ML20098B002
| ML20098B002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1984 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8409250360 | |
| Download: ML20098B002 (105) | |
Text
-- Pubhc Sennce Electnc and Gas Cornpany 80 Park Pla73, Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430-8217 MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 Robert L. Mitti General Manager Nuclear Assurance and Regulation September 21, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 Attention: Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:-
HOPE' CREEK GENERATING STATION
- DOCKET NO. 50-354 DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT OPEN ITEM STATUS Attachment 1 is a current list which provides a status of the open items identified in Section 1.7 of the Draft Safety Evaluation Report (SER). Items identified as " complete" are
~
those for which PSE&G has provided responses and no confir-mation of status has been received from the staff. We will consider these items closed unless notified otherwise. In order to permit timely resolution of items identified as
" complete" which may not be resolved to the staff's satis-faction, please provide a specific description of the issue which remains to be resolved.
Attachment 2 is a current list which identifies Draft SER Sections not yet provided.
Enclosed for your review and approval (see Attachment 4) are the resolutions to the Draft SER open items listed in Attachment 3.
In addition, pursuant to discussions held on September 20, 1984, between PSE&G and NRC Licensee Qualification Branch, enclosed (see Attachment 5), is revised proposed HCGS Technical Specifications. This information supersedes the proposed HCGS Technical Specifications transmitted on l September 14, 1984, and supplements the information con- I tained in FSAR Section 13.4.
s\
The Energ' y People 8409250360 840921 PDR ADOCK 05000354 E PDR gyg g.
L_.
y_ . , _ . - - _
Director offNuclear -4 ReactorLRegulation- 2 9/21/b4
.- FSAR Section 13.4 will be modified in Amendment 8 to address
-the attached technical' specification requirements.
Also, enclosed 1(see Attachment 6), is Revision 1 to the r esponse to BWR Core Thermal Hydraulic Stability (supersedes
-8/12/84 submittal) as requested.by the Core Performance Branch'.
A signed original of the required affidavit is provided to
?
- document the submittal of these items.
Tshould you have any' questions or require any. additional
'information on these items, please contact us.
Very truly yours, b
Attachments / Enclosure C D. H.. Wagner USNRC Licensing Project Manager (w/ attach.)-
W. H..Bateman USNRC Senior Resident Inspector (w/ attach.)
FB18 1/2 1
. - - - - , - - - - , , .,,m, m. - ,.m.
m:.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 50-354 PUBLIC' SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY Public Service Electric and Gas Company hereby submits the anclosed responses to DSER open items, proposed Technical Specifications pursuant _to Final Safety Analysis Report Section 13.4 and response to BWR Core Thermal Hydraulic Stabilityifor the Hope Creek Generating Station.
The matters set forth in this submittal are true to the best of- my knowledge,- information, and belie f.
Respectfully submitted, Public Service Electric -
i and Gas Company
( -
By: Agl //
Thorflas' J. . %rt'i'n~
Vice Pres ent -
Engineer g and Construction Sworn to and subscribed
'before'me, a Notary Public
. of New Jersey, this Z/F day o f September 1984.
.,/2 M / ,
s ,- Nk - -
DAVID K. BURD NOTARYPUBUC OF NEW JERSEY My Comm. Expiras 10-23 85
.MC 28-02 r . , ~ - - .
.,.e , , , , - - , - - - , . , . - - - - - - - ,,,, ,-,
UtrEs 9/21/84 XEDONNY l
~
R. L. MITIL TC
- '- DER A. SODWCER (WW 5E2108 SDGUS t.Er!ER DRIED IE3GER SUETECT 1mmt ossigre tasis tempe'ratures for safety- Ccaplete 8/15/84 1 '2.3.1 related auriHary systmas '
h e!M ical Complete 8/15/84 2a 2.3.3 _w M es d (Rev. 1)-
measurements Accuracies d meteorological Ccaplete 8/15/94 1 2b 2.3.3 (Rev. 1) '1 unapurumorts l I
.hMes of metecrological Ccuplets 8/15/84 2c 2.3.3 (Rev. 2) l mensarements E= =
- d meteorological Complets 8/15/84 ;
3d 2.3.3 (Rer. 2) t measurements Ccaplete 8/15/84 3a 2.3.3 mar = dim d ensite _helmical (asy. 2)
====mments progena (III.A.2)
- i Ca plete 8/15/94 3b 2.3.3 W q d onsite matecrological (Rar. 2)
; measurements progree (III.A.2)
- l lac Action I
3c 2.3.3 Upgrading af ansite h4ical naamaraments program (III.A.2)
Complets 8/03/54 4 2.4.2.2 Pending levels Have impmet and rurup m service Ccaplete 9/13/84 Sa 2.4.5 (Rev. 3) water intake structure 1
Wave ingnet and zurup cn service Casplete 9/13/84 Sb 2.4.5 (aey. 3) water intake structure Wave impact ani rus1up cm service ccuplete 7/27/54 Sc 2.4.5
- mter intake structure Wave ingmet and runup on service ccnglete 9/13/84, Sd 2.4.5 (Rev. 3) water intales structure Stability d erosion pettaction Ccaplete 8/20/94 6a 2.4.10 structurns Couplete 8/20/84 6b 2.4.10 Stability d ertmion grotectim structures Ccaplete 8/03/54 6c 2.4.10 Stahility d orcsfon e m ien structurns ,
M P64 80/12 1-gis
L
. MEMBENE 1 (Quet'd)
R. L. per.1 CEst A. NE WEIR WW m
3R75:f SIRRB INTER QNEW
!!ss MSWR 12senet ampoets d ultfaste heat sink. Qagdete W3/54 7a 2.4.11.2 1 hessel aupacts d ultimets heat sink Ozqpets (/W54 7b 2.4.11 J G oice d nosises earthquehe sur usw Qagdete V15/54 2J.2.2 5
melane - Pimtsant Tectonic Pterince Soil desping values Quplets 4/1/34 9 2J.4 Pa==e=*im level response spectra Quplets 4/% 54 ,
10 2.5.4 Soil sheer unduli verimei- Quplets (/1/54 11 2J.4 '
M a=*i- d soil layer y + W Osglets 6/1/54 12 2J.4 Eab test sheer moduli inlume Omplets 4/1/94 13 2J.4
~
0;=Mi= analysis d river bottae Ozplets 4/1/94 I 14 2.5.4 samde 15 2.5.4 Tabulatione d sheer erzkali M iats 6/1/84 Drying and wetting effect m Ozqdets 4/1/34 16 2.5.4 '
viv Pouer blodr, se**1M sonitoring Ctuplets (/bl4 17 2.5.4 Maziam earth at rest praesure Caplets 6/1/54 le 2.5.4 coefficient O?=h4= analysis for service M iate (/1/34 19 2.5.4
- water piping emplana*im d cheerved power bicck M 1=*= 6/1A4 20 2.5.4 esteleoant 21 2.5.4 service meer pipe settisment recorde M iate 6/1/34 22 2.5.4 Odfordam stability M iate 6/1/54 is No 50/12 2 - es
' N 1 (C at'd)
R. L. MEET.10 DS8R A. emuerve m SE2EN aga 3333T starts LgrTER UttID f rma _
i Clarificatica d F5AR Tables 2.5.13 Ccuplete (/1/84 l 23 2J.4 '
and 2.5.14 2.5.4 Scil depth admis fbe intake Caplete 6/1/94 24 -
semcame Intahm stmetmo soil ocdeling Ccaplete 8/10/84 25 2 5.4 Intake sem m er= slidino stability Couplate 4/24/84
- 26 2.5.4.4 Sicpe stability Cczqdets 6/1/84 27 2.5.5 F1ced gum *ei- Complets s/3c/84 28a 3.4.1 (Rev.1)
Caplate 4/3Q/84 28b 3.4.1 FIced rm im (Rev. 1)
Ceeplete 8/30/84 28c 3.4.1 Flcent rwtim (Rev. 1)
F1ced grotection Ccaplete 8/30/84 28d 3.4.1 (Rev. 1) desplets 8/30/84 l 28e 3.4.1 FIced r_2.+2bi (Rev. 1)
)
Flced gr + M ien Camp!ste 7/27/84 28f 3.4.1 F1ced grotectim Casplete 7/27/84 ,
! 28g 3.4.1 !
Internally generated missiles (cutside Cagdete 8/3/84 l 29 3.5.1.1 (Rev. 1) contaiment)
Internally generatad missiles (inside Ciceed 6/1/84 l 30 3.5.1.2 (5/30/84-contalment) Aux.sys.Mtg. )
t cauglets 7/18/84 ;
! 31 3.5.1.3 Turbine missiles Missilise generatet by natural phenconna Ccaglete 7/27/84 j 32 3.5.1.4 i
stmetures, systems, ami caugenents to Casplete 7/27/84 33 3.5.2 he w_ +M tram esterna11y generated missiles
d M M IB M 3 (Cte4 %
- 3. L. NE21L M M
A.3135E3R M MIEN *m - - STRRB trf!IR tRIED ITBI M3WR (Reestrained titipping pipe inside C== Me 7/18/54 34 3.6.2 catainennt .
Ist geogsee fer pips velds in Ccaplete 4/291/54 35 3.6.2 busek == 1===4a= sans 4/29/94 Boenaleted pipe artamos Cceplets 36 3.6.2 ccuplete 4/24/54 37 3.6.2 FamNeter imaintim check valve gerability Dueign of pipe myture restraints Complete 4/M/94 f 38 3.6.2 SEE analysis ramalts unisqr finite C = a1=to 4/3/84 39 3.7.2J element anthod ant etammie half-space aggrects ihr ccatainment semature f
C=a1 ate 4/3/94 40 3.7.2J SEE analysis reedts using finite element nothest ant elastic half-space i
- appecoch for intake =*=*we ,
Steel ccntairment bucklisqg analysis C = atate 4/1/84 i
41 3.8.2 "
Steel cuat.dment u1*4==*= Pty f=atate 8/M/84 42 3.8.2 (Bev. 1) analysia s.vuxa p.a dyn i. = Cc.p2ete wS4 u 3.8.2 Ccuplete 4/1/84 44 3.3.3 'Act 349 deviations for internal structures .
C = atate 8/20/84 3.8.4 ACI 349 deviations ibe Category I (ase. 1) 43 structures Caplete 8/20/54 46 3.8.5 ACE 349 deviations for fcundatione (Ass. 1)
Complets 8/10 / 54 3.8.4 Base mat response spectra (asv. 1) 47 c i tate 8/20/84 48 3.8.4 Rocking time histories . (Rev. 1) 9 m see 80/12 4 - gs
. - - .- - _ -. -_. _ ____ _ _- = _ _ . . - . - _ . - . - - _ _ . .
- . NEIBOOeff1(Ctat'd)
R. L. NETE 1D EER A. 535E3R WW M2EE 4 ouuus Mrrum UtIED Funs IES W R e-complete 4/2V34
. 49 3J.6 Grass cancrets section (Ber. 1)
Destical f1cce it.wtwuty responso Ca plate 4/24/54 50 3.8.4 (Ber. 1) agectra ,
,-M d sechtel inispondent ce1 ate ' 8/20/94 51 3.8.6 -
(Ber. 2) verificatiszt resalts with the desigs-beels results Ceny]ste 4/3/54 52 3.8.6 thactility retics time to pipe break Design d seismic Category I tanks Ccup2sts 4/24/54 53 3.8.6 (Esr. 1)
Caddnatica d vertical responses ccepiste 4/1S/84 54 3.8.6 (ast. 11 Ccop2str 4/1/84 55 3.8.5 Torstensi stiffness calculatica Drywell stick medal devolcyount Caplets 8/20/84 54 3.8.6 (Ber. 1)
~ ~
notational tism history inguts C7 =to 1 6/1/84 57 3.8.6 Y refe5snem I; pint for assi11ary c7 ate t (/1/84 58 3.8.6 hui1d4= andel overturning accent d reacter Ccaplate 8/20/14 59 3.8.6 (Bar. 1) building foundation ont c i tate 8/20/84 60 3.8.6 BAP element size limitaticas (Rev. 1) l Seismic andeling d drpell shield CM ate i (/1/54 61 3.8.6 iall c e fate 6/1/84 62 3.8.6 crywell shield well u y conditiene 1 l
i neecece building due beundary comp 2mee 4/1/s4 i 63 3.8.6 l conditions l l
l N 804 84/12 5 - gs .
- . . - . _ . - . _ _ _ . , _ . . _ _ _ _ _. __m ., ._w, . _ ._ ,,,
-c . . . .
t
. ErI808Eur 1 (Cast'd)
E.1 net 1L m 1554 A. Sta mE3R '
gg mur rust
- Leewmn 12r!ER ERIED 1g333
- gag lr i n ns CoupIste 4/21/84 64 3J.4 WE analysis 12 as asedf frequency (msv. u k
Intales *===== crans haasy Iomd ccup3sts V1/96 E5 3.8.6 -
49 Ccuez een 8/to/84 66 3.8.6 nupadance analysis see the treate (ast.1)
- =w*im c e tate V1/84 47 3.8.6 Critical Iceds ea1='=*4= for reactor tasilding dass Reactor tasilding feedstiam met Complete V1/84 68 3J.6 ,
contact smemmises CampIste V1/86 3.8.6 ractoss d asisty against sliding and 49 oves ===iag at drywell shield wall h Ccapista -
4/1/84 W 3.8.6 seismic shear force distri- *i= in cylinder iall ove=*iminig d cylinder well Ccaplace 6/1/M I 71 3.8.4 ,
i ceplate 6/1/86
! 72 3.8.6 Ceep tsaa design d fusi geol tells AaB53 &$ne adel Iced irguts C 7 '=*e 6/1/M 73 3.8.6 cW 1ate V1/84 3.8.6 ttumado dagensaarization 74 Camp!ste 6/1/84 3.8.6 Amtillary tamilding abncumal grosmare 75 .
Ccuplate 6/1/84 76 3.8.6 Tangential h strosame in &ywell shield well and the cylinder wall Ccuplete s/20/84 3.8.6 racter e safety against overturning Oter. 1) 77 ci intake attusture c e 1 ate 6/1/84 78 3.8.d Onad Iced calalations c e tate 8/20/84 79 3.8.6 Postmuodification asianic loads der (Dev. 1) the tcuus l
l l N 886 80/12 6 - gs
- - - - - - - - - - ..ww-~,,--r.wmmw. n-~ erww ww--w w
- j l
- 2H M 3 W F 1 (Cent'd),
R. L. NETIL E IER A. - i WW M253 SUtttB IEr5R OtND l me IONR SE235:r '
Ozqdete 4/3/84 80 3J 6 1tsus fluid-structure trearmeelons Seismic displacement d torus Cagdete 4/2W54 81 3J.6 (ast. 1)
Review d satanic Category I tark Czqdses 4/2W54 32 3.8.6 (Bew. 1) desik Factnes d safety for depell Omplate 6/1/84 33 3.8.6
@ ggnalismeinig Ozqdate 4/2W84 84 3.8.6 , Ultiasta Pty d contairment
- (Ber. 1)
(==*= rim 1=)
tend ccetdnatica consistency Quplate 4/1/84 85 3.8.6 Omplate 4/2W84 86 3.9.1 Osguter code =11d=*4am 4
Infansstica en transients Quplets 8/20/84 87 3.9.1 Stress analysis and elastic-plastic czqdate , 6/29/84 88 3.9.1 analysis vibratica levels for MSS piping Czqdets 6/29/54 89 3.9.2.1 systems-l vibration annitoring progras daring capiste 7/18/84 90 3.9.2.1 testing Piping supports ani anchors Cagdete '6/29/84 91 3.9.2.2 Ozqdate 6/15/84 92 - 3.9.2.2 Triple fIund-head containment '
penetratiens Ozq$sts (/29/94 93 3J.3.1 Iced aculdnations and altmmhtm stress limits Design d SEMs and SRV discharge Ccupista 6/29/84 94 3.9.3.2 P19188 _.
. M 704 80/12 7 - go l
l
. ~
- AfDI3eff 1 (Cont'd!
R. L. MITIL 1D
- M A. Sc3NEIR WW E23EN auuss E2rma GRIED mm m M*"P _
- Fatiga evaluation cm SMF piping Ctuplete W15/54 i 95 3.9.3J l and toca --
i Ctuplete W3444 95 3.9,3.3 IE Thian motics 83-40 - (Est.1)
Ccuplete (/29/54 ,
3.9.3.3 mackling critaria used for cesqponent 97 supports Complets 6/15/84 90 3.9.3.3 Desip d bolts ,
Caggets 6/15/84 99m 3.9.5 Stress Wies aal limits for.
cose esppost structures Complete 4/15/84 99tp 3.9.5 Stress catsprias and limits flor ccue sqppcet enanus
(/2444 10CFR50.55s paragregh (g) Ccaplete 100m 3.9.5 ,
Ccaplete 9/12/84 3.9.6 10CF350.55s pg ,-@ (g) (Rev. 1) 10 2 '
PSI ami ISI geograms fcr pumps and Ccuplete 9/12/44 101 3.9.6 (A*v 13 valves teak task d pressure isolation Caplete b/12/s4 102 3.9.6 (ney.1) valves complets 8/20/84 3.10 seismic ami dynamic qualification d 103a1 mechanical ami electrical equipment ,
Seimaic ami dynamic qualification d . Caplete 8/ 23/84 103a2 3.10 eschanical ami electrical equipment seismic and dynaude qualification d ccuplets 8/20/54 103a3 3.10 nochanical ami electrical @
l ccuplets 8/20/84 3.13 seimic and dynaude palification d l 103a4 mechanical ani electrical opfement i
l l
l N res 80/12 s - gs w . ,ww. r
Nrungeur 1 (that'd1
- 3. f MIII.
M A. a m em mll255 -
smuser sexms rarna aux l n= massa 3.10 seismic ami dynamic gentiftm*h of Ozq$ste # 2 /54 f 183a5 *ie=1 ami electrical agaissant l
)
seismic and dynamic 9=1tfimei- of Quplete WEVB4 l 103as 3.10 ==,hant -1 and electrical agaigment safude ami dynamic e='ifimeim of Quplate WE/54 103e7 3.10 chantent and electrical agalpment Seismic ami dynamic gas 11fie=*im of Quplete W3W54 103ht 3.10 = ch==i=1 and electrical agaigment seismic and dynamic ;= ifirmeim of Quglate V2VB4 103h2 3.10 ==ch==ie=1 and electrical egaigment 1
seimda and dynamic O-1481catism of 0:sidete W2VB4 103tG 3.10 =*=aient and electrical agaignant .
. W20/84 4
seismic and dynaude gaslification of Osglete ,
103be 3.10 somehanient m33 =1**h egaignant Seismic ami dynamic ;=1184-4= cc M ate 1 8/2V54 103t2 3.10 "
==.4==4c=1 and electrical agaissent Seimda and dynamic gaslific=*fm of r ~a1 '
- = W20/54 103td 3.10 seceumiie=1 and electrical agaipment Seismic and dynede qualification of W1=*a 8/20/54 103c1 3.10
=*=mie=1 and =1% egaipment seismic and dynamic gan11ficatics: cd 0:ssdeta - 8/20/54 103c2 3.10
=m,*==ie=1 and electrical agaipment said ami dynamic gaalification of Ozq4sta 8/2V54 103c3 3.10
-*eaie=1 amt electrical egaignant Ozylets 8/20/54 3.10 seismic and dynmaic gaslification og 103c4 mechanical and electrical agaissent lac Acticza 104 3.11 aurizarmental c=11firmeim of
==chaahl and electrical agaignant i
il
^
n 354 sW12 9 - os ,
, , - - ,-,w-nn-,-w,---,,--e-,--,-m-,,wm_-,_,..-w_ _ a w m- __m,_. .ew-
. . . , . .. ..z. .
4 l
. l l ..
M \
n.t EtS m MM A. er1amarum 09 3 5E235 '
- 5"m Earven IRIE fus N * '
Casplate 4/2ytt 4J Mase-speciffs ==+imat=1 fracturing (ase.1) 105 analysis .
Asp 11mb(11ty ci seismis aned Eccm caplate W3W54 206 4.2 <- (Ber. 1) c jangag . . ,
stinimini post-irradiatica fumi Ccaglate V29/98 107 4.2 j su pe111anos geogtum Gash 11:a thsemm1 conextivity couplete (/29/94 l los 4.2 egantion cmplets 4/2VB4 100m 4.4.7 1MI-2 Itas II.F.2 Omplete 4/21/88 10Bb 4.4.7 1NI-2 Item II.F.2 l ccuplete 4/3W86 4.6 P==*immt design cf reactivier (asy. 1)
- 110 s
= nema syneums ,
Ccaplete s/30/54 11 2 4.6 Ranctimal desigt d reactivity (mer. 1) control syntes .,
chapists 5/29/94 5.2.4.3 preservice imagection program
- 111a (caponents within reacter pressure l
Ccuplets 4/29/54 5.2.4.3 inspection program 111b (caponents ethin reactor presare boundssy)
Preservice inspection psegram Ccuplete #29/14 111c 5.2.4.3 (caponents 4 thin reactor grasare l
i bandary)
Ccuplate s/30/14
' 5.2.s anector conlant pressure Massary (ase.1) 112a leakage h =*im ,
taundary Capiste ano/es
- limb s.2.s anectae coolant (Rev. u leakage detection I
m see a4/12 10 - gs l
l
. arfacetair 1 (Osnt'd) :
CSIR R. L. IttT!!
