Operations, Inc. _;
ATTN: R. F. Burski, Director Nuclear Safety l P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 i Hall Bohlinger, Administrator Radiation Protection Division P.O. Box 82135 ;
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135 j Parish President !'
St. Charles Parish P.O. Box 302 i Hahnville, Louisiana 70057 i Mr. William A. Cross !
Bethesda Licensing Office !
3 Metro Center :
Suite 610 -l Bethesda, Maryland 20814 j Winston & Strawn !
ATTN: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
1400 L Street, N.W. :
Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 j l
i
__ I
Entergy Operations, Inc. ;
i bec to DMB (IE51) bcc distrib. by RIV: !
J. L. Milhoan Resident Inspector !
Section Chief (DRP/D) Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 !
MIS System DRSS-FIPS i' RIV File Project Engineer (DRP/D)
Section Chief (DRP/TSS) E. Adensan, NMSS 4 E4 ;
W. Reckley, NRR 13 HIS j i
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RIV:C:ES* DDARh / D:DRPyah D:087)
TFWesterman [Tl/owel)# ABBA N [ [C[1 Yins / '
12/2/93 k$/93 \Y[h93 k
v' Entergy Operations, Inc. bec to DMB (IE51) k bec distrib. by RIV:
J. L. Milhoan Resident Inspector >
Section Chief (DRP/D) Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 MIS System DRSS-FIPS RIV File Project Engineer (DRP/D)
Section Chief (DRP/TSS) E. Adensan, NMSS 4 E4 W. Reckley, NRR 13 HIS t
O RIV:C:ES* DD M / D:DRPya M - D:DPf\
TFWesterman [Thowell! ABBE h [ JbCflYins /
12/2/93 fD8/93 \kh93 \
- Previously Concurre'd 140077 1
[ e 1
g""g UNITED STATES i
fy 4 j j d' ,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
November 2. 1993
- .+F HEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel J. Collins, Director .
Division of Reactor Safety l' Region IV FROM: Elinor G. Adensam, Assistant Director for Regions IV and V !
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT: INTERPRETATION OF REPORTING
SUBJECT:
REQUIREMENTS - 93TIA006 (TAC NO. M86339) i In response to your request dated April 13, 1993, we have reviewed the available guidance associated with the reporting requirements related to multiple failures of safety-related components that are identified during the performance of surveillance procedures. The specific examples cited in your 4
questions regarded the outage surveillances related to primary or secondary :
safety relief valves and the discovery that the as-found setpoints were !
outside the allowable technical specification setpoint tolerances. Please !
note that the Public Document Room (PDR) has been included on the distribution for this response.
Licensees were stated to have presented interpretations of the reporting rules (10 CFR 50.72/50.73) and the related guidance provided in NUREG-1022, which }
supported the conclusion that the discovery of safety valve setpoint drift was ,
not reportable. Specifically, question 2.3 of NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, had ;
been used to argue that the condition was not reportable, because the i condition could be assumed to have occurred at the time of discovery. Another argument presented by licensees was stated to involve analyses or evaluations '
which determined that the degraded setpoints did not result in the plant operating outside its design basis, and therefore supported a conclusion that . .
the condition was not reportable. !
i A review of 50.72 and 50.73 identifies several reporting criteria which might be relevant to the discovery of safety valves outside the setpoint tolerances ;
given in the Technical Specifications. These criteria and a discussion of their applicability is provided in Enclosure 1.
The assessment can be summarized as follows:
- The use of question 2.3 to NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, is not appropriate i to justify a decision to not report many conditions found during ;
refueling outage surveillances. Other guidance in Supplement 1 is clear ;
that if conditions are discovered during an outage, but are believed to have existed during operation, they are reportable so long as an applicable threshold for reporting is reached. j
}-jfl$O][f' ,
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e, Samuel J. Collins November 2, 1993
- A licensee may determine that a condition such as safety valve setpoint drift, does not constitute operation outside the design basis of the plant, and therefore not report such events in accordance with those criteria in 50.72 and 50.73. However, as discussed below, the condition may be reportable as a result of other criteria.
