IR 05000321/1993023
| ML20059G015 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1994 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059G013 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-93-23, 50-366-93-23, NUDOCS 9401210066 | |
| Download: ML20059G015 (7) | |
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SALP REPORT - HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT 50-321/93-23 & 50-366/93-23 BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on December 16, 1993, to assess the nuclear safety performance of Hatch Nuclear Plant for the period of May 31, 1992, through November 27, 1993. The Board was conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive 8.6, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance." . Board members were Johns P. Jaudon (Board Chairperson),
Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, NRC Region II (RII); Ellis W. Merschoff, Director. Division of Reactor Projects, NRC RII; Bruce Mallett, Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC RII; and Loren R. Plisco, Acting Director, Project Directorate II-3, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. This assessment was reviewed and approved by Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, NRC RI I PLANT OPERATIONS This functional area consists of the control and execution of activities directly related to operating the plant. It includes activities such as plant startup, power operation, plant shutdown, and response to transients. It also includes initial and requalification training programs for licensed operator Although a good . level of safety performance was maintained during this assessment period, the overall operational performance declined. There was an increase in the number of reactor scrams and unplanned plant shutdowns. Some of the shutdowns during the first twelve months of the assessment period involved poor operator performance, including inattention to detai Several significant deficiencies involving operator performance were identified, such as in September 1992, when an inattentive control room watchstander was identified, and in April 1993, when shutdown cooling -
flow was lost for about one and a half hours before operators identified the problem and corrected the cause. Significant examples of failures to follow procedures involving safety related activities were also identified during this assessment perio Early in the assessment period, inattention to detail by Operations personnel during plant tours resulted in poor remedial actions regarding equipment problems. These included an inoperable battery charger, degraded conditions of the intake traveling water screens, and an overflow of the spent fuel pool. Several of. the deficiencies were identified by NRC inspector Deficiencies in communications between Operations and other groups resulted in poor resolution of problems involving identified equipment 9401210066 940106 ~1 PDR ADOCK 0500
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vulnerabilities. Corrective actions for these issues were delayed or not properly completed. Examples included the single failure vulnerability of the intake structure ventilation system and the turbine building service water isolation issu While the efforts of the Scram Frequency Reduction Committee were strong, implementation of some corrective actions was not timel i Several scrams were caused by failures involving balance of plant equipment. Modifications, such as the improved main steam isolation valve limit switch indications and upgraded feedwater and recirculation >
system controllers, improved system reliabilit Plant management performed detailed reviews of operator performance and implemented corrective actions. This resulted in a significant improvement in operator performance during the last six months of the period. Management's expectations, supervisory responsibilities, and rigorous use of fundamental work practices were emphasized. Since July 1993, overall control room professionalism and communications steadily improved. Several unplanned shutdowns, including a dual unit outage, challenged Operations personnel. Good actions on the part of control room operators were observed during recent transients. The attention to detail by operators during rounds significantly improved. Operators promptly identified equipment problems and initiated corrective action Strengths in some longstanding programs contributed to good overall safety performance. A greater number of operators and supervisors than required by the regulations were assigned to each shift. The majority of the operators were very experienced and possessed excellent knowledge of plant systems. The Shift Technical Advisors were an integral part of each shift and enhanced the ability of the shifts to respond to off-normal conditions. A very strong annunciator control program was consistently maintained. Operations training and the Event Review Team analyses of operational events continued as significant strength Operations management continued efforts to improve overall proficienc Computerized logs for watchstander rounds resulted in more efficient reviews of data and increased trending applications. Increased use of personnel to complete administrative functions outside of the onshift control room organization was noted. There was an increase in information flow from Operations management to the operators. Reports from audits and inspections are shared directly with the operating crews. Management continued to stress consistent use of fundamental work practices (including self verification techniques) which result in good performanc Supervisory involvement and practices were emphasize Additional enhancements were also made in shutdown risk assessment practice The Operations area is rated as a Category _
