IR 05000295/1985013

Insp Rept 50-295/85-13 on 850308-14,20 & 22.No Noncompliance or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Refueling Preparations & Refueling Cavity Water Seal

ML20205A279
Person / Time
Site:	Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	04/11/1985
From:	Guldemond W, Milbrot W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205A272	List: IR 05000295/1985013 ML20205A270
References
50-295-85-13, NUDOCS 8504250468
Download: ML20205A279 (6)

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. U.'S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-295/85013(DRS)

Docket No. 150-295 License No. DPR-39 Licensee: ' Commonwealth Edison Company

.P.-0. Box 767-Chicago, Illinois 60690 Facility.Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1-Inspection At: Zion,' Illinois Inspection Conducted: March 8-14, 20 and 22, 1985 Inspector: _ W. E. Milbrot * <

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~ Approved By: W. G. Guldemond, C ief 4[# I-Operational Programs Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection'on March 8-14, 20 and 22, 1985 (Report No. 50-295/85013(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced-inspection of refueling preparations-and

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activitias, and refueling cavity water sea The inspection involved a. total ~

of 63 inspector-hours onsite by 1 NRC inspector including 6 inspector-hours onsite during off-shift Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• • Graesser, Station Superintendent

• E. Fuerst, Assistant' Station Superintendent, Operations

• J. Gilmore,' Unit 2 Operating Engineer R. Budowle, Unit 1 Operating Engineer

• • L. Pruett, Rad Waste Operating Engineer L. Thorsen, Fuel Handling Foreman R. Chin, Head Nuclear Engineer W. Demo, Shift Engineer

• W. Stone, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• J. Ballard, Quality Control Supervisor

• D. Mc Menamin, Quality' Assurance Supervisor NRC Representatives

• Holzmer, Senior Resident Inspector

• Kish, Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspectio * Denotes personnel attending the March 14, 1985 exi *Donotes personnel attending the March 22, 1985 exi . Refueling Preparations The inspector reviewed documentation of training plans and records of personnel assigned to fuel handling operations, fuel handling equipment inspection and checkout procedures, the results of the inspections and checkouts including proper operation of equipment interlocks and limit switches, results of new fuel inspection, irradiated fuel inspection procedures, and periodic test procedures covering systems that support fuel shuffle to assure that applicable Technical Specification require-ments were satisfied. The inspector also reviewed the procedure followed by the licensee for documenting completion of required periodic tests as recorded on Periodic Test-0, Shift Surveillance Check List, Appendix E, Revision 23, Operating Surveillances for Cold Shutdown and Refueling Modes and discussed this procedure with control room personnel. A review of completed periodic tests that are prerequisites to fuel shuffle was conducte The test results were satisfactor ,

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The licensee conducted a core reload safety evaluation ~in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 that-demonstrated Technical Specification changes are no frequired for operation of Unit 1 during Cycle 9. The review concluded

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, that no unreviewed safety questions are involve No _ items of. noncompliance or deviations were identified.

. . Refueling Activities Prior to performing refueling activities, the fuel handlers established

controls to minimize the possibility of items falling into the open

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reactor' cavity during core shuffle. These controls-included placing a

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rope barrier around-the reactor cavity ~to' keep non-refueling personnel

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away from the area, requiring personnel working within the roped boundary to remove unnecessary items from their clothing.and tape over any pockets

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containing necessary . items such as dosimetry equipment, and limiting work i above the reactor vessel to that which was essential at the time. The same controls were not in effect prior to this time even though the reactor cavity was exposed when the reactor head was removed. The Fuel Handling Supervisor reported that refuelers are responsible for estab-

< lishing the subject material exclusion controls during periods of core

. . shuffle, but have no cognizance over the area during periods when only

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non-refueling work is being conducte Material exclusion controls are j important to protect the reactor internals and need to be in effect

regardless of which licensee organization has cognizance of the work *

are The licensee stated that establishing material exclusion controls during all periods when the reactor internals are exposed will be

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evaluated. Resolution of this issue is considered an open item (295/85013-01(DRS)) pending action by the licensee and subsequent

review by the NRC.

l The initial refueling operation was a top of core inspection for the-i purpose of detecting damage to the fuel and locating any foreign material

as the Noise Monitoring System indicated the possibility of loose items prior to plant shutdown. The inspection was conducted using an under .

water TV camera suspended from the manipulator cran No foreign i material or fuel damage was reported during this~ phase of the inspection.

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Fuel inspections were continued during core shuffle.

The inspector verified that the following periodic test actions were completed

L i PT-0, Appendix B-1, Revision 8, Shutdown Margin Verification

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Instructions and Data Sheet t

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PT-0, Appendix N, Revision 6 Radiation Monitor Check Sheet During Refueling, Unit 1 i- PT-2J, Revision 11, Residual Heat Removal Pump Test

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! PT-4A, Revision 0, Source Range Functional Test

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PT-14, Revision 11, Inoperable Equipment Surveillance Test PT-17 Revision 7, Gas Decay Tanks and Containment Purge'and Vent Auto Isolation Valve Test PT-19, Revision 7, Fuel Building Ventilation Test b. Eight hour refueling checks were recorded on PT-0, Appendix E, Revision 23, Operating Surveillance Check Shee Checks important to refueling included RCS temperature, reactor cavity water level, spent fuel pit water level, operation of one RHR loop,. Source Range Monitor (SRM) operability, and refueling radiation monitors operatio Several shifts of fuel handling operations were observed including use of the manipulator crane, fuel transfer system, spent fuel pit bridge, and rod control cluster change fixture and associated handling tools. Handling of irradiated fuel to be reused included an inspection in accordance with procedure T.S.S. 15.6.75, Revision 0 Irradiated Fuel Inspection During Refueling, as required by Technical Specification 3.1 During this fuel inspection, a continued effort was made to look for possible. fuel damage and foreign item A nut was located in the bottom nozzle of a removed fuel assembl No damaged fuel assemblies were reported during the inspectio The movement of fuel was handled safely and in accordance with written procedure Continuous communications were maintained between the manipulator crane, spent fuel pit area and the Control Room. Manning of the manipulator crane and Control Room wan

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adequate and fuel handling shift turnovers were documented on a Fuel Handling. Turnover Sheet. The turnover sheet provided entries on equipment status, problems encountered during the shift, steps completed and next step to be accomplished, signature of the off going and on coming supervisor and current dat The sequence for handling fuel was determined by the Fuel Transfer Lis Several changes were made to the transfer list to alter the fuel shuffle sequence because of difficulty encountered in handling particular fuel assemblies. There was some inconsistency in the action specified by several of the changes. A change to step 158 stated to delete step 15 Step 158 was deleted and not signed of A second change added new steps 264A and 2648, but made no reference to delete step 26 Step 264 was lined out and not signed of A third change added new steps 319A and 3198 and made no reference to step 31 Step 319, 319A, and 319B were all signed off as complet The licensee stated that the Fuel Handling Foreman knew the' intent of the change and the sequence required. The licensee also stated that all the changes to the Fuel Transfer List would be reviewed to ensure there is consistency in the change .

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, . Status' boards were used on the ' refueling floor and in the Control

-Room to maintain fuel accountabilit The inspector observed good housekeeping practices, analysis of reactor coolant for boron concentration, and posting of radiological controls around the -

. . reactor cavit The spent fuel pit bridge has two electrical-panels located

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approximately.10 and 12 feet above the bridge working level. The

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protective covers have been removed from both panels because of

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. overheating of the electrical breakers. This exposes energized

. electrical components. The licensee reported that there are no i ventilation openings in the covers and no design changes are pending-to. modify or replace the covers. The crane overhead pendant and e

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traverse operating chain hang adjacent'(approximately 2') to the

energized breakers. These exposed breakers are a safety hazard to

/ personnel and equipment. The licensee reported that they are con-sidering a review of the refueling equipment maintenance program including the spent fuel pit bridg Resolution of this issue is considered an open item (295/85013-02(DRS)).pending action by the y licensee and subsequent review by the NR ,

Following completion of core loading, a core verification was conducted using a TV camera and the manipulator crane. The veri-

fication was accomplished in accordance with FHI-34, Revision 0,

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Core Mapping Following Core Loadin A video tape and handwritten record was made of each fuel assembly, noting serial number, core

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location, orientation, and type of insert. No discrepancies were

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noted.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

> Refuel Cavity Water Seal f

As a result of the Haddam Neck reactor cavity drain down event of

August 21, 1984, the licensee had conducted a review to evaluate the potential for a refueling cavity water seal failure prior to Unit 1

' refuelin Information regarding this review is covered in previous Inspection Reports (295/85010(DRP); 304/85011(DRP)). -Potential fluid

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loss flow paths were evaluated by the licensee and administrative

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controls established for this refueling which included RHR recirculation i sump valves tagged out of service (00S), refueling cavity drain valves i locked closed and reactor coolant loop stop valves tagged 00 Reactor j coolant loop stop valve, IMOV-RC-8002A, and reactor coolant loop A

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bypass valve, IMOV-RC-8003A, were disassembled to allow valve internals

!. inspection / repair. The valves were sealed with temporary flanges during

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refuelin Design of the flanges were evaluated and considered accep-table for use. To provide additional protection, changes were issued

[ to procedures FHI-12, Fuel Transfer System Operation; FHI-13, i Manipulator Crane, and FHI-19, Spent Fuel Assembly Tool to incorporate i good working practices and precautions to assure that a fuel assembly l

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is not stored in the applicable fixtures when fuel handlers are not present. This practice would reduce the consequences of a loss of water level in the reactor cavity or spent fuel pi No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Open Items Open items'are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot Two open items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2 and . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives'(denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and on March 14 and 22, 1985 to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio The discussions included the particular areas inspected and the type of procedures and documents reviewed to suoport the inspection area The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report and noted that none of the information reviewed was marked as proprietary informatio The licensee stated that since it is not known specifically what will be included in the report, they will not know if anything in the report is proprietary until after it is reviewe The inspector stated that he had no knowledge of any information likely to be included in the report that was proprietary. The licensee considered that to be correct, but could not verify i _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .