IR 05000263/2010007
| ML103140760 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/2010 |
| From: | Riemer K R NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| To: | O'Connor T J Northern States Power Co |
| References | |
| IR-10-007 | |
| Download: ML103140760 (29) | |
Text
November 10, 2010
Mr. Timothy Site Vice President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company, Minnesota 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362-9637
SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2010007
Dear Mr. O'Connor:
On October 1, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 1, 2010, with you and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The inspection concluded that your staff was effective at identifying problems and incorporating them into the corrective action program (CAP). In general, issues were appropriately prioritized, evaluated, and corrected; audits and self-assessments were thorough and probing, and operating experience was appropriately screened and disseminated. Your staff was aware of the importance of having a strong safety-conscious work environment and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. The inspectors also observed that actions taken to address a declining trend in Human Performance appeared to be effective. However, your staff was not fully effective in addressing an adverse trend in contractor oversight and in work control and planning, which had begun earlier this year. Although both issues were captured in the CAP program, the underlying causes were not fully understood. This resulted in corrective actions being more reactive, instead of proactive, when responding to related issues. The inspectors were concerned that this adverse trend, if not resolved, would negatively impact the significant number of work activities planned for next year. No violations or findings were identified during this inspection. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000263/2010007
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServe
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Report No: 05000263/2010007 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Location: Monticello, MN Dates: September 13 - October 1, 2010 Inspectors: N. Shah, Project Engineer - Team Lead D. Sand, Acting Resident Inspector - Monticello C. Scott, Reactor Engineer G. O'Dwyer, Reactor Engineer M. Phalen, Plant Support Specialist
Approved by: Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000263/2010007; 09/13/2010 - 10/01/2010; Monticello Nuclear Generating Station; Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems. This team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors and the resident inspector. No violations or findings were identified. Identification and Resolution of Problems
Overall, the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was good. Issues were effectively identified, evaluated and corrected. Nuclear Oversight (NOS) audits and department self-assessments were generally critical and identified issues that were captured in the (CAP). Operating Experience (OE) was well communicated and appropriately evaluated. A strong safety culture was evident, based on interviews with licensee staff and a review of the types of issues captured in the CAP and Employee Concerns Program (ECP). The inspectors observed that the evaluation of OE in Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs) had improved since the 2008 PI&R inspection. Specifically, ACEs now discussed whether the failure to properly evaluate previously identified OE was a potential precursor of the event. The licensee took proactive efforts to address a declining trend in the Security Department Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). The inspectors received positive feedback during interviews with Security officers, and noted an increasing trend in the number of issues identified by the Security force. The licensee's actions to address the previous cross-cutting issues in Human Performance and a potential cross-cutting issue in Issue Evaluation appeared good. The corrective actions appeared appropriate and the inspectors noted improving performance over the last six months in these areas. However, the inspectors noted that the licensee had recurring problems with managing the CAP backlog and with ensuring that items identified during management observations were captured in the CAP. The inspectors also identified some examples where licensee staff had changed due dates for subtasks without referencing the source CAP report. The inspectors identified that CAP implementing procedures did not provide good guidance regarding how to evaluate "critical" and "non-critical" component failures. Specifically, some component failures, which could reasonably be considered "critical," (i.e., had significant consequences) could be classified as "non-critical" using the current guidance. The inspectors observed that there were continuing issues related to work planning and execution and with contractor control. Although both problems were captured in the CAP, the underlying causes were not yet fully understood, resulting in most of the corrective actions being reactive rather than proactive. For example, it was unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were the same issues that were affecting the contractor performance. In addition, as previously stated, some issues identified through management observations associated with these topics may not be captured in the CAP.
Although the station continued to evaluate the issue, it remained an area of concern given the significant outage work planned for the next year.
A. NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R)
The activities documented in sections
.1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of PI&R as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152.
.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's CAP implementing procedures and attended CAP program meetings to assess the implementation of the CAP by site personnel.
The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensee's CAP since the last NRC PI&R inspection in November 2008. The issues selected were appropriately varied across the NRC cornerstones, and were identified through routine daily plant activities, licensee audits and self-assessments, industry operating experience reports, and NRC inspection activities. The inspectors also reviewed a selection of apparent, common and root cause evaluations for more significant CAP items. The inspectors performed a more extensive review of the licensee's efforts to address ongoing issues with human performance and issue evaluation. This review consisted primarily of a five year search of related issues identified in the CAP and discussions with appropriate licensee staff to assess the licensee's corrective actions.
During the reviews, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee staff's actions were in compliance with the facility's CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements.
Specifically, whether licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the station's CAP in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings.
All documents reviewed during this inspection were listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Assessment
- (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification The licensee's implementation of the CAP was generally good. Workers were encouraged to identify issues and were familiar with the various avenues available (NRC, CAP, etc). This was evident by the large number of CAP items generated annually, which were reasonably distributed across the various departments. A shared computerized database was used for creating individual reports and for subsequent management of the processes of issue evaluation and response. This included determining the issue's significance, addressing such matters as regulatory compliance and reporting, and assigning any actions deemed necessary or appropriate.
