IR 05000321/1993017

Insp Repts 50-321/93-17 & 50-366/93-17 on 930808-0904.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities,Rv Water Level Instrumentation Mods & Review of Open Items

ML20058N202
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	09/22/1993
From:	Christnot E, Holbrook B, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058N194	List: IR 05000321/1993017 ML20058N191
References
50-321-93-17, 50-366-93-17, NUDOCS 9310080252
Download: ML20058N202 (18)

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11

& S 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.. SUITE 2900 5 'j ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303234199

\...../ Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch Nuclear Plant Inspection Conducted: August 08 - September 04, 1993 Inspectors *

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Leonard Dr We Jr., Sr. Resident Inspector 9 JJ <79 Date~ Signed s -

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not, Resident Inspector 9 2/ 9L pJ Ward T. Ch Date Signed v. h & /  % .94 c"1 )

Bob L-Miolbrook, Resident Inspector Date Si ned Approved by: t '/ &

r4 Pierce H. Skinner, Chief, Project Section 3B f/J93 Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine resident inspection involved inspection on-site in the areas of: oper.tions, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, reactor vessel water level instrumentation modifications, and review of open item Results: The inspectors conducted additional reviews of URI 321,366/93-11-03: Inadequate Testing of Standby Gas Treatment Humidity Sensors. This item will remain open and additional inspections in this area will be required (paragraph 6d).

The inspectors reviewed the activities associated with the reactor vessel water level instrumentation system modifications. The inspectors concluded that the licensee was aggressive in implementing the requested actions outlined in Bulletin 93-03, Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentatiem in BWRs, and in Generic Letter 92-04, Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentatiom in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), (paragraph 5).

9310080252 930922 9 PDR ADDCK 05000321 '

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• L. Adams, Nuclear Security i J. Betsill, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent

• K. Breitenback, Engineering Support Supervisor C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager D. Davis, Plant Administration Manager  !

• P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager

• 0. Fraser, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor G. Goode, Engineering Support Manager

• M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

• S. Grantham, Training and Emergency Preparedness Supervisor i

• J. Hammonds, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor

• W. Kirkley, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

• T. Metzler, Nuclear Safety and Compliance

• C. Moore, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations .

D. Read, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support P. Roberts, Outages and Planning Supervisor

• K. Robuck, Manager, Modifications and Maintenance Support

• H. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager

• P. Wells, Operations Manager  ;

i Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and staff personne NRC Resident Inspectors L. Wert

• E. Christnot

• B. Holbrook ,

• Attended exit interview Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap . Plant Operations (71707) (92701) (93702) i Operations Status and Observations  !

Unit 1 operated at 100 percent RTP throughout this reporting '

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Unit 2 operated at 85 percent RTP throughout this reporting l period. Several rods remain fully inserted to suppress neutron '

flux in the area of a suspected fuel lea l

2 The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, TSs, and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift turnover records, temporary modification logs, LC0 logs and equipment clearance records were reviewed routinely. Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, I&C, and NSAC personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored routinel Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, durina weekdays and on weekends. Observations included control room manning, access control, operator professionalism and attentiveness, and adherence to procedures. Instrument readings, recorder traces, annunciator alarms, operability of_ nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system channels, availability of power sources, and operability of the SPDS were monitored. Control Room observations also included ECCS system lineups, containment integrity, reactor mode switch position, scram discharge volume valve positions, and rod movement control As a result of a recent increase in personnel errors, licensee management reviewed possible causes of these errors. They identified that a significant number of personnel errors were occurring on the operator's first day back to work following time off. On August 10, shift C operators returned to duty for their

"first day back." As a result of this finding, the inspectors spent additional time in the control room observing routine operator activities, surveillances, communications, alarm response actions and procedural usag Proced res 34G0-0PS-024-25, Equipment Rotation and Flushing of PSW and RHRSW Piping Deadlegs, and 34S0-E11-010-2S, RHR System were observed. All activities were performed in a controlled manner, communications were adequate and the procedures were performed step-by-step. The inspectors noted that an increased presence and attention by plant managers was evident during the operators first day bac Several active safety-related equipment clearances were reviewed to confirm that they were properly prepared and execute Applicable circuit breakers, switches, and valves were walked down to verify that clearance tags were in place and legible and that equipment was properly positioned. Equipment clearance program requirements are specified in licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-001-OS, Control of Equipment Clearances and Tag Selected portions of the containment isolation lineup were reviewed to confirm that the lineup was correct. The review involved verification of proper valve positioning, verification that motor and air-operated valves were not mechanically blocked and that power was available (unless blocking or power removal was required), and inspection of piping upstream of the valves for I leakage or leakage path i l

