ML20205A422
| ML20205A422 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1999 |
| From: | Graves D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Maynard O WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9903300377 | |
| Download: ML20205A422 (23) | |
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611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, sulTE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064 MAR I 91999 Otto L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION
Dear Mr. Maynard:
On February 11,1999, the NRC staff completed a PPR of Wolf Creek Generating Station. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance. The results are used by NRC management to facilitate i
planning and allocation of inspection resources. PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews. PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long-term trends but emphasize the last 6 months to ensure that the' assessments reflect current performance. The PPR for Wolf Creek Generating Station involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the penod April 19,1998, through January 25,1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of May 22,1998, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on June 17,1998.
As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of Ocaber 2,1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim in wnich the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP G
program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
The unit operated at full power from the beginning of the current period of detailed focus (April 22,1998) until July 17,1998, when power was reduced for 6 days to 90 percent to perform troubleshooting on a power range instrument. On July 25, power was reduced further to facilitate repairs on a circulating water pump. Subsequently, the unit operated at or near full power until January 16,1999, when power was reduced to 63 percent to repair a tube leak on a feedwater heater. Power was returned to 100 percent on January 17, and the unit operated at or near full power for the remainder of the assessment period.
Overall, performance at Wolf Creek Generating Station was acceptable. Management has been involved in all functional areas. In the operations area, attention to plant operating parameters resulted in several abnormal conditions being identified and corrected at an early stage; however, licensed operators continued to make isolated human performance errors.
9903300377 990319 PDR ADOCK 050004 2 0
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Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Maintenance and engineering performance continued to effectively support overall plant
' operations and, although a number of deficiencies were identified, no operability concerns were noted. Plant support performance was consistent with previous assessments.
Plant operations safety performance continued to be characterized by strong mar.agement involvement. Operator attentiveness and performance during abnormal conditions was very j
good, but isolated deficiencies were noted in the areas of clearance orders, audits, and procedures. Overall performance was consistent with previous assessments. It was determined that only the core inspection program need be conducted in the operations area.
The conduct of maintenance in the field was effective, although isolated instances of failures to follow procedures and knowledge deficiencies were identified. These included improper storage of a heavy door assembly in the control room and the improper installation of six diodes in the voltage regulator circuit for an emergency diesel generator. A number of deficiencies were identified in the Maintenance Rule program and in the implementation of the procedures for the Maintenance Rule program. Plant material condition, however, supported extended plant operation. It was determined that only the core inspection prcgram need be conducted in the maintenance area.
In the engineering area, management involvement and oversight has been generally good, as was demonstrated by the sostained improved performance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Although a number of deficiencies were identified regarding inadequate implementation of 10 CFR 50.59 and failures to properly incorporate accurate design information into procedures, overall engineering performance was effective. It was determined that only the core inspection program need be conducted in the engineering area.
In general, the radiation protection program was properly implemented, but several minor deficiencies were noted related to radiation worker knowledge deficiencies and stop work criteria for filter shearing operations. The security and emergency preparedness programs were effectively implemented. Fire protection performance was generally good, although several reactor coolant pump o'il leaks were identified that did not have proper oil collection, it was determined that only the core inspection program need be conducted in the plant support area. contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance. In addition, the PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspcction report was issued but had not yet received full review and consideration. This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normalissuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence. Enclosure 2 provides definitions for some of the information listed in the PIM.
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation This letter advises you of_ our planned inspection effort resulting from the Wolf Creek Generating Station PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 3 details our inspection plan for the next 8 months. Also included in the plan are NRC noninspection activities. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program has been provided in this letter so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous nature.
Because of the anticipated changes to the inspection program and other initiatives, this inspection schedule is subject to revision. Any changes to the schedule listed will be promptly discussed with your staff. If you have any questions, please contact me at (817) 860-8141.
Sincerely, fl'lb David N. Graves, Chief Project Branch 8 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-482 License Nos. NPF-4.*
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant issues Matrix
- 2. General Description of PIM Table Labels
- 3. Inspection Plan cc w/enciosures:
Chief Operating Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Jay Silberg, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20037 Supervisor Licensing Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
P.O. Box 411 l-Burlington, Kansas 66839 l
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Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Chief Engineer Utilities Division Kansas Corporation Commission 1500 SW Arrowhead Rd.
