Text

License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, BWR Technical Specification Changes That Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
	ML092220045
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	07/30/2009
From:	Cowan B; Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	TSTF-478-A, Rev 2
	Download: ML092220045 (46)
	v • d • e

Exelon, Exelon Nuclear www.exeloncorp.com 200 Exelon Way Nuclear Kennett Square, PA 19348 1 OCFR50.90 July 30, 2009 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

Subject:

License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, "BWR Technical Specification Changes that Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

References:

1) TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, "BWR Technical Specification Changes that Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control," dated November 21, 2007

2) Federal Register Notice 72FR65610 - Notice of Availability on Model Safety Evaluation; Model No Significant Hazards Determination, and Model Application for Licensees that Wish to Adopt TSTF-478, Revision 2, "BWR Technical Specification Changes that Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control," dated November 21, 2007 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC, (Exelon) requests amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS), Appendix A of Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3.

The proposed amendments would revise the TS for PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, consistent with NRC-approved Industry TS Task Force (TSTF) Change Traveler TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, "BWR Technical Specification Changes that Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control" (Reference 1). The availability of this TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on November 21, 2007 (Reference 2) as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). Exelon reviewed the proposed No Significant Hazards Determination published in Federal Register Notice 72FR65610, dated November 21, 2007 (Reference 2), as part of the CLIIP and determined that it is applicable to PBAPS, Units 2 and 3.

The proposed amendments would delete TS 3.6.3.1, "Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD)

System," requirements and associated Bases from the PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, TS consistent with NRC-approved TSTF-478-A, Revision 2. This TSTF also discusses TS and associated Bases changes for the TS section concerning Drywell Cooling System Fans. The PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, TS do not contain this TS section, and therefore, these changes are not applicable.

The NRC has previously approved a similar amendment request for Duane Arnold Energy (Do~

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission License Amendment Request Containment Atmospheric Dilution System Elimination From TS Docket Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 July 30, 2009 Page 2 Center dated June 28, 2007 (ML071420246). The Duane Arnold license amendment request was submitted by letter dated July 17, 2006 (ML062080521), and supplemented by letter dated March 20, 2007 (ML070890301). provides an evaluation and assessment of the proposed changes to remove TS requirements consistent with the applicable criteria specified in NRC-approved TSTF-478-A, Revision 2. These proposed changes will result in modifications to containment combustible gas control TS requirements as permitted by 10 CFR 50.44, "Combustible gas control for nuclear power reactors." Attachment 2 contains the TS page mark-ups for the proposed TS changes. Attachment 3 includes the re-typed TS pages. Attachment 4 contains the mark-ups for the associated TS Bases pages.

The proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee and approved by the Nuclear Safety Review Board in accordance with the requirements of the Exelon Quality Assurance Program.

Exelon requests approval of the proposed amendments by July 30, 2010. Once approved, the amendments shall be implemented within 60 days.

There are no new commitments contained in this submittal.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91 (b)(1), a copy of this License Amendment Request is being provided to the designated official of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Richard Gropp at (610) 765-5557.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 30th day of July 2009.

Respectfully, Pamela B. C wan Director - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments: 1 - Evaluation of Proposed Changes for TSTF-478-A, Revision 2 2 - Mark-ups of Technical Specification Pages 3 - Re-typed Technical Specifications Pages 4 - Mark-ups of Technical Specification Bases Pages cc:

S. J. Collins, Administrator, Region I, USNRC F. L. Bower, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, PBAPS J. Hughey, Project Manager, USNRC R. R. Janati, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania S. Gray, State of Maryland

ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes PBAPS, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 "BWR Technical Specification Changes that Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process" 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

5.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

5.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 5.2 Precedent 5.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration 5.4 Conclusion

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

7.0 REFERENCES

ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 1 of 4 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION Exelon Generation Company, LLC, (Exelon) is requesting amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS), Appendix A, of Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3.

The proposed amendments would delete TS 3.6.3.1, "Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) System," requirements and associated Bases to modify containment combustible gas control requirements as permitted by 10 CFR 50.44, "Combustible gas control for nuclear power reactors." The proposed changes are consistent with NRC-approved Revision 2 to Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Improved Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, "BWR Technical Specification Changes that Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control." The availability of this TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on November 21, 2007 (Reference 2 - i.e., 72FR65610) as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). Exelon reviewed the proposed No Significant Hazards Determination published in Federal Register Notice 72FR6561 0, dated November 21, 2007 (Reference 2), as part of the CLIIP and determined that it is applicable to PBAPS, Units 2 and 3.

Variations from the NRC-approved TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, and the proposed TS changes are delineated in Section 2.0 below.

2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Consistent with the NRC-approved Revision 2 of TSTF-478-A, the proposed TS changes delete TS 3.6.3.1, "Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) System," requirements. The proposed revisions to the TS Bases are also included in this submittal. Adoption of the TS Bases associated with TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, is an integral part of implementing the proposed TS amendments. The changes to the affected TS Bases pages will be incorporated in accordance with the TS Bases Control Program.

The proposed amendments are being made in accordance with the CLIIP. Exelon is proposing the following minor variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) model Safety Evaluation (SE) published in the Federal Register on November 21, 2007 (i.e., 72FR6561 0).

o The PBAPS, Unit 2 and 3, TS for the CAD System is TS 3.6.3.1 rather than TS 3.6.3.3 as provided in the TSTF mark-ups.

o TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, also makes TS and Bases changes for the TS section on Drywell Cooling System Fans. Since the PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, TS do not have this section these changes are not applicable.

o TS Section 3.8.7.b is being revised to delete the specific section reference for "LCO 3.6.3.1" pertaining to CAD.