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II MAINTENANCE This functional area includes activities associated with diagnostic, predictive, preventive, and corrective maintenance of plant structures, systems, and components. It also includes surveillance testing, inservice inspection and testing, instrument calibrations, equipment operability tests, post-maintenance testing, containment leak rate tests, and special test Overall performance in the maintenance area declined during this assessment perio Although the licensee's management instituted good programs to improve plant material conditions and to conduct diagnostic, predictive, preventive and corrective maintenance, implementation problems occurred. There were a number of reactor scrams and forced outages which resulted from maintenance activities; this was in contrast to the previous assessment period. For example, a reactor scram in May 1993 was caused by inadequate work practices and incomplete post-maintenance testing on the main steam isolation valve circuitr Peor work practices contributed to several events during the period and continued to impact the quality of maintenance adversely. There were two instances of failure to follow fundamental electrical safety requirements while performing safety-related work. In one case a worker received an electrical shock while working on an energized 4160 volts AC breaker, and in another case main steam isolation valves limit switches were replaced while their circuits were still energize The licensee maintained a low threshold for problem identificatio Management appropriately prioritized the corrective maintenance work and reduced the work order backlog during this period. A major share of the maintenance resources continued to be dedicated to the preventive and predictive programs. Preventive maintenance activities have recently started to consider risk assessment results. Maintenance management remained sensitive to equipment aging issues and is developing plans to address the likely problem area The preventive and predictive maintenance programs were generally
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effective in assuring reliability of plant equipment. The overall performance of rotating machinery and valves has improved. Management was aggressive in improving the reliability of the High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Systems and the emergency j diesel generators. Management initiatives, such as the material upgrade '
program, have achieved improvements in the material condition of the i plant. The licensee's initiatives to strengthen the erosion / corrosion !
program were timely, and the inservice inspection program functioned wel !
Maintenance training programs were well managed and supported by :
knowledgeable and skilled personnel. Furthermore, the licensee's '
training for maintenance personnel addressed generic areas such as the recommendations of Generic letter 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-0perated Valve Testing and Surveillance," for valve testing.
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Management has dedicated significant efforts to outage and shutdown risk planning even prior to NRC emphatis on these issues. Moreover, 1 management has continued its efforts to reduce the number of full-time contractors for outage and non-outage maintenance activitie Root-cause evaluations and corrective actions were normally thoroug However, there were a number of recurring equipment problems involving i important systems that caused operational problems during the perio !
Examples included leaking residual heat removal service water air l release valves, failure of valve and spent fuel pool alarms that resulted in an overflow of pool water into the reactor building ventilation system, and main feed pump lube oil inleakage via the seal I water system that contributed to a reactor scram. The licensee failed l to identify and resolve the root causes of these recurring equipment problems in a timely manne There was an unusually high number of missed technical specification surveillance tests during the assessment period, especially those of a ,
non-routine or conditional frequency. The majority of the missed l surveillances were caused by individual personnel error or poor l communications. Improvement had been noted in surveillance testing ,
during the last assessment period, but those improvements were not l sustained this period. In addition, deficiencies in functional _ or post- l maintenance testing activities contributed to unnecessary reactor scrams i or caused operability concern !
l The Maintenance area is rated Category IV. ENGINEERING The functional area of engineering addresses the adequacy of technical and engineering support for all regulated plant activities and interfaces. Design control and modifications are encompassed as is the engineering support for operations, maintenance, outages, testing, and 1 licensing related activitie !
l The design change process operated effectively. Staffing on-site and at-the corporate headquarters was strong. Both design changes and -l; temporary modifications were generally well planned and executed. The backlog of design changes significantly decreased. The licensee made 1 some modifications which went beyond regulatory requirements in order to i increase plant reliability and efficiency. There are still potential, '
single-failure vulnerabilities existing, which could result in Teq l f i n n s a n o excellent. The licensee clearly articulated positions for a variety of issues and l worked constructively with the staff to resolve licensing issues. Of l special note was the licensee's proactive efforts with the standard, I revised Technical Specification !
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Licensee' support of plart operations and maintenance was superio The close interface of engineering with other on-site organizations provided !
immediate and effective support for recognized problems (for example, '
the resolution of long standing problems with High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling systems).