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Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a 1 routine basis. The areas toured included the following:

Reactor Buildings Diesel Generator Building l Fire Pump Building Central Alarm Station Station Yard Zone Turbine Building Intake Building During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed. No significant discrepancies were identifie b. Unit 2 Drywell Unidentified Leakage The inspector monitored the licensee's activities involved with the increasing rate of unidentified leakage into the drywell. A review of entries in the operations logs indicated that the licensee became aware of this increase on August During the last week of July,1993, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> leak rate was approximately 0.3 gpm. By the end of the first week of August the rate had increased to 0.76 gpm. On August 21, the rate had further increased to 2.39 gpm. TS requires a unit shutdown if the unidentified leakage reaches 5 gpm within any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> perio Various action items were initiated in an attempt to identify the leakage. A group was formed to review the situation and make recommendations for corrective actions. The licensee closely monitored the leakage, and operators in the CR started taking hourly leakage readings. The licensee backseated open valves and swapped drywell coolers B009B and B009A. The licensee also developed a contingency outage plan and schedule if shutdown of the unit was required. Initially some of the actions appeared to slow down the leakage rate, however, the leakage rate is 1 inconsistent and unpredictable. It was uncertain if any of the '

actions affected the leakage rate. Operators in the CR continue to closely monitoring the leakage rate and record hourly readings. ,

On September 3, the leakage had decreased to 1.21 gpm. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's actions and attention to this matter were appropriate. The inspectors will continue to closely monitor the licensee's actions in this are ,

c. Posting of Notices to Workers (71707)

The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 19.11, Posting of Notices to Workers, and toured the plant facility to verify that the NRC-3 forms were current. The inspectors determined that one NRC-3 form was not the latest revision (June 1993). This observation was discussed with a management representative and the correct form was posted. The inspectors concluded that there was a sufficient number of postings and that individuals could observe them on the way to and from work activities. Also, the inspectors observed that the postings were conspicuous and were not defaced or altere I

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4 Employee Concerns Program (2500/028)

Temporary Instruction 2500/028, which deals with the Employee ;

Concerns Program, was issued on July 29, 1993. This TI was issued '

to obtain information on the implementation of the licensee's employee concerns program. The inspectors reviewed procedure AG-MGR-02-1284N, Quality Concerns Program, and held discussions with the Quality Concerns Program Coordinator to review the program content and implementation. The results of this review and ,

discussions are provided as Attachment 1 of this inspection repor ,

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No violations or deviations were identifie '

3. Surveillance Testing (61726) , Surveillance Observations Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed ,

were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, '

acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin i work, data collection, independent verification where required,- t handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The j tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according '

to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete The following surveillances were reviewed and witnessed in whole .!

or in part:  ! V-Dil-016-25: GE NUMAC MSL Radiation Monitor FT SV-E41-002-2S: HPCI Pump Operability I SV-R43-001-IS: EDG Monthly Test i SV-C51-002-IS: APRM FT Unit 2 HPCI Surveillance A surveillance test for the Unit 2 HPCI was performed on August '

25, 1993. The inspectors closely monitored the test activities from the CR to observe system operation and to assess procedural i usage, communications and overall control of the activities. The t inspectors noted that the system operated correctly and satisfactorily met the TS acceptance criteria. Procedures were followed as required. One annunciator for high plant service water differential pressure was received during the surveillanc i The inspectors noted that the CR operators responded to the alarm I

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quickly and that they referenced the ARP to determine and mplement i the correct course of action for the alarm. The inspectors also ,

noted good communications, both within the CR, and between the CR operators and personnel in the HPCI roo !

