ML20009G031

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Forwards LER 81-097/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20009G031
Person / Time
Site: McGuire Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/08/1981
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009G032 List:
References
NUDOCS 8108030262
Download: ML20009G031 (3)


Text

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DUKE Powsn COMPANY Powen 13ctLotwo 422 SocTu Cucacu Srazzr, CzuntoTTE, N. C. 28242' wi w A14 O. PA R M E R. J R.

'/ ice PRESIDFNT TELEP**ONC; Am(A /04 s<c Pacouctio~ July 8, 1981 273-4ces Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director ((, I' ,

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j C' -

f Region II #

101 Marietta Streec, 5 ite 3100 ' b ' [(,4p,jfi g( 9

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Atlanta, "eorgia 30303

..g Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 -g "

g Docket No. 50-369 4\ S '

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

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Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-369/81-97. This report concerns Technical Specification 3.3.3.l; "As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentar. ion for each fire detection zone shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be operable." This inciG at was considered to be of no significance with respect to th health and safety of the public.

Ve , truly your , l

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William O. Parker, .

PBN/pw Attachment cc: Director Mr. Till Lavallae Office of Management and Program Analysis Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 10412 l Washington, D. C. 20555 Palo Alto, CA 94303

, Ms. M. J. Graham Res*ient Inspector - NRC l McGuice Nuclear Station s

! 1 56i 8108030262 810708 DR ADOCK 05000 L

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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION INCIDENT REPORT Report Number: 81-97 Report Date: July 8, 1981 Occurrence Date: June 12, 1981 Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Cornelius, N.C.

Identification of Occurrence: Several fire zones were declared inoperable due to an insufficient quantity of installed detection instruments.

Condition Prior to Occurrence: Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Description of Occurrence: On June 12, 1981 it was discovered that the quantity of fire detection equipment installed in five (5) fire zones did not comply with the minimum requirement listed in Table 3.3-11 of McGuire Technical Specifications.

These discrepancies were brought to the attention of the Shift Supervisor who immediately declared the fire protection instrumentation in the affected fire sones inoperable. This constituted a reportable incident pursuant to Technical Speci-fication 3.3.3.7 and required instituting an hourly fire watch as stipulated by the appropriate action statement.

Apparent Cause: The discrepancy in one fire zone (#106) was the result of a typographical error in Table 3.3-11. The other four fire zones (around each of the four Reactor Coolant pumps) were analyzed and the quantity installed was determined to be sufficient.

Analysis of Occurrence: An operations engineer discovered that the quantity of fire detection equipment installed in Fi.re Zone #106 and each of the Reactor Coolant pump zones did not agree with the minimum number required by the Technical Specifications. A check of the blue prints confirmed that the instruments that were installed were in accordance with the number and type stipulated by the drawings.

Design Encineerlag was contacted and asked to determine if additional fire pro-tection equipment was needed. After being notified of the discrepancies, the Shift Supervisor on duty declared the affected fire zones inoperable until the differences could be resolved. Hourly fire patrols were established as required.

It was discovered that the inconsistency existing in fire ione #106 between the Tectaical Specification Table 3.3-11 and the equipment installed was the result of a typographical error in the Technical Specifications.

i Fire Zones #147, 148, 149 and 150 (each of the four reactor coolant pump areas) were re-evaluated by the Design Engineering group and it wcs decided that the equipment installed met the requirements of the National Fire Protection Association, NFPA-72E-1974.

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, ^'T Repcrt Number 81-97 Page 2 Steam Production submitted letters to the NRC requesting permission to make ap-propriate changes in Table 3.3-11 to reflect the correct number of fire pro-tection equipment necessary in each area.

Fire Zone #106 was declared operable on June 15, 1981; the remaining fire zones were declared operable on June 19, 1981.

Corrective Action: The initial response to this incident was to establish hourly fire patrols in the affected areas. A re-examination of the installed fire pro-tection equipment revealed a typographical error in Tabla 3.3-11 affecting fire zone #106. It :ias ascertain-d that the equipment in Zones 147, 148, 149 and 150 was adequate. Letters were sent to the NRC requesting the approval of the existing equipment and the subsequent changes to the Technical Specifications. The Technical Specification changes were approved on June 19, 1981.

Safety Analysis: The fire detection equipment is designed to give prompt detection and location of fires in their early stages. Thus, the pot-sntial for damage to safety-ralated equipment would be minimized. It was detert,ined that the type and quantity of fire protection equipment installed met the standards of the NFPA-72E-1974; hence the safe operation of the plant and the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

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