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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20024J3211994-10-0505 October 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 940909,failure to Perform Slave Relay Test Associated W/One Containment Isolation Valve Due to Improper Work Practices.Reviewed All Slave Relay Test Procedures & Trained All Qualified reviewers.W/941005 Ltr ML20046B5251993-08-0404 August 1993 LER 93-007-00:on 930705,TS Required Surveillance Was Not Performed Because of Inappropriate Action Because of Lack of Attention to Detail.Generated WO 93047633 to Perform Required Surveillance on Unit 1 IPE CA 9010.W/930729 Ltr ML20045H9821993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-005-00:on 930612,manual Rt in Unit 1 Occurred Due to Equipment Failure Due to Failure of L-13 Field Cable Between Data Cabinet B & Bulkhead for Undetermined Reasons.Replaced Field cable.W/930709 Ltr ML20045D9681993-06-25025 June 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930526,discovered That Sample Blower for Radiation Monitor 1 EMF-43B Off & Monitor Declared Inoperable & Ventilation Sys Air Intakes Not Isolated.Caused by Deficient Procedures.Test Procedures Revised ML20045B2811993-06-11011 June 1993 LER 93-004-00:on 930513,both Trains of CR Ventilation Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Equipment Failure.Exact Cause of Failure Could Not Be Determined.Train B Nuclear Svc Water Sys Flow Balance completed.W/930611 Ltr ML20029C2091991-03-21021 March 1991 LER 91-003-00:on 910219,both Trains of Control Room Ventilation Sys Inoperable.Caused by Design Malfunction & Management Deficiency.Temporary Modifications,Removing Automatic Closure Function implemented.W/910321 Ltr ML20028G9561990-09-26026 September 1990 LER 90-025-00:on 900827,Unit 1 Shut Down Because of Unidentified RCS Leakage Exceeding Tech Spec Limits.Caused by Equipment Failure.Procedure AP/1/A/5500/10 Implemented. Valve 1NC-33 Will Be Repacked at Next outage.W/900926 Ltr ML20044A0091990-06-25025 June 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900524,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Because More than One Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Exceeded 5% Deviation.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Boric Acid Added to Coolant sys.W/900625 Ltr ML20043H4991990-06-21021 June 1990 LER 90-012-00:on 900522,loose Matl,Consisting of Masslin Cloths & Stepoff Pad,Discovered in Upper Containment.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedures.Loose Items Removed & Cleanliness Procedures revised.W/900621 Ltr ML20043H2641990-06-20020 June 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900521,noted That Valve 1RN-69A Auxiliary Feedwater Assured Supply from Train a Nuclear Svc Water Repositioned to Open Position After Start of Pump.Cause Unknown.Pump Shut Down & Valve closed.W/900620 Ltr ML20043F7471990-06-13013 June 1990 LER 90-010-00:on 900427,discovered That Annulus Ventilation & Control Room Ventilation Sys Headers Would Not Operate,As Designed,Under Postulated Operating Conditions. Caused by Design Deficiency.Change submitted.W/900613 Ltr ML20043F5071990-06-11011 June 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900512,feedwater Isolation Occurred as Result of Steam Generator 1B Reaching hi-hi Level Setpoint of 82% Level.Caused by Inappropriate Action Because of Lack of Attention to Detail.Feedwater Logic reset.W/900611 Ltr ML20043D6541990-05-30030 May 1990 LER 90-007-00:on 881018,during Insp Ice Condenser Basket Found W/Bottom Screws Missing.Caused by Installation Deficiency Because of Improper Matl Selection.Work Request Initiated to Replace Improper screws.W/900530 Ltr ML20043D7121990-05-30030 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900226,discovered Abnormal Degradation on Steel Containment Vessel.Corrosion Caused by Design Deficiency Caused by Unanticipated Environ Interaction. Detailed Insps conducted.W/900529 Ltr ML20043C8041990-05-30030 May 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900430,radiation Monitor for Contaminated Parts Warehouse Ventilation & Sampler Min Flow Device Declared Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Procedures Enhanced to Prevent recurrence.W/900530 Ltr ML20012D1651990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900208,determined That Holes Left in Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Could Allow Water Spray Into Cabinet.Cause Unknown.Holes Covered W/Duct Tape & Repaired. W/900319 Ltr ML20011F4261990-02-16016 February 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900117,hold Down Screws on Sylvania Contactors in Motor Control Ctrs Found Loose.Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Contactor Screws Tightened.All Hold Down Screws Will Be Replaced W/Another type.W/900223 Ltr ML20006D5571990-02-0707 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900108,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Clogged Strainer on Feedwater Pump a Speed Controller.Caused by Water in Oil Sys.Cause for Water Presence in Sys Unknown. Sludge Minimization Attempts pursued.W/900207 Ltr ML20006A8771990-01-21021 January 1990 LER 89-028-00:on 891204,self-initiated Technical Audit Team Personnel Identified Gap Around Control Room Ventilation Air Handling Unit Access Door.Caused by Possible Const/ Installation Deficiency.Door Sys modified.W/900122 Ltr ML19327C2581989-11-13013 November 1989 LER 89-031-00:on 891012,ac Power Supply Fuse Blew Resulting in Automatic Isolation of Four Outside Air Intakes on Ventilation Sys.Caused by Inappropriate Action.Intake Valves Returned to Svc & Tech Spec 3.3.3.1 exited.W/891113 Ltr ML19324C2031989-11-10010 November 1989 LER 