Topeka, Kansas 66604-4027 Office of the Governor State of Kansas Topeka, Kansas 66612 Attorney General Judicial Center 301 S.W.10th 2nd Floor Topeka, Kansas 66612-1597 County Clerk -
Coffey County Courthouse Burlington, Kansas 66839-1798 Vick L Cooper, Chief Radiation Control Program Kansas Department of Health and Environment 1
Bureau of Air and Radiation Forbes Field Building 283.
Topeka, Kansas 66620 Mr. Frank Moussa Division of Emergency Preparedness 2800 SW Topeka Blvd Topeka, Kansas 66611-1287 Gene Merry, Chairman Coffey County Commissioners Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, Kansas 66839 Perry Powell Coffey County Commissioners Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, Kansas 66839 L
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Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation ' Mr. Johnny Sleezer Coffey County Commissioners Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street L
Burlington, Kansas 96839 Mr. Bill Knapp Coffey County Commissioners Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, Kansas 66839 l
Mr. Timothy Sipe Coffey County Commissioners Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, Kansas 66839 George Mills, Coffey County Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, Kansas 66839 Dr. L. D. Kirchner Mayor, City of Burlington City Hall P. O. Box 207 Burlington, Kansas 66839 The Honorable Bill Freemen Mayor, City of LeRoy.
406 2nd Street
. LeRoy, Kansas 66857 The Honorable Hazel Ball Mayor, City of New Strawn
. City Hall P.O. Box 922 l
. New Strawn, Kansas 66871 l
The Honorable James L. Sutton Mayor, City of Waverly Rural Route 3, Box 85-B Waverly, Kansas 66871
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation J. B. Hall, Franklin County Emergency Preparedness Coordinator 1428 South Main Street, #5 Ottawa, Kansas 66067 Ron Moore, Sheriff Allen County Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Allen County Courthouse P.O. Box 433 lola, Kansas 66749 Steve Davis, Lyon County Emergency Preparedness Coordinator 605 Lincoln Emporia, Kansas 66801 Gary Benjamin, Anderson County Emergency Preparedness Coordinator 315 Orange Street
-Garnett, Kansas 66032 Mr. Bruce Deering Public Service Commission P.O. Box 360 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 Federal Emergency Management Agency John A. Miller, Regional Director Region Vil 2323 Grand Blvd., Suite 909 Kansas City, MO 64108-2670 Ronald A. Kucera, Director Department of Natural Resources P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City, MO 65102 l
I Gary McNutt, Chief J
Bureau of Radiological Health l
Department of Health P.O. Box 570 Jefferson City, MO 65102 -
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' Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation '
7-l Jerry Uhlmann, Director State Emergency Management-State Emergency Management Agency
- P.O. Box 116.
Jefferson City, MO 65102 i
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DRS Director RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/B)
DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
Project Engineer (DRP/B)
MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Chief, NRR/ DISP /PIPB Chief, OEDO/ROPMS B. Henderson, PAO i
C. Gordon T. Boyce, NRR/ DISP /PIPB Records Center, INPO C. Hackney, RSLO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16E15)
Associate Dir for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. ior insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)
Chief, inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Management Section, OEDO W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13E16)
C. Poslusny, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13E16)
DOCUMENT NAME: S:\\DRP\\DRPDIR\\PPR\\WC To receive copy of document. Indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV:PE:DRP/B, AC:DRP/B
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Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Cornoration MAR I 91999 bec to DCD (IE40) bec distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator Resident inspector DRP Director SRI (Callaway, RIV)
DRS Director RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/B)
DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
Project Engineer (DRP/B)
MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Chief, NRR/ DISP /PIPB Chief, OEDO/ROPMS B. Henderson, PAO C. Gordon T. Boyce, NRR/ DISP /PIPB Records Center, INPO C. Hackney, RSLO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16E15)
Associate Dir. for Projects,' NRR Associate Dir. for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)
Chief, inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Management Section, OEDO W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13E16)
C. Poslusny, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13E16)
DOCUMENT NAME: S:\\DRP\\DRPDIR\\PPR\\WC To receive copy of document, indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures *N" = No copy m
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 12/17/9P POS 1R 98-20 NRC OPS 1A Licensee management was aggressive in responding to several work performance problems. The problems, although not safety signifcant, indcated a lack of attention to detail by plant personnel. A site-wide work standdown and management briefing reinforced the importance of pubic, plant. and personnel safety to heensee personnel.
12/10/98 POS IR 98-20 NRC-OPS 1A The licensee responded property to a failure of the rod control system. The control room staff entered and performed the appropnate off-normal procedure. The supervising operator exhibited good oversight dunng the response to the event. The operators minimized distractons in the control room dunng the rod control system maintenance and testing and maintained a good awareness of plant conditons.