No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Activities (62703)

Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trade. Activities, procedures, and

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work requests were examined to verify; proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire hazards, cleanliness, exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were me The following maintenance activities were reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part: MWO 2-93-2092: RHR Pump 2D would not start with control l switc . MWO l-93-4277: PSW pump IC did not appear to trip with ,

control switc . MWO 2-93-3287: Repair Oil Leak in the HPCI Turbine Auxiliary 011 Pump Syste . MWO 2-93-3292: Replace Cell 17 Station Service Battery 2B I RHR and PSW breaker problems On July 29, 1993, RHR pump 2D failed to start when operators attempted to start the pump for torus cooling. On August 13, 1993, PSW pump IC failed to _ when operators attempted to trip the pump with the control s'a ' k in the C , In both cases TS LCOs were entered and MW0s were innuted to investigate the problem The inspectors reviewed the maintenance work packages for the two incidents to determine if there was a generic issue concerning breaker operation. The inspectors reviewed the MW0s, LCOs, and post maintenance testing for the two pump breakers. Additionally, i the inspectors conducted a history check and review of past MW0s l for the other RHR and PSW pump breakers to determine if there had l been similar problems identified. The licensee determined that a j latch check switch on the RHR 2D breaker charging mechanism was 1 out of adjustment, preventing proper breaker operation. The licensee also determined that a set screw on the PSW pump breaker had become loose, preventing the trip rod lever from operating correctly. A search of past MW0s indicated that a similar problem had not been previously identified. The inspectors determined

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that the maintenance activities were timely and thorough, post maintenance testing of the breakers were_ adequate, and the-TS LCOs l were met. The inspectors also concluded that a generic breaker l problem was not indicate '

b. Unit 2 HPCI Outage

Due to a recent increase in errors associated with maintenance activities, as indicated in the last inspection report, the inspectors closely monitored activities during the HPCI outag The HPCI outage was scheduled to be completed before-the HPCI operability surveillance was due. The maintenance activities included the repair of some valve packing leaks and an auxiliary oil pump system leak. Also, a relay in the system alarm circuit was replaced. The inspectors noted that the maintenance personnel ,

used procedure 52PM-E41-002-05, HPCI Turbine and Auxiliaries Major !

Inspection, at the job location. Also, the inspectors observed that the individual steps in the procedure were being signed off as they were completed. Adequate supervisory and technical support was provided to the craftworkers during this maintenance wor l c. Unit 2 Station Service Battery The inspector reviewed and observed the licensee's activities I involving the Unit 2 station service batteries. The 5 year battery capacity test indicated a decrease in excess of 10%

capacity, to approximately 102%. This indicated aging of the battery beyond what was expected. The system engineers performed a followup verification test on three randomly selected individual ,

battery cells per bank. This test data also indicated that the i battery capacity had decreased in excess of 10%. A decrease in battery capacity in excess of 10% normally requires the performance of an annual battery test. The annual test requires i the unit to be shutdown and the battery to be taken out of service. The licensee contacted the battery manufacture who indicated the battery capacity decrease of 10% was not characteristic for the battery. The' licensee has concluded that the original test data, that indicated a total capacity of approximately 113%, appeared to be flawed. The licensee is conducting further evaluations of the battery testin During the individual battery cell testing the licensee observed what appeared to be cracks in side of five cell jar Engineering later determined that cells 16, 17, 33, 39, and 89 were cracke The cracks were located on the front corner of four cells and on the front and back corner of the other cell. The licensee decided :

to replace all five cells. The cracks were not through-wall l cracks and no leakage had occurred. Southern Company Services

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evaluated the available data and concluded the battery was capable of performing its intended safety-related function. Additionally, ,

increased monitoring and inspections for leakage and crack growth

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are being conducted. One cell will be transported off site for laboratory failure analysis. The appropriate TS LC0 was 1 initiated. The inspectors specifically observed the preliminary ,

activities for this cell replacement. The inspectors verified that the replacement cell was charged, the installed cell was jumpered out, and that the approved lifting processes were adequate. The licensee will perform a cell capacity test (in the warehouse area) prior to transporting the replacement cells to the battery area for final installation. The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's activities in this are No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation Modification (37700)

The inspector reviewed, observed and discussed the modifications being implemented as a result of GL 92-04, Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), and BU 93-03, Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs. The specific DCRs were 92-120 for Unit 1 and 92-121 for Unit 2. The design changes will provide a !

continuous makeup water supply of high purity de-aerated water to the reference legs of the reactor water level instrumentatio CRD water, the normal supply of water to the RWCU pumps seal and purge and cooling subsystem, is the source of water for this modification. The DCRs consist of two reference leg purge panels for each unit, one panel for each individual reference leg. Each panel consists of isolation valves, drain valves, pressure regulator, flow indicator, filter and a metering valve. As part of this effort, the inspector reviewed the following design drawings:

SC-92-121-01: HNP Unit 2 Reactor Building EL 158 SM-92-121-01: RWCU System P&ID - Sheet 1 (Zone A-8)