89-024-00:on 890908,MSIV Stroke Timing Periodic Test Performed W/O Air Assistance & Three MSIVs Failed to Close within 5 S.Caused by Brass Guide Screws Excessively Tightened.Set Screws Properly set.W/891106 Ltr ML19324C2011989-10-31031 October 1989 LER 88-019-02:on 880719,damper Compartment Flows Did Not Meet Flow Requirements Due to Closure of Some Sys Dampers. Caused by Defective procedure.As-found Measurements Taken While Operating Fans for Damper positions.W/891030 Ltr ML19327B5611989-10-26026 October 1989 LER 89-030-00:on 890714,visual Insp Revealed 3/4 Inch Open Conduit Connection Which Would Have Prevented Successful Leak Test.Cause Unknown.Connection Removed & Hole Sealed. W/891026 Ltr ML19327B4771989-10-23023 October 1989 LER 89-029-00:on 890922,ESF Actuation Occurred When Diesel Generator 1A Started Due to Momentary Undervoltage Condition on Train a 4,160-volt Essential Switchgear.Cause Unknown. Offsite Power Source Returned to Normal svc.W/891023 Ltr ML19327B1511989-10-19019 October 1989 LER 89-026-00:on 890720,both Trains of Control Area Ventilation Sys Inoperable.Caused by Design Deficiency Because of Unanticipated Interaction of Components.Original Check Damper Reinstalled in Fan on Train B.W/891019 Ltr ML19351A4301989-10-18018 October 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890918,jumper Came Loose & Inadvertently Made Contact W/Sliding Link B-14 Directly Above Link B-15, Resulting in Turbine Driven Feedwater Pump Automatically Starting.Caused by Inappropriate action.W/891018 Ltr ML19325D4991989-10-16016 October 1989 LER 89-027-00:on 890915,preheaters Did Not Start Because Air Flow Permissive Was Not Made & Cross Connect Dampers Were Closed & Tagged & Ventilation Sys Train a Remained Logged Inoperable.Caused by Design deficiency.W/891016 Ltr ML19325C4871989-09-28028 September 1989 LER 89-018-00:on 890829,both Trains of Control Area Ventilation (VC) & Chilled Water (Yc) Sys Declared Inoperable.Caused by Equipment/Failure Malfunction. Refrigerant Added to Vc/Yc chiller.W/890928 Ltr ML20043D7041989-09-25025 September 1989 LER 89-022-01:on 890826,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Failed Universal Board in Solid State Protection Sys Cabinet A. Caused by Equipment/Malfunction.Universal Board Replaced. W/900530 Ltr ML19325C4731989-09-18018 September 1989 LER 89-015-00:on 890722,discovered That Neutral Pressure Was Best That Could Be Achieved in Some Required Sys Configurations.Caused by Design Deficiency Due to Design Oversight.Outside Air Ref Point installed.W/891004 Ltr ML20024F2791983-08-29029 August 1983 LER 83-066/03L-0:on 830817,invalid Alarm Received for Fire Detection Zone Efa 90 Which Would Not Clear.Caused by Unusual Svc Conditions.Detector Cleaned & replaced.W/830829 Ltr ML20024D8101983-07-29029 July 1983 LER 83-050/03L-0:on 830629,control Area Ventilation Sys Train B Declared Inoperable.Caused by Automatic Reset Preheater Overtemp Cutout Switch Failure.Replacement Switch Will Be installed.W/830729 Ltr ML20024D7531983-07-27027 July 1983 LER 83-048/03L-0:on 830624,control Area Ventilation Sys Train B Declared Inoperable Following Low Refrigerant Temp Alarm Trip of Control Room Chiller B.Caused by Cleaning of Condenser tubes.W/830727 Ltr ML20024D7701983-07-27027 July 1983 LER 83-049/03L-0:on 830624,surveillance Compliance Review Revealed Three Time Response Tests Not Performed.Cause Not Stated.Remaining Channels Will Be Tested During Next refueling.W/830727 Ltr ML20024D8951983-07-27027 July 1983 LER 83-047/03L-0:on 830627,discovered That 18-month Insp of Fire Hose Station 180 Not Performed During Nov 1981.Caused by Order Preventing Personnel from Entering Area Due to High Radiation Levels.Procedural Change instituted.W/830727 Ltr ML20024C4091983-06-28028 June 1983 Updated LER 83-002/03X-1:on 830110,pressurizer Heater Group 1B Failed to Energize in Manual & Declared Inoperable.Heat Damage Found at Heat Dissipating Resistor Connections.Caused by Design Defect in Contactor Coil circuit.W/830628 Ltr ML20024C3941983-06-28028 June 1983 LER 83-035/03L-0:on 830515,pressurizer Heater Group 1B Failed to Energize in Manual & Declared Inoperable Per Tech Spec 3.4.3.Caused by Blown Fuse in Heater Contactor Control Circuit.Fuse replaced.W/830628 Ltr ML20024C0001983-06-27027 June 1983 LER 83-030/01T-0:on 830526,discovered Monthly Test of Containment Pressure Control Sys Failed to Satisfy Surveillance Requirements to Check Permissive/Termination Setpoint Accuracy.Alarm Modules recalibr.W/830627 Ltr ML20023C4691983-05-0505 May 1983 LER 83-017/03L-0:on 830405,during Draining of Refueling Cavity RHR (Nd) Pumps Began to Cavitate & Eventually Both Nd Pumps Stopped.Caused by Level Gauge Isolation.Cavity Refilled.Nd Sys Vented.Procedures Revised ML20028E0131983-01-10010 January 1983 LER 82-081/03L-0:on 821211,lower Personnel Airlock Declared Inoperable After Reactor Door Found Partially Closed W/Small Seal Ruptured & Large Seal Inflated.Cause Not Known.Seal Not Designed to Withstand Unrestrained Inflationary Forces ML20028A5301982-11-10010 November 1982 LER 82-073/03L-0:on 820403,during QA Audit of Test Procedures,Incore & Nuclear Instrumentation Sys Correlation Monthly Check Found Not Performed.Caused by Incorrect Test Schedule ML20027D3351982-10-22022 October 1982 LER 82-071/03L-0:on 820922,motor Control Ctr Lemxd Lost Power Causing Temporary Inoperability of Several Essential Sys/Components.Caused by Automatic Trip of Feeder Breaker. Breaker Reset & Closed.Power Restored ML20027B5051982-09-10010 September 1982 LER 82-067/03L-0:on 820813,two Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Low Suction Pressure Switches Failed to Perform During Functional Test.Caused by Switches Being Out of