10/15/98 NCV IR 98-19 SELF OPS 3A The clearance order established for the inspection and lubreation of the fuel building emergency exhaust absorber unit tornado damper was inadequate, and was a violation of Technical Specificaton 3.8.1. The clearance order did not provide isolation from all sources of high volumetric air flow and did not include specsal conditions or precautions on the clearance order summary sheet, as was required if positive boundanes were not established. This nonrepetitive, hcensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Polcy.
10/03/98 POS IR 98-17 LIC OPS 3B The licensee identified and responded to an increase in component mispositen events. The hcensee's response provided techniques for use by site personnel to prevent component mispositen events and raised the level of awareness and attention for this issue to site management and personnet.
10/03/98 NCV IR 98-17 LIC OPS 3A The licensee failed to ensure that turbine trip instrumentation surveillance tests were performed during the LER 97-022 required modes of operation as required by Technical specifcations. This nonrepetitive licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was identified by the licensee in LER 9722-00.
08/22/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC OPS 1A 3A The licensee failed to comply with Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 when the containment outer personnel LER 97-023 airlock door was found open with the plant in Mode 4. This nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited viotation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
This condition occurred on November 24,1997.
08/22/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC OPS 1A 2B The licensee failed to compare excora power indication to a calorimetric when reactor power was greater than LER 97-011 15 percent during a plant startup as required by Technical Specifcation Table 4.3-1. This nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation occurred on May 25,1997.
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 08/21/98 NEG IR 98-17 NRC OPS SA The lack of a policy to venty the restoration of systems or components on which work or testing was not fully -
complete contnbuted to the failure of the reactor coolant system makeup control valve to operate as expected. Operators did not venfy that the control valve was appropriately restored before it was retumed fc!!owing the suspension of a cahbration procedure by maintenance technicians.
08/02/98 POS IR 98-15 NRC OPS 3A SA Excellent attention to detail and questioning attitudes on the part of the control room operators resulted in the detection of a small reactor coolant letdown system leak inside containment before the leak was detectable on the control board indicators. This enabled plant operators to locate and isolate the leak before the leak rate increased, which prevented the radiation levels inside containment from increasing and limited the spread of contamination to the local area.
06/29/98 NEG IR 98-14 NRC OPS 1B EA Operators made reasonable preparations for anticipated severe weather, but discovered dunng the storm that other actions, such as closure of the turbine building roll-up doors, would have provided improved protection of plant structures and equipment.
06/05/98 WK 1R 98-13 NRC OPS SA Two audit reports contained executive summary conclusions that generally agreed with the assessments 4
described in the audit reports, but also contained notable deficiencies. The reports did not clearly and consistently present all audit activities and conclusions. One executive summary conclusion could r at be supported by the assessment and one report described two weaknesses without describing adequate corrective actions.
06/05/98 POS IR 98-13 LIC OPS 1A Good operator attention to detail led to prompt identification and termination of an inadvertent reactor coolant system leak which occurred following a malfunction of the postaccident sampling system. The operators noticed that the reactor coolant drain tank level increased and the volume control tank level decreased at a rate higher than expected and this prompted an effective evaluation that identified and stopped the leak.
Jtnuary 25,1999 2
Wolf Creek Generating Station
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 12/10/98 POS IR 98-20 NRC MAINT 2B The licensee's execution of the procedure to identih and correct the cause of a rod control system malfunction was excellent. The prejob brief clearfy identified potential causes, procedural steps, communication expectatens and contingency plans. Maintenance technicians used excellent step-by-step control, peer checks, communicaton techniques, and system response venfcation throughout the process.
11/24/98 NCV IR 98-20 LIC MAINT 28 3A in violation of Technical Specifcaton 6.8.1.a. Icensee personnel performed maintenance on a steam generator atmospheric relief valve using an inadequate maintenance procedure. Licensee maintenance personnel failed to reinstall a control air isolation valve for a steam generator atmospheric rehef valve The maintenance department relied on skill of the craft to control the work on safety-related equipment, instead of providing adequate procedural controls. This was a noncited violation.
11/14/98 NCV 1R 98-19 LIC MAINT 1C in violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, the procedure for testing the spent fuel bndge crane LER 97-017 was inadeqt. ate from September 1986 until October 1997 in that it failed to account for the weight of the scale during checks of the overload cutout setpoint, as required. As a result, the licensee failed to demonstrate operability of the spent fuel bridge crane. The licensee revised and sucessfully performed the procedure.
