IR 05000483/1989011

Insp Rept 50-483/89-11 on 890601-0715.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Nonroutine Events,Plant Operations & Maint/Surveillance

ML20247R804
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	07/27/1989
From:	Charles Brown, Defayette R, Little B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247R795	List: IR 05000483/1989011 ML20247R790
References
50-483-89-11, NUDOCS 8908080109
Download: ML20247R804 (11)

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J U.S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

I ReportNo.'50-483/89011(DRP)

Docket No.60-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company .

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Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 Inspection at: Callaway Site, Steedman, Missouri Inspection Conducted: June 1 through' July'15, 1989'

Inspectors: B. H. Little

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C. H. Brown f?WA Approved By: R. W.' DeFayett Chief'

Reactor Projects Section 3A 7 E7 /[f Date

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Inspection Summary Inspection from June. I through July 15,1989(ReportNo.'50-483/89011(DRP))

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced safety inspection of non-routine events, plant operations, and maintenance / surveillance was performe Results: No violations were identified. Two unresolved items are identified, one relates to an environmental qualification deficiency associated with -

l Target Rock valves, the othe- involves the classification and deportability of emergency diesel generator failures (paragraphs 2a and 2d). 0ther results included: administrative close out of a-generic letter, an LER and an unresolved item (paragraphs 2b and 2c); and-observations of good management 1 and engineering / technical support involvement in operational event .

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Operating crews demonstrated effective control during events-(paragraph 3a). l Effective radiological controir, and practices were being maintained-(paragraph 3d). Observations by NRC Region III management were favorable (paragraph'5).  ;

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890POS010? 89072S DR ADOCK 0500 w _-_ _ - _ _ --_

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DETAILS Persons Contacted D. F. Schnell, Senior Vice President, Nuclear

• G. L. Randolph, General Manager, Nuclear Operations

• J. D. Blosser, . Manager, Callaway Plant C. D. Naslund, Manager, Operations Support

'*J. V. Laux, Manager. Quality Assurance

• J. R. Peevy, Assistant Manager, Technical Services W. R. Campbell, Manager, Nuclear Engineering M. E. Taylor, Assistant Manager,LWork Control D. E. Young, Superintendent, Operations

• W R. Robinson, Assistant Manager, Operations ar.d Maintenance R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Health Physics

• T. P. Sharkey, Supervising Engineer, Site Licensing G. J. Czeschin, Superintendent, Planning and Scheduling W. H. Sheppard, Superintendent, Maintenance G. R. Pendegraff, Superintendent, Security L. H. Kanuckel, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Program G. A. Hughes, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineer Group

• J. C. Gearhart, Superintendent, Operations Support, Quality Assurance J. J. Cassmeyer, Quality Assurance Engineer

• C. S. Petzel, Quality Assurance Engineer

• Denotes those present at one or more exit interview In addition, a number of. equipment operators, reactor operators, senior_

reactor operators, and other members of the quality control, operations, maintenance, health physics, and engineering staffs were contacte . Reports of Non-Routine Events (92700)(92703) Target Rock (TR) Solenoid Valves On June 5, 1989, the licensee notified t M NRC (four hour - ENS report) of a potential environmental qualification deficiency associated with TR solenoid valve Field inspectio-s, performed by the licensee during the refueling 3 outage (April,1989), found that ,

the TR solenoid valves contained BEAU terminal blocks and silicon wire. Through subsequent review and evaluation the licensee:

detennined that the TR solenoid valves "as found" were not qualified in accordance with NUREG 0588 but were " operable" and "qualifiable if tested" based on their similarity to materials which had been-qualified by testing. EQ qualified retrofit kits were installed in the TR solenoid valves during the outag This matter is unresolved pending further NRC review (483/89011-01(DRP)).