3.0 BACKGROUND

The background for this application is stated in the model SE in the NRC's Notice of Availability published in the Federal Register on November 21, 2007 (i.e., 72 FR 65610) and TSTF-478-A,

ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 2 of 4 Revision 2. The proposed changes are consistent with the NRC-approved TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, intended to modify containment combustible gas control requirements as permitted by 10 CFR 50.44, "Combustible gas control for nuclear power reactors." The deviations from the approved TSTF-478-A, Revision 2, are discussed above in Section 2.0.

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Exelon has reviewed the model SE published in the Federal Register dated November 21, 2007 (i.e., 72 FR 65610), as part of the CLIIP Notice of Availability. Exelon has concluded that the changes presented in the model SE prepared by the NRC are applicable to PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, and therefore, justify the proposed TS amendments.

Section 5.2.3.9 of the PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) describes the CAD System and discusses the system conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44, and General Design Criteria (GDC) 41, 42, and 43 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.

GDC 41, "Containment atmosphere cleanup," of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 requires in part, that systems shall be provided as necessary to reduce the concentration and quality of fission products and control the concentration of hydrogen, oxygen, and other substances in the containment atmosphere following postulated accidents to assure that containment integrity is maintained. The requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 provide the standards for controlling combustible gas that may accumulate in the containment atmosphere during accidents.

10 CFR 50.44 was revised on September 16, 2003 (i.e., 68FR54123), based on studies that led to an improved understanding of combustible gas behavior during severe accidents. The studies confirmed that the hydrogen release postulated from a design-basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) was not risk significant because it was not large enough to lead to early containment failure, and that the risk associated with hydrogen combustion was from beyond design-basis (i.e., severe) accidents. As a result, requirements for maintaining hydrogen control equipment associated with a design-basis LOCA were eliminated from 10 CFR 50.44. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident," Revision 3, dated March 2007, provides detailed guidance that would be acceptable for implementing 10 CFR 50.44.

The CAD system will be maintained functional to support the operation of the Safety Grade Instrument Gas (SGIG) system. This ensures that a back-up pneumatic source is available for the operation of the Primary Containment Isolation Valves and Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers. Maintaining the CAD system functional will also allow the system to be potentially used in conjunction with the station emergency operating procedures.

5.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

5.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements A description of these proposed changes and their relationship to applicable regulatory requirements and guidance was provided in the NRC's Notice of Availability published in the Federal Register dated November 21, 2007 (i.e., 72FR6561 0).

ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 3 of 4 5.2 Precedent This application is being made in accordance with the CLIIP. Exelon is not proposing significant variations or deviations from the TS changes described in TSTF-478-A, Revision 2 or in the content of the NRC's model SE published in the Federal Register on November 21, 2007 (i.e.,

72FR65610). A similar amendment request was submitted for Duane Arnold Energy Center on July 17, 2006 (ML062080521). The NRC approved the license amendment request for Duane Arnold on June 28, 2007 (ML071790186).

5.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration (NSHC)

Exelon has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination published in the Federal Register on, November 21, 2007 (i.e., 72FR65610), as part of the CLIIP Notice of Availability. Exelon has concluded that the determination presented in the notice is applicable to PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, and the determination is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91 (a).

Based on the above, Exelon concludes that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.

5.4 Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

Exelon has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in the model SE published on November 21, 2007 (i.e., 72 FR 65610), as part of the CLIIP Notice of Availability. Exelon has concluded that the NRC's findings presented in that evaluation are applicable to PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference for this application.

7.0 REFERENCES

1. Federal Register Notice, Notice of Availability published on November 21, 2007 (72FR65610).

2. TSTF-478-A Revision 2, "BWR Technical Specification Changes that Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control."

3. NRC letter dated June 28, 2007 to Duane Arnold Energy Center - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Technical Specification Change Related to the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control (TAC No. MD2619) (ML071420246)

ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 4 of 4

4. Duane Arnold Energy Center letter dated July 17, 2006 to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Technical Specification Change Request (TSCR-083): Adoption of TSTF-478, Rev. 0, "BWR technical Specification Changes that Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control" (ML062080521)

5. Duane Arnold Energy Center letter dated March 20, 2007 to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Technical Specification Changes at Duane Arnold Energy Center to Implement the Revised Rule for Combustible Gas Control (TAC No. MD2619) (ML070890301)

ATTACHMENT 2 Mark-ups of Technical Specifications Pages PBAPS, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES Unit 2 3.6-32 3.8-41 Unit 3 ii 3.6-31 3.6-32 3.8-41

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4-1 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating.........................

3.4-1 3.4.2 Jet Pumps.............................................

3.4 -6 3.4.3 Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves (Svs) 3.4-8 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE...............................

3.4-10 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation.................

3.4-12 3.4.6 RCS Specific Activity.................................

3.4-14 3.4.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown...............................

3.4-16 3.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown.............................

3.4-19 3.4.9 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits.............

3.4-21 3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure...........................

3.4-28 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM...........................

3.5-1 3.5.1 ECCS-Operating.......................................

3.5-1 3.5.2 ECCS-Shutdown........................................

3.5-8 3.5.3 RCIC System...........................................

3.5-12 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS.......................................

3.6-1 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment...................................

3.6-1 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock..........................

3.6-3 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)..........

3.6-8 3.6.1.4 Drywell Air Temperature...............................

3.6-17 3.6.1.5 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breake rs...........................................

3.6 -18 3.6.1.6 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers........

3.6-21 3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature..................

3.6-23 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level..........................

3.6-26 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool Cooling............................................

3. 6 -27 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool Spray....

3.6-29 3.6.3.1 C.nt.inm...nt Atfesphei. Dilution (CAD) Syst..m.Deleted

. 3.6-31 3.6.3.2 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration..............

3.6-33 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment.................................

3.6-34 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)........