In reviewing licensee management observations conducted between June and October 2010, the inspectors found several examples of items that were apparently not captured in the CAP. Most of the examples were concerned with industrial safety or work planning issues that should have been captured in the CAP. In one example, a worker observing an industrial safety concern stated that because the worker had not met a management expectation, vice a procedural requirement, the issue wasn't going to be documented in the CAP. The licensee documented the inspectors' concern as CAP item 1251890. The licensee was also good at identifying and resolving trends. The inspectors noted a large number of trends identified through the "binning" of issues or via the quarterly department roll-up meeting (DRUM) reports. During the November 2008, PI&R review, the inspectors identified that the licensee's trending program was somewhat limited in that it did not always identify trends with issues affecting the same functional area, but having dissimilar aspects. Subsequently, the licensee initiated an effort to assign cross-cutting criteria (analogous to NRC criteria)to apparent and root cause evaluations, which were then trended. Although the inspectors considered this a positive effor t, it was too early to determine its overall effectiveness.
Findings No findings were identified.
- (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues Overall, CAP issues were being properly screened. The majorities of issues were of low level and were either closed to trend or at a level appropriate for a condition evaluation.
Licensee staff appropriately challenged CAP items during screening meetings and were cognizant of potential trends. Most issues were closed to a work request or to another CAP item. The inspectors noted that both the parent and daughter documents had the necessary verbiage to document the interrelationship. Although fewer in number, the inspectors did not have any concerns with those issues assigned an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) or root cause evaluation. There were no items in the operations, engineering, or maintenance backlogs that were risk significant, individually or collectively. There were no classifications or immediate operability determinations with which the inspectors disagreed.
Root and apparent cause evaluations were generally of good quality and were well documented. During the 2006 PI&R inspection, the inspectors noted that ACEs did not consider whether the failure to consider industry OE was a precursor to events.
Additionally, licensee management did not always address issues with ACE quality that were identified during the evaluation grading process. The inspectors noted that subsequent ACEs now addressed whether OE was properly used prior to the event and that ACE quality issues were communicated to the originating departments.
Station Procedure FP-E-SE-02, "Component Classification," was used by licensee staff to distinguish between a "critical" and "non-critical" component failure.
The procedure was written specifically to address equipment reliability, but was referenced in the CAP for use during cause evaluations. Although the stated guidance was adequate for 5 Enclosure equipment reliability considerations, it was not appropriate for CAP evaluations. For example, this procedure specifically defines any component failure that results in a significant radiological release as a "non-critical" component failure. From a CAP perspective, any component failure resulting in significant radiological consequences would be "critical." The inspectors were concerned that this procedure may result in some component failures being treated as less significant under the CAP, then appropriate. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250116 to review this issue. Since 2006, the licensee has experienced numerous issues in human performance.
Initially, these issues were primarily of lo w significance (i.e., did not result in an NRC finding). However, the issues continued through 2008, with the significance of the findings increasing, until an adverse trend in human performance had become evident.
The licensee's early efforts to address this trend were largely ineffective, as the licensee originally believed that the human performance issues were limited to specific behaviors or work groups, instead of a more widespread concern involving fundamental human behaviors. Subsequently, the licensee identified that the issues were principally due to a lack of resources and an inappropriate tolerance for risk among workers. Several corrective actions were initiated, including additional training to site workers on configuration control and risk management. The inspectors noted that performance had improved among site workers in the past six months. However, the licensee was still dealing with an adverse trend in contractor human performance, primarily related to oversight and work planning and execution. Although this issue was captured in the CAP (items 1249158 and 1247197), the underlying causes are not yet fully understood, and many of the corrective actions, to date, have been more reactive than proactive. For example, it is unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were also affecting the contractor performance. To date, the majority of the issues have been of low significance (i.e., not resulting in an NRC finding); however, the overall trend was similar to the previous issue with site human performance.
Findings
Introduction:
The inspectors identified an Unresolved Item (URI) regarding the High Energy Line Break (HELB) Analyses.
Description:
As part of the review of the ACE for an adverse trend in double disc gate valve (DDGV) local leak rate testing (LLRT) performance documented in CAP 1202466, the inspectors noted that the ACE had determined that the valves' performance degradation did not prevent the valves from performing their safety function. The ACE only addressed the valves' safety function of providing containment isolation. The inspectors questioned if the safety function of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) steam supply valves to close after detection of a HELB should have been considered. The licensee responded that the ACE did not need to consider the effect of the valves' increased leakage on the HELB analyses because any leakage would not impact the alternate shutdown path. The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and acceptance criteria of the HELB calculations for HPCI, RCIC and RWCU line breaks and identified potential inconsistencies between the calculations' assumptions with Technical Specifications' and UFSAR allowed values for valve closure times, incorporation of delay actuations, and isolation initiation signals. The licensee entered the NRC concerns with these 6 Enclosure potential inconsistencies into the CAP by initiating CAP 01252363 on October 1, 2010. The licensee stated that the calculations were appropriate and provided the inspectors
with some original licensing documents for the HELB analyses; however, additional questions remained. This issue will be tracked as URI 05000263/201007-01 pending further NRC review of the licensee responses and the HELB analyses and determination of the original and current licensing bases.
- (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented, commensurate with their safety significance. Those corrective actions addressing selected NRC documented violations were also generally effective and timely.
The inspectors verified that work orders were in place (and scheduled) for selected, open actions that were two years old or greater.
During interviews, the inspectors noted that some individuals did not refer back to the parent CAP when changing due dates for associated subtasks (such as work requests).
The inspectors identified several examples where the revised due dates for subtasks were inconsistent with the parent CAP. Although none of the identified examples were highly significant, the inspectors were concerned that the practice may result in other changes having a greater operational impact. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250089 to evaluate this issue.
