ML19325C638

LER 89-023-00:on 890915,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Sys Being Inoperable.Caused by Defective pre-operational Testing Procedure.Train a Control Room Damper adjusted.W/891011 Ltr

ML19325C638
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	10/11/1989
From:	Glover R, Owen T DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-023-01, LER-89-23-1, NUDOCS 8910170124
Download: ML19325C638 (6)

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TOctober 11,-l1989-sc

'$" Document ~ Control Desk U. S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

.W ashington, D. C. .20555.

Subject:

Catawba Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-413 LER 413/89-23

'Gentlement' Attached is Licensee Event Report 413/89-23, concerning Technical c Specification,3.0.3 being entered as'a result of both trains of

' . control' room area' ventilation being inoperable due to.an incomplete testing-procedure.

This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the l  :. health ~and safety of the public.

3 Very'truly.yours,

.g b _l Tony.

h.. Owen.

Station Manager r

-KEB\LER-NRC.TBO xc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter American Nuclear Insurerr Regional Administrator, Region II c/o Dottle Sherman, ANI Library U.'S. Nuclear Regulator Commission The Exchange, Suite 245 101 Marietta' Street, NW, Suite 2900 270 Farmington Avenue Atlanta, GA 30323 Farmington, CT 06032 M & M Nuclear Consultants Mr. K. Jabbour 1221 Avenues of the Americas U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York, NY 10020 Office of Muclear Reactor Regulation C' Washington, D. C. 20555 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 Mr. W. T. orders 1100 Circle 75 Parkway NRC Resident Inspector Atlanta, GA 30339 Catawba Nuclear Station I

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1 P AC6LITV esAME 06 00CRET sevesSER (Il PAGE(33 I Catawba Nuclear. Station, Unit 1 0l5l0l0l0l 41113 1 loFl 015 l 78 7 '* Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entered as a Result of Both Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Being Inoperable Due to an Incomplete Testing Procedure OVGNT DATE (48 LOR NueeBER 46) RSPont DATE (70 OTMtm 7 ActLifits tesv0LVED tel MON'M DAY YEAR YEAR 'IhW 8,A 6 ga og MONTM DAY YEAR 9ACi4117.sawls DOCKET huwetRts Catawba Unit 2 01610 l 0101411 14 l

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NAME T4LEPHONE hvMS$R ARE A COOL

'R.M.-Glover,-Compliance Manager g l of 3 g la 1 i l_ l 1l ') hlA COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR S ACH COM OhtNT F AILURE Dt9CRiet0 IN THIS REPORT 113i AC n "T CAust 8vlftM COMPONENT MA%C- R{o ,T,Agg t

CAust Sv8 TEM COMPONENT Ny 0 PR k I I I 'l l' I i I i 1 1 -l i I s , ,

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On September 15, 1989, at 1315 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />5.003575e-4 months <br />, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, Power Operation, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered due to both trains of the l

Control Room Area Ventilation (VC) System being inoperable. Train B of the VC l System was already inoperable for maintenance. Train A of VC was declared inoperable following the unsatisfactory performance of a Control Room positive pressure test with only one of the two outside air intakes open. The Control ,

Room return air damper was adjusted on Train A and the Control Room positive pressure test was performed with acceptable results in all alignments. Both

! trains were returned to operability on September 16, following successful iL testing. This incident is attributed to incomplete testing during l pre-operational testing of the VC System. All other appropriate ventilation l

systems' pre-operational tests are being reviewed to assure complete testing was performed.

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BACKGROUND The Control Room Area Ventilation (EIIS UC] ,VC) and Chilled Water [EIIS:UE]

(YC) Systems combine to form one system which is designed to maintain a suitable environment in the following plant areas at all-times' Control Room, Cable Room, Battery Rooms, Switchgear Rooms, Motor Control Center (MCC) Rooms, and the Electrical Penetration [EIIS: PEN] Rooms at elevation 594+0. The VC/YC System is shtred between both Units. There are two 100% redundant trains of VC/YC equipment. Each is capable of being powered by Unit 1 or Unit 2 Essential Auxiliary Power, but under normal conditions both trains are aligned to Unit 1.

