ML20050E305

Forwards Revision 1 to Util 820312 Response to Power Sys Branch Request for Addl Info 430.62,identifying All Electrical Equipment That May Become Submerged as Result of LOCA

ML20050E305
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	04/09/1982
From:	Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:	Miraglia F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SBN-255, NUDOCS 8204130224
Download: ML20050E305 (14)

Text

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, O SEmW STATION Engineering Omce:

IPUBLIC SEAVICE Company of New Hampshir e 1671 Worcester Road Framinoham, Massachusetts 01701 (617) - 872 - 8100 April 9, 1982 4 tr)

SBN-255 O T.F. B 7.1.2 $$ g t VED _

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

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);8 Washington, D. C. 20555 y Attention: Mr. Frank J. Miraglia, Chie f 't-Licensing Branch No. 3 = 6 Division of Licensing

References:

(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket No s . 50-443 and 50-444 (b) PSNil Letter, dated March 12, 1982, " Response to 430 Series RAIs; (Power Systems Branch)," J. DeVincentis to F. J. Miraglia Su bjec t : Revision 1 to 430.62; (Power Systems Branch)

Dear Sir:

We have attached Revision 1 to the subject RAI.

Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY J. DeVincentis Project Manager Attachment pol SI I

O204130224 820409 PDR ADOCK 05000

430.62 Identify all electrical equipment, both safety and non-safety, that may become submerged as a result of a LOCA. For all such equipment that is not qualified for service in such an environment provide an analysis to determine the following:

1. The safety significance of the failure of this electrical equipment (e.g. spurious actuation or loss of act sation function) as a result of flooding.

2. The ef fects on Class lE electrical power sources serving this equipment as a result of such submergence; and

3. Any proposed design changes resulting from this analysis.

RESPONSE: All electrical equipment that may become submerged as a result of a LOCA is listed in Table 430.62-1.

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TABLE 430.62-1 l l

EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN THE CONTAINMENT BELOW THE FLOOD LEVEL OF (-) 20'-8" VALVE LIST V-VITAL TAG NV - NON-VITAL COMPONENT APPLICATION CS-V-59 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch RCP LD Seal Water Return CS-V-145 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Letdown HX-E-2 to HX-E8 CS-V-170 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Letdown HX-E-3 to RCDT CS-V-175 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Excess Letdown Line CS-V-176 NV Limit Switch Excess Letdown Line CS-V-177 NV Limit Switch HX-E2 to Cold Leg 4 CS-V-180 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch HX-E2 to Cold Leg 1 CS-V-185 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch HX-E2 to Pressurizer CS-V-168 NV Motor Operator RCP Seal Water Isolation NG-V-17 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Accumulator 9A Ni Line NG-V-19 NV Limit Switch Accumulator 9B Ni Line NG-V-21 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Accumulator 9C Ni Line NG-V-23 NV Limit Switch Accumulator 9D Ni Line RC-LCV-459 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Letdown Isolation Valve RC-LCV-460 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Letdown Isolation Valve RC-LCV-81 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch RC Loop 3 Letdown to HX-E2 RMW-V-28 NV Solenoid RMW-TK 12 to RC TK 11 RMW-V-180 NV Solenoid RC-P-1B Seal Pressurizer Equalizing Valve RMW-V-181 NV Solenoid RC-P-1A Seal Pressurizer Equali:ing Valve RH-V-27 V Solenoid & Limit Switch HX-E-9B Header Test Ril-V-2 8 V Solenoid & Limit Switch HX-E-9A lleader Test R11-V-49 V Solenoid & Limit Switch HX-E-9A Injection Test RH-V-54 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch SI-P-6A Discharge Test RH-V-55 NV Limit Switch SI-P-6B Discharge Test SI-V-03 V Stem Mounted Limit Switch Accumulator Iso. Valve Stem Limit Switch SI-V-04 NV Limit Switch Accum. Test Valve SI-V-15 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Accum. Fill Valve SI-V-17 V Stem Mounted Limit Switch Accum. Iso. Valve Stem Limit Switch SI-V-18 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Accum. Test Valve SI-V-23 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Accum. Fill Valve SI-V-32 V Stem Mounted Limit Switch Accum. Iso. Valve Stem Limit Switch l

TABLE 430.62.1 (Continued)

VALVE LIST i

V-VITAL TAC NV - NON-VITAL COMPONENT APPLICATION .