This nonrepetitive, hcensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violatton, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
10/03/98 NCV 1R 98-17 LIC MAINT 3A The licensee failed to properfy test Pressurizer Pressure Permissive P-11, because of an inadequate design.
LER 97-010 This nonrepetitive licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violaton, consistent with Section V11.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was identified by the hcensee in LER 9710-00.
08/22/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC MAINT 28 The licensee failed to comply with Technical Specification surveillance requirements in that the feedwater LER 97-021 isolation survei!!ance procedures did not completely test all of the required circuitry. This nonrepetitive.
Iicensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Secton Vil of the NRC Enforcement Polcy. This item was identified in November 1997, 08/22/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC MAINT 2B The licensee failed to comply with Technical Spacification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1 its that three LER 97-010 surveillance procedures, related to several slave relays and the disabling of the manua) block of safety injection, did not adequately test all of the required circuitry. This nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violaton is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcement Policy. These items were identified by the licensee in June through September 1997.
J;nuary 25,1999 3
Wolf Creek Generating Station
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 08/22/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC MAINT 2B The licensee determined that a 10-year interval inspection requirement for a VT-3 visual examination of the LER 97-015 pressurizer safety valves had not been conducted during the first 10-year interval as required by Techncal Specification 4.4.2.2. This nonrepetitrve, Icensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII of the NRC Enfmement Potcy. This etem was identified in August 1997.
08/03/98 POS IR 98-15 NRC MAINT 3A During emergent work on a weekend to repair a leak in the letdown system inside containment, welding technicians stopped work and asked for help in the face of delaying time-sensitive work to resolve a minimum pipe wall thickness issue at one of the weld locations. This was a good example of plant personnel placing safety, procedurai, and program adherence before other concems and hcensee management's support of this philosophy when working on plant equipment.
06/30/98 WK IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 4C The licensee's approach to performing safety significance determination of structures, systems, and components for the Maintenance Ru!e program was considered to be a weakness due to their use of three poor practices. Downgrading the safety signifcance of structures, systems, and components that (a) were in cut sets less than 0.1 percent of the total core damage frequency (i.e., structures, systems, and components in cutsets) cumulatrvely accounting for 62 percent of the core damage frequency considered risk signifcant) and (b) did not meet two or more of the performance measure was a poor practce. Also, the use of old data for the probability risk assessment quantification was a poor practice. In addition, the use of genere instead of plant-specific data for this purpose was a poor practce.
06/30/98 VIO IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 3B The licensee's guidance for performing a Maintenance Rule program periodic evaluation was adequate.
SLIV However, the failure to perform a periodic assessment for the interval of February 1996 to May 1998 was a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3), which requires a periode evaluation at least every refuehr.g cycle.
06/30/98 VIO 1R 98-05 NRC MAINT SA A violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to establish performance measures SLIV that were sufficient to demonstrate that the performance of the emergency diesel generator, excore neutron NCV monitoring, and process radiation monitoring systems were effectively controHed by the licensee's preventive maintenance efforts. Pursuant to Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Polcy, r. noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) requirements was identified for the licensee's identification of tfve failure to initially establish appropriate performance measures for monitoring the containment isolation fundion.
06/30/98 STR 1R 98-05 NRC MAINT 4C SC The licensee's process for assessing plant risk resviting from equipment out-cl-service in Mode 1 was a strength. The licensee's use of the safety monitor to requantify the probabilis.ic risk assessment model for certain configurations and produce risk profiles for a work week was benefic'a!. The process used by the licensee for risk assessments during outages was acceptable.
January 25,1999 4
Woif Creek Generating Station
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 03/30/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC MAINT SA 5B SC While some early assessments had significant findings, the more recent audd findings provided the hcensee with current information on important deficiencies in the prograrn. The self-assessment and audst scopes were appropriate, and the findings provided meaningful feedback to management.
06/30/98 NEG IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 4C Some of the hcensee program procedures were in conflict and not wellintegrated, which had resutted in minor incon:Jstencies in program implementation performance. The Maintenance Rule program data base did not yield consistent data when quened by the licensee staff.
06/30/98 VIO IR 98-05 NRC MAINT SA Generally, the licensee's programmatic monitoring of performance measures and goats was appropriate.
SLIV However, a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to identify maintenance preventable functional failures associated with the containment isolation system and the main steam system.
These failures would have impacted the licensee's monitoring had the failures been identifred earlier as performance measures that had been exceeded.