A. SOBeK2 ,
~
CNSI SE22DI
- 2258 teeER SER7BCr SDt!U5 IRIER Utt! l 112c 5.2J anector coolant pressare boundary e i late W34/54 leakage detection (ast. 11 ;
~
U2d 5.2J Reacter coolant guessure boundary Complete 4/34/54 l
-leakags detection (msy. 1) >
112e 5.2.5 mpactor coolant pressure MM M 1=** W3E/84 leakage detection (mor.1) l ,
113 5.3.4 - GE Le:9 % applicability M 1=** 7/14/34 114 5.3.4 M14- witN BB 2360 d the Smuur Quplets 7/14/54 1972 Addends to the 1971 Ass Quis 115 5.3.4 Deep weight and Charpy imatch tests M 1=*= 9/5/54 fcr closure flange materials (Eur. 1) :
116 5.3.4 Omrpy 6 test stata fcr base M 1=te 7/14/9 4-materials as used in shell course No. 1 -
117 5.3.4 M14- with te 2332 d Winter 1972 M1=*e VM/84 Addenda of the Aes cade ,
i 118 5.3.4 Lead factas and neutron fluencs for c i late 8/24/54 l
marveillance capadas 119 6.2 StI itas II.E.4.1 M 1 ate 6/29/54 120e 6.2 DEI ItasL II.E.4.2 M iate V20/84 120m 6.2 ' DEI Itan II.E.4.2 Quelete W20/84 121 6.2.1.3.3 Use cd! NO3sG-0588 M 1=*e 7/27/84 122 6.2.1.3.3 Itmperature profile M 1=t= 7/27/54 123 6.2.1.4 Batterfly volve Mien (post Qaglete 6/25/54 accident) l
(
n sed 40/1211'- gs
4 NETRQ5mir 1 (Osat'df E. L. NEBI. !
M A. SCBEIEIR WW SEIRE -
5555 EarIIR Ingsp ITBI NamR SR7E2 Ozq$ste 4/28/94 124a 6.21J.1 157 sidsid annulus analysis (Bue.1)
Quplets 4/2l/94 12e 4J.1J.1 EFF aldeM ===h= analysis (Est.1) 6.2.1.5.1 357 sideld annulus analysis Quplets 8/24/54 124c (Ber.1)
Ozqv. ate 4/15/54 125 6.2.1J.2 Design dryus11 head M**==*i.1 y assue M=d=* position trolenkers fkr QupIsts 4/21/34 126a 6.2.1.6 seassa breaksen (and centmL ttssa alasse) anduntant position irdie=*ars fbe M 1 ate 4/2l/54 128b 6.2.1.6 vacuian breakers (and contmL team alarms) r .
8/20/54 1
127 6.2.1.6 cperability testing of vacum breakers Mt.cie (Env. 1) complets 7/27/54 128 6.2.2 Air,ing'estica M =to 1 6/1/54 129 4.2.2 Ic=*1*i= ingsstim Pt*=*4=1 bypass leakage paths Osglets 9/13/84 13o 4.2.2 4.2.2 .* ai e_ h of secondary contain- M 1=ts f$N 131 m= m Qaqpate 6/15/54 132 4.2.4 Catalment i=1=*4= review omanfremne piange syntaan omplata 4/20/54 133a 4.2.4.1 '
6.2.4.1 ointaiment page system M tate 8/20/54 133b 4.2.4.1 contaiment surgs systen M tate 8/20/54 ,
133o
. 4 N 304 80/12126 @
L.--_.___.._.. _ . _ .
l . . , .. : . ,
Jtr w 1merf 1 (Cent'd)
R. L. METE. 10 IEER A. erim e m m e mm nacTrras 122TER Ut!ED suam.i SUGts IfBt IEmam Ccsitaisest 1sekage testing Ccuptste 6/15/84 134 6.2.6 IPG an$ IPCI injecticas valve ccuglete 8/20/84 15 6J.3 interacets '
8/20/94 Plant-specific ICCA (see Section Ccuplets 136 6.3.5 (Rev. 1) 15.9'.13) .
Ccntrol reca habitability Ccglete 8/20/84 137a 6.4 Control roas habitsbility Ccaplete 8/20/84 137b 6.4 centrol reas habitability Ccaplete 8/20/84 137c 6.4 Preservice W_ica gregrant for Ccaplate 6/29/84 13 6.6 Class 2'and 3 components ISIV leakage control systne Caplate 6/29/84 139 6.7 ,
Caplete 9/7/84 140a 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage (Rar. 2)
Ccaplate 9/7/84 140b 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage (Rev. 2)
Complate 9/7/84 140c -
9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage (Rev. 2)
Complete 9/7/84 140d 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage ,Rev.
( 2)
Spent fuel cooling and cleanup Ccaplete 8/30/84 141a 9.1.3 (Rev. 1)
' systne Cauglate 8/30/84 141b 9.1.3 Spent fuel moling and.cleamp (Rev. 1) system Spent fuel pool cooling and cleamp Ccupista 8/30/84 141c 9.1.3 (Rev. 1) systen e
..~r--- , , , . ,,+,,,s,w-w_,cw,.-%.,w,_ _ - . _ . - , , -
! I Arranneer 1 (Ctat'd)
R. L. MmL 10 1 08ER A.enmuuNe Coal SBC"m al MMER SUW8CT 55t205 LETTER ONND ITEM
~
spmt fuel pool cooling and cIsamp complete 8/30/94 I
141d 9.1.3 (now.1) ;
system 1
spent fuel peoL coolice ant cIsanup complets 4/30/84 141e 9.1.3 (mer.1) 1 system .
spent fuel pool cooling and cIsamp Tee 4/30/84
- 141f 9.1.3 (asy.1)
> system 9.1.3 spent fuel pool cooling and clearmy complate 8/30/84 141g (mer.1) system -
Light Iced handling systsua (related Ccuplete 4/15/94 142n 9.1.4 (ase.1) to esfueling)
Light Iced handling systen (related Complate 4/15/54 14 3 9.1.4 (Asv.1) to refueling) osenhead hasvy lead handling Complete 9/7/84 143a 9.1.5 9.1.5 osenhead honey Icmd handling c g lete 9/13/s4 14 3 Station service star systen Complete 8/15/84 144a 9.2.1 (ase. 1)
Statica service water system Ccuplate 8/15/84 144b 9.2.1 (now.1)
Station service meer system Complets 8/15/84 144c 9.2.1 (asv.1)
Ist program ani functicmal tasting Cicand 6/15/54 145 9.2.2 of safety and turtine auriliaries (5/30/84-cooling systems Aux.sys. Meg.)
switches and wiring associated with Cicaud 6/15/84 146 9.2.6 secr/nCIc torus saction (5/30/84.-
Auz.sys.nts.)
n Pe4 80/12 14 - gs
d J
MIE3WE' 1 (Cont'tB R. T NETE, W DM A. m W WlEEN yvemen renn ramn igen m ==-1 2
Omplete 9/21/84 1Ca 9.3.1 Caymsand air systems (Rev. 2)
Qupuessed air systems Caplats 9/21/84 141h 9.3.1 *
(Rev. 2) omplets 9/21/84 1411e 9.3.1 Ospressed air sysemus (Rev. 2)
- _ - air systems Omplate 9/21/04 icd 9.3.1 _
(R v. a)
Post-aaeih samplirql syntes complets 9/12/84 I
148 9.3.2 (aer. 1)
(II.3J) apigment and floor drainage system coplets 7/27/34 I les 9.3J epigment and floor draineen systen capInts 7/27/94 leh 9.3.3 Primary contalment irstrument gas caplete 4/3/84 150 9.3.6 (Rev. 1) syseum contzoL ena== ventilatkai systen Quplete s/34/s4 151a 9.4.1 (Rev. 1)
CentroL' structure ventilation systes Caplate 8/30/04
! 151b 9.4.1 (Rev. 1)
Radianctivity monitoring elements cicmed 4/1/84 152 9.4.4 (5/30/se- .
l Aus.sys. Reg.) .
Enginseged safety featurma ventilm- T ate W34/84 153 9.4.5 * (Rev 2) tien systen ;
omplete W1/94 154 9.5.1.4.a mal red deck curistructica '
I classificidim d seen shutdown leC Action 135 9.5.1.4.b 9.5.1.4.s ongoing reviss d alternets shatdass W C Action 154 W itty 4
O
o .
- I
.. .. . .c . - .- . ,
ll. -
e
- MERGBWff 1 (C0ftt'd)
- a. L. METIL 10 IM A. -
WWI EEETfm .
IMIER QKEED avaum.1 SUnts Trel -E 9J.1.4.e Cabis tray protection Caplete V20/84 157 9J.1J.a class a fire detection system C a plete 6/15/84 158 9.5.1J.a Primary and secondary power aspplies ci Me 6/1/84 159 l
' for fire detectim system a
9.5.1.5.b Fine water pay capacity Complets 4/1344 160 Ccaplete 6/1/84 161 9J.1.5.h Fire eter alve sapervision <
9.5.1J.c Deluge valves
- Ca plete 6/1/84 t 162 i
9.5.1.5.c Marusi h.ome semeim pipe sizing Ceplate W1/84 163 ,.
9J.1.4.e namote stutdoun ganal ventilation Coplate 6/1/84 144 9J.1.4.g amongency diesel generator day tark CcupInte 6/1/84
! 165 1 y.- s -'_%
Alzhnens radioactivity annitor Complete '9/13/84 ,
146 . 12.3.4.2 (nev. 2) i positioning
- l Portable omtirascus air monitors Caplete 7/18/84 147 12J.4.2 l 6/29/84 12J.2 Fqaipseste, training, and procedures cm Me 168 for iglant iodine instrumentation Guidanos at Divisica a assalatory Ccaplate 7/18/84 169 12.5.3 Guides Proomdures generatica package ccuplete '6/29/84 170 13J.2 adsdttal c.
Complate 6/29/84 171 13.5.2 1ME Item I.C.1 Ccuplets 6/29/84
! 172 13.5.2 PW commitment Pecon& ares covering abnormal releases Complets 6/29/84 173 13.5.2 of radicactivity i
M 784 00/12 ls - gs 4
} .
. e"r 1 (Ozut'd)
DMR R. L. NITE.
>! A sanegg a sa m rns StBM:T SDEM MFIER IRII:
1'funt MMBER 13.5.2 mesolutim explanation in F5AR of Omplete W15/54 174
'DEE Itsus I.C.7 and I.C.S 7tgreical amarity Cpen 175 13.5 l 14.2 Initial plant test progras Omplets 8/13/9 4 176e Iditial plant test smogram omplete 9/5/54 17e 14.2 (ase. 1) 14.2 2nitial plant test program Omplete 7/27/54 176c 14.2 Taiti=1 plant test programt M 1=*= - V24/54 17Ed * (Env. 2) 14.2 Initial plant test program Omplets 7/27/94 176e 14.2 Initial plant test psogras Quplets 8/13/54 176f '
14.2 Initial plant test prograa Quplets 8/20/54 -
' 176g Quplets , 8/13/84 176h 14.2 Initial plant test progran 14.2 Initial plant test psogree caplets 7/27/84 1761 15.1.1 PartiIl feessator hosting r* 7 1ate 8/2044 177 (Rev. 1) 15.6.5 Lock resulting frca spectnam of s c Action f 178 .
,~=*a1M piping treaks within R3 .
15.7.4 Matagie=1 consepancas of fuel NRC Action 179 l
- handling accidents 15.7.5 14 pent fbal mek &qp accidents tec Action 180 '
15.s.5 stI-2 Its II.:.3.3 omplete V2s/84 181 15.9.10 1MI-2 Itsus II.K.3.18 Quplets 6/1/54 182 age creek trJtta M t-t= s/15/s4
. 183 . Is n se4 sW 12 17 - es J
,,p.--.-...---nw -,,---w.,*, , , _ . ,anw n, _ _ , , , _ __,,,_,an - -
._m,----___.-,,_~,,. - - - , _-_--n_,_,-
~
~
- E5id3pt1_(Cent,'d)
- 2. f MIE, 2 M A. N (NW E2EN eram eruts I.E!'un ""vun
- vgum 3333 .
Ctagdete V1/88 184 7.2J.1.s Faihares la eector tussel 1svel (ast 1) mansing lines Ctaqdses W3/54 185 7.2.2.2 Trip system sammas and cabling la turedna asildig -
Testhtdlity d plant pmica C7'ee V13/86 186 7.2.2.3 (ast.1)
- systems at pauer I fting d leads to perfous surveil- Ccaplats V3/54 187 7.2.2.4 4
lanos testig l
Ctaplate W1/88 188 7.2.2.5 setpoint methodningy Taalma h devices Ctaplate V1/94 139 7.2J.6 Ccaplate V1/96 190 7.2J.7 magulatney Guids 1.75 C7 Me1 4/ 3 /94 7.2.2.8 Scama dischange alums 191 Ccapiste 8/15/94 I
192 7.2.2.9 anactor modo stitch '
(Rev. 1) ,
ccuplate 8/1/54 193 7.3.2.1.10 Manual initiatics d safety systems Standazd review plan deviations Ccaplate V1/84 194 7.3.2.2 (Der 1)
Ccaplate 8/1/34 195s 7.3.2.3 F. _ - - re +2iam4mtar filled ,
- instrument and asupling lines and l
cabinet tempeeneuse a ccupiste V1/94 195b 7.3.2.3 F.- _ e-A+2 m4mter filled 8
innen=ene amt asupling lines and l
e=Mnem emqnzature entzol Cap 3ste V1/94 7.3.2.4 Sharing d commun istrument taps 196 7.3.2.5 Micrcproomosor, multiplaner and C7% 8/1/94 (Ret 1) 197 ccuputse systems l
M 784 8W12 18 - gs ,
1 MIMESIf_1 (Cont'dl ,
- 3. L. MIN. E
._ g A= N WW SE233 .7 menu tr um p twas m 1NE Itan II.L3.19-MS actuatics @ V2VM l 198 7JJ.6 ceplete V2V34 I 199 7.4J.1 II h11a*4= W27-tass d nueclass (ase. u l zB instammetstJan ans aintrat ymer !
l system tius durise geration )
Remes stastdess system Quplete V15/54 l 200 7.4.2.2 (nur u ,
Caplete S/3/54 201 7.4.2.3 BCR*.AWCZ interactions Laget usasurassar, wress as a resalt Ccaplats WW54 203- 7.5.2.1 of enriran==sent tasperature affsces -
an Inset in=*n====*=*ian redsmenos ,
Regalatasy Guicle 1.97 Ospiste W3/94 1 203 7.5.2.2 .
1NI Itma II.F.1 - Accident sanitarirg Ccaplate W1/N I 204 7.5.2.3 P1 art process etsputer systen Cmqdete 4/1/N >
205 7.5.2.4 .
sjela guesasse/ low pressure interbsem capInts 7/27/94 204 . 7.4.2.1 NEas anii assequential control syntas Complete V2VM 207 7.7.2.1 (Rev. 1) failures lealtiple control systen failures cuplate 8/24/54 208 7.7.2.2 (Ber. 1)
Credit 8er nureefety related systmas complete 8/1/N 25 7.7.2.3 (Rev 1) in Chapter 15 d the Psla Transient analysis recordins systen Caplate 7/27/94 l 210 7.7.2.4 '
Centrol red drive structural setorials ccuplate 7/27/54 211a 4.5.1 j
Control rod drive structural asterials ccuplets 7/27/54 l 211b 4.5.1 7/27/54 211e 4.5.1 ccatrol red drive structural suencials Cc71sts l
l .
e I N 704 SW1219 - gs l
,,, .e --.,,- - .~,.n,. - , - , - ,n,,_.n., .,,__,n_..--
I-I
, . : .. .v . . . ,
- t. .- .
l .
WIMEWir 1 (Qint'd) .
& L. MER. i M .
A ,-ggg'l mmryms - em um WE m _. _ . _;
g _
Qistent sul tive structural amtsrials Qup1ste 7/27/94 211d - 4J.1 Qimtzel sad eive strucessal antarials Qup&ste 7/27/54 211e 4J.1
~
hester inteensis antarials Quplets 7/27/54
, 212 4J.2 i l .
anester coolant pressure tiendasy Ong1ste 7/27/94 +
213 S.2.3 !
untarial !
meinossed safety features antarials cuplets 7/27/54 j 2*,4 8.1.1 Isla steam and foschatar syntan Qagists 7/27/54 i 215 10J.4 -
l motorials passter vessel imitarials Quplets 7/27/54 l' 218e 5.3.1 Quplets 7/27/54-
. 216b 5.3.1 ansctor vessel antarials Fire p-A=ti= cugeni=*Im Quelste 4/15/54 l 217 9'.5.1.1
)
Fire hanmda analysis Quplete . (/1/54 218 9.5.1.1 i Quplets 8/1544 219 9.5.1.2 Fize n-l+M= alheinistrative ;
contzels 1 Fire tirigade and fire tirigade Omplets 8/15/54 i 220 9.5.1.3 traiains 0: splats -
8/1/54 221 8.2.2.1 shysical superation.at offsits 7 w=<= unas ;
Quplets 9/14/84 8.2.2.2 Oss4p psavistens for a r*11shr-222 meet ad a adesite gamer source (Rev. 1) l Independenen d adtsite circuits Qupiste 9/21/84 A 223 8.2.2.3 (Rev. 2) tiotuaan the switchread and class M j husse .
j Cuplete 9/21/a4 l 224 8.2.2.4 Quman failure ande tietween ensite (Rov. 1) and offsite pcaer cirtsaits 0
. ,,..n__nn-- . _ . _
~
~
~- ~ . , . . ._
= . .
N L (C at?dt R. L NtrE,3 m A. -
W.
McIBM ............. . ....
IE I.I*I+1 % d NI" IEEfWfor d @ 9/21/84 M EEE h M W M f
pouer searce (Rev. 1)
Cmqdses 4/13/04 23 8.2.2.5 erid staW11tF (Ber. 1) i Couplets 8/1/34 8.2.2.4 Capacity ano espeM11ty d offsits 227 droits Cagdsts 4/1/94 '
8.3.1.1(1) Waltage &cp daring' tzamsient candi-22 times Cagdets 4/L44 229 8.3.1.1(2) samis 'far using tus voltsgs versus i actus1 aannected lead voltage is the voltsgo erg analysis .
Ccepista s/1/94 8.3.1.1(3) Clarifimei- d Tatds 8.3-11 238 Camplate 8/1/84 231 8.3.1.1(4) undervoltsgs trip seda**
- 8/1/34 Cagdets '
232 8.3.1.1(5) Lead cond4? -*i- used for the soltage k m ansLp is "TMs 9/21/84 233 8.3.3.4.1 periodie systen testing (Rev. 2) eTMs 4/1/84 8.3.1.3 Capacity and capaW11er d ensite 234 Ac peuer mgplies and uso d =>
ministzstive contzels to prevent -
overlandisq d the diesel generators i Ccuplew 9/21/84 8.3.1.5 Dismal ganaratoes lead acceptanom (Rev. 2) 235 gg Cagdste 4/1/84 23 8.3.1.4 ccup11anos dth positics C.4 cd m 1.s I Campista 9/21/84 237 8.3.1.7 Decrip4= d t!W Iced sepancer (Rev. 1)
Caspiste 9/21/s4 238 8.2.2.7 $mponeirq d lasts en the disits ,
(Rev. 1)
. PRISC @ M 4
N 704 88/12 21 = gs -
- - - ~ - - - -. . . . . .. __ .
. 4 3EEEPElf 1 (C88t'8 R. L I m E M A. SM WW vgus M255
=== cunen m ruman i
' Besting to gesify 888 assissa cmqdete V15/84
! 23 8.3.1.5- -
udesse Caplete W3/94 348 8.3.1.9 Qu$ lamas 4th EN '
tand acusptanne test after geotonged Caplete 9/21/84 i 24 8.3.1.10 ca y, 33 no had <posatias d the demol guessment 9/13/s4 2c 8.3.2.1 OzW1ance with genition 1 d mapala- Ctuplem
- (h. 3 tory eside 1.13 8.3.3.1J 7teemation er galifistian d class coplate gf13fg4 243
- 15 egalymmet fram the effects d (Rev. 1) fise egyrussian systems 1
SJJJ.1 Analysis an4 test to demonstrate Ctaplete 9/13/s4 244 (Rev. 2) adegaany W Imms them specified -
,,,,,,gga ,
cczylete W15/94 25 8.3J.3.2 The uma d 18 versas 36 inches d '
(Ber.1) sagasatism hetmoon recommye 8.3.3.3.3 Specified suomestica d raosusys by complets 8/1/84 l 246 l analysi's and test I Ccaplate 9/13/84 !