SI-V-33 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Accum. Test Valve ,

SI-V-38 NV Limit Switch Accum. Fill Valve j SI-V-47 V Stem Mounted Limit Switch Accum. Iso Valve - Stem Limit Switch l SI-V-4 8 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Accum Test Valve SI-V-53 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch Accum Fill Valve SI-V-131 V Limit Switch SI - Cold Leg Test SI-V-132 NV Limit Switch SI - llot Leg 3 Test SI-V-133 NV Limit Switch SI - Hot Leg 2 Test SI-V-134 V Solenoid & Limit Switch SI - Hot Leg Test SI-V-lS8 V Solenoid Charging Pump Test SI-V-160 V Limit Switch SI Pump - Test Line Iso. Valve WLD-FV-1403 NV Solenoid & Limit Switch RCDT Transfer Valve

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TABLE 430.62.1 (Continued)

INSTRUMENTATION LIST SAFETY-RELATED INSTRUMENTS DESCRIPTION ACTION TAG NI-NE-41 A/B Power Range Neutron Detectors Not required post-LOCA NI-NE-42 A/B Power Range Neutron Detectors Not required post-LOCA NI-NE-43 A/B Power Range Neutron Detectors Not required post-LOCA NI-NE-44 A/B Power Range Neutron Detectors Not required post-LOCA RM-RM-6535A Manipulator Crane Radiation Monitor Not required post-LOCA RM-RM-6535B Manipulator Crane Radiation Monitor Not required post-LOCA RC-FT- 414, 415, 416 RC System Loop 1 - Flow Will be raised above the flood level 424, 425, 426 RC System Loop 2 - Flow Will be raised above the flood level 434, 435, 436 RC System Loop 3 - Flow Will be raised above the flood level 444, 445, 446 RC System Loop 4 - Flow Will be raised above the flood level

TABLE 430.62-1 (Continued)

NON-VITAL INSTRUMENTS DESCRIPTION TAG NI Detector Wall Temp.

Call-TE-5640 - 5647 CAS-AE-8815 Ilydrogen Analyzers in RC TK 55 Area CAS-AE-8816 Ilydrogen Analyzers in RC CS-E-3 Area CAS-AE-8817 lIydrogen Analyzers in Cntmnt. Valve Rm.

CAS-AE-8818 liydrogen Analyzers in CS-E-2 Area i

COP-PT-1787 CS-PT-124 Excess Letdown llX, CS-E-3 Outlet Pres.

CS-TE-126 Regenerative liX, CS-E-2 Charging Line Temp.

j RCP Low Range Leakage Flow CS-FT-154 - 157 l CS-FIS-191 - 194 RCP Seal Flow LD-LT-8333 Sump B Level RC-LT-9405 Press. Relief Tank Level RM-RX-6578 - 6581 Radiation Monitor SF-LT-2629 Refueling Canal Level SH-XS , XT-6701 Seismic Monitor SM-XS, ST-6709 Seismic Monitor WLD-LT-1403 RCDT, TK 55 - Level WLD-TE-1403 RCDT, TK 55 - Temp.

WLD-FT-1406 RCDT, TK 55 - Flow WLD-FT-1411 RCDT, EX E-43 Inlet Temp.

WLD-TE-1413 RCDT, EX E-43 Outlet Temp.

WLD-PT-1412 RCDT, EX E-43 Pump P33 A/B Discharge Pres.

WLD-PT-1420 RCDT, EX E-43 Pump P33 A/B Section Pres.