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j b. Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor vessel Materials (Generic Letter 88-11)

Generic letter (GL) 88-11 requested licensees to use the method described in Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.99 to predict the effect of neutron radiation on reactor vessel materials. In i addition, a technical analysis was required to be performed and a schedule of proposed actions was to be submitted within 180 days of the effective date of RG 1.99, Revision The staff has reviewed and agrees with the licensee's response to GL 88-11 (dated November 30,1988) and considers GL 88-11 to be closed for Callawa c. (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 88-013-02 and Unresolved Item 483/88004-01(DRP). Improper insta11af ;on of Raychem heatshrink termination )

LER 88-013, Supplement 1, dated January 3,1989, identified specific , j deficiencies, corrective actions and root causes, associated with j Raychem heatshrink applications in EQ circuits. LER 88-013,  !

Supplement 2, dated April 10, 1989, provided additional information j in the safety significance portion of the repor I t

An inspection in this matter was performed by NRC Region III and documented in Report No. 50-483/89002 (DRS). The inspection included the missing heatshrink tubing associated with the containment radiation monitors, (unresolved item 50-483/88004-01(DRP)), and was considered in the violation I identified in inspection report item 89002-01B(DRS). The report l closed unresolved item 50-483/88019-02(DRP), and although intended, j failed to document the closure of LER 88013 and unresolved item 88004-01(DRP).

This matter was discussed with NRC Region III, DRS and no further .

concerrs were identified. This item documents the closure of LER j 88013, Supplement 1, Supplement 2, and Unresolved Item l 88004-01(DRP). j d. Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) Failures l (1) Callaway Special Report 89-03, Invalid Diesel Generator "A" Failure, dated May 1, 1989 reported a condition identified by the licensee which could have prevented the diesel generator from performing its long term safety function. The condition resulted from a cooling water "O rir.g" failure which allowed water to enter the rocker arm lube oil reservoir. This condition was discovered in response to the rocker arm lube oil reservoir alarm. The licensee classified the failure as an invalid test failur i i

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(2) Callaway. Incident Report (IR)89-079, dated April 1,1989 documented that the "A" DG failed to start as' required during the performance of surveillance procedure ISP-SA-2413A step i (Blackout Without Safety Injection). The licensee determined that the cause of the failure was a failed relay driver card in j the load shedding and emergency. load sequencing circuit'which

.was outside of the defined diesel generator unit design and therefore not reportable. This test and failure was observed by the resident inspector and documented in inspection report -

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483/89009(DRP).  ;

Subsequent NRR review questioned the classification of the failure reported in Special Report 89-03'and the deportability-of the failure described in inspection report 8900 q On July 13, 1989 the inspectors met with the licensee and

. discussed the apparent misclassification of item (1). above and the failure to report' item (2) above. The licensee discussed j

the basis for its original determination of classification and '

i deportability, but will re-evaluate this matte In addition, a review of DG related incident reports will be performed to assess appropriate reporting. The licensee expressed a desire for further discussion of this matter with NRR, which was i, pending at the close of this inspection perio i This matter is unresolved pending further NRC review (483/89011-02(DRP)).

] Plant Operations (71707) (71710) Operational Safety Verification Inspections were routinely performed to ensure tha't'the licensee conducts activities at the facility safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. The inspections focused'on the implementation and overall effectiveness of the licensee's control 1 of operating activities, and' on the performance of licensed and '

non-licensed operators and shift technical advisors. -The inspections included direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, <

interviews and discussions with licensee personnel,-independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions of l

. operation (LCO), and reviews of facility procedures, records, and j reports. The following items were considered during thes :

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Adequacy of plant staffing and supervisio !

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Control room professionalism, including procedure adherence, ;

operator attentiveness, and response to alarms, events, and I off-normal condition !

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- Operability of selected safety-related' systems, including attendant alarms, instrumentation, and. controls'.