247 8.3.3J.1 PutF d penetrations to witle= (Rev. 1) stant Isme darmelan short cirmaits l at less tasa ==m4== or umst een '.
short circasit Ccaplets 8/1/84 248 8.3.3.5.2 % e" d genetzstica primary -
)
and basene ps=*=*4a=
ccuplete 4/1/84 2e 8.3JJJ 1he uma d bypassed thesmal cuer3 cad puotective devices far penetratian pectactions complets 8/1/84 250 8.3.3 J.4 'Danting d Bases in accordanen with i
- 3.4. 1.0 ,
e
5 .
NH N 3 m r 1 (Omt'd) si. L. Mmt. E m A. -
(WW -
M255 - **
_m._ ;
- erums' tavum gggp
, sums 33g3 p 9/21/04 31 8.3.3.5.5 Fusit m anlysis k all
___r4 " CiE"Allts (Rev. 2)
__ __ " amag i
9/21/04 32 8.3J.5J 13se was d a single tweake to prorish Onplate (Rev. 2)
. pometraties s1 -1 "- '
Quplets 9/13/s4 253 S.3.3.1.4 Qumstment to grotset all Class 1R (Rev. 1) egsipment tua esteenal hasarth verstas "
caly class 15 agsipment in cue division 9/14/84 !
254 8.3.3.1J Protection d class 13 power agplies Omplets (Rev. 1) team failuss g 9 ,-tici.e class it ,
Imads . . ...
emplete 4/L44 ;
8'.3.2.2 ametsey esposity .
255 k w ia trip d leads to unintain Quplets 9/13/s4 l 8.3.2.3 (Rev.1) 356 adficient battery P_ty P
M ats 9/13/84 ,
>I 257 -
8.3.2 J Justificatica for a 0 to 13 second (Rev. 1)
- w ap je Qagdate 8/1/94 -
l 8.3.2.6 Design and qualification d DC i 258 sysema lames to agorate hetumen t minimum and ==m4= = voltage Invuls i
. i cmqdets 8/1/54 ,
239 8.3.3.3.4 Use d e imorter as a isolatica !
device Quplets 9/13/84 l 200 s.3.3.3 J Uso d a single bewahar tripped by (Rev. 1) ,
l a m 4 d used as m isolation devias ,
Quptste 9/13/84 281 8 JJ.3.4 AutsumabletransdurdIcedsand (Rev. 1) -
L= - - _ - :n
_ i= hetmoen ruhndant ;
divisions :
W ata $/M/54 11.4.2 J Solid weste control pengras M2 I
e l
b I
j
. 8.m ==
- i
- - ~ . - - . - _ , , _ _ , , _ _ _ _
- . I I
. i 5
m 1 (ent'4B !
' E. LIM ,
M &,gesom. m '
I nemu, , ,um em sm nm v
_ . _ . I venn i Omplete 4/13/94 l 11.4J.e Mas puutestka sur enlid submete .
- 283 steunge asas l amuseme af enggum ,
Ompleto 4/2/94 l age SJJ .
4/13/94 j
. amplets
' 25 6.8.1.4 m .n1testlaatias ,
1, Quplets 4/13/54 l 206 6J.1.4 Field leak tests 4 carpiste 4/1 # 54 f 287 6.4.1 Outsal soms tesis chmudanL j i ,
detesteen t l .
Air tLitsation mait 4,aine Quplete 9/13/34 i age bYl Quplets !
200 S.2.2- Quem cases >242 and >24>1 ' I Qup!ste 4/M/94 ,
2M S.2.2 caen case >32 - .
i 2.4.14 closuse ad startight dazu to sadoty- cpan
.' . 1>1 related staustuses ..
single resisumlation Imay W @me 1>2 4.4.4 '
4A/94 4.4.5 case ties monitoring for crud effects Qupiste 1>2 /
! cyan 4.4.4 tasse parts annitoring system 1>4 1 cpse 1
1>S ' 4.4.9 lameural d H**9 in nosmal ..
l epoemalan - l
\ open l 4.2.3 asamudesy amutaisamnt negative l
1>4
' 9**** . 1 cyan 1>7 4J.3 mIW and drandman time in sessmenay amutaiseman l c
l 4.2.4.1 = 1 ritr.t tia.
i acca suberoenn perindia casqmnant cena 1>9 4.2.4.2 ;
I -
testise 4
8
_ _ - - - _ _- -_ l
. 1
- 1. .. .
l o ,
mil 5EWIr 1 (Oun'4 .
R. L IEEL IM .
A. stm es s 1 CWW st:Est3B - ' enmus Earts ung
' esa.- +
rwen 33333 .
6.7 IsrF 1sehage mes DM i Aemilability, setpoints, and testing cyan 9 11 15J.2 of timbias typass system D 12 15.6.4 - Prisery coolant activity ftast med internal preamse criteria Quplate 4/2/54 sc-1 4J stabiliar analysis semitted heeuse cyan sc-2 4.4.4 -
sesambcycle qmration l '
i 1
t 4 e ' #
g t
t i .
I i
O e
G G
9 nn n , _
ATTAGNENT 2 DATE: 9/21/84 DRAFF SER SECTIONS AND DATES PROVIDED g 58CTION DATE -
M 3.1 -
11.4.1 See Notes 165 3.2.1 11.4.2 See Notes 165 3.2.2 11.5.1 See Notes 165 5.1 11.5.2 See Notes 165 5.2.1~ See Note 4 6.5.1 See Notes 165 13.1.1 See Note 2 13.1.2 See Note 4 8.1 13.2.1 See Note 4 8.2.1 See Note 2 .
See Note 4 8.2.2 See Note'2 13.2.2 See Note 2 13.3.1 See Note 4 8.2.3 13.3.2 See Note 4 8.2.4 See Note 2 See Note 4
,- 8.3.1 See Note 2 13.3.3 See Note 2 13.3.4 See Note 4 8.3.2 13.4 See Note 4
-8.4.1 See Note 2 See Note 4 8.4.2 See Note 2 13.5.1 8.4.3 See Note 2 15.2.3 3.4.5 -
~ see. Note 2 15 .2 .4 8.4.6 See Not's.2 15.2.5 -
^ J 8.4.7 fee. Note 2 15.2.6
<8.4.8 See Note 2. 15.2.7 '
9.5.2 _ l See Note 3 15 ~.2.8 .
See Note 3 15.7.3 See Notes 165 l' 9.5.3 17.1 8/3/84 9.5.7 See Note 3. , ..
17.2 8/3/84 .
9.5.8 See Note 3 .
l 10.1 See Note 3 '17.3 8/3/84 sSee Note 3 17.4 8/3/84 10.2 -e 10.2.3, ^ 'See' Note 3 '
+ 10.3.2 See Note 3 '
10.4.1 See Note 3
10.4.2 ,- See Notes 345 10.4.3\ .See Notes 365 .
10 . 4. 4 ' See Mote 3 .
See Notes 165 Notess 1- 11.1.1 ' '
'11 '.1. 2 See Notes 165 - .
- - See Notes 145 1. Open' items provided in 11.2.1 ^
See Notes 165 letter dated July 24, 1984 11.2.2-l 11.3.1 See Notes 145 (Schwencer to Nitti)
- 1L 3.2 See Notes 1&5
- 2. open items provided in
.f June 6, 1984 meeting
- 3. open items provided in April 17-18, 1984 seating l CT db 4. Open items provided in Nay 2, 1984 meting N 5. Draft SER Section provided
- y. -' ' in letter dated August 7,
+
s . 1984 (Schwencer to Nitti) s%
7' Nr 84' 95/03
= Ol' _.-__'_____
w DATE: 9/21/84 l
ATTACHMENT 3 DSER ITEM DSER SECTION SUBJECT 2
147 9.3.1 Compressed air system 223 8.2.2.3 Independence of offsite circuits between F
the switchyard and Class lE buses 224 8.2.2.4 ~Cosmon failure mode between onsite and offsite power circuits 225 8.2.3.1 Testability of automatic transfer of power from the normal to preferred-power source 233-- 8.3.3.4.1 Periodic system testing
'235 8.3.1.5 Diese) generators load acceptance test 237 8.3.1.7 Description of the load sequencer
'238 8.2.2.7 Sequencing of loads on the offsite power system 241 8.3.1.10 Load acceptance test after prolonged no load operation of the diesel generator 251 8.3.3.5.5 Fault current analysis 'ior all repre-sentative penetratiou circuits 252 8.3.3.5.6 The use of a single breaker to provide penetration protection l-l W vw'T ww.--- -
.-,#.--y., ,-m., , , , , ,, , _
l 1
1 ATTACHMcT 4
. - y- e - - me . . -
-w n-- ., - ,
6
+ HCGS .
DSER Open Item No. 1472.t r DSER Section 9.3.1)
COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS '
The sort ice air system consists of two 100 percent capacity trains of compressors, af tercoolers, moistura separators, receivers, and m.ssociated piping and valves. Cooling is provided by the turbine i
auxiliary cooling system. One compressor runs automatically with the other compressor on standby. The standby compressor starts automatically on failure of the first system or failure of the Th.is system first system to meet the demand for compressed air.
paintains a constand pressure in the instrument air system. (The applicant has not~provided an FSAR figure which identifies each air user, the location of each user, and all accumulators, check valves, and other appurtenances associated with safety related components, systems,.and equipment, such as the ADS. The appli-cant has not provided readable figures in the FSAR, due to the drawing scale factor.) The service air compressor supplies air for the instrument air system by means of an intertie between the service air system and the instrument air cystem before the instrument air dryer package. The isolation between the two air systems is supplied air from the emergency air supply system (consisting of one compressor, filter, aftercooler, moistureCooling separator, and receiver) for all accidents except a LOCA.
is provided by the rescotr auxiliaries cooling system.
(The applicant has not identified the location of the equipment and the component classifications on the FSAR figures. Therefore, we cannot conclude that air systems satisfy the requirements of '
l General Design Criterion 2, '" Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29,.
Positions C.1 and C.2, " Seismic Design Classification.]
A- scheduled program of testing and inspection of the system will be provided to ensure oparability of the system components and control systems. For compliance with the requirements of GDC 1, see Section 3.2 of this SER.
The service air system has no functions necessary for achieving safe reactor shutdown condition nor for accident prevention or '
. mitigation. (The applicant has not identified and demonstrated that all instruments, controls and services required for safe
' shutdown of the plant such as the MSIV and ADS valves are pro-i
. vided with seismic Category I passive air accumulators to assure I their proper function in a loss of the air system.] All other air-operated valves including the scram discharge inlet and outlet valves and other devices are designed to move to a safe position on loss of instrument air and do not require a continuous air supply under emergency or abnormal conditicnc.
l K53/4 147 D 2 d"1 f
L
- 8t
[ Additionally, the applicant has not verified that all station air system containment penetrations are provided with redundant Therefore, seismic Category I, Quality Group B isolation valves. 1 we cannot conclude the requirements of General Design Criterion j 2 and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C.2, are )
satisfied.1 -
i l
The service instrument air systems will initially meet the re-(ANSI) MCll.1- ,
quirements of American National Standards Institute [The applicant 1976, using non-oil-lubricated air compressors.
has not committed to perform periodic air quality testing of the air systems to assure compliance with the requirements of ANSI-MC11.1-197 6. ]
[ Based on the above, we cannot conclude that the safety-related and non safety-related compressed air systems meet the require-ments of General Design Criterion 2 regarding the protection against natural phenomena and theguidelines of Regulatory GuideWe will re 1.29, Positions C.1 and C.2.
item in a supplement to this SER. The compressed air system does not meet the applicable acceptance criteria of SRP Section
- 9. 3.1. ] .. .
RESPONSE
ne bs[aema,.h for e,ach n : ,- x ser,n a2 a / / - - - - . . . . .
. -- . Lt. e. um aInAm- sg ehecak Alve s u & c th er --_ . - - -
... .- .a.pp attcoan.e,r s a ssoc,w.h d w.i.+A . . ..-
...$ok $e.1$ y - e e.1a.de.a_l .c~ponwh e s..y..,1L.e m 1 i
- -. -.an.s d' eg u.jpor.co t h , paa.v2. Ed- in-- &ke I - .
.....n.s3 p o n s e ,ho_G w=n h n t'LA:. L.7.. - -- - .--- - ... -
The ADS valve actuators are supplied with nitrogen (air) from the ._
l primary containment instrument gas system (see Section 9.3.6 for l
details of nitrogen (air) supply to ADS valves). _.
i As described in FSAR Section 9.3.1.3 except for the containment '~'
isolation valves and penetration, whose location and classifica- ~
cion is shown in Table 3.2-1 (Item XVII.a.3) ' I the . . - _ .
service air system'is not safety relate'd7 ~'iierefore,TGeneral Design Criteria 2 and Regulatory Guide 1.29, position) C.1 _ . . . _
/o not apply. 6 . ._
As described in Sectiot 6.2.4.3.2.4, " Containment Isolation System the Compressed Service Air Line" and Table 3.2-1 (Item . . .
XVII.a.3) the contaiment penetration is provided with redundant Seismic Category I, Quality Group 8 isolation valves. !
14 22O'"
K53/4
As described in revised Section 9.3.1. the quality of air supplied to the instrument air system will be periodically tested to see that it meets the requirements of ANSI MC11.1-1976 " Quality Standard for Instrument Air".
.5;'na.ddlffon, f7 >> < isut. u en t a ie a ystem af4erh/ fee is o/e.s ign eof +a e emo ve o. 4 m ic.<- a m edre pa.ekcle s with a i?! per e.ent effic.ien cy . rh e s y.s fem is d esig n ed +a per mit pre v ei, +i de a r-e.o re c e m e. m a. ; n +sno.a s e.e. oa o n e. a.;e cLo ye.e a.n el o. A f,' lte.c + r=, n w .%owt- e.4 ec.-h'n 3 s y s+, m o p e.r a.b ; I; h y . % e.e e.G a r e,g v oAe.eIy s on s y e c +s o n o f th<. aflerfo'/4ee a.:1sa.re s tho.6
+he /naxun a m p a.e k c./e .1) 2.e. io the. aie Sfr-ea.m o. d- 9-/s e ins fewn en h j 3 3.Q m iks'd nr tbres.
'7% } S So.bi2 hec 2 Y .2 C E 14M.5 Z~
l- t} ui s~ern est l
M e p.l -/ 9 7.f*
o j
i
- l. .
/V7-3 I
...--.,.- ...- . , _ , - . . . , .--.-.y-rey ,,,,..m. _,---,- -c r .--- ,--r-,-4,. _ - - , . . .. - --.-.-y--.-
Category I and ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 2, requirements l
as defined in Sections 3.7 and 6.2.
9.3.1."4 Tests and Inspections .
The containment penetration portions of the compressed air systems are preoperationally tested in accordance wth the requirements of Chapter 14. The instrument air system is tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.68.3, Preoperational Testing of Instrument Air Systems. Compressors and dryers shall be tested in accordance with ASME and manufacturers' test '
- procedures.
fNSfAl~ A
- 9.3.1.5 Instrumentation Acolication Instrumentation is provided for each instrument air and service air compressor train to monitor and automatically control each '
8 compressor's operation. ,
The compressors are tripped on the following signals: low oil d 1 pressure, high oil temperature, high cooling water discharge j temperature, high air pressure in the receiver, high outlet air
- temperature, and high vibration. Most of these signals are annunciated in the main control room by common trouble alarms.
- High air temperature in the aftercooler and moisture separators, low pressure in the air receivers, and high intake filter differential pressure are also alarmed on a local control panel 1 and the main control room by a common trouble alarm.
Instrumentation is also provided locally for each instrument air dryer package train to monitor the packages operation.
Service air compressor and emergency instrument air compressor trouble are individually annunciated and alarmed on the local
, common service air compressor control panel. These alarms also indicate on the main control room computer, along with the air dryer trouble alarms.
9.3.2 PROCESS AND POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEMS The process sampling system (PSS) is designed to monitor and provide grab samples of both radioactive and nonradioactive fluids used in the normal operation of Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS).
9.'3-4 osza orna m n / v7 w
l .
l, ,a.ssx open zrax, No. I17 s st '
- INSERT A
,, i
,,, a 1 5 a . , dw paid w;// 4e hded <n aec='d*"cc c H
',;p ANSI MCU.I~1975> 9"*Il h' "* * "*!
. fa, Indewned Air, al a Ney*ncy *f *"**
e, pa,/e, a.r ,rpeciReal in Me air dryer j[ feeknical manual.
- The . In s trom..t Air sy .+e. a%f, %-
is destyed to . rem.Je .ci4 m.cf...tre pvf4fe4 with 4 iS */. eEcleg . T he gstem is desfoed to perm'at p< eventide or correctin
. maintensnr.~t on one aqer and a.%g.rfi' Iter M io wehod a&ct1'ng gatem ogeral./hg,.
Therefsee qo.< tea 3 iosge.m o4 the affe/ thy assores ht the maxime ,
p.< Ales. s , i.<. iw w i s+.<e.,n , I-ik. ins +roment is 3,o m ;cra ,.,etres. Th.4 S*+tkS*bs t'eg aire ment %L 64 hMSC MC II. I-I415,
~'
s . . . . . .
a
== om 2- /r7
e O
.. 1 1
m n (,ur p &
n .- a er -
b n ns se n n
,,rs. + = : u 1. lz. d... M p & s.z.t w i L *a -
A., W 3. L-l . 5L L
- p M M 2. /, 4-1 , & c. . L
,+:s:s, f
D e
-r a--- - - -7 ---e- **---v 4-.ww w- w---, -- - - e, ,--=----we wee- v - .,----e+s- ee w- y- -ve--- --p-,='v*W-*g **
TABLE 3.2-1 (cont) Page 20 of 39- ,1 I
Principal Quality Construc-I source Group tion QA FSAR- of Loca- Classi-. Codes and Seismic Require-Section supply tion fication standards Category ments comments (a) can tan top tas cra Principal Components XVII. Auxiliary Systems
- a. Compressed air (service and 9.3.1-instrument) systems:
} 1. Compressors P T NA None E/L 1tR- -et" (SO
- 2. Preasure vessels, not for P All D VIII-1 E/n-404 .F (50) safety-related equipment
- 3. Piping and valves, containment P C,A B III-2 I Y coes j penetration and isolation
- 4. Piping and valves, reactor P c C 'III-3 I Y (**8
- building penetration and isolation
- 5. Piping and valves, other P All D B31.1.0 E[T.4th- #- (50)
- b. Primary containment instrument gas system: 9.3.6
! 1. Compressors P C B III-2 I Y (**8
- 2. Filter housings, dryers, & P c B III-2 I Y coolers (air side) i 3. Coolers (water side) P C C III-3 I Y
- 4. Receiver tanks P C B III-2 I Y j 5. Piping and valves, air with P C B III-2 I Y (**8
! safety function
- 6. Piping and valves, cooling water P C C III-3 I Y (488
- 7. Piping and valves, air with P A C III-3 I Y (*es j safety function (inside drywell)
- 8. Piping and valves, containment.. P A,C B III-2 I Y (**8 j penetration and isolation
' Piping and valves, air, other P A,C D B31.1.0 N N 9.
! 10. Notors, compressors P c N/A IEEE-323/344 I Y a
J 4
j Amendment 5 l l
}
~
f(ev.1-
- 3 DSER Open Item No. 223 (DSER Section 8.2.2.3)
INDEPENDENCE OF OFFSITE CIRCUITS BETWEEN THE SWITCHYARD AND THE CLASS lE BUSSES The Hope' Creek design provides two immediate access offsite circuits between the switchyard and the 4.16~kV Class lE busses. It is the staf f position that these two circuits be physically separate and independent such that no single event can simultaneously affect both circuits in such a way that neither can be returned to service in time to prevent fuel design limits or design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary from beng exceeded.- The physical separation and independence of these.two circuits from and including station service transformers LAX 501 gnd 1BX501 to the 4.16 kV Class lE busses has not been described or analyzed in the FSAR.
By Amendment 4 to the FSAR, the applicant implied, in response to a request for information, that the offsite circuits are non-Class lE and thus do not have to be physically separated in accordance with the' requirements of Criterion 17 of Appendix A of 10CFR50. The
- staff finds this interpretation to be unacceptable.
RESPONSE
FSAR Section 8.2.2.2 has been added to provide a discussion'of the physical separation and independence of the two offsite power circuits from the station service transformers to the 4.16 kV Class lE buses, t
1 a
REV 2
HCGS-~FSAR QUESTION 430.4 (Section 8.2)
The-Hope. Creek design provides two immediate access offsite circuits betweenlthe switchyard and the 4.16 kV Class lE buses. It is the staff position that these two circuits be physically separate and independent such that no single event can simultaneously affect both circuits in such a way that neither can be returned to service in ting to prevent fuel design limits or design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary from being exceeded. The physical separation and independence of transformers LAX 501 and 1BX501 to the 4.16 kV Class 1E buses.has not been described or analyzed in
- the FSAR. Provide the description and analysis and justify areas of noncompliance with the above staff position. The analysis should include separation and independence of control and protective relaying circuits as well as the power circuits.
RESPONSE-FSAR'Section 8.2.2.2 has been added to provide the required
- information.
t j --
4 k
J 7
DSER OPEN ITEM 223 430.4-1 Amendment 4
--we. e g--w-9.- e -,.y_.,p9 p g ,, .. ,-yg ,.,,g y.