The station has a recurring problem with managing the backlog. A recent licensee initiative to redefine the items tracked in the backlog has reduced the numbers, but didn't necessarily address the issue. The licensee currently tracks only Corrective Actions, Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence, and operability issues. Other items, that used to be part of the backlog, were instead tracked as CAP action items. However, the inspectors noted that there was no formal effort to determine whether the CAP action items were being addressed in a timely fashion (i.e., no performance indicator similar to the formal backlog indicator). Since these action items were corrective actions (albeit of lower significance), the inspectors were concerned that some may not get implemented. Complicating the issue was an apparent mixed message from station management, who expressed the view that the backlog numbers weren't important so long as items were being properly managed. Since this issue was already captured in the CAP, the inspectors' observations were included as part of the ongoing licensee evaluation.
Findings No findings were identified.
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the facility's OE program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed implementing OE program procedures, attended CAP meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The inspectors' review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively 7 Enclosure integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensee's program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented.
Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Assessment In general, OE was effectively used at the station. The inspectors observed that OE was discussed as part of the daily station planning meetings, at shift turnover meetings, and at maintenance pre-briefings. Also, the inspectors determined that OE was appropriately reviewed during causal evaluations. During interviews, several licensee personnel commented favorably on the use of OE in their daily activities.
The inspectors noted that the OE evaluation for a relay failure that resulted in the inoperability of a safety-related train at Harris (Action Request (AR) 1233871) was somewhat limited in scope. The evaluation identified that similar relays were used at Monticello, but in non-safety related equipment; therefore, no actions were required. However, there was no documented evaluation whether a failure of these relays in the affected equipment could have had any significant operational impact. The licensee documented this issue as CAP item 1252873.
Findings No findings were identified.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensee staff's ability to identify and enter issues into the CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits.
b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits were typically accurate, thorough, and effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold level. The audits and self-assessments were completed by personnel knowledgeable in the subject area, and the quality of the NOS audits was thorough and critical. The self-assessments were acceptable but were not at the same level of quality as the NOS audits. The inspectors observed that CAP items had been initiated for issues identified through the NOS audits and self-assessments.
The inspectors observed selected meetings of the Performance Assessment Review Board and reviewed board meeting minutes over the past six months. The Board provided oversight for the CAP including the self-assessment program. The inspectors identified no issues with the Board's performance during the inspection.
Findings No findings were identified.
.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensee's SCWE through the reviews of the facility's ECP implementing procedures, discussions with ECP coordinators, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results of licensee safety culture surveys.
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the plant staff were aware of the importance of having a strong SCWE and expressed a willingness to ra ise safety issues. No one interviewed had experienced retaliation for safety issues raised, or knew of anyone who had failed to raise issues. All persons interviewed had an adequate knowledge of the CAP and ECP process. These results were similar to the findings of the licensee's safety culture surveys. Based on these interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable SCWE.
The inspectors noted that the licensee had taken proactive efforts to address a declining SCWE trend within the Security force. This trend had been identified through self-assessments and audits conducted in 2009. The number of issues self-identified by the security staff had increased since the corrective actions were implemented.
Additionally, during interviews with the inspectors, Security staff commented favorably on the licensee initiatives to improve the SCWE.
The inspectors determined that the ECP process was being effectively implemented. The review of the selected ECP issues indicated that site personnel were appropriately using the CAP and ECP to identify concerns. However, many staff were unaware of the
other avenues the licensee had to raise concerns (collectively known as the PEACH process). For example, most staff were unaware of the Differing Professional Opinions (DPO) program for addressing engineering issues. Additionally, some newer staff confused safety culture with industrial safety. Similar issues were identified during the 2008 PI&R inspection. The licensee captured these issues as CAP item 1252870.
Findings No findings were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On October 1, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. O'Connor and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- H. Butterworth, Fleet Operations Standards Director
- P. Byers, Security Manager
- J. Early, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- N. Haskell, Engineering Director
- M. Holmes, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager
- K. Jepson, Business Support Manager
- J. Mestad, Employ Concerns Program Manager
- D. Neve, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- J. Ohotto, Design Engineering Manager
- T. O'Connor, Site Vice-President
- S. Porter, System Engineering Manager
- S. Radebaugh, Acting Plant Manager
- S. Sharpe, Operations Manager
- G. Sherwood, Program Engineering Manger
- T. Toglery, Nuclear Oversight Manager
- J. Windchill, Fleet Performance Assessment Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. Riemer, Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened: URI
- 05000263/201007-01 HELB Analysis Potentially Non-Conservative
Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection.
- Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort.
- Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
- PLANT PROCEDURES
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- FP-PA-ARP-01 CAP Action Request Process Revision 27
- FG-PA-CAE-01 Corrective Action Effectiveness Review Manual Revision 6
- FG-PA-ACE-01 Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual Revision 17
- FG-PA-RCE-01 Root Cause Evaluation Manual Revision 17
- FG-PA-CTC-01 CAP Trend Code Manual Revision 12
- FP-PA-OE-01 Operating Experience Program Revision 14
- FG-PA-KPI-01 Performance Indicator Data Reporting Revision 0
- FP-E-SE-02 Component Classification Revision 4
- EWI-05.02.01 Maintenance Rule Program Document Revision 16
- B.5.12 System Basis Document:
- Area Radiation Monitor Revision 3 B.7.1 System Basis Document:
- Liquid Radwaste Revision 2
- CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- Cubicles 9/8/2008
- Continuing Issues With FME Control on Turbine Floor 8/20/2009
- 3/8/2009
- 2/26/2009
- AR 1170876 Lack of Safety Related Material Control/Traceability
- 9/14/2009
- AR 1211312 NOS Finding:
- Configuration Control Performance Issues 3/3/2010
- AR 1226594 Work Tasks Authorized Without Proper C/O C/L
- Hung 6/18/2010
- AR 1228190 NOS Finding-Weak Barriers in Work Management
- 5/25/2010
- AR 1237891 Failed Bellows Spring in Positioned Removed from
- CV-1242
- 6/28/2010
- AR 1158526 Adverse Trend In Work Package Quality
- 2/10/2008
- Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 01194357 Potential Trend WM ID'd in Ops 4
th Qtr 2008 DRUM
- Potential Trend JP&P ID'd in Ops 4
th Qtr 2008 DRUM
- Adverse Trend in FME issues
- Ops CSE ID's AFI in Objective 3 Adverse Trend: work plan changes made w/o review & approval Potential trend DP ID'd in Ops 4
th Qtr 2008 DRUM Adverse Trend in Program Management Issues
- AFI Independent FSA Monti Human Performance Adverse Trend in OSHA reportable injuries Recirc riser relay did not respond to de-energize
position during IST
- LOR Annual Operating Exam Issues
- Proposed NRC Violation - Reactor Level Control
- 9/11 Scram HPCI failed to trip when Rx level rose to 48" Rx Low Low Water Level signal received during
- CRD pump start Voltage of cell 116 in #17 battery is at 2.07 Volts Not all Tech Specs were entered
- 2009 Ops CSE - AFI Objective 5 AFI 5.1 A SBGT Flow Not Within Band Assessment AFI ID'd for licensed operator
medicals
- B SBGT failed to operate as expected
- Adverse Trend - Procedure performed without OPS Auth. GE Part 21 (SC05-03) Potential to exceed low pressure limit Main Steam Line plugs interfere with separator removal SPDS Disp 710 showing incorrect configuration of circuit breaker
- NRC Commitments in procedures not meeting
requirements Station challenged by projects interface/alignment issues Unplanned rise in Offgas Radiation and Stack
- WGRM's Loss of motor cooling to Div II RHRSW Pumps
reports Adverse Trend; Badge control by site personnel Door-18, Condenser room flood door found closed
- 1/29/2009
- 1/29/2009
- 3/18/2009
- 10/13/2008
- 6/09/2009
- 1/29/2009
- 9/07/2010
- 11/26/2008
- 8/5/2008 5/13/2010
- 11/7/2008
- 3/26/2009
- 9/21/2008
- 9/21/2008
- 1/12/2010
- 2/17/2009
- 7/20/2009
- 7/20/2009
- 7/10/2009
- 6/28/2009
- 4/9/2009
- 3/30/2005
- 3/20/2007
- 9/24/2008
- 10/8/2008
- 10/2/2008
- 10/31/2007
- 5/6/2008
- 6/25/2010
- 5/19/2009
- 9/9/2009
- 8/20/2009
- Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- FME - Drier Measurement Platform Wheel Inadequate shutdown margin during
- EOC-23 core
alterations Reactor Scram Number 121 occurred on Sept
th, 2008 Ops Trng CSE identifies AFI's in Objective 1-4 Performance gaps to industry standards not recognized
- 4/20/2009
- 11/13/2008
- 9/12/2008
- 9/18/2008
- 1/30/2010
- AR 01144214-02 Trend-RCE Grades Low in 2 Areas
- 7/2008
- AR 01173245 Actions to Address Equipment Problems are Shortsighted
- 4/15/2009
- AR 01186832 Core Spray Pump Quarterly Test Terminated Due to No Flow
- 6/25/2009
- AR 1191812 Adverse Trend in Failure Rates to ACEs Assigned to Projects
- 7/31/2009
- 1/30/2010
- AR 01174411 PRNMS:
- Ineffective Condition Evaluation
- CE01162340-02
- 3/23/2009
- AR 01187909 Accountability in Meeting CAP Action Due Dates Tracking 7/2/2009
- AR 01238254 PI&R FSA AFI:
- Rigor in Resolving NRC Violations Not Consistent
- 6/22/2010
- AR 1222439 MNGP EPU Mod 3 Surveillance
- 3/12/2010
- AR 01208801 Three NRC X-Cutting Findings in One Aspect
- 2/1/2009
- AR 01216516 Station hs Three Potential Findings in One NRC Xcut Aspect
- 2/2/2010
- AR 01215513 Potential Adverse Trend Recent Events/Near Misses 1/27/2010
- AR 01170720 Inconsistent CAP Problem Statements CA Quality
- ACE Quality
- 2/25/2009
- AR 01232886 Adverse Trend-Corrective Action Backlog Exceeding Goal
