ML20137K889
| ML20137K889 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1985 |
| From: | Hackney C, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137K857 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-85-25, NUDOCS 8512030310 | |
| Download: ML20137K889 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1985025
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APPENDIX
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-382/85-25
License:
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Docket:
50-382
Licensee:
Louisiana Power & Light Company
142 Delaronde Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70174
Facility'Name: Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station (SES)
Inspection At: Waterford 3 SES site near Killona, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted:
September 16-20, 1985
Inspector:
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C. A. Hackney, Emergency Prepaq@dness Analyst
Date
Accompanying
Personnel: J. Kenoyer, Battelle
J. Jamison, Battelle
J. Will, Sonalyst
J. Davis, Batelle
NRC
Observers:
D. Matthews, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Branch
E. Christenbury, Chief Hearing Counsel
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Approved:
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A. Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness
Date
and Safeguards Programs Section
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted' September 16-20, 1985 (Report 50-382/85-25)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance
and capabilities during an exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.
The
inspection involved 190 inspector-hours onsite by 5 NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or
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deviations were identified.
Five deficiencies were identified.
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DETAILS
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' 1. ' Persons Co'ntacted
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Principal-Licensee Personnel
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- R. S. Leddick, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- F..J..Drummond, Nuclear Services Manager
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~*R.'P.:Barkhurst, Plant Manager
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- S' A.=Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical Services
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- R..G.~Azzarello, Emergency Planning Manager
- L. W. Cook, Nuclear Support and Licensing Manager
State of Louisiana
Dr. H. Bohlinger, Assistant Administrator, Nuclear Energy Division
W. Spell,' Administrator, Nuclear Energy Division
St. Charles Parish
J. Lucas, Emerger.cy Preparedness Director
NRC
- B. A. Breslau, Representing the Resident Inspector
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
A. Lookabaugh, Chief, Technological Hazards Branch
The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate
personnel in the areas of health physics, operations, and emergency
response organization.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
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2.
Exercise Scenario
The exercise scenario was reviewed to determine if provisions had been
made for the level of participation by state and local agencies, and that
all the major elements of the emergency response would be exercised in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 and the guidance criteria in
NUREG 0654, Section 11.n.
The review included an evaluation of the
adequacy of both operational and radiological aspects of the scenario.
In addition, a review of the internal consistency and thoroughness of
information provided to participants, observers, controllers and
evaluators was made.
Results of this review were as follows:
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The scenario contained a narrative summary of physical events which
occurred'and the rational behind those events.
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.There were numerous scenario messages given to the players; prompting
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was minimal.
Scenario events were timed such that players appeared to have
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adequate time to respond and react to the event.
The~ scenario was written to test the reactor operations personnel,-
- onsite and offsite monitoring personnel, first aid, and other support
functions.
The scenario challenged the operations personnel for emergency
detection, classification, and notification.
Further, the cnsite and
offsite radiological monitoring teams had the opportunity to
demonstrate the use of emergency procedures and radiological
monitoring equipment.
- 3.
' Control Room
Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned to
respond to the simulated emergency at 5:00 a.m.
Among significant
initial conditions were the following:
a.
The plant reactor had been operating for 60 days at 100% power and
was at the end of a 300 day operating cycle.
b.
The automatic dump valves.were in manual control.
c.
"A" charging pump was out of service for mechanical maintenance.
d.
One reactor coolant vent path to the quench tank was out of service.
The exercise was initiated at 5:00 a.m. with an injured, contaminated
person located in the Radioactive Waste Compactor Building.
The licensee
declared a Notification of Unusual Event based on a contaminated and
injured plar.t person.
The plant first aid team was dispatched to the
injured person.
At 6:00 a.m., security receives a report that the National
Weather Service has issued a severe weather thunderstorm warning.
At
7:20 a.m., indications are received in the control room that the "A" 230
Kv feeder has been lost. A tornado is sighted over the Waterford switching
station.
