ML17030A302

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Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, Revision 2
ML17030A302
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/30/2017
From: Jim Barstow
Exelon Generation Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML17030A302 (248)


Text

200 Exelon Way Exelon Kennett Square, PA 19348 January 30, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 www.exeloncorp.com Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 10 CFR 50.90 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 N RC Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

Subject:

Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," Revision 2 In accordance with 1 O CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGG) requests an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS} for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. The proposed changes replace existing Technical Specifications (TS} requirements related to "operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel" (OPDRVs) with new requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIG) to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires reactor vessel water level to be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel. EGG has concluded that the proposed changes present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 1 O CFR 50.92. The proposed changes have been reviewed by the PBAPS Plant Operations Review Committee in accordance with the requirements of the EGG Quality Assurance Program. This amendment request contains no regulatory commitments.

Attachment 1 provides an evaluation of the proposed changes. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 3 provides the existing Bases pages marked up to show the proposed changes (information only). EGG requests approval of the proposed amendment by September 30, 2017 in support of the Fall 2017 Unit 3 refueling outage. Once approved, the amendments shall be implemented on both units prior to the next refueling outage on either unit.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Application to Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-542 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 January 30, 2017 Page2 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation," paragraph (b), EGC is notifying the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of this application for license amendment by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Official.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Stephanie J. Hanson at (610) 765-5143.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 30 1 h day of January 2017. Respectfully, IJ[;: James Barstow Director -Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments:

1. Evaluation of Proposed Changes 2. Markup of Technical Specifications Pages 3. Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages (For Information Only) cc: USNRC Region I, Regional Administrator w/ attachments USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, PBAPS USNRC Project Manager, PBAPS R. R. Janati, Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection S. T. Gray, State of Maryland ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

Subject:

Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," Revision 2

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 ASSESSMENT

2.1 Applicability

of Published Safety Evaluation

2.2 Variations

3.0 REGULATORY

ANALYSIS 3.1 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL

CONSIDERATION

5.0 REFERENCES

Evaluation of Proposed Change Application to Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-542 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

1.0 DESCRIPTION

Attachment 1 Page 1 of 5 Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC), proposes changes to the Technical Specifications (TS), Appendix A of Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3, respectively.

The proposed changes replace existing Technical Specifications (TS) requirements related to "operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel" (OPDRVs) with new requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires reactor vessel water level to be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel. 2.0 ASSESSMENT

2.1 Applicability

of Published Safety Evaluation EGC has reviewed the safety evaluation provided to the Technical Specifications Task Force on December 20, 2016, as well as the information provided in TSTF-542.

EGC has concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-542 and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRG staff are applicable to Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3, and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the PBAPS TS. The following PBAPS TS reference or are related to OPDRVs and are affected by the proposed changes: 3.3.5.1 3.3.6.1 3.3.6.2 3.3.7.1 3.5.2 3.6.1.3 3.6.4.1 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.3 3.7.4 3.8.2 3.8.5 3.8.8 2.2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation ECCS -Shutdown Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) Secondary Containment Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System AC Sources -Shutdown DC Sources -Shutdown Distribution Systems -Shutdown Variations EGC is proposing the following variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-542.

These variations do not affect the applicability of TSTF-542 or the NRG staff's safety evaluation to the proposed license amendment.

EGC proposes to change the number for the OPDRV TS to TS 3.5.4 and the Instrumentation section to TS 3.3.5.4 for consistency purposes.

These differences are administrative and do not affect the applicability of TSTF-542 to the PBAPS TS.

Evaluation of Proposed Change Application to Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-542 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 Attachment 1 Page 2 of 5 PBAPS design for RWCU isolation is on Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3), not Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Low (Level 2). Therefore, it is appropriate to revise PBAPS TS Table 3.3.5.4.-1 to reflect this design difference for PBAPS. EGG proposes to revise PBAPS TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.4.8 and TS Bases 3.3.5.4 to clarify that for manual initiations PBAPS utilizes hand switches in lieu of push buttons. EGG is proposing to add a note to TS Table 3.3.5.4-1 (RPV WIG Instrumentation) to clarify the intent of allowing credit for an OPERABLE Low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem when it is aligned and operating in the decay heat removal mode of RHR. This is appropriate since the associated RHR pump minimum flow valve (while operating in the decay heat removal mode) is closed and deactivated to prevent inadvertent vessel drain down events. Because the minimum flow valve is closed and deactivated, the associated TS Table 3.3.5.4-1 Function 2.b would not be required to be OPERABLE.

Without the note, TS 3.3.5.4 Condition D would require that the associated RHR pump be declared inoperable, which would be contrary to the intent of the LCO 3.5.4 Note which allows the LPCI subsystem to be OPERABLE when aligned for decay heat removal. 3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS 3.1 No Significant Hazards Determination Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGG), proposes changes to the Technical Specifications (TS), Appendix A of Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3, respectively.

EGG requests adoption of TSTF-542 "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," which is an approved change to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS}, into the PBAPS TS. The proposed amendment replaces the existing requirements in the TS related to "operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel" (OPDRVs) with new requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIG) to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires reactor vessel water level to be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel. EGG has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 1 O CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response:

No. The proposed changes replace existing TS requirements related to OPDRVs with new requirements on RPV WIG that will protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Draining of RPV water inventory in Mode 4 (i.e., cold shutdown) and Mode 5 (i.e., refueling) is not an accident previously evaluated and, therefore, replacing the existing TS controls to prevent or mitigate such an event with a new set of controls has no effect on any accident previously evaluated.

RPV water inventory control in Mode 4 or Mode 5 is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated.

The existing OPDRV controls or the proposed RPV WIG controls are not mitigating actions assumed in any accident previously evaluated.

Evaluation of Proposed Change Application to Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-542 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 Attachment 1 Page 3 of 5 The proposed changes reduce the probability of an unexpected draining event (which is not a previously evaluated accident) by imposing new requirements on the limiting time in which an unexpected draining event could result in the reactor vessel water level dropping to the top of the active fuel (TAF). These controls require cognizance of the plant configuration and control of configurations with unacceptably short drain times. These requirements reduce the probability of an unexpected draining event. The current TS requirements are only mitigating actions and impose no requirements that reduce the probability of an unexpected draining event. The proposed changes reduce the consequences of an unexpected draining event (which is not a previously evaluated accident) by requiring an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem to be operable at all times in Modes 4 and 5. The current TS requirements do not require any water injection systems, ECCS or otherwise, to be Operable in certain conditions in Mode 5. The change in requirement from two ECCS subsystems to one ECCS subsystem in Modes 4 and 5 does not significantly affect the consequences of an unexpected draining event because the proposed Actions ensure equipment is available within the limiting drain time that is as capable of mitigating the event as the current requirements.

The proposed controls provide escalating compensatory measures to be established as calculated drain times decrease, such as verification of a second method of water injection and additional confirmations that containment and/or filtration would be available if needed. The proposed changes reduce or eliminate some requirements that were determined to be unnecessary to manage the consequences of an unexpected draining event, such as automatic initiation of an ECCS subsystem and control room ventilation.

These changes do not affect the consequences of any accident previously evaluated since a draining event in Modes 4 and 5 is not a previously evaluated accident and the requirements are not needed to adequately respond to a draining event. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response:

No. The proposed changes replace existing TS requirements related to OPDRVs with new requirements on RPV WIG that will protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. The proposed changes will not alter the design function of the equipment involved.

Under the proposed changes, some systems that are currently required to be operable during OPDRVs would be required to be available within the limiting drain time or to be in service depending on the limiting drain time. Should those systems be unable to be placed into service, the consequences are no different than if those systems were unable to perform their function under the current TS requirements.

The event of concern under the current requirements and the proposed changes are an unexpected draining event. The proposed changes do not create new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators that would cause a draining event or a new or different kind of accident not previously evaluated or included in the design and licensing bases.

Evaluation of Proposed Change Application to Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-542 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 Attachment 1 Page 4 of 5 Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response:

No. The proposed changes replace existing TS requirements related to OPDRVs with new requirements on RPV WIG. The current requirements do not have a stated safety basis and no margin of safety is established in the licensing basis. The safety basis for the new requirements is to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. New requirements are added to determine the limiting time in which the RPV water inventory could drain to the top of the fuel in the reactor vessel should an unexpected draining event occur. Plant configurations that could result in lowering the RPV water level to the TAF within one hour are now prohibited.

New escalating compensatory measures based on the limiting drain time replace the current controls.

The proposed TS establish a safety margin by providing defense-in-depth to ensure that the Safety Limit is protected and to protect the public health and safety. While some less restrictive requirements are proposed for plant configurations with long calculated drain times, the overall effect of the change is to improve plant safety and to add safety margin. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based on the above, EGG concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 1 O CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL

CONSIDERATION A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement.

However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

Evaluation of Proposed Change Application to Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-542 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

5.0 REFERENCES

Attachment 1 Page 5 of 5 1. TSTF-542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," dated December 29, 2016. 2. Final Safety Evaluation of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control" {TAC No. MF3487) ADAMS Accession No. ML 163438065 ATTACHMENT2 Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 ii 1.1-3 3.3-32 3.3-33 3.3-35 3.3-39 3.3-40 3.3-47a* 3.3-47b* 3.3-47c* 3.3-47d* 3.3-50 3.3-54 ii 1.1-3 3.3-32 3.3-33 3.3-35 3.3-39 3.3-40 3.3-47a* 3.3-47b* 3.3-47c* 3.3-47d* 3.3-50 3.3-54 *New TS Page Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 Revised Technical Specifications Pages Unit 2 TS Pages 3.3-58 3.3-59 3.5-1 3.5-8 3.5-9 3.5-10 3.5-11 3.5-12 3.5-15*

3.5-16* 3.5-17* 3.5-18* 3.6-12 3.6-34 Unit 3 TS Pages 3.3-58 3.3-59 3.5-1 3.5-8 3.5-9 3.5-10 3.5-11 3.5-12 3.5-15* 3.5-16*

3.5-17* 3.5-18* 3.6-12 3.6-34 3.6-35 3.6-36 3.6-38 3.6-40 3.6-41 3.7-7 3.7-8 3.7-9 3.8-21 3.8-22 3.8-23 3.8-35 3.8-44 3.8-45 3.6-35 3.6-36 3.6-38 3.6-40 3.6-41 3.7-7 3.7-8 3.7-9 3.8-21 3.8-22 3.8-23 3.8-35 3.8-44 3.8-45 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 . 0 USE AND APPLICATION

...........................................

1 .1-1 1 . 1 Defi ni ti ans ............................................... 1 . 1 -1 1. 2 Logical Connectors

........................................

1. 2-1 1.3 Completion Times ..........................................

1.3-1 1 . 4 Frequency

................................................. 1 . 4-1 2.0 2 .1 2.2 3.0 3.0 3 .1 3. 1 . 1 3.1 .2 3.1 .3 3.1 .4 3.1 .5 3.1 .6 3.1 .7 3.1 .8 3.2 3. 2 .1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.3 3.3.1 .1 3.3.1 .2 3.3.2.1 3.3.2.2 3. 3 .3.1 3.3.3.2 3.3.4.1 3.3.4.2 3.3.5.1 3.3.5.2 3.3.5.3 3.3.5.4 3.3.6.1 3.3.6.2 3. 3. 7 .1 3.3.8.1 3.3.8.2 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) ...........................................

2. 0-1 SLs .................

..................................

2.0-1 SL Violations

.............................................

2.0-1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY

..........

3.0-1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY

...................

3.0-4 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ................................

3.1-1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) .................................

3.1-1 Reactivity Anomalies

..................................

3.1-5 Control Rod OPERABILITY

...............................

3.1-7 Control Rod Scram Times ...............................

3.1-12 Control Rod Scram Accumulators

........................

3.1-15 Rod Pattern Control ...................................

3.1-18 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System ...................

3.1-20 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves .... 3.1-26 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS .................................

3.2-1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) ...........................................

3. 2-1 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) ...................

3.2-2 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) ...................

3.2-4 INSTRUMENTATION

...........................................

3. 3-1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

....... 3.3-1 Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation

..... 3.3-10 Control Rod Block Instrumentation

.....................

3.3-16 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation

....................................

3.3-22 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation

........ 3.3-24 Remote Shutdown System ................................

3.3-27 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT)

Instrumentation

...............

3.3-29 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT)

Instrumentation

.............

3.3-31a thru 3.3-31c Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

.. 3.3-32 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation

....................................

3. 3-44 Not Used .............................................. 3. 3. 47a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation

...........................

......... 3. 3. 47b Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

.........

3.3-48 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

....... 3.3-55 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation

.............................

3.3-59 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

...................

3.3-61 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Mani tori ng ............................................

3. 3-66 PBAPS UNIT 2 (continued)

Amendment No. 225 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 3.4 3. 4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9 3.4.10 3.5 3. 5 .1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.5.4 3.6 3. 6 .1 .1 3.6.1 .2 3.6.1.3 3.6.1 .4 3.6.1 .5 3.6.1.6 3.6 .2.1 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.3 3.6.2.4 3.6.2.5 3.6.3.1 3.6.3.2 3.6.4.1 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.3 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 PBAPS UNIT 2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) .........................

..... 3.4-1 Recirculation Loops Operating

.........................

3.4-1 Jet Pumps .............................................

3. 4-6 Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves (SVs) ... 3.4-8 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ...............................

3.4-10 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

.................

3.4-12 RCS Specific Activity .................................

3.4-14 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown ...............................

3.4-16 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown ..............................

3.4-19 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits .............

3.4-21 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure ...........................

3.4-28 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 . 5-1 ECCS-Operating

.......................................

3.5-1 EGGS-Shutdewn Deleted .................................

3.5-8 RCIC System ...........................................

3. 5-12 RPV Water Inventory Control ........................... 3.5-13 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS .......................................
3. 6-1 Primary Containment

...................................

3. 6-1 Primary Containment Air Lock ..........................

3.6-3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ..........

3.6-8 Drywall Air Temperature

...............................

3.6-17 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers ...........................................

3.6-18 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers ........ 3.6-21 Suppression Pool Average Temperature

..................

3.6-23 Suppression Pool Water Level ..........................

3.6-26 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cool i ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. 6-27 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray .... 3.6-29 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywell Spray .............

3.6-30a Deleted ...............................................

3.6-31 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration

..............

3.6-33 Secondary Containment

.............................

.... 3.6-34 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) ........ 3.6-36 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System ....................

3.6-40 PLANT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. 7 -1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) System .............

3.7-1 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and Normal Heat Sink .........................................

3. 7-3 Emergency Heat Sink ...................................

3.7-5 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System ...........

..................................

3.7-7 Main Condenser Offgas .................................

3.7-10 (continued) ii Amendment No. 288 Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

END OF CYCLE ..... ,n-s_e_rt_1..._...., RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ....___ __ ( EOC-RPTl SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME LEAKAGE LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE ( LHGR) PBAPS UN IT 2 The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from initial signal generation by the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

LEAKAGE shall be: a. Identified LEAKAGE 1. LEAKAGE into the drywel l, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b. Unidentified LEAKAGE A 11 LEAKAGE into the drywel l that is not identified LEAKAGE; c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall. The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length. (continued)

1. 1-3 Amendment No.

PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 1.1 Definitions

-Insert 1: DRAIN TIME The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming: a) The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate; b) The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate , or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event , loss of normal power , single human error), for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except: 1. Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system , or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked , sealed , or otherwise secured in the closed position , blank flanges , or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths; 2. Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation

or 3. Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task , who in continuous communication with the control room , is stationed at the controls , and is capable of closing the penetration flow path isolation device without offsite power. c) The penetration flow paths required to be evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated , and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory; d) No additional draining events occur; and e) Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used. A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated value.

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.l Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation LCD 3.3.5.l The ECCS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.5.1-1.

ACTIONS ----------------


NOTE --------------


Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. CONDITION A. One or more channels inoperable.

B. As required by Required Action A.l and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

PBAPS UN IT 2 A.l B.l REQUIRED ACTION Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 for the channel. --------NOTE-&--------1. Only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. -:--Only appl i cable for Functions l.a, l.b, 2.a, and 2.b. Declare supported feature(s) inoperable when its redundant feature ECCS initiation capability is inoperable.

3.3-32 COMPLETION TIME Immediately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of feature initiation capability in both trip systems (continued)

Amendment No. -2+-G ACTIONS CONDITION B. (continued)

C. As required by Required Action A.l and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

PBAPS UN IT 2 B.2 B.3 C.l Alli2 C.2 ECCS Instrumentation

3. 3. 5 .1 REQUIRED ACTION Only applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b. Declare High Pressure Coolant Injection ( HPC I) System inoperable.

Pl ace channel in trip. --------N DTE.£--------1. Onl)' applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. -:-Only applicable for Functions l.c, l.e, l.f, 2.c, 2.d, and 2. f. Declare supported feature(s) inoperable when its redundant feature ECCS initiation capability is inoperable.

Restore channel to OPERABLE status. 3.3-33 COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 1 hour from discovery of loss of subsystem initiation capability in both subsystems 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (continued)

Amendment No. l--G ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION E. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

PBAPS UN IT 2 E. 1 E.2 REQUIRED ACTION --------NOTE.£--------1. Only appli cabl c in MODES 1, 2, and 3. :-Only appl i cable to Functions l.d and 2.g. Declare supported feature(s) inoperable when its redundant feature ECCS initiation capability is inoperable.

Restore channel to OPERABLE status. 3.3-35 ECCS Instrumentation 3. 3. 5 .1 COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of subsystem initiation cap ab i l i ty in both subsystems 7 days (continued) Amendment No. +G

1. FUN CTI ON Core Spray System a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low (Level 1) b. Drywell Pressure -High c. Reactor Pressure -Low (Injection Permissive)
d. Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow -Low (Bypass) e. Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relay Closs of offsite power) f. Core Spray Pump Time Delay Relay (offs i te power available) Pumps A,C Pumps B,D Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page Emergency Core Cooling System APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS 1 , 2 , J, 4' a) t 5'tt+ 1'2 , 3 , 2 , 3 4 I a I' 5'vt , 2 , 3, 4 (al 5 (# 1, 2 , 3 4' a l , 5'il+ 1 , 2.3 1. 2' 3 REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION 4 (0) 4\D I 4 4 C l per pump) 4 Cl per pump) 2 (1 per p ump) 2 Cl per pump) 1 of 5) Instrumentation CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.1 B B c -B c c c ECCS Instrumentation SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 -&R a.a.s.L> -&R 3.3.5.L2 -&R 3.3.5.!.4 -&R 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 3.3.5.l ALLOWABLE VALUE -160.0 inches :s; 2.0 psig 425.0 psig and :s; 475. a psig i! 4 2 5.B vfHI 319.0 psi d and :s; 351.0 psid 5 .a seconds and :s; 7.0 seconds 12.1 seconds and :s; 13.9 seconds 21.4 seconds and :s; 24. 6 seconds (continued)

C a l asse ei ateEI E CCS S ij es;stem!s l are t e BP E R AB LE pe F l EB 3.5.2 , HES A C b) Also required to initiate the associated diesel generator COGJ. PBAPS UN IT 2 3.3-39 Amendment No.

FUN CTI ON 2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCIJ System a. Reactor Vessel Water Leve 1 -Low Low Low (Level ll b. Orywell Pressure -High c. Reactor Pressure -Low (Injection Permissive)

d. Reactor Pressure -Low Low (Recirculation Discharge Valve Permissive)
e. Reactor Vessel Shroud Level -Level 0 f. Low Pressure Cool ant Injection Pump Start -Time Delay Relay (offsite power available) Pumps A,B Pumps C,D g. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow -Low Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 5) Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICAB L E MOO ES OR OTHER SPECIFIED C ONDITION S 1, 2 , J , 4 c a 1 , 5 rtt , 2 , 3 1, 2. 3 1 lCJ ,2lC J 0 1, 2 ,3 1 , 2, 3 , 1.2. 3 REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION 4 4 4 2 B (2 per pump) 4 (1 per pump) CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.1 B B c c B c ECCS Instrumentation
3. 3. 5. 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.l.l* SR 3.3.5.1.5 3.3.5.1.1 3.3.5.l.2 3.3.S.l.4 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 ALLOWABLE VALUE ;:., -160 inches s 2.0 psig ;:., 425.0 psig and s 475.0 psig a-ffil :S 475.9
., 211.0 psig ;
., -226. 0 inches ;:., 1.9 seconds and s 2.1 seconds ;:., 7.5 seconds and s 8.5 seconds ;:., 299.0 psid and s 331.0 psid (continued)

(a) \IAe R as s ee i atea E GGS ar e feEjtiiF e el te Ile QPE R AB L E l 69 3.5.2 , E GES ShtHtl9\IR.

,,.( !cl With associated recirculation pump discharge valve open. PBAPS UN IT 2 3.3-40 Amendment No.

PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 New PBAPS TS Section 3.3.5.3 3.3.5.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.3 Not Used PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.3-47a Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.4 3.3.5.4 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.4 The RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.4-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY

According to Table 3.3.5.4-1. ---------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------

Separate Conditi o n entry is allowed for each channel. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.4-1 for the channel. B. As required by B.1 Declare associated Immediately Required Action A. l penetration flow and referenced in path(s) incapable of Table 3.3.5.4-1. automatic isolation. AND --B.2 Calculate DRAIN TIME. Immediately

c. As required by C. l Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Required Action A.1 trip. and referenced in Table 3.3.5.4-1. D. As required by D.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Required Action A. l OPERABLE status and referenced in Table 3.3.5.4-1. (continued)

PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.3-47b Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION E. Required Action and E.l associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED ACTION Declare associated low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable. COMPLETION TIME Immediately


NOTE---------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.4-1 to determine which SRs apply f o r each ECCS Function. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.4.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. SR 3.3.5.4.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. SR 3.3.5.4.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.3-47c FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued)

Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 FUNCTION 1. Core Spray System a. Reactor (Injection Permissive)

b. Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow--Low (Bypass) c. Manual Initiation
2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System a. Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive)
b. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow -Low (Bypass) c. Manua 1 Ini ti at ion 3. RHR System Isolation
a. Reactor Vesse 1 Water Level -Low, Level 3 4. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.4 Table 3.3.5.4-1 (page 1 of 1) RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS 4.5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 (b) (b) REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION 4 1 per pump (a) 1 per subsystem (a) 4 1 per pump (a),(c) 1 per subsystem (a) 2 2 CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.1 c D D c D D B B SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.4.1 SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.1 SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.3 SR 3.3.5.4.1 SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.1 SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.3 SR 3.3.5.4.1 SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.1 SR 3.3.5.4.2 ALLOWABLE VALUE 2 425.0 psig and s. 475.0 psig 2 319.0 psid and s. 351.0 psid A _ 425.0 psig and s. 475.0 psig 2 299.0 psid and s. 331. 0 psid NA 1.0 inches 1.0 inches (a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCD 3.5.4, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control." (b) When automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path(s) is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. (c) Function not required to be OPERABLE while associated pump is operating in decay heat removal when minimum flow valve is closed and deactivated.

PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.3-47d Amendment No. XXX ACTIONS (continued)

COND I TION H. As required by H.l Required Action C.l and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. .QR H.2 I. As required by I. 1 Required Action C.l and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

!tR J. As required by J.l Required Action C.l and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

PBAPS UN IT 2 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

3. 3. 6 .1 REQUIRED ACT ION COMPLETION TIME Declare associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> standby liquid control CS LC) subsystem inoperable.

Isolate the Reactor 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Water Cleanup System. Initiate action to Immediately restore channel to OPERABLE status. IRitiate aetieA te Immediately iselate the Residual Heat Reme1;1al (

Shutde* .. *R Ce el i Ag System. Isolate the affected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> penetration fl ow path(s). 3.3-50 Amendment No.

FUNCTION s. Reactor Water Cleanup RWCUJ System Isolation a.IT}Rwcu Flow-High

b. SLC System Initiation
c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) 6. RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation
a. Reactor Pressure-High
b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3l 7. Feedwater Recirculation Isolation
a. Reactor Pressure-High B. Traversing Incore Probe Isolation
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) b. Drywell Pressure-High Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.l Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 3 of 3) Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REOU I RED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPEC! FI ED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.l REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1 , 2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.l s 125% rated SR 3.3.6.1.3 flow (23.0 SR 3.3.6.1.7 in-we) 1,2,3 H SR 3.3.6.1. 7 NA l. 2. 3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.l " 1. 0 inches SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.l.S SR 3.3.6.1.7 1,2 , 3 F SR 3.3.6.1.3 s 70.0 psig SR 3.3.6.1.7 3,-4,-5 2.L tt SR 3.3.6.1.1 " 1.0 inches SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7 l , 2. 3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.l s 600 psi g SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.l.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7 I. 2. 3 2 J SR 3.3.6.1.l 1.0 inches SR 3.3.6.l.2 SR 3.3.6.l.S SR 3.3.6.1.7 1 , 2,3 2 J SR 3.3.6.1.l s 2.0 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.l.7 I (a) IA t19 El ES 4 aAa S, f:lFeoiE!ee R l l R G ee li Ag S;*s t eA! i ntegPit} i s A!ain taineEI , en1; ene eflaAne 1 f:)el' tFif:l s;steA! **i tll an iselatien si gnal a*1ailae le te ene eeeling i se'atieA 1ahe 's PBAPS UN IT 2 3.3-54 Amendment No.

FUN CTI ON 1. Reactor Vessel Water Leve 1 -Low (Leve 1 3 J 2. Drywel l Pressure -High 3. Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Rad i ation -High Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Table 3.3.6.2-1 (page 1 of ll Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED OTHER CHANNELS SPEC! FI ED PER SURVEILLANCE C ONDITIONS TRIP SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 1'2 '3;-SR 3.3.6.2.1

+.rt SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 1 , 2 , 3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 1'2 '3' 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1

{-a+, ( b) SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 1 , 2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 tt+, ( bl SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 ALLOWABLE VALUE ;,: 1.0 inches ,;; 2.0 psig ,;; 16.0 mR/hr ,;; 16.0 mR/hr (a) witA a f op SPai R iA§ the Peaeter 1 esse l. C b l During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in secondary containment.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-58 Amendment No. 6-9 MCREV System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7.1 APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS Two channels per trip system of the Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High Function shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS , DuriAg operatioAs with a poteRtia l for draiRiAg the reactor vessel ( OPDRV s). -------------------------------------

NOTE -------------------------------


Separate Cond i tion entry is allowed for each cha nn el. CONDITION A. One or more required channels inoperable.

PBAPS UN IT 2 A.l A.2 REQUIRED ACT ION Declare associated MCREV subsystems inoperable.

Pl ace channel in trip. 3.3-59 COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of MCREV System initiation capability 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (continued)

Amendment No. Ht

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), ECCS-Operati ng 3. 5 .1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING 3.5.1 ECCS-Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of five safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) is not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome 150 psig and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure 100 psig. AC TIONS -------------------------------------NOTE ------------------------------------LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCI. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One low pressure ECCS A .1 Restore low pressure 7 d ays injection/spray ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status. QR One low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump in each subsystem inoperable.

B. Required Action and B.l Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 2 3.5-1 Amendment No .... 2.., 92,....._-

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS COOLING (RCICl SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION EGGS Sl=lutdo1m

!Deleted LCO 3.5.2 Two low pressure E G G S injection/spray subsystems sl=lall be OPERABL E. One LPG! subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during { alignment and operation for decay l=leat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. APP LI GABI LITY. MOD E 4 , MOD E 5 , e)(cept *,11 t h the spent fuel storage pool gates removed , water level > 4 58 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero , and no operations with a potential for draiAiAg tl=le reactor vessel (OPDR'Js) in progress.

G9NOIHON R E 91:JIREO ACTION TIM E .{;..-One E GG S Restore EGGS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> i nj ecti on,1spra,.

i njecti oA,1spFay subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Action aF18 Initiate action to Immediately associated Comp1et:ion suspeAd OPDRVs. Th:ie of Coneition A not met. *-:-

EGGS Initiate action to Immedia t ely injectionilspFa:Y sttspend OPDRVs. subsystems inoperable. A#f} Resto Fe enc EGGS 4 ROUFS injection/spray subsystem to OPERA B LE status. (contintted)

PBAPS UN IT 2 3.5-8 Amendment No. 5-9 ACTIONS (contiAued)

CONDITION Requi Fed Acti OA c. 2 and associated Completion Time not flTe-t-;-REQUIRED ACTION Initiate action to restore secondary COAtainfflent to OPERABLE status. Initiate action to restore one standby gas treatment subsystem for Unit 2 to OPERABLE status. ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.2 COMPLETION TIME !fflffledi a tel y I fflm e di ate l )' :-3-Initiate action to Immediately restore isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.£R-3.5.2.1 PBAPS UN IT 2 SURVEILLANCE Verify , for each required low pressure coolant injection (LPG!) subsystem , the suppression pool water level is> 11.0 ft. 3.5-9 FREQUENCY In accordance

\Ii tf1 the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued)

Amendment No . .;y..g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ( coAti Rued) 5-R 3.5.2.2 5-R 3.5.2.3 .&fl 3.5.2.4 PBAPS UN IT 2 SURVEILLANCE Verify , for each required core spray (CS) subsyste111 , the. -er.-Suppressi OA pool *.rnter 1 evel is > 11.0 ft; or 0A1y oAe required CS subsystem may tai(e credit for this optioA during OPDRVs. Condensate storage taAk water level is 17.3 f+:-Verify , for each required EGGS iAjcctioA/

spray subsystem , l ocatioAs susceptible to gas accumulation arc sufficiently filled with h'atcr. Not required to be met for syste111 veRt flow paths opeAed under admiAistrative coAtrol. Verify each required EGGS iAjectioA/spray subsyste111 maAual , power operated , aAd automatic valve in the flow path , that is Rot locked , scaled , or otherwise secured iA positioR , is iA the correct positioA. 3.5-10 ECCS-Shutdown

3.5.2 FREQUENCY

In accordance

'n'i th tl9e S urveillance Frequency CoAtrol Program. IA accordance

>i*ith the ,f SuriveillaAcc FrcquCAcy CoAtrol Program . IA accordance ifith the Survei 11 a Ace FrequeAcy CoAtrol Program. (contiAued)

Amendment No.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) 3.5.2.5 3.5.2.6 PBAPS UN IT 2 SURVEILLANCE For the CS pumps , SR 3.5.2.5 may be met using equivalent values for flow rate and test pressure determined using pump curves. Verify each required ECCS pump develops the specified flow rate against a system head corresponding to the specified reactor presstJre. SYSTEM FLOlt' RATE ?'! 3 , 125 gpm Z: 8 , 600 gpFA SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDHlG TO A R E ACTOR PRESSURE OF 105 psig 20 psig Vessel injection/spray may be excluded. Verify each required ECCS in j ection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. 3.5-11 ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.2 FREQUENCY In accordance th the Sunei 11 a nee FreQUency Contro l Program. In accordance

  • ,fi th the Surveillance Frequency Contro l Program. Amendment No. 93-

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE CRCIC) SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig. ACTIONS ----* --------------------------------NOTE --------------


LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC. CONDITION R EQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIM E A. RCIC System A.1 Verify by Immediately inoperable.

administrative means High Pressure Coolant Injection System is OPERABLE.

AN.D. A.2 Restore RCIC System 14 days to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.l Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. PBAPS UN IT 2 3.5-12 Amendment No.

PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 New PBAPS TS Section 3.5.4 RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.4 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.4 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control LCO 3.5.4 DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the top of active fuel (TAF) shall be > 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. AND One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem shall be OPERABLE. --------------------------

-NOTE---------------------------

--A Low Pressure Coolant Injection

'LPCI) subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for deca y heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and n n t otherwise inoperable. APPLICABILITY

MODES 4 and 5 ACTIONS CONDITION A. Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable. B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. C. DRAIN TIME < 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> and > 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 A. l B.l C.l AND REQUIRED ACTION Restore required ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status. Initiate action to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power. Verify secondary containment boundary is capable of being established in less than the DRAIN TIME. 3.5-15 COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Immediately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (continued)

Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 ACTIONS (continued)

c. (continued)

D. DRAIN TIME< 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 RPV Water Inventory Control 3. 5. 4 C.2 AND C.3 Verify each secondary containment penetration flow path is capable of being isolated in less than the DRAIN TIME. Verify one standby gas treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation in less than DRAIN TIME. D.l --------NOTE--------Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem or additional method of water injection shall be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. Initiate action to establish an additional method of water injection with water sources capable of maintaining RPV water level > TAF for > 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 4 hours Immediately AND Immediately D.2 Initiate action to establish secondary containment boundary. AND D.3 Initiate action to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path or verify it can be manually isolated from the control room. AND 3.5-16 Immediately (continued)

Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 RPV Water Inventory Control 3. 5. 4 ACTIONS (continued)

D. (continued)

D.4 Initiate action to verify one Standby Gas Treatment subsystem is capable of being placed into operation. E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C and D not met. E.l Initiate action to restore DRAIN TIME to > 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. OR DRAIN TIME < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.4.1 SR 3.5.4.2 SR 3.5.4.3 SURVEILLANCE Verify DRAIN TIME > 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Verify , for a required low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem , the suppression pool water level is> 11.0 ft. Verify , for a required Core Spray (CS) subsystem , the: a. Suppression pool water level is > 11. 0 ft. or b. Condensate storage tank water level is > 17.3 ft. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.5-17 Immediately Immediately FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued)

Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.5.4.4 SR 3.5.4.5 SR 3.5.4.6 SR 3.5.4.7 SR 3.5.4.8 SURVEILLANCE Verify , for each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water. ----------------NOTE---------


Not required to be met for system vent flow paths open under administrative control. Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position. Operate the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line for> 10 minutes. Verify each valve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal. -------------------NOTE----------------

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded. Verify the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually actuated. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.5-18 FREQUENCY In accordance w ith the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Amendment No. XXX ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION E. Purge/Vent flowpath E.l Isolate the penetration.

open for an accumulated time greater than 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> QR for the calendar year while in MODE 1 or 2 E.2.1 Be in MODE 3. with Reactor Pressure greater than 100 psig. F. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. G. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during MODE 4 or 5. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E.2.2 Be in MODE 4. F. 1 AND F.2 Be in MODE 3. Be in MODE 4. B-:+ Initiate action to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor 11essel. Initiate action to restore valve(s) to OPERABLE status. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 PBAPS UNIT 2 Verify nitrogen inventory is equivalent 22 inches water column in the liquid nitrogen storage tank. 3.6-12 PC I Vs 3.6.1.3 COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> IFRmediately Immediately FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued)

Amendment No.

3.6 CONTAINMENT

SYSTEMS 3.6.4.l Secondary Containment Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 LCO 3.6.4.l The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment , OuriAg operatioAs with a potential for drainiAg the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). ACTIONS CONDITION A. Secondary containment inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. C. Secondary containment inoperable during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment or duriAg OPDRVs. PBAPS UN IT 2 A.l B.l C.l REQUIRED ACTION Restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status. Be in MODE 3.

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 12 hours Suspend movement of Immediately RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment. (continued) 3.6-34 Amendment No.

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.l ACTimlS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION {;--;-(CORtiRued)

IRitiate actioR to suspeRd OPDRVs. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed. SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry or exit. SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verify secondary containment can be drawn down 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in 180 seconds using one standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem.

SR 3.6.4.1.4 Verify the secondary containment can be 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> using one SGT subsystem at a flow 10,500 cfm. PBAPS UN IT 2 3.6-35 COMPLETION TIME Iffimediately FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Amendment No. -3{}3. t

3.6 CONTAINMENT

SYSTEMS 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) LCD 3.6.4.2 Each SC IV sh a 11 be 0 PERA BL E . APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, SCI Vs 3.6.4.2 During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment , Duririg operatioris

\rith a potrntial for drairiirig the reactor % vessel (OPDRVs). ACTIONS -------------------------------------NOTES ------------------------------------1. Penetration flow paths may be uni sol ated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed f o r each penetration flow path. 3. Enter applicable Conditi o ns and Required Actions for systems m ade inoperable by SCIVs. CONDITION REQ U IRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.l Isolate the affected 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> penetration flow paths penetration flow path with one SCIV by use of at least inoperable.

one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, o r blind flange. (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 2 3.6-36 Amendment No.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment or during OPORVs. PBAPS UN IT 2 D.l REQUIRED ACTION --------NOTE------LCO 3.0.3 is not appli c able. SCI Vs 3.6.4.2 COMPLETION TIME Suspend movement of Immediately RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment.

Init i ate action to suspend OPORVs. 3.6-38 Immediate l y Amendment No.

3.6 CONTAINMENT

SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, SGT System 3.6.4.3 During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment , During operations

  • n*ith a potential for drainiAg tl9e reactor ,f vessel COPDRVs). ACTIONS CONDITION A. One SGT s ubsystem inoperab l e. B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE l, 2, or 3. C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment or during OPDRVs. PBAPS UN IT 2 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.l Restore SGT subsystem 7 days to OPERABLE status. B. 1 Be i n MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ------------

NOTE-------------LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

C.l Place OPERABLE SGT subsystem in operation.

3.6-40 Immediate l y (continued)

Amendment No.

ACTIONS CONDITION

c. (continued)
c. 2.+/- 0. Two SGT subsystems

0.1 inoperable

in MOOE l, 2' or 3. E. Two SGT subsystems E. 1 inoperable during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment 9f dt!fiAg 8PDRVs. Mil PBAPS UN IT 2 REQUIRED ACT ION Suspend movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in secondary containment.

Afffi IAH:iate aetieR te 5tl5i;leREl 8PDfH£5. Be i n MODE 3. --------NOTE--


LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.



Suspend movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in secondary containment.

IAHi ate aetieR te 5t!Si;leREl 8PDRVs. 3.6-41 SGT System 3.6.4.3 COMPLETION TIME Immediately --+-Immediately r 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 1' Immediately t -+--ImmeEliate1y r Amendment No. 6-9 MCREV System 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System LCD 3.7.4 Two MCREV subsystems shall be OPERABLE. ------------------------NOTE -------------------------------1 The main control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control. ---------------... ----------------------... ---------------------APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS , During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPORVs). ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MCREV subsystem A.l Restore MCREV 7 days inoperable for reasons subsystem to OPERABLE other than Condition status. B. B. One or more MCREV B.l Initiate action to Immediately subsystems inoperable implement mitigating due to inoperable CRE actions. boundary in MODE l, 2 or 3. AND B.2 Verify mitigating 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological/chemical hazards wi 11 not exceed limits and mitigating actions for smoke hazards are taken as required.

AND B.3 Restore CRE boundary 90 days to OPERABLE status. PBAPS UN IT 2 3.7-7 Amendment ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. D. associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated or fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS , or duriAg OPDRVs. E. Two MCREV subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition B. PBAPS UNIT 2 ------------

NOTE -------------LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable.

D.l Place OPERABLE MCREV subsystem in operation.

D. 2 .1 Suspend movement of irrad i ated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

D.2.2 Suspend CORE AL TERA TI ONS. IAitiate actioA to susprnd OPORVs. E.l Be in MODE 3. 3.7-8 MCREV System 3.7.4 COMPLETION TIME 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> + -+ Amendment No.

ACTIONS CONDITION F. Two MCREV subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, CORE or during OPDRVs. OR One or more MCREV REQUIRED ACTION ------------

NOTE -------------

LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable.

F.l Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

subsystems inoperable F.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

due to an inoperable CRE Boundary during movement of irradiated A#B fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, -F-:-3 during CORE _'//ALTERATIONS or during OPDRVs. Initiate action to suspend OPDR Vs. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.4.l SR 3.7.4.2 SR 3.7.4.3 SR 3.7.4.4 PBAPS UNIT 2 SURVEILLANCE Operate each MCREV subsystem for 15 minutes. Perform required MCREV filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). Verify each MCREV subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal. Perform required CRE unfiltered air inleakage testing in accordance with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. 3.7-9 MCREV System 3.7.4 COMPLETION TIME Immediate l y Immediately Imme di a tel :Y FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the VFTP In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. Amendment No.

ACTIONS AC Sources -Shutdown 3.8.2 -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION A. One or m o re required offsite c ircuits inoperab l e. PBAPS UN IT 2 REQUIRED ACTION ------------NOTE-------------Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.8, with one or more required 4 kV emergency buses de-energized as a result of Condition A. COMPLETION TIME A.l Declare affected Immediately required feature(s), OR A.2.1 AND A.2.2 with no offsite power available inoperable.

Suspend CORE AL TERA TI ONS. Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary contain m ent. !Aitiate actioA to suspeAd operatioAs a pote ntial for draiAiAg the reactor vessel (QPORVs). 3.8-21 Immediately Immediately Immediately (continued)

Amendment No. +G ACTIONS CONDITION A. (continued)

B. One required DG inoperable.

PBAPS UNIT 2 REQUIRED ACTION A.2.4 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit(s) to OPERABLE status. B.l Declare affected required feature(s) with no DG available inoperable . .QR B. 2. 1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS AND B.2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

A#-9 IAHiat:e aet:ieA t: e suspeAd OPDRVs. AND Initiate action to restore required DGs to OPERABLE status. 3.8-22 AC Sources -Shutdown 3.8.2 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediat:e l y Immediately (continued)

Amendment No.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION C. Two or more required DGs inoperable.

PBAPS UN IT 2 C.l C.2 REQUIRED ACTION Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs. Initiate action to restore required DG(s) to OPERABLE status. 3.8-23 AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately Amendment No.---2+G ACTIONS CONDITION A. (continued) 3 PBAPS UN IT 2 A.2.2 REQUIRED ACTION Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Initiate action to suspend operations ttith a potential for draining the reactor vessel. A.2.4 Initiate action to restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status. 3.8-35 DC Sources -Shutdown 3.8.5 COMPLETION TIME Immediately lfRfftediatel y Immediately Amendment No.-2-1-G Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown 3.8.8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Distribution Systems-Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 RPV Water Inventory Control APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS The necessary portions of the following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE; and b. Unit 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal <RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown," LCO "E GGS Strntdo\m ," LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment l!J (SGT) System," LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown," LCO 3.9.7, "RHR-High Water Level," and LCO 3.9.8, "RHR-Low Water Level." MODES 4 and 5, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. -------------------------------------

NOTE-----------------------


LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One or more required A.l Declare associated supported required feature(s) inoperable.

AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.

PBAPS UN IT 2 A.2.1 Suspend CORE AL TE RATIONS. 3.8-44 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately (continued)

Amendment No. '2-l-G ACTIONS CONDITION A. (continued)

Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown 3.8.8 A.2.2 REQUIRED ACTION Suspend handling of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

A-:-2-:-3 Initiate action to suspend operations A.2.4 1/i tl9 a potential for draining tl9e reactor vessel. Initiate actions to restore required AC and DC electrica l power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status. COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.8-45 Amendment No.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 . 0 USE AND APPLICATION

...........................................

1 .1-1 1.1 Definitions

...............................................

1 .1-1 1 . 2 Logical Connectors

........................................

1. 2-1 1.3 Completion Times ..........................................

1.3-1 1 . 4 Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 4-1 2.0 2 .1 2.2 3.0 3.0 3 .1 3. 1 . 1 3.1 .2 3.1 .3 3.1 .4 3.1 .5 3.1 .6 3.1 .7 3.1.8 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.3 3. 3 .1 .1 3.3.1.2 3.3. 2.1 3.3.2.2 3.3.3.1 3.3.3.2 3. 3. 4.1 3.3.4.2 3.3.5.1 3.3.5.2 3.3.5.3 3.3.5.4 3 .3 .6.1 3.3.6.2 3. 3. 7 .1 3. 3. 8.1 3.3.8.2 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs} ...........................................

2.0-1 SLs ...............................................

.... 2.0-1 SL Violations

.................................

............

2.0-1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY

..........

3.0-1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR} APPLICABILITY

...................

3.0-4 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ................................

3.1-1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) .................................

3.1-1 Reactivity Anomalies

..................................

3. 1-5 Control Rod OPERABILITY

...............................

3.1-7 Control Rod Scram Times ...............................

3.1-12 Control Rod Scram Accumulators

........................

3.1-15 Rod Pattern Control ...................................

3.1-18 Standby Liquid Control (SLC} System ...................

3.1-20 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves .... 3.1-26 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS .................................

3.2-1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR} ...........................................

3.2-1 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR} ...................

3.2-2 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR} ...................

3.2-4 INSTRUMENTATION

.................

......................

.... 3. 3-1 Reactor Protection System (RPS} Instrumentation

....... 3.3-1 Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM} Instrumentation

..... 3.3-10 Control Rod Block Instrumentation

.....................

3.3-16 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation

...........................

......... 3. 3-22 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM} Instrumentation

........ 3.3-24 Remote Shutdown System ............................

.... 3.3-27 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT}

Instrumentation

...............

3.3-29 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT}

Instrumentation . . . . . 3.3-31a thru 3.3-31c Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

.. 3.3-32 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC} System Instrumentation

....................................

3.3-44 Not Used .....................

...................

...... 3.3.47a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV} Water Inventory Control Instrumentation

...........

.........................

3.3.47b Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

.........

3.3-48 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

....... 3.3-55 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV} System Instrumentation

.............................

3.3-59 Loss of Power (LOP} Instrumentation

...................

3.3-61 Reactor Protection System (RPS} Electric Power Mani tori ng ............................................

3. 3-66 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 Amendment No. 229 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 3.4 3. 4 .1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9 3.4.10 3.5 3. 5 .1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.5.4 3.6 3. 6 .1 .1 3.6.1.2 3.6.1 .3 3.6.1 .4 3.6.1.5 3.6.1 .6 3.6.2.1 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.3 3.6.2.4 3.6.2.5 3.6.3.1 3.6.3.2 3.6 .4.1 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.3 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 PBAPS UNIT 3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ..............................

3.4-1 Recirculation Loops Operating

.........................

3.4-1 Jet Pumps .............................................

3.4-6 Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves (SVs) ... 3.4-8 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ...............................

3.4-10 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

.................

3.4-12 RCS Specific Activity .................................

3. 4-14 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling Sys tern-Hot Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. 4-16 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown ..............................

3.4-19 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits .............

3.4-21 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure ...........................

3.4-28 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 . 5-1 ECCS-Operating

.........................

..............

3.5-1 EGGS-ShutdownDel eted .................................

3. 5-8 RCIC System ...........................................
3. 5-12 RPV Water Inventory Control ............

............... 3.5-13 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS .......................................

3. 6-1 Primary Containment

..........

......................... 3.6-1 Primary Containment Air Lock ..........................

3.6-3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ..........

3.6-8 Drywall Air Temperature

...............................

3.6-17 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers ...........................................

3.6-18 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywall Vacuum Breakers ........ 3.6-21 Suppression Pool Average Temperature

..................

3.6-23 Suppression Pool Water Level ..........................

3.6-26 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling ....................................

........ 3.6-27 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray .... 3.6-29 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywall Spray .............

3.6-30a Deleted ...............................................

3.6-31 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration

.............. 3.6-33 Secondary Containment

.................................

3.6-34 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) ........ 3.6-36 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System .................... 3.6-40 PLANT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. 7 -1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) System .............

3.7-1 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and Normal Heat Sink .........................................

3. 7-3 Emergency Heat Sink ...................................
3. 7-5 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System ..........

................................... 3. 7 -7 Main Condenser Offgas .................................

3.7-10 (continued) ii Amendment 291 Insert 1 Definitions

1. 1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP CEOC-RPT)

SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME LEAKAGE LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE ( LHGR) PBAPS UN IT 3 The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from initial signal generation by the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil control oi 1 pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

LEAKAGE shall be: a. Identified LEAKAGE 1. LEAKAGE into the drywel 1 , such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE; c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System CRCS) component body, pipe wal 1, or vessel wal 1. The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length. (continued)

1. 1-3 Amendment No.

PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 1.1 Definitions

-Insert 1: DRAIN TIME The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming: a) The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate; b) The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate , or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event , loss of normal power , single human error), for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except: 1. Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system , or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked , sealed , or otherwise secured in the closed position , blank flanges , or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths; 2. Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation

or 3. Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task , who in continuous communication with the control room , is stationed at the controls , and is capable of closing the penetration flow path isolation device without offsite power. c) The penetration flow paths required to be evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated , and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory; d) No additional draining events occur; and e) Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used. A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated value.

ECCS Instrumentation

3. 3. 5 .1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.l Emergency Core Cooling System CECCS) Instrumentation LCD 3.3.5.l The ECCS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.5.1-1.

ACTIONS -------------------------------------

NOTE -------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. CONDITION A. One or more channels inoperable.

B. As required by Required Action A.l and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

PBAPS UN IT 3 A. l B.l REQUIRED ACTION Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 for the channel .

1. Only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. :--Only applicable for Functions l.a, l.b, 2.a, and 2.b. Declare supported feature(s) inoperable when its redundant feature ECCS initiation capability is inoperable.

3.3-32 COMPLETION TIME Immediately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of feature initiation capability in both trip systems (continued)

Amendment No.

ACTIONS CONDITION B. (continued)

C. As required by Required Action A.l and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

PBAPS UN IT 3 B.2 B.3 C.l C.2 ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.l REQUIRED ACTION Only applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b. Declare High Pressure Coolant Injection CHPCI) System inoperable.

Pl ace channel in trip.

1. Only applicasle in MODES 1, 2, and 3. Only applicable for Functions l.c, l.e, l.f, 2.c, 2.d, and 2. f. Declare supported feature(s) inoperable when its redundant feature ECCS initiation capability is inoperable.

Restore channel to OPERABLE status. 3.3-33 COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 1 hour from discovery of l OS S Of subsystem initiation capability in both subsystems 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (continued)

Amendment No. 214 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION E. As required by Required Action A.l and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

PBAPS UN IT 3 E. 1 E.2 ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 REQUIRED ACTION --------N DTE.£--------1. 0Al y appli cable iA MODES 1, 2, aAd 3. -;-Only applicable to Functions 1.d and 2.g. Declare supported feature(s) inoperable when its redundant feature ECCS initiation capability is inoperable.

Restore channel to OPERABLE status. 3.3-35 COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of subsystem initiation capability in both subsystems 7 days (continued)

Amendment No. 214

1. FUN CTI ON Core Spray System a. Reactor V essel Water Level-L o w Low Low (Level 1) b. Drywell Pressure-High
c. Reactor Pressure-Low

<Injection Permissive)

d. Core Spray Pump Discharge (Bypass) e. Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relay ( 1 ass of offsite power) f. Core Spray Pump Time Delay Relay (offsite power available)

Pumps A.C Pumps B,D Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page Emergency Core Cooling System APPLICABLE MODES DR OTHER SPEC I FI ED CO NDITIONS 1,2,3 , 4'a l

______

(a) l llleR as s eeiateEI ECCS aFe ta 9PE!M B LE peF u;g 3.5.2 , EGGS (b l Also required to initiate the associated diesel generator (OGJ. PBAPS UN IT 3 3.3-39 Amendment No.

FU NC TI ON 2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPC!l System a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low (Level 1) b. Drywel l Pressure-High

c. Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive)
d. Rea c t o r Pressure-Low Low (Recirculation Discharge Valve Permiss i ve) e. Reactor Vessel Shroud Level-Level 0 f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start-Time Delay Relay Coffsite power available) Pumps A , B Pumps C,D Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 5) Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITION S 1, 2 , 3-,-1, 2 , 3 1.2.3 1, 2 , 3 l , 2 , 3-,-REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION 4 4 4 4 8 (2 per pump) CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.l B B c B c B c ECCS Instrumentation
3. 3. 5 .1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 £11 3.6.5.1.l £11 3.3.5.1.2 £11 3.3.5.-L-4 £11 3.3.5.l.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 ALLOWABLE VALUE -160 inches s 2.0 psig 425.0 psig and s 475.0 psig 4 25.9 211.0 psig -226.0 inches 1.9 seconds ands 2.1 seconds 7.5 seconds ands 8.5 seconds g. Low Pressure Coolant 1,2,3 4 E SR 3.3.5.1.2 299.0 psid Injection Pump Cl per SR 3.3.5.1.4 and D I Discharge Flow-Low 4.L.a.l 5.L..tt pump! SR 3.3.5.1.5 s 331.0 psid eeted (continued)

(a l asseeiatee EHS aPe te lie 9PERA B H L£9 3.5.2 , E£CS

<c l With associated recirculation pump discharge valve open. PBAPS UN IT 3 3.3-40 Amendment No.

PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 New PBAPS TS Section 3.3.5.3 3.3.5.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.3 Not Used PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.3-47a Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation

3. 3. 5. 4 3.3.5.4 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.4 The RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY

A ccording to Table 3.3.5.4-1. ---------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A. l Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.4-1 for the channel. B. As required by B.l Declare associated Immediately Required Action A. l penetration flow and referenced in path(s) incapable of Table 3.3.5.4-1. automatic isolation. AND --B.2 Calculate DRAIN TIME. Immediately

c. As required by C. l Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Required Action A.1 trip. and referenced in Table 3.3.5.4-1. D. As required by D.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Required Action A.1 OPERABLE status and referenced in Table 3.3.5.4-1. (continued)

PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.3-47b Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION E. Required Action and E.l associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED ACTION Declare associated low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable. COMPLETION TIME Immediately


NOTE------------------------------

---1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.4-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.4.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. SR 3.3.5.4.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. SR 3.3.5.4.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.3-47c FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (co n tinued) Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 FUNCTION 1. Core Spray System a. Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive)

b. Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow-Low (Bypass) c. Manual Initiation
2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System a. Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive)
b. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow -Low (Bypass) c. Manual Initiation
3. RHR System Isolation
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 4. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation
3. 3. 5. 4 Table 3.3.5.4-1 (page 1 of 1) RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS 4,5 4,S 4,S 4,5 4,S 4,5 (b) (b) REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION 4 1 per pump (a) 1 per subsystem (a) 4 1 per pump (a), (c) 1 per subsystem (a) 2 CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.1 c D 0 c D D B B SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.4.1 SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.l SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.3 SR 3.3.5.4.1 SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.l SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.3 SR 3 . 3 . 5 . 4 . 1 SR 3.3.5.4.2 SR 3.3.5.4.1 SR 3 . 3 . 5 . 4 . 2 ALLOWABLE VALUE 2: 425.0 psig and 5 475.0 psig 2: 319.0 psid and 5 351.0 psid NA :-425.0 psig and 5 475.0 psig > 299.0 psid and 5 331. 0 psid NA 2: 1. 0 inches 2: 1. 0 inches (a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.4, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control." (b) When automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path(s) is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. (c) Function not required to be OPERABLE while associated pump is operating in decay heat removal when minimum flow valve is closed and deactivated.

PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.3-47d Amendment No. XXX ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION H. As required by H.l Required Action C.l and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. .QR H.2 I. As required by I. l Required Action C.l and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

£IB -h-2 J. As required by J.l Required Action C.l and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

PBAPS UNIT 3 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.l REQUIRED ACT! ON COMPLETION TIME Declare associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> standby liquid control CSLC) subsystem inoperable.

Isolate the Reactor 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Water Cleanup System. Initiate action to Immediate ly restore channel to OPERABLE stat us.

te lmmedi a tel y Hie Heat Remeval ( RllR) s Fnrt: El e '11' A Gee l ing System. Isolate the affected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> penetration fl ow path(s). 3.3-50 Amendment Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.l Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 3 of 3) Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation FUNCTION 5. Reactor Water Cleanup CRWCU) System Isolation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS

a. RWCU Flow-High 1.2,3 b. SLC System Initiation 1,2,3 c. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) 6. RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation
a. Reactor Pressure-High b. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) 7. Feedwater Recirculation Isolation
a. Reactor Pressure -High 8. Traversing Incore Probe Isolation
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) b. Drywell Pressure-High 1,2,3 1, 2. 3 1, 2 ,3 1 , 2. 3 1 , 2 , 3 REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM 2 2-1-.tt 2 2 2 CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION C .1 H F F J J SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.1 ALLOWABLE VALUE s 125% rated flow C23.D in-wcl NA 1.0 inches s 70.0 psig 1.0 inches s 600 psig 1.0 inches s 2.0 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (a l IA '4\l9ES 4 aAEI S ,

ieee RllR S;5teRt iRtegrit) is RtaiA t aiReEI , aRl) a11e eha11Rel s;stem 11ith aA i selat i a,; sigAal a1ai 1 allle ta ePe eee'iRg iselatieA .ai.e i s PBAPS UN IT 3 3.3-54 Amendment -r FUNCTION 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) 2. Drywell

3. Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Radi ati gh Refueling Floor Deleted Ventilation Exhaust Radi ati gh Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Table 3.3.6.2*1 (page 1 of ll Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICAB L E MODES OR REQUIRED OTHER CHANN EL S SPECIFIED P ER SUR VEI L LAN C E CONDITIONS TRIP SYSTEM REQ UIREMEN TS 1.2 , 3 , SR 3.3.6.2.1 fa+ SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 1.2.3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 1, 2. 3. 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 fa+, (b) SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 1, 2. 3. 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 tt+, (b) SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.5 ALLOWABLE VALUE ;;, 1.0 inches s 2.0 psig s 16.0 mR/hr s 16.0 mR/hr 9dF1A g a fe P r e a c t e* o esse 1. (b l During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in secondary containment.

PBAPS UN IT 3 3.3-58 Amendment No.

MCREV System Instrumentation

3. 3. 7 .1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation CMCREV) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7.l APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS Two channels per trip system of the Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High Function shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS , DuriAg operatioAs with a potential for draiAiAg the reactor vessel ( OPDRVs). -------------------------------------

NOTE ------------------------------


Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. CONDITION A. One or more required channels inoperable.

PBAPS UN IT 3 A. 1 A.2 REQUIRED ACTION Declare associated MCREV subsystems inoperable.

Pl ace channel in trip. 3.3-59 COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of MCREV System initiation capability 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (continued)

Amendment No. -2+4

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), ECCS-Operati ng 3.5.1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE (RCIC) SYSTEM ANO REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING 3.5.l ECCS-Operating LCD 3.5.l Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of five safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) is not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure$

150 psig and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure $ 100 psig. ACTIONS -------------------------------------

NOTE ------------------------------------

LCD 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCI. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One low pressure ECCS A.l Restore low pressure 7 da ys injection/spray ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status. OR One low pressure coolant injection ( LPC Il pump in each subsystem inoperable.

B. Required Action and B.l Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 3 3.5-1 Amendment No. 9-5

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ECG s sh u td ._I D_e_le_t_e_d

___ __. Two low pressure EGGS inject i on/spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE. One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during { alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. APPLICABILITY:

MODE 4 , MODE 5 , except with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed , water level > 458 inches above reactor pressure vessel i n strument zero , and no operations with a potentia l for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) in progress. AC TI ONS CQNDIT!ON REQl:J I RED ACTHHI COMPL E TION TIME One Pe*juired EGGS Restore reeiuiFed EGGS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> i nj ecti on.i spray injectionlspray subsystef!l inoperable. subs;istem to OPERABLE stattts. B-:-Reeiui F'eS Action and B-;4-I nHi ate action to lfllmediately associates Completion suspene OPDRVs. +i me of GonElition A not f!let.

Feeiuiree EGGS .£-:-+ InH.i at:e action to I ffiFRe di ate 1 : Y iRjection>1spPay suspend OPDRVs. subsystems inoperab l e. A#& f..-;.-2.

Restore one EGGS 4 hottrs i nj ecti en,'spray subs:,'stem to OP£RABLE stat:us. (contintted) PBAPS UN IT 3 3.5-8 Amendment No.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION Required Action C.2 and associated Completion Time not met-;-REQUIRED ACTION Initiate action to restore secondary contaiAFRent to OPERAB LE status. Initiate action to restore one standby gas treatment subsystem for Unit 3 to OP E RABLE status. ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.2 COMPLETION TIME lfflmediately Immediately tt-:-3 Initiate action to Iffimediately restore isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isol ated. SURVEILLANCE REQUIR E MENTS -&R 3.5.2.l PBAPS UN IT 3 SURVEILLAN CE Verify , for each required low pressure cool ant injection ( LPCI) subsystem , the suppression pool 11ater level is> 11.0 ft. 3.5-9 F R E Q UENCY In accordance 1;ith the Survei 11 ance Frequency Control Program. (continued)

Amendment No.

SURVEIL L ANCE REQUIREM E NTS (continued)

-&R 3.5.2.2 -&R 3.5.2.3 -&R 3.5.2.4 PBAPS UN IT 3 SURVEILLANC E Verify , for eact:i required core spray (CS) subsystem , tt:ie. ir.-Suppressisn pool '1tater level is ?: 11.0 ft; or lU'\T r-Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this sption during OPORVs. Condensate storage tank water level is ?: 17.3 f-h Verify , for eact:i required EG GS injection/

spray subsystem , l oca t ions susceptib l e to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled *,fi tfl 1tate r. -.... Not required to be me for system vent flow patt:is opened under administrative control. Verify eact:i required EGGS iAjection/spray subsystem manual , pm,er operated , and automatic valve in the flow path , tflat is not locked , sealed , or otherwise secured iA position , is in tt:ie correct position. 3.5-10 ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.2 FREQUENCY In accordance ifi th the S urveillaAce Fr equency CoAtrol Program. IA accordance

  • ,ii Hl the SurveillaRce FrequeAcy GoAtrol PFOgram. I n accordance with the Surveillance Frequency CoAtrol Program. (csnt i nued) Amendment No. G-G SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) 54t 3.5.2.5 3.5.2.6 PBAPS UN IT 3 SURVEI L LANCE For the CS pumps , SR 3.5.2.5 may be met using equivalent values for flow rate and test pressure determined using pump curves. Verify each required EGGS pump develops the specified flow rate agains t a system head corresponding to t he specified reactor pressure. SYSTEM F LQH RATE ?! 3 , 125 gpm ?! 8 , 600 gpm S Y S TEM HEAD CORRESPONDING TO A R E ACTOR PRESSURE OF ?! 105 psig ?! 20 psig Vessel injection/spray may be excluded. Verify each required EGGS injection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. 3.5-11 ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.2 FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance F requenc,y GontFOl Program. In accordance
i th the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Amendment No. -9-6

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig. ACTIONS -------------------------------------NOTE ------------------------------------LCD 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC. COND ITION R EQ U IRED ACT ION COMPLETION TIME A. RCIC System A.l Verify by Immediately inoperable.

administrati ve means High Pressur e Coolant Injection Sy stem is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC System 14 days to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.l Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. PBAPS UN IT 3 3.5-12 Amendment No.

PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 New PBAPS TS Section 3.5.4 RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.4 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.4 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control LCO 3.5.4 DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the top of active fuel (TAF) shall be > 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. AND One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem shall be OPERABLE. ----------------------


NOTE---------------------------

--A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. APPLICABILITY

MODES 4 and 5 ACTIONS CONDITION A. Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable. B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. C. DRAIN TIME < 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> and > 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 A.1 B.1 C.1 AND REQUIRED ACTION Restore required ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status. Initiate action to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power. Verify secondary containment boundary is capable of being established in less than the DRAIN TIME. 3.5-15 COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Immediately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (continued)

Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 ACTIONS (continued)

c. (continued)

D. DRAIN TIME < 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.4 C.2 AND C.3 Verify each secondary containment penetration flow path is capable of being isolated in less than the DRAIN TIME. Verify one standby gas treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation in less than DRAIN TIME. D.l --------NOTE---------Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem or additional method of water injection shall be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. Initiate action to establish an additional method of water injection with water sources capable of maintaining RPV water level > TAF for > 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 4 hours Immediately AND Immediately D.2 Initiate action to establish secondary containment boundary. AND D.3 Initiate action to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path or verify it can be manually isolated from the control room. AND 3.5-16 Immediately (continued)

Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.4 ACTIONS (continued)

D. (continued)

D.4 Initiate action to verify one Standby Gas Treatment subsystem is capable of being placed into operation. E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C and D not met. E.l Initiate action to restore DRAIN TIME to > 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. OR DRAIN TIME < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.4.l SR 3.5.4.2 SR 3.5.4.3 SURVEILLANCE Verify DRAIN TIME > 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Verify , for a required low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem , the suppression pool water level is > 11.0 ft. Verify , for a required Core Spray (CS) subsystem , the: a. Suppression pool water level is > 11.0 ft. or b. Condensate storage tank water level is > 17.3 ft. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.5-17 Immediately Immediately FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued)

Amendment No. XXX PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.5.4.4 SR 3.5.4.5 SR 3.5.4.6 SR 3.5.4.7 SR 3.5.4.8 SURVEILLANCE Verify , for each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem , locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water. -------------

---NOTE------------------Not required to be met for system vent flow paths open under administrative control. Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

Operate the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line for > 10 minutes. Verify each valve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal. --------------


NOTE----------------

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually actuated. PBAPS UNITS 2 & 3 3.5-18 FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In acc v rdance with the Surveillance Frequency Contr o l Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Amendment No. XXX ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION E. Purge/Vent flowpath open for an accumulated time greater than 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> for the calendar year while in MODE 1 or 2 with Reactor Pressure greater than 100 psig. F. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, c, or D not met in MODE l, 2. or 3. G. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during MODE 4 or 5. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED ACTION E.l Isolate the penetration. .Q.R E. 2 .1 Be in MODE 3. AND E.2.2 Be in Mode 4. F.l Be in MODE 3. fil:ill F.2 Be in MODE 4. *-:-!-Initiate actioA to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. 00 9 Initiate action to restore valve(s) to OPERABLE status. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 PBAPS UN IT 3 Verify nitrogen inventory is equivalent 22 inches water column in the liquid nitrogen storage tank. 3.6-12 PC I Vs 3.6.1.3 COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> Immediately Immediately FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued)

Amendment

3.6 CONTAINMENT

SYSTEMS 3.6.4.l Secondary Containment Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 LCO 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY:

MODES l, 2, and 3, During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the ,{" secondary containment , OuriAg operatioAs

tith a potential f or draining the reactor essel ( OPORVs). ACTIONS CONDITION A. Secondary containment inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. C. Secondary containment inoperable during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment or during OPORVs. PBAPS UN IT 3 A.l B.l C.l REQUIRED ACTION Restore secondary containment to OPERAB L E status. Be in MODE 3. --------NOTE ---------LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment.

3.6-34 COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 12 hours Immediately (continued)

Amendment No. -iY-3 Secondary Containment 3.6.4.l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION ( conti mied) Initiate action to suspend OPORVs. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed. SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry or exit. SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verify secondary containment can be drawn down to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in s 180 seconds using one standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem.

SR 3.6.4.1.4 Verify the secondary containment can be maintained 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> using one SGT subsystem at a flow rates 10,500 cfm. PBAPS UN IT 3 3.6-35 COMPLETION TIM E h1mediately FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Amendment No. 1

3.6 CONTAINMENT

SYSTEMS 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves CSCIVs) LCD 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, SCI Vs 3.6.4.2 During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment , Duri Ag operati OAS .,,;th a poteAti al for drai Ai Ag the reactor f' vessel (OPDRVs). ACTIONS --------------


NOTES---------------------------


1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIVs. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMP L ETION TIME A. One or more A.l Isolate the affected 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> penetration flow paths penetration flow path with one SCIV by use of at least inoperable.

one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 3 3.6-36 Amendment No. 7 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment or duriRg OPORVs. PBAPS UN IT 3 D.l REQUIRED ACTION --------NOTE--LCO 3.0.3 is no t applicable.

Suspend movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment.

IRitiate act i oR to suspeRd OPORVs. 3.6-38 SCI Vs 3.6.4.2 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Amendment No. 7-3 t

3.6 CONTAINMENT

SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, SGT System 3.6.4.3 During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment , Ouri Ag opera ti OAS .,,;th a potCAti a1 for drai Ai Ag the reactor --f' >tessel ( OPOR'Js). ACTIONS CONDITION A. One SGT subsystem inoperable.

B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment or duriAg OPORVs. PBAPS UN IT 3 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.l Restore SGT subsystem 7 days to OPERABLE status. B.l Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ------------NOTE-------------LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

C.l Place OPERABLE SGT subsystem in operation.

3.6-40 Immediately (continued)

Amendment No . .2-f.3.

SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME c. (continued)

C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately RECENTLY IRRADIATED

{ FUEL assemblies in secondary contai n ment. A#-9 aetieA te Immediately

{ StjSf3eAd 8P9Rlf5. D. Two SGT subsystems D.l Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> inoperable in MODE 1, 2' or 3. PBAPS UN IT 3 3.6-41 Amendment No.

MCREV System 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System LCO 3.7.4 Two MCREV subsystems shall be OPERABLE. ------------------------

NOTE -------------------------------

-t The main control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control. ----------



APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS , During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). ACTIONS CONDITION A. One MCREV subsystem A.l B. inoperable for reasons other than Condition B. One or more MCREV subsystems inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary in MODE l, 2 or 3. PBAPS UN IT 3 B.l AND B.2 AND B.3 REQUIRED ACTION COMP LET! ON TI ME Restore MCREV 7 days subsystem to OPERABLE status. Initiate action to Immediately implement mitigating actions. V erify mitigating 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological/chemical hazards wi 11 not exceed limits and mitigating actions for smoke hazards are taken as required.

Restore CRE boundary 90 days to OPERABLE status. 3.7-7 Amendment No.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION C. Required Action and C.l Be in MODE 3. D. associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS , or during or OPDRVs. E. Two MCREV subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition B. PBAPS UN IT 3 ------------NOTE-------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

D.l Place OPERABLE MCREV subsystem in operation.

D. 2 .1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

D.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs. E.l Be in MODE 3. 3.7-8 MCREV System 3.7.4 COMPLETION TIME 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Immediately Immediate ly Immediate ly Immediate l y 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Amendment No.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION F. Two MCREV subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the ------------NOTE ----------

---LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. F.l Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

OR Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Initiate action to suspeAd OPDRVs. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.4.1 SR 3.7.4.2 SR 3.7.4.3 SR 3.7.4.4 PBAPS UN IT 3 SURVEILLANCE Operate each MCREV subsystem for 15 minutes. Perform required MCREV filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). Verify each MCREV subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal. Perform required CRE unfiltered air inleakage testing in accordance with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. 3.7-9 MCREV System 3.7.4 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediate l y FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the VFTP In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. In accordance with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. Amendment No.

ACTIONS AC Sources -Shutdown 3.8.2 -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION A. One or more required offsite circuits inoperable.

PBAPS UNIT 3 REQUIRED ACTION ------------NOTE-------------Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.8, with one or more required 4 kV emergency buses de-energized as a result of Condition A. COMPLETION TIME A.1 Declare affected Immediately required feature(s), with no offsite power available inoperable.

A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

A.2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. !Ritiate actioA to suspeAS operatioAS with a poteAtia l for araiAin§ the reactor vesse l (OPDRVs).

3. 8-21 Immediately Immediately I mmeaiately (continued)

Amendment No.

ACTIONS CONDITION A. (continued)

A.2.4 B. One required DG B.1 inoperable.

OR B.2.1 AND B.2.2 ANG AND B.2.4 PBAPS UNIT 3 REQUIRED ACTION Initiate act i on to restore required offsite power circuit(s) to OPERABLE status. Declare affected required feature(s) with no DG available inoperable.

Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assembl i es in the secondary containment.

I A=i a:t:e ae:t:=i eA :t:e s1:1s p eAd O PD R\ls. Initiate action to restore required DGs to OPERABLE status. 3.8-22 AC Sources -Shutdown 3.8.2 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately I m meel=i atel y Immediately (continued)

Amendment No.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION

(. Two or more required C.1 DGs inoperable.

AND C.2 ANG AND C.4 PBAPS UNIT 3 REQUIRED ACTION Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

I nitiat e a e t:ien ta suspend OPORVs. Initiate action to restore required DG(s) to OPERABLE status. 3.8-23 AC Sources -Shutdown 3.8.2 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately I mmediat e l y Immediately Amendment No.

ACTIONS CONDITION A. C continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 A.2.2 REQUIRED ACTION Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Initiate action to suspeAa op e ratioAs with a poteAtial for the reactor vessel. Initiate action to restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status. 3.8-35 DC Sources -Shutdown 3.8.5 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immeaiately Immediately Amendment No. 214 Distribution Systems -Shutdown 3.8.8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Distribution Systems-Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 The necessary portions of the following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Unit 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE; and b. Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required OPERABLE by LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR 1J Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown, 11 LCO 3.5.2-, -----:?"" ECC S Stu1teo w n," LCO 3. 6. 4. 3, "Standby Gas Treatment I "" (SGT) System," LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Emergency RPV Water Ven ti 1 ati on (MCREV) System, 11 LCO 3. 8. 2, 11 AC Sources -Control Shutdown," LCO 3. 9. 7, "RHR-High Water Leve 1 , " and Inventory LCO 3. 9. 8, "RHR-Low Water Level. 11 APPLICABILITY:

MODES 4 and 5 , During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS ------------



NOTE-------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated supported required feature(s) inoperable.

AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.

PBAPS UNIT 3 A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

3.8-44 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately (continued)

Amendment No. 2-+/-4 ACTIONS CONDITION A. (continued) 3 4 PBAPS UNIT 3 Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown 3.8.8 A.2.2 REQUIRED ACTION Suspend handling of i r radiated fue 1 assemblies in the secondary containment. IRitiate actioR to suspeRd operatioRs with a poteRtial for th e reactor vessel. AND A.2.4 Initiate actions to restore required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status. COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately AND A.2.-5-Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation.

3.8-45 Amendment No.

ATTACHMENT 3 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages (For Information Only) ii B 3.3-99 83.3-101 B 3.3-102 B 3.3-103 B 3.3-104 B 3.3-106 B 3.3-117 B 3.3-118 B 3.3-120 B 3.3-122 B 3.3-140a*

B 3.3-140b*

B 3.3-140c*

B 3.3-140d*

ii B 3.3-100 B 3.3-102 B 3.3-103 B 3.3-104 B 3.3-105 B 3.3-107 B 3.3-118 B 3.3-119 B 3.3-121 B 3.3-123 B 3.3-141a*

B 3.3-141b*

B 3.3-141c*

B 3.3-141d*

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 Revised Technical Specifications Bases Pages B 3.3-140e*

B 3.3-140f*

B 3.3-1409*

B 3.3-140h*

B 3.3-140i*

B 3.3-140j*

B 3.3-158 B 3.3-159 B 3.3-172 B 3.3-174 B 3.3-182 B 3.5-1 B 3.5-6 B 3.5-18 B 3.5-19 B 3.5-19a B 3.3-141e* B 3.3-14 H* B 3.3-1419*

B 3.3-141h*

B 3.3-141i*

B 3.3-141j*

B 3.3-159 B 3.3-160 B 3.3-172 B 3.3-174 B 3.3-182 B 3.5-1 B 3.5-6 B 3.5-18 B 3.5-19 B 3.5-19a Unit 2 TS Bases Page B 3.5-19b B 3.5-20 B 3.5-21 B 3.5-22 B 3.5-23 B 3.5-24 B 3.5-25 B 3.5-31* B 3.5-32* B 3.5-33* B 3.5-34* B 3.5-35* B 3.5-36* B 3.5-37* B 3.5-38* B 3.5-39* Unit 3 TS Bases Page B 3.5-19b B 3.5-20 B 3.5-21 B 3.5-22 B 3.5-23 B 3.5-24 B 3.5-25 B 3.5-31

  • B 3.5-32* B 3.5-33* B 3.5-34* B 3.5-35* B 3.5-36* B 3.5-37* B 3.5-38* B 3.5-39* B 3.6-18 B 3.6-23a B 3.6-54 B 3.6-74 B 3.6-75 B 3.6-79 B 3.6-82 B 3.6-87 B 3.6-88 B 3.6-89 B 3.7-17 B 3.7-19 B 3.7-20 B 3.8-40 B 3.8-42 B 3.8-43 B 3.6-18 B 3.6-23a B 3.6-54 B 3.6-74 B 3.6-75 B 3.6-79 B 3.6-82 B 3.6-87 B 3.6-88 B 3.6-89 B 3.7-17 B 3.7-19 B 3.7-20 B 3.8-40 B 3.8-42 B 3.8-43 *New TS Bases Page B 3.8-44 B 3.8-45 B 3.8-46 B 3.8-72 B 3.8-73 B 3.8-74 B 3.8-75 B 3.8-94 B 3.8-95 B 3.8-96 B 3.8-97 B 3.10-2a B 3.8-44 B 3.8-45 B 3.8-46 B 3.8-72 B 3.8-73 B 3.8-74 B 3.8-75 B 3.8-94 B 3.8-95 B 3.8-96 B 3.8-97 B 3.10-2a TABLE OF CONTENTS B 2.0 B 2.1.1 B 2.1.2 B 3.0 B 3.0 B 3.1 B 3.1.1 B 3.1.2 B 3.1.3 B 3.1.4 B 3.1.5 B 3.1.6 B 3.1.7 B 3.1.8 B 3.2 B 3.2.1 B 3.2.2 B 3.2.3 B 3.3 B 3.3.1.1 B 3.3.1.2 B 3.3.2.1 B 3.3.2.2 B 3.3.3.1 B 3.3.3.2 B 3.3.4.1 B 3.3.4.2 B 3.3.5.1 B 3.3.5.2 B 3.3.5.3 B 3.3.5.4 B 3.3.6.1 B 3.3.6.2 B 3.3.7.1 B 3.3.8.1 B 3.3.8.2 SAFET Y LIM I TS ( SLs) .........................................

B 2. 0-1 Reactor Core SLs ....................................

B 2. 0-1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ...........

B 2.0-7 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY

........ B 3.0-1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY

.................

B 3.0-10 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ..............................

B 3.1-1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SOM) ...............................

B 3.1-1 Reactivity Anomalies

................................

B 3.1-8 Control Rod OPERABILITY

.............................

B 3.1-13 Control Rod Scram Times ............................. B 3 .1-22 Control Rod Scram Accumulators

......................

B 3.1-29 Rod Pattern Control .................................

B 3.1-34 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System .................

B 3.1-39 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves .. B 3.1-48 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS ...............................

B 3.2-1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) .........................................

B 3. 2-1 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) .................

B 3.2-6 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) .................

B 3.2-11 INSTRUMENTATION

.........................................

B 3.3-1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

.........

B 3.3-1 Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation

....... B 3.3-36 Control Rod Block Instrumentation

.......................

B 3.3-45 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation

..................................

B 3. 3-58 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation

..........

B 3.3-65 Remote Shutdown System ..................................

B 3. 3-76 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT)

Instrumentation

.............

B 3.3-83 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT)

Instrumentation B 3.3-91a thru B 3.3-91j Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

..................................

B 3. 3-92 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation

..................................

B 3. 3-130 Not Used ............................................... B 3.3-140a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation

.................................... B 3.3.140b Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

...........

B 3.3-141 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

.........

B 3.3-169 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation

..............

.............

B 3.3-180 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

.....................

B 3.3-187 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring

..............................

.........

B 3.3-199 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 i Revision No. 25 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.4 B 3.4.1 B 3.4.2 B 3.4.3 B 3.4.4 B 3.4.5 B 3.4.6 B 3.4.7 B 3.4.8 B 3.4.9 B 3.4.10 B 3.5 B 3.5.1 B 3.5.2 B 3.5.3 B 3.5.4 B 3.6 B 3.6.1.1 B 3.6.1.2 B 3.6.1.3 B 3.6.1.4 B 3.6.1.5 B 3.6.1.6 B 3.6.2.1 B 3.6.2.2 B 3.6.2.3 B 3.6.2.4 B 3.6.3.l B 3.6.3.2 B 3.6.4.l B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6.4.3 B 3.7 B 3.7.1 B 3.7.2 B 3.7.3 B 3.7.4 B 3.7.5 PBAPS UNIT 2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ............................

B 3.4-1 Recirculation Loops Operating

.......................

B 3.4-1 Jet Pumps ...........................................

B 3. 4-11 Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves (SVs) B 3.4-15 RCS Operational LEAKAGE .............................

B 3. 4-19 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

...............

B 3.4-24 RCS Specific Activity ...............................

B 3.4-29 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown ............................ . B 3.4-33 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown ........................... . RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits .......... . Reactor Steam Dome Pressure ........................ . B 3.4-38 B 3.4-43 B 3.4-52 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ...................................

B 3. 5-1 ECCS-Operating

.....................................

B 3. 5-1

...............................

B 3.5-18 RCIC System .........................................

B 3. 5-24 RPV Water Inventory Control ......................... B 3.5-25 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6-1 3.6-1 3.6-6 3.6-14 3.6-31 Primary Primary Primary Drywell Reactor Containment

.....................................

B Containment Air Lock ............................

B Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ............

B Air Temperature

.................................

B Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers .........................................

B Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers ..........

B Suppression Pool Average Temperature

....................

B Suppression Pool Water Level ............................

B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling ..........................................

B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray ...... B Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) System ...........

B Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration

................

B Secondary Containment

...................................

B Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) ..........

B Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System ......................

B 3.6-34 3.6-42 3.6-48 3.6-53 3.6-56 3.6-60 3.6-64 3.6-70 3.6-73 3.6-78 3.6-85 PLANT SYSTEMS ...........................................

B 3. 7-1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) System ...........

B 3.7-1 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and Normal Heat Sink .......................................

B 3. 7-6 Emergency Heat Sink .................................

B 3. 7-11 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System ...........................................

B 3. 7-15 Main Condenser Offgas ...............................

B 3.7-22 (continued) ii Revision No. 0 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCD, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 2 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 which with their setpoints within the speci ied Allowa le Values, where appropriate.

The actual setpo nt is cali rated consistent with applicable setpoin assumptions.

Table 3.3.5.1-1 is modified by tw-e ootnote 5-o is added to clarify that the associated functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and § only when their supported EGGS are required to be operable per LGO 3.3.2 , EGGS Shutdown. Footnote Cb) is added to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions also perform DG initiation.

Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in the Table. Trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.

The trip setpoints are selected to ensure that the settings do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.