Calibr,Possibly Due to Instrument Drift or Misadjustment ML20027B5521982-09-0808 September 1982 LER 82-064/03L-0:on 820809,vent Flow Monitor Indicated Zero W/Vent in Operation During Process of Returning to Mode 1. Caused by Out of Calibr Differential Pressure Transmitter Due to Instrument Drift.Transmitter Recalibr ML20052H5831982-05-10010 May 1982 LER 82-027/03L-0:on 820326,one Channel of Position Indication for RCS Power Operated Relief Valves NC-32 & NC-36 Declared Inoperable When Closed Indicator Lights Failed.Caused by Loose Fitting Bulb Due to Crack in Socket ML20052G6791982-05-0707 May 1982 LER 82-030/01T-0:on 820423,diesel Generator 1A Declared Inoperable After Failing to Start for Periodic Test.Caused by Failure of Station Design Change Implementation Program to Control Work on Station Mods ML20052H7421982-05-0707 May 1982 LER 82-031/03L-0:on 820408,boric Acid Transfer Pump a Failed to Perform at Capacity & Declared Inoperable.Caused by Reverse Rotation Due to Improperly Connected Windings. Personnel Counseled & Maint Routine Modified ML20052H7481982-05-0606 May 1982 LER 82-029/03L-0:on 820402,investigation of Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) & Pressurizer Code Safety Discharge Line High Temp Alarms Revealed Indications of Leakage for PORV NC-34.Cause Undetermined.Valve Will Be Repaired ML20052H6091982-04-30030 April 1982 LER 82-028/03L-0:on 820401,during Mode 1 Operation,Radiation Monitors EMF-31 & EMF-33 Lost Power.Caused by Monitor EMF-46 Tripping Circuit Breaker Due to Direct Short Across Power bulb.EMF-46 Isolated & EMF-31 & 33 Returned to Svc ML20052G3611982-04-29029 April 1982 LER 82-025/03L-0:on 820318,vol Control Tank Makeup Frequency Increased & Containment Floor & Equipment Sump 1A Level Increased During RCS Leak Test.Caused by Failure to Verify Isolation Valves Closed Due to Procedural Deficiency 1994-10-05
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML20024J3211994-10-0505 October 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 940909,failure to Perform Slave Relay Test Associated W/One Containment Isolation Valve Due to Improper Work Practices.Reviewed All Slave Relay Test Procedures & Trained All Qualified reviewers.W/941005 Ltr ML20046B5251993-08-0404 August 1993 LER 93-007-00:on 930705,TS Required Surveillance Was Not Performed Because of Inappropriate Action Because of Lack of Attention to Detail.Generated WO 93047633 to Perform Required Surveillance on Unit 1 IPE CA 9010.W/930729 Ltr ML20045H9821993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-005-00:on 930612,manual Rt in Unit 1 Occurred Due to Equipment Failure Due to Failure of L-13 Field Cable Between Data Cabinet B & Bulkhead for Undetermined Reasons.Replaced Field cable.W/930709 Ltr ML20045D9681993-06-25025 June 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930526,discovered That Sample Blower for Radiation Monitor 1 EMF-43B Off & Monitor Declared Inoperable & Ventilation Sys Air Intakes Not Isolated.Caused by Deficient Procedures.Test Procedures Revised ML20045B2811993-06-11011 June 1993 LER 93-004-00:on 930513,both Trains of CR Ventilation Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Equipment Failure.Exact Cause of Failure Could Not Be Determined.Train B Nuclear Svc Water Sys Flow Balance completed.W/930611 Ltr ML20029C2091991-03-21021 March 1991 LER 91-003-00:on 910219,both Trains of Control Room Ventilation Sys Inoperable.Caused by Design Malfunction & Management Deficiency.Temporary Modifications,Removing Automatic Closure Function implemented.W/910321 Ltr ML20028G9561990-09-26026 September 1990 LER 90-025-00:on 900827,Unit 1 Shut Down Because of Unidentified RCS Leakage Exceeding Tech Spec Limits.Caused by Equipment Failure.Procedure AP/1/A/5500/10 Implemented. Valve 1NC-33 Will Be Repacked at Next outage.W/900926 Ltr ML20044A0091990-06-25025 June 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900524,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Because More than One Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Exceeded 5% Deviation.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Boric Acid Added to Coolant sys.W/900625 Ltr ML20043H4991990-06-21021 June 1990 LER 90-012-00:on 900522,loose Matl,Consisting of Masslin Cloths & Stepoff Pad,Discovered in Upper Containment.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedures.Loose Items Removed & Cleanliness Procedures revised.W/900621 Ltr ML20043H2641990-06-20020 June 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900521,noted That Valve 1RN-69A Auxiliary Feedwater Assured Supply from Train a Nuclear Svc Water Repositioned to Open Position After Start of Pump.Cause Unknown.Pump Shut Down & Valve closed.W/900620 Ltr ML20043F7471990-06-13013 June 1990 LER 90-010-00:on 900427,discovered That Annulus Ventilation & Control Room Ventilation Sys Headers Would Not Operate,As Designed,Under Postulated Operating Conditions. Caused by Design Deficiency.Change submitted.W/900613 Ltr ML20043F5071990-06-11011 June 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900512,feedwater Isolation Occurred as Result of Steam Generator 1B Reaching hi-hi Level Setpoint of 82% Level.Caused by Inappropriate Action Because of Lack of Attention to Detail.Feedwater Logic reset.W/900611 Ltr ML20043D6541990-05-30030 May 1990 LER 90-007-00:on 881018,during Insp Ice Condenser Basket Found W/Bottom Screws Missing.Caused by Installation Deficiency Because of Improper Matl Selection.Work Request Initiated to Replace Improper screws.W/900530 Ltr ML20043D7121990-05-30030 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900226,discovered Abnormal Degradation on Steel Containment Vessel.Corrosion Caused by Design Deficiency Caused by