06/30/98 VIO IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 3B The licensee's program scoping, in general, was adequate and met the intent of the Maintenance Rule.
SL IV LIC Pursuant to Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Oohey, a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)
NCV requirements was identified for the licensee identification of the failure tu include three functions (auxilit.y feedwater flow for a fautted steam generator, isolatico between Class /nonClass 125 volt de power, and reactor coolant system pressure limit following anticipated trip without scram) in the program scope. Two NRC-identified examples of failure to scope applicable funciens into the program were identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b) requirements.
06/26/98 POS IR 98-12 NRC MAINT 2A 3B The material condition of the contro! room ventilation system was good, and the operators were very knowledgeable regarding system operation.
05/26/98 NEG IR 98-12 NRC MA NT 1C 2B A faulty relay in the engine start circuitry resulted in the failure of the diesel fire pump engine to start during post-maintenance testing. The failure to perform inspection and periodic replacement of the relays was identified as a weakness in the preventive maintenance program.
06/16/98 NCV IR 98-14 LIC MAINT 38 An electrical maintenance technician and quality control technician lacked sufficient knowledge regarding diode bias orientation, resulting in incorrect installation and quality control verification of diodes which led to a failed postmaintenance test. The licensee promptly identified the error and took aggressive corrective actions; therefore, this issue was teated as a noncited violation as allowed by Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy.
J;nuary 25,1999 5
Wolf Creek Generating Station
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM i
CODE 06/05/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 2B Maintenance department management and supervisory oversight for the removal and replacement of the air oil pump on Main Steam Isolation Valve AB HV0011 was not effective for work on a safety-system component that invoked a short duration Technical Specificaton acton statement. As a result of delays which could have been minimized or prevented, the operatons department came within 4 minutes of exceedino tha 4-6p twne limit allowed by limiting conditions for operation, which would have required a forecd shutdown of the reactor.
06/04/98 VIO IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 3A SA Maintenance technicians stored a heavy, unrestrained door and frarna in the control room near the Train A SLIV protection system logic cabinets contrary to Procedure AP 21J-001 with the permission of the shift supervisor.
This issue was cited as a VIO of TS 6.8.1.a for not for.owing the procedure goveming such activities.
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t J nuary 25,1999 6
Wolf Creek Generating Station
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 11/14/98 POS IR 98-19 NRC ENG 4B Substantial effort by the engineering organization resulted in sustained improved performance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. At the end of September 1998, the accumulated rolling 18-month unavailability for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was approximately 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, substantia!!y less than the goal of 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />.
10/03/98 POS IR 98-17 NRC ENG 4C Licensee management demonstrated a questioning attitude during an engineering presentaten on the health of the residual heat removal system by asking challenging questions regarding long-term operabihty and bearing tube oit volume and demanding adequate responses.
08/06/98 NEG IR 98-15 LIC ENG 3A Support engineering personnel failed to use due caution while performing work in the vicinity of safety-related equipment, resulting in the inadvertent misalignment and draining of an oil reservoir levelindcator on a motor-driven auxilia y feedwater pump. This indicated a lack of sensitivity for the potential to impact safety system configuration while performing work in the plant and did not meet with licensee management expectations.
06/26/98 VIO IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4A On three occasions, the licensee made changes to Emergency Management Guidelines (EMG) ES-12, SLIV
" Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation,* that involved an unreviewed safety question, without prior Commission approval and without performing safety evaluations. The changes to ES-12 constituted changes to procedures as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. This was identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.59.
06/26/98 VIO IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4A 58 5A The following example of a violation of to CFR Part 50. Appendix B, Criterion V was identified:
SLIV 1R 97-201 S;ation battery surveitlance test procedures were inappropriate to the circumstances, in that the acceptance criteria did not assure that the battery discharge current was consistent with the load profite, that the battery final terminal voltage was greater than the minimum allowable design value, and that a constant discharge rate be maintained during testing. (Note: This violation was initially issued citing two examples, but based on information provided in the violation response, the first example of the violation regarding calculaton NK-E-003 was retracted). This closes Unresolved items 50-482/201-13 and 14. The licensee's corrective actions were reviewed by the team and found to be thorough and comprehensive. No operability concems were identified.
05/26/98 NEG IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4B 3A An inconsistency between the voltage regulation specification for the purchase of battery chargers and the specification for the purchase of spare battery chargers (which are designated by the USAR as equivalent) was identified as a weaknesses in the licensee's design and procurement processes.
