ML18018B616

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Forwards Revised Response to Draft SER Open Item 136 Re Loss of Component Cooling Water to Reactor Coolant Pumps.Flow Diagram Re Component Cooling Water Sys Also Encl
ML18018B616
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/09/1984
From: Mcduffie M
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NLS-84-146, NUDOCS 8404120069
Download: ML18018B616 (8)


Text

REGULATORY INI-ORNATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTII (RIBS)

"ACCESSION NBR;8404120069 DOC ~ DATE'4/04/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET 0 FACIL:50 400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit 1< Carolina 05000400

'AUTH'AME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MCDUFFIEr M ~ A, Car o l ina Power= 8 Light Co.

RECIP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTON're Rs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationr Director SUBJECT! For wards revised response to draft SER Open =-Item 136 re loss of component.coo'ling water. to reactor coolant pumpsiFlow diagram re component cooling water sys:also encl, DISTRIBUTION CODE'001'S COPIES RECEIVED;LTR ENCL SIZE; TITLEi Licensing*Submittals,PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8, Related Correspondenc~'OTES; RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES IO CODE/NAME, LTTR ENCL" IO CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL NRR/DL/AOL 0 NRR LB3 BC 1 0 NRR LB3 LA 1 0 BUCKLEYrB 01 1 1 INTERNAL! ELD/HDS1 1. 0 IE 1 1 FILE'E/DEPER/IRB 35 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 3 43 1 1 IE/DQA SIP/QA821 NRR/DE/AEAB

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SERIAL: NLS-84-146 Carolina Power 8 Light Company APR O J 1984 Hr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOe 1 DOCKET NOo 50 400 LOSS. OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER

Dear Nr. Denton:

Carolina Power & Light Company hereby submits a revised response to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER) Open Item 136 concerning loss of component cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps. This revised response provides additional details of the design "

modifications to be completed in response to this item. This information is being submitted in response to a verbal request from the Auxiliary Systems Branch reviewer.

If you require additional information on this subject, please contact our staff.

Yours very truly, N. A. HcDuffie Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation JHE/ccc (9791JHE)

Attachment cct Hr. B. C. Buckley (NRC) Hr. Wells Eddleman Hr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP) Dr. Phyllis Lotchin hir. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII) Hr. John D. Runkle Hr. N. Wagner (NRC-ASB) Dr. Richard D. Wilson Nr. Travis Payne (KUDZU) Hr. G. 0. Bright (ASLB)

Hr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP) Dr. J. H. Carpenter (ASLB)

Chapel Hill Public Library Hr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB)

Wake County Public Library

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Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Draft SER Open Item 136 (410.13)

Revised Res onse Figure 9 ' '-3 indicates that a single active failure (e.g., spurious closure of a containment isolation valves) can result in loss of component cooling water flow to the reactor coolant pumps (RCP). Loss of cooling to the RCPs must not result in unacceptable damage to RCP motor bearings which could result in fuel damage. We require that you demonstrate compliance with one of the following alternatives:

(1) Demonstrate with test data that the RCPs can withstand a complete loss of cooling water for 20 minutes and that instrumentation, designed in accordance with IEEE 279, that alarms in the control room is provided to detect a loss of cooling water to ensure a period of 20 minutes is available so that the operator would have sufficient time to. initiate manual protection of the plant; or (2) Provide instrumentation designed in accordance with IEEE 279 to initiate automatic protection of the plant upon loss of cooling water to a pump.

(Operator action is acceptable if it can be demonstrated that the proper operator action can be taken within 10,minutes).

Revised Res onse Loss of component cooling water to the'il coolers of the reactor coolant pump motors will be detected by redundant safety grade flow instrumentation, which will be designed in accordance'ith IEEE 279 (see attached diagram). Low flow alarms will be provided in the control room to alert the operator. Procedures will be provided to initiate manual protection of the affected reactor coolant pump(s) if component cooling water cannot be restored within ten minutes.

Additional protective actions will be based on the Technical Specification requirements for operability of Reactor Coolant Loops'ther alarms/indicators are also available to the operator to alert him of single active failures (e.g., spurious closure of a containment isolation valve) and to determine which pump(s) should be tripped:

(a) CCW containment isolation valve position indicators.

(b) CCW flow alarms for each of the RCP motor oil coolers return lines (upper and lower oil cooler common return).

(c) CCW temperature alarm for the common return lines from all RCP motor oil coolers.

(d) RCP motor upper thrust shoe, lower thrust shoe and upper guide bearing temperature alarms. (These bearings are served by the upper oil cooler)

(e) RCP motor lower guide bearing temperature alarm. (This bearing is served by the lower oil cooler).

(9791JHE/ccc)

(f) RCP motor winding temperature alarm.

The component cooling water lines supplying the RCP motor oil coolers are ASIA Class 3 and seismic Category I. During normal operation manually operated isolation and throttle valves on these lines do not require adjustment.

Therefore to preclude inadvertent operator action, these valves will be locked in the throttled position. Also, RCP'otor vibration detectors and alarms are available to the operators if excessive vibration were to occur.

Instanteous seizure of a RCP-motor due to a loss of CW to the oil coolers is not considered to be a credible event. However, an evaluation of a locked rotor, scenario has been completed for Shearon Harris (FSAR 15.3.3), and the radiological consequences are less than the 10 CFR 100 guideline values.

(9791JHE/ccc)

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