Unanticipated Environ Interaction. Detailed Insps conducted.W/900529 Ltr ML20043C8041990-05-30030 May 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900430,radiation Monitor for Contaminated Parts Warehouse Ventilation & Sampler Min Flow Device Declared Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Procedures Enhanced to Prevent recurrence.W/900530 Ltr ML20012D1651990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900208,determined That Holes Left in Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Could Allow Water Spray Into Cabinet.Cause Unknown.Holes Covered W/Duct Tape & Repaired. W/900319 Ltr ML20011F4261990-02-16016 February 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900117,hold Down Screws on Sylvania Contactors in Motor Control Ctrs Found Loose.Caused by Mfg Deficiency.Contactor Screws Tightened.All Hold Down Screws Will Be Replaced W/Another type.W/900223 Ltr ML20006D5571990-02-0707 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900108,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Clogged Strainer on Feedwater Pump a Speed Controller.Caused by Water in Oil Sys.Cause for Water Presence in Sys Unknown. Sludge Minimization Attempts pursued.W/900207 Ltr ML20006A8771990-01-21021 January 1990 LER 89-028-00:on 891204,self-initiated Technical Audit Team Personnel Identified Gap Around Control Room Ventilation Air Handling Unit Access Door.Caused by Possible Const/ Installation Deficiency.Door Sys modified.W/900122 Ltr ML19327C2581989-11-13013 November 1989 LER 89-031-00:on 891012,ac Power Supply Fuse Blew Resulting in Automatic Isolation of Four Outside Air Intakes on Ventilation Sys.Caused by Inappropriate Action.Intake Valves Returned to Svc & Tech Spec 3.3.3.1 exited.W/891113 Ltr ML19324C2031989-11-10010 November 1989 LER 89-024-00:on 890908,MSIV Stroke Timing Periodic Test Performed W/O Air Assistance & Three MSIVs Failed to Close within 5 S.Caused by Brass Guide Screws Excessively Tightened.Set Screws Properly set.W/891106 Ltr ML19324C2011989-10-31031 October 1989 LER 88-019-02:on 880719,damper Compartment Flows Did Not Meet Flow Requirements Due to Closure of Some Sys Dampers. Caused by Defective procedure.As-found Measurements Taken While Operating Fans for Damper positions.W/891030 Ltr ML19327B5611989-10-26026 October 1989 LER 89-030-00:on 890714,visual Insp Revealed 3/4 Inch Open Conduit Connection Which Would Have Prevented Successful Leak Test.Cause Unknown.Connection Removed & Hole Sealed. W/891026 Ltr ML19327B4771989-10-23023 October 1989 LER 89-029-00:on 890922,ESF Actuation Occurred When Diesel Generator 1A Started Due to Momentary Undervoltage Condition on Train a 4,160-volt Essential Switchgear.Cause Unknown. Offsite Power Source Returned to Normal svc.W/891023 Ltr ML19327B1511989-10-19019 October 1989 LER 89-026-00:on 890720,both Trains of Control Area Ventilation Sys Inoperable.Caused by Design Deficiency Because of Unanticipated Interaction of Components.Original Check Damper Reinstalled in Fan on Train B.W/891019 Ltr ML19351A4301989-10-18018 October 1989 LER 89-025-00:on 890918,jumper Came Loose & Inadvertently Made Contact W/Sliding Link B-14 Directly Above Link B-15, Resulting in Turbine Driven Feedwater Pump Automatically Starting.Caused by Inappropriate action.W/891018 Ltr ML19325D4991989-10-16016 October 1989 LER 89-027-00:on 890915,preheaters Did Not Start Because Air Flow Permissive Was Not Made & Cross Connect Dampers Were Closed & Tagged & Ventilation Sys Train a Remained Logged Inoperable.Caused by Design deficiency.W/891016 Ltr ML19325C4871989-09-28028 September 1989 LER 89-018-00:on 890829,both Trains of Control Area Ventilation (VC) & Chilled Water (Yc) Sys Declared Inoperable.Caused by Equipment/Failure Malfunction. Refrigerant Added to Vc/Yc chiller.W/890928 Ltr ML20043D7041989-09-25025 September 1989 LER 89-022-01:on 890826,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Failed Universal Board in Solid State Protection Sys Cabinet A. Caused by Equipment/Malfunction.Universal Board Replaced. W/900530 Ltr ML19325C4731989-09-18018 September 1989 LER 89-015-00:on 890722,discovered That Neutral Pressure Was Best That Could Be Achieved in Some Required Sys Configurations.Caused by Design Deficiency Due to Design Oversight.Outside Air Ref Point installed.W/891004 Ltr ML20024F2791983-08-29029 August 1983 LER 83-066/03L-0:on 830817,invalid Alarm Received for Fire Detection Zone Efa 90 Which Would Not Clear.Caused by Unusual Svc Conditions.Detector Cleaned & replaced.W/830829 Ltr ML20024D8101983-07-29029 July 1983 LER 83-050/03L-0:on 830629,control Area Ventilation Sys Train B Declared Inoperable.Caused by Automatic Reset Preheater Overtemp Cutout Switch Failure.Replacement Switch Will Be installed.W/830729 Ltr ML20024D7531983-07-27027 July 1983 LER 83-048/03L-0:on 830624,control Area Ventilation Sys Train B Declared Inoperable Following Low Refrigerant Temp Alarm Trip of Control Room Chiller B.Caused by Cleaning of Condenser tubes.W/830727 Ltr ML20024D7701983-07-27027 July 1983 LER 83-049/03L-0:on 830624,surveillance Compliance Review Revealed Three Time Response Tests Not Performed.Cause Not Stated.Remaining Channels Will Be Tested During Next refueling.W/830727 Ltr ML20024D8951983-07-27027 July 1983 LER 83-047/03L-0:on 830627,discovered That 18-month Insp of Fire Hose Station 180 Not Performed During Nov 1981.Caused by Order Preventing Personnel from Entering Area Due to High Radiation Levels.Procedural Change instituted.W/830727 Ltr ML20024C4091983-06-28028 June 1983 Updated LER 83-002/03X-1:on 830110,pressurizer Heater Group 1B Failed to Energize in Manual & Declared Inoperable.Heat Damage Found at Heat Dissipating Resistor Connections.Caused by