- 5/14/2010
- AR 01150601 Ops Tng CSE Identifies Ineffective Closure of CA
- 9/15/2008
- AR 01157287 Red
- KPI-NRC Cross Cutting Aspects (H.4.c.) Oversight
- 10/29/2008
- AR 1226438 Site Received Fourth P.1.c Cross Cutting Aspect from NRC 4/8/2010
- AR 01147103 Adv Trnd in Organization Perf. Leads to Near Miss Events
- 8/9/2008
- AR 01137245 Station KPI for NRC Cross-Cutting Issue-
- Potential Red
- 5/9/2008
- AR 01184816 Evaluation of Project Dept Clock Resets During
- 2009 Outage
- 6/8/2009
- AR 01163396 Adverse Trend in HU Identified in 3 Quarter 2008
- Site DRUM
- 2/22/2008
- Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 01135426 CAPRs From RCEs Non Institutionalized
- 4/23/2008
- AR 01138493 Adverse Trend in Human Performance
- 5/22/2008
- AR 01158802 Potential Adverse Trend-Station Cross Cutting Issues PI&R
- 11/11/2008
- AR 1161531 Reoccurring Qualification Issues at Monticello
- 2/05/2008
- AR 1199160 Unexpected
- AR-10 Discharges on the Range
- 2/01/2010
- AR 1140153 Adverse Trend in Refueling Floor Activities
- 2/17/2009
- AR 1169027 High Radiation Controls Violation
- 06/01/2010
- AR 1170636 Security Human Performance Adverse Trend
- 03/24/2009
- AR 1161679 Potential Adverse Trend - Security Weapons / Ammo Handling
- 01/16/2009
- AR 1210338 Adverse Trend - BRE Issues
- 2/30/2010
- AR 1150642 Incomplete Information Sent to NRC on an Operator's License Renewal Application
- 09/15/2008
- AR 1136955 Adverse Trend in Service Water Radiation Monitor Flow 05/07/2008
- AR 1177731 Adverse Trend in LLRT Radiation Exposure
- 04/10/2009
- AR 1164409 Increased Trend in Badge Control Issues
- 03/02/2009
- AR 1135335 Adverse Trend in Emergency Planning Drill /
- Exercise Report Timeliness
- 08/21/2008
- AR 1215924 EP Department Performance Has Declined
- 03/12/2010
- AR 1174197 Lengthy Out Of Service Time for EP Equipment
- 07/31/2009
- AR 1216118 EP 1-1 ERO personnel Make Knowledge Based Errors 09/03/2010
- AR 1215924 Site EP Precursors to Further Declining Performance
- 10/29/2010
- AR 1188771 Follow-up PAR Development Inaccurate /
- Untimely 11/17/2009
- AR 1135335 Adverse Trend in Emergency Planning Drill /
- Exercise Report Timeliness
- 08/21/2008
- AR 1215924 EP Department Performance Has Declined
- 03/12/2010
- AR 1217199 Security Officer Failed to Perform a Security Patrol 08/31/2010
- AR 1168195 Rx Water Soluble Co-60 No Longer Trending Down 02/05/2009
- AR 1207385 SGI Package Not Properly Marked
- 03/31/2010
- AR 1204338 New Security Door to Intake Tunnel Found Closed
- 04/23/2010
- AR 1156598 Security Force on Force Exercises
- 08/21/2009
- AR 1238171 Unexpected Dose rates Encountered During RWCU
- BW 06/21/2010
- AR 1164240 Movement of Radioactive material Not in Accordance with AWI
- 01/02/2009
- AR 1196952 Low level of Tritium in Monitoring Well (MW-9)
- 09/09/2009
- 2/10/2009
- 2/22/2010
- Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 01209649-01
- AR 1088210-01
- P-109C, 13 RHRSW Pump D/P in Alert Range
- Adverse Trend in Bearing Failures on 11 CRD
- Pump
- CBDI FOF Mod Did Not Assess Impact to T-44
- Tank SRV Lift Test Surveillance Interval Potentially Missed Thin Pipe Identified During MIC Exam On 18 A
- Appendix J Programmatic Deficiencies Post-Modification Testing Issues Adverse Trend in Engineering Department HP
- Clock Resets
- CDBI- Calculation Quality- Adverse Trend
- EPU-Wiring Discrepancy Discovered in Field Adverse Trend in Feedwater Heater Level Transmitter Replacement
- 1AR XFMR Lockout Caused By 1N^ Ground
- Fault Declining Trend-Engineering Work Process-Work Control Mgmt Adverse Trend Control of Engineering MTE
- Part of Head Vent Line Not Insulated
- D10 125VDC Div 1 Battery Charger Unavailability Exceeds MR Goal
- D10 Exhibits Erratic Voltage Output During Surveillance Clearance and Tagging Issues Degraded HELB Flow Path Over The SLAE Room Missing Instillation On The Head Vent Valve
- Manifold Equalizing Valve Failure Causes 'B' Main Steam Line Flow Isolation Instrument to Become Inoperable
- Work Performed Without Adequate Tag-Out Protection Failure to Promptly Identify Failed SBGT
- Surveillance Failures of V-AC-4 (B4305) and V-AC-5 (B3305)
- Adverse Trend for Engineering Non-Mod
- EC Backlog Failures of V-AC-4 Declining Trend for Engineering- Process Failure Mode-RR1
- Increasing Trend for System Health Assessment
- KPI 04/06/2010
- 03/31/2010
- 11/02/2009
- 05/14/2010
- 03/31/2009
- 04/23/2009
- 11/13/2009
- 09/25/2009
- 11/11/2009
- 03/04/2009
- 10/25/2009
- 04/14/2010
- 2/19/2009
- 05/29/2009
- 09/21/2010
- 09/29/2010
- 05/09/2008
- 2/04/2010
- 01/05/2007
- 04/20/2007
- 05/12/2009
- 08/03/2009
- 08/21/2009
- 05/22/2009
- 01/22/2009
- 09/19/2007
- 01/01/2009