3.6-36 3.6.4.3

Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System....................

3.6-40 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS.............................................

3.7-1 3.7.1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW)

System.............

3.7-1 3.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat S ink.........................................

3.7 -3 3.7.3 Emergency Heat Sink...................................

3.7-5 3.7.4 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

Sy st e m................

........... 3.7 -7 3.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas.................................

3.7-10 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 ii Amendment No.

24-OXXX

CAD System 3.6.3.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.1 49ef-a+flfflent iktmesene*1r 10 wi iutief---Aý

-s-teffi Del eted L C O 3.6.3. 1 T w o C APPLICABI Y:

MODES ACTIONS AD subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

1 and 2.

CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION TIME A.

One or both CAD A.1 tore CAD 30 days subsystems inoperable.

su stem(s) to OPERA status.

B.

Required Ac

" n andý" B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associat Completion Tim met.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.6-31 Amendment No.

2-&2XXX

\\SUR ILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CAD System 3.6.3.1 SURVEILLANCE FREXQ/

CY SR 3.6.3.1\\.

Verify Safety Grade Instrument Gas (SGIG) 2/hiours System header pressure is ý: 80 psig./

SR 3.6.3.1.2 Verify CAD System liquid nitrogens orage 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months tank lev1 is 33 inches water c umn.

SR 3.6.3.1.3 Verify each CAD bsyste

manual, power 31 days operated, and auto ti valve in the flow path that is not oc d,

sealed, or otherwise secured i p sition is in the correct position r can e aligned to the correct posit.

SR 3.6.3.1.4 Verify ach SGIG System manual val e in 31 days the f/ ow paths servicing CAD System val es, that is not locked, sealed, or o erwise secured in position is in the gcorrect position or can be aligned to the correct position.

SR 3

.3.1.5 Verify the CAD System supplies nitrogen 24 month*

to the SGIG System upon loss of the normal air supply.

The information on this page has been deleted.

Intentionally left blank.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.6-32 Amendment No.

2-1-GXXX

Distribution Systems--Operating 3.8.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Distribution Systems -Operating LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Unit 2 Division I and Division II AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and

b.

Unit 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown,"

LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS

-Operating,"

LCO 3.6.2.3, "RHR Suppression Pool Cooling,"

LCO 3.6.2.4, "RHR Suppression Pool Spray,"

LU 3. C. 3. 1,"Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD)

System,"

LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System,"

LCO 3.7.1, "High Pressure Service Water (HPSW)

System,"

LCO 3.7.2, "Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat Sink,"

LCO 3.7.3, "Emergency Heat Sink," and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources--Operating."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.8-41 Amendment No.

24-4XXX

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9 3.4.10 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

Recirculation Loops Operating................

Jet Pum ps....................................

Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves RCS Operational LEAKAGE......................

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation........

RCS Specific Activity........................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown......................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown.....................

RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits....

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure..................

(SVs)...

3.4-1 3.4-1 3.4-6 3.4-8 3.4-10 3.4-12 3.4-14 3.4-16 3.4-19 3.4-21 3.4-28 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.6 3.6.1 3.6.1 3.6.1 3.6.1 3.6.1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM......

ECCS-Operating..................

ECCS-Shutdown...................

RCIC System......................

AND REACTOR CORE

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS...............................

Primary Containment...........................

Primary Containment Air Lock..................

Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)..

Drywell Air Temperature.......................

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breake rs...................................

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers Suppression Pool Average Temperature..........

Suppression Pool Water Level..................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool 3.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-8 3.5-12 3.6-1 3.6-1 3.6-3 3.6-8 3.6-17 3.6-18 3.6-21 3.6-23 3.6-26 3.6.1.6 3.6.2.1 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.3 3.6.2.4 3.6.3.1 3.6.3.2 3.6.4.1 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.3 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 Cooling............................................

3. 6 -27 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool Spray....

3.6-29 entainment Atmespheie Dilutien (CAD) Syst....Deleted.

3.6-31 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration..............

3.6-33 Secondary Containment.................................

3.6-34 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)........

3.6-36 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System....................

3.6-40 PLANT SYSTEMS.............................................

3.7-1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW)

System.............

3.7-1 Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat S ink.........................................

3.7 -3 Emergency Heat Sink...................................

3.7-5 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

S y st em...................

.......................... 3.7 -7 Main Condenser Offgas.................................

3.7-10 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 i i Amendment 2-19XXX

CAD System 3.6.3.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.1 t

Mi 1.,ý I (' A M %

1) Chleted 3.6.3.1 Two CAD subsystems shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILIT MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED AC N

COMPLETION TIME A.

One or both CAD A,1 ore CAD 30 days subsystems inoperable, sub stem(s) to OPERA status.

B.

Required Actl'o nd B.1 Be in MODE 3.

1 or associated elpl eti on F*

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.6-31 Amendment No.

-2&5XXX

SURVEIL ANCE REQUIREMENTS CAD Syste 3.6..

SURVEILLANCE F QUENCY SR 3.6.3.1.1 Verify Safety Grade Instrument Gas (SGIG)*4 hours stem header pressure is

Ž 80 psig.

SR 3.6.3.1.2 Verify D System liquid nitrogen storage 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months tank leve is 33 inches water column.

SR 3.6.3.1.3 Verify each CAD s syst

manual, power 31 days operated, and autom valve in the flow path that is not lo0

, sealed, or otherwise secured n po ition is in the correct positio or can b aligned to the correct positi n.

SR 3.6.3.1.4 Verifeach SGIG System manual valv in 31 days the ow paths servicing CAD System va es, that is not locked, sealed, or herwise secured in position is in the

/correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.

SR 3

.3.1.5 Verify the CAD System supplies nitrogen 24 month*

to the SGIG System upon loss of the normal air supply.