Design Defect in Contactor Coil circuit.W/830628 Ltr ML20024C3941983-06-28028 June 1983 LER 83-035/03L-0:on 830515,pressurizer Heater Group 1B Failed to Energize in Manual & Declared Inoperable Per Tech Spec 3.4.3.Caused by Blown Fuse in Heater Contactor Control Circuit.Fuse replaced.W/830628 Ltr ML20024C0001983-06-27027 June 1983 LER 83-030/01T-0:on 830526,discovered Monthly Test of Containment Pressure Control Sys Failed to Satisfy Surveillance Requirements to Check Permissive/Termination Setpoint Accuracy.Alarm Modules recalibr.W/830627 Ltr ML20023C4691983-05-0505 May 1983 LER 83-017/03L-0:on 830405,during Draining of Refueling Cavity RHR (Nd) Pumps Began to Cavitate & Eventually Both Nd Pumps Stopped.Caused by Level Gauge Isolation.Cavity Refilled.Nd Sys Vented.Procedures Revised ML20028E0131983-01-10010 January 1983 LER 82-081/03L-0:on 821211,lower Personnel Airlock Declared Inoperable After Reactor Door Found Partially Closed W/Small Seal Ruptured & Large Seal Inflated.Cause Not Known.Seal Not Designed to Withstand Unrestrained Inflationary Forces ML20028A5301982-11-10010 November 1982 LER 82-073/03L-0:on 820403,during QA Audit of Test Procedures,Incore & Nuclear Instrumentation Sys Correlation Monthly Check Found Not Performed.Caused by Incorrect Test Schedule ML20027D3351982-10-22022 October 1982 LER 82-071/03L-0:on 820922,motor Control Ctr Lemxd Lost Power Causing Temporary Inoperability of Several Essential Sys/Components.Caused by Automatic Trip of Feeder Breaker. Breaker Reset & Closed.Power Restored ML20027B5051982-09-10010 September 1982 LER 82-067/03L-0:on 820813,two Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Low Suction Pressure Switches Failed to Perform During Functional Test.Caused by Switches Being Out of Calibr,Possibly Due to Instrument Drift or Misadjustment ML20027B5521982-09-0808 September 1982 LER 82-064/03L-0:on 820809,vent Flow Monitor Indicated Zero W/Vent in Operation During Process of Returning to Mode 1. Caused by Out of Calibr Differential Pressure Transmitter Due to Instrument Drift.Transmitter Recalibr ML20052H5831982-05-10010 May 1982 LER 82-027/03L-0:on 820326,one Channel of Position Indication for RCS Power Operated Relief Valves NC-32 & NC-36 Declared Inoperable When Closed Indicator Lights Failed.Caused by Loose Fitting Bulb Due to Crack in Socket ML20052G6791982-05-0707 May 1982 LER 82-030/01T-0:on 820423,diesel Generator 1A Declared Inoperable After Failing to Start for Periodic Test.Caused by Failure of Station Design Change Implementation Program to Control Work on Station Mods ML20052H7421982-05-0707 May 1982 LER 82-031/03L-0:on 820408,boric Acid Transfer Pump a Failed to Perform at Capacity & Declared Inoperable.Caused by Reverse Rotation Due to Improperly Connected Windings. Personnel Counseled & Maint Routine Modified ML20052H7481982-05-0606 May 1982 LER 82-029/03L-0:on 820402,investigation of Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) & Pressurizer Code Safety Discharge Line High Temp Alarms Revealed Indications of Leakage for PORV NC-34.Cause Undetermined.Valve Will Be Repaired ML20052H6091982-04-30030 April 1982 LER 82-028/03L-0:on 820401,during Mode 1 Operation,Radiation Monitors EMF-31 & EMF-33 Lost Power.Caused by Monitor EMF-46 Tripping Circuit Breaker Due to Direct Short Across Power bulb.EMF-46 Isolated & EMF-31 & 33 Returned to Svc ML20052G3611982-04-29029 April 1982 LER 82-025/03L-0:on 820318,vol Control Tank Makeup Frequency Increased & Containment Floor & Equipment Sump 1A Level Increased During RCS Leak Test.Caused by Failure to Verify Isolation Valves Closed Due to Procedural Deficiency 1994-10-05
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G7951999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217F3661999-09-22022 September 1999 Rev 18 to McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 14 Colr ML20212D1911999-09-20020 September 1999 SER Accepting Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App A,General Design Criterion 57 Closed System Isolation Valves for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E8851999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20217G8101999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Unit 1 & 2 ML20211G5261999-08-24024 August 1999 SER Accepting Approval of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Request for Relief 98-004 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20210S2371999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E8951999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20209H1631999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20210S2491999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H1731999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20195K3691999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N3511999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety- Related Movs ML20195K3761999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised MORs for Apr 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206R0891999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205L2341999-04-0505 April 1999 SFP Criticality Analysis ML20206R0931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Repts for Mar 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P8991999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205C4171999-03-25025 March 1999 Special Rept 99-02:on 801027,Commission Approved for publication,10CFR50.48 & 10CFR50 App R Delineating Certain Fire Protection Provisions for Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate Prior to 790101.Team Draft Findings Reviewed ML20207K2051999-03-0505 March 1999 Special Rept 99-01:on 990128,DG Tripped After 2 H of Operation During Loaded