8.2.2.2 SEPARATION OF OFFSITE POWER SUPPLIES WITHIN THE PLANT The circuits for the offsite power supply located within the plant are designed to comply with the requirements'of GDC 17. Refer to FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.1 for a detailed description.
e
_._s v_.v. .,,_.y- - _ _ . . ... .. . , - . -9 9,.. _,,,c,,--__ _ , , , . , p , y., ,,y.,,, , , 4-.,.,,_m..a y ,,-v,. c . . - . +_ 9 ,-g--y
MI l l
l groups remain intact to provide for 1. and 2. ;
above. 1 7 /NSE W A I Each 4.16-kV Class IE bus has access to the two l
. physically independent offsite power sources. '
Upon LOP, the Class 1E system is automatically ,
isolated from'the offsite power system and the onsite non-Class IE distribution system. The isolation of the offsite and Class 1E onsite power systems is accomplished by tripping of the ,
incoming offsite source breakers to the 4.16-kV Class 1E buses. This tripping is accomplished through the undervoltage relays connected on the source side of these breakers. The tripping of these incoming offsite source breakers to the 4.16-kV Class IE buses also isolates one power supply channel from redundant power supply channels. The combination of these factors considered in the design of the electric power system minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the onsite power supplies as a result of the loss of power from the offsite sources or any disturbances of the non-Class IE ac system.
The voltage analysis performed in accordance with Branch Technical Position PSB-1, Item 3, indicates that the onsite distribution system voltages are adequate to support Class IE. loads within the
! equipment ratings during LOCA and plant shutdown with the offsite system voltages at anticipated minimum or maximum voltage and with only the offsite source being considered available. The analysis _also confirmed that the setting of the undervoltage relays on the source side of the incoming offsite source breakers on the Class IE 4.16-kV buses will protect Class 1E-loads from degraded voltages resulting from sustained low offsite system voltage condition.
The voltage analysis is based on the simplified single line diagram shown on Figure 8.3-15 which represents one half of station distribution buses and one of the two offsite sources. Because of similarity in the redundant Class 1E buses and similarity of non-Class IE buses, the voltage analysis conducted is applicable to all of the station distribution buses. This single line 8.3-32 Amendment 4 N
m c e - s.
l Insert A Figure 8.3-5 shows that each of the four 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear buses is supplied from two offsite (preferred) power sources and
.one onsite standby diesel generator (SDG). The offsite power to these buses-is supplied from station service transformers LAX 501 and.1BX501-by non-segregated phase buses that are enclosed in metallic ducts. The non-segregated phase buses from the station service transformers to the 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear are designated as non-Class lE.
- Figure 8.3-16 shows the routing of these non-segregated phase bus ducts from station service transformers LAX 501 and 1BX501 to 4.16 kV switchgear.
Station service transformers LAX 501 and 1BX501 are provided with individual water spray systems and are separated from each other by a 1-hour fire barrier. Each transformer has a collection dike and drainage outlet for collecting transformer oil spills and fire suppression system water and draining it to the oily waste drainage system. The-drainage outlet for each transformer is designed to drain the entire volume of oil from the transformer plus the maximum flow of water.from the automatic water spray system.
The non-segregated phase buses are run outside the turbine building wall up to the point where they enter the building. An extension of the station service transformers' water spray sprinkler system provides additional protection-in the area of the common bus support and the limited area of crossover of the -two non-segregated buses.
The'non-segregated bus. ducts are designed and constructed for adverse outdoor weather conditions - (rain, ice, etc) . The bus ducts are designed per ANSI Standard C37.20-1969/C37.20C-1974, Section i,
8.2.2.4, Watertight Tests, and, therefore, water from the sprinkler system of one transformer will not endanger the operation of the
! non-segregated bus of the other transformer.
L These design -features ensure that a station service transformer ,
l fire can not damage the bus duct from the other transformer and i
.cause a loss of both offsite sources of power. l
[- /
( ~Within;the turbine building the offsite buses are routed through l
common areas. Separate supports are provided for the non-segregated :
l phase buses in non-seismic plant areas. In Seismic Class I plant areas Seismic Class I supports are provided for the non-segregrated phase buses. -The buses are physically separated from each other and their steel duct enclosures minimize, to the extent practical,
[.
the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident environmental conditions.
1 I
Page two The onsite power feeds to the 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear are routed in rigid steel conduit from the standby diesel generator rooms. Each train of onsite Class lE power is compartmentalized such that the four trains are separated from each other by two-hour fire rated concrete' walls and each diesel is separated from its associated offsite power bus by a three-hour fire rated wall.
The circuit breakers that connect a-4.16 kV Class lE switchgear bus to the two offsite power supplies and its associated onsite standby power supply are Class lE and are qualified to the HCGS seismic and' environmental parameters for any design basis event. These breakers are electrically interlocked to prevent the automatic paralleling '
of the onsite and offsite power supplies.
The only control interf ace between the onsite Class lE and of fsite power systems is the station service transformer differential relay current transformer.(CT) leads in the Class lE switchgear. The CT leads are classified as non-Class lE and are enclosed in armorad cable.or conduit to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.75.
Each of the four SDGs are located in separate rooms of a Seismic Class 1 structure. The SDGs and the associated control panels are qualified for HCGS seismic and environmental parameters for all design basis events. The control panels, power, and control cables for all the four SDGs are separated to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.75 requirements.
Each of the four Class lE 4.16 kV switchgear buses has its own independent protective relaying schemes. Tts failure of a protective relay in the 13.8 kV and/or 500 kV systems does not impact any of .
the four onsite power sources.
s The control power supplies for both the offsite and onsite Class lE
-infeed breakers are from a 125V de distribution panel of the same Class lE channel. Cables of the same Class lE channel are routed in common raceways but these raceways are separated from their redundant counterpart by two-hour fire rated concrete walls from Lthe switchgear room to the cable spreading room. Within the cable spreading room the redundant Class 1E control raceways are provided with Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation as well as automatic fire suppression systems.. Figures 9.5-1 to 9.5-5 show these features.
Common control room panels, where both onsite and offsite. control cables terminate, have separation or. barriers provided, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, to eliminate common mode failures between
(- onsite and offsite breaker control.
i Protection against common mode fire induced failure of the onsite power trains is addressed as part of the Hope Creek fire protection analysis in Section 9.5.1, and Appendix 9A.
. _. - . . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ... _ _ _ . _ . _ _. i
a Page three.
These design- features minimize the probability of losing electric power from any.of the required Class lE electrical power systems as a result of, or coincident with, loss of the power generated by the main generator, loss of the power from the offsite transmission network, or loss of the power from the onsite electric power supplies, as required by GDC 17.
0
- - - - - < - , - -- g- , - - - . m--h--- - - . - - , - - . - , , - - - - ,,y - , ... c_,,, ,_, , , _ . ,, , . , , , , , , .,
1
. L
~
fG. l 94
_DSER Open Item No. 224 (DSER Section 8.2.2.4) 4 COMMON FAILURE MODE BETWEEN ONSITE AND OFFSITE POWER CIRCUITS Each of the 4.16 kv Class lE busses at Hope Creek is supplied power
~
from preferred offsite and standby onsite circuits. It is the staff position that these circuits should not have common failure
- modes. Physical separation and independence of these circuits has not been described or analyzed in the FSAR. By Amend. 4 to the FSAR,'the applicant, in response to a request for information, indicated that a single event can not cause common failure of both onsite and of fsite power source circuits because they are separated
- in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75. The staff disagrees.- Separation in accordance with Regulatory Guide l.75 by itself is not sufficient for the staff to conclude that
- there are no common failure modes or to conclude that the probability of coincident loss of both onsite and of fsite power sources has
- been minimized in accordance with the requirements of Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
RESPONSE
FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.1 has been revised to include the results of an analysis to show compliance of the onsite and offsite power systems to GDC 17.
r i
REV 1
QUESTION 430.5 (SECTION 8.2)
Each of the 4.16 kV Class lE busses at Hope Creek is supplied power from preferred offsite and standby onsite circuits. It is the staf f position that these circuits should not have common failure modes. _ Physical separation and independence of these circuits has not been described or analyzed in the FSAR. Provide a description and analysis in accordance with Section 5.2.l(5) of IEEE Standard 308-1974.
RESPONSE
FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.1 has been revised to provide the requested information.
I-DSER. OPEN ITEM 224 430.5-1 Amendment 5 L
1
groups remain intact to provide for 1. and 2.
above.
7 / Ass &L7~~ A Each 4.16-kV Class 1E bus has access to the two physically independent offsite power sources.
Upon LOP, the Class 1E system is automatically isolated from the offsite power system and the ,
onsite non-Class 1E distribution system. The l isolation of the offsite and Class IE onsite power l systems-is accomplished by tripping of the i incoming offsite source breakers to the 4.16-kV Class 1E buses. This tripping is accomplished through the undervoltage relays connected on the source side of these breakers. The tripping of these incoming offsite source breakers to the 4.16-kV Class 1E buses also isolates one power supply channel from redundant power supply channels. The combination of these factors considered in the design of the electric power system minimizes the probability of losing
. electric power from the onsite power supplies as a result of the loss of power from the offsite sources or any disturbances of the non-Class 1E ac system.
j_
i
- The voltage analysis performed in accordance with Branch Technical Position PSB-1, Item 3, indicates that the onsite distribution system voltages are adequate to support Class 1E loads within the equipment ratings during LOCA and plant shutdown i
with the offsite system voltages at anticipated f
L minimum or maximum voltage and with only the offsite source being considered available. The analysis also confirmed that the setting of the, undervoltage relays on the source side of the incoming offsite source breakers on the Class IE 4.16-kV buses will protect Class IE loads from l~
l degraded voltages resulting from sustained low
! offsite system voltage condition.
The voltage analysis is based on the simplified single line diagram shown on Figure 8.3-15 which represents one half of station distribution buses and one of the two offsite sources. Because of '
similarity in the redundant Class IE buses and similarity of non-Class IE buses, the voltage analysis conducted is applicable to all of the station distribution buses. This single line l
, 8.3-32 Amendment 4 N , - .- - -
t
+
I l
~
l Insert A-rigure 8.3-5 shows that each of the four 4.16 kV Class 1E switchgear buses.is supplied from two offsite (preferred) power sources and 1 one onsite standby diesel generator (SDG). The offsite power to l these buses is supplied from station service transformers LAX 501 1 and IBX501 by non-segregated phase buses that are enclosed .in metallic ducts. - The non-segregated phase buses from the station .
service transformers to the - 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear are designated as non-Class lE.
- Figure 8.3-16 -shows the routing of these non-segregated phase bus
' ducts from station service transformers LAX 501 and 1BX501 to 4.16 kV switchgear.
Station . service transformers LAX 501 and 1BX501 are provided with
- individual water spray systems and are separated from each other by a 1-hour fire barrier. Each transformer has a collection dike and drainage outlet for collecting transformer oil spills and fire l- suppression system water and. draining it to the oily waste drainage system. The drainage outlet for each transformer is designed to
- drain the entire volume of oil from the transformer ~plus the maximum flow of water from the automatic water spray system.
The non-segregated phase buses are run outside the turbine building wall up.to the point where they enter the building. An extension L
of the station service transformers' water spray sprinkler system provides additional protection in.the area of the common bus support and ' the limited area of crossover of the two non-segregated buses.
The non-segregated bus ducts are' designed and constructed for adverse outdoor weather conditions (rain, ice, etc). The bus ducts are designed per ANSI Standard C37.20-1969/C37.20C-1974, Section 8.2.2.4, Watertight Tests, and, therefore, water from the sprinkler system of one transformer will not endanger the operation of the non-segregated bus of the other transformer.
These dcsign features ensure that a station service transformer fire can not damage the bus duct from the other transformer and cause a loss of both offsite sources of power.
l.
- Within the turbine building the offsite buses are routed through common areas. Separate supports are provided for the non-segregated phase buses in non-seismic plant areas. In Seismic Class I plant areas Seismic Class I supports are provided for the non-segregrated phase buses. The buses are physically separated from each other and their steel duct enclosures minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of - their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident environmental conditions.
l
'7e^ -meu wi. ==-Fy-y g- e*w-.-+--q-,--ee .g. ,> e,,.-y..y- --p---+.-y-w-Nw-+y,,e '
9er7-Nw--"wt4'e-
t Page two The onsite power feeds to the 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear are routed in rigid steel condult from the standby diesel generator rooms. Each
. train of onsite Class lE power is compartmentalized such that the four trains are separated from each other by two-hour fire rated concrete walls and each diesel is separated from its associated offsite power bus by a three-hour fire rated wall.
< The circuit breakers that connect a 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear bus to the two offsite power supplies and its associated onsite standby power supply are Class lE and are qualified to the HCGS seismic and environmental parameters for any design basis event. These breakers 4
are electrically interlocked to prevent the automatic paralleling of the onsite and offsite power supplies.
The only control interface between the onsite Class 1E and offsite power systems is the station service transformer differential relay current transformer (CT) leads in the Class 1E switchgear. The CT leads are classified as non-Class lE and are enclosed in armored cable or conduit to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.75.
i Each of the four SDGs are located in separate rooms of a Seismic.
Class-1 structure. The SDGs and the associated control panels are
~
qualified for HCGS seismic and environmental parameters for all design basis events. The control panels, power, and control cables for all the four SDGs are separated to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.75 requirements.
Each of the four Class lE 4.16 kV switchgear buses has its own independent protective relaying schemes. The failure of a protective relay in the 13.8 kV and/or 500 kV systems does not impact any of the four onsite power sources.
The control power supplies for both the offsite and onsite Class lE infeed breakers are from a 125V de distribution panel of the same Class 1E channel. Cables of the same Class lE channel are routed in common raceways but these raceways are separated from their redundent counterpart by two-hour fire rated concrete walls from i the switchgear room to the cable spreading room. Within the cable-spreading room the redundant Class lE control raceways are provided with Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation as well as automatic fire suppression systems. Figures 9.5-1 to 9.5-5 show these features.
Common control room panels, where both onsite and offsite control cables terminate, have separation or barriers provided, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, to eliminate common mode failures between onsite and offsite breaker control.
Protection against common mode fire induced failure of the onsite power trains is addressed as part of the Hope Creek fire protection analysis in Section 9.5.1, and Appendix 9A.
t 1Page three These design features minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the required Class IE electrical power systems as a result of, or coincident with, loss of the power generated by the main generator, loss.of the power from the of fsite transmission.
network, or loss of the power from the onsite electric power supplies, '
as required by GDC 17.
1 f
4 O
l ,
- )
i !
t !
l i
l
- . = - - , . , , . . - - - , . . . . , - - - . . ~ . , , , - - . . . . _ . . - . . . . - - , - - - - - , , . . - - - , - , .
.}k.$
Re v . '
DSER Open item No. 225 (DSER Section 8.2.3.1)
TESTABILITY OF AUTOMATIC TRANSFER OF POWER FROM THE NORMAL TOl PREFERRED POWER SOURCE Bach Class IE bus is supplied with a normal and alternate off-site power source. On loss of the normal source, the bus The is automatically transferred to the alternate power source.
capability to test this transfer of power has not been specifi-cally addressed in the FSAR.
Inclusion of the test capability in the FSAR and justification for not testing while the plant is operating at power will be pursued with the applicant.
RESPONSE
The res)ponse .fd C a es fsd/3 '/30 6 ha .s been Pe.vtsed
+o pr ovo'de th e o.sg u esh'd o n ferm a.h'an .
I I
l
(- .
. . , , ., , , ,.,,.g,.,,.f.... . . . , . ,
l- - - - - - - . ~ - . _ _ . , , _ _ _ , _ _ , , , _ __
l HCGS FSAR 1/84 QUESTION 430.6 (SECTION 8.2) l Each Class IE bus is supplied with a normal and alternate offsite power source. . On loss of the normal source, the bus is automatically transferred to the alternate power source. The capability to test this transfer of power has not been specifically addressed in the FSAR. Describe the transfer circuitry, how it is tested during normal plant operation, and its compliance with GDC 18.
RESPONSE
A alescriph % of ik<,. + runs fer circus'try , i4s les+13,w1 ih compliane, w*tk SDC 18 are pc.v t JeJ in re.vlsed Sec.+ ion B.2.2.. .
l t
>. s ,.
1 4
I Under all power flow conditions tested, the. station and its transmission arrangements satisfy the MAAC Reliability Principles and Standards.
4 The stability analysis was conducted for the system configuration
.using the Philadelphia Electric Company transient stability program TRANSTAB.
l The types of faults tested in accordance with the MAAC Criteria, ,
. Section IV, were:
- a. Three-phase faults with normal clearing time
- b. Single-phase-to-ground f~aults with delayed clearing. j The analysis established that the critical fault condition was a three-phase fault on the Hope Creek to#eeney 500 kV line at HCGS.
The single-phase-to-ground fault case with delayed clearing simulated a stuck breaker condition, such that with independent pole tripping of the breakers, the breaker closest to the fault on the faulted phase failed to open. Therefore, backup or delayed clearing is required to isolate the fault. A transient stability case list is given in Table 8.2-1.
l The loss of the Hope Creek Unit represents the loss of the largest single generating unit. For this condition, grid stability is maintained. Beyond this criteria, HCGS will remain ,
stable with the loss of both Salem Units 1 and 2.
The circuits from the offsite system to the onsite distribution system are of sufficient capacity and capability to supply the station loads during normal or abnormal operating conditions, i accident conditions or plant shutdown conditions independent of 4
the onsite standby power, sources. The circuits consist of two paths as'shown on Figure 8.3-1. One path is from Station Power Transformers T1 and T3 to the station service transformers as shown. Whereas, the other path begins from Station Power Transformers T2 and T4. In the event that one of the paths is unavailable and/or.the offsite system has a degraded vol.tage condition, automatic transfer of its station distribution buses to the other path is initiated.
2.
I 1
8.1 -7 l
\
On the Class IE 4 kV buses the transfer circuit has two l functions. One is to transfer the bus to the alternate source if the normal source is lost due to transformer fault. The other function is to transfer the bus to the alternate source if the normal source has an undervoltage condition. The transfer circuit is shown in each of the main circuit breaker schematic diagram. The applicable diagrams were submitted under separate cover in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 3, Section 1.7 and consist of Drawing Numbers E-0068-0 thru E-0075-0 and Sheets 3 and 4 of E-0106-0 together with other drawings referenced thereon.
There are eight main circuit breakers, two for each bus, and the transfer circuit is typical for each breaker. The transfer circuit (c) is described as follows, using Bus 10A401 as an example
- a. Transformer Fault Bus 10A401 is normally supplied from station service transformer 1AX501 through main circuit breaker (1)52-40108.
Drawing Number E-0068-0 shows this breaker's schematic diagram. In the event transformer protective relay operation (differential, ground overcurrent or overcurrent <
relay), lockout relay (3)86TR-AX501 or (3)86TB1-AX501, shown on Drawing Number E-0112-0, will trip breaker (1)52-40108 and close the alternate feeder breaker (1)52-40101, shown on Drawing Number E-0069-0.
- b. Undervoltace of Normal Source Voltace Undervoltage relays (1)27-40108(A-B) and (1)27-40108(B-C) will pickup auxiliary relays (1)27X-40108(A-B) and (1)27X-40108(B-C) when the normal source voltage is 92% or less of normal bus voltage as shown on Sheet 3 of Drawing Number E-0106-0. Contacts 7-8 of the two auxiliary relays are connected in series to provide a trip signal to breaker (1)S2-40108 upon relay actuation - shown as wire number 31 in Drawing Number E-0068-0. The bus is now deenergized since the normal source feeder breaker is tripped. Bus l undervoltage relays (1)27Al-401(A-B), (1)27Al-401(B-C),
(1)27A2-401(A-B) and (1)27A2-401(B-C) will operate auxiliary relays (1)27AX1-401(A-B), (1)27AY1-401(A-B),
(1)27AX1-401(B-C), (1)27AY1-401(B-C), (1)27AX2-401(A-B),
(1)27AY2-401(A-b), (1)27AX2-401(B-C), and (1)27AY2-401(B-C)
- all shown on Sheet 3 of Drawing Number E-0106-0.
Of the eight auxiliary relays, contacts 9-10 of (1)27AY1-401(A-B), (1)27AY1-401(B-C), (1)27AY2-401(A-B) and (1)27AY2-401(B-C) are connected in a two-out-of-four, twice arrangement to close the alternate source feeder breaker (1)52-40101 - shown as wire number 52 on Drawing Number E-0069-0.
h.1 'b
- . _ _ _ _ _ =_- - - - - -_ - . - - - _ --
. NA
>e itCGS FtAR. .