- 10/14/2008
- Attachment ROOT, APPARENT AND COMMON CAUSE EVALUATIONS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 1140145 Incorrect Grounding Trucks Installed in 4KV
- Cubicles 6/6/2008
- EFR 1140145-24 Effectiveness Review of
- CAP 1140145-05 Truck Installation Procedure
- 11/6/2009
- EFR 114145-25 Effectiveness Review of Grounding Truck Installation
- 11/6/2009
- AR 1150968 JLG Lift Basket Contacts 115 KV
- 9/17/2008
- EFR 1150968-10 Effectiveness Review for AR
- 9/30/2009
- PCR 1152979 Revise
- FP-SC-GEN-08 Revision 2
- 9/30/2008
- AR 1158526 Adverse Trend in Work Package Quality
- 11/7/2008
- AR 1166773 Adverse Trend in Rigor of Implementing SOER Recommendations
- 1/26/2009
- AR 1167946 Mid Cycle FSA
- 2/3/2009
- AR 1168344 TS Action for CREF Exited Prior to all PMTs Being Completed
- 2/5/2009
- AR 1170876 Lack of Safety Related Material Control/Traceability
- 2/25/2009
- AR 1183728 Continuing Issues with FME Control on Turbine Floor 5/29/2009
- AR 1183728 Continuing Issues with FME Control on Turbine Floor 5/29/2009
- 1/26/2009
- AR 1168344 TS Action for CREF Exited Prior to All PMTs Being Completed
- 2/5/2009
- AR 1202466 Adverse Trend in Double Disc Gate Valve LLRT Performance
- 10/14/2009
- AR 1205719 ARM S&C Refurb not Performed IAW Tech Manual 11/4/2009
- AR 1211312 NOS Finding:
- Configuration Control Performance Issues 12/18/2009
- AR 1226594 Work Tasks Authorized Without Proper C/O C/L
- Hung 4/9/2010
- AR 1228190 NOS Finding-Weak Barriers in Work Management
- 4/20/2010
- AR 1237891 Failed Bellows Spring In Positioned Removed from
- CV-1242
- 6/18/2010
- AR 1095181 PRA Compliance With Regulatory Guide 1.200
- 6/5/2007
- AR 1121269 SOER 07-02 on Intake Cooling Water Blockage
- 2/14/2007
- AR 01237478 PI&R FSA; All req's for
- CAP 01189206 not performed
- 6/16/2010
- AR 01237558 PI&R FSA; Trend in security trng team used for shift needs
- 6/16/2010
- Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 01237585 PI&R FSA; CAP closed out to action in GAR
- 6/16/2010
- AR 01237702 PI&R FSA; Documenting Completion of actions unclear in 2 FBMs
- 6/17/2010
- AR 01237779 PI&R FSA; No CAP tracking completion of Top Ten Eqp. Items
- 6/17/2010
- AR 01237802 PI&R FSA; No action to track completion of work under B CAP
- 6/17/2010
- AR 01237820 CAP extension documentation missing, found during PI&R FSA
- 6/18/2010
- AR 01237838 PI&R FSA - CAPR process not followed for form revision 6/18/2010
- AR 01237839 PI&R FSA: Typos and dated info in Ops Burden Report 6/18/2010
- AR 01237876 PI&R OE evaluation uploaded in sharepoin is not correct 6/18/2010
- AR 01237905 PI&R FSA - overdue operating experience actions 6/18/2010
- AR 01237917 2010 PI&R FSA: Lack of documentation for level of effort
- 6/18/2010
- AR 01237928 2010 PI&R FSA: CAP not written for identified issue 6/18/2010
- 6/21/2010
- AR 01238284 PI&R FSA AFI: Root Cause Statements - CA Line of Sight 6/22/2010
- AR 01238292 PI&R FSA AFI: Independent workers applying own standards on CAP initially
- 6/22/2010
- AR 01243250 PI&R FSA - Ops Status Notes Not Sustainalbe for Fire Pump
- 7/28/2010
- AR 01243411 PI&R FSA Review ACE to CE for
- 01174955
- 7/29/2010
- AR 01243430 PI&R FSA corrective action for
- 7/29/2010
- AR 01243485 PI&R FSA - CAP Improperly closed to no action
- 7/29/2010
- CAP 01141018 Screening N Notes are incorrect
- 7/30/2010
- AR 01243728 PI&R FSA - EFR assignment
- CAP 01165741 had no goal stated
- 7/30/2010
- AR 01244435 PI&R Inspection self assessment identified 4kv rooms issue
- 8/5/2010
- AR 01139415 D10 125VDC Battery Charger Unavailability exceeds MR goal
- 5/30/2008
- AR 01155593 Inability to attract personnel due to Industry Competition
- 10/15/2008
- RF 24
- MS 38 for preoutage work in jeopardy
- 11/11/2008
- AR 01159308 IR24
- MS 13 for work order planning above control band 11/15/2008
- Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 01167860 Mid cycle FSA AFI 3 - Insufficient operations staffing plan
- 2/3/2009
- AR 01179605 Greater than 1 yr will be needed to qualify a SM candidate
- 4/25/2009
- AR 01180220 Quality issues found on Isophase Bus Cooling System 4/30/2009
- AR 01200192 Emergent Contractor Trng request diverts Maint Training resource
- 9/29/2009
- AR 01217990 EP Drill - Not enough controllers in the Plant during drill
- 2/12/2010
- AR 01227941 RWCU restoration time discrepancy
- 4/19/2010
- AR 01230850 EM&P Resource Availability impacts scheduled work 5/3/2010
- AR 01233699 Operations unable to support system walkdown
- 5/20/2010
- AR 01237487 Personnel removed from Training to cover Shift staffing need
- 6/15/2010
- AR 01240903 Supervisor pulled from training to meet staffing needs 7/9/2010