- 50.73(a)(2)(vii) is deemed the most relevant criterion for the reporting of primary or secondary safety valves found to be outside the acceptable setpoint tolerance. This is due to the fact that this criterion is based on the train or channel level and does not require the loss of a safety ?
function but only the inoperability of multiple channels of a safety i system. Some latitude might be given in light of the number of secondary safety valves; but, for most instances of setpoint drift, this criterion I would result in the conditions being reportable. !
- Note that we currently expect to include guidance along these lines in i the forthcoming Revision 1 to NUREG-1022; if so, that specific guidance :
should be consulted in the future in determining reportability.
i Elinor G. Adensam. Assistant Director r for Regions IV and V Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Criteria cc w/ enclosure:
W. Hodges, Region I A. Gibson, Region II-G. Grant, Region III .
K. Perkins, Region V i
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i ENCLOSURE !
ASSESSMENT OF VARIOUS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICABILITY TO PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SAFETY VALVES FOUND OUTSIDE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACCEPTABLE SETPOINT TOLERANCE BAND 50.72(b)(1)(ii) Any event or condition during operation that results in the i 50.73(a)(2)(ii) condition of the nuclear power plant, including its ,
principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or :
results in the nuclear power plant being: >
(A) In an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety; (B) In a condition that is outside the design basis of ;
the plant; or (C) In a condition not covered by the plant's operating ,
t and emergency procedures.
Discussion: The applicability of these criteria is determined by an evaluation of the situation by the licensee. Upon determining that the setpoints were outside the allowable range of the technical specifications, the licensee would be '
expected to follow the required actions of the technical specifications and assess the plant condition in regards to equipment operability and required corrective actions. .
Guidance related to the evaluation of degraded and nonconforming conditions is provided by Generic Letter 91-18. As stated in the second draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, it is expected that licensees may use engineering judgement and experience in determining whether ;
a condition meets these reporting criteria. -The ability of
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a licensee to justify that a given condition is neither unanalyzed nor outside the design basis is dependent on the ,
as-found condition of the equipment and the degree of analyses performed.
50.72(b)(2)(i) Any event, found while the reactor is shut down, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal ,
safety barriers, being seriously degraded or being in an :
unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant !
safety.
Discussion: The arguments are very similar to those above and again can ;
support either a reportable or non-reportable conclusion based on the licensee's assessment of the significance of the condition. However, this criterion was intended to '
l capture potential problems which might be . discovered only during refueling outage surveillances. Question 7.10 in )
NUREG-1022. Supplement 1, is considered relevant guidance in {
regard to the reportability of equipment found to be )
inoperable during outage surveillances.
a
Question 2.3 of NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, and the seco'nd draft of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, state that failures should be assumed to occur at the time of discovery unless there is firm evidence to believe otherwise. It seems appropriate to classify setpoint drift as a mechanism which would occur some time (usually indeterminable) during the period between calibration and subsequent surveillance unless some factor, ,
such as an extended outage or testing conditions, could be identified as a likely cause. If testing conditions or-other causes are identified such that reporting is deemed unnecessary, the licensee would still be expected, under
- other programs and regulatory requirements, to evaluate the adequacy of the surveillance program to ensure that the activity is ensuring the operability of the safety valves or other components. A voluntary report may still be useful as a means of distributing the information related to the problem and its cause to the industry. Please note that. i although question 2.3 may be deemed an insufficient reason to determine safety valve drift is not reportable, the '
licensee may determine that the significance (see above)'of the condition does not satisfy the reporting threshold.