The transfer circuit will be tested during the preoperational test of Class 15 4.16 kV ac power system as indicated in Section 14.2.12.1.32. This test will include actual loads on the bus if the loads are ready for preoperational test; otherwise the complete bus transfer test will be performed during the ECCS integrated initiation curing loss of offsite power preoperational test described in Section 14.2.12.1.47. The protective relays of the transfer circuit are designed for testing during normal plant operation by use of test plugs or test switches to isolate their actuating f unc-tion. Actual power source transfer testing from the normal source to the alternate sources as required by GDC 18 will be performed in accordance with surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1.1 of the Standard Technical Specifications. Power source transfer testing is not performed during power operation in order to precludo an undesirable transient which may result due to the interruption of normal ac power to an individual bus should the transfer sequence fail.
f voltage analysts performed indicate that each path is of sufficient capacity and capability to supply all the station loads, Class IE and non-Class IE, without exceeding design limits of the station equipment (except during the unlikely event that the offsite system voltage is at maximum with no loads on the station distribution buses which are fed from unit substation transformers with taps of 5% boost.)
8.2.2.1 Outaces of Transmission Lines in vicinity of the Station To demonstrate the reliability of the transmission line associated with the Hope Creek station, unscheduled outages of existing transmission lines (of similar or identical design) in the geographical area were investigated. Unscheduled outages of these lines for the past 5 years are listed below:
Transmission Lines 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Salem - Keeney 0 0 2 1 1 Salem - New Freedom-North 1 0 1 0 0 Salem - New Freedom-South 0 0 0 1 1 Historically, outages in the area have been caused by lightning strikes, fires, and equipment problems.
\
Q
)
UQ
. , tg. 6 RN.S w" a glo DSER.Ooen Item No'. 233 (DSER Se,ction 8.3.3.4.1)
~
r -
' ] ~
PERIODIC S'isTEM TESTING
> n Description of compliance to Section 6.4, Periodic System Tests, of IEEE Standard 308-1774, had not been included in Section 8.1.4.6 of the FSAR. :By;Amendsent 4 to the FSAR, the applicant provided the following. description *of compliance: " Periodic system tests shall
.,h be performed using written procedures which will be designed to
+
demonstrate system performance. The frequency of testing shall be governed?by the frequencies specified in the Technical Specifications."
3 The following periodic, system tests are required by Section 6.4 of
-ISES: Standard 308-1974 in order to demonstrate:
pg (1)- The Class lE loads can operate on the preferred power
- supply, w y ,
)
(2) The loss of the preferred power supply can be detected.
(3) The-standby power supply can be started and can accept
"'] design . load within the design basis time.
'1 Syd)'!The standby power supply is independent of the preferred "ng power supply,i
":3: L _ ,
.\ y . .
Eyiw Pending inclusion-of each of these tests in the Hope Creek Technical
/\' ~ Specifications, the staff concludes that periodic system testing my will- comply .with the- guidralines of Section 6.4 of IEEE Standard 308-
- ~1974. This testing meets tihe . requirements of GDC 17 and 18 and is acceptable.,
.{RESPONSEI
' !T'S Hope Creek Generating Station Technical Specifications, when
' issued,; will include the -approps-l' ate periodic syrtem tests as required by Section 6.4 of IEEE' Standard 308-1974 in order to '
demonstrate: ,
.'2
- ( ll' The Class lE loads can operate on the preferred power
-y supply.
(2); The loss of the preferred power supply can be detected.
- 8 y;
,(3) The standby power supply.can be started and can accept 4
design load within the design basis time.
.( 4) The standby power supply is independent of the preferred power supply.
" FSAR .5ectiod d.l.4.6 has been' revised to include this ccramitment.
L w g. ; .
s l
Y, r- l
[-[ I a3 m i ;
.c ,
+
, s ) _
s ,
. .......m_._ .._.m ...._._....,,_.,_,,;5. ,,,m _ , , . , _ _ . . . . . _, . . . , ~ . , . . _ _ , _ , , _ _ _ _ , , _ , _ . ,,, _ , . _ , , . _ , . _ ,
' QUESTION 430.13 (SECTION 8.3.1. AND 8.3.2)
Description of compliance to Section 6.4, Periodic System tests, of IEEE Standard 308-1974, has not been included in Section 8.1.4.6 of the FSAR. Provide the description and justify areas of noncompliance.
RESPONSE
Section 8.1.4.6 describes compliance to Section 6.4, Periodic System Tests, of IEEE Standard 308-1974.
l s
w- ---3 -- , - , .-,y -,.. .- . -,-.-- -- . - - - - - - - - - , . , , -
- 6. The batteries of the de power. supply can meet the design requirements of their connnected load without the chargers in operation. l l
- 7. Each battery charger has sufficient capacity to meet the largest combined demands of the various !
continuous steady-state loada plus the charging !
capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state
. within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- c. Periodic equipment tests are performed at scheduled
-intervals in accordance with the requirements of.
Chapter 16. These tests are performed to:
- 1. Detect within prescribed limits the deterioration of the equipment toward an unacceptable condition.
- 2. Demonstrate that standby power equipment and other components that are not exercised during normal operation of the station are operable.
- d. Periodic system-tests shall be performed using written procedures which will be designed to demonstrate system performance. The frequency of testing shall be governed by the-frequencies specified in the Technical a ( Specifications.j A N laJs t A.T A y ; V
{. As'HCGS is a' single unit-generating plant, multiunit station l- considerations do_not apply. Battery testing is described in l Chapter 16.
l
.8.1.4.7 Reculatory Guide 1.40, Qualification
'ests of Continuous-Duty Motors Installed Inside the T
Containment of Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, March 1973
'HCGS complies with Regulatory Guide 1.40 as discussed in Section"1.8.
8.1-10 Amendment 4
,w-- ----,,,,aee-.,,-w,-,v.w -m,,-e----.- ,-,,,m,an+,,-v,,,. e -- a ,e n r w-m m w w e,,--w,..--w e- e- -m e , e - en-,v,-~w,-------p-ev.a,--~~~..-
' Insert "A" to FSAR Section 8.1.4.6:
The HCGS Technical Specifications will also include the appro-priate periodic system tests as recuired by'Section 6.4 of IEEE
' Sthndard'3C8-1974 in order'to demonstrate:
'(1) The Class lE loads can operate on the preferred power
- supply.
(2) The loss of tha preferred power supply can be detected.
(3) The standby power' supply can be started and can accept design load within the design basis time.
(4) The_ standby power supply is independent of the preferred power supply.
4 4
4 4
,,wwrww-~-ew-~-er w -e ,--yyw,w-- ->--w,~w-m-- -ee-~mrw-w-~~ e--e-w-~ go--- ye
~
3-r ~
Re v. 2-
~
DSER Open item No. 235 (DSER.Section 8.3.1.5)
DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD' ACCEPTANCE ' HEST Position C.2.a(2), of Regulatory Guide 1.108, requires-that the preoperational and periodic tests demonstrate proper operation of the diesel generator -for design accident loading sequence to design load-requirements.- Section 1.8.1.9 of the FSAR states that for preoperational testing actual loads are started but may not duplicate their: design basis condition. This statement implies exception to the above position. Justification for non-compliance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.108 will be pursued with the
' applicant, and the results c f the staf f review will be reported in a ' supplement to this report.. -
RESPONSE
- Section 1.8.1.108 has been revised to provide the required information.
I s'
[
REV 2 i
- - . . . . , _ . . , - - . _ _ _ , . - , - - . _ - _ . - - - - . . . . _ . - ~ _ _ _ _ ~ . _ _ _ . .
~
^
,~
-QUESTION 430.15 (SECTION 8.3.1)
In. Sections 1.8.1.9:and 8.1.4.2 of the FSAR. -You state (1) that
-preoperational testir.g at Hope Creek does not meet the guidelines I of position C3 of Reg Jlatory Guide 1.9 (revision 1), (2) predicted l
' loads ' are verified by testing; however, loads that cannot be tested i
are verified by analysis or.by comparison, and (3) for preoperational testing, actual design loads are started but may not duplicate their design basis condition. The above statement imply (1) that
. the diesel generators at Hope Creek will not be preoperationally or periodically tested to demonstrate their capacity and capability to operate properly when subject.to design load, (2)' that the guidelines
, of position C.2.a(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (revision 1) will' notnbe followed, and (3) that the design does not meet the requirements of Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. In~Section 8.1.4.20 of the : FSAR ~ provide -justification for noncompliance.
RESPONSE
Section 1.8.1.9 has been revised to delete the clarification to
- .. position C.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 1. The preoperational
- test program at HCGS for diesel generator testing will follow the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.9 and 1.108, as shown in Sections 14.2.12.1.30 and 14.2.12.1.47.
Periodic testing of the SDGs, at the required 18 month intervals, will be performed using written -procedures in accordance with the requirements of the Hope Creek Technical Specifications. Sections 1.8.1.108 and 8.1.4.20 have been revised to reflect this response.
' Position C.2.a(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.108 is met with the exception
~ discussed and justified in FSAR Section 1.8.1.108.
t i
l-i i
l
NT HCGS FSAR 8/84 See Section 1.8.2 for the NSSS assessment of this Regulatory Guide.
1.8.1.107 Conformance to Reaulatory Guide 1.107, Revision 1, February 1977: Qualifications for Cement Grouttna for Prestressino Tendons in Containment Structures Regulatory Guide 1.107 is not applicable to HCGS.
1.8.1.108 Conformance to Reculatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, Auoust 1977: Periodic Testino of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants Although Regulatory Guide 1.108 is not applicable to HOGS, per its implementation section, HCGS complies with it, with the fellowing exception:
1.8.1.109 Conformance to Reculatory Guide 1.109, Revision 1, October 1977: Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routtne Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose
-i' of Evaluatino Como.,iance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I
\ .
HCGS complies with Regulatory Guide 1.109.
For further discussion, see Chapter 15.
[
1.8-97 Amendment 7
\
Insert "A" to Page 1.8-97
- 1. During the preoperational test phase, the proper design accident loading sequence will be demonstrated by the test described in Section 14.2.12.1.47. This test will verify the ability of the SDG to start and accept the sequenced design loads as specified in Table 8.3-1 except for certain valves while maintaining voltage and frequency within specified limits. This test will not provide ECCS flows
.to the reactor vessel. Therefore certain motor operated valves that provide ECCS isolation will not be actuated during the test. These transitory valve loads have been calculated to represent 2 percent of the total load expected under an-actual LOCA condition. Since this percentage is minimal, compared to the total load, the SDG load test closely approximates the exact functional loads of an actual LOCA condition.
- 2. For periodic testing required by the Hope Creek Technical Specifications, the test per this regulatory position ~will be performed during shutdown. This test will simulate, separately, a loss of offsite power, and a loss of offsite power plus a LOCA condition, to verify the SDGs' ability to
. start and accept the sequenced design loads.
mg Rev. I DSBR Open Item No. 237 (DSER Section 8.3.1.7) pni(qesoag ;
DESCRIPTION OF THE LOAD JEQUENCER By Amendment 4 to the FSAR,. the applicant in response to a request for information, provided a descriptica of the Bope Creek load sequencer. Based on a review of this description, it appears that provisions for shedding of safety loads has not been considered in the design of the load sequencer.
Load shedding capacity and inclusion of the description in Section 8.3 of the FSAR will be pursued with the applicant.
RESPONSE
V- d " renis dc\
% C RAShic^ U f N.If h 4 0
-c m dade o. c\ es a y ki ~ o L ,Oab se.gve><erwel Iooa shuld;nD of non-Chss is load co- clu:f do 1
u c% u ta as , vsa s su s. s.,. ,. 2 7 6,.ei y f e M es e? e e. ioad segmccc d, r h ed shc)dixg o 2 A han (Anss .LC Acs .
I .
l t . , . . . . .
- & lb DSEN en Item No. 238 (DSER Section 8.2.2.7)
_ SEQUENCING OF LOADS ON THE OFFSITE FOMER SYSTEM the of fsite power system should It is the staf f's position that r have sufficient capacity to supply all required loads withoutBy Am l sequencing of loads.
indicated that the Hope Creek design includes provision for sequencing of loads on the of fsite as we)(11 as the onsite power supply.
Thus, the Hope Creek of faite power system may not have suffici(f(t capacity to supply all loads viithout sequencing. -
Sequencing of loads on the offsits power system represents an additional source of unreliability and because the same sequencer is used for both onsite and offsite power sources, independenceTherefore between sources may be compromised.
position that the applicant must perform an analysis with results documented in the FSAR, to demonstrate (1) (1) that there are no credible circuits or common failure modes in the sequencer design that could render both the onsite and of fsite power sources un-available and, (2) that the combined reliability of onsite and This item will of fsite power sources has not been compromised.
be pursued with the applicant.
RESPONSE
Arra.cAeof, per yow- re]. u e.c & I s o eopy a f 64e.
EL $ s y.s +em ye,fik.bllldy a na/y.s l.s . h9c. ecspwc fc G u.e.s +oin 43o.17 ha s been e e ds ed' fo r-cHe c t
- Y'L\ichiU Phc s u.b ml Na.l c [ 9-h /3 anqs, y ksuqion o G A- ka squw "Ok j(J g n m Co'r comm0~ ,
w% , A)ss 46 FS A L s Mon 8 3 1.\ 2,7 I k66 .% c%au & loa sum l M k ,.o M S h e M i n D f\0 6 Cda4% N c ck 1
1 9
i d
l5 h
QUESTION 430.19-(SECTION 8.3,1)
A description of the diesel generator automatic load sequencer has not been'provided in the FSAR. Provide the description. In addition, provide the results of a reliability analysis for the i sequencer that demonstr'ates the capability of the onsite power l system to supply power to safety loads on demand.
RESPONSE
HCGS has four Class IE automatic emergency load sequencers (ELS),
one osch for the four Class IE channel power supplies. The-ELSs
.are designed to provide sequenced starting of ESF and selected non-1E loads, in response to loss of offsite power (LOP) and/or loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The sequenced application of loads minimizes the drop in voltage and frequency at the power
, supply. buses.
19 Control power for the ELSs is provided from their respective channel of uninterruptible power supply source.
- b. The inputs and outputs of the four ELSs are electrically and physically separated to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75.
OPERATION:
During normal plant oper'ation, the ELSs are in a standby condition. Each of the four ELSs is supplied inputs from its corresponding channel that represents
- a. LOCA - Low reactor vessel level and/or high drywell pressure condition.
- c. Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) circuit breaker closed.
- d. Remote system reset.
Each ELS provides the following four sets of outputs fanned out to various plant electrical loads within its Class 1E channel systems
- a. Sequential start signals to loads required following a LOCA.
- b. Sequential start signals to loads required following a LOP. -
430.19-1 Amendment 4
. s.
iQuestion 430.19)
Insert B Each channelized ELS consists of two individual solid state sequencers -
f that are' housed in a single control panel. These two solid state' sequencers are for the LOP sequence and the LOCA sequence. The LOP and LOCA sequencers have two solid state logic timers for each particular. sequence powered from red,ndent. internal power supplies.
Each. of the four channelized ELS hra these internal redundant
. component features.
4 There are four Class lE emergency load sequencers, one for eachf the four Class lE power divisions. These four' emergency load sequencers
- are electrically and physically independent of each other.- There are no interconnections of electrical cabling between any of the four divisional emergency load sequencers. The individual solid state design circuitry and unique redundant solid state timers and
- power supplies within each emergency load sequencer minimize the possibility of a sneak circuit or misoperation of an individual
-ELS. 'In the event that an ELS did have inadvertent operation as a result of a sneak circuit, only one Class lE ELS would be impacted since each ELS is electrically and physically independent of each other. There would be three Class lE ELS available for plant shutdown if any single ELS failed.
There are no credible' sneak circuits or common failure modes in the sequencer design-that could impact the availability of the onsite and offsite power sources. The HCGS sequencer design does net degrade the combined reliability of the onsite and of fsite power sources.
k i
I
, - . --m.,,,~,,y-,,,,%,-,,,-,.,,.y-,w-n-,,,, , , - , , . , -y.y ._,..,.,-.,m y
, , ., , , . , ,. %.,,,,-- w..-we<._,_,w.,,4.
HCGS FSAR 1/84 1: . - One set of process start inhibit signals (PSIS) to the LOCA Loads to prevent inadvertant starting of LOCA equipment due to automatic signals while ELS is in
. operation.
- d. One set of PSIS tus prevent inadvertant starting of the LOP equipment due to automatic signals while the ELS is in operation.
The ELSs respond to the receipt of LOCA and/or LOP signals in the following manner:
- a. LOP ONLY ,
The LOP input to the sequencer resets the logic to prevent starting of the ELS timer until the SDG circuit breaker closes. Upon the closing of the SDG circuit breaker, the ELS timer starts applying the LOP loads in the predetermined sequence. The ' LOP Loads' here refers to the loads that are required to shutdown the reactor safely under an LOP event.
The LOP sequencer is manually reset-after the end of the LOP sequence.
- b. LOCA ONLY The LOCA signal sheds a non-Class IE loads (independent of ELS)'and initiates the ELS logic to start applying the LOCA loads in the predetermined sequence. The LOCA loads here refers to the loads that are required to shutdown the reactor safely under LOCA condition. The LOCA sequence is manually reset after the end of LOCA sequence.
! The LOCA signal sheds non-Class 1E loads (independent of l- ELS),.and overrides the LOP sequencer and starts the LOCA l
sequencer to apply LOCA loads'in the predetermined sequence.
- d. LOP'DURING LOCA SEQUENCING The LOCA sequencer stopc and resets. When the power is i . restored tc.the 4.16 kV Class'1E bus associated.with the ELS, the LOCA signal overrides the LOP timer initiated l
signal. The LOCA sequencer restarts applying LOCA loads, e.. LOCA AFTER LOP SEQUENCING COMPLETED l The LOCA signal sheds the non-Class IE loads (independent of ELS) and starts the LOCA sequencer to apply LOCA loads in a l predetermined sequence.
l .
l L 430.19-2 Amendment 4
- f. LOP AFTER LOCA SEQUENCING COMPLETED If a LOCA signal is still present when the SDG circuit brdaker is closed, the LOCA signal overrides the LOP sequencer and starts the LOCA sequencer to apply LOCA loads in the predetermined sequence.
For scenarios '2a' through '2f' above, the PSIS signals are present to prevent the inadvertant starting of equipment before its predetermined sequenced time.
ELS TESTING:
Provisions exist at each of the sequencer cabinets to test the ELSs for 2a through 2f scenarios described above. An alarm is provided in the main control room to indicate that an ELS is being tested. If an actual LOP or LOCA occurs during the testing h of an ELS, the sequencer resets autokatically and responds to LOP and/or LOCA event.
The ELS system reliability analysis will be provided by July, 1984.
Jdh7 430.19-3 Amendment 4
.(Question 430.19)
-Insert A The load shedding of non-Class lE loads connected to Class 1E busses occurs upon a loss of offsite power and upon LOCA. -During a LOP without. LOCA condition, each Class lE electrical bus has undervoltage relays that energize auxiliary relays which trip the non-Class lE loads connected to the Class lE buses. The emergency load sequencer has no electrical interconnection with the load shedding of the non-Class lE loads.
If offsite power is available and LOCA occurs, then individual LOCA signals will go directly to the Class lE unit substation breakers feeding the non-Class lE loads and trip these breakers. Any Class lE loads that are running during the condition will remain running.
The einergency load sequencer has no electrical interconnection with the tripping of the non-Class lE loe.ds by the LOCA signal and in addition, has no electrical interties with the offaite power sources.
S l
P 1
l I
i l'
. - - _ _ - _ _ . _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . ~
I t
- d. 120-V ac distribution panels
- 1. Buses: 225 A continuous rating, 10,000 A bracing.
- 2. Breakers: 100 A frame size, 10,000 A interrupting 4 rating. .
- e. 120-V ac UDS panels
- 1. Buses: 225 A continuous rating, 10,000 A bracing 1
- 2. Fuses: 10,000 A interrupting rating.
8.3.1.1.2.7 Automatic Load Shedding and Sequential Loading Load shedding of the loads off the Class 1E buses is achieved by tripping the 4.16-kV breakers as described below:
- a. Upon LOP, undervoltage relays monitoring the voltage on the Clasg 1E buses, trip all the breakers on their respective buses except the two breakers on each bus,
' which supply power to 4,80-V unit substations.
i
- b. Upon the occurrence sf a LOCA, the 480-V unit substation breaken 'eeding the non-Class 1E loads are tripped.
M %A.+ 4. M % -
Sequential loading is shown in Table 8.3-1.
l I
c 8.3.1.1.2.8 Physical Identification of Safety-Related Equipoent Section 8.1.4.14 provides information regarding the physical identification of safety-related cables and raceways.
Color-coded nameplates are provided for all Class 1E equipment.
Each separation group has its own color. The color codes assigned to' identify electrical switchgear, MCCs, control panels, I
I )
' 8.3-9
- - . ._. . . _._ _ _ _ , _ - . - . , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ . . - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ . _ . - _ . - . - _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _
(Question 430.19)
Insert A The load shedding of non-Class- lE loads connected to Class lE busses occurs-upon a loss of offsite power and upon LOCA. During a LOP without LOCA condition, each Class lE electrical bus has undervoltage relays that energize auxiliary relays which trip the non-Class lE loads connected to the Class 1E buses. ~
The emergency load sequencer
. .has no electrical interconnection with the load shedding of the non-Class 1E loads.
If offsite power is available and LOCA occurs, then individual LOCA signals will go directly to the Class lE unit substation breakers.
feeding the non-Class 1E loads and trip these breakers. Any Clasa 1E-loads that are running during the condition will remain running.