The shift superviss- declares an Alert emergency class due to
- the tornado striking inside the protected area.
The control room operators
note that pressurizer level begins to decrease at 8:40 a.m. , (loss of
packing gland to CVC-208).
At 8:55 a.m.,
the letdown system is isolated.
Following a series of investigations and radiological surveys the staff
are confronted with abnormal radiation indications and loss of charging
flow at 9:10 a.m.
The emergency class is elevated to a Site Area Emergency
based on a loss of safety function.
At 11:00 a.m. , the operators noted
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that the "B" 230 Kv station feeder had tripped due to a momentary loss of
power.
The turbine tripped due to the loss of offsite power and a relief
valve on #2 steam generator did not seat. The main steam line radia ion
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monitor alarms indicated the possibility of a tube rupture, thereby
allowing a primary to secondary radiological release path to the area out-
side the site boundary.
The emergency class was upgraded to a Gener/
Emergency based on a loss of safety functions.
Time was advanced 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to allow for recovery activities to occur.
The NRC inspectors observed that control room personnel consulted
appropriate procedures for the exercise events.
Initial notification to
the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness, and both Parishes were
within 15 minutes after the event had been classified.
The following are recommended improvement items:
Relocate the communicators telephone to an area accessible to the
communicator.
Provide a separate instrument for the hot line so that
the communicator does not have to wait on the telephone to make
offsite notifications.
-Include in shift supervisor training the importance of using station
personnel to assist him in performing notifications, filling out
forms, and other administrative duties.
Provide a note in the resource book to alert communicators that the
Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) telephone number shown is
for normal work hours.
Additionally, revise off hour notification
call out to note that LNED may not respond to the hot line, and will
have to be notified through an alternate means.
Assign a communicator to assist in performing the 10 CFR 50.72.
communications requirement.
The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiencie: .
10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) states that "The licensee shall. notify the NRC
immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local
agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee
declares one of the Emergency Classes." Review of the NRC incident
response centers emergency notification system tapes shows the first
notification of an emergency classification being made to the NRC was
at 7:58 CST to the NRC duty officer.
A Notification Of Unusual Event
(NOUE) had been declared earlier at 5:37 CST due to an
injured / contaminated plant person.
The NRC was not notified of the
NOUE, the NRC was notified of an Alert classification-2-hours and
21-minutes after the initial declaration of an emergency.
(382/8525-01)
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Following the declaration of the Notification of Unusual Event no
update was given to'the state and local agencies for approximately
two-hours. EP-2-010, Section 5, states that updates will be provided
at 'approximately 30 minute intervals.
(382/8525-02)
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
The Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated approximately 1-hour and
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16-minutes after thel declaration of an Alert.
TSC personnel were observed
consulting their emergency procedures.
Emergency action levels and
emergency classification discussions were excellent among the TSC staff.
Offsite notifications were adequate.
The NRC inspectors noted that the
TSC " command" center for decision making and communications did not
contain sufficient working space as recommended in NUREG 0696.
Further,
work space was insufficient for NRC site team personnel to interface with
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functional counterparts for reactor operations and radiological dose
assessment personnel in the TSC " command" center, (reference NUREG 0737
Supplement 1 Section 8.2.1).
The following are recommended improvement items:
Maintain positive control of accountability for the TSC at the
personnel access and egress points.
Offsite radiological conditions should be integrated into the
decision for downgrading the accident and permitting plant personnel
to return onsite.
Plant personnel should be kept apprised of plant status and events 1
from the TSC.
The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiencies:
The NRC was not provided timely information from the TSC concerning
reactor conditions and dose assessment, refer to 10 CFR 50.72.
(382/8525-03)
Adequate work space was not provided for the NRC emergency response
personnel in the TSC " command" center, refer to NUREG 0737
Supplement 1, Section 8.2.1. (382/8525-04)
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Dose Assessment
Dose assessment personnel in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
routinely ~ compared data between the state, local, and NRC site team
members.