Containment Drains Sump A Level WLD-LSil-6266 WLD-LSil-6267 Containment Drains Sump B Level r

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TABLE 430.62-1 (Continued)

MISC. NON-VITAL EQUIPMENT PUMPS TAG DESCRIPTION RC-P-271 Pressurizer Relief Tank, TK 11, Recire. Pump SP-P-272 Refueling Canal Drain Pump WLD-P-5A, 5B Containment Sump A Pumps WLD-P-SC, SD Containment Sump B Pumps WLD-P-33A, 33B RCDT, TK 55, Pumps INSTRUMENT RACKS Individual instruments located on these racks have been identified above.

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CONTROL PANELS TAG DESCRIPTION WLD-CP-280 Containment Sump A - Control Panel WLD-CP-281 Containment Sump B - Control Panel LIGHTING TAG DESCRIPTION ED-X-16F Transformer Supply for Panel Ll7 E D-X-16A Transformer Supply for Panels PP-8B and EL 13 ED-X-16J Transformer Supply for Panel L41 Panel L41 Lighting Panel TERMINAL BOXES TAG DESCRIPTION X45 l-Pressurizer Heater Backup Group C X46 Pressurizer Heater Backup Group D i-1

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.l. The following analysis discusses the tafety significance of the failure as a result of flooding of the electrical The analysis concludes

! equipment 1isted in Table 430.62-1.

that there is no spurious actuation or loss of safety

- function as a result of flooding.

1 A. Valves - Sa fety-Related

} (1) Stem-mounted Limit Switches for SI Accumulator Valves 1

Stem-mounted limit switches only provide an alternate valve position indication. -Failure of l- these switches could cause loss of the alternate l valve position indication circuits but would not ,

affect valve operation.

(2) RCP Seal Water Isolation Valve, CS-V-168 This motor-operated valve is driven closed upon a

' containment isolation signal, therefore, this valve would fail in its safe position. Motor-operated valves are powered from individual circuits of a  ;

motor control center so failure of this circuit would not affect the remaining loads on the motor control center. Failure of the limit switch internal to the operator could effect the valve position indication at the control switch on the MCB and also the post-accident monitor (PAM) light indication of this valve.

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This circuit will be modified by adding an i interposing relay to the circuit of CS-V-168 . The

' relay will be located in the control building and will prevent loss of the remaining PAM monitor circuits upon flooding of the valve.

(3) SI Pump Cold and Hot Leg Test Line Isolation Valves

' SI-V-131, and SI-V-160 and Charging Pump Test Line Isolation Valve, SI-V-158 These Train B air-operated valves are closed on a containment isolation signal.

1 Failure of this circuit will also cause loss of ,

power to two other safety-related. valves, SI-V-174 and SI-V-70, which are powered from the same circuit. These valves are already closed on safety l injection or containment. isolation signals,

.therefore loss of power results only in loss of valve position. indication at the MCB control.

switches. The limit switches for valves SI-V-131, V-158 & V-160 are also used in the Train-B PAM monitor light circuits, and this circuit may also be lost.

These circuits will he modified by adding interposing relays to the circuits of SI-V-131, SI-V-ISR and St-V-160. The relays will be located in the control building and will prevent loss of the remaining Train B PAM monitor circuits upon flooding of the above valves.

(4) SI Hot Leg Test Line Isolation valves, SI-V-134 This valve is a normally closed test valve that also receives a containment isolation signal to ensure that it is closed. Valve SI-V-134 is a train A valve, and failure of this circuit will cause loss of power to four other safety-related valves, SI-V-165 & V-173 (already closed on safety injection) and SI-V-62 & V-157 (already closed on containment isolation). Valve position indication at their respective MCB control switches will be lost.

Limit switch contacts for SI-V-134 are also used in the PAM monitor light circuits. An interposing relay will be added to SI-V-134 circuit to prevent loss of the remaining PAM monitor circuits upon flooding of SI-V-134.

(5) RHR Test Valves RH-V-27 and RH-V-49 These valves are normally closed Train A test valves that receive a containment isolation signal. The open contact of the containment .

isolation signal isolates the solenoids. .If the containment isolation signal is reset, the circuit for Ril-V-27 and V-49 could fail. This circu'it failure would also cause loss of power to safety related valve Ril-V-16, and solenoids for FY-618-1 and ilCV-606. Valve Ril-V-16 is already closed on containment isolation. Loss of power to FY 618-1 and IICV-606 solenoids will result in full flow of the Ril system A loop through the RilR heat exchanger E-9A and the closing of the bypass line. Valve Position indication for'these valves at the MCB control switches Ril-V-27 and V-49 will be lost.