January 25,1999 7
Wolf Creek Generating Station
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE CS/26/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC ENG 5B SC 1he failure to promptly correct a hcensee-identified discrepancy conceming when CCW cooling water flow to the SFP heat exchanger during cool-down should be reduced or terminated was identified as a non-cited violation. This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-20.
06/26/98 VIO IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4A The following 5 examples of violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 111 were identifted:
SL IV 1R 97-201 1.
The licensee failed to property verify adequacy of design, in that when implementing a plant modification, the licensee failed to revise a Westinghouse design analysis to reflect the new servce water flow rate to the component cooling water heat exchangers. This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-01.
2.
The licensee failed to ensure that applicable design data was correctly translated into calculations, in that an incorrect initial water temperature was used in Ca!culation EJ-M-018. *RHR Pump Recire.
Operation vs. Time of initiation of CCW flow to RHR Heat Exchanger." This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-03.
3.
The hcensee failed to ensure that applicable design bases were correctly translated into specifications, in that the effect of density variations due to temperature and boron concentration was not considered in determining the tank levelinstrument uncertainties. As a result, tank volume available for the operator response could be reduced. This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-15.
4.
The licensee failed to ensure that applicable design bases were translated into specifications, in that the "MOV Design Configuration Document" utilized an incorrect differential pressure across component cooling water motor operated valves. This closed Unresolved item 50-482/97201-18.
5.
The licensee failed to ensure that applicable design basis information was correctly translated into specifications, in that the licensee failed to address the effects of a change in the minimum allowable component cooling water temperature on safety related motor oil temperatures and on the spent fuel pool reactivity. This closed Unreso!ved item 50-482/97201-19.
The licensee *s subsequent evaluations revealed no operability'concems. The team reviewed the licensee's planned and completed corrective actions and found them to be thorough and comprehensive 06/26/98 NEG IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4A 5B The evaluations of licensee-identified discrepancies between the Updated Safety Analysis Report and EMG ES-12, " Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation," reported in Performance improvement Request 97-3483 were poorly performed, limited in scope, and ineffective in determining the proper priority of the performance improvement request. This resulted in untimely resolution of the issues.
Jrnuary 25,1999 8
Wolf Creek Generating Station r
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 06/12/98 LIC NRR Letter NRC ENG 4C Technical Specification Amendment 117 was issued on an exigent basis to add a new Action Statement to 5/28/98 Specifcation 3/4.3.2. A supplement to the initial amendment request was needed to address the exigent circumstances surrounding the request.
06/05/98 VIO IR 98-13 NRC ENG 2A Contrary to the requirement; of 10 CFR 50.59, in 1992, following the failure of the reactor coolant dissolved SLIV IR 98-04 hydrogen analysis instrumer t in the postaccident monitoring system, the licensee selected the secondary analysis method of performirg grab samples which could not be performed within the 3-hour time limit prescribed in the safety analysis. This violation constituted a change to the facility without a safety evaluation having been performed to determine if an unreviewed safety question existed (50-482/9813-02). This closed Unresolved item 482/9804-04 06/05/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC ENG 4B The shift supervisor declared a mi steam isolatron valve operable with an identified deficient condition that was expected to reduce the valve's service life and increase the probability of imminent valve failure.
Engineering personnel acknowledged, but did not bound the expected reduction in the valve's service life A subsequent failed bench test of the leaking pump demonstrated the concem regarding the decreased service life of the pump. The licensee's subsequent actions to declare the valve inoperable within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for rework was appropriate. The system engineer displayed a deficiency in system knowledge by not knowing the purpose of the hole in the air pump that the air leaked from.
06/05/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC ENG 4B SA The engineering, operations, and maintenance departments coordinated efforts effectively to successfully troubleshoot and identify the cause of an unexpected increase in volts-amperes reactive (VARS) during testing on the Emergency Diesel Generator A which resulted in an unplanned entry into a 72-hour Technical Specification action statement. This indicated an improvement in interdepartmental cooperation and planning.
J;nuary 25,1999 9
Wolf Creek Generating Station
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 12/26/98 POS IR 98-20 NRC PS 1C The ALARA review committee provided a rigorous, probing, and in-depth review of a number of refuehng outage work packages. The committee closely examined the work processes to ensure that all available means of reducing radiation exposure were considered and appropriately utdized.
12/26/98 NEG IR 98-20 NRC PS 1C The licensee did not ensure that the technical support center would be habitable if the technical support center diesel combustion air inlet damper became inoperable. The licensee's planned corrective actov were appropriate.