Operation with a trip setting less conservative than the trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.

A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water 1 evel), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic or design limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis or other appropriate documents.

The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic or design limits, corrected for calibration, process, and instrument errors. The trip setpoints are determined from analytical or design limits, corrected for calibration, process, and instrument errors, as wel 1 as, instrument drift. In selected cases, the Allowable Values and trip setpoints are determined from engineering judgement or historically accepted practice relative to the intended functi o ns of the channel. The trip setpoints determined in this manner provide adequate protection by assuming instrument and process uncertainties expected for the environments during the operating time of the associated channels are acc o unted for. For the Core Spray and LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relays, adequate margins for applicable setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the Allowable Values and actual setpoints.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS (or DGl initiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis transient or accident.

To ensure reliable ECCS and DG function, a combination of Functions is required to provide primary and secondary initiation signals. continu B 3.3-99 Revision No . .;+

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 2 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.l 1. a. 2. a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low (Level 1 l (continued) initiation.

Per footnote (a) to Table 3.3.S.l l , this EGGS t function is only required to be OPERA B LE in MODES 4 and S whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 , " EGGS Shutdown ," for Applicability Bases for the low pressure EGGS subsystems

LCO 3 .8 .1 , " AG Sources Operating": and LCO 3.8.2 , " AC Sources Shutdown ," for Applicability Bases for the DGs. 1. b. 2. b. Drywel 1 Pressure-High High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary CRCPB). The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function with a Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive) in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The DGs are initiated from Function l.b signals. This Function also initiates the closure of the recirculation discharge valves to ensure the LPCI subsystems inject into the proper RPV location.

The Drywell Pressure-High Function with a Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive), along with the Reactor Water Level-Low Low Low (Level 1) Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure.

The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or DG is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE.

Thus, four channels of the CS and LPCI Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and DG initiation.

In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required, since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the primary containment to Drywell High setpoint.

Refer to LCO 3.5.l for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems and to LCO 3.8.l for Applicability Bases for the DGs. con in ed B 3.3-101 Revision No . .s+

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCD, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 2 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.l l.c. 2.c. Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive)

Low reactor pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

This ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems or initiating the low pressure ECCS subsystems on a Drywell Pressure-High signal, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' maximum design pressure and a break inside the RCPB has occurred respectively.

This Function also provides permissive for the closure of the recirculation discharge valves to ensure the LPCI subsystems inject into the proper RPV location.

The Reactor Pressure-Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS during the transients analyzed in References 1 and 3. In addition, the Reactor Pressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure.

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equipment in the low pressure ECCS, but high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from e x ceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Four channels of Reactor Pressure-Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation.

Per FootRote (al to Table t 3.3.5.l 1 , this EGGS FuRctiOR is ORly required to be OPERABLE iA MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPERABLE per LCD 3.5.2. Refer to LCD 3.5.1 and LCD 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure EGGS subsystems. l.d. 2.g. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow-Low (Bypass) The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow is sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump. The LPCI and d B 3.3-102 Revision No. 9 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCD, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UNIT 2 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.l l.d. 2.g. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow-Low (Bypass) (continued)

CS Pump Discharge Flow-Low Functions are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the minimum flow valves to ensure that the low pressure ECCS flows assumed during the transients and accidents analyzed in References 1, 2, and 3 are met. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. One differential pressure switch per ECCS pump is used to detect the associated subsystems' flow rates. The logic is arranged such that each switch causes its associated minimum flow valve to open. The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded.

The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for 10 seconds after the switches detect low flow. The time delay is provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the RHR shutdown cooling mode. The Pump Discharge Flow-Low Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core. Each channel of Pump Discharge Flow-Low Function (four CS channels and four LPCI channels) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the ECCS function.

Per footnote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1 l , this r EGGS Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES q and 5 11henever the associated EGGS is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2. Refer to LGO 3.5.l and LGO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure EGGS subsysteffiS. l.e, l.f. Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relay The purpose of this time delay is to stagger the start of the CS pumps that are in each of Divisions I and II to prevent overloading the power source. This Function is necessary when power is being supplied from the offsite sources or the standby power sources CDG). The CS Pump Start-Time Delay Relays are assumed to be OPERABLE in the accident and transient analyses requiring ECCS initiation.

That is, the analyses assume that the pumps will initiate when required and excess loading will not cause failure of the power sources. con inu B 3.3-103 Revision No.-5 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UNIT 2 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.l l.e. l.f. Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relay (continued)

There are eight Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relays, two in each of the CS pump start logic circuits Cone for when offsite power is available and one for when offsite power is not available).

One of each type of time delay relay is dedicated to a single pump start logic, such that a single failure of a Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relay will not result in the failure of more than one CS pump. In this condition, three of the four CS pumps will remain OPERABLE; thus, the single failure criterion is met (i.e., loss of one instrument does not preclude ECCS initiation).

The Allowable Value for the Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relays is chosen to be long enough so that the power source will not be overloaded and short enough so that ECCS operation is not degraded.

Each channel of Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relay Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the associated CS subsystem is required to be OPERABLE.

Per footRote (a) r to Table 3.3.5.l 1 , this EGGS is only requ i red to be OPERABLE iR MODES 4 aRd S whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPERABLE per LGO 3.5.2. Refer to LGO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the CS subsystems. 2.d. Reactor Pressure-Low Low <Recirculation Discharge Valve Permissive)

Low reactor pressure signals are used as permissives for recirculation discharge valve closure. This ensures that the LPCI subsystems inject into the proper RPV location assumed in the safety analysis.

The Reactor Pressure-Low Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the valve during the transients analyzed in References 1 and 3. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Pressure-Low Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The Reactor Pressure-Low Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor pressure.

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that the valves close prior to commencement of LPCI injection flow into the core, as assumed in the safety analysis.

ed B 3.3-104 Revision No. 7-BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCD, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 2 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 2.e. Reactor Vessel Shroud Level-Level O (continued)

Two channels of the Reactor Vessel Shroud Level -Level 0 Function are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES l, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specified initiation time of the LPCI subsystems is not assumed, and other administrative controls are adequate to control the valves associated with this Function (since the systems that the valves are opened for are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and are normally not used). 2.f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start-Time Delay R.e.l.ll The purpose of this time delay is to stagger the start of the LPCI pumps that are in each of Divisions I and II, to prevent overloading the power source. This Function is only necessary when power is being supplied from offsite sources. The LPCI pumps start simultaneously with no time delay as soon as the standby source is available.

The LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relays are assumed to be OPERABLE in the accident and transient analyses requiring ECCS initiation.

That is, the analyses assume that the pumps will initiate when required and excess loading will not cause failure of the power sources. There are eight LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relays, two in each of the RHR pump start logic circuits.

Two time delay relays are dedicated to a single pump start logic. Both timers in the RHR pump start logic would have to fail to prevent an RHR pump from starting within the required time; therefore, the low pressure ECCS pumps will remain OPERABLE; thus, the single failure criterion is met (i.e., loss of one instrument does not preclude ECCS initiation).

The Allowable Values for the LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relays are chosen to be long enough so that most of the starting transient of the first pump is complete before starting the second pump on the same 4 kV emergency bus and short enough so that ECCS operation is not degraded.

Each channel of LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relay Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the associated LPCI subsystem is required to be OPERABLE.

Per footnote (a) to Tab l e 3.3.5.l 1 , this ECCS Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2. Refer to L CO 3.5.l and LCD 3.5.2 for Applicabil i ty Bases for the L PG! subsysteflls. ed B 3.3-106 Revision No. -5+

BASES ACTIONS (continued) PBAPS UNIT 2 B.l. B.2. and B.3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.l Required Actions B.l and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s).

Required Action B.l features would be those that are initiated by Functions l.a, l.b, 2.a, and 2.b (e.g., low pressure ECCS). The Required Action B.2 system would be HPCI. For Required Action B.l, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if (a) two or more Function l.a channels are inoperable and untripped such that both trip systems lose initiation capability, (b) two or more Function 2.a channels are inoperable and untripped such that both trip systems lose initiation capability, (c) two or more Function l.b channels are inoperable and untripped such that both trip systems lose initiation capability, or (d) two or more Function 2.b channels are inoperable and untripped such that both trip systems lose initiation capability.

For low pressure ECCS, since each inoperable channel would have Required Action B.l applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated system of low pressure ECCS and DGs to be declared inoperable.

However, since channels in both associated low pressure ECCS subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) are inoperable and untripped, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in the associated low pressure ECCS and DGs being concurrently declared inoperable.

For Required Action B.2, redundant automatic HPCI initiation capability is lost if two or more Function 3.a or two Function 3.b channels are inoperable and untripped such that the trip system loses initiation capability.

In this situation Closs of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Action B.3 is not appropriate and the HPCI System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. As Roted (Note 1 to Required ActioA B.l), Required A ctioA B.l is oAly applicable iA MODES l , 2 , aAd 3. IA MODES 4 and 5 , the specific iAitiatioA time of the low pressure ECCS is net assumed and the probabi l ity of a LOCA is lower. Thus , a total loss of continued B 3.3-117 Revision No.

BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 B.l. B.2. and B.3 (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as a ll owed by Required Action B.3) is allowed durin§ MODES 4 and 5. T here is no similar Note provided for Required Action 8.2 since HPGI instrumentation not required in MODES 4 and 5; thus , a Notes are also provided Note-2-to Required Action B.l and the Note to Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable.

This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed.

Required Action B.l (the Required Action for certain inoperable channels in the low pressure ECCS subsystems) is not applicable to Function 2.e, since this Function provides backup to administrative controls ensuring that operators do not divert LPCI flow from injecting into the core when needed. Thus, a total loss of Function 2.e capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed, since the LPCI subsystems remain capable of performing their intended function.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.l, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that a redundant feature in the same system (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Function in the same trip system. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the con in B 3.3-118 Revision No.---B-BASES ACTIONS C.l and C.2 (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 concurrently declared inoperable.

For Functions l.c, l.e, l.f, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f, the affected portions are the associated low pressure ECCS pumps. As noted (Note 1), Required Action G.1 is on l y applicable in MODES 1 , 2 , and 3. IA MODES 4 aAd 5 , the specific initiation time of the E GGS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus , a total loss of automatic initiatioA capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as a l lowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. Note that Required Action C.l is only applicable

/'tor Functions l.c, l.e, l.f, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f. Required Action C.l is not applicable to Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 5 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by Required Action C.2. The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action C.l, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or it would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events. con in PBAPS UN IT 2 B 3.3-120 Revision No. -G BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 0.1. 0.2.1. and 0.2.2 (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 piping remains filled with water. Alternately, if it is not desired to perform Required Actions 0.2.1 and 0.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the HPCI suction piping), Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. E.l and E.2 Required Action E.l is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump, Discharge Flow -Low (Bypass) Functions result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s).

For Required Action E.l, the features would be those that are initiated by Functions l.d and 2.g (e.g., low pressure ECCS). Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if (a) two or more Function l.d channels are inoperable affecting CS pumps in different subsystems or (b) three or more Function 2.g channels are inoperable.

Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action E.l applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected low pressure ECCS pump to be declared inoperable.

However, since channels for more than one low pressure ECCS pump are inoperable, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels of the low pressure ECCS pumps, this resu l ts in the affected low pressure ECCS pumps being concurrently dec l ared inoperable.

In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 7 day allowance of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and the subsystem associated with each inoperable channel must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. As noted (Note 1 to Required Action E.lJ , Required Action E.l is oRly applicable iR MODES 1 , 2 , and 3. -Ht MODES 4 and 5 , the specific initiation time of the EGGS is not assumed and the probability of a LOGA is lo wer. Thus , a total loss of initiation capability for 7 days (as allowed by Required Action E.2) is a llowed during MODES 4 and 5. A Note is also provided (Note 2 to Required Action E.l) to delineate that Required Action E.l is only applicable to low con in B 3.3-122 Revision No. {}

PBAPS TSTF-542, Rev 2 Attachment X New PBAPS TS Bases Section 3.3.5.3 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.3 Not Used PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.3 B 3.3-140a Revision No. XXX RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.4 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND PBAPS UNIT 2 The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF , the ability to remove decay heat is reduced , which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures. Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as " Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed , the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However , in practice , the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1 , 2 , and 3 in LCO 3. 3. 5. 1 , " Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

," or LCO 3.3.6.1 , " Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation

". With the unit in MODE 4 or 5 , RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. Under the definition of DRAIN TIME , some penetration flow paths may be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation if they will be isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. (continued)

B 3.3-140b Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

BACKGROUND (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation is to support the requirements of LCO 3.5.4 , "Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control ,# and the definition of DRAIN TIME. There are functions that are required for manual initiation or operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.4 and other functions that support automatic isolation of Residual Heat Removal subsystem and Reactor Water Cleanup system penetration flow path(s) on low RPV water level. The RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation supports operation of core spray (CS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI). The equipment involved with each of these systems is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.4. With the unit in MODE 4 or 5 , RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure , reduced piping stresses , and ductile piping systems. Instead , an event is postulated in which a single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate , or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event (except when the risk is assessed and managed in accordance with TS LCO 3.0.8), loss of normal power , single human error). It is assumed , based on engineering judgment , that while in MODES 4 and 5 , one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually initiated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. As discussed in References 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , and 5 , operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore , RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Permissive and interlock setpoints are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy. The specific Applicable Safety Analyses , LCO , and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by (continued

  • B 3.3-140c Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 Function basis. RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems l.a , 2.a. Reactor Pressure -Low (Injection Permissive)

Low reactor pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual injection functions. This function ensures that , prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems , the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems

' maximum design pressure. While it is assured during MODES 4 and 5 that the reactor pressure will be below the ECCS maximum design pressure , the Reactor Pressure -Low signals are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS. The Reactor Pressure -Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure. The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equipment in the low pressure ECCS. The four channels of Reactor Pressure -Low Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when ECCS manual initiation is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.4. l.b , 2.b. Core S p ra y and Low Pressure Coolant In j ection Pum p Discharge Flow -Low (Bypass) The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow is sensed , and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump. One differential pressure switch per ECCS pump is used to detect the associated subsystems

' flow rates. The logic is arranged such that each transmitter causes its associated minimum flow valve to open. The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for 10 seconds after the switches detect flow. The time delay is provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling mode. (continued B 3.3-140d Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 The Pump Discharge Flow -Low Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump , yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core. One channel of the Pump Discharge Flow -Low Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when the associated Core Spray or LPCI pump is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.4 to ensure the pumps are capable of injecting into the Reactor Pressure Vessel when manually initiated. A note is added to TS Table 3.3.5.4-1 for Function 2.b to clarify the intent of allowing credit for an OPERABLE Low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem when it is aligned and operating in the decay heat removal mode of RHR. This note is appropriate since the associated RHR pump minimum flow valve (while operating in the decay heat removal mode) is closed and deactivated to prevent inadvertent vessel drain down events. l.c , 2.c. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels consist of pump start hand switches that introduce signals into the appropriate ECCS logic to provide manual initiation capability. There is one hand switch for each of the pumps required for the CS and LPCI subsystems. There is no allowable value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the hand switches.

A channel of the Manual Initiation Function (one channel per required pump) is required to be OPERABLE in Modes 4 and 5 when the associated ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.4. RHR System Isolation 3.a Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function associated with RHR System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RHR System. (continued) B 3.3-140e Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 signals are Reactor initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function are available , only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.6.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Functi n is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation f the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation 4.a Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RWCU System. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function are available , only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. (continued) B 3.3-140f Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 This Function isolates the inboard and outboard RWCU pump suction penetration and the outboard valve at the RWCU connection to reactor feedwater. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels. Section 1.3 , Completion Times , specifies that once a Condition has been entered , subsequent divisions , subsystems , components , or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions continue to apply for each additional failure , with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However , the Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel. A.l Required Action A.l directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.4-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable , Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition. B.l and B.2 RHR System Isolation , Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 , and Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation , Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 functions are applicable when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. If the instrumentation is inoperable , Required Action B.l directs an immediate declaration that the associated penetration flow path(s) are incapable of automatic isolation. Required Action B.2 directs calculation of DRAIN TIME. The calculation cannot credit automatic isolation of the affected penetration flow paths. (continued)

B 3.3-140g Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 C.l RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual injection functions. If the permissive is inoperable , manual initiation of ECCS is prohibited. Therefore , the permissive must be placed in the trip condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. With the permissive in the trip condition , manual initiation may be performed. Prior to placing the permissive in the tripped condition , the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to inject water into the RPV. The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate any discovered inoperabilities and to place the channel in trip. D.l If a Core Spray or Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow -Low bypass function is inoperable , there is a risk that the associated low pressure ECCS pump could overheat when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. In this condition , the operator can take manual control of the p ump and the injection valve to ensure the pump does not overheat. If a manual initiation function is inoperable , the ECCS subsystem pumps can be started manually and the valves can be opened manually , but this is not the preferred condition. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time was chosen to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The Completion Time is appropriate given the ability to manually start the ECCS pumps and open the injection valves and to manually ensure the pump does not overheat. E.l With the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met , the associated low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem may be incapable of performing the intended function , and must be declared inoperable immediately. As noted in the beginning of the SRs , the SRs for each RPV Water Inventory Control instrument Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.4-1. (continued) B 3.3-140h Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 2 SR 3.3.5.4.l RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited; thus , it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff , based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties , including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria , it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal , but more frequent , checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO. SR 3.3.5.4.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued , B 3.3-140i Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

REFERENCES PBAPS UNIT 2 SR 3.3.5.4.3 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.4 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. 1. Information Notice 84-81 " Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup ," November 1984. 2. Information Notice 86-74, " Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves ," August 1986. 3. Generic Letter 92-04 , " Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 (F), " August 1992. 4. NRC Bulletin 93-03 , " Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs ," May 1993. 5. Information Notice 94-52 , Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1 ," July 1994. B 3.3-140j Revision No. XXX BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 2 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.l 6.a. Reactor Pressure-High (continued)

MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the only MODES in which the reactor can be pressurized; thus, equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization.

This Function isolates both RHR shutdown cooling pump suction valves. 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low C Level 3) Function associated with RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safety analyses because a break of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is bounded by breaks of the recircu l ation and MSL. The RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown C o oling System. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level C va ri able leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1 1), only one channel per trip system (with an isolation signal availab l e to one shutdown cooling pump suction isolation valve) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level LoH (level 3) F1:Jnction are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and S , provided the Rl l R Shutdo*.m Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor through the system. con in ed B 3.3-158 Revision No.----tt BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 2 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3l (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.ll, since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Function is only required to be OPERABLE in 4,' and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Pressure-High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path. This Function isolates both RHR shutdown cooling pump suction valves. Feedwater Recirculation Isolation 7.a. Reactor Pressure-High The Reactor Pressure-High Function is provided to isolate the feedwater recirculation line. This interlock is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenario, and credit for the interlock is not assumed in the accident or transient analysis in the UFSAR. The Reactor Pressure-High signals are initiated from four transmitters that are connected to different taps on the RPV. Four channels of Reactor Pressure-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the only MODES in which the reactor can be pressurized; thus, equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization.

This Function isolates the feedwater recirculation valves. Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation 8.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low.

Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool fuel may be threatened.

The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to (continued) t B 3.3-159 Revision No. 7-BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCD, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 l. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low C Level 3) A 11 ow able Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCD 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves and SGT System start are not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low C Level 3) Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES l, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required.

In addition , the Function is also required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) because the capability of isolating potential sources of leakage must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs. 2. Orywell Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary CRCPB). An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The isolation on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis.

The Drywell Pressure-High Function associated with isolation is not assumed in any UFSAR accident or transient analyses but will provide an isolation and initiation signal. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis. d B 3.3-172 Revision No. +

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCD, and APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 3, 4. Reactor Building Ventilation and Refueling Floor Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High (continued) channels of Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High Function and four channels of Refueling Floor Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding.

The Reactor Building Ventilation and Refueling Floor Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required.

In addition, the Functions are also required to be OPERABLE during OPDRVs and movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment, because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.

However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.

As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel. B 3.3-174 Revision No. +.&

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 MCREV System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 The Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High Function consists of four independent monitors.

Two channels of Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High per trip system are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude MCREV System initiation.

The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel.

The Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High Function t: is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and duri or E ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs , and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, to ensure tat control room personnel are protected during a LOCA, uel handling event , or vessel draindo*.m During MODES 4 and 5, when these specified conditions are not in progress (e.g., CORE ALTERATIONS), the probability of a LOCA or fuel damage is low; thus, the Function is not required.

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to MCREV System instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.

However, the Required Actions for inoperable MCREV System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.

As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable MCREV System instrumentation channel. A.l and A.2 Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the MCREV System design, an allowable out of service time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4), to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. However, this out of service time is only acceptable provided the Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High Function is still maintaining MCREV System initiation capability.

The Function is considered to be maintaining MCREV System B 3.3-182 Revision No.-+/-

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), ECCS-Operating B 3.5.1 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING COOLING CRCIC) SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION B 3.5.1 ECCS-Operating BASES BACKGROUND PBAPS UN IT 2 The ECCS are designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containment, to limit the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods (flooding and spraying) to cool the core during a LOCA. The ECCS network consists of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, the Core Spray (CS) System, the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal CRHR) System, and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The suppression pool provides the required source of water for the ECCS. Although no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank (CST), it is capable of providing a source of water for the HPCI and CS systems. On receipt of an initiation signal, ECCS pumps automatically start; simultaneously, the system aligns and the pumps inject water, taken either from the CST or suppression pool, into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) as RCS pressure is overcome by the discharge pressure of the ECCS pumps. Although the system is initiated, ADS action is delayed, allowing the operator to interrupt the timed sequence if the system is not needed. The HPCI pump discharge pressure almost immediately exceeds that of the RCS, and the pump injects coolant into the vessel to cool the core. If the break is small, the HPCI System will maintain coolant inventory as well as vessel level while the RCS is sti 11 pressurized.

If HPCI fails, it is backed up by ADS in combination with LPCI and CS. In this event, the ADS timed sequence would be allowed to time out and open the selected safety/relief valves (S/RVs) depressurizing the RCS, thus allowing the LPCI and CS to overcome RCS pressure and inject coolant into the vessel. If the break is large, RCS pressure initially drops rapidly and the LPCI and CS cool the core. Water from the break returns to the suppression pool where it is used again and again. Water in the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR System heat exchanger cooled by the High Pressure Service Water System. Depending on the location and size of the break, portions of the ECCS may be on i nued B 3.5-1 Revision No.--G BASES LCD (continued)

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.1 piping, resulting in the potential to damage the RHR system, r including water hammer. This is necessary since the RHR System is required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR shutdown cooling when necessary.

One LPCI subsystem shall be declared inoperable when M0-34A(B) and M0-39A(B) are simultaneously open in the same subsystem Cone or both subsystems) with no Emergency Diesel Generators CEDGs) declared inoperable to ensure compliance to References 7, 14, and 15 single failure analyses (Ref. 11). If the M0-34A and M0-39A are simultaneously open, the 'A' subsystem of LPCI shall be declared inoperable unless the E-1, E-2, or E-4 EOG is declared inoperable.

If the M0-34B and M0-39B are simultaneously open, the 'B' subsystem of LPCI shall be declared inoperable unless the E-1, E-2, or E-3 EOG is declared inoperable.

APPLICABILITY All ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In MODES 2 and 3, when reactor steam dome pressure is 5 150 psig, HPCI is not required to be OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS subsystems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure.

In MODES 2 and 3, when reactor steam dome pressure is 5 100 psig, ADS is not required to be OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS subsystems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure.

f*t-& \./,-L--J for MODES 4 and 5 are specified in LCD " EGGS S Flutdmm *" l"RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL" I ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable HPCI subsystem.

There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable HPCI subsystem and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCD not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

con inued PBAPS UN IT 2 B 3.5-6 Revision No.

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), EGGS Shutdmm B 3.5.2 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION B 3.5.2 EGGS Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCD PBAPS UN IT 2 A description of the Core Spray (CS) System and the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual H eat Removal (RHR) System is provided in the B ases for LCD 3.5.1 , "EGGS Operating." The EGGS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for a postulated l oss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one low pressure EGGS injection/spray subsystem is required , post LOCA , to maintain adequate reactor vessel water l evel in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown.

It is reasonable to assume , based on engineering judgement , that while in MODES 4 and 5 one low pressure E GG S injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reacto r vesse l water level. To provide redundancy , a minimum of t*,10 1 o*,, pressure EGGS injection/

spray subsystems arc required to be OPERA B LE in MOD E S 4 and 5. The low pressure EGGS subsystems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRG Policy Statement. Two l ow pressure EGGS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. A low pressure EGGS injection/

spray subsystem consists of a CS subsystem or a LPCI subsystem. Each GS subsystem consists of two motor driven pumps , piping , and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or condensate storage tank (CST) to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). E ach LPG! subsystem consists of one motor driven pump , piping , and va l ves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. Only a single LPGI pump is required per subsystem because of the larger injection capacity in relation to a GS subsystem. +R MODES 4 and 5 , the LPGI cross tie valve is not required to be closed. The necessary portions of the Emer§ency Service Water System are also required to provide appropriate cooling to each required EGGS subsystem , as necessary (Reference TRM 3.11). Management of gas voids is i mportant to E GGS injection/spray OPERA B IL I TY. B 3.5-18 Revision No.

t8} (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 EGGS Shutdown B 3.5.2 As noted , one LPG! subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPG! mode and is not otherwise inoperable.

Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes when the required RHR pump is not operating or when the system is realigned from or to the RHR shutdown cooling mode. This allowance is necessary since the RHR System may be required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Because of low pressure and low temperature conditions in MODES 4 and 5 , sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery. The following discussion applies when the LPGI cross tie valve CMO 20) is closed: One LPCI subsystem shall not be considered one of the required EGGS injection/spray subsystems when MO 3 4 ACBl and MO 39A (B) are simultaneously open in the same subsystem with no Emergency Diesel Generators CEDGs) declared inoperable. As discussed below , an exception to this may be taken if an EOG is declared inoperable. If the MO 34A and MO 39A arc simultaneously open , the 'A' subsystem of LPGI shall not be considered as one of the required EGGS injection/spray subsystems unless the E l , E 2 , or E 4 EOG is declared inoperable. -!-+ the MD 34B and MO 39B are simultaneously open , the 'B' subsystem of LPG! shall not be considered as one of the required EGGS injection/spray subsystems unless the E 1 , E 2 , or E 3 EOG is declared inoperable. The following discussion applies 11hen the LPG! cross tic valve CMO 20) is open: The LPG! cross tie valve CMO 20) cannot be credited for c l osing during an event to isolate both LPCI subsystems. A pipe break within Primary Containment is assumed 11hen the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is pressurized. Conversely , a pipe break within Primary Containment is not assumed when the RCS is depressurized. Mode 4 with RCS pressurized

When the un*t is in Mode 4 with reactor steam dome pressure indicating that the RCS is then both subsystems of LPGI are inoperable.

B 3.5-19 Revision No.