Two Diesel Generators (EIIS GEN] (D/Gs) are provided pr Unit to energize the Essential Auxiliary Power buses during emergency conditions.

Pressurization of the Control Room and Control Room Area is affected by the

. -induction of outside air into the air handling systems serving these areas by way of filter.[EIIS:FLT) trains and associated fans (EIIStBLO]. The two outside air intakes are at two separate locations and consist of isolation valves

[EIIS:V),'a tornado damper, a radiation monitor, two chla.ine detectors

[EIIS:XT} and a smoke detector in each intake. The radiation monitors and the chlorine and smoke detectors are arranged so as to close their respective air intake valves upon detection of radiation, chlorine or smoke. Train separation provides for one shut-off valve in sach intake to be Train'A and the other to be Train B. The duct for the outside air intakes is arranged so that the Train A and Train B filter trains can take air from either intake location. This allows the Operator to switch to the alternate intake if one should become l' contaminated. The filtration system is also arranged so that a percentage of

-the return air from the Control Room and Control Room Area is routed through the filter train for clean-up purposes.

l Technical Specification 3.7.6 specifies that two independent trains of VC/YC l shall be operable during all operational modes. If one train becomes inoperable l while either Unit is in Mode 4 Hot Shutdown, or above, the inoperable train must be-restored to operability within seven days, or the operating bnits must l be shutdown. If both Units are below Mode 4 and one train is inoperable, the l train must be restored to operability within seven days or the operable train i must be operated in the FILTER mode. If both trains are inoperable, or with the operable train not capable of being powered by an operable emergency power l1

' source, all core alterations and positive reactivity changes must be suspended on both Units. The requirement for an operable emergency power source is only L specifically stated for Units operating below Mode 4. However, the bases for Technical Specification 3.7.6 states that the operability of VC/YC ensures that ambient air temperature does not exceed allowable limits for equipment and instrumentation, and the Control Room will remain habitable, during and following all credible accident conditions. This implies that an operable emergency power supply should be a prerequisite to VC/YC operability in all modes, y'* =^ .v.s. e o, ,ee.n

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UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION waoveo one uo. mo.m ExPints: t/31/3 PAesLITY 814418 m . Doomer""" ?R m (gg gegunga gg, , pagg gas Catawba Nuclear' Station,' Unit 1-vanv <n . uw % n3 l l l 89 -

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0l0 0l3 w 0 l5 The acceptance criteria for VC is as follows; each VC train must be capable of-maintaining the Control Room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 20.125' inch water gauge (in.wg) relative to adjacent areas with pressurization air flow to the Control Room of less than or equal to 4000 cubic feet per minute (cfm). .,

'F EVENT DESCRIPTION-On August 23, 1989, during performance of Work Request 1512 MES, the Control Room (CR) pressure increased to a higher than normal level when an access door on 2CR-AHU-l'was opened (see PIR 0-C89-0277). Design Engineering requested that Performance conduct PT/0/A/4450/08, Control Room Positive Pressure Test. to ensure that no CR penetrations were degraded, by the higher pressure experienced on August 23, and that VC could establish the required positive pressure.

On September 15, 1989, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1. Power Operation, plans had been made to conduct the Control Room positive pressure test.- At the time of the test, Trair B of VC/YC was inoperable due to work on the Train B chiller and the Unit 2 VC inlet line (Train B) was isolated due to an inoperable EMF on that duct work.

With Train B of VC inoperable due to chiller work being performed, the CR positive pressure test was performed, at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />, with. Train A of VC in service and the Train B outside air intake isolated'due to EMF-43B being.

. inoperable. The test failed with a CR pressure of 0.05 in.wg and 2396 cfm of I

outside air for pressurization.. Train B had been dcclared inoperable on September 14, 1989, at 0625 hours0.00723 days <br />0.174 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.378125e-4 months <br />.