The information on this page has been deleted.

Intentionally left blank.

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.6-32 Amendment No.

24-4XXX

Distribution Systems--Operating 3.8.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Distribution Systems -Operating LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Unit 2 Division I and Division II AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and

b.

Unit 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown,"

LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS--Operating,"

LCO 3.6.2.3, "RHR Suppression Pool Cooling,"

LCO 3.6.2.4, "RHR Suppression Pool Spray,"

L2O 3.6.3o.,

"Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD)

System,"

LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System,"

LCO 3.7.1, "High Pressure Service Water (HPSW)

System,"

LCO 3.7.2, "Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat Sink,"

LCO 3.7.3, "Emergency Heat Sink,"

LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

System," and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources--Operating."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.8-41 Amendment No.

244XXX I

ATTACHMENT 3 Re-typed Technical Specifications Pages PBAPS, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES Unit 2 ii 3.6-31 3.6-32 3.8-41 Unit 3 ii 3.6-31 3.6-32 3.8-41

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9 3.4.10 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.6 3.6.1.1 3.6.1.2 3.6.1.3 3.6.1.4 3.6.1.5 3.6.1.6 3.6.2.1 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.3 3.6.2.4 3.6.3.1 3.6.3.2 3.6.4.1 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS).........................

Recirculation Loops Operating......................

Jet Pumps......................................

Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves (Svs)

RCS Operational LEAKAGE............................

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation..............

RCS Specific Activity..............................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown............................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown...........................

RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits..........

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure........................

3.4-1 3 4-1 3 4-6 3.4-8 3.4-10 3.4-12 3.4-14 3.4-16

... 314-19

... 3.4-21

... 3.4-28 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM......

ECCS-Operating..................

ECCS-Shutdown...................

RCIC System......................

AND REACTOR CORE CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS.......................................

Primary Containment...................................

Primary Containment Air Lock..........................

Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)..........

Drywell Air Temperature...............................

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum B rea k e rs...........................................

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers........

Suppression Pool Average Temperature..................

Suppression Pool Water Level..........................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool C o o l i n g............................................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool Spray....

D e l e t e d Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration..............

Secondary Containment.................................

Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)........

Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System....................

3.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-8 3.5-12 3.6-1 3.6-1 3.6-3 3.6-8 3.6-17 3.6-18 3.6-21 3.6-23 3.6-26 3.6-27 3.6-29 3.6-31 3.6-33 3.6-34 3.6-36 3.6-40 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 PLANT SYSTEMS......................................

High Pressure Service Water (HPSW)

System......

Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat S ink..................................

Emergency Heat Sink............................

Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

System..................................

Main Condenser Offgas..........................

3.7-1 3.7-1 3.7-3 3.7-5 3.7-7 3.7-10 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 i i Amendment No.

CAD System 3.6.3.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.1 Deleted PBAPS UNIT 2 3.6-31 Amendment No.

The information on this page has been deleted.

Intentionally left blank.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.6-32 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems-Operating 3.8.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Distribution Systems-Operating LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Unit 2 Division I and Division II AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and

b.

Unit 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown,"

LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS

-Operating,"

LCO 3.6.2.3, "RHR Suppression Pool Cooling,"

LCO 3.6.2.4, "RHR Suppression Pool Spray,"

"Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD)

System,"

LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System,"

LCO 3.7.1, "High Pressure Service Water (HPSW)

System,"

LCO 3.7.2, "Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat Sink," LCO 3.7.3, "Emergency Heat Sink," and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.8-41 Amendment No.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9 3.4.10 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.6 3.6.1.1 3.6.1.2 3.6.1.3 3.6.1.4 3.6.1.5 3.6.1.6 3.6.2.1 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.3 3.6.2.4 3.6.3.1 3.6.3.2 3.6.4.1 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS).....................

Recirculation Loops Operating................

Jet Pumps....................................

Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves RCS Operational LEAKAGE......................

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation........

RCS Specific Activity........................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown......................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown.....................

RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits....

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure..................

3.4-1 3.4 -1 3.4-6 (SVs)...

3.4-8 3.4-10 3.4-12 3.4-14 3.4-16 3.4-19 3.4-21 3.4-28 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM...........................

3.5-1 ECCS-Operating.......................................

3.5-1 ECCS-Shutdown........................................

3.5-8 RCIC System...........................................

3.5-12 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS.......................................

Primary Containment...................................

Primary Containment Air Lock..........................

Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)..........

Drywell Air Temperature...............................

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum B rea k e rs...........................................

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers........

Suppression Pool Average Temperature..................

Suppression Pool Water Level..........................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool C o o l i n g............................................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool Spray....

D e l e t e d...............................................

Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration..............

Secondary Containment.................................

Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)........

Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System....................

3.6-1 3.6-1 3.6-3 3.6-8 3.6-17 3.6-18 3.6-21 3.6-23 3.6-26 3.6-27 3.6-29 3.6-31 3.6-33 3.6-34 3.6-36 3.6-40 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 PLANT SYSTEMS..............................................

3.7-1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW)

System.............

3.7-1 Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat Sink.........................................

3.7 -3 Emergency Heat Sink...................................

3.7-5 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

Sy stem.....................................

3.7 -7 Main Condenser Offgas.................................

3.7-10 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 i i Amendment No.

CAD System 3.6.3.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3.1 Deleted PBAPS UNIT 3 3.6-31 Amendment No.

The information on this page has been deleted.

Intentionally left blank.

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.6-32 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems -Operating 3.8.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Distribution Systems-Operating LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Unit 2 Division I and Division II AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and

b.