The emergency load sequencer has no electrical interconnection with the tripping of the non-Class lE loads by the LOCA signal and in addition, has no electrical interties with the offsite power sources.
Insert B HEach channelized ELS consists of two individual solid state sequencers that are housed in' a single control panel. These two solid state sequencers are for the LOP sequence and the LOCA sequence. The LOP and LOCA sequencers have two solid state logic _ timers for each particular sequence powered from redundent internal power supplies.
Each of the four channelized ELS has these internal redundant component features.
There are-four Class lE emergency load sequencers, one for each the
~
four Class lE power divisions. These four emergency load sequencers ure electrically and physically independent of each other. Thore are no-interconnections of electrical cabling between any of the f aur divisional emergency load sequencers. The individual solid r, tate design circuitry and unique redundant solid state timers and
- power supplies within each emergency load sequencer minimize the
- possibility of a sneak circuit or misoperation of an individual ELS. In the event that an ELS did have inadvertent operation as a result of a sneak circuit, only one Class lE ELS would be impacted since each ELS is electrically and physically independent of each other. There would be three Class lE ELS available for plant shutdown if any single ELS failed.
There are no credible sneak circuits or common failure modes in the ,
sequencer design that could impact the availability of the onsite and offsite power sources. The HCGS sequencer design does not ]
degrade the combined reliability of the onsite and offsite power l sources. j
.. 1ho) .
%.3:
DSER Open'Iten No. 241 (DSER Section 8.3.1.10)
LOAD ACCEPTANCE TEST AFTER PROLONGED NO LOAD OPERATION OF THE
- DIESEL GENERATOR Section-6.4.2 of IEEE Standard 387-1977 requires, in part, that the load acceptance test consider the potential effects on load acceptance af ter prolonged no load or light load operation of .
F the diesel' generator. This capability should be demonstrated over the full range of ambient air temperatures that may exist at the diesel engine air intake.
l By Amendment 4 to the FSAR, the applicant indicated that this diesel generator capability is being reviewed by the diesel engine manufacturer and that additional information with res-
~
~
pect to the diesel generators capeoility will be provided at i a later time. This item will continue to be pursued with the l_
applicant.
RESPONSE.
See the response to Question 430.145 for the information requested
. -above regarding diesel generator operation under ambient conditions,
. including low ambient temperatures. '
The Hope Creek-diesel generators can accommodate a full load accep-
'tance test per.IEEE 387-1977 after a no load operation of the diesel generator.
During pre-operational testing, a full load acceptance test per IEEE 387-1977 will be. performed af ter four hours of intermittent no load operation of a diesel generator. Intermittent operation shall. consist. of unloaded operating periods of fif teen minutes on an average basis. This test.will be conducted in accordance with-the diesel generator manufacturer's recommendations. ,
1 The four hours of unloaded operation is considered to be a 4'
realistic time based on~ expected operation of the diesel gener-
+
ators.
Station operating procedures will be provided to assure that after a cumulative four hours of operation at light load, i.e.,
- l. less than 20% of rated, on any diesel, that diesel will be oper-ated for one hour at a minimum of 50% rated load as per the diesel manufacturer's recommendations.
. Section 8.3.1.1.3.10 of the HCGS FSAR has been revised to incor-porate the information provided above.
I i
4 ,
t 1
\
4 HCGS FSAR 6/84 QUESTION 430.22 (SECTION 8.3.1)
Section 6.4.2 of IEEE Standard 387-1977 requires, in part, that the load acceptance test consider the potential effects on load acceptance after prolonged no load or light load operation of the diesel generator. Provide the results of load acceptance tests or analysis that demonstrates the capability of the diesel generator to accept the design accident load sequence af ter prolonged no load operation.
This capability should be demonstrated over the full range of ambient air temperatures that may exist at the diesel engine air intake. If this capability cannot be demonstrated for minimum ambient air tempe'rature conditions, describe design provision that will assure an acceptable engine air intake temperature during no load operation.
RESPONSE
See the response to Question 430.145 for the information raquested above regarding operationunder ambient conditions, including low
- ambient temperatures.
Section 8.3.1.1.3.10 has been revised to provide the information requested regarding load acceptance tests in accordance with IEEE 387-1977.
W
, . ., ...y, -~---,n v..n-,,w_,-,.,,.,_ny...w-,-.,,-.,,. an,.m_g+,,-,v-.gm._-,4 ,,m.n-
, a. - . _ - .= - ._ . . . . _ . - - - - .. -
1
^
~ b. Start the SDG
- c. Trip and lockout the 4.16-kV feeder breakers that connect the Class lE bus to the offsite power supplies.
on an undervoltage condition at a unit substation bus, the undervoltage relays on the unit substation bus trip the class lE motor feeders fed from the bus.
-As the SDG reaches rated voltage and frequency, logic is provided to generate an permissive interlock for the closing of the SDG circuit breaker.
8.3.1.1.3.7 Periodic Testing of SDGs m i Periodic testing of SDGs is discussed in Section 16.
8.3.1.1.3.8 Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System
.The fuel oil storage and transfer system associated with the SDGs is discussed in Section 9.5.4.
8.3.1.1.3.9- SDG Cooling Water System-The . SDG cooling and heating system, including engine keepwarm, is described in Section 9.5.5.
8.3.1.1.3.10 Loading of Standby Diesel Generators The SDGs'are designed to start and attain rated voltage and t'requency within 10 seconds of the receipt of the starting signal. The
- generator exciter, and voltage regulator fare designed to permit the unit 'to r.ccept the Lload and to start the motors in the sequence and time requirements shown in Table 8.3-1. When the automatic load sequencing of Class lE loads is completed, the operator may manually add additional loads as shown in Table 8.3-1. The application of these ' additional loads does not exceed the SDG capacity.
I The Hope Creek diesel generators can accommodate a full load accep-tance test per IEEE 387-1977 'af ter a no load operation of the diesel i generator.
During pre-operational testing, a full load acceptance test per IEEE 387-1977 'will be performed af ter four hours of intermittent no load operation of a diesel generator. Intermittent operation l- shall consist of unloaded operating periods of fifteen minutes i on'an average basis. This : test will be conducted in accordance with the diesel generator manufacturer's recommendations.
The four hours of unloaded operation is considered to be a realistic time based on expected operation of the diesel gener-ators.
[
j Station operating procedures will be providad to assure that l after a cumulative four hours of operation at light load, i.e.,
less than 20% of rated, on any diesel, that diesel will be oper-ated for one hour at a minimum of 504 rated load as per the diesel manuf acturer's recommendations.
i I,b l4 -
4 9T
~
$'fL,. .
Rw. 2.
DSSR 5 n Item No. 251_ (DSER sesetion 8.3.3.5.5) I i- FAULT CtNLRENT ANALYSIS FOR ALL REPRESENTATIVE FENETRATION CIRCUITS I
I nated f ault-current versus time curves for representat I tration conductors and their protective Based on devices areofincluded a review in these figures, Fig ure s 420.46-1 of the FSAR.
the staf f concludes 430.46-1. that representative curves for m were not included in Figure
! as versus welltime as other curves circuits is representative such that the of allcoordinated fault-current penetration circuits will be pursued with the applicant.
RESPONSE
FShe Settua t. l,q.12. has been ~ rev; sed 1 o mpm A Qunde q'50,%, M # addun. taw h.
l
)
l 1
l t
e e
4 e--, - , , --a,- , ,-~w,--,--------e,-m-,,am~n,n-- -,-~,-~e-wwmw- m --
]
l
. MT l
- \
OUESTION 430.46 (SECTION 8.3.1 and 8.3.2) l Section 8.1.4.12 of the FSAR simplies, through the use of the term " penetration conductor", that primary and backup circuit protection is provided to protect the circuit conductor versus the penetration. This design for containment electrical penetration protection does not meet the guidelines of position I of Regulatory Guide 1.63. Position 1 requires primary and backup protection where maximum available fault-current exceeds the current-carrying capability of the penetration versus capability of the conductors.
- a. Provide justification for noncompliance with the guidelines of position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.63.
- b. Provide coordinated fault-current versus time curves for each representative type cable that penetrates primary containment. For each cable, the curves must show the relationship of the fault carrying capability between the electric penetrations, the primary overcurrent protective device, and the backup overcurrent protective device.
- c. Provide the test report with results that substantiates the capability of the electrical penetration to withstand the total range of time versus fault current without seal failure for worst case environnemental conditions.
RESPONSE
FsAA. Sech 8 14.11 has b,,o av;u2 4a paviJe the rtyofeJ i44ermaFo n .
l t
430.46-1 Amendment %
7,
. NT 43o .% - I ki3nct
+a IS Shu+s I 3 E LE To e
, l n, . j ti
. - l M2 l J! hgl i Eu 3'F.rC7 lll d."
33 !!8 8 v vs s!
! rs -:
IIIIII I I ! Inn a 'T '""L " .",""" . . . , . , . . , . . . , . .
a p pli . ....pq- ,
- a , ;;
i- ;
y:; . ,. . ;
- < o l
. !;! l. i/ ; -
9,:
, . f...i a 4
- t c -
..q i trh ;c.
, ,,, 4 ,
.ses ma r -- -
i.> ! l w - -
w , ii :. i :sl i - l..
- l ,,
I; A.. nip e 't spe e, .j .
- ;l 11';:2 w.ho .
l ' '
i[i-f -
NC$ I
-4m Wey
, ,. ,o : 1 ::: . .i .-
0 1 R,1 I' !-
/j i :
n.c ; T e
- gn ;i[ l .Q,., ,
i- ...
pj, ,:t in l
~
4 W9 :. r. i e .
)>
. : & r i:.,n l Al a r y
i "l. . ..{
ij
%,y;('1:!)ffR
?l1 m c lk l ;h l
l l' f U -'^-
e i h! i l! n 6 , . -L '
,i). ( i ,. .
i i l: ..d -
,., f j!
.' $ ! ll l {,,
i '1 bN!l. .
y.: : 'l 4 ,
M r i- ,
i l
4ll l p i i.
- t. a. . . !p. .:. r .
-l , W ,.. ,,,, .1,,,>..,. - y,
,, g ., c g .. ..t a i. , , ,
ilii : mig 1 0 2. iE 1 i yipc2hpI i;- ne I s migt ij!i Fgi i i kEiih gi 1, ,l. 7 'i' g. r i -
l p. A sq .
i . 2 o .i: m '
- i l,
lA :;
L!' _
$l. ,
N .
e g I n = j ,g ,(
y lre- [- l i. . ,,
,e f :
I1 ;
. ,n + ,,i, .. .
m . ,, : i .g 3
g! ,IN 'k ' ' l' i
}, i j .,.
)
- i. ! !
j ;p# p .. _j u}, .i l. .I I .,
n w '"ss t e,: ni > l, . ,
i -,
,, , .. ; I p .
,M f [.w i ,
U l l ,. j ,.. j , 4 i g,
e d; :il .&- ..
88'M- .
1 p[-
t i
l -
).',. i I >48 j,kr,t as ei pvse ,,,
I!.
1 ! 3 -
,d P
l ! , l e a ..
i i
d 7[: !q ci-i- .
.. . ;- i
,ii 1' i 'i ; i l .
r -
j .lc 9 l. ,hl j i ~
I l 3
- [" 0 l '
i i f,,
e ,i . I 6
I a i i
il; 3,v u ~l w . ,
-m
~ J.\ u,,,o A wrR . I. ,
3 ,
Wha;! ,i ll ld,Il3
.5 i ili - i .l ..'.I.l -
Illiti i I i inam a n .. a. .
L w . _ . . - - - . . . . .
v-- ----,e g ..-g-,p..q---,.&g-p ,.- g- --,r.,-,.-y..,-m,y-_.,,,_r,-umeq,.p,, _ , -
..j
[ ., .
n 1 5
I as t. \
PG ey 1
[3 '
[p jh 1
iFi!iPi iWiMInili1% 8 l
$ 'd ,' '
! 1 net!!M qiWMp jth ! ll3 ktl l d.
l N! -
, ll lo 0 -
l
- hy g ! (
M,r:.ewrew i.r.x,,mb. .
.s..[I .1 , ,e>i... .oil
..is.z 4 f gf f N N/
I' ,
p<-
ll l!.i!
.!i
's -m.g. .<i 4w_. p 1 i i l,,
ti n :
. Lil!! i,l,tani iilij;ln l y
- c.; _* L w wg ni
%jh '
ji i
.s..;@[
- m. .m, min Ng ,
.t C T- .
4
' ps m
t, ac it .1 ';
- e. -
n n .,
y t [ .. g
'.,- !.,,I"i w J,!I -~ $..%... 5 r .k i
...,.i j.jd._$ii' 4 _. e , a .c , i.fi w
.i : nu: ded :gg. 2
.g ..
,7 (J .!y #'sjf @llr,j '1-- j#"fl _p
/ - -----
- 'l djgimiip*V
.p .
s ,.
w.
I,(y ~_p(iTJdg,3llt!
- l. . l i .'
)/in *4 li!!
g
- El, *u 2 A. " g'.~es
- '.7:. w"-._.! N[res .
- - -]Ij l (g "l . -l ! -
i l 4 . ., nsdk:tl.i .Zi 6 -
! pa!l_4 .l I_;tN.lf, i .
< ./ l: :.
I
' l
- p. -gdl .h --
@q.i .
lyt!
-:2 . ;
.,iMJ Syf I 1 F-i ; l .
5y.
e i
- ,Y; I _
l 0" '
r--$ . 8
- . i {#
1 e
..e1d.3. .,o fy,, s at 7- lws: -
r--
ww l'S.1ulf.M'u,{.a.6w
.t i' - I ~
lw ~.
D tw.- . ! e7
$l$$1'Qllj: "f ! gf'1i 1 3 (l ,k
],e f
. .k M .
,, /l!(d.[{II!
l.
g s.l! ~ -_ _ .s . .
........... . _ tJ . . . . . .
i Aw 4 @.......:.T.......;,,. '
l ,......,-@_.a.wpip'!--e l 4g':..j i ......
l' .
p
!: Yi 'll . , . , . , .
,j.
iYl I
O at
e n
.r , a g 8
w glv I1 t
- i. r.
I .e p,
.. g i
/S2 N.zu ME7fG =l dhl i i
IIIIII I I I "
lassa a a a : "'
i.... . . . . . . . . . . .. .
[ i y :
g 1 .___ . . , _, _ .., ... .L i t, .... .l ., ,
b,1
.i, og i
J-*o.
i: ! - %.N i ,,$,'l' va* 4
+.$'
i h ..,$
- . !'6- !h' t
' 1 m '- F - i' ' M L *. s.
. . . . a - . ., .. se s, ,p o r
- i.. -, .g
- . a.
g.i 9 ., . . -r. -
... p 7 . .. .
.j },3 _ .. . . ,._ ,
a .7 . ..o .. . .,. . , .
- r
- .
5
? .". W ' .; C,. Z :l?j M "n ' * '. **
~..h i. Ll.
- i. "
}
tL 'j pI: ;
- y
.m :{jpUp. i( j. ', . : rq: ;-
4 i n ,
i l 4 -
, in m t.
i s; L gll us '. ; t ; ": .t. j :t d n:..n .;., 5 i
f :.1L ' i .'o y
li'. ';!i
, ,i .. f ; .. .. _. ., 2 I g .'i ,
EQQ.ij' I;[ I,il lU; 5'Ta h
, i- . ..
MgH N
.,. ..,t.
L .... _-.h:
.m.
I, ,
" (- .. 9-3 o 6 s m,. n 2NM",h:g,[ U 2SS q jm,,
i .
ar*Mkh E--
.1m b it H t ' i! .
)ig m ..
n,. , .
I fDm i 5
5
- M IUI' 1 -7 i m' :-
- + .
7- 4,'_M. . I. M- " r- -
8,
- n ;
,.m ,.
5 p:: _- '::: :: ,
q nM...M_I,1 JJ ll lj j
if - - ?
)-r j 'i; l'. i:
'i i
. il ...
b.
g _L T M -
4
..lj 4,:: ,j i
..N k ilj id ,j' 2..
7
..__fo ,
I., .yE n ..
7
. / '
..- . . a+ . l F e i ,- 1, e . .: -
- a. t
- l I il r M.
m :dWa -;
1' ,,. A. .t 4 I , ,, .- . .
. _.- .. t. .. , . .
'c.
,. Je , l
- !-a A.
u, -- , ... ..... . - ,. m t
- L h", *g; Wra9,, E aC: =" d #
] , m.= ._. . _
- g.O: : :::ma 2 d :, l
=
I
- f,,
p 9 2').%.. .
e i
k J___N r
n ,
yk o a
l y .
4 b. ~[ "
li
~ ~
- .. $1 d ij" , 't
=t u n. n.EM m-c e
- e. -
t- u mm1 3 - --
-+- = - --
x 3 2 ,4 nl
-i m--
V = "m g- - -
u,#EN t
N!!lilllld 4 sf bin' d
~
.k f : !,
TplYI ? 4.h ? l 0 1 N' '$.n. n .
L 1
n NW -
!!o k m k. O ,
g-
{
ip i_ e, j k.#i:
q ! ,,s 1. o, .
i y
g.W(h m 9
,i i
n: .i. : - .
p .
1 ,. ., i e ." -
n 3 . .
I
- e.
1 q..g1, h -
m . .
.g ,
t . m. 9 ... . .. . L .. , }. ,
. ... l.
a ,,3 .W , 2. , .
- ... , , .. .a . en,
= ;l,t g';~:r: -
, :: :. :::: 1: , p=
"lllgl g i I I ists n'p" ;:: ::si i T . i.-.~~..' T -" ** * " " 'k""
i i
t, i
_LN I
l i . . . . . . . . . .
NT
- s. .
. .e
._,.,...- . . . ..m. . . _ . .A_, . . . . . ., _.m. a .
a a .e.a.. e n, est.,. -
7 1 I I I,,llll,,i -
. .... e.
.L3 . x
,a . .
o S
~ '
d f $$
,. 1xi""k.'$4b. ; I; ' l '
1
. ~ ..""
W 5 "7 T *""" ""
it .h me
WETydei4" *'Ndl*b;$ Br41 1Y 't"1"t , .
~
t $~ P o -
- la '.i A 4, r l -a.
..'..t h.:
'= -
, . . . _,.1 m[$ .. <
[.
'.. . . i-b.s,
. . a , y'
~
' ~
I ~'
~ ~' ~
- as hPNkPh Y _.
f I
' " d .
9
- j'
. kiy f hh+t{. ' - f ' .
7* "J Id '
< b.Mr.4 D'i u. 7L f
- v-1 , ,,, . .i ,
.. g .N
(; k i
a l
l 3 k16. Y
' s .
.i .
- L .~
f :
P.a: r
- 2 1 c..
'T #'J '
's- 6
~
i .
I
't. , . .s k 2' I hh.
g8I
'-3/ ) -l
- Es . - e 3 8 9 ,s .
LJ- . 1 .
38' I lN, '. '
7h: 4*' <
g[ [h . ;u h ! ' .I .TW< .!.,_ : ;
. ., g. p .
f[
e a ;,,;
- 4. l s5 ,
,u,,,.- .
n ,_i,q{d::::N. 't 1$
f <
i ahn ; bn %ul r f ,,
.- < ,ti .,, ,
? t ,,,
M.J
/. .- ; I tes n, y ,,
L ... . ..
e .. < . ., .
n ggg
- ' :."". <gn - m
- " "" 4 ; , ,
l* u i : .
- . -d .
. 1 n, #
l 1.8.
P ...
[i.
v i--, i 1, ,j.',"6 _".
7
. , ,,-r .
i.is ,i,.41 7,
es
-t ' -t - i*' ,,,
i.
. r I_ .5 %s' 1.
il di ;I .
, - . -' I' ,,,.__ ,,,
M ,;,.
"i
'; - N IEGEWlt' "' Y~
gg 'r{
- i. .t m} I f' "-
' NY N e
"*b '=1 f"," g,,. p.
'I i=i==
M"""
M* * .
o lOpigg - - -
b H"1 1 6, ar -
- /' i' Cr _
l""O
.t,9 " '
.o <
[ 1 5
h ,- ,
n], [
L Y m n.
u ,
mg,,, . . .. . .. .
,t ..
w 8- . . ;9.* ' f.
.-.uv m gi ;
.t.
p
+.
i li ' .11 {,4 2
,,;. .. s
- d I] M 'JI .'
' . 3 T-.. .J ,'p i.!1rl *,
glI l,g 6'
=l1 M ,j
?A 3.jjg; l . .l. s.L % .
pt.,,, .i i h i. ? .
m -
,' ,4,3 T .I'i "
iS t F e a' ;.r' , 4, f h ,
, ]Y ..- _:,.
> .. w w 116. ..,
in m .
4., -
I e
4.
, ,j'-
.n-- .
3' ',-
1 7 (tp p ... . !
.,,,,M. ., . .,., ) ,p .a. ..d . '
I,,* [_ k. ; *=, {=-j-
.y g g j-PED %TI % ,43,4 =. Ja 4 .,. .s. j pe. , , =3 < t.