11/14/98 POS IR 98-19 NRC PS 1C Overall, the licensee's response to road closures due to flooding was excellent. The licensee maintained contact with offsite agencies and provided timely updates to necessary personnel The licensee ensured that all emergency response organization requirements would be met if needed and provided updated road closure information to emergency response managers. The road closure information was also posted in the technical information center and the emergency offsite facility.
10/03/98 POS IR 98-17 NRC PS 2A The inspector noted a reduction in the number of storage containers and installed drip bags, and a generally improved appearance inside the radiological controlled area because of a licensee housekeeping improvement effort directed at reducing the resources required to maintain tools and equipment, and improve surveying capabilities inside the radiological controlled area.
10/03/98 NEG 1R 98-17 NRC PS 3A 3B Observations by the inspector of poor radiological work practices indicated a deficiency in the knowledge of some radiation workers regarding contaminated area boundary controls and methods of preventing the spread of contamination. The inspector identified maintenance technicians working greater than 8 feet above the floor inside the radiologically controlled area without first contacting health physics. This supported the conclusion in NRC Inspection Report 98-15 that there was a deficiency in radiation worker knowledge regarding the requirement to contact health physics before working in the overhead in the radiologically controlled area.
J:nuary 25,1999 10 Wolf Creek Generating Station
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 09/25/98 STR 1R 98-18 NRC PS 1C Performance in the physical security and access authorizaton areas was very good. An excetient access authorization program had been established to grant individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas. The security alarm statens were redundant and well protected. Some minor problems were identified with the security radio communication system. Installation of a new radio trunk system in 1999 should improve the communication capability. A very good program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was maintained. Assessment aids were very good and provided complete assessment of the penmeter detection zones. Changes to security plans were reported within the required time frame and property implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p). A very good security event reporting program was in place. Senior management support for the security organization was very good as demonstrated by ongoing support for improved equipment and facilities. Audits of the security, access authorization, and fitness-for-duty programs were effective, thorough, and intrusive.
09/20/98 POS IR 98-17 NRC PS 3A Health physics technicians responded appropriately to the discovery of unexpected contamination and elevated levels of airborne radioactivity during reactor coolant system fdter sheanng operations.
09/20/98 NEG 1R 98-17 NRC PS 3A Weaknesses were identified in the licensee's stop-work criteria and in identifying the increased potential for airbome radioactivity, known to exist, to workers performing reactor coolant system filter shearing operations.
The stop work criteria was based soley on the dose from the HEPA filtration unit, and a known increased potential for airborne radioactivity was not communicated to the workers.
08/13/98 LIC 08/11/98 NRC PS 1C Wolf Creek Nuclear Operting Corporation's (WCNOC) August 6,1997, submittal requesting approval of MTNG SUM changes to the Wolf Creek Generating Station Emergency Plan contained errors, and the justification for certain changes lacked depth and completeness. As a result, WCNOC will submit a supplement to their August 6,1997 request in early September 1998.
06/29/98 POS IR 98-14 NRC PS 1C The inspector concluded that security personnel made generally appropriate preparations for antoipated severe weather, and security personnel provided required security contingencies while facing adverse weather conditions. Security management also provided a good review of their activities, idcntified appropriate weaknesses and initiated effective correc5ve actions.
06/26/98 POS 1R 98-12 NRC PS 1C The team noted that the licensee had in place only four fire protection impairment control and breach authorization permits that required a compensatory fire watch.
06/05/98 POS !R 98-13 LIC PS 1C The security department appropriately responded to a failure of the security diesel generator to pass a weekly surveillance test, taking action to correct the problem while implementing existing contingency plans J:nuary 25,1999 11 Wolf Creek Generating Station
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 06/05/98 POS 1R 98-13 NRC PS 1C An emergency plan drift provided effective training and demonstrated effective interaction and communecation between hcensee and state drdi participants.
05/11/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC PS 1C 4A The following 2 examples of violations of Operating License NPF-42. Secten 2.C.(5)(a) are being treated as LER 98-002 non-cited violations:
LER 97-016 1.
The licensee identified that on numerous occasions during the past 10 years, the tre protection 00,-01,-02 system had been used for non-fire protection purposes, a practice that rendered the fire protection system temporarily inoperable.
2.
On three occasions the licensee identified leakage sites from the reactor coolant pump lube o+1 system that were not provided with a collection system, as required.