Unit 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown,"

LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS-Operating,"

LCO 3.6.2.3, "RHR Suppression Pool Cooling,"

LCO 3.6.2.4, "RHR Suppression Pool Spray,"

"Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD)

System,"

LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System,"

LCO 3.7.1, "High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) System,"

LCO 3.7.2, "Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat Sink,"

LCO 3.7.3, "Emergency Heat Sink," LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

System," and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.8-41 Amendment No.

ATTACHMENT 4 Mark-ups of Technical Specifications Bases Pages PBAPS, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES Unit 2 IU

.n ~.......

ii B 3.6-16 B 3.6-35 B 3.6-64 B 3.6-65 B 1 3 -- 6 5 B 3.6-66 B 3.6-67 B 3.6-68 B 3.6-69 3 6 B 3.6-70 Unit 3 ii B 3.6-16 B 3.6-35 B 3.6-64 3..6......-

-1 11 B 3.6-65 B 3.6-66 B 3.6-67 B 3.6-68 B 3.6-69 B 3.6-70

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B B

3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 B 3.4.8 B 3.4.9 B 3.4.10 B 3.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

Recirculation Loops Operating.......................

Jet Pumps...........................................

Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves (SVs)

RCS Operational LEAKAGE.............................

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation...............

RCS Specific Activity...............................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown.............................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown............................

RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits...........

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure.........................

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM.........................

ECCS-Operating.....................................

ECCS-Shutdown......................................

RCIC System.........................................

B B

B B 3.4-33 3.4-1 3.4-1 3.4-11 3.4-15 3.4-19 3.4-24 3.4-29 B

B B

B 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 B

B B

3.4-38 3.4-43 3.4-52 3.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-18 3.5-24 3.6-1 3.6-1 3.6-6 3.6-14 3.6 3.6.1.1 3.6.1.2 3.6.1.3 3.6.1.4 3.6.1.5 3.6.1.6 3.6.2.1 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.3 3.6.2.4 3.6.3.1 3.6.3.2 3.6.4.1 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.3 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS............................

Primary Containment............................

Primary Containment Air Lock....................

Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)...

Drywell Air Temperature........................

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers.................................

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers.

Suppression Pool Average Temperature...........

Suppression Pool Water Level...................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool Cooling.................................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool Spr Geat~iinmcnt Atrosphcric Di"at-i....

)

tS ue Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration.......

Secondary Containment..........................

Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System.............

B 3.6-31 ay......

e t,.,ek B

B B

3.6-34 3.6-42 3.6-48 3.6-53 3.6-56 3.6-60 3.6-64 3.6-70 3.6-73 3.6-78 3.6-85 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 B 3.7.3 B 3.7.4 B 3.7.5 PLANT SYSTEMS............

B 3.7-1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW)

System............

B 3.7-1 Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat Sink B 3.7-6 Emergency Heat Sink.................................

B 3.7-11 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

System...........................................

B 3.7-15 Main Condenser Offgas...............................

B 3.7-22 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 ii Revision No.

XX

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) each of the supported system and components in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.1.5, "Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers-,." and LCO 3.6.3.1, "Containment Atmosphoric Dilution (CAD)

System."

For the SGIG System, liquid nitrogen from the CAD System liquid nitrogen storage tank passes through the CAD System liquid nitrogen vaporizer where it is converted to a gas.

The gas then flows into a Unit 2 header and a Unit 3 header separated by two manual globe valves.

From each header, the gas then branches to each valve operator or valve seal supplied by the SGIG System.

Each branch is separated from the header by a manual globe valve and a check valve.

To support SGIG System functions, the CAD System liquid nitrogen storage tank minimum required level is a 16 inches water column and a minimum required SGIG System header pressure of 80 psig.

Minimum roquirmonts fer the CAD-Systemn liquid nitragen st.ag. tank t rcupptrst CAD System OPERABILITY a, rc o

,,ifid in LCO 3.6.3.1, "Cntainmo,,nt At.csphc-.i* Dilution (CAD) Systf,,'

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents.

As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment.

Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.

The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material and are mitigated by PCIVs are a LOCA and a main steam line break (MSLB).

In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation.

This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs (including primary containment purge valves) are minimized.

Of the events analyzed in Reference 1, the LOCA is a limiting event due to radiological consequences.

The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) is the most significant variable from a radiological standpoint.

The MSIVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds after signal generation.

Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-16 Revision No. GXX

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.5 BASES BACKGROUND suppression chamber atmosphere.

Low spray temperatures and (continued) atmospheric conditions that yield the minimum amount of contained noncondensible gases are assumed for conservatism.

The Safety Grade Instrument Gas (SGIG)

System supplies pressurized nitrogen gas (from the Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD)

System liquid nitrogen storage tank) as a safety grade pneumatic source to the CAC System purge and exhaust isolation valve inflatable seals, the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breaker air operated isolation butterfly valves and inflatable seal, and the CAC and CAD Systems vent control air operated valves.

The SGIG System thus performs two distinct post-LOCA functions:

(1) supports containment isolation and (2) supports CAD System vent operation.

SGIG System requirements are addressed for each of the supported system and components in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs),"

LCO 3.6.1.5, and "Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers,"*-." and LO 3.6.3.1, "C÷ntainmnt Atm.÷

.ph.rie Dilutien (CAD) Syse.m."

For the SGIG System, liquid nitrogen from the CAD System liquid nitrogen storage tank passes through the CAD System liquid nitrogen vaporizer where it is converted to a gas.

The gas then flows into a Unit 2 header and a Unit 3 header separated by two manual globe valves.

From each header, the gas then branches to each valve operator or valve seal supplied by the SGIG System.

Each branch is separated from the header by a manual globe valve and a check valve.

To support SGIG System functions, the CAD System liquid nitrogen storage tank minimum required level is a 16 inches water column and a minimum required SGIG System header pressure of 80 psig.