Operation for Monthly Test.Caused by Several Components That Were Degraded or Had Intermittent Problems.Parts Were Replaced & Initial Run Was Performed ML20204C8911999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9021999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C8961999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199E0301998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20198A4481998-12-11011 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That for Relief Request 97-004, Parts 1 & 2,ASME Code Exam Requirements Are Impractical. Request for Relief & Alternative Imposed,Granted ML20198D7561998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199E0491998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20199E9651998-11-24024 November 1998 Rev 1 to ATI-98-012-T005, DPC Evaluation of McGuire Unit 1 Surveillance Weld Data Credibility ML20196D4171998-11-24024 November 1998 Special Rept 98-02:on 981112,failure to Implement Fire Watches in Rooms Containing Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetrations,Was Determined.Repair of Affected Fire Barriers in Progress ML20196G0581998-11-0606 November 1998 Rev 17 to COLR Cycle 13 for McGuire Unit 1 ML20196G0761998-11-0606 November 1998 Rev 15 to COLR Cycle 12 for McGuire Unit 2 ML20198D7771998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195E5961998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154L6251998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195E6021998-09-30030 September 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154B4131998-09-22022 September 1998 Rev 0 to ISI Rept for McGuire Nuclear Unit 1 Twelfth Refueling Outage ML20151W3521998-09-0808 September 1998 Special Rept 98-01:on 980819,maint Could Not Be Performed on FPS Due to Isolation Boundary Leakage.Caused by Inadequate Info Provided in Fire Impairment Plan.Isolated Portion of FPS Was Returned to Svc ML20154L6321998-08-31031 August 1998 Rev 1 to MOR for Aug 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20153B3741998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236U1601998-07-31031 July 1998 Non-proprietary DPC-NE-2009, DPC W Fuel Transition Rept ML20237B2381998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20153B3931998-07-31031 July 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236P0451998-07-0808 July 1998 Part 21 Rept Re non-conformance & Potential Defect in Component of Nordberg Model FS1316HSC Standby Dg.Caused by Outer Spring Valves Mfg from Matl That Did Not Meet Specifications.Will Furnish Written Rept within 60 Days 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
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. v. Duke herr Compacy . ' (704) 075 4000
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McGuire NuclearStation P O Bax488 Cornehus, NC 2M.fl.0488 DUKEPOWER
~ November 6, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cotamission ,
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. . 20555 e
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 ,
Docket No. 50-369 ,
Licensee Event Report 369/89-24 f
Gentlemen: g Pursuant to 10 CFR 30.73 Sections (a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 369/89-24 concerning the Main Steam Isolation Valves tested in a nonconservative manner. This report is being submitted as a Voluntary Report.
- This event'is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and
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safety of the public.
Very truly yours, r
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DVE/ADJ/cb1
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Attachment xc Mr. S.D. Ebneter American Nuclear Insurers Administrator, Region II c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Exchange, Suit 245 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 270 Farmington Avenue Atlanta, GA 20323 Farmington, CT 06032 INPO Records Center Mr. Darl Hood Suite 1500 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l I
1100 circle 75 Parkway Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation .
l Atlanta, GA 30339 Washington, D.C. 20555 M&M Nuclear Consultants Mr. P.K. Van Doorn <
1221 Avenue of the Americas NRC Resident Inspector New York, NY 10020 McGuire Nuclear Station l l
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I" .1.ER Cover Letter
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J.J. Maher R.O. Sharpe (MNS)
G.B. Swindlehurst-h K.D. Thomas
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! J.D. Wylie (PSD) '
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!- QAfech. Services NRC Coordinator (EC 12/55)
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The Main Steam Isolation Valves Were Tested In A Non Conservative Manner Because Of An Installation Deficiency EVP8st Datt 4) LOR 8euesstR ici R4 PORT Datt 471 OvMER SaCl41 tit $ 18svotyl0 mi uoNtn pav vtan vta= ** M '" . 3*,'rg voNt* oav vtaa ' acm" **ve s oocalv =venn,i, McGuire. Unit 2 0 1510 l 010 l3 l 7 lo
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On May 16, 1989, General Office (GO) Performance personnel wrote Problem j Investigation Report (PIR) 0-M89-0122 as a result of a review of Information Notice (IEN) 88-51. IEN 88-51 described a failure of Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) :
to close without air assistance. It was discovered that McGuire timed the MSIVs to close with air assistance. Safety analysis calculations take no credit for air l assistance to close. On May 26, 1989, an Operability Evaluation was issued stating j that the MSIVs would close as required without air assistance and the MSIVs should l be stroke timed without air assistance to close during the next refueling outages.