EMF-43B was repaired and declared operable on September 15 at 0845 hours0.00978 days <br />0.235 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.215225e-4 months <br />, and Train B'outside air i..take was opened. The CR positive pressure test was performed again and the results were acceptable with 0.15 in.wg and 3786 cfm of

l. outside' air for pressurization.

Work Request 7230 PRF was written to investigate the cause of inadequate CR l pressurization with only one outside air intake open. Bahnson walkeo down the L ducts and found no obstructions. In addition, Work Request 44238 OPS was ^

l written to inspect all CR penetrations for leaks.

l The CR positive pressure test was performed again, with Train A in service, and l 'all of the CR doors were taped per Work Request 44239 OPS. The test failed with each outside air intake individually isolated and CR pressurization increased l2 only after both intakes were opened.

At 1315 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />5.003575e-4 months <br />, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered due to both trains of the.VC System being inoperable. The NRC was notified and, based on the extensive compensatory measures established, granted an extension to 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> on Septebmer 16, 1989, to return one train to service. These measures included g " "" 8"' ~ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ .. . _

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. _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i limitations on. burning in the areas of the intakes, establishment of a fire

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watch in the intake areas, restriction of movement of chlorine cylinders in the ,

plant, and instructions of the Operators on actions to take if one or both intakes became isolated.

The VC System was then aligned to Train B and the CR positive pressure test was performed.' The results were acceptable in all alignments. After adjusting the CR return air damper on Train A, the CR positive pressure test was performed with acceptable results in all alignments.

Performance tested Train B with acceptable results in all alignments and it was declared operable'at 0909 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.458745e-4 months <br /> on September 16, 1989. Train A was balanced and u tested with acceptable results in all alignments and declared operable on L September 16 at_1751 hours.

' CONCLUSION

-This incident has been attributed to a defective pre-operational testing i_

L procedure. The test procedure did not test the system in all possible Modes of operation. The ability of each trcin of VC was not-verified to be capable of

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l' me.eting the acceptance criteria with only one outside air intake open. All other appropriate ventilation pre-operational tests are being investigated to ensure they were performed to demonstrate adequate performance during multiple intake alignments.

i There have been three Technical Specification violations due to a defective ,

procedure / incomplete information, during the past twelve months. Since none of these involved pre-operational testing, this is not considered to be a recurring event.

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[ CORRECTIVE ACTION l

.. SUBSEQUENT 1)~ Train A's CR return air damper was adjusted under Work Request 7230 PRF.

l 2) All CR penetrations were inspected for leaks under Work Request 44238 OPS.

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3) CR positive pressure tests were satisfactorily performed on both trains of VC, in all intake alignments.

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4) From September 15 to September 16, 1989, compensatory measures were taken to limit burning in the area of the intakes, to establish a fire watch in the intake areas, to restrict movement of chlorine cylinders in the plant, and to instruct the Operators on actions to take if one or both intakes became isolated.

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. ass wmacwsenswim i.l l- PLANNED-1); All~ appropriate ventilation pre-operational tests are being' reviewed'

.to assure adequate testing of multip'le intake alignments.

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l SAFETY ANALYSIS 17 j .

Technical Specification-3.7.6 allows one train of the VC System to be inoperable '.i D providing appropriate-actions are taken .

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It.was determined by testing the VC System that'no problem had existed with.

y . Train'B operability. Technical Specification and FSAR requirements were met for L flow,; pressurization and filtration with Train B.

The' Train A operability Technical Specification ~and FSAR requirements could have

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been met with both outside air intakes open. However, the Technical.

Specification and'FSAR requirements could not be met with.only'one-outside air Lintake open with only Train A in operation. In this' case, VC was still able to .

. provide 0.05 in.wg of pressurization in the CR.- This is adequate to prevent .

migration of radioactivity into-the CR until such time as the other train or ,

=outside-air' intake could be placed'in service. The healthf.and safety of'the public were unaffected by this incident.

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