{~~~ [.u }.p. r-3, .. . .. . .u m y . .t
%.M '.1) ,1h4...
4 . . . - ..w'mi $.44 f .1. o t, - . % .p
.a.f
. =(1, y u ' 'f.p., o ,':tl. - - } , . a ssig # . .
e e
$.,: s .
)
M
- ,p .: 1 4 J *M. ' ;j'
l p*
. I,
. 6 .,9 ; . r' #" o .
.- .9 9 t.j' g A ,et., . - .* g
- a- -
f]. .-'.v.
3a.; f. 4.t- '
C l,.
r .g . .
I J <"'
!.!. 'g! ' ' , .#-
. ;\ . ! . .
/ . 'p e j ..
i..-pIll, 4 . .}S ,,, j ,,,
8
.%l 40'.q i . . - 4
,, .d *L ,,,, ,
. ,1. g- ,,,. , ... -
.. .),
%a}
.+ -
. p
,a
, 1 mingg.,1.. < . ,, .
- h ... . . , .
a' ' I' .a. , .
k 4 ,..' ,
4
' *i , , , ,,,
_1 ,, ;,,, , , ,
\
i .I , . . , , , , ,
E i l1
,s i .
8 ;6.,
6
..f3 e e ., y .... . +. . . .. _
"i*td* ~ l' "
"I + * ? "
- l 'i .:t' gdntrd'.sd.p g64&'it , d" '
@ Mt. .P ( !il i!( - F h 1NWM-M .i d:
s 2, . __ ,
7, e ~ o . r. .: .J
. -m n. I '*i " _"3., . ' , . ij.p .gl J.
S,. :. !4 '.. e f;
! ,. s, 1 n
WM W ill LM r.3 L._l..D_- . ., ,l, o -
t i
lll hi!ER ,_i, ! . . ,,,
. [ i
~-' \ ,
c.* *
- 05
"'i*' '
l
'C' "
,f ~
y o
, K .
- 1. . ._ ..
. . < ,,, m , ..
. r_
.m ., ..
c ... . .
.A2._ . ._. _ .. t..
m . . #,,
- m. ,. ..a _, _ _ 4. .
- .... .m
_,.,,. . .c_. n y __ .
'._.a.'l w<...
r ,
--- - u ~-
- ; : po .
.u. i rr - . ..
g
. r.
m ,
- r. m.,
l
,, t _. m
[,',ii S,,,Q p - 7 } Q q*' c[ . %. y 3 j.
g . ..
.g p,!
a n c- 1
, 2 1
- 'r,., . _
" , e n + . wt -~r . . .-1 ,y ,;n. a ,. 4 m..
3 u. ,m..m.p. .
- a. , u . ..
.iW, p.. LN. glllI >;i. - I i.gG. .. il E.9 JlII,HO d h,... Cpl
.--e .
n
==== ,
.a .a e a saseg i I111llll ,
b l %
est m en.cr p ,,s ,,ie d e8 we hasm ***W C
~
. pm e n a.~a & ' 3 ' m, , ..e.n, es, ~.
app;:,c n . w .esam's,,,sef6.wnannes e M l
g g, ,) .ves, entoff .e6 88**etsdLman. .y.n , w a
. I, i a .
1 J
e e D 665
, - - , --,.--,.--,--c_,---,.---.,.,,a-_----.-,, , - - - . , - - . - . , . , . _ - ~ ~ . - , - . , - - . - - - - . - - , , - -
y '
NT
. HCGS FSAR 8.1.4.10 Reaulatorv Gu:.de 1.53, Apoliestion of .
the Sincle Fa , lure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protec ion Systems, June 1973 l
The electric power system is designed to comply with Regulatory i Guide 1.53 as discussed in Section 1.8. All four Class 1E power system channels are designed and located in accordance with the separation criteria for the plant. Routing of cables and location of equipment is designed so that a failure of any kind in any channel cannot propagate to any other redundant channel.
Consistent with the single failure criterion, only one failure is 1 assumed to occur in the system following a DBA. -
,' i i l
< 8.1.4.11 Reau:,atory Guide 1.62. Manual ,
Init:,ation of Protect:,ve Act ,ons, October 1973 j i
i NCGS complies with Regulatory Guide 1.62 as discussed in Section 1.8.
8.1.4.12 ReculatoiN Guide 1.63, Electric Penetrat',o' Assembl: .es in Containment Structures .
for Liahi:- fater-C m ed Nuclear Power Plan';s, July 1973 Design of HCGS penetration assembly systems is in e p liance with . .
Regulatory Guide 1.63, w *n $s EEeptions [JrANJ m (p h,anJ y '
- t. below. /\
The types of circuits that*go'through penetration assemblies are as follows:
- a. Power feeders for me61um voltage 3.92-kV motors ,
/
- b. Power feeders for 480-V ac. motors
- c. 400-V ac and 208-V ac miscellaneous power feeders l
- d. 120-V ac control circuits 1
l
- e. 125-V de control circuits l
8.1-12 i
- - - - . , , . - _ . - , . _ _ _ _ , , _ , . , __n_,-.. . . _ - , -- n ., - - .c,, _
~
l' .
e Y
1/34 BCGS FSAR
- e
~a f.
120-V ac lighting circuits Motor.difforential relay current transformer circuits *
, g. .
c 3
e
- h. Low voltage, instrumentation circuits -
I J
l
- 1. Communication circuits. - ,
The following system features are provided to ensure compliance with the Regulatory Guide position on single random failures of circuit'hverload protection dev'icess The only m'edium
- a. Medium voltage penetration assemblies: voltage circuits r a 3.92-kV circuits for the two reactor recirculation pump Each motor is supplied from a variable frequency motor-generator set. The maximum fault motors.
1 current limited by available the generatorfor a fault inside the contribution andcontainment the circuit is resistance. pe.\M Alt Y A ug SA Cw.uP Pft.owcTscw Fot.
7Mt 1000 kcynd., PE. Weit.Aitou 15 PtovtDED 15Y TWO CLAS S lE Clf. CULT sit.E AKER$ IM SE E.lES AS SHOWW N F S At Fiones ,3-i+ EACM ctaculT SE.EAKEIL 15 PR 0VtOED WM M AN , ov f,g.C u st.g.E MT a-E.L AY TV C SE
',_ E I'WS AT.E. SG.T To Tgtp THElt. RESPECTivs mp v.s-n ,c,Ap4gi snen. n ut. e urT- sr.swses dy SMOWS TMAT ius ,TtME- c.ure It.EwT OY TME \0Co M'.Cd PEMETILATIOW 15 4 g E AT E.E.
TMAW ANY M Ac M um gggg,7 cgg,gg g 7 g,g Q g, c.ov t.g o e e, q g, ,,
9 5. TI M t. C 09DtTtDN Tu AT.
~ The 480-V ac loads '
h b;- 480-V ac motor feeder circuits:
M inside the containment consist of Class 1E and non-g - Class 1E motor-opecsted valves and non-Class IEAll these loads
' continuous-duty motors.
E
" from 450-V motor control centers (Mccs).
-5 -
m
['"y . t The magnetic-only circuit breaker used in the i t '
- g. '
- "binatian starter for the motor provides A primary thersal-8 '
protection for pene*. ration conductors.
,, ' 8.1-13 Amendment 4 2,? -.;._~_m________________.____.____ ___ ___________
t g
, UT HCGS FSAR 1/84 magnetic breaker in series with the starter brecker provides backup protection for these penetration conductors. These primary and backup breakers used for the protection of penetration conductors are both located in the same cubicle of the MCC. The primary breaker is set to provide only short circuit protection. It does not provide locked-rotor protection, which is provided by overload relays in the MCCs for non-Class IE motor-operated valves and
. continuous-duty motors.
For Class 1E motor-operated valves (MOVs), the overload relay is bypassed for emergency plant operation to increase the availability of these valves in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106. For these Class IE MOVs, the backup breakers are selected to allow for sustained locked rotor current and penetration conductors are selected to ensure that the thermal limits of the penetration are not exceeded during this condition.
The thermal-magnetic backup breaker has a nonadjustable trip setting, which is rated on the following basis:
e
- 1. The time-current characteristic curve remains under the thermal damage curve of the penetration conductor over the range of postulated temperatures so that the breaker trips on overcurrent before the thermal limit of the penetration , conductor is reached.
, 2. The breaker allows locked rotor current of non-Class IE motors'for at least 10 seconds and 1000 seconds for Class IE motors. These breaker settings prevent nuisance tripping of non-Class 1E motors during starting and allows ample time for i the motors to start.
- c. 480-V and 208-V miscellaneous feeders: Non-Class IE
- 480-V MCCs provide power for hoists, reactor recirculation pump motor space heaters, and welding outlets in the drywell. The primary and backup protections.for these feeders are provided by two thermal magnetic breakers in series. Both the breakers t have the same ratings and are located in the same cubicle of the MCC. The ratings of both the breakers 8.1-14 Amendment 4
e ,.
MT HCGS FSAR 1/84 are selected so that on overcurrent, the breakers trip before the thermal limit of associated penetration conductor is reached.
208-V ac miscellaneous feeders from a 208/120-V ac power panel provide power for source range monitoring (SRM) and intermediate range monitoring (IRM) systems.
The primary protection for the 208-V ac_ circuit is provided by fuses in each circuit conductor. These fuses are located in GE control panels. The main 20-ampere thermal-magnetic breaker, located in the power
. panel, provides the backup protection for these circuits. The time-current characteristics of bath the fuses and circuit breakers are selected so that both the devices trip before the thermal limit of the associated penetratiqn conductor is reached.
- d. 120-V ac control circuits: 120-V ac circuits are powered from 480/120-V ac control transformers located in the MCC cubicles. Two fuses, with the same rating in series for each circuit, located in the associated cubicles of MCCs, provide both the primary and backup protection. For a. fault, the fuses blow before the thermal limit of the associated penetration conductor i is reached.
120-V ac control circuits fed from uninterruptible-i power supply (UPS) distribution panels are provided l with two fuses in series for each circuit. Primary L protection is provided by the-fuses located in GE
! control panels. Backup protection is provided by the j main fuse with a rating higher'than the primary fuse
- located in the UPS panel. For a fault, the fuses blow before the thermal limit of the penetration conductor is reached.
- e. 125-V de control circuits: Each circuit powered from the 125-V de control bus in the switchgear is provided with two fuses of the same rating located in the l associated switchgear~ cubicle. These two fuses wired in series provide both primary and backup-protection for the associated penetration conductor.
l Each circuit powered from the control bus in the GE l control panels is provided with a fuse in that panel to ensure primary protection for the penetration L
l 8.1-15 Amendment 4
, _ . _ _ J.-_.___..____._..___._______________..__________
- NT HCGS FSAR 1/84 conductor. Backup. protection is provided by the feeder breaker supplying the control bus.
i l
I In both cases above, either the primary or backup protection is capable of clearing the fault before the l thermal limit of the associated penetration conductor l is reached. l
- f. 120-V ! ac lighting circuits: All lighting circuits going ,
, through the penetrations are 120-V ac. Each circuit is l provided with two thermal-magnetic breakers in series.
-The primary protection for the penetration conductor is provided by oceakers located in breaker panels.
Breakers located in the lighting panels wired in series
. circuit with breaker panels provide the backup
. protection for the penetration conductor.
Both the primary and backup protection are capable of clearing the fault before the thermal limit of the penetration conductor is reached.
- g. ' Motor differential relay current transformer circuits:
The only. circuits in this category are the current transformer circuits for differential protection of the reactor recirculation pump motors. No protection is necessary for.the penetration conductors associated with these current transformer leads because the maximum possible relay current for a sustained fault in H the medium voltage cable is only 37 amperes. The
- ampacity of the penetration conductor is 41 amperes.
Furthermore, the relay current decays-to 1.7 amperes.
after 80 seconds because of.the fault current-decrement. These current transformer circuit cables are designated control cables and are routed in L * separate . raceways from power cables. This eliminates
.hYg d the possibility of a short. circuit between power and control cables.s J'
l t h. Instrumentation' circuits: Instrument circuits are all low-energy circuits carrying only a few mil 11 amperes. .
Also, these circuits are routed in separate raceways from power cables to eliminate the. possibility of a short-between pg sppment circuits. C4d "Th ent n n~e instrument circuits b not' exceed the ampacity of penetration-
! conductors under any faulted condition. In addition,
[
8.1-16 Amendment 4 l
1 _ . _ . , , . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ , _ , , _ , _ _ _ _ _ _, ,
NT l
Insert A The differential relay fails safe for shorts or opens in the current transformer circuits. If the differential leads were to short 1 while carrying their normal load of 3.17 amperes, the differential relay would operate and trip the generator drive motor in 144 milliseconds and the 3.17 amperes load would drop down to 1.7 amperes in 80 seconds. The penetration is rated for 41 amperes continuously.
l I
i l
l I
l' l
l ees , --, en-- --e-v-- e a e-+- - -- -,,--,m + g---s w- r, - ~ -,y- - ,,,gy-mwg o - , - - - mw-vmw--w-g,w n e-- , 4sy-,,-,-o-y-wg-yw-r-, -
-o,g ,y ms~-.--
. 't ,
tJT HCGS FSAR 1/84 the instrumentation circuits are protected from overloads by primary overcurrent protective devices which are integral with their power supply and by i backup overcurrent protective devices located upstream g/f ofthepowersuppliey
+
- 1. Communication circuits - Communication circuits consist ,
of 120-V ac power and signal circuits. Each power circuit has two fuses in series. One located in the
~ distribution panel provides the primary protection, and another. located in a terminal box near the penetration provides backup protection for the associated penetration conductors. Both of these are capable of i
, ,, clearing the fault before the penetration conductor i g _
reaches its thermal limit.77
( 8.1.4.13 Reculatory Guide 1.73, Qualification Tests of Electric Valve ODerators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Plants, January 1974 HCGS complies with Regulatory. Guide,1.73 as discussed in Section 1.8.
8.1.4.14 Reaulatory Guide 1.75, Physical Independence of Electric Systems,~ September 1978 L
HCGS ' complies with Regulatory Guide 1.75. Clarifications and exceptions are noted in Section 1.8.
8.1.4.14.1 General Separation Criteria Electrical equipment and wiring for the engineered safety feature systems (ESF), reactor protection system (RPS), and neutron
. monitoring system (NMS) are segregated into separated channels / divisions as shown in Table 8.1-1, so that under DBAs no single credible event is capable of disabling sufficient equipment to prevent reactor shutdown, decay heat removal from-the core, or mitigation of accidents. The ESF systems, RPS, and NMS are separated electrically and physically from one another, and each is further separated into four channels. *The degree of separation provided is commensurate with the potential hazards in a given area.
8.1-17 Amendment 4
. w.. .
Insert-B The only penetrations with instrument class circuits that are
. protected by a single circuit breaker or fuse are as follows:
- 1. Vibration Monitoring (a) Circuit breaker is 7. amperes.
- (b) Maximum short circuit current is 0.8 amperes.
(c) . Penetration is #16 AWG wire with a continuous rating of 15 amperes.
(d) . These penetrations have a-continuous rating in excess of 18 times the maximum short circuit current they may be expected to experience.
- 2. Neutron Monitoring System (a) Circuit protected.by a 1/4 ampere fuse.
(b) Maximum short circuit current is 0.2 amperes.
(c)~ Penetration is $16 AWG wire with a continuous rating of 15 amperes.
(d) These penetrations have a con,tinuous rating in excess of 75 times the maximum short circuit current they may be expected to experience.
- 3. Acoustical Monitoring System (a) Circuit protected by a 2.5 ampere fuse.
-- (b) Maximum short circuit current <0.1 ampere.
(The 330Km. resistor would limit the short zcircuit to 0.1 ampere;even if the rest of the circuit impedance. was zero.)
- (c) Penetration is 916 NWG wire with a continuous rating of 15 amperes.-
(d) These penetrations have a continuous rating in excess
- of 150 times the maximum short circuit current they may be expected to experience.
- 4. Thermocouple Circuits (a) Thermocouples cannot generate any conceivable short circuit challenge'to a penetration.
i
-l 4-- -. - -i m-m --?m --me t e- t e-', h-w ,**--wh --e-=wemwe gs.-muy -we - r *m-+-twt-w -c1m'*--w--myNurt w*pw ri W eyv-- v y =w sevy9 -M w t -w - yevet-ww.m,wg-9.e,p,9 93----,9-
Insert C The P.A. voice circuits carry millivolt signals only when they are actually transmitting a voice communication.
The system cannot generate any conceivable short circuit challenge to a penetration.
In addition, the penetration assemblies are designed to. withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum short-circuit current vs. time conditions that could occur, given single random failures of circuit overload protection devices. Time current characteristic curves, based on . tests, of the penetration conductors have been established by the penetration supplier; these curves shoV the maximum duration of symmetrical short circuit current.
Based on these curves the primary and backup protective devices are selected.to ensure that the mechanical integrity of the penetrations is maintained. Coordinated fault-current versus time curves for representative penetration cor.ductors and the protective devices are shown in Figures 8.3-17, Sheets 1 to 22.
The test report that substantiates the capability of the electrical penetration to withstand fault current without seal failure for worst case environmental conditions has been submitted under a separate cover.
The testing of all penetration over-current protective devices will be incorporated in the HCGS Technical Specifications.
l l
l-l' l
g - -
- .. 0 &,Z DSER Open Item No. 252 (DSER Section 8.3.3.5.6) l
- . THE USE OF A SINGLE BREAKER TO PROVIDE PENETRATION PROTECTION By Amendment 4 to tne FSAR, the applicant has indicated that penetration protection for the two_ reactor recirculation pump motor circuits is provided by a single breaker that is tripped
~ by primary and backup relaying. This design does not meet the requirements of position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.63. Justification
..for.noncompliane will be pursued with the applicant.
RESPONSE
Figure 8.3-17, Sheet 11, has been provided to show two breakers.
' The only penetrations with instrument class circuits that are protected by a single circuit breaker or fuse are as follows:
1.- Vibration Monitoring
- a. Circuit Breaker is 7 amperes,
- b. Maximum short circuit current is 0.8 amperes.
- c. Penetration is #16 ANG ~ wire with a continuous rating of 15 amperes.
- d. These penetrations have a continuous rating in excess of 18 times the maximum short circuit
~
- current they may be expected to experience.
- 2. Neutron Monitoring System
- a. Circuit protected by a 1/4 ampere fuse.
- b. Maximum short circuit current is 0.2 amperes.
- c. Penetration is $16 AWG wire with a continuous rating of 15 amperes.
These penetrations have a continuous rating in L d.-
i excess of 75 times the maximum short circuit i current they may be expected to experience.
i L 3. Acoustical Monitoring System l-Circuit protected by a 2.5 ampere fuse a.
- b. Maximum short circuit current <0.1 ampere.
-(The 330kJL resistor would limit the short circuit to 0.1 ampere'even if.the rest of the circuit l
- , impedance .was zero.)
E c.. Penetration is #16 ANG wire with a continuous rating of 15 amperes.
L d. These penetrations have a continuous rating in l
excess of 150 times the maximum short circuit L current they may be ' expected to experience.
i i
..._...._..__.._.-_._-..,i--_..._-__n._._.-_.-._.~...-___._-._.,._.,~.._
Page two-
- 4. Thermocouple Circuits
- a. Thermocouples cannot generate any conceivable short circuit challenge to a penetration.
- 5. P.A. Voice Circuits
- a. These circuits carry millivolt signals only when they are actually transmitting a voice communication.
- The system cannot generate any conceivable short circuit challenge to a penetration.
- 6. Differential Relaying Current Transformer Secondary Leads
- a. These circuits carry current the equivalent of 1/300 of the current in the conductors of the reactor primary recirculation pump motor. The .
maximum current flowing in the differential leads.
under primary short circuit conditions is 37 amperes, while the normal load ~cdcrent in the differential leads is 3.17 amperes. The penetration is sized for 41 amperes continuous.
- b. For a primary fault of-the recirculation pump motor, and assuming failure of the differential relay, the maximum duration of.the 20 amperes short circuit current in the current transformer leads is 15 seconds. This is the amount of time that the back-up overcurrent relays would take to trip the dual recirculation pump motor breakers.
The penetration is' sized to carry -41 amperes continually and can carry 370 amperes for the same 15 seconds.
- c. The differential relay fails safe for shorts or opens in the current transformer circuits. If the differential leads were to short while carrying their normal load of 3.17 amperes, the differential relay would operate and trip the generator
! drive motor in 144 millisecond and the 3.17 amperes load would drop down to 1.7 amperes in 80 seconds.
The penetration can carry 41 amperes continuous.
~
The above cases illustrate that the intent of Reg. Guide 1.63 is met. No single. failure of a circuit overcurrent protective
-device could cause a penetration failure. Refer to the repre-sentative curves of Figure 8.3-17.
FSAR Section 8.1.4.12 has been revised to incorporate this information.
v.
- --c
- v - c g-. y tww e g --e--ew--ay--- +-w- p-++e---,-1wd v w- ,e #we-.- er- - - w we g- --e4--4-e- ew+--we.e- --e f- e w
I-
- a e vind
! i !s I' t!III
'*, i l ; .
- ; j I .
'df' E'
- -: + : . =e
- . l"l h .
h - ,
-l - ,
- [
- u. p9"."""+7*"". ..
mae; i
\. . : i I(g k,,at,,0,,
hpt H
p - : g
!j..i ,'..;! igs' .Ya@""t"
!j,
~
3
@. L L \ 7 :i3M i
- = ; .I h -
ill_
\3 -
% .p' m A ':'
l ,, l!:.l ;
- i .i
, t
. i 8 - ,.
- ,,.. ..ttrI m r
i .
l
!.; & .se
- ,l, ; 6 ;
i ,
! I i l .. ;
,'.l, p;_.,:,.[ . i *1 l
.6
. I I I I i tjI -. ,. .
.. s
- p. e 3
i i ,
- c. ,o 1 .
i a\ i
.t._p.
.y 1
l : l. / t. >
3 pg 1 l-
,. ! g, :rg ". a=: r
.. ,' l .
- f ..W :
y, .,r :
- l. .:i ..
. m.~+
,i
- i I
, ::, i en.., ._un .uasm.s_mi 1
er l
+r ; r -
7
. , i i.* - .
3 g jat r e;
- 1 l i .
.. E g: ,- 1 I , l ., .
h , -
- V440A4LIl WIWW l l. I-
{s ,
. g 88MGW . -
- I f . I' [-
r- sa y, i. .l:l , . j -
(, ,
(s .
,l, l a
- r .
'"
- i j.
11; r:r] ..
.' ,' T.
- ' " "8 "'" d
- r
.g {, {
l-
- I ;;;: h . .$%;d;,;;1
'..~ i-j,wj, l
- o ;
.a : .
o.#y.w
. i .
- -- . .- 21 ;
ityq , ,
.p.,, ; ..
..g ;
.q. . i,..
., 7, 3
..i; 7 '. ,,
lf
, i' ]En% M. g .,
,,! -g -j . <
.. ;. ;. - jij j
,i g.
N, .I .
.s I;
h_ I}I', ..}
I i . l- I 1
~ !, 4,--mn c j
.,; [ -'--d_,l r .
.m,.
.. l g .V1. , n h..
.) ,I jk i(
' b
~
'g l' i I l,
O}[ N.s.i ndi.lin.liin.
9 iAI..u. Eth et-.' '
- }r. q
' i l' '
l.' -
i .-
l' '-
l! .l j .' !!
tj in iitti i
?
Fi.wisetj a ; I 3 -
~ '
5 $.hh, f+ I .] ll j.
",'.if.ing . 3 fj ul(
6 si I i .gl .L saW .
"l l 'ii i i
.: ECl S
[:,$ %'.IM .aM.. .,
l .. i-i i
! l- i i j
y., r J' .
a:
4;! ..- .,
bN.
! 5.' l h [
l .
. I . ! ! . . . ._ ' .c.
. 51.!_.i, ..,.t,. , , ~[ . , . , . , . ,ji,NL , .- ,AM$ , , %,,,,, g' co , ..
l u!,o,
=
>-n=nn,5 5 59 < !x n,2 ,
I o a
,,, 4. 5_2 W .,
lin I' SER / TEM 252 ]
l i
] .
ee. <.
W 1
i b'.
i*
5 3
)
J ATTACHMENT 5 4
I 1
L_ _ _m _ , - - - - - . . - . . . - - - ,,.., , - , , , , , . , _, ,
-e sc 4 m een.ss.u asa *see&*= w-o e44** carn 4
, , PROPOSED HCGS TECH SPEC 8.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT -
6.5.1 STATION OPERATIONS REVIEW COMMITTEE (SORC) .
MCTION .
8.5.1.1 The station Operations Review Committee shall function to advise the General Manager Hope Creek Operations on operational matters related to nuclear safety.
COMPOSITION 6.5.1.2 The station Operations Review Committee (SORC) shall i be composed of:
^
Chairman: Assistant General Manager - <
Hope Creek Operations Member and Vice Chairman Operations Manager Member and Vice Chairman: Technical Manager Member and Vice Chairman: Maintenance Manager Members operating Engineer Member: I & C Engineer Member: Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor Member Technical Engineer Member ,
Maintenance Engineer Member: Radiation Protection Engineer Member Chemistry Engineer Member Manager - On site Safety Review Group or his designee.
ALTERNATES .
6.5.1.3 All alternate members shall be appointed in writing by the SORC Chairman. -
- a. Vice Chairman shall be members of Station managelsent.
t
- b. No more than two alternates to members shall participate as voting members in sORC activities at any one meeting.
- c. Alternate appointees will only represent their respective department.
- d. Alternates for members will not make up part of the voting quorum when the member the alternate represents is also present.
k l
l l
MEETING FMEOUENCY 6.5.1.4 The SORC shall meet at least once per calencar month and as convened by the SORC Chairman or his designated alternate.
OUORUM 6.5.1.5 The minimum quorum of the SORC necessary for the performance of the SORC responsibility and authority provisions of these technical specifications shall consist of the Chairman er his designated alternate and five members including alternates. No more than two alternates to members shall participate as voting members in SORC activities at any one meeting.
RESPONSIBILITIES 6.5.1.6 The Station operations Review Committee shall be responsible for
- a. Review of (1) Station Administrative Procedures and
' cnanges thereto and (2) Newly created procedures or changes to existing procedures that involve a
- significant safety issue as described in Section 6.5.3.2.d.
- b. Review of all proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety.
- c. Review of all proposed changes to Appendix "A" Technical Specifications.
c
- d. Review of all proposed cnanges or modifications to plant systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety,
- e. Review of the safety evaluations that have been completed under the provisions of 10CFR50.59.
l
- f. Investigation of all viol ~ations of the Technical l Specifications including the preparation and forwarding of reports covering evaluation and
' recommendations to prevent recurrence to the Vice President - Nuclear and to the General Manager -
Nuclear Safety Review.
[ g. Review of all REPORTABLE EVENTS.
L h. Review of facility operations to detect potential nuclear safety hazards..
t NRB2/02 2
.. . . = - . -
= _ - - - - _ . _ - - - . - - _ - - - - -
}
l l
1
-J i. Performance of special reviews, investigations or analyses and reports thereon as requested by the General Manager - Hope Creek Operations or General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review. ,
- j. Review of the Plant Security P?an and implementing procedures and shall submit recommended changes to the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review.
- k. Review of'the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures and shall submit recommended changes to the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review.
t
- 1. Review of the Fire Protection Program and implementing procedures and shall submit recommended l
' changes to the General Manager - Nuclear Safety ,
f
.nview.
- m. Review of all unplanned on-site releases of .
< radioactivity to the environs including the preparation of reports covering evaluation, recommendations, and disposition of the corrective action to prevent recurrence an'd the forwarding of these reports to the Vice President - Nuclear and to the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review.
- n. Review of changes to the PROCESS CONTROL MANUAL and the OFF-SITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL.
/NI6 d b 'S W SORC REVIEW PROCESS , /Ep',v 6.5.1.7 A technical review and control system utilizing qualified reviewers from within the station organization shall be establisded to perform the periodic or routine review or LLC proceourssaand changes thereto. Only those items that have a l safety significance will be reviewed by SORC. Details of this
' technical review process are previoed in Section 6.5.3.
! % u7C r @ ws will concentrate.on safe and reliable ope d ~
of tne station.NJ;,_ reviews for determination or verification of USQ,shal-l'h performed-ny the Nuclear Safety Review Degartmen F(NSR) and the results of NSW reviews _wLil_be prgvided to SORC.
AUTHORITY !
- :,^
8 6.5.1.8 The Station Operations Review Committee shall:
f
[
l a. Recommend to the General Manager - Hope Creek
( Operations written approval or disapproval of items ;
considered under 6.5.1.6 (a) through (e) above.
l-NRB2/02 3 ,,
l l
1 l
I
- b. Provide written notification within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the !
Vice President - Nuclear and the General Manager -
Nuclear Safety Review of disagreement between the SORC and the General Manager . Hope creek Operationar however, the General Manager - Hope Creek Operations !
shall have responsibility for resolution of such i disagreements pursuant to 6.1.1 above.
55S0829. .
l 6.5 1.9 The station operations Review Committee shall ,
' maintain written minutes of each meeting and copies shall be provided to the Vice President - Nuclear, the General Manager
- Muclear safety Review and the Manager - Off-Site Review.
- 6. 5' .2 NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW M
6.5.2.1 The Nuclear Safety Review Department (NSR) shall 4
function to provide the independent safety review program and audit of designated activities.
COMPOSITION 6.5.2.2 NSR shall consist of a , eneral G Manager, a Mhaager of the On-site Safety Review Group (SRG) supported by at least four dedicated, full-time engineers located on-site, and a Manager of the Off-site Review Group (OSR) supported by at least four dedicated, full time engineers located off-site.'
The OSR staff shall possess experience and competence in the general areas listed in Section 6.5.2.4.- The General Manager and Managers will datermine when technical experts shall be used to assist in reviews of complex problems.
NSR shall establish a system of qualified reviewers from other technical organizations to augment its expertise in the disciplines of section 6.5.2.4. Such qualified reviewers shall meet the same qualification requirements as the NSR staff, and will not have been involved with performance of the original work. .
- Since the Nuclear Department is located on Artificial Island site, the terms on-site and off-site are intended to convey the distinction between -inside and outside of the station fence.
t mRs2/02 4
o Establishment of the Manager - of t-Site Review and Staf f is
' guided by the provisions for independent review of Section 4.3 of ANSI N18.7 (ANS-3.2), and the qualification requirements for the review staf f will meet or exceed enose described in Section 4.7 ot ANS-3.1. The Manager - On Site Review and staf f will meet or exceed the qualifications describec in Section 4.4 of ANS 3.1. .
CONSULTANT 3 Consultants shall be utilized as determined by the l 6.5.2.3 NSR General Manager to provide expert advice to the NSR.
6 6
e e
O 9
e t
NRB2/02 5 ,
i
'uFF-SITE REVIEW GROUP 6.5.2.4- The Off-Site Review Group (USR) shall function to provide independent review and audit of cesignated activities in the areas of:
- a. Nuclear Power Plant Operations
- b. Nuclear Engineering
- c. Chemistry and Radiochemistry
- d. Metall'urgy
- e. Instrumentation and Control
- f. Radiological Safety
- g. nochanical Engineering *
- h. Electrical Engineering
- i. Quality Assurance
- j. Nondestructive Testing
- k. Emergency Preparedness It shall also function to' examine' plant operating characteristics, NRC issuances, industry advisories, Licensee Event Reports, and other sources which may indicate areas for bnproving plant safety.
REVIEW 6.5.2.4.1 The OSR shall reviews
- a. The Safety evaluations for
- 1) Changes to procedures, equipment, or systems and
- 2) Tests or experiments completed'under the provision of Section 50.59, 10CYR, to verify~
that such actions did not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
- b. Proposed changes to procedures, equipment, or systems that involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in Section 50.59, 10CFR.
b NRB2/02 6
" " ' ' * " ~ ---------m . _ . . _ _ ,,_ ,_,_4. . . _ _
I c. Proposed tests or experiments that involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in section 50.59, 10CFR.
- d. Proposed changes to Technical Specifications or to the operating License.
. e. Violations of codes, regulations, orders, Technical specifications, license requirements, or of internal procedures or instructions having nuclear safety significance.
- f. Significant operating abnormalities or deviations from normal and expected performance of plant equipment that affect nuclear safety.
- g. All REPORTABLE EVENTS All' recognized indications of an unanticipated
-h'.
deficiency in some aspect of design or operation of safety-related structures, systems or components.
.i. Reports and meeting minutes of the Station' operations Review Committee.
AUDITS 6.5.2.4.2 Audits of fac.ility activities that are required to be performed under the cognizance of OSR are listed belows
- a. The conformance of facility operation to provisions container :ithin the Technical Specifications and applicabl license conditions at least once per 12 months.
- b. The performance, training, and qualifications of.the entire facility staff at laast once per 12 months.
- c. The results of antions taken to correct deficiencies occurring in iacility equionent, gtructures, systems, or method of operation that affect nuclear safety at least once per 6 months.
- d. The performance of activities required by the Operational Quality Assurance Program to meet the Criteria of Appendix "B", 10CFR50, at least once per 24 months.
t NRB2/02 7
+4-
- e. The Facility Emergency Plan and implementing '
p ocedures at least once per 12 months. ,
- f. The Facility Security Plan and implementing proced ures at least once per 12 months.
, g. Any other area of facility operation considered appropriate by the General Manager - Nuclear safety Review or the Vice President - Nuclear.
h.- The Facility Fire Protection Program and implementing procedures at least once per 24 months.
- i. An independent fire protection and loss prevention program inspection and audit shall be performed at least once per 12 months utilizing either qualified off-site licensee personnel or an outside fire protection firm.
- j. An inspection and audit of the fire protection and loss prevention program shall be performed by a qualified outside fire consultant at least once per
. 36 months.
- k. The radiological environmental monitoring program and the results thereof at least once per 12 months.
The above audits shall be conducted by the Quality Assurance Department or an independent consultant. Audit results and recommendations shall be reviewed by NSR.
ON-SITE SAFETY REVIEW GROUP ,
6.5.2.5 The on-site safety Review Group (SRG) shall function to provides the review of plant design and operating experience for potential opportunities to, improve plant safetyr the evaluation of plant operations and maintenance activities; and advice to management on the overall quality and safety of plant operations. ,
The SRC -will make , recommendations for revised procedures, equipment modifications, or other means of improving plant safety to appropriate station / corporate management.
RESPONSIBILITIES 6.5.2.5.1 The SRG shall be responsible for was2/02 e
-s
- a. Review of sel.ected plant operating cnaracteristics, NRC issuances, industry advisories, and other appropriate sources of plant cesign and operating experience information that may indicate areas for Laproving plant safety.
- b. Review of selected facility features, equipment, and systems.
- c. Review of selected procedures and plant activities including maintenance, modification, operational problems, anc operational analysis.
- d. Surveillance of selected plant operations and maintenance activities to provide independent verification
- that they are performed correctly and ,
that human errors are reduced to as low as reasonably achievable.
- - NSR AUTHORITY 6.5.2.6 NSR shall report to and ad, vise the Vice President - Nuclear on those areas of responsibility specified in Sections 6.5.2.4 ano 6.5.2.5.
REC'ORDS 6.5.2.7 Records of. NSR . activities shall be prepared and maintained. Reports of reviews and audits shall be distributed as follows:
- a. Reports of reviews encompassed by Section 6.5.2.4.1 above, shall be prepared, approveo and-forwarded to the Vice Presicent - Nuclear, within 14 days following completion of the review.
i b. Audit reports encompassed by Section 6.5.2.4.2 l above, shall be forwarced to the Vice President -
Nuclear and to the management positions responsible for the areas audited within 30 days after completion of the audit. <
6.5.3 TECHNICAL REVIEW AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES pild'j (* 3'f 6.5.3.1 X Programh r/f equired by Technical specification 6.8 and) l.
otherAprocedurestwhich affect plant nuclear safety as /
{
f'Notresponsibleforsign-offfunction [~2lLty> MWdC l
l
\
i.-f;; tx0 g
?
)
NeH7 /n? O
V Ecx tn 3 'd.cn k)kii@%!? 2/lailye, : shat / /A 4..n, t,i; f $c,- c jve -u'e:,.psc )ei c !w ef,yc4m - ..
I determined by the General Manager - hope Creek uperations, and-
- - other than editorial or typographical changes, shall receive an independent operability and technical review and be subjected to an independent USQ l determination. l PROCEDURE RELATED DOCUMENTS 6.5.3.2 Procedures, Programs and changes thereto shall be reviewed as follows:
- a. Eacit newly created procedure, program or change thereto shall be independently reviewed by an individual knowledgeable in the area affected other than the individual who prepared the procedure, program or procedure change, but who may be from the ,
same organization as the individual / group which prepared the procedure or procedure change.
Procedures etther than Station Administrative procedures will be approved by the appropriate station Department Manager or by the Assistant
- General Manager - Hope Creek' Operations.4M General Manager - Hope Creek Operations shall
' approve Station Administrative Procedures, Security y 0
.. Plan implementing procedures, Emergency Plan 4 implementing procedures, and Fire Protection Program F.O implementing procedures. p f
- b. On-the-spot changes to procedures which clearly co, notchangetheintentoftheapprovedprocedureg shall be approved by two members of the plantp taff, at least one of whom holds a senior Reactor operator's License. For 2evisions to procedures which may involve a change in ir. tent or the approved.
procedures, tr.: ;;;;;; : thm.i.e4 ets : te q;;;;; W //
tr.; p aeduce ,-shari-1-approvethe-reviroien .
IM rc.** M *n J"e & % kh w+ cd . i 1 M WM.
4
- c. Individuals responsible for reviews performed in accorcance with item 6.5.3.2a above shall be members of the station staff previously approved by the SORC Chairman and designated as a Qualitied Reviewer. A system of Qualified Reviewers shall be maintained by the SORC Chairman. Each review shall include at dffv'8 determination of whether or not additionalIf deemed cross-disciplinary review is necessary.
j- necessary, such review shall be performed by the appropriate designated review personnel.
Yiw th.c.t. bed $s. k wa y:_st ,nw cr u c aJ r% _ c_i, ris : + w ., #
I d. na.hud a., f u +,c.) v. y : - /4 > 2 / ,
! NRB2/02 10
. - . - , - _ - _ _ _ _ . . - . _ - - - a. - - - - - _ . . _ - - - ..
- d. If the Department ttanager determines that the.
i documents involved contain significant safety issues, the documents shall be forwarded for SURC review and also to NSR for an incependent review to determine whether or not an unreviewed safety question is involved. Pursuant to 10CFR50.59, NRC approval of items intolving unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification changes shall be obtained prior to implementation.
NON-PROCEDURE RELATED DOCUMENTS .
6.5.3.3 Tests'or experiments, changes to Technical Specifications, and changes to equipment or systems shall be
- - :: ri-11__ : th ; described in items
(; 3 , _reviewedA i n :
.F.I.2a, c, and d above.r'-' -' _
r; tic. t.e tt:
commendations for approval are made by SORC to the General -
Manager - Hope Creek Operations. : d: ;;f;;; ::f;;, ;;;i;u; fer f:t rri--'ir :-;- ;;. ifice;io_' ;f ;;;;;i;;;d ;;fe;, '
! 22 ffI j337'_I?3,ihb_:~# ! E- i k3_
.....______,__.__"__'____..""...y._"_._____"__" .
- 2 = .
%;;D_ _ _ u J _ ' .. '.~' _ ..
'"~ ~
"*_ ,_ :"_ - '".: ,..ss....
-Y~
- t ; il i _
- . _ _ - . . _ _ _, .'... . . . ..
- ;rr-*^ ::;1____;_;c tr --_,,__;
JWWE Pursuant to 10CFR50.59, NRC approval of items involving unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification cnanges shall be obtained prior to implementation.
RECORDS -
6.5.3.4 Written records of reviews performed in accordance with item 6.5.3.2a above, including recommencations for approval or disapproval, shall be maintained. Copies shall be provided to the General Manager - Hope Creek Operations, SURC, NSR, and/or NRC as necessary when tneir reviews are required.
6.6 REPORTABLE EVENT ACTION .
6.6.1 The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:
- a. The Commission shall be notified 'and/or a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10CFR Part'50, and
- b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the SORC and the resultant Licensee Event Report submitted to the NSR and the Vice President - Nuclear.
NRB2/02 11 ..
- ...,e - _ - . - -
l l
?
)
6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION .
I 6.7.1 The following actions shall be taken in the event a safety Limit is violated:
- a. The unit shall be placed in at least HOT STANDBY within one hour.
- b. The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour. The Vice President - Nuclear and General manager - NSR shall be notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ,
- c. A Safety Limit Violation Report shall be prepared.
The report shall be reviewed by the SORC. This report shall describe (1) applicable circumstances .
preceding the violation, (2) effects of the violation upon facility components, systems or structures, and (3) corrective action taken to -
prevent recurrence.
- d. The Safety Limit Violation Report shall be submitted to the Commission, the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review and the Vice President - Nuclear
, within 14 days of the violation.
I t
NRS2/02 12 .
. ry ':
.,* e9 e
9
)
ATTACHMENT 6 9
l 1
1 e
e 89 5
__ l
REV. 1 CPB OPEN ITEM BWR CORE THERMAL HYDRAULIC STABILITY Core thermal hydraulic stability will be assured by compli-ance with the Stability Technical Specification recommended by GE in a letter dated June 14, 1984, to the BWR Owners Group (BWROG). GE has written this specification to address the concerns of BWR Thermal Hydraulic Stability which are presented in SIL No. 380. This specification will be adopted in the Hope Creek Technical Specifications. The requirements of the limiting condition for operation will be addressed in the integrated operating and abnormal operating procedures. A surveillance test procedure will be developed to establish the baseline APRM and LPRM neutron flux noise levels and to check the existing noise levels against base-line values when required. It is PSE&G's intention at this time, to use double loop operation at Hope Creek.
M P84 144/05-cag
.