Following the General Emergency the dose assessment team made
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timely pro'ect we acti n recommendations.
There appeared to be good
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coordinatio'n betwe6n the EOF, staff.and the offsite radiological monitoring
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eteam. -Dose. assessment personnel in the EOF and TSC' appeared to be
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familiar with' procedures _and equipment. LThere were instances.where status
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boards were not filled outjwith updated radiological information 'in the
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. The' following' are recommended improvement items:
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Review the dose projection coordinator's areas of responsibility in the
EOF.
Consider obtaining assistance for the dose projection
. coordinator.
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. Review the dose projection program to eliminate calculations that are
required to be perf .med prior to entering data into the computer.
Review the CEPADAS program to determine and correct causes for the
system not being able to perform during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Medical First Aid
The response of the first aid team was timely and decontamination of the
injured player was done in a proper manner.
Response personnel appeared
knowledgeable in performing their duties.
The following are recommended improvement items:
Review ambulance call procedure to determine time loss in requesting
an ambulance from the hospital.
Review classroom training to assure that initial radiological
surveys'are taken for the response first aid team.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Offsite Monitoring
The offsite radiological monitoring teams responded to the emergency in a
timely manner.
One team was required to function with the loss of the
field radio as part of the scenario.
The following are recommended improvement items:
All equipment should be tested for operability prior to the team
departing the Operational Support Center (OSC).
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Consideration should be given to obtaining more than one air sample
'during the exercise.
If NaHS0s is required for adding to the water sample, the additive
should be included in the kit.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was activated in a timely manner.
The EOF director (EOFD) announced the transfer of exercise command to the
staff and made periodic plant status announcements to the EOF staff.
Additionally, the EOFD and staff kept the state and local agencies
informed of exercise events in a timely manner.
The EOFD turned over
command of the exercise to the assistant EOFD and briefed the NRC site
team upon their arrival at the EOF.
The transfer was timely and did not
appear to interrupt the EOF staffs emergency response effort.
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Accountability of personnel was maintained for all personnel during~ the
exercise.
Further, personnel were observed to check for radiological
contamination prior to entering the EOF.
The following is a recommended improvement item:
Maintain a status of action taken on E0FD protective action
recommendations to the state and local agencies.
Further, maintain a
record of such action in the EOF for emergency response records.
The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:
The management of overall emergency response is to be conducted from
the EOF, reference NUREG 07/ Supplement 1, Section 8.4.1).
The NRC
inspectors noted that the TdC emergency coordinator downgraded the
exercise from the TSC.
It did not appear to the SRC inspectors that
reactor operations expertise and support were available in the EOF to
assist the EOFD in mak
actionrecommendations.{ngfinaldecisionsforoffsiteprotective
(382/8525-05)
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Support Centers
The Operational Support Center (OSC) was activated in a timely manner.
OSC personnel were radiologically monitored during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Exercise Critique
The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critique by the licensee
staff on September 19, 1985, to evaluate the licensee's identification of
deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and
Appendix E of Part 50., Paragraph IV.F.5.
The licensee staff identified
the deficiencies listed below.
Corrective action for identified
deficiencies and weaknesses will be examined during a future NRC
inspection.
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The NRC was not notified on a NOUE.
The control room did not keep the Parishes informed of emergency
events.
Key plant announcements were not .made from the TSC.
Licensing information was not current for giving to the NRC.
Dose assessment depended too much on the backup computer and did not
use CEPADAS.
Inadequate communication existed between the TSC and OSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Meeting
The_NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 19, 1985.
The NRC inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection
and the findings.
Additionally, the.licensea representatives were
informed that additional findings may result following a briefing of the
NRC site team.
The licensees actions during the exercise were found to be
adequate to protect the health and safety of tc9 public.
No violations or deviations were identified.