50.72(b)(2)(iii) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the 50.73(a)(2)(v) fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Discussion: The second draft of NUREG-1022 Revision 1, provides safety valve drift as an example of a common mode problem which may ,
be reportable under this criterion. The example was added :
to the case described in Information Notice 85-27 which dealt with multiple inoperaole control rods. Although .
certain occurrences of multiple safety valve drift problen.s should be determined to be reportable under this criterion, ,
it should not be tssumed that all cases of one or more safety valves exceeding the technical specification tolerance band need be reportable in accordance with this criterion. As in the previously discussed reporting criteria, the licensee's' engineering judgement should determine if the condition could have prevented the ,
fulfillment of a safety function. Candidates for reporting include those cases in which the setpoints of multiple safety valves could have resulted in exceeding the associated system's design pressure. If experience or engineering judgement can reasonably estimate the maximum ,
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l drift which might occur and determine that the safety function would be maintained, the licensee can determine that the condition is not reportable.
Although discussed in the various drafts and revisions of !
NUREG-1022, it warrants repeating that the primary motivation behind evaluating plant conditions such as safety valve drift should be to ensure safety and only secondarily to determine reportability. If engineering assessments identify a problem and determine that plant equipment was not and reasonably could not be rendered inoperable by a phenomenon such as setpoint drift..the licensee can then also justify a determination that the condition is not reportable. Voluntary reports are appreciated if the licensee feels the information might be helpful to others. :
The staff should, as always, be cautious in recomending that a licensee aiake a " voluntary" report.
50.73(a)(2)(vi) Events covered in paragraph (a)(2)(v) of this section may '
include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies. However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant to this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety e' function.
Discussion: (See above) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least ';
one independent train or channel to become inoperable in -
multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to !
become inoperable in a single system designed to:
(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe !'
shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. 4 Discussion: This criterion may be the most relevant to the specific example of safety valves found outside the technical ,
specification tolerance band. As stated in the second draft 1 of NUREG-1022, Revision 1, the reporting threshold for this '
part of 10 CFR 50.73 is lower than for other parts since it is at the train or channel level rather than the system and function levels. Valves found outside the technical ,
specification setpoint tolerance band can reasonably be j considered to have been inoperable during operation unless a licensee determines that testing is not representative of conditions during operation (see item 50.72(b)(2)(i)). This !
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t criterion was developed with general consideration given to- .
the normal two train. design level of redundancy.. Given-that most plants can satisfy pressure relief requirements with ;
several main steam safety valves unavailable, a rigid ;
interpretation of this criterion regarding the secondary i safety valves.(i.e., any case with more than one safety -
valve outside the tolerance band) may be overly conservative. However, the licensees are considered to have the weakest argument if they determine that this criterion is not applicable, and therefore the condition is not -i l
reportable, when finding multiple safety valves outside the acceptable range.
50.73(a)(2)(1.B) Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's 1 technical specifications. .
Discussion: Available guidance regarding operability and technical -;
specification requirements generally have licensees enter !
the allowel outage time and associated action statements. !
upon discovery of equipment inoperability unless a definite' e time of inoperability can be established. Technical specifications are considered satisfied provided the allowed -
outage time and associated action statements are satisfied. :
Therefore, provided that licensees restore compliance prior i to returning to' power operation, reporting of safety valve j drift in accordance with this criterion would not be i necessary. However, it is expected that upon identification ;
of a problem such as. safety valve setpoint drift, licensees should take actions to prevent. recurrence or pursue a change- l in the technical specification requirements (such as increasing the acceptable tolerance. range of the setpoints). ;
If a licensee determines, through. industry experience,; .
information from 'a vendor, or self assessments, that a .j component may be inoperable during operation, appropriate - '
actions should be taken in accordance with the technical !
specifications (reduce power or shutdown). This reporting !
criterion may be applicable if a licensee' fails to satisfy s the required action or can determine that a limiting l condition of. operation had not been satisfied for. longer. j than the allowed outage time following a specific cause.for; -!
a component becoming inoperable. :!
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