On September 8, 1989, the MSIV Stroke Timing Periodic Test was performed without I the air assistance and 3 MSIVs failed to close within 5 seconds as required. PIR ,
0-M89-0239 was written or. the same day. As a result of this PIR, an Operability Evaluation was issued on September 11, 1989, stating that the MSIVs were operable j with the air assist to close feature. The MSIVs were tested with air assist to '
close and they all successfully passed the MSIV Valve Stroke Timing test. This ,
event is assigned a cause of Installation Deficiency because brass guide screws in l the actuators were tightened excessively causing the MSIV actuators to bind when !
closing. Unit I was in Mode 1, Power Operation at 100 percent power, and Unit 2 l was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) at the time this event was discovered. Maintenance 5 Engineering Services (MES) personnel wrote a Station Problem Report to request ;
Design Engineering (DE) personnel to perform a design study to determine the best !
resolution to the problem. This report is being submitted as a Voluntary LER.
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Background
Main Steam [EIIS:SB) (SM) Isolation valves [EIIS:ISV) (MSIVs) 2SM-3, 5, 7, 9 are provided in each Steam Generator [EIIS:SG) steam line immediately downstream of the safety valves to isolate each individual Steam Generator and prevent reverse flow in the event of a steam line rupture. The MSIVs close on a high-high Containment '
pressure signal and/or on high steam line pressure rate of change or low steam line pressure as a result of an SM line rupture between the Steam Generator and the Turbine [EIIS:TB] Steam Stop valves.
The McGuire MSIVs are 34 inch Y-pattern globe valves manufactured by Atwood and Morrill and are equipped with fail close air / spring actuators. The valve actuators utilize air pressure under a piston to hold the valves open for steam flow. When called upon to close and perform their safety function, the air under the piston is ,
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vented to atmosphere and the energy stored in the springs drives the valves closed.
An additional air supply is directed to the top of the piston to assist closure.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.4 requires that each MSIV shall be operable in Mode 1, Mode 2 (Startup), and Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Each MSIV shall be demonstrated operable by verifying full closure within 5 seconds.
On July 21, 1988, the NRC issued Information Notice (IEN) 88-51, Failures of MSIVs at Dresden Unit 2. IEN 88-51 detailed an event in which an MSIV failed to close as required when the air supply line pulled out of the manifold on the valve operator.
TS at Drerden required quarterly functional testing to evaluate MSIV closure with combined actuator air and spring forces even though the air sources were from -
non-safety grade sources. Testing demonstrated that the MSIVs would not close with spring forces alone which was contrary to the safety design basis of the plant.
Description of Event On May 16, 1989, GO Performance personnel completed a review of IEN 88-51 and determined that the same circumstances detailed in IEN 88-51 existed at McGuire
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Nuclear Station. The Valve Stroke Timing periodic test for the MSIVs tested the l MSIVs with the air and spring force combined. Based upon this discovery, PIR l 0-M89-0122 was initiated to document the discovery.
On May 26, 1989, DE personnel issued an Operability Evaluation concerning the MSIVs. The Operability evaluation stated in part that the MSIVs under the worst
- case operating conditions (full pressure, reverse flow) have an operator closing margin of 2264 ft. Ib. or 24 percent using spring force only. DE personnel recommended that Unit 1 and Unit 2 continue operating until the Unit 2 Refueling l
Outage when test.ing without air assist to close the MSIVs could be performed.
! On September 8, 1989, Performance personnel using procedure PT/2/A/4255/03A and 1 03B, SM Train A and B Valve Stroke Timing Test, valve stroke timed the MSIVs l
without air assist to close by isolating the air supply to the top of the actuator.
l MSIVs 2SM-5, and 2SM-7 did not c1cse within the required 5 seconds using Train A
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01 0 Ol 3 0F 0l6 solenoid valves. MSIVs 2SM-3, 2SM-5, 2SM-7, did not close within 5 seconds using !
'4' rain B solenoid valves.
The valve stroke timing results were as follows:
Valve Time For Valve To close Without Air Assistance ,
2SM-5A 13.8 seconds 2SM-7A 7.6 seconds e 2SM-3B 5.4 seconds 2SM-5B 9.0 seconds i 2SM-7B 7.0 seconds. .
3 On September 8, 1989, based upon these results, Performance personnel initiated PIR 0-M89-0239. DE personnel were contacted, and on September 11, 1989, DE personnel issued an Operability Evaluation that determined that the MSIVs were operable in their existing configuration (with air assist) and capable of performing their intended safety function with air assistance to close.
DE personnel determined the safety status and design basis for the air assist feature of the MSIVs. The air assisted closure feature of the MSIVs begins as a branch line off'the Instrument Air [EIIS:LD} (VI) system. This portion of the VI system is classified as ASME III - Class 3. The materials used in the components
.of the air assisted closure feature and the methods used to manufacture them are conenensurate with those used in environmentally qualified components. A Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) evaluation of the components was performed and the components were determined to be seismically qualified. DE personnel determined that the air supply and control systems that constitute the air assisting closure feature to the MSIVs to be operable.