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Maintenance of quality records and report j The inspectors observed that control. room supervisors,' shift technica advisors, and operators were attentive to plant conditions, performed '

frequent panel walkdowns- and were responsive to off-normal alarms and'

condition On June 23, 1989, during control rod. testing, control rod bank "B" J failed to move when demanded. This failure placed the plant in a :l six-hour action statement. A controlled shutdown of. the plant commenced. At approximately 2:20 p.m., when the turbine was' removed from service and breakers V-53 and V-55 opened as required,.a faulty ,,

relay in V-55 caused the "A" switchyard bus to be_ isolated by j opening breakers V-85 and V-45. l.oss of the "A" switchyard bu I resulted in loss of power to NB01 since the "A" diesel was already out of service for a planned outage, therefore, no power was i available to NB01. The loss of NB01 caused an auxiliary feedwater actuation of the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump and a-blowdown i isolatien signa ]

Following the' bus loss, the plant reached a level of approximately 1 two percent reactor power at which point the operators manually !

initiated a reacter trip in accordance with their procedures for I handling a rod control system malfunction. All plant systems J performed as expected. Two faulty cards were found in rod. control 1 logic cabinets and.were subsequently replaced by I&C. After th card repairs were complete and "A" diesel was returned to service, pirat startup was commenced and the unit was returned to service I on iune 24, 1989 at approximately 10:00 .

The resident inspectors responded'to the control room when notified of the problem and potential plant shutdown and observed management and engineering / technical support involvement in the evaluation of plant problems, shutdown preparations, and the operating crew's performance during the plant shutdown and response to associated j events. The Spl observed control rod tests following relay card J replacement and the reactor startup on June 24, 198 Good management involvement and engineering and technical support was demonstrated during the above events. Effective supervision, good system knowledge and procedure use was demonstrated by the operating crew in response to the events. Inspection follow-up will be performed following the issuance of the licensee event repor On July 13 at 10:38 CDT, a main control board annunciator indicated a lowering pressure in the "D" emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

accumM ator. A containment entry and investigation revealed the i nitt ugen supply relief valve, EP-8855D, for' the "D" ECCS accumulator ,

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to be leaking past its seat to the containment atmosphere. The condition required periodic recharging of the accumulator with nitrogen (about every 30 minutes) in order to maintain the accumulator pressure within the technical specification requirement of 602 to 648 psi The licensee determined that replacement of the defective relief valve was appropriate and prepared a thorough job plan and schedule for the task. The job was expected to extend into the applicable six-hour shutdown technical specification action requirement. The licensee alerted NRC. Region III of the problem and the potential for requesting enforcement discretion and provided justification for such actio The inspector monitored the licensee's response to the event. The

"D" accumulator was removed from service at 9:57 a.m. on July 7, 1989; the relief valve was replaced and the accumulator was returned to service at 12:01 p.m. on July 7, 1989, thus completing the work in less than six hours therefore eliminating the need for discretionary enforcement or reactor shutdown. The licensee demonstrated a high level of safety awareness and sensitivity to NRC interest in this matte Additional onsite in5pections were performed by an NRC Training Center instructor during the period June 5 through 8, 198 Inspection activities included alant tours and control room observations during day and bac( shift periods, accompanying an equipment operator (E0) during plant rounds and a reacter containment entry. Observations and findings are summarized as follow Control room (CR) observations; CR supervisors and operators were knowledgeable of ongoing work activities, were attentive-to plant conditions and responded promptly to off-normal conditions (CR alarms). Instrument and control (ISC)

technicians performing surveillance activities were meticulous in following procedural steps. Communications between groups (operating crew, health physics (HP), I&C) were open and effective, indicative of good team spiri Several CR recorders (non technical specification instruments)

were not inking properly. Two recorders (EJ-TR-613 and BB-TR-443) showed no recorder traces for periods of approximately five hours (3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.). Three other recorders showed traces starting about shift change but showed no trace for the previous one to three hours. One recorder had .

e broken pen, which ut. corrected. Some traces indicated several attempts (brief periods of inking) by operators to correct inking problems. Although CR operators were observed to perform frequent panel walkdowns, which included monitoring of recorders, some inking problems were uncorrecte .