Minimum rcquir....nts fF the GAD-Sy-s-tem...1. i.qui d-i-t.*rege...s..-tofage....4ank-t&..Suepp.rt.--.AD. Syst.em.

OPERABILITY arc spccified in L.O.6..

3.1,",,ontaimcnt Atm..phr*...

Diluti.. (CAD y.t*...

APPLICABLE Analytical methods and assumptions involving the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers are used as part of the accident response of the containment systems.

Internal (suppression-chamber-to-drywell) and external (reactor building-to-suppression chamber) vacuum breakers (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-35 Revision No.

GXX

CAD System B 3.6.3.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.3.1 Ge meF t-4t eeted

<BASES B*CKGROUND The CAD System functions to maintain combustible gas

/

~concentrations within the primary containment altoor bel/dw

~~~the flammability limits following a postulatedlos*

coolant accident (LOCA) by purging hydrogen and oxyy en with nitrogen.

To ensure that a combustible gas mixtur does not occur, oxygen concentration is kept < 5.0 volum percent The CAD System is manually initiated and nsists of two 100% capacity subsystems.

Each subsyst consists of the li uid nitrogen supply tank, the atmo heric vaporizer, an ele ric vaporizer, and connected p' ing to supply the drywe 1 and suppression chamber v umes.

The liquid nitroge tank, the atmospheric v porizer and electric vaporizer are common componen which are shared between the CAD subsyst ms of the two Piping from the liquid nitrogen tan downstream ou the vaporizers is routed into a common header ere it i/s split and routed to each unit.

Two pipes are ro ed t each unit.

Each of the two pipes to a particular unit deseto supply nitrogen to both the drywell and suppre n chamber. The intent of this arrangement is t provi e redundant nitrogen supplies to both the drywe and SUP ession chamber to satisfy single failure crit ia. In Orde to purge primary containment of combustibl gases, the origi 1 CAD System design provided two vent for each unit.

One 's to allow venting from the drywell and the other is to allo venting from the s uppr ssion chamber. The nitrogen torage tank contains 38 4 gallons (which corresponds to level of 33 inches wer col umn), which is adequate for days of CAD System

//and Safety Grade Instrument Gas (SGIG) stem operation for both units.

The SGIG System supplies pressurized nitrogen as (from the CAD System liquid nitrogen storage tank) as a s ety grade pneumatic source to the Containment Atmospheric Ctrol (CAC) System purge and exhaust isolation valve infl table seals, the reactor building-to-suppression chamber va uum breaker air operated isolation valves and inflatable se 1, and the CAC and CAD Systems vent control air operated valves.

The SGIG System thus performs two distinct post-(conti nued')

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-64 Revision No.

.-7XX

CAD System B 3.6.3.1 B\\, E S BACKG UND LOCA functions:

(1) supports containment isolation ad (2)

(continued) supports CAD System vent operation.

SGIG System re irements are addressed for each of the supported system and omponents in LCO 3.6.1.3,

'Primary Containment Isolation Va es (PCIVs),"

LCO 3.6.1.5, "Reactor Building-to-Supp ession Chamber Vacuum Breakers," and LCO 3.6.3.1, "Co ainment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD)

System."

For the IG System, liquid nitrogen from the CAD System liquid ni rogen storage tank passes through the CAD System liquid nitrogen vaporizer where it is converted to a gas.

The gas en flows into a it 2 header and a Unit 3 header separa d by two manual g be valves.

From each header, the ga then branches to ea valve operator or valve seal supp ied by the SGIG Syst m.

Each branch is separated frop the header by a manual globe valve and a check valve.

The CAD ystem operates as direct d in the emergency operatingfprocedures to remove ccmbustible gases from primary containnmenn APPLICABLE The CAD Systemlis manualo y conitiated from the main control SAFETY ANALYSES room in the pur mode aism irected by the emergency operating procedures (EOPsA if itis determined that the concentration of combustible gadss i c

uprimary containment exceeds the action levels spaeci in the EOPs. The CAD SGutem is used The information on this page has been deleted.

o o

raterts I

~Intentionally left blank./

ine gi aysdem s

s modrege y respgnea io atOT, containment oxygen bnretisunrizing pwlmary containment with nitrogen to approximateInyai5% of the co~nalnment design pressure.

Above this preAsu *,

containment gs d be vented to maaie n this pre uae w ie CAD continued ti supply diluting nitrogen.

The original deSign calcuationl demonstrated that, with oxypen t neration rates specifie in Regulatory Guide 1.7, Tab21 a(Reference 3),

and the CAD ystem operated per its orimgiya design mode (i.e., repressufization), oxygen concentrations would be maintained <

v/o and offsite doses would be maintained less than ther requsements of 10 The PBAPS combustible gas control system hno since been dosreevaluated with oxygen generation rates basid on

/

experimentally and analytically determined p~a meters as

/

permitted in Regulatory Guide 1.7, and document d in NEDO-

/

22155 and Reference 1.

As a result it wa s fo und that the

/

primary containment inerting alone is sufficient t*maintain

/

oxygen concentrations < 5 v/o and that CAD system o eration

/

would not be required to control combustible gases.

/Therefore, the CAD system, n

nprticular containm Nt

/

~venting, is no longer considered the primary means of

/

combustible gas control.

As a result, no releases or of site

//

doses are anticipated to result from design basis combust le gas control.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-65 Revision No.

2-3XX

B\\AS S CAD System B 3.6.3.

APPLICA LE Nevertheless, Reference 1 did direct that the CAD Sys m be SAFETY A LYSES maintained as it was originally designed to comply w* h the (contin d) requirements of criteria 41, 42, and 43 of Appendix A of 10 I/

CFR Part 50 and installed in accordance with 10CF 0.44 (Reference 2).

The CAD System satisfies the requirements of N Policy Statement (Reference 5) because through Refer nce 1 review, the CAD System has been determined to be imp rtant to public ealth and safety.

Thus, it is retained i the Technical S cifications.

LCO APPLICABIL Two C D subsystems must be OPERABLE.

his ensures operation of at east one CAD subsystem in the vent of a worst case single &tive failure.

Operation o a least one CAD subsyste tis designed to maintain rimay containment post-LOCA oxyge concentration < 5.0 v o for 7 days.

For the CAD $stem vent control/air operated valves and the GAG System yen control air o 'era ted valves which support CAD System oper tion to be c) nsid ered

OPERABLE, the SGIG System supplying nitrogen gs to the air operators of these valves must be OP DBLE.

The information on this page has been deleted.

ITY Intentionally left blank.