Limit switch contacts for Ril-V-27 and Ril-V-49 are also used in PAM monitor light circuits.

Interposing ~ relays will be added to these valve circuits to prevent loss of the remaining PAM monitor circuits upon flooding of the above valves.

(6) RilR Test Valve Ril-V-28 Valve Ril-V-28 is a normally closed Train B test valve that also receives a containment isolation signal. The open contact of the containment isolation signal isolates the solenoid. This valve

is similar to RH-V-27 (above) and failure of this circuit wou'd result in loss of power to safety-related valve RH-V-17 and solenoids for FY-619-1 and HCV-607. This will result in full flow through RHR heat exchanger E-9B. Valve position indication for these valves at the MCB control switches will be lost.

Limit switch contacts for RH-V-28 are also used in PAM monitor light circuits. An interposing relay will be added to this valve circuit to prevent loss of the remaining PAM monitor circuits upon flooding of the above valve.

B. Valves - Non-Safety Non-safety-related, air-operated valves that may be submerged following LOCA, are listed in Table 430.62-1.

Failure of the stem-mounted limit switch or pilot solenoid will cause the entire valve circuit to lose power with the results that all non-safety-related valves on that particular circuit will de-energize to their fail safe position. Valve position indication will also be lost.

Those valves not submerged, which may be affected by flooded solenoids or limit switches are indicated on the attached table 430-62.2.

C. Instrumentation All safety related instrumentation, with the exception of the excore neutron detectors and maniulator crane radiation monitors is located or will be relocated above the flood level. The excore neutron detectors and manipulator crane radiation monitors are not required following a LOCA.

Non-safety related instrumentation located below the flood level may fail and give misleading information.

None of this instrumentation is required following a LOCA.

D. Miscellaneous Non-Safety-Related Equipment (1) Pumps Those pump motors that may become submerged and fail are either protected by redundant Class lE breakers or are de-energized during normal plant operation. Failure of the particular circuit will not affect other circuits. These non-safety-related motors are not required following a LOCA.

(2) Control Panels The sump pump control panels are not required following a LOCA.

(3) Lighting l

The lighting system inside containment is normally off. Control of the system is at control stations located outside the persona; air lock. Failure of lighting equipment due to flooding will not affect other circuits.

t (4) Pressurizer Heater Terminal Boxes Flooding of the terminal boxes for pressurizer heater backup groups C & D, will cause de-energization of these heaters. Pressurizer heater backup groups A & B will not be af fected because their terminal boxes are above the flood level. Backup groups A & B are fed f rom the diesel generators.

2. The following analysis discusses the ef fect on the Class lE electrical power sources as a result of equipment submergence and concludes that there is no ef fect on the Class lE electrical power sources as a result of equipment submergence.

A. Safety-Related Valves Only the circuits powering those valves which may become submerged will be lost from the Class lE power distribution system. Other Class lE circuits will not be affected.

B. Non-Safety-Related Valves Non-safety related valves that may be submerged are powered from the non-Class IE power system. Failure of these circuits will not af fect any Class lE power supply.

C. Instrumentation Safety-related and non-safety-related instruments are powered through separate instrumentation panels. These ]

panels are powered from separate distribution circuits.

Internal low voltage power supplies further isolate the individual circuits from the distribution system.

Therefore, the Class lE power sources will not be af fected by submergence of any instrumentation.

D. Misec11aneous (1 ) pumps The non-vital pumps that may be submerged are 4

powered from the non-Class IE power system.

i Failure of these motor circuits will not af fect the Class IE sources.

(?) control Panels The control panels for the containment sump pumps are powered from non-Class 1C sources and their failure will not affect the Class lE system.

(3) Lighting System The lighting system inside the containment is normally de-energized during plant operation; therefore, the Class lE power sources will not be affected.