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Plant Observations; overall housekeeping and material .

l conditions within the. plant were' good. The E0 was attentive ' during plant tours and displayed good watch-standing _ practice Minor deficiencies identified during the tour were promptl communicated to the control room.and responded to. Activities- 1 in containment associated with the re  ;

nuclear power range detector (NIS-41) placement'of was a- defective-well supervised and- 'j performed. -HP technicians provided a thorough pre-task ~ALARA briefing and close HP. coverage throughout .the replacement wor Exceptional information exchange and. cooperative attitudes were-

~ demonstrated by personnel involved in the-tas The above observations were discussed with operations' managemen An operations' night order was issued to increase CR personnel's l sensitivity relating to recorder performar.ce and directed that'

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problem recorders be reported on work requests. The licensee indicated that changing to a different' inking system was being:

evaluate ! Off-shift Inspection of Control Room The inspectors performed routine inspections of. the control' room during off-shift and weekend periods; these included inspections between the hours of 10:00 p.m..and 5:00 a.m. The inspections were .!

conducted to assess overall crew performance and, specifically, control room operator attentiveness during night shift The inspectors determined that both licensed and non-licensed -

operators were attentive to their duties, and that the-administrative controls relating to the conduct of' operation were being adhered t Plant Material Conditions / Housekeeping-The inspectors performed routine plant tours to assess material conditions within the plant, ongoing quality activities' and'

plantwide housekeeping.- The inspectors also accompanied the; licensee's management on monthly. plant tour Overall material conditions within the plant were considered goo Deficiencies were appropriately. tagged for repair.. With the-exception of isolated areas, housekeeping was considered goo The licensee lhad increased housekeeping. efforts'to re-establish preoutage condition R_ radiological Controls The licensee's radicionical controls and practices were routinely observed by the inspectors during plant tours.and during the

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inspection of selected work activities. The . inspection included direct observations of health physics (HP) activities relating to radiological surveys and monitoring, maintenance of radiological y control signs and barriers, contamination, and radioactive waste controls. ;The inspection also included a routine review of the licensee's. radiological and water chemistry control records and ;

report Good radiological controls, conditions, and practices were observe ]

The HP staff maintained effective access control and were knowledgeable of ongoing work, radiological conditions and rotective requirements within the radiological controlled areas p(RCA) . HP technicians provided effective ALARA briefings for jobs within the RC Securit9 The licensee's security activities were observed by the inspectors i during routine facility tours and during the inspectors' site {

arrivals and departures. Observations included the security "i personnel's-performance associated with access control, security j checks, and surveillance activities, and focused on the adequacy of i security staffing, the security response (compensatory measures),> .

and the security staff's attentiveness and' thoroughnes Other than the minor anomalies discussed above, all activities were conducted in an adequate and safe manne . Maintenance / Surveillance (62703) (61726)

Selected portions of the plant surveillance, test and maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed or reviewed.to ascertain that the activities were perfonned in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and the Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during these inspections: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed: from. service; approvals were obtained prior to. initiating the work; activities w're accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable;-

functional testing and/or calibration was performed prior to recurning the components or systems to service; parts and materials tha*.'were used

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were properly certified; and appropriate fire prevention, rad:ological, and ilousekeeping conditions were maintaine Maintenance The reviewed maintenance activities included':

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Work Request N Activity W122731 Troubleshoot / rework level switch feedwater low pressure heater 3C high level switc W120419 Reactor coolant system loop 1 delta temperature indicator - rework to verify delta temperatur WO66815/ Rework cubicle indicating tape and W111027 troubleshoot / rework breaker indication on main feeder breaker to load center PGZ P458053 Security diesel generator operability test OTS-UB-0000 C420652/ Disconnect space heater, modify wiring, C457717/ inspect and service limitorque, and P421471/ i# ntify torque switch type for valve EG-12 Wil6260 (e sential service water to component cooling water train B).