aintain the f ammab

-ii y lii nn

5.

v/o following a L A.

This ensures that the r lative leak tightness of primaryeoth containment is ad *quate an* prevents damage to safety related equipme and instr ments located within primary In MODE 3, b ~th the hydrogen anh oxygen production rates and the total a~ounts produced after a LOCA would be less than those cal lated for the Design B,sis Accident LOCA.

Thus, if the a ~alysis were to be performL starting with a LOCA in MODE 3,//the time to reach a flammabT concentration would be extended beyond the time conservative y calculated for MODE 'I and 2.

The extended time woul allow hydrogen rem al from the primary containment at ~sphere by other me Yns and also allow repair of an m

oper lle CAD subsystem, i CAD were not available.

Therefore, the\\CAD System is not equired to be OPERABLE in MODE 3.

/zIn MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequ ces of a LOCA Sare reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of ths ODES..

Therefore, the CAD System is no* required tn t

m ACTIONS A.1 If one or both CAD subsystems (or one or more supply an vent paths) are inoperable, both subsystems must be rest ed to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

In this Condition, the oxygen control function of the CAD System may be lost.

However, alternate oxygen control capabilities may be

\\

provided by the Primary Containment Inerting System.

The 7(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-66 Revision No. MXX

\\BASES CAD System B 3.6.3.1 ACTIONS A.1 (continued) 30 day Completion Time is based on the low pr ability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generat hydrogen and xygen in amounts capable of exceeding th flammability li it, the amount of time available afte the event for ope tor action to prevent exceeding t s limit, and the avail ility of other hydrogen mitig ing systems.

B.1 If any Require Action cann be met within the associated Completion Time, the plan must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not ply.

To achieve this status, the The information on this page has been deleted.

nable, based Intentionally left blank.

)all, based conditions in an raerly nner and witnou ca lenging plant systems.

SU RE(

RVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3

.1 QUIREMENTS This S ensures that the pressure i the SGIG System header is

Ž/

0 psig.

This ensures that the st-LOCA nitrogen pr sure provided to the valve operator and valve seals is equate for the SGIG System to perform i s design function.

he 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency was developed conside iing the importance of the SGIG System for maintainin the containment isolation function and combustible as control function of valves supplied by the SGIG System.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is also considered to be adequate to ens re timely detection of any breach in the SGIG System which wou dl render the system incapable of performing its functio (continu PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-67 Revision No.

&2-XX

CAD System

\\BASESB 3.6.3.

SURVEILLAN SR 3.6.3.1.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Verifying that the level in the CAD liquid nitr gen tank is

Ž 33 inches water column will ensure at least days of ost-LOCA CAD System and SGIG System operati n for both its.

This minimum volume of liquid nitr gen allows su ficient time after an accident to rep nish the nitrogen supp y for long term inerting.

This is verified every 24 ho s to ensure that the system is capable of performing its int nded function when required.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is based n operating experience, ich has shown 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to be an a ceptable period to ver fy the liquid nitrogen supply and the availability f other hydrogen mitigating systems.

SR 3.6.3.1.3 The information on this page has been deleted.

operated, Intentionally left blank.

flow paths st for system operation.

This S does'not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, r otherwis secured in position, since these valves w re verified to be in the correct position prior to loc ng, sealing, or curing.

A valve i also allowed to be in e nonaccident position provide it can be aligned to the a ident position within the ti e assumed in the accident ana sis.

This is acce able because the CAD System is m ually initiated.

Thi SR does not apply to valves that ca not be i dvertently misaligned, such as check v lves.

This SR oes not require any testing or valve manip lation; rather, it involves verification that those valves c able of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the v lves are operated under procedural control, improper valve p sition would only affect a single subsystem, the probabilit of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and t e system is a manually initiated system.

/ /

(continue

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-68 Revision No. OXX

S.ES CAD B

System 3.6.3.1 SURV LLANCE SR 3.6.3.1.4 REQUIR ENTS (conti ued)

Verifying the correct alignment for each manual v lve in the SGIG System required flow paths provides assura e that the proper flow paths exist for system operation.

his SR does not apply to valves that are locked or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified be in the correct position prior to locking or secur

g.

A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident pos"tion provided it can be aligned to the accident position ithin the time sumed in the accident analysis.

Thi is acceptable b ause the CAD System is manually in'tiated.

This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be i advertently misaligned such s check valves.

This SR doe not require any testing or va e manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those lves capable of being mi positioned are in the correct osition.

The 31 day F/equency is based on engineeri

judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls go erning valve ope ation, and ensures correct valve positi ns.

SR 3.6.3.1.5 The information on this page has been deleted.

instrument Intentionally left blank.

ýrform its hired pressure for val e ope tors and valve seals supported by the SGIG System/. The 2"month Frequency was developed considering i is prudent that this Surveillance be performed on during a plct outage.

Operating experience has shown t at these compone ts will usually pass this Surveilla e when performed a the 24 month Frequency.

Thus, th Frequency was conclu d to be acceptable from a reliabi ity standpoint.

REFERENCES

1.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (

C) Letter (SER) from John E. Stolz (Chief, Operating actors Branch (Division of Licensing)) to Edward

. Bauer, Jr., Vice President and General Counsel, Phila elphia Electric Company "Recombiner Capability Requir ents of 10CFR50.44(c)(3)(ii)