(4) Pressurizer lleater Terminal Boxes Backup heater groups C and D are not powered from the Class lE power system and their failure will not af fect the Class lE system.

3. Proposed Design Changes A. Safety-Related Valves As discussed in Item 1, interposing relays will be added to certain valve circuits to electrically isolate the valve PAM monitor light circuit from the valve limit switch circuit. This modification prevents submergence of the valve limit switch from tripping the entire PAM monitor light circuit. No additional changes are proposed.

B. Non-Safety-Related Valves No design changes are proposed.

C. Instrumentation Safety-related reactor coolant flow-transmitters will be raised above the flood level.

No additional design changes are proposed.

D. Miscellaneous Equipment No design changes are proposed.

TABLE 430.62-2 NON-SAFETY-RELATED VALVES ON Tile SAME CIRCUIT AS SUBMERGED NON-SAFETY-RELATED VALVES CllEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM  ;

E39/7 CS System A Trali Non-Vital Control RC-P-1A Seal Water Ret Iso Valve I-V-10 RC-P-1B Seal Water Ret Iso Valve I-V-28 RC-P-lC Seal Water Ret Iso Valve I-V-44 RC-P-ID Seal Water Ret Iso Valve I-V-59*

IlX-E2 to Cold Leg 4 Valve I-V-177*

IlX-E2 to Przr. Iso Valve I-V-185*

E97/11 CS System A Train Nan-Vital Control LTDN HX E-2 To E-8 Iso Valve I-V-145*

Demin 3E Isolation Valve I-V-256 Boric Acid Inj to Blender Valve I-FCV-Il0A Blender to Chg PP Suction I-FCV-110B BA Blender MM-1 to RMW Isp Valve I-FCV-Illa BA Blender to VC TK Iso Valve I-FCV-lllB CVCS TK-1 Outlet Iso Valve I-LCV-ll2A CVCS TK-1 Outlet Iso Valve I-LV-112A LTDN HX E-4 to E-1 Iso Valve I-TCV-129 E95/4 CS System B Train Non-Vital Control LTDN HX E-3 to RCDT 150 Valve I-V-170*

Excess LTDN Line Iso Valve I-V-176*

Boron Meter Iso Valve I-V-478 CS-DM-1 to Boron Conc Meas Sys Iso Valve I-V-541 Boron Conc Meas Sys Bypass Iso Valve I-V-543 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM E89/1 RC System A Train Non-Vital Control Reactor Vessel Flange Leak-Of f Drain Valve I-V-147 Letdown Isolation Valve I-LCV-459*

Letdown Isolation Valve I-LCV-460*

Przr. Press. Spray valve, I-PC-455A I-PC-455B REACTOR MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM E89/8 RMW System A Train Non Vital Control RC-P-lD Seal Pressure Equalizing Valve I-LCV-178 RC-P-lC Seal Pressure Equalizing Valve I-LCV-179 RC-P-1B Seal Pressure Equalizing Valve I-LCV-180*

RC-P-1A Seal Pressure Equalizing Valve I-LCV-181 l

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TABLE 430.62-2 NON-SAFETY-RELATED VALVES ON Tile SAME CIRCUIT AS SUBMERGED NON-SAFETY-RELATED VALVES (Continued)

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM E89/4 SI System Non-Vital A Train Control Accum TK-9A Test Line Iso Valve  :-V-4*

Accum TK-9A Fill Line Iso Valve I-V-15*

Accum TK-98 Test Line Iso Valve I-V-18*

Accum TK-9C Test Line Iso Valve I-V-33*

I-V-38*

Accum TK-9C Fill Line Iso Valve I-V-48*

Accum TK-9D Test Line Iso Valve SI Pumps llot Leg-3 Test Line Iso Valve I-V-132*

SI Pumps Hot Leg-2 Test Line Iso Valve I-V-133*

Chg Pump Test Line Iso Valve I-V-159 WASTE LIQUID DRAIN SYSTEM E25/23 RC Drain Tank Valves Drain Valve I-V-53 Recirc Valve I-V-87 Transfer Valve I-FV-1403

• - SUHMERGED VALVES 4

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