b. Surveillance The reviewed surveillance included:

Procedure N Activity ISF-GG-00R28 Functional - nuclear; fuel building vent l radiation detect'> ISL-SE-ON41B Loop - nuclear; power range N41 axial flux diff erenc f

ISL-SE-0N44B Locp - nuclear; power range axial flux differenc ISF-AE-0L527 Functional - level; steam generator "B" narrow range level protectio ISF-AE-0L517 Functional - level; steam generator "A" r; arrow range level protectio ISL-BB-0T411 Loop - temperature; loop 1 delta  ;

temperature / temperature averag SE-NK-QB002 Quarterly surveillance NK-12 battery No. 2, 125 volt D ,

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Procedure N Activity I

ISF-AE-OL528 Functional - level; steam generator "B" narrow range level protectio ISF-AE-OL548 Functional - level; steam generator _ "D" narrow range level protectio ISF-EB-0F434 Functional - flow; reactor coolant loop 3 flo ISF-AB-0P524 I&C functional - pressure; steam generator

"B" pressure.

L The inspector noted that the ongoing maintenance and surveillance activities observed were properly authorized and were being performed using approved procedures. The limiting conditions for operation were adhered to during these activities. In general the workmanship was found to be satisfactor All activities were conducted in an adequate and safe manne . NRC Reoion III Management Visit (30703)

The NRC Region III Administrator and the Director, Division of Reactor Projects, visited the Callaway Plant, on June 21, 1989, to meet with the resident inspectors and to tour the plant. NRC NRR, Directorate III-3 and the Licensee Project Manager (LPM) accompanied Region III management during the visi Following the plant tour a' briefing was held with licensee corporate and plant management persannel. The brief#ng included '

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a discussion of the following NRC observations *

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The utility has shown good outage performance and overall performance improving trands in most area Overall plant material conditions were very goe Housekeeping was generally good but a lack of " deep cleaning" was observed in localized areas, eg; under the emergency diesel generator skid and floor grating ,

- Licensee's personnel displayed a positive attitude and communications were open and forthrigh In addition, the licensee discussed recent personnel reassignments and major outage activities and .:hievemer,ts including health physics outage successe Additional onsite inspection was performed by the LPM during the week of June 19, 1989. Activities and findings are sunnarized as follows:

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Selected 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations of changes. approved ard implemented at Callaway. The items . reviewed were selected from modifications made during the recent refueling outage and other items from the licensee's. latest annual 10 CFR 50.59 report dated June 1, 1989. The inspection consisted of reviewing-the' change-packages .and other applicable' documents such as the. FSAR and P&ID's; discussions with engineering staff; and examination of hardware. None of the items were determined to require additional'

review by the NRC technical staf '

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Attended the Callaway' Plant onsite review committee meetin Issues addressed include procedural changes, FSAR changes, design modification, incident reports and future technical specification change applications. The comittee also reviewed a draft LER discussing the reactor trip on May 29. 1989, when I & C personnel inadvertently allowed two leads' to come in contact when connecting flukes to power range instrumentation to do flux maps. The ccmmittee decided it needed additional details to make sure the LER correctly characterizes the root cause in terms of personnel error, procedural inadequacy or' design deficiency, or some combination of cause Accompanied the senior reactor operator (SRO) "fbid supervisor" during routine plant tours and during a reactor containment entr The SR0 displayed exceptional plant knowledge and attention to detail during the tour. The health physics (HP) technicians had j

.available and were using procedures for the containment entr The containment interior appeared to be in very good order.with respect to housekeeping and cleanlines All activities were conducted in an adequate and safe manner.- Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a violation, a i failure to meet a licensee commitment, or a' deviation. Unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 2a. and 2d. of this. repor . Exit Meeting (30703)  !

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the' inspection period. The inspectors l summarized the scope and findings of the inspections The licensee j

! representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein._ The-inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the ;

inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the !

inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did.not identify any such: .;

documents / processes as proprietar ]

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