Generic Letter 84-9" dated 6/26/85.

2.

10 CFR Part 50.

3.

Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision 0.

4.

UFSAR, Section 5.2.3.9.5.

5.

Final Policy statement on Technical Specification Improvements July 22, 1993 (58 FR3913)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-69 Revision No. -37XX

Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration B 3.6.3.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.3.2 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration BASES BACKGROUND All nuclear reactors must be designed to withstand events that generate hydrogen either due to the zirconium metal water reaction in the core or due to radiolysis.

The primary method to control hydrogen is to inert the primary containment.

With the primary containment inert, that is, oxygen concentration < 4.0 volume percent (v/o),

a combustible mixture cannot be present in the primary containment for any hydrogen concentration.

The capability to inert the primary containment and maintain oxygen

< 4.0 v/o works together with the Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD)

System *t--3-6--3-4-T-,i-ei.-Atrnepher*

D4t.4.en-t(G.)-ysem# to provide redundant and diverse methods to mitigate events that produce hydrogen.

For example, an event that rapidly generates hydrogen from zirconium metal water reaction will result in excessive hydrogen in primary containment, but oxygen concentration will remain < 4.0 v/o and no combustion can occur.

Long term generation of both hydrogen and Oxygen' from radiolytic decomposition of water may eventually result in a combustible mixture in primary containment, except that the CAD System dilutes and removes hydrogen and oxygen gases faster than they can be produced from radiolysis and again no combustion can occur.

This LCO ensures that oxygen concentration does not exceed 4.0 v/o during operation in the applicable conditions.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The Reference 1 calculations assume that the primary containment is inerted when a Design Basis Accident loss of coolant accident occurs.

Thus, the hydrogen assumed to be released to the primary containment as a result of metal water reaction in the reactor core will not produce combustible gas mixtures in the primary containment.

Oxygen, which is subsequently generated by radiolytic decomposition of water, is diluted and removed by the CAD System more rapidly than it is produced.

Primary containment oxygen concentration satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.6-70 Revision No.

GXX

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B B

3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

Recirculation Loops Operating.................

Jet Pumps.....................................

Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and Safety Valves RCS Operational LEAKAGE.......................

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation.........

RCS Specific Activity.........................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown.......................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown......................

RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits.....

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure...................

(SVs)

B 3.4-1 B 3.4-1 B 3.4-11 B 3.4-15 B 3.4-19 B 3.4-24 B 3.4-29 B 3.4-33 B 3.4.8 B 3.4.9 B 3.4.10 B 3.5 B 3.5.1 B 3.5.2 B 3.5.3 B 3.6 B 3.6.1.1 B 3.6.1.2 B 3.6.1.3 B 3.6.1.4 B 3.6.1.5 B 3.6.1.6 B 3.6.2.1 B 3.6.2.2 B 3.6.2.3 B 3.6.2.4 B 3.6.3.1 B 3.6.3.2 B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6.4.3 B 3.7 B 3.7.1 B 3.7.2 B 3.7.3 B 3.7.4 B 3.7.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM.........................

ECCS-Operating.....................................

ECCS-Shutdown......................................

RCIC System.........................................

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS.....................................

Primary Containment.....................................

Primary Containment Air Lock............................

Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)............

Drywell Air Temperature.................................

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers.........................................

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers..........

Suppression Pool Average Temperature....................

Suppression Pool Water Level............................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool Cooling..........................................

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Suppression Pool Spray......

Containment Atimospheric Dilution (CAD) SystcmDeeleed....

Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration................

Secondary Containment...................................

Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)..........

Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System......................

B B

B 3.4-38 3.4-43 3.4-52 3.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-18 3.5-24 3.6-1 3.6-1 3.6-6 3.6-14 3.6-31 3.6-34 3.6-42 3.6-48 3.6-53 3.6-56 3.6-60 3.6-64 3.6-70 3.6-73 3.6-78 3.6-85 PLANT SYSTEMS...........................................

B 3.7-1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW)

System............

B 3.7-1 Emergency Service Water (ESW)

System and Normal Heat Sink B 3.7-6 Emergency Heat Sink.................................

B 3.7-11 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

System............................................

B 3.7-15 Main Condenser Offgas...............................

B 3.7-22 (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 Revision No.

4Xx ii

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) each of the supported system and components in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.1.5, "Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum BreakersT."-

and LCO 3.6.3.1, "Cntainont Atm..

sph.r.i*

Dilti.n. '(AD),

Sct.m." For the SGIG System, liquid nitrogen from the CAD System liquid nitrogen storage tank passes through the CAD System liquid nitrogen vaporizer where it is converted to a gas.

The gas then flows into a Unit 2 header and a Unit 3 header separated by two manual globe valves.

From each header, the gas then branches to each valve operator or valve seal supplied by the SGIG System.

Each branch is separated from the header by a manual globe valve and a check valve.

To support SGIG System functions, the CAD System liquid nitrogen storage tank minimum required level is a 16 inches water column and a minimum required SGIG System header pressure of 80 psig.

Minimum rcquir,,,,nt÷ for, the GAD-Sy.t.... liquid nitr.g.n star-age tank to supp.r.

t CAD System OPRABILI.T.Y arc spOeeifiod in LCO 3.6.3.1, "C.nt.inment Atf...spheric Dilution (*AD) System."