- AR 01227056 One Live Ammo Round at STF Mixed with Training Rounds
- 4/13/2010
- AR 01225619 Unable to Obtain Definitive Reading of TS
- Required Parameter
- 4/2/2010
- AR 01181388 "B" Safety Relief Valve Leaking
- 5/8/2009
- AR 01243585 Program Deficiencies From PHC Not Incorporated into CAP 7/30/2010
- AR 01181249 HPCI Governor Valve Failed to Open During Overspeed Test
- 5/7/2009
- AR 01083169 Crack Like Indication on Steam Dryer Found in
- 2007 RFO 3/20/2007
- AR 01070668 Rx Bldg RR Doors Switched in HELB Gothic Model 1/8/2007
- AR 01206949 Incorrect Severity Assigned to
- CAP 01184369-02
- 11/16/2009
- AR 01243568 PI&R FSA Potential
- AR 1150849 Screening
- 7/30/2010
- AR 01225682 1AR Transformer Pad Has Sunk about 1 inch since Install
- 4/4/2010
- AR 01225762 #12 RHRSW Pump has Excessive Packing Leakage 4/5/2010
- Pump
- 4/6/2010
- AR 01225997 CAP Closure Review-"B" Action Closure Quality Issues 4/6/2010
- AR 01226060 12 RFP L.O. Cooler Piping Rusting Through Upstream of
- TI-1555
- 4/6/2010
- AR 01135291 Internal Threads on WDW7 Look Bad
- 4/22/2008
- AR 01135409 Questionable Off-Gas Sample
- 4/23/2008
- AR 01136879 Oil Flush on 11 Service Water Motor Ineffective
- 5/6/2008
- Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- The Site Lacks a Single Tracking Mechanism for
- Failed PMTs
- 5/15/2008
- 5/20/2008
- AR 01138824 Battery Chargers Maintenance Rule Status Declining
- 5/27/2008
- AR 01178034 Employee Exceeded Work Hours
- 4/13/2009
- AR 01179554 SBLC Tank Level is Lower After Draining and Refilling
- 4/25/2009
- AR 01179701 Lack of Alternative Access Increases Operator Response Time
- 4/27/2009
- AR 01216080 Snowmelt Causes Possible EOP Entry Alarm
- 1/29/2010
- RR-4902 Has Incorrect Chart paper During Test
- 289-A 2/11/2010
- AR 01219159 Alt N2 Train Pressures at Low End of Allowed Operating Band
- 2/19/2010
- AR 01212202 RCIC is Conservatively Declared Inoperable
- 2/31/2009
- AR 01212209 Both LPCI Subsystems Declared Inoperable During Venting
- 2/31/2009
- AR 0119936 Voltage Drop Evaluation for RHR and RHRSW
- ASCO Sol. Valves
- 9/28/2009
- CDBI-Undocumented Assumption in Calculation
- 06-104 9/12/2009
- AR 01200723 CDBI P-111B Calculated Starter Voltage Lower Than Expected
- 10/2/2009
- AR 01210817 NRC Feedback on Reportability of SBGTS Event
- 2/15/2009
- AR 01150773 Some Station Log Entries Were Not Made During SCRAM 121
- 9/16/2008
- AR 01151413 Rx Low Low Water Level Signal Received During CRD Pump Start
- 9/21/2008
- AO-2945 Failed to Open During 0253-01 "A" SBGT QTRLY Test
- 9/29/2009
- AR 01220488 NRC Violation for Failure to Make 10CFR50.72 Notification
- 3/1/2010
- AR 01175537 NDE Examiner Procedure Non-Compliance
- 3/29/2009
- AR 01216894 Loss of Offsite Power 10CFR50.72 Reporting Reqts. 2/4/2010
- AR 01082564 Reactor Core Water Level Recorder Found Failed Upscale 3/16/2007
- Unachievable
- 3/14/2008
- AR 01106816 Charcoal Filter Iodine Loading Calcs Non-Conservative
- 8/14/2007
- AR 01143954 11/12 CT Pump Operation Safety Enhancement Opportunity
- 07/13/2008
- Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 01243644 PI&R FSA-
- CAP 01141018 Screening N Notes are Incorrect
- 07/30/2010
- AR 01237813 Buried Pipe Health Report Issues/ Exemplary Rating Questioned
- 06/18/2010
- AR 01158314 11 Air Compressor PM Deleted But Has NRC Commitement
- 11/05/2008
- AR 01184683 Adverse Trend-DW Floor and Equipment Drain Sump Issues
- 06/05/2009
- AR 01184683-03 EFR- Effectiveness of Potentiometers DWEDS,DWFDS
- 07/31/2010
- AR 01197773 Revise
- ISP-RHR-0558-01 as Interim Action for
- RCE 1181868
- 11/09/2009
- AR 01197769 Revise 0056 as Interim Corrective Action For
- RCE 1181868
- 2/11/2009
- AR 01181868 Leaking Manifold Valve for
- DPIS-2-117A B Stm Line Flow
- 05/13/2009
- AR 01093089 Non-Conservative Input to AST Post- Local pH
- 06/15/2009
- AR 01064602 Shortcomings in Cross Referencing CAPS and
- WRs 06/10/2008
- AR 01087740 Pipe Downstream of
- PCV-1242 is Significantly Thinned 06/05/2009
- AR 01070668 RX Bldg RR Doors Switched in HELB Gothic Model 01/16/2009
- AR 01127660 Surveillance 1467 Extended Twice
- 03/29/2008
- AR 01119232 Abandoned Limit Swithces in Second Floor EFT Building 03/27/2008
- AR 01107610 3 Inch Movement on Moisture Sep. to 14B Htr Pipe 07/15/2009
- AR 01105975 Guidance for Use of Third RBCCW Heat Exchanger Inadequate
- 09/30/2008
- CV-1729 Not Controlling at 7000gpm, Results in Unplanned LCO
- 03/12/2008
- AR 01149748 Loss of Level Indication C MSDT Dump Controller
- LC-1003 09/05/2008
- AR 01243477 Question Regarding the Control of Radiograpers
- 07/29/2010
- AR 01129677 Area for Improvement
- 03/03/2008
- AR 01243430 PI&R FSA Corrective Action for
- 07/29/2009