SM-92-121-02: Nuclear Boiler System P&ID - Sheet 2 SM-92-212-03: RWCU Pump Seal, Purge and Cooling SM-92-121-04: Reactor Vessel Level and Press Rack Sheet 2 (Panal 2H21-P004, Section B, Zone B-8)

SM-92-121-05: Reactor Vessel Level and Press Rack Sheet 2 )

(Panal 2H21-P005, Section B, Zone B-8)

SM-92-121-06: HNP - Unit 2 Location, Panels 2H21-P532A & 532B, Routing from Panels 2H21-P004 & P005 SM-92-121-07: HNP - Unit 2 Instrument Installation Detail Panels 2H21-P532A and 2H21-P532B 1

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The inspectors also contacted the resident staff at the Millstone facility to ascertain if any particular difficulties may have been encountered during that facilities installation and testing of a similar system. The inspectors learned that there were no particular problems i or difficulties identified that might be of concern at the Hatch facilit The inspectors noted that the modifications were identical for both units. The inspectors walked down the Unit 2 modification and ,

determined that the majority of the hardware installations were completed. However, the connections to instrument racks P004 and P005 ,

are not completed. The licensee will complete the installation on the '

Unit 2 instrument racks when the unit is shutdown. A comparison between the design drawings and field installations revealed no deficiencies and that all items observed were adequately identified. The installation on Unit I has begun and the final connections will also be completed when >

the unit is shutdown. The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's activities in this are No violations or deviations were identifie . Inspection of Open Items (92700) (92701)

r The following items were reviewed using licensee reports, inspections, record reviews, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate: ! (Closed) LER 321/92-22: Spurious Actuations of ESF. This LER addressed an occurrence on August 27, 1992, when the A trains of SBGT for both units received an automatic initiation signal. The cause could not be determined and the SBGT system and logic were returned to normal. Based on the inspectors review of the i licensee's actions, this LER is close i (Closed) LER 366/92-12: Hisinterpretation of TS Results in Missed Surveillance. On July 27, 1992, the operators were reviewing -i surveillance procedure 345V-T46-004-1, Secondary Containment Test, in preparation for the movement of irradiated fuel. During this review it was determined that the requirements of Unit 2 TS 4.9.5.1 had not been met for the spent fuel shipping cask handling activities. The corrective action consisted of training personnel on the requirements of the TS. The inspector reviewed the training provided to personnel assigned to perform the  !

surveillance. Based on this review, this LER is close (Closed) LER 50-321/92-08: Personnel Error Results in Missed TS Required Surveillance. This LER addressed a personnel error involving the installation of a particulate filter and charcoal cartridge in a sampling assembly. This was identified as a NCV in j IR 50-321,366/92-12. Corrective actions for this LER was to ;

require verification when installing a particulate filter. The inspector reviewed procedure 64CH-SAM-005-05, Gaseous Effluent Sampling, Revision 6, dated July 20, 199 Section 7.1, ;

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Particulate and Iodine Gas Sampling, Subsection 7.1.1, has been revised to incorporate verification of activities performe Based on the inspectors reviewed of this revision, this LER is close (0 pen) URI 50-321,366/93-11-03: Inadequate Testing of Standby Gas Treatment Humidity Sensors. This item was originally opened as a-result of the inspectors review of the SBGT system. It was noted during the inspector's review that none of the SBGT system humidity sensors were being tested, as recommended by the manufacturers technical manual. A detailed account of this item is documented in IR 50-321,366/93-11. The licensee contracted with an outside facility to perform the operability tests on the sensors. The inspector independently reviewed the results of the tests and noted that the tests indicated that the Unit 2 sensors were still operable and that the Unit I sensors were not operabl The inspector also reviewed an evaluation, performed by the A/E,

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concerning the need for the SBGT humidity heaters. The inspector noted the A/E evaluation stated that even without humidity heaters the SBGT system trains would still have performed their safety function. The inspector requested assistance in determining if the A/E's evaluation was valid. Additional inspection activities will be required to fully evaluate and determine the past operability status of the SBGT systems. This item will remain ope . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 10, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Acronyms and Abbreviations AC - Alternating Current ACCM - Average Cubic Centimeters Per Minute A/E - Architect / Engineer AGM-P0- Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations AGM-PS- Assistant General Manager - Plant Support APRM - Average Power Range Monitor APLHGR- Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate ARP - Alarm Response Procedure ATTS - Analog Transmitter Trip System BU - NRC Bulletin BWR - Boiling Water Reactor BWROG - Boiling Water Reactors Owners Group CFM - Cubic Feet Per Minute CFR - Code of Federal Regulations COLR - Core Operating Limits Report

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CR - Control Room CRD - Control Rod Drive CST - Condensate Storage Tank DBA - Design Basis Earthquake .

