ML20064A803

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Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-369/90-13 & 50-370/90-13.Corrective Actions:Procedures Dealing W/Fuel Handling Will Be Enhanced by Adding Sign Off to Sections Which Ref Fuel Handling in Tech Specs
ML20064A803
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  
Issue date: 09/10/1990
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9009280115
Download: ML20064A803 (5)


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' Duke fouer Company '

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licePresident ^

Nuclear Production

- Cimrlotte, NC 28242 (104)373 4531 i

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.C k DUKEPOWER

September 10, 1990' c

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U..S. Nuclear Regulktory' Commission

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' Document Control Desk:

{ Washington, D.C. ~20555 j

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Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Sta+ h.,

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Docket Nos.. 50-369,-370 Inspection Report Nos.--369, 370/90 Reply;to'a Notice of Violation C

Ge.ntlemen:

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Pu'rsuant to 10CFR.201, please. find attached _ Duke Power Company's-responseLto.

J LViolation-369/90-13-02:and 369/90-13-03 for the McGuire Nuclear'Statio.n.-

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Should there-be any questions concerning this matter, contact W. T. Byers: at -

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((704)373"6194.

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,R Very truly your~s j

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. Hal:.LTucker iaM '

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IAttachment o

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. Regional! Administrator, Region II.

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.101'Marietta St., NW,. Suite'2900 T

Atlanta, ' Georgia - 30323 :

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.Mr. ' Darl Hood 1

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor! Regulation Washington,:0.sc. 20555' hr. P. KL VanDoorn NRCJResidentEinspector-McGuire Nuclec.' Station f7' A

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^d' McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION D

' RESPONSE-TO VIOLATIONS

-violation 369/90-13-02:

, Specification 3.9.11 states, in part:

Tne ael Handling Ventilation Exhaust System shall be operable

- whenever irradiated fuel 11s in the storage pool.

With the Fuel Handling. Ventilation _ Exhaust System inoperable, suspend alli l

operations. involving' crane operation with loads over the storage-m

. pool until the Fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust System is-restored.to operable status.

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Contrary to the alove, on July 10, 1990, while the Fuel Handling-Ventilation Exhaust System was inoperable, a control rod was; moved in'the storage pool.

4 This'is a-Severity' Level IV violation and applicable to Unit 1-only (supplement I).

Responses-1.

Admission or denial of violation:

Duke Power admits the violation.as stated.

2.;

_The: reason for the violation.if admitted:

The, event was dueLto inadequate: work control 1and. group

. On July. 10, 1990,' a Maintenance (MNT) fuel interface.

~ handler requestedothe Unit 1. Fuel' Pool Ventilation (VF)-

- i system-be placed?inDthe~ filter mode.

The work 1 practice..for

'the MWT fuel handling crew has been to goLto,theicontrol' H

room and requestionly-thatithe VF system be placed inifilter J

mode.

However, having the VFTaystem'in filter modeldoesinot-h

' ensure 1the system'is meeting.its-Technical Specification 1

-(TS)-' requirements.

The. maintenance fuel handler was not 1

viare of the; terms " operable'.' and " inoperable as it ref ers O

to TS. -AfterLchecking:the control panel, the. Reactor

-operatorL(RO) informed the MNT fuel handler the Unit,1_VF was in; filter mode.

The MNT fuel handler. told the RO he would: be Lmoving.a -dummy control rod assembly from one fuel assemblyito another.

The RO knew'the'MNT'fual handler was moving redummy control rod assembly and he also knew the-Unit 1 VF' system:was inoperable; however, he did not realize u

the MNT fuel? handler's job involved moving a load over the i

storage pool area because of his limited fuel handling experience.

The RO was subsequently informed ~he Unit.1 VF l

system;was required to be operable-when perfonsing this j

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The corrective: steps taken and the results achieved:

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4 (1)--operations' suspended any_further operations;in the Unit-

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l' spent, fuel-pool =until the VF_ system was< operable.-

(2)

Operations-management discussed this event with a1 representative:from each operation shiftLwith an emphasis ontgroup interface.

- 4.

The: corrective; steps which will be'taken to avoid further

. violations:

(1)-10perations will' enhance procedure enclosures! dealing with fuel handling by adding a sign-off to the steps of the sections which reference'the appliceble fuel handling-Technical' Specifications.

-(2) -The-Maintenance Fuel Handling Supervisor will cover:?he event with the Maintenance fuel handling technicians with an emphasis-on group interface.

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.The'date when full compliance.will be achieved:

McGuire.will be in-full compliance 11/1/1990.