BASES tW (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 2 Mode 4 with RCS depressurized or Mode S: MO 3 4 A(8) and MO 3 9 A(Bl Closed: ECCS Shutdo*,m B 3.5.2 When the Unit is in Mode 4 *,1i th reactor steaffi dome pressure indicating that the RCS is depressurized or in Mode 5 AND there are no f l ow paths that could divert LPGI flow going to the reactor vessel (i.e., MO 34/39 closed), then both subsystems of LPGI can be considered operable as the required EGGS injection/spray subsysteffis. MO 3 4 ACB) and MO 3 9A(8) Open. When MO 20 , MO 34A , and MO 39A are simultaneously open , the 'A' subsys t em of Core Sp ray and both subsystems of L PCI cannot be considered as separate E CCS injection/spray subsystems because a single failure (failure of the E 3 EOG) exists that causes the 'A' subsystem of Core S pray and both subsystems of LPGI to be unable to perform their design functions. As a result, the 'A' subsy s tem of Gore Spray and both subsystems of LPCI can only be considered as one of the t*u*o required EGGS injection/spray subsystems when aligned in this configuration. 1 1/hen MO 20 , MO 34 A , and MO 39A are simultaneously open *,1ith either Hie E 1 , E 2 , or E 4 EOG declared inoperable , then the 'A' and 'B' subsystems of LPGJ may be credited as being operable , separate subsystems , since a fai l ure of the E 3 EOG is not postulated. When MO 20 , MO 3 4B, and MO 398 are simultaneously open , the 'B' subsystem of Core Spray and both subsystems of LPCI cannot be considered as separate EGGS injection/spray subsystems because a single failure (failure of E 4 EOG) exists that causes the 'B' subsystem of Gore Spray and both subsystems of LPCI to be unable t o per f orm their functions. A5-a result , the 'B' subsystem of Gore Spray and both subsystems of LPGI can on l y be considered as one of the t'.rn required EGGS i nj ecti on/s pray subsystems when aligned in this configuration. B 3.5-19a Revision No.--9-6 ..}--

BASES H-0 (continued)

APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 EGGS Shutdo11'R B 3.5.2 When MO 20 , MO 3 4B , and MO 3 9 B are simultaneously open with either the E 1 , E 2 , or E 3 EOG de cl a red i nope rabl e , then tt=1e 'A' and 'B' subsystems of LPCI may be credited as being operable , separate subsystems , siRce a failure of the E 4 E DG is not postulated. OPERABILITY of the low pressure E GGS injection/spray subsystems is required in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure adequate coolaRt iRveRtory aRd sufficient heat removal capability for the irradiated fuel in the core iR case of an iRadvertent draindown of the vessel. RequiremeRts for EGGS OPERABILITY during MODES l , 2 , and 3 are discussed iR the Applicability sectioR of the Bases for LCD 3.5.1. EGGS subsystems are no t required to be OPERABLE duriRg MODE 5 11ith the speRt fuel storage pool gates removed , the 11ater level maintained at inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero (20 ft 11 inches above the RPV flaAge), aRd no operations

  • ,;ith a potential for d r ainiAg the reactor vessel (OPDR'Js) in progress. This provides su f ficieAt coolaRt inventory to allow operator actioA to terminate the inveAtory loss prior to fuel uAcovery iR case of aA iAadverteAt draiAdown. The Automatic Depressurization System is Rot required to be OPERA B LE during MODES 4 aRd 5 because the RPV pressure is psig , and the CS System and the LPCI subsystems can provide core cooling without aRy depressurizatioR of the primary system. The H igh Pressure Coolant IRjectioA System is Rot required to be OPERABLE during MOD E S 4 and 5 siAce the low pressure EGGS iRjectioA/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to Hie vessel. A.l aAd B.l If any one required 1 o*,1 pressure EGGS i Rjecti on/spray subsystem i s iRoperable , aA inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. IR this ConditioA , the remaiRing OPERABLE subsystem can provide sufficient vessel floodiAg capability to recover from aA iAadvertent vesse l drai ndmm. H01Jever , overal 1 system rel i abi 1 i ty is reduced because a single failure iA the remaiAiRg OPERABLE B 3.5-19b Revision No. % _...r BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 A.l aAd B.l (continued)

ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.2 subsystem concurrent with a vessel draindown could result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended function. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring the required low pressure EGGS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based oA engineering judgment that considered the remaining available subsystem and the low probability of a vessel draindown event. llith the inoperable subsystem not restored to OPERABLE status in the required Completion Time , action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPORVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draiAdown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPORVs are suspended. C.l. C.2. 0.1. 0.2. and 0.3 With both of the required EGGS injection/spray subsystems inoperable , all coolant inventory makeup capability may be unavailable. Therefore , actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPORVs are suspended. One EGGS injection/spray subsystem must also be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. If at least one low pressure EGGS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time , additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem for Unit 2 is OPERABLE; aAd secondary coAtaiAment isolation capability (i.e., oAe isolation valve aAd associated instrumentatioA are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative coAtrols to assure isolation capability) in each associated secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases. OPERABILITY may be verified by an administrative check , or by examining logs or other information , to determine whether the components are out of service for mainteAance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the compoAents. B 3.5-20 Revision No. G BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UN IT 2 C.l. C.2. 0.1. 0.2. and 0.3 (continued)

ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.2 If , however , any re q uired coffiponent is inoperable , then it must be restored to OP ERABLE status. In this case , the Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to O PERABL E status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time to restore at least one low pressure E CCS injection/spray subsystem to O PERABLE status ensures that prompt action will be taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes any potential fission product release to the environment. £R 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 Hie mini ffium 'n'a ter 1 evel of 11. 0 feet required for the suppression p ool is periodically verified to ensure that the supp r ession pool will provide adequa t e net positive suction head (NPSH) for the CS System and LPGI subsystem pumps , recirculation volume , and vortett prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit , all EGGS injection/spray subsystems are inoperable unless they are aligned to an OPERABLE CST. When suppression pool leve l is < 11.0 feet , the CS System i s considered O PERABLE only if it can take suction from the CST , and the CST * .. *at er 1 evel is sufficient to provide the required NPSll for the CS pump. Therefore , a veri fi ca ti on that either the suppression pool water level is 11.0 feet or that CS is aligned t o take suction from the CST and the CST contains>

17.3 feet of water , equivalent to > 90 , 976 gallons of water , ensures that the CS System can supply at least 50 , 000 ga l lons of makeup water to the RPV. The unavailable volume of the CST for GS is at tAe 40 , 9 76 g a 11 on l eve 1 . H m1 ever , a s noted , on 1 y one re q u i red CS subsystem may take credit for the CST option during OPDRVs. During O PORVs , the volume in the CST may not provide ade q uate makeup if the RPV were complete l y drained. Therefore , only one CS subsystem is allowed to use the CST. This ensures the other required EGGS subsystem has adequate lftakeup volume. B 3.5-21 Revision No. G SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UN IT 2 £R 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 (continued)

EGGS Sh1::1tdo1m B 3.5.2 The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. £R 3.5.2.3. SR 3.5.2.5. and SR 3.5.2.6 The Bases provided for SR 3.5.l.l , SR 3.5.1.7 , and SR 3.5.1.10 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3 , SR 3.5.2.5 , and SR 3.5.2.6 , respectively. £R 3.5.2 , 4 Verifying the correct alignment for Alanual , po* .. *er operated , and automatic valves in the EGGS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for EGGS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked , sealed , or otherwise secured in position , since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking , sealing , or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation

rather , it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently Alisaligned , such as check valves. For the RHR System , verify each RHR heat exdianger inlet fl ow control valve is positioned to achieve at least the minimum flow rate required by SR 3.5.1.7. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Su r veillance Frequency Control Program. Hie Survei 11 ance is modified by a Note 1thi cl9 e)tempts systemjf vent fl 0*1 paths opened under admi ni strati ve control. administrative control shou l d be proceduralized and include stationing an individua l who can rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed. B 3.5-22 Revision No. 2-6 REFERENCES PBAPS UN IT 2 EGGS Shutdo*1m B 3.S.2 h 20566A , " General Electric Company Analytical Mode l for Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis in Accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix K ," September 1 98 6. B 3.5-23 Revision No.

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIG), RCIC System B 3.5.3 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION B 3.5.3 RCIC System BASES BACKGROUND PBAPS UN IT 2 The RCIC System is not part of the ECCS; however, the RCIC System is included with the ECCS section because of their similar functions.

The RCIC System is designed to operate either automatically or manually following reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation accompanied by a loss of coolant flow from the feedwater system to provide adequate core cooling and control of the RPV water level. Under these conditions, the High Pressure Coolant Injection CHPCI) and RCIC systems perform similar functions.

The RCIC System design requirements ensure that the criteria of Reference 1 are satisfied.

The RCIC System (Ref. 2) consists of a steam driven turbine pump unit, piping, and valves to provide steam to the turbine, as well as piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line, where the coolant is distributed within the RPV through the feedwater sparger. Suction piping is provided from the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool. Pump suction is normally aligned to the CST to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the RPV. However, if the CST water supply is low, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source ensures a water supply for continuous operation of the RCIC System. The steam supply to the turbine is piped from a main steam line upstream of the associated inboard main steam line isolation valve. The RCIC System is designed to provide core cooling for a wide range of reactor pressures (150 psig to 1170 psig). ,,r--Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the RCIC turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the RCIC flow increases, the turbine governor valve is automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the RCIC turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water back to the CST to allow testing of the RCIC System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV. B 3.5-24 Revision No. -+/-+G BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO APPLICABILITY D RCIC System B 3.5.3 The RCIC pump is provided with a m1n1mum flow bypass line, which discharges to the suppression pool. The valve in this line automatically opens when the discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge piping is kept full of water. The RCIC System is normally aligned to the CST. The height of water in the CST is sufficient to maintain the piping full of water up to the first isolation valve. The relative height of the feedwater line connection for RCIC is such that the water in the feedwater lines keeps the remaining portion of the RCIC discharge line full of water. Therefore, RCIC does not require a "keep fill" system. The function of the RCIC System is to respond to transient events by providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safeguard System and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation.

Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, however, the system satisfies Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement.

The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides adequate c o re cooling such that actuation of any of the low pressure ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity for maintaining RPV inventory during an isolation event. Management of gas voids is important to RCIC System OPERABILITY.

'I The RCIC System is required to be OPERABLE during MODE l, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since RCIC is the primary non-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized.

In MODES 2 3 with reactor steam dome pressure $ 150 in MODES 4 and 5, RCIC is not re q uired to be ABLE sine the low EGGS . . RPV inventory control is required by LCO 3.5.4 , "RPV Water Level Inventory Control." PBAPS UN IT 2 B 3.5-25 Rev i sion No.

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.4 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO PBAPS UNIT 2 The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF , the ability to remove decay heat is reduced , which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures. With the unit in MODE 4 or 5 , RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment should an unexpected draining event occur. A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure , reduced piping stresses , and ductile piping systems. Instead , an event is considered in which single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate , or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event (except when risk is assessed and managed in accordance with TS 3.0.8), loss of normal power , single human error) . It is assumed , based on engineering judgment , that while in MODES 4 and 5 , one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. As discussed in References 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , and 5 , operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore , RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 1 0 C FR 5 0 . 3 6 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( ii ) . The RPV water level must be controlled in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should occur , the reactor coolant water level remains above the top of the active irradiated fuel as required by Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. (continued) B 3.5-31 Revision No. XXX BASES LCO (continued)

APPLICABILITY PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to be 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate unexpected draining of reactor coolant. An event that could cause loss of RPV water inventory and result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation. One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required to be OPERABLE and capable of being manually started to provide defense-in-depth should an unexpected draining event occur. A low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem consists of either one Core Spray (CS) subsystem or one Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem. Each CS subsystem consists of one motor driven pump , piping , and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or condensate storage tank (CST) to the RPV. Each LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump , piping , and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. In MODES 4 and 5 , the RHR System cross tie valve is not required to be closed. The LCO is modified by a Note which allows a required LPCI subsystem to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise inoperable. Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes when the required RHR pump is not operating or when the system is realigned from or to the RHR shutdown cooling mode. This allowance is necessary since the RHR System may be required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Because of the restrictions on DRAIN TIME , sufficient time will be available following an unexpected draining event to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to maintain RPV water inventory prior reaching the TAF. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5. Requirements on water inventory control in other MODES are contained in LCOs in Section 3.3 , Instrumentation , and other LCOs in Section 3.5 , ECCS , RCIC , and RPV Water Inventory Control. RPV water inventory control is required to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 which is applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel. (continued B 3.5-32 Revision No. XXX BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 2 A.l and B.l RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 If the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable , it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In this Condition , the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME minimize the possibility that an unexpected draining event could necessitate the use of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem , however the defense-in-depth provided by the ECCS injection/spray subsystem is lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considers the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME and the low probability of an unexpected draining event that would result in loss of RPV water inventory. If the inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time , action must be initiated immediately to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls , water sources , and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems , and must be able to access water inventory capable of maintaining the RPV water level above the TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. If recirculation of injected water would occur , it may be credited in determining the necessary water volume. C.l , C.2 , and C.3 With the DRAIN TIME less than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> but greater than or equal to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> , compensatory measures should be taken to ensure the ability to implement mitigating actions should an unexpected draining event occur. Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF , there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained , diluted , and processed prior to being released to the environment. The secondary containment provides a controlled volume in which fission products can be contained , diluted , and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action C.l requires verification of the capability to establish the secondary containment boundary in less than the DRAIN TIME. (continued) B 3.5-33 Revision No. XXX BASES ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 The required verification confirms actions to establish the secondary containment boundary are preplanned and necessary materials are available. The secondary containment boundary is considered established when one Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment. Verification that the secondary containment boundary can be established must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. Secondary containment penetration flow paths form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action C.2 requires verification of the capability to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to isolate the secondary containment penetration flow paths are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Power operated valves are not required to receive automatic isolation signals if they can be closed manually within the required time. Verification that the secondary containment penetration flow paths can be isolated must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action C.3 requires verification of the capability to place one SGT subsystem in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to place a SGT subsystem in operation are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Verification that a SGT subsystem can be placed in operation must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. D. 1 , D. 2 , D. 3 , and D. 4 With the DRAIN TIME less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> , mitigating actions are implemented in case an unexpected draining event should occur. Note that if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> , Required Action E.l is also applicable. Required Action D.l requires immediate action to establish an additional method of water injection augmenting the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required by the LCO. The additional method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls , water sources , and pumps and (continued)

B 3.5-34 Revision No. XXX BASES ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The Note to Required Action D.l states that either the ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the additional method of water injection must be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The additional method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems. The additional method of water injection must be able to access water inventory capable of being injected to maintain the RPV water level above the TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources. If recirculation of injected water would occur , it may be credited in determining the required water volume. Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF , there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensu r e that radioactive material will be contained , diluted , and processed prior to being released to the environment. The secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products can be contained , diluted , and processed p rior to release to the environment. Required Action D.2 requires that actions be irrunediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary. With the secondary containment boundary established , one SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment. The secondary containment penetrations form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action D.3 requires that actions be irrunediately initiated to verify that each secondary containment penetration flow path is isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room. One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the [secondary]

containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action D.4 requires that actions be irrunediately initiated to verify that at least one SGT subsystem is capable of being placed in operation. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. E.l If the Required Actions and associated Completion times o f Conditions C or D are not met or if the DRAIN TIME is les s (continu ed) B 3.5-35 Revision No. XX X BASES ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> , actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. In this condition , there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF. Note that Required Actions D.l , D.2 , D.3 , and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. SR 3.5.4.l This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF is 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate draining of reactor coolant. Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation. The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic crosssectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation. A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single , wise , or integrated calculation considering the changin g RPV water level during a draining event. For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blank flange , the realistic cross-sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube. If the control rod blade will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade , the exposed crosssectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used. The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system , or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked , sealed , or otherwise secured in the closed position , blank flanges , or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths. A blank flange or other bolted device must be connected with a sufficient number of bolts to prevent draining in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake. Normal or expected leakage from closed systems or past isolation devices is permitted. Determination that a system is intact and closed or isolated must consider the status of branch lines and ongoing plant maintenance and testing activities. The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system when misalignment issues (Reference

6) have been precluded by functional valve (continued) B 3.5-36 Revision No. XXX BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 interlocks or by isolation devices , such that redirection of RPV water out of an RHR subsystem is precluded. Further , RHR Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system if its controls have not been transferred to Remote Shutdown , which disables the interlocks and isolation signals. The exclusion of penetration flow paths from the determination of DRAIN TIME must consider the potential effects of a single operator error or initiating event on items supporting maintenance and testing (rigging , scaffolding , temporary shielding , piping plugs , snubber removal (except when risk is assessed and managed in accordance with TS LCO 3.0.8), freeze seals , etc.). If failure of such items could result and would cause a draining event from a closed system or between the RPV and the isolation device , the penetration flow path may not be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation. Surveillance Requirement 3.0.l requires SRs to be met between performances. Therefore , any changes in plant conditions that would change the DRAIN TIME requires that a new DRAIN TIME be determined. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.2 and SR 3.5.4.3 The minimum water level of 11.0 ft. required for the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the CS subsystem or LPCI subsystem pump , recirculation volume , and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit required ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable unless aligned to an OPERABLE CST. The required CS System is OPERABLE only if it can take suction from the CST , and the CST water level is sufficient to provide the required NPSH for the CS pump. Therefore , a verification that either the suppression pool water level 11.0 ft. or that a required CS subsystem is aligned to take suction from the CST and the CST 90 , 976 gallons of water , equivalent to 17.3 ft., ensures that the CS subsystem can supply at least 50 , 000 gallons of makeup water to the RPV. The CS suction is uncovered at the 40 , 976 gallon level. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued B 3.5-37 Revision No. XXX BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 SR 3.5.4.4 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS subsystem will perform properly. This may also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.5 Verifying the correct alignment for manual , power operated , and automatic valves in the required ECCS subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will be available for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked , sealed , or otherwise secured in position , since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking , sealing , or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation

rather , it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned , such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.6 Verifying that the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually started and operate for at least 10 minutes demonstrates that the subsystem is available to mitigate a draining event. Testing the ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line is necessary to avoid overfilling the refueling cavity. The minimum operating time of 10 minutes was based on engineering judgement. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.7 Verifying that each valve credited for automatically isolating (continued) B 3.5-38 Revision No. XXX BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

REFERENCES PBAPS UNIT 2 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated RPV water level isolation signal is required to prevent RPV water inventory from dropping below the TAF should an unexpected draining event occur. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.8 The required ECCS subsystem is required to be manually actuated. This Surveillance verifies that the required CS subsystems or LPCI subsystem (including the associated pump I valve(s))

can be placed into service. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. l.Information Notice 84-81 " Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup ," November 1984. 2.Information Notice 86-74 , " Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves ," August 1986. 3.Generic Letter 92-04 , " Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F), " August 1992. 4.NRC Bulletin 93-03 , " Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs ," May 1993. 5.Information Notice 94-52 , Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1 ," July 1994. 6.General Electric Service Information Letter No. 388, " RHR Valve Misalignment During Shutdown Cooling Operation for BWR 3/4/5/6 ," February 1983. B 3.5-39 Revision No. XXX BASES LCO (continued)

APPLICABILITY when the ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 PC I Vs B 3.6.1.3 de-activated and secured in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Reference 2 and Reference

5. MSIVs must meet additional leakage rate requirements.

Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing. This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, me-54: PCIVs are not required to be 0 BLE and the primary containment purge and exhaust valves not required to be normally closed in MODES 4 and 5. Cer valves, however, are required to be OPERABLE .:f-A.e.5-e associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.l, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation." CThis does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation

.) The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) except for purge or exhaust valve flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

Due to the size of the primary containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves is not allowed to be operated under administrative controls.

continu d B 3.6-18 Revision No.

BASES ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 G.l and G.2 PC I Vs B 3.6.1.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during MODE 4 or 5, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCD does not apply. Action must be immediately initiated

{-a suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (QPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended and valve(s) are restored to OPERA B L E status. If suspend i ng an OPORV 11ould result in closing the residual heat removal CRHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves , an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve. (continued)

B 3.6-23a Revision No. "1:+4 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO APPLICABILITY "RPV Water Inventory Control" ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 Suppression Pool Water Level B 3.6.2.2 Initial suppression pool water level affects suppression pool temperature response calculations, calculated drywell pressure during vent clearing for a DBA, calculated pool swell loads for a DBA LOCA, and calculated loads due to S/RV discharges.

Suppression pool water level must be maintained within the limits specified so that the safety analysis of Reference 1 remains valid. Suppression pool water level satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

A limit that suppression pool water level be 14. 5 feet and 14.9 feet is required to ensure that the primary containment conditions assumed for the safety analyses are met. Either the high or low water level limits were used in the safety analyses, depending upon which is more conservative for a particular calculation.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA would cause significant loads on the primary containment.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. requirement for maintaining suppression pool water level 4 within limits in MODE 4 or 5 is addressed in LCO " ECCS S hutdo;m". With suppression pool water level outside the limits, the conditions assumed for the safety analyses are not met. If water level is below the minimum level, the pressure suppression function still exists as long as main vents are covered, HPCI and RCIC turbine exhausts are covered, and S/RV quenchers are covered. If suppression pool water level is above the maximum level, protection against overpressurization still exists due to the margin in the peak containment pressure analysis and the capability of the Drywell Spray System. Therefore, continued operation for a limited time is allowed. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is sufficient to restore suppression pool water level to within limits. Also, it takes into account the low probability of an event impacting the suppression pool water level occurring during this interval.

con i nue B 3.6-54 Revision No.

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LCO APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.l however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be processed prior to release to the environment.

For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment.

Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations

\lith a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), or during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment.

However, outside ground level hatches (hatches Hl5 through Hl9 and Torus room access hatch H33) may not be opened during movement of irradiated fuel. This wi 11 maintain CR doses acceptable.

If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES l, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal. c ntinued B 3.6-74 Revision No. +.§.

BASES Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.l ACTIONS 1L.l (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. C.l , and C,2 Movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment.

In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment.

Therefore, movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position.

Also , action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize probabi lity of a vessel and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDR Vs arc suspended. Required Action C.l has been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable, since the movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL can only be performed in MODES 4 and 5. (continued)

B 3.6-75 Revision No. +&

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LCO APPLICABILITY PBAPS UNIT 2 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 boundary established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.

Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary.

The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs. The power operated automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Reference

2. The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are de-activated and secured in their closed position, and blind flanges are in place. These passive isolat i on valves or devices are listed in Reference
2. J---In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment.

Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as operatioAs 11ith a poteAtia l for drain i Ag the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment.

SCIVs are only required to be OPERABLE during OPDRVs or handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES l, 2, and 3. (continued)

B 3.6-79 Revision No. -s.

BASES ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 2 C.l and C.2 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. D.l and 0.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCD does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also , if applicable , actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimi2e the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product re l ease. Actions must continue unti l OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action D.l has been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable, since the movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL can only be performed in MODES 4 and 5. SR 3.6.4.2.l This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is not locked, sea l ed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.

Rather, it involves verification that those SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

continued B 3.6-82 Revision No . .;z.;

BASES LCO (continued)

APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 For Unit 2, one SGT subsystem is OPERABLE when one charcoal filter train, one fan (0AV020) and associated ductwork, dampers, valves, and controls are OPERABLE.

The second SGT subsystem is OPERABLE when the other charcoal filter train, one fan (0BV020) and associated ductwork, damper, valves, and controls are OPERABLE.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel COPDRVs), or during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment.

The SGT System is only required to be OPERABLE during OPDRVs or handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL. With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function.

However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a OBA occurring during this period. If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Remaining in the continued B 3.6-87 Revision No. -5 BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 2 B.l (continued)

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 Applicability of the LCD is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. C.1 1 C.2.1. and C.2.2 During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies, in L-the secondary containment or during O PDRVs , when Required -i-Action A.l cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should immediately be placed in operation.

This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.l is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies must immediately be suspended.

Suspension of this activity must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also , if applicab l e , actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potentia l for fission product release. Actions must continue unti l OPDRVs are suspended. The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable, since the { movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL can only be performed in MODES 4 and 5. continued B 3.6-88 Revision No. +;.

BASES SGT System B 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS .Q....J. (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 2 If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT System may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function.

Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCD is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. E.l aRd E.2 When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended.

Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completio n of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also , if app li cab l e , actions must immediately be iRitiated to suspeRd OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown aRd subsequent poteAtia l for fissioA p r odu c t re l ease. Actions must coAtiRue unti l OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action E.l has been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable, since the m o vement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL can only be performed i n MODES 4 and 5. SR 3.6.4.3.l Operating each SGT subsystem (including each filter train fan) for 15 minutes ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly.

It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature)

  • 15 minutes periodically is suffic i ent to eliminate moisture ...-t' on the adsorbers and HEPA filters since during idle periods instrument air is injected into the filter plenum to keep the filters dry. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the j/' Surveillance Frequency Control Program. ......-1 continued B 3.6-89 Revision No.

MCREV System B 3.7.4 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 In MODES l, 2, and 3, the MCREV System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CRE will remain habitable during and following a OBA, since the OBA could lead to a fission product release. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a OBA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the MCREV System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for tfie follo*,;in§ situations 1:1nder wfi id1 si§nificant radioactive releases can be postu lated: Ourin§ operations with potential for drainin§ the reactor vessel C OPDRVs); During CORE ALTERATIONS; and During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

With one MCREV subsystem inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary, the inoperable MCREV subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE MCREV subsystem is adequate to maintain control room temperature and to perform the CRE occupant protection function.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the MCREV System function.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a OBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.l. B.2 and B.3 If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past a CRE boundary and into the CRE can result in CRE .{' occupant radiological dose greater than the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of OBA consequences (allowed to be up to 5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE)), or inadequate protection of CRE occupants from hazardous chemicals or smoke that have been licensed to occur, the CRE boundary is inoperable.

Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE CRE boundary within 90 days. contin ed B 3.7-17 Revision No.

and BASES MCREV System B 3.7.4 ACTIONS -f---( continued)

PBAPS UN IT 2 The Required Actions of Condition Dare modified by a Note indicating that LCD 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPORVs, if the inoperable MCREV subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE MCREV subsystem may be placed in operation.

This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.l is to immediately

---+-suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. Thisplaces the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also , if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPORVs to minimize tAe probability of a vessel draindown and tAe subsequent potent i al for f i ssion product release. Actions must continue until tAe OPORYs are suspended. Ll If both MCREV subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary (i.e., Condition B), the MCREV System may not be capable of performing the intended function.

Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCD is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. con in ed B 3.7-19 Revision No . .es and BASES ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 2 MCREV System B 3.7.4 The Required Actions of Condition F are modified by a Note indicating that LCD 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with two MCREV subsystems inoperable or with one or more MCREV subsystems inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

If applicable , actioAs must be iAitiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. SR 3.7.4.1 This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate 15 minutes. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly.

As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem periodically provides an 1 adequate check on this system. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.7.4.2 This SR verifies that the required MCREV testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations).

Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. continued B 3.7-20 Revision No. 8-6 AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES PBAPS UN IT 2 A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCD 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." The OPERABILITY of the m1n1mum AC sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as -tttt inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents.

However, assuming a single failure and concurrent lass of all offsite or lass of all onsite power is not required.

The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents CDBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences.

These deviations from OBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCD for required systems. During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that d B 3.8-40 Revision No . .g BASES LCO (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 2 AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 offsite circuit. In addition, some equipment that may be required by Unit 2 is powered from Unit 3 sources (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System). Therefore, one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the Unit 3 onsite Class lE AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s), and one DG (not necessarily a different DG than those being used to meet LCO 3.8.2.b requirements) capable of supplying power to one of the required Unit 3 subsystems of each of the required components must also be OPERABLE.

Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit(s) and required DG(s) ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and reactor vessel draindown). Automatic initiation of the required DG during shutdown conditions is specified in LCO 3.3.S.l , EGGS Instrumentation , and LCO 3.3.8.l, LOP Instrumentation.

The qualified Unit 2 offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to the respective Unit 2 4 kV emergency bus(es), and of accepting required loads during an accident.

Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR, Technical Specification Bases Section 3.8.l and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. A Unit 2 offsite circuit consists of the incoming breaker and disconnect to the startup and emergency auxiliary transformer, the respective circuit path to the emergency auxiliary transformer, and the circuit path to the Unit 2 4 kV emergency buses required by LCO 3.8.8, including feeder breakers to the required Unit 2 4 kV emergency buses. A qualified Unit 3 offsite circuit's requirements are the same as the Unit 2 circuit's requirements, except that the circuit path, including the feeder breakers, is to the Unit 3 4 kV emergency buses required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8. The required DGs must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to their respective Unit 2 emergency bus on detection of bus undervoltage.

This sequence must be accomplished within 10 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the 4 kV emergency buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot and DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions.

Additional contin ed B 3.8-42 Revision No. -5+

BASES LCO (continued)

AC Sources -Shutdown B 3.8.2 DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode. Proper sequencing of loads is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

The necessary portions of the Emergency Service Water System are also required to provide appropriate cooling to each required DG. The OPERABILITY requirements for the DG capable of supplying power to the Unit 3 powered equipment are the same as described above, except that the required DG must be capable of connecting to its respective Unit 3 4 kV emergency bus. (In addition, the Unit 3 ECCS initiation logic SRs are not applicable, as described in SR 3.8.2.2 Bases.) It is acceptable for 4 kV emergency buses to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required buses. No automatic transfer capability is required for offsite circuits to be considered OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the

..........

to provide assurance that: that provide core cooling PBAPS UN IT 2 a. ystems providing adequate coolant inventory makeup arc available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core i n case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1. (continued)

B 3.8-43 Revision No. -G BASES (continued)

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 ACTIONS LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCD 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

P8APS UNIT 2 A.l and B.l With one or more required offsite circui s inoperable, or with one DG inoperable, the remaining equired sources may be capable of supporting sufficient equired features (e.g., system, subsystem, division, comp nt, or device) to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, uel movement ,---a-Fl-G operations with a poten t ia l for draining the reactor vesse l. For example, if two or more 4 kV emergency buses are required per LCD 3.8.8, one 4 kV emergency bus with offsite power available may be capable of supplying sufficient required features.

By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable that are not powered from offsite power (Required Action A.l) or capable of being powered by the required DG (Required Action B.l), appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected feature(s)

LCOs' ACTIONS. Required features remaining powered from a qualified offsite power circuit, even if that circuit is considered inoperable because it is not powering other required features, are not declared inoperable by this Required Action. If a single DG is credited with meeting both LCD 3.8.2.d and one of the DG requirements of LCD 3.8.2.b, then the required features remaining capable of being powered by the DG are not declared inoperable by this Required Action, even if the DG is considered inoperable because it is not capable of powering other required features.

A.2.4 B.2.1. B.2.2. B.2.3 , B.2.4 C.l. an offsite circuit not available to all required 4 kV emergency buses or one required DG inoperable, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable d B 3.8-44 Revision N o.

BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UN IT 2 AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 A.2.3. A.2.4. B.2.1. B.2.2. B.2.3. B.2.4 C.l. (continued) (per Required Actions A.land B.1). Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With two or more required DGs inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources may not be available.

It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATION movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary and activities Suspension of these activities s all not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention.

The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization.

Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required 4 kV emergency bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a required bus is de-energized.

LCO 3.8.8 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized bus. SR 3.8.2.l SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the Unit 2 AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. SR 3.8.1.8 is not con in e B 3.8-45 Revision No. tl BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UN IT 2 SR 3.8.2.1 (continued)

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 required to be met since only one offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE.

SR 3.8.1.17 is not required to be met because the required OPERABLE DG(s) is not required to undergo periods of being synchronized to the offsite circuit. SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE.

Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCD 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4 kV emergency bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit are required to be OPERABLE.

This SR is modified by a second Note. The reason for the 1 Note is to preclude requiring the automatic functions of the DG(s) on an ECCS initiation to be functional during periods when ECCS are not required.

Periods in which EGGS are not required are specified in LCO 3.S.2 , " ECCS ShutdO'tm". SR 3.8.2.2 This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 3 AC sources are governed by the Unit 3 Technical Specifications.

Performance of the applicable Unit 3 Surveillances will satisfy Unit 3 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 2 Surveillance Requirement.

Seven exceptions are noted to the Unit 3 SRs of LCD 3.8.1. SR 3.8.1.8 is excepted when only one Unit 3 offsite circuit is required by the Unit 2 Specification, since there is not a second circuit to transfer to. SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8.1.17, SR 3.8.1.18 CECCS load block requirements only), and SR 3.8.1.19 are excepted since these SRs test the Unit 3 ECCS initiation signal, which is not needed for the AC sources to be OPERABLE on Unit 2. SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted since starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE.

B 3.8-46 c n inue Revision No. +e Amendment No. 221 DC Sources -Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating." APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 14 CRef. 1), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE.

The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators ( DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

LCO PBAPS UN IT 2 The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as i3-!T inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

The Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystems, with each DC subsystem consisting of two 125 V station batteries in series, two battery chargers Cone per battery), and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus, are required to be con inu d B 3.8-72 Revision No . .ft BASES LCO (continued)

APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 2 DC Sources -Shutdown B 3.8.5 OPERABLE to support Unit 2 DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Shutdown." When the equipment required OPERABLE:

1) does not require 250 VDC from the DC electrical power subsystem; and 2) does not require 125 VDC from one of the two 125 V batteries of the DC electrical power subsystem, the Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystem requirements can be modified to only include one 125 V battery (the battery needed to provide power to required equipment), an associated battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying 125 V power to the associated bus. This exception is allowed only if all 250 VDC loads are removed from the associated bus. In addition, DC control power Cwhi ch provides control power for the 4 kV load circuit breakers and the feeder breakers to the 4 kV emergency bus) for two of the four 4 kV emergency buses, as wel 1 as control power for two of the di es el generators, is provided by the Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystems.

Therefore, the Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystems needed to support required components are also required to be OPERABLE.

The Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystem OPERABILITY requirements are the same as those required for a Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystem.

In addition, battery chargers (Unit 2 and Unit 3) can be powered from the opposite unit's AC source (as described in the Background section of the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating"), and be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of meeting this LCO. This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that: jcore cooling a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; contin ed B 3.8-73 Revision No.

BASES APPLICABILITY (continued)

ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 b. DC Sources -Shutdown B 3.8.5 Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCD 3.8.4. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCD 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCD 3.8.8, the DC electrical power subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC electrical power subsystems inoperable may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC electrical power subsystems inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. However, in many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for suffi ci entl y conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel). con in ed B 3.8-74 Revision No.

BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UN IT 2 A DC Sources -Shutdown B 3.8.5 (continued)

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention.

The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power. SR 3.8.5.l SR 3.8.5.l requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.l through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCD 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC electrical power subsystems from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

SR 3.8.5.2 This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystems are governed by the Unit 3 Technical Specifications.

Performance of the applicable Unit 3 Surveillances will satisfy Unit 3 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 2 Surveillance Requirement.

The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 3 SR also governs performance of that SR for Unit 2. contin d B 3.8-75 Revision No. {}

Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES PBAPS UN IT 2 A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems-Operating." The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 14 (Ref. 1), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Cool ant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (continued)

B 3.8-94 Revision No . .g BASES (continued)

Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition.

Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features.

This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the Unit 2 electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications required systems, equipment, and components-both specifically addressed by their own LCO, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 2 In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 2 receive power through Unit 3 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and DC control power for two of the four 4 kV emergency buses, as well as control power for two of the di es el generators).

Therefore, Unit 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support the required equipment must also be OPERABLE.

In addition, it is acceptable for required buses to be cross-tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single source to supply multiple redundant buses, provided the source is capable of maintaining proper frequency (if required) and voltage. Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents aRd iRadvertent reactor vessel drai Rdo*.m). The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide that core cooling ! a. Systems r ! adequate cool a Rt i nv ntory ma l(eup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an iRadvertent draindown of the reactor vesse l; b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available; con in d B 3.8-95 Revision No. {}

BASES APPLICABILITY (continued)

ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 2 c. Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCD 3.8.7. LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE l, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCD 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4 1 and A.2.5 Although redundant required features may require redundant e ctrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPER E distribution subsystem may be capable of supporting sufficie required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS fuel movemen t-; and operati ens 1.*i th a potentia l for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with associated electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable, propriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with th ffected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. Howeve in many instances this option may involve undesired administr ive efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently nservative actions is made, Ci .e., to suspend CORE ALTERATION , movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment , and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vesse l). continued B 3.8-96 Revision No. B BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES PBAPS UN IT 2 Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 A.l. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. and A.2.5 (continued)

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems. Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal-shutdown cooling CRHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable.

In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCD 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR-SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR-SDC ACTIONS. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention.

The restoration of the required electrical power distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power. SR 3.8.8.l This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem is functioning properly, with the buses energized.

The verification of indicated power availability on the buses ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. This may be performed by verification of absence of low voltage alarms. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. 1. UFSAR, Chapter 14. B 3.8-97 Revision No. 86 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation B 3.10.1 unlikely that could result in draining of the RPV BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) re DE 4 by LCD more than adequate to keep the \fi'K'-f'-4-+-f*l-A-fl-fl-heat load condition.

Sma by leakage inspections LCD PBAPS UN IT 2 los........, ...................... RPV water level above TAF For the purposes of this test, the protection provid Inventory normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in additio Control ," secondary containment requirements required to be me this Special Operations LCD, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases. As described in LCD 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCD is optional.

Operation at reactor coolant temperatures

> 212°F can be in accordance with Table 1.1-1 for MODE 3 operation without meeting this Special Operations LCD or its ACTIONS. This option may be required due to P/T limits, however, which require testing at temperatures

> 212°F, while the ASME inservice test itself requires the safety/relief valves to be gagged, preventing their OPERABILITY.

Additionally, even with required minimum reactor coolant temperatures<

212°F, RCS temperatures may drift above 212°F during the performance of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing or during subsequent control rod scram time testing, which is typically performed in conjunction with inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. While this Special Operations LCD is provided for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and for scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, parallel performance of others tests and inspections is not precluded.

B 3.10-Za Revision No.

TABLE OF CONTENTS B 2.0 B 2 .1.1 B 2 .1.2 B 3.0 B 3.0 B 3.1 B 3 .1.1 B 3 .1.2 B 3 .1. 3 B 3 .1. 4 B 3 .1. 5 B 3 .1. 6 B 3 .1. 7 B 3 .1. 8 B 3.2 B 3. 2 .1 B 3.2.2 B 3.2.3 B 3.3 B 3.3.1.1 B 3.3.1.2 B 3. 3. 2 .1 B 3.3.2.2 B 3. 3. 3 .1 B 3. 3. 3. 2 B 3. 3. 4 .1 B 3.3.4.2 B 3. 3. 5 .1 B 3.3.5.2 B 3.3.5.3 B 3.3.5.4 B 3. 3. 6 .1 B 3.3.6.2 B 3.3.7.1 B 3.3.8.1 B 3. 3. 8. 2 SAFETY LIMITS ( SLs) ........................................ . Reactor Core SLs ................................... . Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL .......... . LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY

....... . SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY

................ . REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ............................. . SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SOM) .............................. . Reactivity Anomalies

............................... . Control Rod OPERABILITY

............................ . Control Rod Scram Times ............................ . Control Rod Scram Accumulators

..................... . Rod Pattern Control ................................ . Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System ................ . Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves .. POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS .............................. . AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) ........................................ . MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) INSTRUMENTATION

........................................ . Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

........ . Wide Range Neutron Monitor (WRNM) Instrumentation

...... . Control Rod Block Instrumentation

...................... . Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation

................................. . Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation

......... . Remote Shutdown System ................................. . Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT)

Instrumentation

............ . End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip B 2.0-1 B 2.0-1 B 2.0-7 B 3.0-1 B 3.0-1 0 B 3.1-1 B 3.1-1 B 3.1-8 B 3.1-13 B 3.1-22 B 3.1-29 B 3.1-34 B 3.1-39 B 3.1-48 B 3.2-1 B 3.2-1 B 3.2-6 B 3.2-11 B 3.3-1 B 3.3-1 B 3.3-37 B 3.3-46 B 3.3-59 B 3.3-66 B 3.3-77 B 3.3-84 (EOC-RPT)

Instrumentation . . . B 3.3-92a thru B 3.3-92j Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

..................................

B 3. 3-93 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation

..................................

B 3. 3-131 Not used B 3.3-140a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control B 3.3-14lb Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

...........

B 3.3-142 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentati o n .........

8 3.3-169 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation

...........................

B 3.3-180 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

..............

....... B 3.3-187 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring

.......................................

B 3.3-199 PBAPS UNIT 3 i Revision No. 8-TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.4 B 3.4.1 B 3.4.2 B 3.4.3 B 3.4.4 B 3.4.5 B 3.4.6 B 3.4.7 B 3.4.8 B 3.4.9 B 3.4.10 B 3.5 B 3.5.1 B 3.5.2 B 3.5.3 B 3.5.4 B 3.6 B 3.6.1.1 B 3.6.1.2 B 3.6.1.3 B 3.6.1.4 B 3.6.1.5 B 3.6.1.6 B 3.6.2.1 B 3.6.2.2 B 3.6.2.3 B 3.6.2.4 B 3.6.3.1 B 3.6.3.2 B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6.4.3 B 3.7 B 3.7.1 B 3.7.2 B 3.7.3 B 3.7.4 B 3.7.5 PBAPS UNIT 3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ............................

B 3.4-1 Recirculation Loops Operating

.......................

B 3.4-1 Jet Pumps ...........................................

B 3. 4-11 Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves (SVs) B 3.4-15 RCS Operational LEAKAGE .............................

B 3.4-19 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

...............

B 3.4-24 RCS Specific Activity ...............................

B 3.4-29 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown .............................

B 3. 4-33 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown ............................

B 3. 4-38 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits ...........

B 3.4-43 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure .........................

B 3.4-52 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ...................................

B 3. 5-1 ECCS-Operating

.....................................

B 3. 5-1

...............................

B 3. 5-18 RCIC System .........................................

B 3. 5-24 RPV Water Inventory Control ......................... B 3.5-25 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6-1 Primary Containment

.....................................

B 3. 6-1 Primary Containment Air Lock ............................

B 3.6-6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ............

B 3.6-14 Drywell Air Temperature

.................................

B 3. 6-31 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers .........................................

B 3. 6-34 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers ..........

B 3.6-42 Suppression Pool Average Temperature

....................

B 3.6-48 Suppression Pool Water Level ............................

B 3.6-53 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling ..........................................

B 3. 6-56 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray ...... B 3.6-60 Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) System ...........

B 3.6-64 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration

................

B 3.6-70 Secondary Containment

...................................

B 3. 6-73 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) ..........

B 3.6-78 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System ......................

B 3.6-85 PLANT SYSTEMS ...........................................

B 3. 7-1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) System ...........

B 3.7-1 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and Normal Heat Sink .......................................

B 3. 7-6 Emergency Heat Sink .................................

B 3. 7-11 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System ...........................................

B 3. 7-15 Main Condenser Off gas ...............................

B 3. 7-22 (continued)

Revision No. 3 ii BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.l which with their setpoints within the s ecified All wable Values, where appropriate.

The actual set oint is ca ibrated consistent with applicable setpoi methodolo assumptions.

Table 3.3.5.1-1 is modified by twe footnote 5.-FootAote (a) is added to clarify that the associated function s are requ i red to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 only wheA their supported ECCS are required to be OPERAB L E per L CO 3.5.2 , EGGS Shutdown. F ootnote C b) is added to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions also perform DG initiation.

Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in the Table. Trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.

The trip setpoints are selected to ensure that the settings do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.

Operation with a trip setting less conservative than the trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.

A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic or design limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis or other appropriate documents.

The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic or design limits, corrected for calibration, process, and instrument errors. The trip setpoints are determined from analytical or design limits, corrected for calibration, process, and instrument errors, as well as, instrument drift. In selected cases, the Allowable Values and trip setpoints are determined from engineering judgement or historically accepted practice relative to the intended functions of the channel. The trip setpoints determined in this manner provide adequate protection by assuming instrument and process uncertainties expected for the environments during the operating time of the associated channels are accounted for. For the Core Spray and LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relays, adequate margins for applicable setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the Allowable Values and actual setpoints.

In general, the i ndi vi dual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS (or DG) initiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis transient or accident.

To ensure reliable ECCS and DG function, a combination of Functions is required to provide primary and secondary initiation signals. con in d B 3.3-100 Revision No.

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 l.a. 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low (Level ll (continued) initiation.

Per Footnote (a) to Table 3.3.S.l l , this EGGS t Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 aRd 5 whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPERABLE per LC O 3.5.2. Refer to LC O 3.5.1 and LCD 3.5.2 , " EGGS ShutdowR ," for Applicability Bases for the low pressure E G GS subsystems

LCD 3.8.1 , " AC Sources Operating";

and LCO 3.8.2 , "A C Sources Shutdown ," for App licability Bases for the DGs. l.b. 2.b. Drywell Pressure-High High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary CRCPBl. The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function with a Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive) in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The DGs are initiated from Function l.b signals. This Function also initiates the closure of the recirculation discharge valves to ensure the LPCI subsystems inject into the proper RPV location.

The Drywell Pressure-High Function with a Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive), along with the Reactor Water Level -Low Low Low (Level 1) Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure.

The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or DG is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE.

Thus, four channels of the CS and LPCI Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and DG initiation.

In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required, since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the primary containment to Drywell High setpoint.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems and to LCO 3.8.1 for Applicability Bases for the DGs. B 3.3-102 Revision No . .S.S BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCD, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 l.c. 2.c. Reactor Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive)

Low reactor pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

This ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems or initiating the low pressure ECCS subsystems on a Drywell Pressure-High signal, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' maximum design pressure and a break inside the RCPB has occurred respectively.

This Function also provides permissive for the closure of the recirculation discharge valves to ensure the LPCI subsystems inject into the proper RPV location.

The Reactor Pressure-Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS during the transients ana l yzed in References 1 and 3. In addition, the Reactor Pressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure.

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equipment in the low pressure ECCS, but high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Four channels of Reactor Pressure-Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation.

Per footnote C a) to Table 3.3.5.1 1 ,

EGGS F unction is on l y required to be OPERAB L E in MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OP E RABLE per LGO 3.5.2. Refer to LGO 3.5.l and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure EGGS subsystems. l.d. 2.q. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow-Low (Bypass) The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow is sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump. The LPCI and d B 3.3-103 Revision No. 8 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UNIT 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 l.d. 2.g. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow-Low (Bypass) (continued)

CS Pump Discharge Flow-Low Functions are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the minimum flow valves to ensure that the low pressure ECCS flows assumed during the transients and accidents analyzed in References 1, 2, and 3 are met. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. One differential pressure switch per ECCS pump is used to detect the associated subsystems' flow rates. The logic is arranged such that each switch causes its associated minimum flow valve to open. The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded.

The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for 10 seconds after the switches detect low flow. The time delay is provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the RHR shutdown cooling mode. The Pump Discharge Flow-Low Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core. Each channel of Pump Discharge Flow-Low Function (four CS channels and four LPCI channels) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the ECCS function.

Per footRote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1 1 , tRis EGGS FURCtioR is ORly required to be OPERAB LE iR MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPERABLE per LG O 3.5.2. Refer to LGO 3.5.l and LCO 3.S.2 for Applicability Bases for tRe low pressure EGGS subsystems. l.e. l.f. Co r e Spr a y P u mo Start-Time Delay R e lay The purpose of this time delay is to stagger the start of the CS pumps that are in each of Divisions I and II to prevent overloading the power source. This Function is necessary when power is being supplied from the offsite sources or the standby power sources CDG). The CS Pump Start-Time Delay Relays are assumed to be OPERABLE in the accident and transient analyses requiring ECCS initiation.

That is, the analyses assume that the pumps wi l l initiate when required and excess loading will not cause failure of the power sources. con inue B 3.3-104 Revisi on N o. ;s BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UNIT 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 1.e. l.f. Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relay (continued)

There are eight Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relays, two in each of the CS pump start logic circuits Cone for when offsite power is available and one for when offsite power is not available).

One of each type of time delay relay is dedicated to a single pump start logic, such that a single failure of a Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relay will not result in the failure of more than one CS pump. In this condition, three of the four CS pumps will remain OPERABLE; thus, the single failure criterion is met Ci .e., loss of one instrument does not preclude ECCS initiation).

The Allowable Value for the Core Spray Pump Start-Time Delay Relays is chosen to be long enough so that the power source will not be overloaded and short en o ugh so that ECCS operation is not degraded.

Each channel of Core Spray Pump Start-Time De l ay Relay Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the asso c iated cs subsystem is required t o be OPERABLE.

Per footAote (a) t to Table 3.3.5.l 1 , this E GGS FuActioA is only required to be OPERABLE iA MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OP E RABLE per LCD 3.5.2. Refer to LCO 3.5.l and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the CS subsystems. 2.d. Reactor Pressure-Low Low (Recirculation Discharge Valve Permissive)

Low reactor pressure signals are used as permissives for recirculation discharge valve closure. This ensures that the LPCI subsystems inject into the proper RPV location assumed in the safety analysis. The Reactor Pressure-Low Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the valve during the transients analyzed in References 1 and 3. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Pressure-Low Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The Reactor Pressure-Low Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor pressure. The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that the valves close prior to commencement of LPCI injection flow into the core, as assumed in the safety analysis.

B 3.3-105 Revision No. ;a BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 2. e. Reactor Vessel Shroud Level-Level O (continued)

Two channels of the Reactor Vessel Shroud Level -Level 0 Function are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specified initiation time of the LPCI subsystems is not assumed, and other administrative controls are adequate to control the valves associated with this Function (since the systems that the valves are opened for are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and are normally not used). 2.f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start-Time Delay Rlli.y The purpose of this time delay is to stagger the start of the LPCI pumps that are in each of Divisions I and II, to prevent overloading the power source. This Function is only necessary when power is being supplied from offsite sources. The LPCI pumps start simultaneously with no time delay as soon as the standby source is available.

The LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relays are assumed to be OPERABLE in the accident and transient analyses requiring ECCS initiation.

That is, the analyses assume that the pumps will initiate when required and excess loading will not cause failure of the power sources. There are eight LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relays, two in each of the RHR pump start logic circuits.

Two time delay relays are dedicated to a single pump start logic. Both timers in the RHR pump start logic would have to fail to prevent an RHR pump from starting within the required time; therefore, the low pressure ECCS pumps will remain OPERABLE; thus, the single failure criterion is met (i.e., loss of one instrument does not preclude ECCS initiation).

The Allowable Values for the LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relays are chosen to be long enough so that most of the starting transient of the first pump is complete before starting the second pump on the same 4 kV emergency bus and short enough so that ECCS operation is not degraded.

Each channel of LPCI Pump Start-Time Delay Relay Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the associated LPCI subsystem is required to be OPERABLE.

Per footAote (a) to Table 3.3.5.l 1 , this EGGS Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated EGGS is required to be OPERABLE per LGO 3.5.2. Refer to LGO 3.5.l and LGO 3.5.2 for Applicabi l ity Bases for the LPGI sul3systems.

con i nued B 3.3-107 Revision No. ;&

BASES ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B.l. B.2. and B.3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 Required Actions B.l and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s).

Required Action B.l features would be those that are initiated by Functions l.a, l.b, 2.a, and 2.b (e.g., low pressure ECCS). The Required Action B.2 system would be HPCI. For Required Action B.l, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if (a) two or more Function l.a channels are inoperable and untripped such that both trip systems lose initiation capability, (b) two or more Function 2.a channels are inoperable and untripped such that both trip systems lose initiation capability, Cc) two or more Function l.b channels are inoperable and untripped such that both trip systems lose initiation capability, or (d) two or more Function 2.b channels are inoperable and untripped such that both trip systems lose initiation capability.

For low pressure ECCS, since each inoperable channel would have Required Action B.l applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated system of low pressure ECCS and DGs to be declared inoperable.

However, since channels in both associated low pressure ECCS subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) are inoperable and untripped, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in the associated low pressure ECCS and DGs being concurrently declared inoperable.

For Required Action B.2, redundant automatic HPCI initiation capability is lost if two or more Function 3.a or two Function 3.b channels are inoperable and untripped such that the trip system loses initiation capability.

In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Action B.3 is not appropriate and the HPCI System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. As noted (Note 1 to Required Action B.l), Required Action B.l is only applicable in MODES l , 2 , and 3. In MODES 4 and S , the specific initiation time of the low pressure ECCS is not assumed and the probabi l ity of a LOCA is lower. Thus , a total loss of continued B 3.3-118 Revision No.

BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 3 B.l. B.2. and B.3 (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 iRitiatioR capabi l ity for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required ActiOA B.3) is a l lowed duriA§ HODES 4 aAd 5. There is RO simi l ar Note proYided for Required ActioA B.2 siRce HPCI iAstrumentatioA is not required iA MODES 4 aAd 5; thus , a is Rot Aecessary. ;--Jtliel Notes are also provided Required Action B.l and the Note to Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable.

This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed.

Required Action B.l (the Required Action for certain inoperable channels in the low pressure ECCS subsystems) is not applicable to Function 2.e, since this Function provides backup to administrative controls ensuring that operators do not divert LPCI flow from injecting into the core when needed. Thus, a total loss of Function 2.e capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed, since the LPCI subsystems remain capable of performing their intended function.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.l, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that a redundant feature in the same system (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Function in the same trip system. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the B 3.3-119 Revision No. -3 BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 3 C.l and C.2 (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 concurrently declared inoperable.

For Functions 1.c, 1.e, l.f, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f, the affected portions are the associated low pressure ECCS pumps. As noted (Note 1), Required Action C.l is only applicable in MODES l , 2 , and 3. In MODES 4 and 5 , the specific initiation tiffie of the EGGS is not assuffied and the probability of a LOGA is lower. Thus , a total loss of autoffiatic initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is al lo wed during MODES 4 and 5. states that Required Action C.1 is only applicab l e for Functions l.c, l.e, l.f, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f. Required Action C.l is not applicable to Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 5 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by Required Act ion C.2. The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time t o evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action C.l, the Completion Time only begin s upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or it would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events. con inu B 3.3-121 Revision No.-3 BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 3 P.l. D.2.1. and D.2.2 (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 piping remains filled with water. Alternately, if it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the HPCI suction piping), Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. E.l and E.2 Required Action E.l is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump, Discharge Flow -Low (Bypass) Functions result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s).

For Required Action E.l, the features would be those that are initiated by Functions l.d and 2.g (e.g., low pressure ECCS). Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if (a) two or more Function l.d channels are inoperable affecting CS pumps in different subsystems or (b) three or more Function 2.g channels are inoperable.

Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action E.l applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected low pressure ECCS pump to be declared inoperable.

However, since channels for more than one low pressure ECCS pump are inoperable, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels of the low pressure ECCS pumps, this results in the affected low pressure ECCS pumps being concurrently declared inoperable.