DC - Deficiency Card DCR - Design Change Request DPM - Disintegration Per Minute DW - Drywell  !

ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System EDG - Emergency Diesel Generator EHC - Electro Hydraulic Control System EMA - Emergency Management Agency ERT - Event Review Team ESF - Engineered Safety Feature EST - Eastern Standard-Time F - Fahrenheit FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report :

FT - Functional Test  !

FT&C - Functional Test and Calibration GE - General Electric Company GEMA - Georgia Emergency Management Agency GL - Generic letter HP - Health Physics t HPCI - High Pressure Coolant Injection System I&C - Instrumentation and Controls IFI - Inspector followup Item LCO - Limiting Condition for Operation LER - Licensee Event Report LHGR - Linear Heat Generation Rate LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident LOSP - Loss of Offsite Power LPRM - Local Power Range Monitor MCC - Motor Control Center MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve MSL - Mean Sea Level MWe - Megawatts Electric MWO - Maintenance Work Order NCV - Non-cited Violation NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

NSAC - Nuclear Safety and Compliance NOVE - Notice of unusual Event OBE - Operating Basis Earthquake PE0 - Plant Equipment Operator P&ID - Piping and Instrumentation Drawing ,

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PM - Preventive Maintenance PRB - Plant Review Board PSW - Plant Service Water System RB - Reactor Building RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System R/F - Refueling Floor  !

RFP - Reactor Feed Pump  :

RG - Regulatory Guide l

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RH - Relative Humidity  ;

RHR - Residual Heat Removal l RHRSW - Residual Heat Removal Service Water System RPS - Reactor Protection System RPV - Reactor Pressure Vessel RTP - Rated Thermal Power RWL - Reactor Water Level l RX - Reactor SAER - Safety Audit and Engineering Review '

SBGT - Standby Gas Treatment SDC - Shutdown Cooling SDV - Scram Discharge Volume SFP - Spent Fuel Pool '

SFRC - Scram Frequency Reduction Committee SOS - Superintendent of Shift-(0perations)

SPDS - Safety Parameter Display System ,

SRO - Senior Reactor Operator  !

SS - Shift Supervisor STA - Shift Technical Advisor i SV - Surveillance .

TBV - Turbine Bypass Valve TC - Temporary Change .

TI - Temporary Instruction TS - Technical Specifications URI - Unresolved Item

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Attachment 1

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EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAMS 50-321 PLANT NAME: E. I Hatch LICENSEE: Georaia Power DOCKET #: 50-366

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NOTE: Please circle yes or no if applicable and add comments in the space '

provide PROGRAM: Does the licensee have an employee concerns program?

(Yes on No/ Comments)

Yes See comment No. . Has NRC inspected the program? Report # N/A No formal inspection performed. However, the resident inspectors periodically reviews the status of the program and verify adequate resolution of safety significant example . SCOPE: (Circle all that apply) Is it for: Technical? (Yes, No/ Comments) ,

Yes -t Administrative? (Yes, No/ Comments)

Yes See comment No. I Personnel issues? (Yes, No/ Comments)

Yes i See comment No. l l Does it cover safety as well as non-safety issues? l (Yes or No/ Comments)

Yes See comment No. l

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Is it designed for

Nuclear safety? (Yes, No/ Comments)

Yes  ;

See comment No. ) Personal safety? (Yes, No/ Comments)  :

Yes _;

See comment No. ' Personnel issues - including union grievances? '

(Yes n No/ Comments)

No See comment No. . Does the program apply to all licensee employees? 1

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(Yes n No/ Comments)

Yes Contractors?

(Yes E No/ Comments)

Yes  ! Does the licensee require its contractors and their subs to !

have a similar program?  :

(Yes E No/ Comments) -

No The QCP coordinator stated that plant managers have (in the ,

past) visited vendor offices to explain Hatch's program and i described the vendors responsibilities in adhering to the i progra l Does the licensee conduct an exit interview upon terminating J employees asking if they have any safety concerns?