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Violation 369/90-13-03:

Technical Specification 4.5.2.c-requires:

Each. Emergency Core Cooling System, subsystem shall be demonstrated operable by a visual inspection which verifies-that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the?

containment:which could be transported to the ContainmentLSump-

.and:cause restriction of the~ pump' suctions during LOCA' conditions. -The visual inspection shall besperformed:

-(l)

For all accessible areas of the containment pricr to:

establishing containment' integrity,.and n.

1( 2 ) ' Of the areas affected within containment at the completion W

of each containmant entry.when containment integrity is

-established.

b Contrary to the.above, on two occasions, loose debris was'found

'in the Upper-Containment fol10 wing the' completion--of-the containment. cleanliness'inspeccion. -The iirst' instance, during 0-

' June, 1989, waslnot1 recognized at a Technical Specification

! violation and subsequently was not reported.

The second

. occurrence took place'during May, 1990.

In neither case had successful completion of the Techni. cal Specification Surveillance requirements been met.

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This is a! Severity Level IV violation applicable to Unit 1 only) y (Supplement.I).

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Response

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'Admissionlor' denial of violation:

t DukeLPowerLadmits the violation as stated.

2.-

The reason:for the violation if admitted:

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on MayLil, 1990, Quality Assurance (QA) personnel.and-Janitorial Service (K-Mac)' personnel performed a cleanliness

-inspection _ of upper _ and lower containment in preparation.tx) t entering ModeJ4.

PT/3/A/4800/03F, Containment cleanliness

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Inspection, was used document the inspection-in' upper and 4

lower, containment.

Q1 personnel signed off,the procedure i

p l steps and the= containment cleanliness acceptable step-in the E

Mode-4-checklist of OP/1/A/6100/01,' Controlling Procedure W

for Unit lStartup.

On May 22, 1990, after Unit l had entered

ModeT3, a Radiation-Protection-(RP) technician discovered 4

various unsecured itemsLin upper containment.= The' Reactor _

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Building-Coordinator (RBC) entered upper containment and' y

discovered three additional-items that-should have been H

removed.

The QA~ personnel did not document the loose material: located in upper containment.

QA personnel i

believed that~RP personnel would' remove.their items prior to L

startup of the unit'.

QA personnel: stated their-focus while performing the procedure was to identify _ maintenance generated items-left from the outagesandLthey did not look-L

for'RP. items.

This.mindset led to the failure to fellow 4

procedure.

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TheLeorrective steps taken and the resultsiachieved:

l Corrective steps taken for the occurrence in:1989:

i (1)

The identified mop heads-in Unit 1 containment were=

removed immediately.

~(2) : Station Directive 3.1.8 was reviewed 1x) assure-

' requirements 'for the recorded' entry of each individual and the accountability of all materials.

q (3)

Management requested a review of these controls with employees through regular > supervision meetings to A

emphasize the importance of no loose materials in the containment' buildings during operational modes.

(4) 'An INFORM (Information Needed for McGuire) Bulletin was issued to'all station _ personnel highlighting changes 1to Station Directive 3.1.8.and re-emphasizing housekeeping responsibilities for the Reactor Building.

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1 corrective? steps ~taken for the occurrence in 1990:

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(1). ! Operations (OPS)' ara RP personnel and the RBC removed:

=the' loose itemsJfrom upper-containment.

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OPS and RP personnel entered ~ lower containment outsidec the. crane < wall and inspected for loose material.

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(3)

This event?was discusred with the personnel involved o.

. including appropriate QA_ personnel.

-(4)

This'eventLwas discussed with_the Shift Managers to l

L' ensure that' consistent requirements are applied until 1

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.the guidance from corrective step l' below is' determined y

and;can be? implemented.

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TheEborrectiveistepswhichwillbetakencoavoidfurther.

I violations:

-(l) = Integrated Scheduling (IS) and OPS personnel will

obtain specific guidance asuto what items may remain-in

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. containment and what methods are' acceptable to secure

' items remaining in containment.

"(2)

OPS, QA,LIS-and RP-personnel will revise

-PT/1/A/4800/03F and PT/2/A/4800/03F, Containment l

Cleanliness Inspection, to provide a clear

-understanding of the responsibilities of'all station groups:pertai,ning to_ performing the procedure.

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(3)' IS; personnel will: evaluate changing Station LDirective l

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.3.1.8, Access'to the, Reactor Building, based on=the p

results-of corrective'stepol.

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OPS will evaluate changing PT/1/A/4800/03F_and

'PT/2/A/4800/03F based'on the results of corrective step-1.

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iThe date when full compliance will be achieved:

McGuireWill be.in-full compliance prior to completion of-d 2 Unit 2^end of cycle 6 refueling outage.

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