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Performance personnel successfully completed PT/2/A/4255/03A and 03B, SM Train A and B Valve Stroke Timing Test, on September 12, 1989. All MSIVs cicsed within the required 5 seconds using both Train A and Train P solenoid valves with the air assistance to close.
l Conclusion f This event is assigned a cause of Installation Deficiency because during initial l-installation of the MSIVs, brass guide screws that the actuator plates ride on were installed too tightly. The brass guide screws being too tight caused the actuator '
to bind and slow the closure time. If the brass set screws had been set properly
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h during initial installation the MSIVs would have closed within the required 5
! seconds with spring force alone. The air assistance to close components would not L have been added to the MSIVs because there would not have been a problem meeting the 5 second closure time. The MSIVs would have been tested properly if the brass L
set screws had not been misadjusted. The cause of the guide screws being installed I too tight could not be determined during this investigation. This fact was not l.
discovered until after the air assistance to close components were added to the l , MSIVs during preoperational testirg. Once the brass set screws were set properly,
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the MSIVs were fully capable of closing using spring force alone. The air
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. win mic n- asam on assistance to close compcnents were then an added feature not needed to close the MSIVs within the required 5 seconds. The components used to construct the air assistance to-close portion of the MSIVs were of the highest grade available but were not seismically qualified. The air assistance to close portion of the MSIVs should not have been used when valve stroke timing tests were performeu; however, it is not obvious that it is not safety related equipment. The McGuire Final i Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 9.3.1.3 states in part that, "ASME,Section III, Class 3 air reservoirs are provided on the instrument air to each MSIV operator. Redundant ASME,Section III, Class 3 check valves are provided upstream of each reservoir for isolation from the remainder of the VI system. The '
interconnecting piping between the check valves, air reservoir, and the MSIV operators is Duke Class C. These safety class air reservoirs are provided as a t redundant means of closure for each MSIV. These valves are also capable of being closed by spring action. Each reservoir has air capacity for a single closure of its respective MSIV."
The flow diagrams for the MSIVs show a seismic safety related valve that receives a safety signal and power. The flow diagrams do not show clearly that a portion of
.the components are not safety related. FSAR Section 9.3.1.3 does not state that any portion of the air assistance to close portion of the MSIVs is not safety related. It would have been difficult for someone to determine that a portion of the air assistance to close feature of the MSIVs was not safety related.
DE and MES personnel investigated the MSIVs to determine the cause of the MSIVs not closing within the required 5 seconds. DE personnel determined that the lack of a vent to atmosphere for the instrument air supply directed to the top of the actuator piston caused the MSIVs to fail to close within 5 seconds. When the air is failed to the top of the actuator piston and the valves close by spring force alone, a vacuum is pulled within the cylinder slowing the closure time of the MSIVs. At the direction of DE personnel, supplemental testing was performed with i
the air supply disconnected and entirely vented during testing. The air supply was
- disconnected to the top of the actuator of valve 2SM-5, and the MSIV closed within
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the required 5 seconds using spring force alone, performance personnel stated that it is possible that the test method used to stroke time the MSIVs without air assistance to close was too conservative. During l the testing, the air supply was isolated from the top of the actuator and all the l
pressure relieved from the tank and lines. During an event that would require
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closure of the MSIVs, some pressure would be available in the instrument air components supplying air to the top of the actuator and upon closing the MSIVs would not pull a vacuum in the cylinder. In the event the non seismic portion of the air assistance to close components failed, the failure would create a vent path. Testing by MES and DE personnel has proved that with a vent path established, the MSIVs will close on spring force alone. performance personnel l will perform testing on the MSIVs during the 1990 Unit 1 Refueling Outage to determine if the test method for stroke timing the MSIVs was too conservative.
DE perscnnel reviewed all the test data compiled by Station personnel and made the following recommendations:
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- 1. The MSIV air essist components and the MSIVs are fully operable as built.
The only limitation is that if the station elects to retain the air assist feature, additional maintenance and inspection activities will be required. The air assist portion of the MSIVs will have to be evaluated in two years because of the time limitations of the SQUG evaluation.
- 2. As stated in the resolution for PIR 0-M89-0122, a calculated closure force margin of 24 percent exists for the MSIVs using spring force alone.
This margin and additional test data on MSIV 2SM-5 with the top of the actuator cylinder vented provides evidence that the air assist feature is unnecessary. Modifications would be required to vent the actuator cylinders if the air assist feature is deleted. ;
MES personnel initiated a Station Problem Report to request DE personnel begin a t design study to determine the best resolution to the problem. MES personnel will perform a test of the valve packing drag of the MSIVs and will also perform a survey of other utilities that do not use the air assistance to close feature to detemine if they are experiencing any MSIV closure problems. Based on the design ,
study and results of the testing and utility survey, Project Services will initiate modifications as necessary.
This event is not Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) reportable.
A review of McGuire incidents for the past 12 months did not reveal any events involving the MSIVs with a cause of Installation Deficiency. This event is not recurring.
There were no personnel injuries, radiation overexposures, or releases of radioactive material as a result of this event.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
Immediate: None Subsequent: 1) DE personnel issued an Operability Evaluation stating the MSIVs were operable with air assist to close.
- 2) Performance personnel performed the Valve Stroke Timing Test !
with air assistance to close, and all MSIVs closed within 5 i seconds, l
- 3) MES personnel wrote a Station Problem Report requesting DE personnel perform a design study determine the best resolution to the problem.
Planned: 1) Performance personnel will perform testing of the MSIVs to determine if the valve stroke timing tests are appropriate.
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, 2) DE personnel will perform a design study to determine the best
' resolution of the problem and the as.sociated scope and costs of the proposed resolutions.
- 3) MES personnel will perform a test of the valve packing drag of the MSIVs and will also perform a survey of other utilities '
that do not use the air assist to close to determine if they I are experiencing any MSIV closure problems. j l 4) Based on the results of planned corrective actions number 1 and 2, Project Services personnel will initiate an NSM to implement ,
the changes required.
SAFETY ANALYSIS:
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c DE personnel determined during the Operability Evaluation that.the MSIVs are I b operable and fully capable of performing their intended function using the air assist closure feature.
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A failure of the nonseismic portion of the air assistance to close portion of the MSIVs is considered to be a passive failure. A passive failure would have provided a vent path to the top of the MSIV actuator and the MISV.4 would have closed within 5 seconds using spring force alone.
This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.
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