- 01150085 Possible Inconsistency Between MPR Setpoint and Calc Input
- 09/10/2008
- 01149441 Results of MET CSP Assessment Concluded Further Migration
- 09/03/2008
- 01079705 LAR Required for Use of Tormis Code Methodology
- 2/28/2007
- 01197771
- 011977701
- Revise
- ISP-RHR-0552-01 as interim action for RCE1181868
- Revise 0060 As Interim Corrective Action for
- RCE1181868
- 09/15/2009
- 09/15/2009
- 09/15/2009
- 09/15/2009
- Attachment CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- 01197768
- 01197774
- 252368
- 250089
- 2149351
- 01159968
- Revise 0060 As Interim Corrective Action for RCE1181868
- Revise
- ISP-RHR-0558-02 As Interim Action for
- RCE 1181868
- NRC-PI&R-Question on Classification of DW
- Actions Several NRC Findings had Improper
- AR Assignments per
- ARP-01
- IPB Mod Design Issues with Service Water Valves
- 10/10/2010
- 09/16/2010
- 10/04/2010
- 11/20/2008
- OPERATING EXPERIENCE
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- OE 31215 Jet Pump Wedge Wear
- 5/25/2010
- 01175420 NRC
- Solid State Protection System Card Failure Results in Spurious Safety Injection Actuation and Reactor Trip
- 6/11/2009
- 01137557 Station OE Evaluation of Industry Documents
- 5/13/2008
- 01143701 Station OE Evaluation of
- OE 26794
- 7/10/2008
which Contained Safety-Related Cables
(Cook Plant)
- 5/7/2010
- 01245020 Station OE Evaluation of
- OE 31283
- 8/10/2010
- 01149696 Fisher Information Notice 1997-01, Supplement 1
- 9/5/2008
- 8/11/2009
- 01126257 Part 21:
- GE Fuel Rod Thermal-Mechanical Methodology
- 2/05/2008
- Weekly OE Screening Minutes
- 06/10/2010
- 01180269
- 01142237 OE26962 Flux Map Gaps Ginna
- 2/02/2009
- 07/18/2008
- 09/23/2008
- 01142952 Westinghouse Detached P-Grid Dimples
- 01/09/2009
- 10/31/2008
- 01157701
- 10/31/2008
- 09/30/2009
- Attachment
- AUDITS, ASSESSMENTS AND
- SELF-ASSESSMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- 01121234
- FASA of
- 2/17/2008
- 1205004 EPU Outage Readiness Assessment 6/10/2010 2010-02-014 Corrective Action Program 5/14/2010 2010-01-029 Corrective Action Program 3/12/2010
- SAR 01249160 Site Roll-up Meeting Results 1
st and 2 nd Quarter 2010 SAR01116710
- Component Design Bases Inspection Focused Self-Assessments
- 11/17/2008
- NOS 1 st Quarter 2010 Assessment Report 05/14/2010
- NOS 4th Quarter 2009 Assessment Report 03/01/2010
- QF-0426 Focused Self-Assessment MNGP Dry Cask Loading Readiness Revision 2
- QF-0402 Fleet Focused Self Assessment Report: Reportability
- SAR 01117506
- Revision 3
- 1133118 Exposure Monitoring and Dose Control 11/06/2008
- CONDITION REPORTS GENERATED DURING INSPECTION
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 1250188 NRC PI&R Process Control for WO from
- CA Process
- AR 1250127 NRC PI&R:
- Closure Documentation for
- 1150601-06 Inadequate
- 9/17/2010
- AR 1250089 NRC PI&R:
- CAs Not Created for Interim RCE Actions
- 9/16/2010
- AR 1249923 NRC PI&R:
- NRC is Questioning Status of
- 25V DC 9/15/2010
- AR 1251890 PI&R:
- Inconsistencies in Observation Program 9/29/2010
- AR 1249158 Contactor Oversight Insufficient to Prevent Performance Issues
- 10/11/2010
- AR 1243583 Incorrect CAP Severity Determination 9/24/2010
- AR 1252870 NRC PI&R:
- PEACH Process Not Well Understood
- 10/5/2010
- AR 1252873 OE Not Well Evaluated Beyond the Event 10/5/2010
- Attachment
- MISCELLANEOUS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- 3784 A(1) Action/Performance Improvement Plant Revision 0
- Performance Assessment Review Board Package 9/14/2010
- Alignment Teamwork and Oversight Meeting 9/15/2010
- IC-RHR,
- ISP-RHR-0552-01 RX Recirc Loop
- DP-LPCI INTR FUNCT T
- 01/27/2010
- IC-RCI, 0060 RCIC High Steam Flow Sensor Test 2/18/2010
- Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- USED [[]]
- NRC [[]]
WO Work Order
T. O'Connor -2-
No violations or findings were identified during this inspection. In accordance with
- NRC 's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Website
at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-263
License No. DPR-22
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000263/2010007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServe
- See next page
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPIII\1-Secy\1-Work In Progress\MON 2010 0007 PIR.docx Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
Sensitive Non-Sensitive To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
- OFFICE [[]]
- RIII [[]]
- ERIII [[]]
- RIII [[]]
- RECORD [[]]
- PLANT [[]]
- AND [[]]
RidsNrrDorlLpl3-1 Resource
RidsNrrPMMonticello
RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource
Steven West Steven Orth Jared Heck
- DRPIII [[]]
DRSIII Patricia Buckley