In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 7 day allowance of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and the subsystem associated with each inoperable channel must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. As Roted (Note 1 to Required Action E.l), RequiPed ActioA E.1 is OAlj' applicable iA MODES l , 2 , and 3. ffl MODES 4 and 5 , the specific initiation time of the EGGS is not assumed and the probability of a L OGA is lower. Thus , a total loss of initiation capability for 7 days (as allowed by Required Action E.2) is allowed dur ing MODES 4 and 5. A Note is also provided (Note 2 to Required Action E.1) to delineate that Required Action E.1 is only applicable to low con in ed B 3.3-123 Revision No. -3 New PBAPS TS Bases Section 3.3.5.3 B 3.3.5.3 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.3 Not Used PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3. 3-141a Revi si on l\b. XXX RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.4 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND PBAPS UNIT 3 The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF , the ability to remove decay heat is reduced , which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures. Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as " Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed , the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is e x ceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However , in practice , the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1 , 2 , and 3 in LCO 3.3.5.1 , " Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

," or LCO 3.3.6.1, " Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation

". With the unit in MODE 4 or 5 , RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. Under the definition of DRAIN TIME , some penetration flow paths may be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation if they will be isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. (continued) B 3.3-141b Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

BACKGROUND (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation is to support the requirements of LCO 3.5.4 , "Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control ," and the definition of DRAIN TIME. There are functions that are required for manual initiation or operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.4 and other functions that support automatic isolation of Residual Heat Removal subsystem and Reactor Water Cleanup system penetration flow path(s) on low RPV water level. The RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation supports operation of core spray (CS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI). The equi p ment involved with each of these systems is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.4. With the unit in MODE 4 or 5 , RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure , reduced piping stresses , and ductile piping systems. Instead , an event is postulated in which a single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate , or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event (except when the risk is assessed and managed in accordance with TS LCO 3.0.8), loss of normal power , single human error). It is assumed , based on engineering judgment , that while in MODES 4 and 5 , one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually initiated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. As discussed in References 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , and 5 , operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore , RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c) (2) (ii). Permissive and interlock setpoints are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy. The specific Applicable Safety Analyses , LCO , and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by (continued) B 3.3-14lc Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 Function basis. RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems l.a , 2.a. Reactor Pressure -Low (Injection Permissive)

Low reactor pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual injection functions. This function ensures that , prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems , the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems

' maximum design pressure. While it is assured during MODES 4 and 5 that the reactor pressure will be below the ECCS maximum design pressure, the Reactor Pressure -Low signals are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS. The Reactor Pressure -Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure. The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equipment in the low pressure ECCS. The four channels of Reactor Pressure -Low Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when ECCS manual initiation is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.4. l.b , 2.b. Core S p ra y and Low Pressure Coolant In j ection Pum p Dischar g e Flow -Low (B yp ass) The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow is sensed , and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump. One differential pressure switch per ECCS pump is used to detect the associated subsystems

' flow rates. The logic is arranged such that each transmitter causes its associated minimum flow valve to open. The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for 10 seconds after the switches detect low flow. The time delay is provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling mode. (continued) B 3.3-14ld Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 The Pump Discharge Flow -Low Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump , yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core. One channel of the Pump Discharge Flow -Low Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when the associated Core Spray or LPCI pump is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.4 to ensure the pumps are capable of injecting into the Reactor Pressure Vessel when manually initiated. A note is added to TS Table 3.3.5.4-1 for Function 2.b t n clarify the intent of allowing credit for an OPERABLE Low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem when it is aligned and operating in the decay heat removal mode of RHR. This note is appropriate since the associated RHR pump minimum flow valve (while operating in the decay heat removal mode) is closed and deactivated to prevent inadvertent vessel drain down events. l.c , 2.c. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels consist of pump start hand switches that introduce signals into the appropriate ECCS logic to provide manual initiation capability. There is one hand switch for each of the pumps required for the CS and LPCI subsystems. There is no allowable value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the hand switches. A channel of the Manual Initiation Function (one channel per required pump) is required to be OPERABLE in Modes 4 and 5 when the associated ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.4. RHR System Isolation 3.a Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHR System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RHR System. (continued) B 3.3-14le Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 signals are Reactor initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function are available , only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.6.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation 4.a Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal t o the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the R WCU System. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function are available , only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. (continued)

B 3.3-141f Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 This Function isolates the inboard and outboard RWCU pump suction penetration and the outboard valve at the RWCU connection to reactor feedwater. The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels. Section 1.3 1 Completion Times , specifies that once a Condition has been entered , subsequent divisions , subsystems , components , or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions continue to apply for each additional failure , with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However , the Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel. A.1 Required Action A.l directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.4-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable , Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition. B.l and B.2 RHR System Isolation , Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low , Level 3 , and Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation , Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 functions are applicable when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. If the instrumentation is inoperable , Required Action B.l directs an immediate declaration that the associated penetration flow path(s) are incapable of automatic isolation. Required Action B.2 directs calculation of DRAIN TIME. The calculation cannot credit automatic isolation of the affected penetration flow paths. (continued)

B 3.3-14lg Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 C.l RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual injection functions. If the permissive is inoperable , manual initiation of ECCS is prohibited. Therefore , the permissive must be placed in the trip condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. With the permissive in the trip condition , manual initiation may be performed. Prior to placing the permissive in the tripped condition , the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to inject water into the RPV. The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate any discovered inoperabilities and to place the channel in trip. D.l If a Core Spray or Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow -Low bypass function is inoperable , there is a risk that the associated low pressure ECCS pump could overheat when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. In this condition , the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to ensure the pump does not overheat. If a manual initiation function is inoperable , the ECCS subsystem pumps can be started manually and the valves can be opened manually , but this is not the preferred condition. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time was chosen to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The Completion Time is appropriate given the ability to manually start the ECCS pumps and open the injection valves and to manually ensure the pump does not overheat. E.l With the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met , the associated low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem may be incapable of performing the intended function , and must be declared inoperable immediately. As noted in the beginning of the SRs , the SRs for each RPV Water Inventory Control instrument Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.4-1. (continued) B 3.3-14lh Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 3 SR 3.3.5.4.l RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited; thus , it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff , based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties , including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria , it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal , but more frequent , checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO. SR 3.3.5.4.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued) B 3.3-14li Revision No. XXX BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

REFERENCES PBAPS UNIT 3 SR 3.3.5.4.3 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.4 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. 1. Information Notice 84-81 " Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup ," November 1984. 2. Information Notice 86-74, " Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves ," August 1986. 3. Generic Letter 92-04 , " Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F), " August 1992. 4. NRC Bulletin 93-03 , " Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs ," May 1993. 5. Information Notice 94-52 , " Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone l ," July 1994. B 3.3-14lj Revision No. XXX BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 3 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 6.a. Reactor Pressure-High (continued)

MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the only MODES in which the reactor can be pressurized; thus, equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization.

This Function isolates both RHR shutdown cooling pump suction valves. 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

Shaul d RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, i sol ati on of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Function associated with RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safety analyses because a break of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is bounded by breaks of the recirculation and MSL. The RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1 1), only one channel pep tPip system (\lith an isolation signal available to one shutdown cooling pump suction isolation valve) of the Reactor Vessel Watef' Leve l Low (Level 3) Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and S , provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system. c n in B 3.3-159 Revision No.

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 3 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Allowable Value CLCO 3.3.1.1), s i nee the ca pa bi l i ty to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Function is only required to be OPERABLE in 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation Ci .e., Reactor Pressure-High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path. This Function isolates both RHR shutdown cooling pump suction valves. Feedwater Recirculation Isolation 7.a. Reactor Pressure-High The Reactor Pressure-High Function is provided to isolate the feedwater recirculation line. This interlock is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenario, and credit for the interlock is not assumed in the accident or transient analysis in the UFSAR. The Reactor Pressure-High signals are initiated from four transmitters that are connected to different taps on the RPV. Four channels of Reactor Pressure-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the only MODES in which the reactor can be pressurized; thus, equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization.

This Function isolates the feedwater recirculation valves. Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation

8. a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low. Level 3* Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the -+ fuel may be threatened.

The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to (continued) B 3.3-160 Revision No. 8 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCD, and APPLICABILITY PBAPS UNIT 3 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 32 (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) A 11 ow able Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCD 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves and SGT System start are not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required.

ln addition , the Function is also required to be OPERAB L E during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (QPORVs) because the capabi l ity of isolating potential sources of leakage must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs. 2. Drywel l Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB l. An is o lation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The isolation on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis.

The Drywel l Pressure-High Function associated with i sol ati on is not assumed in any UFSAR accident or transient analyses but will provide an isolation and initiation signal. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis. con in ed B 3.3-172 Revision No.

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 3 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 3. 4. Reactor Building Ventilation and Refueling Floor Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High (continued) channels of Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High Function and four channels of Refueling Floor Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding.

The Reactor Building Ventilation and Refueling Floor Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required.

In addition, the Functions are also required to be OPERABLE during OPDRVs and movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment, because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.

However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.

As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel. d B 3.3-174 Revision No. :tfr BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 3 MCREV System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 The Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High Function consists of four independent monitors.

Two channels of Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High per trip system are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude MCREV System initiation.

The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel. The Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during CORE ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs , and movement of irradiated assemblies in the secondary containment, to ensure t t control room personnel are protected during a LOCA, uel handling event, or vesse l draindown event. During MODES 4 and 5, when these specified conditions are not in progress (e.g., CORE ALTERATIONS), the probability of a LOCA or fuel damage is low; thus, the Function is not required.

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to MCREV System instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.

However, the Required Actions for inoperable MCREV System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.

As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable MCREV System instrumentation channel. A.l and A.2 Because of the redundancy of sensors available t o provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the MCREV System design, an allowable out of service time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4), to permit rest o rati o n o f any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. However, this out of service time is only acceptable provided the Control Room Air Intake Radiation-High Function is still maintaining MCREV System initiation capability.

The Function is considered to be maintaining MCREV System d B 3.3-182 Revision N o. 3

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), ECCS-Operating B 3.5.l B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION B 3.5.1 ECCS-Operating BASES BACKGROUND PBAPS UN IT 3 The ECCS are designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containment, to limit the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods (flooding and spraying) to cool the core during a LOCA. The ECCS network consists of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, the Core Spray (CS) System, the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The suppression pool provides the required source of water for the ECCS. Although no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank (CST), it is capable of providing a source of water for the HPCI and CS systems. On receipt of an initiation signal, ECCS pumps automatically start; simultaneously, the system aligns and the pumps inject water, taken either from the CST or suppression pool, into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) as RCS pressure is overcome by the discharge pressure of the ECCS pumps. Although the system is initiated, ADS action is delayed, allowing the operator to interrupt the timed sequence if the system is not needed. The HPCI pump discharge pressure almost immediately exceeds that of the RCS, and the pump injects coolant into the vessel to cool the core. If the break is small, the HPCI System will maintain coolant inventory as wel 1 as vessel 1 evel whi 1 e the RCS is sti 11 pressurized.

If HPCI fails, it is backed up by ADS in combination with LPCI and CS. In this event, the ADS timed sequence would be allowed to time out and open the selected safety/relief valves (S/RVs) depressurizing the RCS, thus allowing the LPCI and CS to overcome RCS pressure and inject cool ant into the vessel. If the break is 1 arge, RCS pressure initially drops rapidly and the LPCI and CS cool the core. Water from the break returns to the suppression pool where it is used again and again. Water in the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR System heat exchanger cooled by the High Pressure Service Water System. Depending on the location and size of the break, portions of the ECCS may be B 3.5-1 Revision No. 0 BASES LCO (continued)

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.1 piping, resulting in the potential to damage the RHR System, 1 including water hammer. This is necessary since the RHR System is required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR shutdown cooling when necessary.

One LPCI subsystem shall be declared inoperable when M0-34A(B) and M0-39A(B) are simultaneously open in the same subsystem Cone or both subsystems) with no Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) declared inoperable to ensure compliance to References 7, 14, and 15 single failure analyses (Ref. 11). If the M0-34A and M0-39A are simultaneously open, the 'A' subsystem of LPCI shall be declared inoperable unless the E-1, E-2, or E-4 EOG is declared inoperable.

If the M0-34B and M0-39B are simultaneously open, the 'B' subsystem of LPCI shall be declared inoperable unless the E-1, E-2, or E-3 EOG is declared inoperable.

APPLICABILITY All ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during ACTIONS MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In MODES 2 and 3, when reactor steam dome pressure is s 150 psig, HPCI is not required to be OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS subsystems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure.

In MODES 2 and 3, when reactor steam 9 dome pressure is s 100 psig, ADS is not required to be 4 OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS subsystems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure.

ECCS r;,-i 11 r equirements for MODES 4 and 5 are s ecified in LCO 11 EGGS Stuitdo*.m. 11 "RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL." A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable HPCI subsystem.

There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specif i ed condition in the Applicability with an inoperable HPCI subsystem and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

PBAPS UN IT 3 B 3.5-6 Revision No. 112

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), EGGS ShutdO\m B 3.5.2 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING COOLING CRCIC) SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION B 3.5.2 EGGS Shutdown BACKGROUPID APP LI CABLE SAFETY ANALYSES PBAPS UN IT 3 A description of the Core Spray (CS) System and the low 13ressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is 13rovided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1 , " EGGS 013erati ng." The EGGS 13erformance is evaluated for the eAtire s13ectrum of break sizes for a 13estulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one low pressure EGGS injection/spray subsystem is requ i red , post LOCA , to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown. It is reasonab l e to assume , based en engineering judgeme n t , that *.1hile in MODES 4 and 5 one low 13ressure EGGS injection/s13ray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy , a minimum of two low pressure EGGS injection/

spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in HODES 4 and 5. The low pressure ECGS subsystems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRG Policy Statement. Two low pressure EGGS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERAB L E. A low pressure EGGS injection/

spray subsystem consists of a CS subsystem or a LPG! subsystem. Each CS subsystem consists of two motor driven pumps, pi13ing , and va l ves to transfer water from the suppression pool or condensate storage tank (CST) to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Each LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump , piping , and va l ves to transfer water from the su13pression pool to the RPV. Only a single LPCI pump i s required per subsystem eecause of the larger iAjection capacity iA relatioA to a GS stibsysteffi. -Ht MODES 4 and 5 , the LPG! cross tie valve is not required to be closed. The necessary portions of the EffiergeAcy Service Water System are also required to provide appropriate cooling to each required EGGS subsystem , as Aecessary (RefereAce TRH 3.11). MaAagement of gas voids is important to ECCS iAjection/spray subsystem OPERABILIT Y. B 3.5-18 Revi s i o n No. -3-5 t&G (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 EGGS Shutdown B 3.5.2 As noted , one LPG! subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise inoperable. Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes when the required RHR pump is not operating or when the system is realigned from or to the RHR shutdown cooling mode. This allowance is necessary since the RHR System may be required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Because of low pressure and low temperature conditions in M O DES 4 and 5 , sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPGI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery. The follo11ing discussion applies when the LPCI cress tie valve (MO 20) is closed. One LPGI subsystem shall not be considered one of the required EGGS injection/spray subsystems when MO 34A(B) and MO 39A(B) are simultaneously open in the same subsystem with no Emergency Diesel Generators C EDGs) declared inoperable. As discussed below , an exception to this may be taken if an EOG is declared inoperable. If the MO 34A and MO 39A are simultaneously open , the 'A' subsystem of LPGI shall not be considered as one of the required EGGS injection/spray subsystems unless the E 1 , E 2 , or E 4 EOG is declared inoperable . .t-f the MO 3 4 B and MO 39B are simultaneously open , the 'B' subsystem of LPGI shall not be considered as one of the required EGGS injection/spray subsystems unless the E 1 , E 2 , or E 3 EOG is declared inoperable. The following discussion applies when the LPGI cross tie valve (MO 20) is open: The L PG! cross tie valve C MO 20) cannot be credited for closing during an event to isolate both L PGI subsystems. A pipe break within Primary Containment is assumed when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is pressurized. Conversely , a pipe break within Primary Containment is not assumed when the RCS is depressurized. Mode 4 with RCS pressurized. When the Unit is in Mode 4 with reactor steaffi dome pressure indicating that the RCS is pressurized , then both subsysteffis of LPGI are inoperable. B 3.5-19 Revision No. 9-6 tt-G (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 3 EGGS ShutdO\IA B 3.5.2 Mode 4 with RCS depressurized or Mode 5: M O 34 A(B) aAd MO 39A(B) Closed: WheA the URit is iR Mode 4 with reactor steam dome pressure iAdicatiAg that the RCS is depressurized or in Mode 5 ANO there are AO flow paths that could divert LPGI flow goiAg to the reactor *vessel (i.e., 34/39 closed), thCA both subsystems of LPG I caA be coRsidered operable as the required EGG S injection/spray subs)'Stems. MO 34 A(B) aAd HO 39A(B) OpeA: ',/hen MO 20 , 3 4 A , a Ad MO 3 9A a re simultaAeously opeA , the 'A' subsystem of Gore Spray aRd both subsystems of LPCI caAAo t be coAsidered as separate EGGS iAjectioA/spray subsystems because a siAgle failure (failure of the E 3 EOG) eKists that causes the 'A' subsystem of Core Spray aAd both subsystems of L P CI to be unable to perform their design functions. As a result , the 'A' subsystem of Core Spray and both subsystems of LPCI can only be considered as oAe of the two required E G GS iAjectioA/spray subsystems when aligAed iA this coAfiguratioA. WheA MO 20 , MO 34A , aAd HO 39 A are simultaAeously open with either the E 1 , E 2 , or E 4 E OG declared iAoperable , theA the 'A' aAd 'B' subsystems of LPGI may be credited as beiAg operable , separate subsystems , siAce a failure of the E 3 EOG is Rot postu l ated. When MO 20 , MO 3 48, and MO 39B are simultaAeously open , the 'B' subsystem of Gore Spray aAd both subsystems of LPCI cannot be considered as separate EGGS injectioA/spray subsystems because a single failure (failure of E 4 EOG) exists that causes the 'B' subsystem of C ore Spray aAd both subsystems of LPCI to be unable to perform the i r desigA fuActions. A-5-a result , the 'B' subsystem of Gore Spray aAd both subsystems of LPG! can only be coAsidered as one of the two required EGGS iAjectioA/spray subsystems wheA aligned in this configuratiOA. B 3.5-19a Revision No.

tb-0 (continued)

APPLICA B ILITY AGTI ONS PBAPS UN IT 3 EGGS ShutdO'rm B 3.5.2 When MO 20 , MO 3 4 B , and MO 39B are siffiultaneously open with either the E 1 , E 2 , or E 3 EOG declared inoperable , then the 'A' and 'B' subsystems of LPCI may be credited as being operable , separa t e subsystems , since a failure of the E 4 EOG is not postulated. OPERABI LIT¥ of the 1 pressure E GGS injection/spray subsystems is required in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure adequate coolant inventory and suf f icient heat removal capability for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindO'n'A of the vessel. Requirements for E GGS OPERABILITY during MODES 1 , 2 , and 3 are discussed in the Applicability section of the Bases for LCO 3.5.1. EGGS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE during MODE 5 with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed , the water level maintained at c--45-8 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero C20 ft 11 inches above the RPV flange), and no operations 1;ith a potential for draining the reactor vessel COPDRVs) in progress. This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allm1 operator action to terminate tt:le inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown. Tt:le Automatic Depressuriza t ion System is not required to be OP E RABLE during MODES 4 and 5 because the RPV pressure is psig , and the CS System and tt:lc LPCI subsystems can provide core cooling without any depressurization of the primary system. The High Pressure Coolant Injection System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 since the l ow pressure EGGS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to tt:le vessel. A.l and B.l If any one required l ow pressure EGGS injection/spray subsystem is inoperab l e , an inoperable subsystem must be restored to OP E RABLE status in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In this Condition , tt:le remaining OPERABLE subsystem can provide sufficient vessel flooding capabi l ity to recover from an inadver t ent vessel draind01m. Ho* .. *ever , overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPER A BLE B 3.5-19b Revision No. % J" AcTim1s PBAPS UN IT 3 A.1 and B.l (continued)

EGGS Sh1:1tdo*.m B 3.5.2 subsystem concurrent with a vessel draindown could result in the EGGS not being able to perforFA its intended f1:1nction. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring the req1:1ired 1 011 press1:1re EGGS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considered the remaining available subsystem and the 1011 probability of a vessel draindo11n event. \Ji th the inoperable subsysteFA not restored to OPERA B L E status in the required Completion Time , action must be immediately initiated to suspend O PORVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the s1:1bsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. C.l. G.2. 0.1. 0.2. and 0.3 With both of the req1:1ired EGGS injection/spray s1:1bsystems inoperable , all coolant inventory makeup capability may be 1:1navai1able. Therefore , actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPORVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions m1:1st continue until OPORVs are suspended. One EGGS injection/spray subsystem must also be restored to OPERA B LE stat1:1s within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. If at least one low pressure EGGS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time , additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem for Unit 3 is OPERABLE , and secondary containment isolation capability (i.e., one isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERAB L E or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability) in each associated secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases. OPERA B ILITY may be verified by an administrative check , or by examining logs or other information , to determine the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. B 3.5-20 Revision No. {}

AC T IONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 3 C.l. C.2. D.l. D.2. and D.3 (continued)

EGGS Shutdown B 3.5.2 If , however , any required component is inoperable , then it must be restored to O PERABLE status. In this case , the Survei l lance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERA B LE status. Actions must continue unti l all required components are OP E RABLE. The q hour Completion Time to restore at least one l ow pressure E GGS injection/spray subsystem to OPERA B LE status ensures that prompt action will be taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes any potential f ission product release to the en¥ironment. .£R 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 The minimum water l eve l of 11.0 feet required for the suppression pool is periodica l ly ¥erified to ensure tha t the suppression poo l will prov i de ad e quate net positive suct i on head C NPSH) for the CS System and L PGI subsystem pumps , recirculation volume , and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than t he required l imit , all EGGS injection/spray subsystems are inoperable unless they are aligned to an OPERABLE CS T. When suppression poo l leve l is < 11.0 feet , the CS System is considered OPERABLE on l y if it can ta k e suction from the CST , and the CST water level is sufficient to provide the required NPSH for the CS pump. T herefore , a verification tha t either the suppression pool water l evel is> 11.0 feet or that CS is aligned to ta k e suction from the CST and the CS T contains>

17.3 feet of water , equivalent to > 90 , 976 gallons of water , ensures that the CS System can supply at l e ast 50 , 000 gallons of ma k eup water to the RPV. The unavailable volume of the CST for C S is at the 4 0 , 976 gallon level. However , as noted , only oAe required CS subsystem may take credit for the CST optioA during OPDRVs. OuriAg O PDRVs , the volume in the CST may not provide adequate makeup if the RPV were complete l y drained. Therefore , only one CS subsystem is a l lowed to use the CST. This eAsures the other EGGS subsystem has adequate makeup volume. B 3.5-21 Revision No. G SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 3 .£.R 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 (continued)

EGGS ShutdO'tm B 3.5.2 The Surveillance FrequcAcy is coAtrolled uAder the SurveillaAce Frequency Control Program . .£R 3.5.2.3. SR 3.5.2.5. and SR 3.5.2.6 The Bases provided for SR 3.S.1.1 , SR 3.5.1.7 , and SR 3.5.1.10 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3 , SR 3.5.2.5 , and S R 3.5.2.6 , respectively. ££ 3.5.2.4 Verifying the correct alignment for maAual , power operated , and automatic valves in the EGGS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow path s will exist for EGGS opera:ioA. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked , sealed , or otherwise secured in position , since these valves were verified to be in the correc t position prior to lockin g , sealing , or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a noAaceident posi t ion provided the valve will automatically repositioA in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve maAipulatioA

rather , it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does Rot apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned , such as check valves. For the RHR System , verify each RHR heat exchanger inlet flow control valve is positioned to achieve at least the minimum flow rate required by SR 3.5.2.5. The Surveillance Frequency is coAtrolled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Survei 11 ance is modified by a Note 1.*hi ch e*effipts system { vent fl o*.1 paths opCAed under admi ni strati ve control.
i:.A-e administrative coAtrol should be proceduralized and include stationing an individual
  • ,1ho can Fapidly close the system vent flow path if diFected. B 3.5-22 Revision No.--+/--2 BASES RE!=ERtNCES PBAPS UN IT 3 ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.2 h NE:DO 20'3661\, "General Electric Company Analytical Model for Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis in Accordance
  • .. *ith 10 Gi=R SO Appendi x K ," September 1986. B 3.5-23 Revision No. ;s

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), RCIC System B 3.5.3 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING COOLING CRCIC) SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION B 3.5.3 RCIC System BASES BACKGROUND PBAPS UN IT 3 The RCIC System is not part of the ECCS; however, the RCIC System is included with the ECCS section because of their similar functions.

The RCIC System is designed to operate either automatically or manually following reactor pressure vessel CRPV) isolation accompanied by a loss of coolant flow from the feedwater system to provide adequate core cooling and control of the RPV water 1 evel. Under these conditions, the High Pressure Coolant Injection CHPCI) and RCIC systems perform similar functions.

The RCIC System design requirements ensure that the criteria of Reference 1 are satisfied.

The RCIC System (Ref. 2) consists of a steam driven turbine pump unit, piping, and valves to provide steam to the turbine, as well as piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line, where the coolant is distributed within the RPV through the feedwater sparger. Suction piping is provided from the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool. Pump suction is normally aligned to the CST to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the RPV. However, if the CST water supply is low, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source ensures a water supply for continuous operation of the RCIC System. The steam supply to the turbine is piped from a main steam line upstream of the associated inboard main steam line isolation valve. The RCIC System is designed to provide core cooling for a wide range of reactor pressures (150 psig to 1170 psig). --r-----Upon receipt of an i niti ati on signal, the RCIC turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the RCIC flow increases, the turbine governor valve is automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the RCIC turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water back to the CST to allow testing of the RCIC System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV. con in B 3.5-24 Revision No.-t+G BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO APPLICABILITY RCIC System B 3.5.3 The RCIC pump is provided with a m1n1mum flow bypass line, which discharges to the suppression pool. The valve in this line automatically opens when the discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge piping is kept full of water. The RCIC System is normally aligned to the CST. The height of water in the CST is sufficient to maintain the piping full of water up to the first isolation valve. The relative height of the feedwater line connection for RCIC is such that the water in the feedwater lines keeps the remaining portion of the RCIC discharge line full of water. Therefore, RCIC does not require a "keep fill" system. The function of the RCIC System is to respond to transient events by providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safeguard System and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation.

Based on its contribution to the reduction of overal l plant risk, however, the system satisfies Criter i on 4 o f the NRC Policy Statement.

The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides adequate core cooling such that actuation of any of the low pressure ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity for maintaining RPV inventory during an isolation event. Management of gas voids is important to y RCIC System OPERABILITY.

,., I The RCIC System is required to be OPERABLE during MODE l, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since RCIC is the primary non-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized. In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome 150 MODES 4 and 5, RCIC is not required to be the low EGGS (continued)

RPV inventory control is required by LCO 3.5.4 , "RPV Water Level Inventory Control." PBAPS UN IT 3 B 3.5-25 Revision No.

