ML20137K889

Insp Rept 50-382/85-25 on 850916-20.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Five Deficiencies Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Performance & Capabilities During Exercise of Emergency Plan & Procedures

ML20137K889
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	11/12/1985
From:	Hackney C, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137K857	List: ML20137K851 ML20137K889
References
50-382-85-25, NUDOCS 8512030310
Download: ML20137K889 (8)

See also: IR 05000382/1985025

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.? APPENDIX

, U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

. REGION IV

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/85-25 License: NPF-38

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Docket: 50-382

Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company

142 Delaronde Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70174

Facility'Name: Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station (SES)

Inspection At: Waterford 3 SES site near Killona, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: September 16-20, 1985

Inspector: h. M //- 5'- 7 7

C. A. Hackney, Emergency Prepaq@dness Analyst Date

Accompanying

Personnel: J. Kenoyer, Battelle

J. Jamison, Battelle

J. Will, Sonalyst

J. Davis, Batelle

NRC

Observers: D. Matthews, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Branch

E. Christenbury, Chief Hearing Counsel

Approved: f ,

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L A. Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Date

and Safeguards Programs Section

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted' September 16-20, 1985 (Report 50-382/85-25)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance

and capabilities during an exercise of the emergency plan and procedures. The

inspection involved 190 inspector-hours onsite by 5 NRC inspectors.

Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or 4

deviations were identified. Five deficiencies were identified.

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DETAILS

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' 1. ' Persons Co'ntacted

, Principal-Licensee Personnel

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• R. S. Leddick, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations

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• F..J..Drummond, Nuclear Services Manager

u e ~*R.'P.:Barkhurst, Plant Manager

• S' A.=Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical Services

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• R..G.~Azzarello, Emergency Planning Manager

• L. W. Cook, Nuclear Support and Licensing Manager

State of Louisiana

Dr. H. Bohlinger, Assistant Administrator, Nuclear Energy Division

W. Spell,' Administrator, Nuclear Energy Division

St. Charles Parish

J. Lucas, Emerger.cy Preparedness Director

NRC

• B. A. Breslau, Representing the Resident Inspector

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

A. Lookabaugh, Chief, Technological Hazards Branch

The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate

personnel in the areas of health physics, operations, and emergency

response organization.

• Denotes those present at the exit interview.

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2. Exercise Scenario

The exercise scenario was reviewed to determine if provisions had been

made for the level of participation by state and local agencies, and that

all the major elements of the emergency response would be exercised in

accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 and the guidance criteria in

NUREG 0654, Section 11.n. The review included an evaluation of the

adequacy of both operational and radiological aspects of the scenario.

In addition, a review of the internal consistency and thoroughness of

information provided to participants, observers, controllers and

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evaluators was made. Results of this review were as follows:

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>3 - a* The scenario contained a narrative summary of physical events which

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occurred'and the rational behind those events.

, . *- .There were numerous scenario messages given to the players; prompting

( was minimal.

• - Scenario events were timed such that players appeared to have

adequate time to respond and react to the event.

• The~ scenario was written to test the reactor operations personnel,-

- onsite and offsite monitoring personnel, first aid, and other support

functions.

• The scenario challenged the operations personnel for emergency

detection, classification, and notification. Further, the cnsite and

offsite radiological monitoring teams had the opportunity to

demonstrate the use of emergency procedures and radiological

monitoring equipment.

3. ' Control Room

Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned to

respond to the simulated emergency at 5:00 a.m. Among significant

initial conditions were the following:

a. The plant reactor had been operating for 60 days at 100% power and

was at the end of a 300 day operating cycle.

b. The automatic dump valves.were in manual control.

c. "A" charging pump was out of service for mechanical maintenance.

d. One reactor coolant vent path to the quench tank was out of service.

The exercise was initiated at 5:00 a.m. with an injured, contaminated

person located in the Radioactive Waste Compactor Building. The licensee

declared a Notification of Unusual Event based on a contaminated and

injured plar.t person. The plant first aid team was dispatched to the

injured person. At 6:00 a.m., security receives a report that the National

Weather Service has issued a severe weather thunderstorm warning. At

7:20 a.m., indications are received in the control room that the "A" 230

Kv feeder has been lost. A tornado is sighted over the Waterford switching

station. The shift superviss- declares an Alert emergency class due to

- the tornado striking inside the protected area. The control room operators

note that pressurizer level begins to decrease at 8:40 a.m. , (loss of

packing gland to CVC-208). At 8:55 a.m., the letdown system is isolated.

Following a series of investigations and radiological surveys the staff

are confronted with abnormal radiation indications and loss of charging

flow at 9:10 a.m. The emergency class is elevated to a Site Area Emergency

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based on a loss of safety function. At 11:00 a.m. , the operators noted

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that the "B" 230 Kv station feeder had tripped due to a momentary loss of

power. The turbine tripped due to the loss of offsite power and a relief

" valve on #2 steam generator did not seat. The main steam line radia ion

monitor alarms indicated the possibility of a tube rupture, thereby

allowing a primary to secondary radiological release path to the area out-

side the site boundary. The emergency class was upgraded to a Gener/

Emergency based on a loss of safety functions.

Time was advanced 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to allow for recovery activities to occur.

The NRC inspectors observed that control room personnel consulted

appropriate procedures for the exercise events. Initial notification to

the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness, and both Parishes were

within 15 minutes after the event had been classified.

The following are recommended improvement items:

• Relocate the communicators telephone to an area accessible to the

communicator. Provide a separate instrument for the hot line so that

the communicator does not have to wait on the telephone to make

offsite notifications.

-Include in shift supervisor training the importance of using station

personnel to assist him in performing notifications, filling out

forms, and other administrative duties.

Provide a note in the resource book to alert communicators that the

Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) telephone number shown is

for normal work hours. Additionally, revise off hour notification

call out to note that LNED may not respond to the hot line, and will

have to be notified through an alternate means.

• Assign a communicator to assist in performing the 10 CFR 50.72.

communications requirement.

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiencie: .

• 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) states that "The licensee shall. notify the NRC

immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local

agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee

declares one of the Emergency Classes." Review of the NRC incident

response centers emergency notification system tapes shows the first

notification of an emergency classification being made to the NRC was

at 7:58 CST to the NRC duty officer. A Notification Of Unusual Event

(NOUE) had been declared earlier at 5:37 CST due to an

injured / contaminated plant person. The NRC was not notified of the

NOUE, the NRC was notified of an Alert classification-2-hours and

21-minutes after the initial declaration of an emergency.

(382/8525-01)

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• Following the declaration of the Notification of Unusual Event no

update was given to'the state and local agencies for approximately

two-hours. EP-2-010, Section 5, states that updates will be provided

at 'approximately 30 minute intervals. (382/8525-02)

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Technical Support Center

The Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated approximately 1-hour and ,

16-minutes after thel declaration of an Alert. TSC personnel were observed

consulting their emergency procedures. Emergency action levels and

emergency classification discussions were excellent among the TSC staff.

Offsite notifications were adequate. The NRC inspectors noted that the

TSC " command" center for decision making and communications did not

contain sufficient working space as recommended in NUREG 0696. Further,

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work space was insufficient for NRC site team personnel to interface with

functional counterparts for reactor operations and radiological dose

assessment personnel in the TSC " command" center, (reference NUREG 0737

Supplement 1 Section 8.2.1).

The following are recommended improvement items:

• Maintain positive control of accountability for the TSC at the

personnel access and egress points.

• Offsite radiological conditions should be integrated into the

decision for downgrading the accident and permitting plant personnel

to return onsite.

• Plant personnel should be kept apprised of plant status and events 1

from the TSC.

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiencies:

• The NRC was not provided timely information from the TSC concerning

reactor conditions and dose assessment, refer to 10 CFR 50.72.

(382/8525-03)

• Adequate work space was not provided for the NRC emergency response

personnel in the TSC " command" center, refer to NUREG 0737

Supplement 1, Section 8.2.1. (382/8525-04)

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No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Dose Assessment

Dose assessment personnel in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

routinely ~ compared data between the state, local, and NRC site team

members. Following the General Emergency the dose assessment team made

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timely pro'ect

t we acti n recommendations. There appeared to be good

. coordinatio'n betwe6n the EOF, staff.and the offsite radiological monitoring

eteam. -Dose. assessment personnel in the EOF and TSC' appeared to be 1

familiar with' procedures _and equipment. LThere were instances.where status

[ boards were not filled outjwith updated radiological information 'in the

EOF and the TSC.

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. The' following' are recommended improvement items:

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• Review the dose projection coordinator's areas of responsibility in the

EOF. Consider obtaining assistance for the dose projection

. coordinator.

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• . Review the dose projection program to eliminate calculations that are

required to be perf .med prior to entering data into the computer.

• Review the CEPADAS program to determine and correct causes for the

system not being able to perform during the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Medical First Aid

The response of the first aid team was timely and decontamination of the

injured player was done in a proper manner. Response personnel appeared

knowledgeable in performing their duties.

The following are recommended improvement items:

Review ambulance call procedure to determine time loss in requesting

an ambulance from the hospital.

• Review classroom training to assure that initial radiological

surveys'are taken for the response first aid team.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Offsite Monitoring

The offsite radiological monitoring teams responded to the emergency in a

timely manner. One team was required to function with the loss of the

field radio as part of the scenario.

The following are recommended improvement items:

• All equipment should be tested for operability prior to the team

departing the Operational Support Center (OSC).

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Consideration should be given to obtaining more than one air sample

'during the exercise.

• If NaHS0s is required for adding to the water sample, the additive

should be included in the kit.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Emergency Operations Facility

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was activated in a timely manner.

The EOF director (EOFD) announced the transfer of exercise command to the

staff and made periodic plant status announcements to the EOF staff.

Additionally, the EOFD and staff kept the state and local agencies

informed of exercise events in a timely manner. The EOFD turned over

command of the exercise to the assistant EOFD and briefed the NRC site

team upon their arrival at the EOF. The transfer was timely and did not

appear to interrupt the EOF staffs emergency response effort. . . .

Accountability of personnel was maintained for all personnel during~ the

exercise. Further, personnel were observed to check for radiological

contamination prior to entering the EOF.

The following is a recommended improvement item:

• Maintain a status of action taken on E0FD protective action

recommendations to the state and local agencies. Further, maintain a

record of such action in the EOF for emergency response records.

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:

• The management of overall emergency response is to be conducted from

the EOF, reference NUREG 07/ Supplement 1, Section 8.4.1). The NRC

inspectors noted that the TdC emergency coordinator downgraded the

exercise from the TSC. It did not appear to the SRC inspectors that

reactor operations expertise and support were available in the EOF to

assist the EOFD in mak

actionrecommendations.{ngfinaldecisionsforoffsiteprotective

(382/8525-05)

No violations or deviations were identified. ,

9. Operational Support Centers

The Operational Support Center (OSC) was activated in a timely manner.

OSC personnel were radiologically monitored during the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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10. Exercise Critique

The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critique by the licensee

staff on September 19, 1985, to evaluate the licensee's identification of

deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and

Appendix E of Part 50., Paragraph IV.F.5. The licensee staff identified

the deficiencies listed below. Corrective action for identified

deficiencies and weaknesses will be examined during a future NRC

inspection. ,A

• The NRC was not notified on a NOUE.

The control room did not keep the Parishes informed of emergency

events.

• Key plant announcements were not .made from the TSC.

• Licensing information was not current for giving to the NRC.

• Dose assessment depended too much on the backup computer and did not

use CEPADAS.

• Inadequate communication existed between the TSC and OSC.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Exit Meeting

The_NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 19, 1985.

The NRC inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection

and the findings. Additionally, the.licensea representatives were

informed that additional findings may result following a briefing of the

NRC site team. The licensees actions during the exercise were found to be

adequate to protect the health and safety of tc9 public.

No violations or deviations were identified.