5 January 25,1999 12 Wolf Creek Generating Station
n GENERAI. DFSCRII" TION OF Pl%I T4Bl.E I 4 RFl.N F
3 Actual date of an esent or significant iss:se for thme items that hate a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the inforw.ation was issued Ouch as slee LER date A or, for inspection reports, etw lad fwr date of the inspection pcrismi. If the esent date is earlier than the current assessment Iplant performance revien p period, the daciement issue date/end afinspection should be used and the event date documented in the IT Eh! DESCRIPTION column.
Type The categnrization of the issue - see the T pe Item Code tahte.
3 SF.I N %l.P Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations: M AINT far Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
Semes The document that centeins the issue information: IR for NRC laspection Report; LER for licensee Event Repert; letter for NRR letter.
If7 Identification of who diwonered issue: NRC for NRC; LIC for licensee; er SELF for Self Identifying te,entsL issar fkstrrptian Iktails of the hsue from the LE R test er from the IR Enecutive Summaries.
Codes Template Codes - we table.
TVPE ITEM CODFS TEMPLATE CODES EA I nforrenwns Action letter with Civil Pensity I
Opet ational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C - Programs and Processes
&D Enfurcement IHwretion - Na Citil Penalty 2
Material Condition: A - FApaipment Condition er B - Programs and Processes NT3 Oserall Strong 1.icenwe Performance uA Oserall % enk I.icenwe Performance 3
Ilumen Perfarniance: A - Work Perfernience; B Knowledge, Skills,and AbilitiesiTraining: C-Wnk Environment EEE
- Ewalated Enforcenwnt item-Waiting Fical NRC Action 4
Engineering /Desaga: A - Design: B - Engineering Support; C-Programs and Processes l
%10 Vinistion level I. II III, or IV NCV Nuncited Violation 5
Problem Identification and Resciuties 4 Identification: B - Amalysis; and C-Resciution DEV Iksiation frtwn 1.icenwe Cummitment to NRC NOTES:
POS Indisidual Gerut inspection Finding
- Eels are either: (I) a, parent vietations of NRC requirenwnts that are twing considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statenwnt of Puticy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcenwat PWicy ), NUREG-1600, or (2s isseses, = hich niay NEG Indisidumt Poor inspection Finding represent a SL IV potential siciation.that remain open pending receipt of the licensee's corrective actions todetermine if an NCV or 410 eshes.
Ilomever the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on tAe issues identiNd by the Eels and the PIM entries will be emwhfied a hen I.ER I.icenwe Etent Report to the NRC the final decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its decision for escalated enforcement items, the Ikensee mill he pro =ided with an opportunity to either: (I) respond to the apparent siolation er (2) reepsest a predecisions' caforcement cor.ference.
Ulti **
Unreselsed item fron Inspection Report 1.IC l.icenung twue from NMR s an amohed items shuist which more information is required to determine whether the hsue in question is an acceptable irent a desistion, a nonconformance,or a violation. Ilomever,it e NRC has sont reached its final canctusiens on the hsues, and the PIM entries mitt Misc Miweltaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding tEPL be mndified when the final conclusions are raade.
Ikclared Enwrgeary. Nonconformance Issue, etc.
ENCLOSUREJ WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION INSPECTION PLAN iP - inspection Procedure TI - Temporary instruction Core inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
Regional Initiative - Performed in areas that require additiona: inspection effort based or. plant performance INSPECTION TITLE /
NUMBER OF DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION / COMMENTS PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS IP 73753 Inservice inspection Program 1
4/5-9/99 Core inspection IP 8375G Occupational Radiation Exposure 1
6/28-7/2/99 Core inspection 8/9-13/99 IP 81700 Physical Security Program 1
7/26-30/99 Core inspection N/A Operator Licensing Examinations 4
7/26-30/99 N/A IP 86750 Solid Rad Wasta Management and 1
8/9-13/99 Core inspection Transportation of Radioactive Materials IP 40500 Evaluation of Licensee Self-3 8/16-20/99 Core Inspection Assessment Capability IP 82701 Operational Status of the EP Program 1
8/30-9/3/99 j - :. c;r.ction IP 93809 Safety System Engineering inspection 5
9/13-10/1/99 Core inspectx)n IP 37001 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation included in 5 above 9/13-10/1/99 Core Inspection Program IP 71001 Licensed Operator Requalification 3
10/04-08/99 Core inspection Proaram Evaluation IP 84750 Radioactive Waste Treatment. Effluent.
2 10/4-8/99 Core Inspection and Environmental Monitoring