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.4 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO PBAPS UNIT 3 The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF , the ability to remove decay heat is reduced , which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures. With the unit in MODE 4 or 5 , RPV water inventory control is not required to m itigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment should an unexpected draining event occur. A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure , reduced piping stresses , and ductile piping systems. Instead , an event is considered in which single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate , or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event (except when risk is assessed and managed in accordance with TS 3.0.8), loss of normal power , single human error) . It is assumed , based on engineering judgment , that while in MODES 4 and 5 , one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. As discussed in References 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , and 5 , operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore , RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 1 0 C FR 5 0 . 3 6 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( ii ) . The RPV water level must be controlled in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should occur , the reactor coolant water level remains above the top of the active irradiated fuel as required by Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. (continued) B 3.5-31 Revision No. XXX BASES LCO (continued)

APPLICABILITY PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to be 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate unexpected draining of reactor coolant. An event that could cause loss of RPV water inventory and result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation. One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required to be OPERABLE and capable of being manually started to provide defense-in-depth should an unexpected draining event occur. A low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem consists of either one Core Spray (CS) subsystem or one Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem. Each CS subsystem consists of one motor driven pump , piping , and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or condensate storage tank (CST) to the RPV. Each LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump , p iping , and valves to transfer water from the suppression p ool to the RPV. In MODES 4 and 5 , the RHR System cross tie valve is not required to be closed. The LCO is modified by a Note which allows a required LPCI subsystem to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise inoperable. Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes when the required RHR pump is not operating or when the system is realigned from or to the RHR shutdown cooling mode. This allowance is necessary since the RHR System may be required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Because of the restrictions on DRAIN TIME , sufficient time will be available following an unexpected draining event to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to maintain RPV water inventory prior reaching the TAF. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5. Requirements on water inventory control in other MODES are contained in LCOs in Section 3.3 , Instrumentation , and other LCOs in Section 3.5 , ECCS , RCIC , and RPV Water Inventory Control. RPV water inventory control is required to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 which is applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel. (continued) B 3.5-32 Revision No. XXX BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 3 A.l and B.l RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 If the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable , it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In this Condition , the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME minimize the possibility that an unexpected draining event could necessitate the use of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem , however the defense-in

-depth provided by the ECCS injection/spray subsystem is lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considers the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME and the low probability of an unexpected draining event that would result in loss of RPV water inventory. If the inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time , action must be initiated immediately to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls , water sources , and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems , and must be able to access water inventory capable of maintaining the RPV water level above the TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. If recirculation of injected water would occur , it may be credited in determining the necessary water volume. C.l , C.2 , and C.3 With the DRAIN TIME less than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> but greater than or equal to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> , compensatory measures should be taken to ensure the ability to implement mitigating actions should an unexpected draining event occur. Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF , there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained , diluted , and processed prior to being released to the environment. The secondary containment provides a controlled volume in which fission products can be contained , diluted , and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action C.l requires verification of the capability to establish the secondary containment boundary in less than the DRAIN TIME. (continued) B 3.5-33 Revision No. XXX BASES ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 The required verification confirms actions to establish the secondary containment boundary are preplanned and necessary materials are available. The secondary containment boundary is considered established when one Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment. Verification that the secondary containment boundary can be established must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. Secondary containment penetration flow paths form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action C.2 requires verification of the capability to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to isolate the secondary containment penetration flow paths are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Power operated valves are not required to receive automatic isolation signals if they can be closed manually within the required time. Verification that the secondary containment penetration flow paths can be isolated must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action C.3 requires verification of the capability to place one SGT subsystem in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to place a SGT subsystem in operation are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Verification that a SGT subsystem can be placed in operation must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. D. 1 , D. 2 , D. 3 , and D. 4 With the DRAIN TIME less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> , mitigating actions are implemented in case an unexpected draining event should occur. Note that if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> , Required Action E.1 is also applicable. Required Action D.l requires immediate action to establish an additional method of water injection augmenting the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required by the LCO. The additional method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls , water sources , and pumps and (continued) B 3.5-34 Revision No. XXX BASES ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The Note to Required Action D.l states that either the ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the additional method of water injection must be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The additional method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems. The additional method of water injection must be able to access water inventory capable of being injected to maintain the RPV water level above the TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources. If recirculation of injected water would occur , it may be credited in determining the required water volume. Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF , there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained , diluted , and processed prior to being released to the environment. The secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products can be contained , diluted , and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action D.2 requires that actions be immediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary. With the secondary containment boundary established , one SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment. The secondary containment penetrations form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action D.3 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that each secondary containment penetration flow path is isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room. One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the [secondary]

containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action D.4 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that at least one SGT subsystem is capable of being placed in operation. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. E.l If the Required Actions and associated Completion times of Conditions C or D are not met or if the DRAIN TIME is less (continued) B 3.5-35 Revision No. XXX BASES ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> , actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. In this condition , there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF. Note that Required Actions D.l , D.2 , D.3 , and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. SR 3.5.4.l This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF is 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate draining of reactor coolant. Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation. The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic sectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation. A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single , stepwise , or integrated calculation considering the changing RPV water level during a draining event. For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blank flange , the realistic cross-sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube. If the control rod blade will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade , the exposed crosssectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used. The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system , or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked , sealed , or otherwise secured in the closed position , blank flanges , or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths. A blank flange or other bolted device must be connected with a sufficient number of bolts to prevent draining in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake. Normal or expected leakage from closed systems or past isolation devices is permitted. Determination that a system is intact and closed or isolated must consider the status of branch lines and ongoing plant maintenance and testing activities. The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system when misalignment issues (Reference

6) have been precluded by functional valve (continued) B 3.5-36 Revision No. XXX BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 interlocks or by isolation devices , such that redirection of RPV water out of an RHR subsystem is precluded. Further , RHR Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system if its controls have not been transferred to Remote Shutdown , which disables the interlocks and isolation signals. The exclusion of penetration flow paths from the determination of DRAIN TIME must consider the potential effects of a single operator error or initiating event on items supporting maintenance and testing (rigging , scaffolding , temporary shielding , piping plugs , snubber removal (except when risk is assessed and managed in accordance with TS LCO 3.0.8), freeze seals , etc.). If failure of such items could result and would cause a draining event from a closed system or between the RPV and the isolation device , the penetration flow path may not be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation. Surveillance Requirement

3.0.1 requires

SRs to be met between performances. Therefore , any changes in plant conditions that would change the DRAIN TIME requires that a new DRAIN TIME be determined. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.2 and SR 3.5.4.3 The minimum w ater level of 11.0 ft. required for the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the CS subsystem or LPCI subsystem pump , recirculation volume , and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit required ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable unless aligned to an OPERABLE CST. The required CS System is OPERABLE only if it can take suction from the CST , and the CST water level is sufficient to provide the required NPSH for the CS pump. Therefore , a verification that either the suppression pool water level is 2 11.0 ft. or that a required CS subsystem is aligned to take suction from the CST and the CST contains 2 90 , 976 gallons of water , equivalent to 17.3 ft., ensures that the CS subsystem can supply at least 50 , 000 gallons of makeup water to the RPV. The CS suction is uncovered at the 40 , 976 gallon level. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued B 3.5-37 Revision No. XXX BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 SR 3.5.4.4 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS subsystem will perform properly. This may also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.5 Verifying the correct alignment for manual , power operated , and automatic valves in the required ECCS subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will be available for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked , sealed , or otherwise secured in position , since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking , sealing , or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation

rather , it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned , such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.6 Verifying that the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually started and operate for at least 10 minutes demonstrates that the subsystem is available to mitigate a draining event. Testing the ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line is necessary to avoid overfilling the refueling cavity. The minimum operating time of 10 minutes was based on engineering judgement. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.7 Verifying that each valve credited for automatically isolating (continued) B 3.5-38 Revision No. XXX BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

REFERENCES PBAPS UNIT 3 RPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.4 a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated RPV water level isolation signal is required to prevent RPV water inventory from dropping below the TAF should an unexpected draining event occur. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.4.8 The required ECCS subsystem is required to be manually actuated. This Surveillance verifies that the required CS subsystems or LPCI subsystem (including the associated pump I valve(s))

can be placed into service. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. !.Information Notice 84-81 Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup ," November 1984. 2.Information Notice 86-74, " Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves ," August 1986. 3.Generic Letter 92-04 , " Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F), " August 1992. 4 .NRC Bulletin 93-03 , " Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs ," May 1993. 5.Information Notice 94-52 , " Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1 ," July 1994. 6.General Electric Service Information Letter No. 388 , " RHR Valve Misalignment During Shutdown Cooling Operation for BWR 3/4/5/6 ," February 1983. B 3.5-39 Revision No. XXX BASES LCO (continued)

APPLICABILITY PC I Vs B 3.6.1.3 de-activated and secured in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Reference 2 and Reference

5. MSIVs must meet additional leakage rate requirements.

Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing. This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, me-s-t PCIVs are not required to be OPERABLE and the primary containment purge and exhaust valves are not required to be normally closed in MODES 4

5. Certain valves, however, are required to be OPERABLE ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 3 instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation." (This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) except for purge or exhaust valve flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

Due to the size of the primary containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves is not allowed to be operated under administrative controls.

con in ed B 3.6-18 Revision No.

BASES ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 G.l and G.2 PC I Vs B 3.6.1.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during MODE 4 or 5, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCD does not apply. Action must be immediately initiated t-& suspend operations with a po t ential for draining the r eactor vessel COPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs arc suspended and valve (s) arc restored to OP E RABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in c l osing the r esidual heat removal CRHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves , an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve. (continued)

B 3.6-23a Revision No. ,.-f" BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCD APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 3 Suppression Pool Water Level B 3.6.2.2 Initial suppression pool water level affects suppression pool temperature response calculations, calculated drywell pressure during vent clearing for a DBA, calculated pool swell loads for a DBA LOCA, and calculated loads due to S/RV discharges.

Suppression pool water level must be maintained within the limits specified so that the safety analysis of Reference 1 remains valid. Suppression pool water level satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

A limit that suppression pool water level 14.5 feet and 14.9 feet is required to ensure that the primary containment conditions assumed for the safety analyses are met. Either the high or low water level limits were used in the safety analyses, depending upon which is more conservative for a particular calculation.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA would cause significant loads on the primary containment.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. The requirement for maintaining suppression pool water level within limits in MODE 4 or 5 is addressed in LCD " ECCS Shutdmm". l"RPV Water Inventory Control". I With suppression pool water level outside the limits, the conditions assumed for the safety analyses are not met. If water level is below the mini mum level , the pressure suppression function still exists as long as main vents are covered, HPCI and RCIC turbine exhausts are covered, and S/RV quenchers are covered. If suppression pool water level is above the maximum level, protection against overpressurization still exists due to the margin in the peak containment pressure analysis and the capability of the Drywell Spray System. Therefore, continued operation for a limited time is allowed. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is sufficient to restore suppression pool water level to within limits. Also, it takes into account the low probability of an event impacting the suppression pool water level occurring during this interval.

d B 3.6-54 Revision No. 0 BASES APP LI CAB LE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LCD APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 3 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.l however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be processed prior to release to the environment.

For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment.

Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as duriAg eperatieAs with a peteAtial fer draiAiAg the reaeter vessel (OPDRVs), er during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment.

However, outside ground level hatches (hatches H20 through H24 and Torus room access hatch H34) may not be opened during movement of irradiated fuel. This will maintain CR dose acceptable.

If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES l, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal. continued B 3.6-74 Revision No. :t-f, BASES Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS .!L...l (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 3 If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCD is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. C.l and C.2 Movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment.

In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment.

Therefore, movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position.

Also , action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product re l ease. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action C.l has been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable, since the movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL can only be performed in MODES 4 and 5. -+--(continued)

B 3.6-75 Revision No. 76 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LCO APPLICABILITY PBAPS UNIT 3 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 boundary established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.

Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary.

The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs. The power operated automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Reference

2. ...f' The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are de-activated and secured in their closed position, and blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Reference
2. ,.f' In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment.

Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel C OPDRVs l or during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment.

SCIVs are only required to be OPERABLE during handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3. (continued)

B 3.6-79 Revision No.

BASES ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 3 C.l and C.2 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. D.l and D.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCD does not apply. If applicable, the movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also , if app li cab l e , actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs i n order to minimize the probabi l ity of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fiss i on product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action D.l has been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable, since the movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL can only be performed in MODES 4 and 5. I SR 3.6.4.2.l This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.

Rather, it involves verification that those SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

con inued B 3.6-82 Revision No. +-6 BASES LCO (continued)

APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 3 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 For Unit 3, one SGT subsystem is OPERABLE when one charcoal filter train, one fan (0CV020) and associated ductwork, dampers, valves, and controls are OPERABLE.

The second SGT subsystem is OPERABLE when the other charcoal filter train, one fan (0BV020) and associated ductwork, damper, valves, and controls are OPERABLE.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment.

Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel C OPORVs) or during movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in the secondary containment.

The SGT System is only required to be OPERABLE during OPRDVs or handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL. With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function.

However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a OBA occurring during this period. If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overa l l plant risk is minimized.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Remaining in the con i nue B 3.6-87 Revision No. +&

BASES ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 3 .!L...l (continued)

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 Applicability of the LCD is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. C.l. G.2.1 and C.2.2 During movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies, in the secondary containment OF during OPDRVs , when Required Action A.l cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should immediately be placed in operation.

This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.l is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies must immediately be suspended.

Suspension of this activity must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

A l so , if app li cab l e , actions must immediately be in i t i ated to suspend OPDR V s in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for f i ssion product release. Actions must conti n ue until OPDRVs are suspended. The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable, since the movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL can only be performed in MODES 4 and 5. c ntinued B 3.6-88 Revision No. +&

BASES SGT System B 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS D.l (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 3 If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT System may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function.

Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCD is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. E.l and h.2 When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended.

Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also , if applicable , act i ons must immediate l y be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in oFder to minimize the probability of a vessel dra i ndown and subsequent potentia l for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action E.l has been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable, since the movement of RECENTLY IRRADIATED FUEL can only be performed in MODES 4 and 5. SR 3.6.4.3.l Operating each SGT subsystem (including each filter train fan) for 15 minutes ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly.

It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature) 15 minutes periodically is sufficient to eliminate moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters since during idle periods instrument air is injected into the filter plenum to keep the filters dry. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. con in e B 3.6-89 Revision No. s+

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 3 MCREV System B 3.7.4 In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the MCREV System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CRE will remain habitable during and following a OBA, since the OBA could lead to a fission product release. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a OBA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the MCREV System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for Hie foll o*,o'i ng situations under 11'hi ch si gni fi cant radioactive re l eases can be postulated:

During operations with potential for draining the reactor .. *essel (OPDRVs); During CORE ALTERATIONS; and During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

With one MCREV subsystem inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary, the inoperable MCREV subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE MCREV subsystem is adequate to maintain control room temperature and to perform the CRE occupant protection function.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the MCREV System function.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a OBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.l. B.2 and B.3 If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past a CRE boundary and into the CRE can result in CRE occupant radiological dose greater than the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of OBA consequences (allowed to be up to 5 rem total effective dose equivalent CTEDE)), or inadequate protection of CRE occupants from hazardous chemicals or smoke that have been licensed to occur, the CRE boundary is inoperable.

Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE CRE boundary within 90 days. d B 3.7-17 Revision No. ++/-4 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 3 D .1. IZ D.2.1. D.2.2. and 0.2.3 MCREV System B 3.7.4 The Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that LCD 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS , or during OPDRVs , if the inoperable MCREV subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE MCREV subsystem may be placed in operation.

This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.l is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This L ...... places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident --! risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also , if applicab l e , actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. Ll If both MCREV subsystems are inoperable in MODE l, 2, or 3 for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary (i.e., Condition B), the MCREV System may not be capable of performing the intended function.

Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCD is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. continued B 3.7-19 Revision No. W BASES ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UN IT 3 lZ_ F.1. F.2 and F.3 MCREV System B 3.7.4 The Required Actions of Condition Fare modified by a Note indicating that LCD 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS , or during OPDRVs, with two MCREV subsystems inoperable or with one or more MCREV subsystems inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

If app licable , actioRs must be iAitiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probabi lity of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission produ ct release. Actions must contiAue until the OPDRVs are suspended. SR 3.7.4.1 This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate for 15 minutes. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly.

As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem periodically provides an { adequate check on this system. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.7.4.2 This SR verifies that the required MCREV testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations).

Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. continued B 3.7-20 Revision No. &7-AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES PBAPS UN IT 3 A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCD 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents.

However, assuming a single failure and concurrent 1 oss of all offsite or 1 oss of all onsite power is not required.

The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents CDBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences.

These deviations from OBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCD for required systems. During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that B 3.8-40 Revision No . .@

BASES LCO (continued)

PBAPS UN IT 3 AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 offsite circuit. In addition some equipment that may be required by Unit 3 is powered from Unit 2 sources (e.g., Containment Atmospheric Dilution System, Standby Gas Treatment System, Emergency Service Water System, and Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System). Therefore, qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Unit 2 onsite Class lE AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s), and the DG(s) (not necessarily different DGCs) from those being used to meet LCO 3.8.2.b requirements) capable of supplying power to the required Unit 2 subsystems of each of the required components must also be OPERABLE.

Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit(s) and required DG(s) ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and reactor vesse l drai ndmm). Automatic t initiation of the required DG during shutdown conditions is specified in LGO 3.3.5.1 , EGGS Inst ru mentation , and LCO 3.3.8.l, LOP Instrumentation.

The qualified Unit 3 offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to the respective Unit 3 4 kV emergency bus(es), and of accepting required loads during an accident.

Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR, Technical Specification Bases Section 3.8.l and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. A Unit 3 offsite circuit consists of the incoming breaker and disconnect to the startup and emergency auxiliary transformer, the respective circuit path to the emergency auxiliary transformer and the circuit path to the Unit 3 4 kV emergency buses required by LCO 3.8.8, including feeder breakers to the required Unit 3 4 kV emergency buses. A qualified Unit 2 offsite circuit's requirements are the same as the Unit 3 circuit's requirements, except that the circuit path, including the feeder breakers, is to the Unit 2 4 kV emergency buses required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8. The required DGs must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to their respective Unit 3 emergency bus on detection of bus undervoltage.

This sequence must be accomplished within 10 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the 4 kV emergency buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot and DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions.

Additional continu B 3.8-42 Revision No . .§.-8 BASES LCO (continued)

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode. Proper sequencing of loads is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

The necessary portions of the Emergency Service Water System are also required to provide appropriate cooling to each required DG. The OPERABILITY requirements for the DG capable of supplying power to the Unit 2 powered equipment are the same as described above, except that the required DG must be capable of connecting to its respective Unit 2 4 kV emergency bus. (In addition, the Unit 2 ECCS initiation logic SRs are not applicable, as described in SR 3.8.2.2 Bases.) It is acceptable for 4 kV emergency buses to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required buses. No automatic transfer capability is required for offsite circuits to be considered OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment to provide assurance that: PBAPS UNIT 3 a. Syste providing adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1. (continued)

B 3.8-43 Revision No.

BASES (continued)

AC Sources -Shutdown B 3.8.2 ACTIONS LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

PBAPS UN IT 3 A.l and B.l With one or more required offsite circuits ino or with one DG inoperable, the remaining requi d sources may be capable of supporting sufficient re

  • ed features (e.g., system, subsystem, division, compone , or device) to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, el operatioAs with a poteAtial for draiRiAg the reactor vessel. For example, if two or more 4 kV emergency buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, one 4 kV emergency bus with offsite power available may be capable of supplying sufficient required features.

By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable that are not powered from offsite power (Required Action A.l) or capable of being powered by the required DG (Required Action B.l), appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected feature(s)

LCOs' ACTIONS. Required features remaining powered from a qualified offsite power circuit, even if that circuit is considered inoperable because it is not powering other required features, are not declared inoperable by this Required Action. If a single DG is credited with meeting both LCD 3.8.2.d and one of the DG requirements of LCD 3.8.2.b, then the required features remaining capable of being powered by the DG are not declared inoperable by this Required Action, even if the DG is considered inoperable because it is not capable of powering other required features.

A.2.3, A.2.4 B.2.1. B.2.2. B.2.3. B.2.4. C.l. an offsite circuit not available to all required 4 kV emergency buses or one required DG inoperable, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable contin e B 3.8-44 Revision No . .g BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UN IT 3 AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 A.2.3. A.2.4. B.2.1. B.2.2. B.2.3. B.2.4. C.l. (continued) per Required Actions A.land B.l). Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With two or more required DGs inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources may not be available.

It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATION movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary c tainment, aRd activities Suspension of these activities shall not preclude comp l etion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention.

The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power. Pursuant to LCD 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization.

Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required 4 kV emergency bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a required bus is de-energized.

LCO 3.8.8 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized bus. SR 3.8.2.1 SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the Unit 3 AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. SR 3.8.1.8 is not contin ed B 3.8-45 Revision No. -G BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 3 SR 3.8.2.1 (continued)

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 required to be met since only one offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE.

SR 3.8.1.17 is not required to be met because the required OPERABLE DGCs) is not required to undergo periods of being synchronized to the offsite circuit. SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DGCs) that is not required to be OPERABLE.

Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE OG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4 kV emergency bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit are required to be OPERABLE.

This SR is modified by a second Note. The reason for the r Note is to preclude requiring the automatic functions of the DGCs) on an ECCS initiation to be functional during periods when ECCS are not required.

Periods iR which EGGS are not required are specified in LG O 3.5.2 , E GGS Shutdown". SR 3.8.2.2 This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 2 AC sources are governed by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Performance of the applicable Unit 2 Surveillances will satisfy Unit 2 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 3 Surveillance Requirement.

Seven exceptions are noted to the Unit 2 SRs of LCD 3.8.1. SR 3.8.1.8 is excepted when only one Unit 2 offsite circuit is required by the Unit 3 Specification, since there is not a second circuit to transfer to. SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8.1.17, SR 3.8.1.18 CECCS load block requirements only), and SR 3.8.1.19 are excepted since these SRs test the Unit 2 ECCS initiation signal, which is not needed for the AC sources to be OPERABLE on Unit 3. SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted since starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE.

B 3.8-46 continued Revision No. -+/--8 AmeRdment No. 226 DC Sources -Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND APP LI CABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCD PBAPS UN IT 3 A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating." The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 14 (Ref. 1), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE.

The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators ( DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as iHT inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

The Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystems, with each DC subsystem consisting of two 125 V station batteries in series, two battery chargers (one per battery), and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus, are required to be con inu B 3.8-72 Revision No. B BASES LCD (continued)

APPLICABILITY PBAPS UN IT 3 DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 OPERABLE to support Unit 3 DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE by LCD 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown." When the equipment required OPERABLE:

1) does not require 250 VDC from the DC electrical power subsystem; and 2) does not require 125 VDC from one of the two 125 V batteries of the DC electrical power subsystem, the Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystem requirements can be modified to only include one 125 V battery (the battery needed to provide power to required equipment), an associated battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying 125 V power to the associated bus. This exception is allowed only if all 250 VDC loads are removed from the associated bus. In addition, DC control power (which provides control power for the 4 kV load circuit breakers and the feeder breakers to the 4 kV emergency bus) for two of the four 4 kV emergency buses, as well as control power for two of the di es el generators, is provided by the Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystems.

Therefore, the Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystems needed to support required components are also required to be OPERABLE.

The Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystem OPERABILITY requirements are the same as those required for a Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystem.

In addition, battery chargers (Unit 2 and Unit 3) can be powered from the opposite unit's AC source (as described in the Background section of the Bases for LCD 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating"), and be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of meeting this LCO. This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindownl.

The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that: core cooling a. Required features to provid adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent dra i ndmm of the reactor 1,*essel; con inu B 3.8-73 Revision No. B BASES APPLICABILITY (continued)

ACTIONS PBAPS UN IT 3 b. DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCD 3.0.3 is not applicable.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCD 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

A.1. A. 2.3 **** A.2.4 If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCD 3.8.8, the DC electrical power subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC electrical power subsystems inoperable may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC electrical power subsystems inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. However, in many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made Ci .e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel). con in e B 3.8-74 Revision No. {}

BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PBAPS UNIT 3 DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 land I A.l. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. aed A.2.4 (continued)

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention.

The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power. SR 3.8.5.1 SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC electrical power subsystems from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

SR 3.8.5.2 This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystems are governed by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Performance of the applicable Unit 2 Surveillances will satisfy Unit 2 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 3 Surveillance Requirement.

The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 2 SR also governs performance of that SR for Unit 3. c n in ed B 3.8-75 Revision No.

Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES PBAPS UN IT 3 A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LCD 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems-Operating." The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 14 CRef. 1), assume Engineered Safety Feature CESF) systems are OPERABLE.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (continued)

B 3.8-94 Revision No . .g BASES (continued)

Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 LCD Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition.

Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features.

This LCD explicitly requires energization of the portions of the Unit 3 electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications required systems, equipment, and components-both specifically addressed by their own LCD, APPLICABILITY and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

In addition some components that may be required by Unit 3 receive power through Unit 2 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment System, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System, and DC control power for two of the four 4 kV emergency buses, as well as control power for two of the diesel generators).

Therefore, Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support the required equipment must also be OPERABLE.

In addition, it is acceptable for required buses to be cross-tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single source to supply multiple redundant buses, provided the source is capable of maintaining proper frequency (if required) and voltage. Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel drain down) . The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment that provide core cooling rovide assurance that:

PBAPS UN IT 3 a. Syste to provide adequate coo l ant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fue l in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vesse l; b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available; con i nued B 3.8-95 Revision No. G BASES APPLICABILITY (continued)

ACTIONS PBAPS UNIT 3 c. Di stri buti on Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

A.l. A.2.1. A.2.4, aAd A.2.5 Although redundant required features may require redundant electrical power di stri buti on subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem may be capable of supporting su *

  • nt required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATION , fuel movement, aAd opePatioAs with a poteAtial for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with associated electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. However, in many instances this option may involve undesired

.-a-n_d_, inistrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for suff1 c

  • conservative actions is made, (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATI , movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment , and any activities that could result in inadvertent draiAing of the reactor vessel). con i nued B 3.8-96 Revision No. G BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES PBAPS UN IT 3 Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 A.1. A.2.1. and A.2.5 (continued)

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems. Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal -shutdown cooling (RHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable.

In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR-SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR-SDC ACTIONS. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention.

The restoration of the required electrical power distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power. SR 3.8.8.1 This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem is functioning properly, with the buses energized.

The verification of indicated power availability on the buses ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. This may be performed by verification of absence of low voltage alarms. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. 1. UFSAR, Chapter 14. B 3.8-97 Revision No. &7-BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO PBAPS UN IT 3 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation B 3.10.1 that could result in a draining of the RPV required in MODE 4 by LCO more than adequate to keep the

........ decay heat load condition.

Small sys detected by leakage inspections before loss RPV water level about TAF or "RPVWIC," For the purposes is s , e protection provided by normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met by this Special Operations LCO, wi 11 ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is opti anal, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCDs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases. As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional.

Operation at reactor coolant temperatures>

212°F can be in accordance with Table 1.1-1 for MODE 3 operation without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. This option may be required due to P/T limits, however, which require testing at temperatures

> 212°F, while the ASME inservice test itself requires the safety/relief valves to be gagged, preventing their OPERABILITY.

Additionally, even with required minimum reactor coolant temperatures<

212°F, RCS temperatures may drift above 212°F during the performance of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing or during subsequent control rod scram time testing, which is typically performed in conjunction with inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. While this Special Operations LCO is provided for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and for scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, parallel performance of others tests and inspections is not precluded contin ed B 3.10-2a Revision No. Hi: