ML20064A803
| ML20064A803 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1990 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9009280115 | |
| Download: ML20064A803 (5) | |
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' Duke fouer Company '
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licePresident ^
Nuclear Production
- Cimrlotte, NC 28242 (104)373 4531 i
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.C k DUKEPOWER
- September 10, 1990' c
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U..S. Nuclear Regulktory' Commission
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' Document Control Desk:
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Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Sta+ h.,
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Docket Nos.. 50-369,-370 Inspection Report Nos.--369, 370/90 Reply;to'a Notice of Violation C
Ge.ntlemen:
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Pu'rsuant to 10CFR.201, please. find attached _ Duke Power Company's-responseLto.
J LViolation-369/90-13-02:and 369/90-13-03 for the McGuire Nuclear'Statio.n.-
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Should there-be any questions concerning this matter, contact W. T. Byers: at -
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((704)373"6194.
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,R Very truly your~s j
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. Hal:.LTucker iaM '
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IAttachment o
.s xc: 'Mr. S..D. Ebaeter.
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. Regional! Administrator, Region II.
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.101'Marietta St., NW,. Suite'2900 T
Atlanta, ' Georgia - 30323 :
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.Mr. ' Darl Hood 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor! Regulation Washington,:0.sc. 20555' hr. P. KL VanDoorn NRCJResidentEinspector-McGuire Nuclec.' Station f7' A
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37 19009280115 900910
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' RESPONSE-TO VIOLATIONS
-violation 369/90-13-02:
, Specification 3.9.11 states, in part:
Tne ael Handling Ventilation Exhaust System shall be operable
- whenever irradiated fuel 11s in the storage pool.
With the Fuel Handling. Ventilation _ Exhaust System inoperable, suspend alli l
operations. involving' crane operation with loads over the storage-m
. pool until the Fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust System is-restored.to operable status.
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Contrary to the alove, on July 10, 1990, while the Fuel Handling-Ventilation Exhaust System was inoperable, a control rod was; moved in'the storage pool.
4 This'is a-Severity' Level IV violation and applicable to Unit 1-only (supplement I).
Responses-1.
Admission or denial of violation:
Duke Power admits the violation.as stated.
2.;
_The: reason for the violation.if admitted:
The, event was dueLto inadequate: work control 1and. group
. On July. 10, 1990,' a Maintenance (MNT) fuel interface.
~ handler requestedothe Unit 1. Fuel' Pool Ventilation (VF)-
- i system-be placed?inDthe~ filter mode.
The work 1 practice..for
'the MWT fuel handling crew has been to goLto,theicontrol' H
room and requestionly-thatithe VF system be placed inifilter J
mode.
However, having the VFTaystem'in filter modeldoesinot-h
' ensure 1the system'is meeting.its-Technical Specification 1
-(TS)-' requirements.
The. maintenance fuel handler was not 1
viare of the; terms " operable'.' and " inoperable as it ref ers O
to TS. -AfterLchecking:the control panel, the. Reactor
-operatorL(RO) informed the MNT fuel handler the Unit,1_VF was in; filter mode.
The MNT fuel handler. told the RO he would: be Lmoving.a -dummy control rod assembly from one fuel assemblyito another.
The RO knew'the'MNT'fual handler was moving redummy control rod assembly and he also knew the-Unit 1 VF' system:was inoperable; however, he did not realize u
the MNT fuel? handler's job involved moving a load over the i
storage pool area because of his limited fuel handling experience.
The RO was subsequently informed ~he Unit.1 VF l
system;was required to be operable-when perfonsing this j
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The corrective: steps taken and the results achieved:
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4 (1)--operations' suspended any_further operations;in the Unit-
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l' spent, fuel-pool =until the VF_ system was< operable.-
(2)
Operations-management discussed this event with a1 representative:from each operation shiftLwith an emphasis ontgroup interface.
- 4.
The: corrective; steps which will be'taken to avoid further
. violations:
(1)-10perations will' enhance procedure enclosures! dealing with fuel handling by adding a sign-off to the steps of the sections which reference'the appliceble fuel handling-Technical' Specifications.
-(2) -The-Maintenance Fuel Handling Supervisor will cover:?he event with the Maintenance fuel handling technicians with an emphasis-on group interface.
5.
.The'date when full compliance.will be achieved:
McGuire.will be in-full compliance 11/1/1990.
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Violation 369/90-13-03:
Technical Specification 4.5.2.c-requires:
Each. Emergency Core Cooling System, subsystem shall be demonstrated operable by a visual inspection which verifies-that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the?
containment:which could be transported to the ContainmentLSump-
.and:cause restriction of the~ pump' suctions during LOCA' conditions. -The visual inspection shall besperformed:
-(l)
For all accessible areas of the containment pricr to:
establishing containment' integrity,.and n.
1( 2 ) ' Of the areas affected within containment at the completion W
- of each containmant entry.when containment integrity is
-established.
b Contrary to the.above, on two occasions, loose debris was'found
'in the Upper-Containment fol10 wing the' completion--of-the containment. cleanliness'inspeccion. -The iirst' instance, during 0-
' June, 1989, waslnot1 recognized at a Technical Specification
! violation and subsequently was not reported.
The second
. occurrence took place'during May, 1990.
In neither case had successful completion of the Techni. cal Specification Surveillance requirements been met.
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This is a! Severity Level IV violation applicable to Unit 1 only) y (Supplement.I).
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Response
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'Admissionlor' denial of violation:
t DukeLPowerLadmits the violation as stated.
2.-
The reason:for the violation if admitted:
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on MayLil, 1990, Quality Assurance (QA) personnel.and-Janitorial Service (K-Mac)' personnel performed a cleanliness
-inspection _ of upper _ and lower containment in preparation.tx) t entering ModeJ4.
PT/3/A/4800/03F, Containment cleanliness
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Inspection, was used document the inspection-in' upper and 4
lower, containment.
Q1 personnel signed off,the procedure i
p l steps and the= containment cleanliness acceptable step-in the E
Mode-4-checklist of OP/1/A/6100/01,' Controlling Procedure W
for Unit lStartup.
On May 22, 1990, after Unit l had entered
- ModeT3, a Radiation-Protection-(RP) technician discovered 4
various unsecured itemsLin upper containment.= The' Reactor _
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- Building-Coordinator (RBC) entered upper containment and' y
discovered three additional-items that-should have been H
removed.
The QA~ personnel did not document the loose material: located in upper containment.
QA personnel i
believed that~RP personnel would' remove.their items prior to L
startup of the unit'.
QA personnel: stated their-focus while performing the procedure was to identify _ maintenance generated items-left from the outagesandLthey did not look-L
- for'RP. items.
This.mindset led to the failure to fellow 4
procedure.
L 3.
TheLeorrective steps taken and the resultsiachieved:
l Corrective steps taken for the occurrence in:1989:
i (1)
The identified mop heads-in Unit 1 containment were=
removed immediately.
~(2) : Station Directive 3.1.8 was reviewed 1x) assure-
' requirements 'for the recorded' entry of each individual and the accountability of all materials.
q (3)
Management requested a review of these controls with employees through regular > supervision meetings to A
emphasize the importance of no loose materials in the containment' buildings during operational modes.
(4) 'An INFORM (Information Needed for McGuire) Bulletin was issued to'all station _ personnel highlighting changes 1to Station Directive 3.1.8.and re-emphasizing housekeeping responsibilities for the Reactor Building.
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1 corrective? steps ~taken for the occurrence in 1990:
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(1). ! Operations (OPS)' ara RP personnel and the RBC removed:
=the' loose itemsJfrom upper-containment.
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~ (2)
OPS and RP personnel entered ~ lower containment outsidec the. crane < wall and inspected for loose material.
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(3)
This event?was discusred with the personnel involved o.
. including appropriate QA_ personnel.
-(4)
This'eventLwas discussed with_the Shift Managers to l
L' ensure that' consistent requirements are applied until 1
1.
.the guidance from corrective step l' below is' determined y
and;can be? implemented.
4.
TheEborrectiveistepswhichwillbetakencoavoidfurther.
I violations:
-(l) = Integrated Scheduling (IS) and OPS personnel will
- obtain specific guidance asuto what items may remain-in
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. containment and what methods are' acceptable to secure
' items remaining in containment.
"(2)
OPS, QA,LIS-and RP-personnel will revise
-PT/1/A/4800/03F and PT/2/A/4800/03F, Containment l
Cleanliness Inspection, to provide a clear
-understanding of the responsibilities of'all station groups:pertai,ning to_ performing the procedure.
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(3)' IS; personnel will: evaluate changing Station LDirective l
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.3.1.8, Access'to the, Reactor Building, based on=the p
results-of corrective'stepol.
( 4)
OPS will evaluate changing PT/1/A/4800/03F_and
'PT/2/A/4800/03F based'on the results of corrective step-1.
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iThe date when full compliance will be achieved:
McGuireWill be.in-full compliance prior to completion of-d 2 Unit 2^end of cycle 6 refueling outage.
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