More effective >tilization of system and component engineers has improved the identification and resolution of equipment problem Management support for system and component engineers resulted in an increased sense of ownership of assigned components and systems, thereby providing additional strength to support plant operatio ,
i Despite the strong support for plant operations, there were problems identified in one area of engineering support; this was the testing and i analysis of the performance of motor-operated valves. In this area, !
engineering has not been aggressive in the follow-up of test data and '
the resolution of operability questions. This single weakness was noted in an otherwise superior program of engineering suppor The licensee made effective use of risk information in the outage process to enhance safet :
l The Engineering area is rated as Category V. PLANT SUPPORT The Plant Support functional area covers all activities related to the plant support function including radiological controls, emergency preparedness, security, chemistry, fire protection, and housekeeping control The radiological controls program has made significant improvements ;
since the last SALP assessment period in the areas of controlling the i radiation dose to individuals. The source term at the facility remained i high, mainly as the result of hydrogen water injection chemistry and i leaking fuel in Unit 2. Despite this source term, radiation' dose has '
been reduced through a proactive ALARA progra The ALARA program has been strengthened such that it is now an integral part of the day-to-day ,
operations. As a result, job planning efforts are factoring in dose i considerations and procedures are being changed to cause dose savings (e.g., operators and health physics using remote cameras as alternative j to entering high radiation areas). Despite the increased challenge in j source term, the licensee has maintained the collective dose at the site
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l in 1993 similar to that in 1992 and significantly reduced from 1991. A large contributor to this is the planning of ~only one major outage per !
year in 1992 and 1993. The licensee has been superior.in pursuing )
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reduction of-contaminated area In the radiological effluents and chemistry controls areas, the licensee has continued an effective program in maintaining releases and chemistry parameters well below technical specifications. There was an excellent ]
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program for assessing radiological samples and monitoring the affects on .
the environment. There were some positive steps taken to address !
procedural adherence problems in the chemistry area identified during the last assessment period. These appeared to be effective in reducing these types of problems this assessment. During the first twelve months ,
of this assessment period, there were indicators of inattention and not 1 i
being thorough in completing all aspects of tasks. This caused problems I in each case (examples included not performing adequate evaluation of
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release levels of sludge disposed of onsite, releasing a radiation waste shipment with contamination levels exceeding regulatory limits, discharging the contents of a radiation waste tank without obtaining a required sample, and not recognizing the consequences of mismatched flow rates on the monitors for the plant stack). Although there were some ,
isolated incidence of high radiation area doors left open and l individuals not following radiation work permits when entering high j radiation areas, the licensee had taken aggressive steps to reduce the -
number of these instances significantl )
The emergency preparedness organization continued to have a strong )
training program with initiatives to address potential weaknesses (e.g., I the licensee brought in a simulated NRC team during one of the drills).
The performance in the September 1993 exercise was excellent. The licensee created a challenging scenario; the emergency facilities were .!
staffed promptly, and the licensee's responders exhibited a good j knowledge of the correct questions to ask and of the indicators for :
classification of the event. This was a significant improvement over )
the performance in the September 1992 exercise. The licensee continued l to have minor problems with notifying offsite agencies of key event changes during exercises but has been aggressive in addressing this issue. There was a strong program of audits and critiques in emergency preparedness. The audits were thorough, and there were positive steps taken to resolve identified problems. Early in the assessment period, there was some untimely followup to minor facility / equipment issues, but the licensee had taken action to correct the issue The security program continued to exhibit strength. Key to this was the strong self-assessment and aggressive tracking and management of emergent issues. The licensee was also effective in retaining a well qualified and trained staff. This also resulted in a significant reduction in the number of detection problems when compared to the l previous assessment period. The performance in the fitness-for-duty '
program was superior, and many aspects of the program exceeded regulatory requirement There was good identification and resolution of fire protection i problem In general, performance in this area showed good improvement- l when compared to that noted during the previous assessment period. This '
contributed to the reduction in fires requiring fire brigade response
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during the assessment period. The licensee identified and corrected i deficiencies involving fire protection material in the intake structure.
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The licensee was not aggressive in conducting specific training for the U
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fire brigade in plant areas where exceptions to Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 had been take In the housekeeping area the licensee had taken strong actions to improve conditions of some areas such as the High Pressure Coolant Injection room. The control of oil leaks and housekeeping in the diesel generator rooms was excellent, but there was evidence of some inattention to cleanliness controls in the intake' structure and in the drywell after an outag The Plant Support area is rated as a Category I
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