(Yes E No/ Comments)

Yes i INDEPENDENCE: What is the title of the person in charge?

Quality Concern Program Coordinator (QCPC) Who do they report to?

Assistant General Plant Manager - Plant Support Are they independent of line management?

No l

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Employee Concerns Program 3 Does the ECP use third party consultants?

Hatch does not routinely enlist services of a third party consultant. However, they have in the past, obtained legal advice and other expertise as deemed necessar . How is a concern about a manager or vice president followed up? .

The QCPC will contact the next (Higher) level of management !

or executive. The concern will be addressed outside the normal concerns proces , RESOURCES: What is the size of staff devoted to this program?

One (1) individual QCPC QCP steering Committee consisting of 6 managers and the VP Hatch Projec See comment No. . What are ECP staff qualifications (technical training, interviewing training, investigator training, other)? *

There is no formalized or specific training to be a QCP [

staff membe i See comment No. REFERRALS: , Who has followup on concerns (ECP staff, line management, ,

other)? .

QCPC, any selected line manager selected as investigator or QCP steering committee membe CONFIDENTIALITY: Are the reports confidential?

(Yes or No/ Comments)

Yes Who is the identity of the alleger made known to (senior management, ECP staff, line management, other)?

(Circle, if other explain)

QCPC Others--if the individual tasked with the investigation deems it necessary, after approval of the alleger, he or she may interview the allege _ _

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Employee Concerns Program 4 Can employees be: Anonymous? (Yes, No/ Comments)  ;

Yes J

' Report by phone? (Yes, No/ Comments)

Yes See comment No. FEEDBACK: , Is feedback given to the alleger upon completion of the followup? (Yes Dr No - If so, how?)

Yes Followup by verbal (phone or face to face) or writte . Does program reward good ideas?

No , Who, or at what level, makes the final decision of resolution?

Vice President - Hatch project, Chairman of QCP Steering Committe . Are the resolutions of anonymous concerns disseminated?

N . Are resolutions of valid concerns publicized (newsletter, bulletin board, all hands meeting, other)? '

Yes, articles have been written in the past for the Hatch ,

Gazett ' EFFECTIVENESS: i

' How does the licensee measure the effectiveness of the program?

No specific measurement of effectiveness is performe However, the QCP steering committee reviews and comments on program progres . Are concerns:  ; Trended? (Yes gr Ho/ Comments) *

No Used? (Yes or No/ Comments)

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Employee Concerns Program 5

' In the last three years how many concerns were raised? 307 Closed? L494 What percentage were substantiated? 50.2%

I How are followup techniques used to measure effectiveness (random survey, interviews, other)? <

No followup techniques used to measure effectivenes ' How frequently are internal audits of the ECP conducted and by whom? The last audit (88-SA-03) was performed in April, 1988, at plant managements request. The Safety Audit and Engineering Review section conducts the audit ADMINISTRATION / TRAINING: Is ECP prescribed by a procedure? (Yes ot No/ Comments)

Yes AG-MGR-02-1284N (Quality Concern Program)

' How are employees, as well as contractors, made aware of this program (training, newsletter, bulletin board, other)?

New employee orientation Annual retraining Bulletin Boards ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: (Including characteristics which make the program especially effective.) ,

Characteristics which make the program effective are: 1. The concern may be .

assigned to any manager who would be the most knowledgeable person in the area of concern. 2. Safety issues are referred to a manager associated with the plant safety committee. 3. The final disposition of a concern is reviewed by '

the QCP steering committee, who is chaired by the VP Hatch projec *

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o Comment N l .. Hatch program is referred to as Quality Concerns Progra . The procedure does not specifically refer to administrative or personnel issues. However, the program accepts these types of matters as a matter of routine. The procedure specifically states: Any questionable act or practice should be reported .... Contract employee who indicate union grievance concerns are ,

directed to contact their employe I The QCPC or Steering Committee may select any manager or assign a task force to function as an investigato l

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Employee Concerns Program 6 Managers are assigned as investigators. Managers are required to complete a managers training course and participate in continuing training. Communications, interviewing and listening skills training are an integral part of the managers training cours Managers have technical skills and qualifications in their area of responsibilit . Concerns may be reported by plant phone or toll free numbe The person completing this form please provide the following information to the Regional Office Allegations Coordinator and fax it to Richard Rosano at 301-504-343 HAME: TITLE: PHONE #:

/ / DATE COMPLETED: