ML20133M882

Insp Rept 50-155/85-11 on 850611-0729.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Maint Operation,Ie Bulletins & Generic Ltrs,Ler Followup & Licensing Actions

ML20133M882
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	08/08/1985
From:	Boyd D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133M869	List: IR 05000155/1985011 ML20133M867
References
50-155-85-11, GL-84-11, IEB-83-02, IEB-83-2, NUDOCS 8508130300
Download: ML20133M882 (10)

See also: IR 05000611/2007029

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                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,
                                          . REGION III
      Report'No. 50-155/85011(DRP)
      Docket No. 50-155                                             License No. DPR-6
      Licensee:   Consumers Power Company
                  212 West Michigan Avenue
                  Jackson, MI 49201
      Facility Name:    Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant
     ' Inspection At:   Charlevoix, MI 49720
      Inspection Conducted:    June 11, 1985 through July 29, 1985
      Inspector:   S. Guthrie.
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      Approved B :    D. C. Boyd, Chiev                              [/[ [[
                      Projects Section 18                           Date '
      Inspection Summary
      Inspection on June 11, 1985 - July 29, 1985 (Report No. 50-155/85011(DRP))
      Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee actions on
      previous inspection findings, operational ~ safety, maintenance operation, IE

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      Bulletins and Generic Letters, licensee event report followup, licensing actions,
      and spent fuel pool activities. The inspection involved a total of 169
      inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.
      Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
      No significant safety items were identified.
             8508130300 050809
             PDR  ADOCK 05000155
             G                  PDR

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                                           DETAILS

! 1. Persons Contacted

           D. Hoffman, Plant Superintendent
         *G.   Pettijean, Technical Superintendent
           G. Withrow, Maintenance Superintendent
         *R. Alexander, Technical Engineer
           A. Sevener, Operations Superintendent
           R. Abel, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
         *L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent
            R. Barnhart, Senior Quality Assurance Administrator
            P. Donnelly, Senior Review Supervisor, Nuclear Activities Department
           J. Lovell, Quality Control Supervisor
            E. McNamara, Shift Supervisor
           W. Blissett, Shift Supervisor
           D. Swem, General Engineer
           G. Sonnenberg, Shift Supervisor
           D. Staton, Shift Supervisor
         *R. DeWitt, Vice President, CPC0
         *J. Beer, Chem / Health Physics Superintendent
         *W. Blosh, Acting Maintenance Superintendent
         *W. Trubilowicz, Acting Operations Superintendent
         The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations,
         Maintenance, Radiation Protection and Technical Departments.
         * Denotes those present at exit interview.
      2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
         (Closed) Open Item (155/82017-01), Evaluation of use of silicon oil in
         Barton water level transmitter reference leg. The licensee completed the
         modification to use silicon oil in the reference leg in the installed
         transmitter and in the spare transmitter.
         (Closed) Open Item (155/84011-01), Conversion to Scott Air Paks.     The
         licensee has completed the conversion to portable Scott Air Paks.     The
         cascade system for the control room, at the close of the inspection period,
         was being modified to adapt the Scott system. Training of all site
         personnel has been completed.     Newly hired personnel will receive training
         as part of regular fire training.
         (Closed) Open Item (84013-01), Acoustic Monitor procedural changes. The
          licensee modified 0TGS-1, Master Check-Off Sheet, to include a verification
         that all six channels are operable prior to startup, and modified Standard
         Operating Procedure (SOP) 29 to require monitor operability at all power
          levels.
          (Closed) Violation, Severity Level 4,(155/84017-01), Failure to perform
         RDS valve surveillance. The licensee has completed their review of the
         occurrence. No specific corrective action is required.
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       (Closed) Violation, Severity Level 4,(155/84017-02), Failure to notify
       NRC of required shutdown.     No specific corrective action is required.
   3.  Operational Safety Verification
      'The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
       and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection
       period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems,
       reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected
       components. Tours of the containment sphere and turbine building were
       conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire
       hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance
       requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The
       inspector by ebservation and direct interview verified that the physical
       security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security
       plan.
       The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified
       implementation of radiation protection controls. During the inspection
       period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Liquid
       Poison, Emergency Condenser, Reactor Depressurization, Post Incident, Core
       Spray and Containment Spray systems to verify operability.
       a.    On May 24 routine sampling of the secondary water in the Emergency
             Condenser's shell side indicated a small primary to secondary leak.
             Loop No. 2 was removed from service and secondary water sampling
             was conducted every two days until, on June 11, the declining level
             of the Xenon 133 isotope confirmed the leak in Loop No. 2 was isolated.
             Normal monthly samples of shell side water show no detectable level of
             Xenon, while the May 24 sample indicated a level of 1.1 x 10 4 pCi/ml.
             After isolation of Loop No. 2, Xenon level was 2.3 x 10 6 pCi/ml. This
             low level is not detectable at the emergency condenser vent monitor
             installed at the containment penetration, and is well below the limits
             of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B. Technical Specifications require both
             emergency condenser tube bundles to be operable prior to heating the
             plant for power operation, but permit operation with one leaking tube
             bundle isolated until the next outage.    Each tube bundle provides 100%
             design heat removal capacity. The licensee, by an Operations
             Memorandum issued to operators on June 13, directed that the control
             switch for the isolated loop be placed in the " pull to stop" position
             and that this loop should only be used if Loop No. 1 failed to operate
             in an emergency. The inspector verified that removing the switch from
             the " pull to lock" position is the only operator action necessary to
             return Loop No. 1 to full operability, and that this action can be
             accomplished promptly from the control room. The licensee verified
             the operability of Loop No. 1 isolation valves prior to isolation of
             Loop No. 2.
             On June 25 the inspector, after gaining concurrence of Region III and
             NRR, informed the licensee that if the unit tripped or experienced an

l unscheduled forced outage they had the option of returning to power by

             unisolating Loop No. 2 for the estimated six hour period required by

l l Technical Specifications. The leaking loop would then be reisolated ,

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                               as a conservative measure.      This interpretation of Technical Specific-

l ations:was based on the anticipated difficulty of locating the very ' J small leak,-estimated to be'less than 0.1 gpm. A leak rate of this

                               magnitude is too~small~to accurately calculate and offers little

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                              . likelihood of approaching the total leakage. limit of Technical Specific-
                              'ations or the limits for Xenon 133 concentration in air above natural          '
                               background levels as specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix 8. The licensee
                                is. preparing for use special. leak detection equipment. Repair will
                                involve partial disassembly of the condenser, and is being scheduled
                               for the upcoming refueling outage.
                      .b .-    On June 20'the public. warning system serving the area surrounding the
                               Big Rock site was removed from service while system controls were

relocated within the Charlevoix County Sheriff's office. The inspector

                               verified that the licensee made the appropriate notifications. The
                               system was returned to service in approximately three hours.
                       c.     ~0n July 2 the inspector discussed with the licensee his concerns over          '
                               access to and radiological posting of the Radwaste Storage Building,
                                located adjacent to the protected area and surrounded by a separate

E fence. The inspector, during a routine tour of the building while l licensee personnel had the gate and building open for maintenance

                                activities, was able to enter the building and move about without
                                being observed.by workers engaged in work activities in one corner.
                               The inspector pointed out that it was possible to enter the licensee's
                              ; property by following shoreline routes not constantly monitored by
                                security personnel and that the gate being normally open while work
                               was being performed within presented a situation where a member of the         ,
                                public could gain unobserved access to the building. Dose rates
                               within the building vary from zero to 800 Mr/hr contact, and normal
                              . contamination levels vary from zero to 1000-5000 dpm in the packaging
                                area. The licensee agreed to shut the gate and leave it unlocked when
                                the building was occupied.

!~ The licensee has one posting for the radwaste building, located at the

                              . personne1' access-door. The building is not partitioned except for

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                               walls separating the packaging area. The building has three general

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                                areas: the shielded vault where high level radioactive waste is stored
                                awaiting transportation; the packaging area where low level radioactive

! waste -is packed into barrels for shipment; and, a general area where ! radioactive material is stored for the packaging operation or shipment.

                                When the stored contents necessitate, a high radiation area with roped

I boundaries is established. Otherwise, a person is free to move about

                                the building. The posting notice describes the range of general fields        t
                                and typically notes contamination levels and areas of high exposure
                                 rates. The inspector expressed his concern to the licensee that the          ,
                                 section of the posting notice that specifies protective and anticontamin-
                                ation. dress requirements is highly generalized and does not provide a

j- worker with specific requirements for the area or activity in which L he/she is enp ged. For example, the posted requirements on July 15 ,

                                 called for workers to wear cloth gloves and coveralls. As posted,
                                 this requiremer t would be in effect for all activities in the building.

! In practice, coveralls are only required in certain portions of the I r i

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        building; thus, posted requirements are subject to interpretation by
        each worker. The licensee elected to require a rad-chem technician
        be present in the radwaste building when any employee is engaged in
        work in the building. The licensee normally issues a key to an
        employee who has received radiation worker training. The conservative
        decision to require rad-chem technician presence is in part in response
        to an unusually high level of radwaste building work activity associated
        with the fuel pool cleaning effort and the relatively high dose rates
        present from some of the waste now stored there. The new requirement
        was communicated to rad-chem technicians verbally on July 22 and is
        subject to review when use of the radwaste building returns to former
        levels.
     d. During the inspection period the inspector monitored the progress of
        construction on the remote shutdown building. At the close of the
        inspection period foundation work was being completed.          Conduit
        installation continued, including the penetrations to the control room.
        When the penetrations in the control room wall were open the licensee
        conducted hourly fire watches.     Vendor delays have caused the project
        some minor schedular setbacks.     Cable penetrations previously installed
        in the equipment lock are having their flange faces replaced to correct
        a design error, an action not expected to delay the project.
     e. During the previous inspection period the inspector registered concerns
        over the addition of several functions to the responsibilities of the
        site Quality Assurance (QA) group without a corresponding increase in
        QA manpower availability. During the inspection period the licensee
        transferred from site QA to an offsite group the lead for fuels
        procurement and inspection. The site QA staff will continue to be
        involved as a team member on fuels inspections. The entire issue of
        QA workload vs. manpower is addressed in a special report by a Regional
        QA specialist, Report No. 50-155/85010.
     f. On July 13 at 11:50 a.m. the licensee discovered that all emergency
        notification system (ENS) telephones were not operable and that all
        normal commercial lines were inoperable outside the local exchange.
        The licensee later determined that the phone outage was caused by
        cables accidentally severed by Michigan Bell workmen. The licensee
        used radio communications with Grand Rapids, and dispatched an
        auxiliary operator by truck to inform licensee management at home.
        At 12:56 p.m. the Shift Supervisor declared an unusual event because
        of loss of ENS phones. An unusual event is the least serious of the
        four emergency classifications specified by the Site Emergency Plan.
        The inspector noted that while notification of NRC headquarters (via
        radio to Grand Rapids) of the loss of phones is appropriate, the
        guidance provided by the Site Emergency Plan does not call for the
        unusual event declaration. The inspector discussed with the licensee
        previous examples of difficulty in determining emergency classifications.
        The licensee is reviewing the adequacy of guidance provided to the
        Shift Supervisors and evaluating the need to provide additional training
        in event classification and interpretation of requirements of 10 CFR 50.72.
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           g.           On July 26 the inspector observed the licensee's hands on fire training,
                          involving the use of hoses and extinguishers to control actual flames.
           h.            During the inspection period the inspector reviewed the licensee's
                         deletion of fifteen Nuclear Operations Department Standards (N0DS).
                        The licensee stated their intention to incorporate the contents of
                         each deleted N0DS into the appropriate Big Rock administrative
                         procedure or other document. The N0DS are the vehicle by which
                         Topical Report CPC-2A, Quality Assurance Program Description for
                        Operational Nuclear Power Plants, is implemented and provide a means
                         by which the licensee staff can be assured that the requirements of
                          the various codes and regulations are compiled in one location. The
                          inspector identified the following concerns with the deletion of the
                          fifteen N0DS.
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                                                      Deleting the N0DS before the requirements contained therein are
                                                      incorporated into other. appropriate procedures or documents
                                                      creates the likelihood that those requirements may be lost.
                                                      Transferring all the requirements to other procedures prior to
                                                      N0DS deletion would likely insure all requirements remain in
                                                      force.
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                                                      During the interval between N0DS deletion and incorporation of
                                                      the N0DS's requirements into other procedures those requirements
                                                      are not available to the licensee staff except by returning to
                                                      and thoroughly researching code and regulatory source documents.
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                                                      The licensee has not identified a deadline by which all the
                                                      requirements of each deleted N0D will be addressed by other
                                                      procedures. The licensee intends to incorporate the requirements
                                                      whenever a procedure is reviewed for other reasons, or during the
                                                      biennial review of each procedure. This means that the require-
                                                      ments-formerly contained in the N0DS could go unaddressed for up
                                                      to two years. This enhances the opportunity for engineers, who
                                                      formerly could use the N0DS as a resource document to ensure all
                                                      applicable QA requirements had been included in their project,
                                                      to overlook QA requirements.
                          Through discussions with licensee management and staff the inspector
                           recognizes the difficulty the licensee has experienced in getting the
                          engineer who generates a document to identify and to include all the
                          applicable codes and regulatory requirements. The licensee has
                            identified as a goal the reduction of on-site QA time spent in
                          procedure review by upgrading the QA knowledge of the procedure's
                            author. Presently the QA staff often departs from its official review
                             function and is relied upon to identify for the author all applicable
                          QA requirements.                          Although the procedural and biennial reviews that
                           are to be relied upon for verifying that all the requirements of the
                           deleted N0DS are incorporated into administrative procedures are
                           conducted by the site engineering staff, that review is in turn
                            reviewed by the site QA staff. Thus, the QA review will be the safety
                            net to insure all the requirements are identified and included. By
                            expecting the QA department, in practice, to be responsible for
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         ensuring all the requirements of a deleted N0DS get included in
         procedures during the QA review, the QA staff departs from their
          stated function of review of and concurrence in administrative
         procedures for compliance with QA program requirements.
          Section 2.2.5 of CPC-2A states that NODS are used for " implementing
          the provisions" of the Quality Assurance Program Description (CPC-2A).
          It further states that the methods for implementing QA program controls
          are integrated into the N0DS.
          While CPC-2A is not affected directly, the ability to implement CPC-2A
          is likely affected by the N0DS deletion.
    These and other concerns are the subject of a special inspection by a
    Region III QA Specialist. (50-155/85010)                                                            ,
    No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
 4. Monthly Maintenance Observation
    Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components.
    listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
    in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry
    codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
    The following items were considered during this review: the limiting
    conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed
    from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;
    activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected
    as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior
    to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were
    maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and
    materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were
     implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
    Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to
     assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance
    which may affect system performance.
     a.    On June 27, the unit was lowered in power to approximately 15 MWe to
           repair a packing leak on VHS-265, Steam Drum Level Element Drain
            isolation valve. The packing leak had caused an indicated difference                            ,
           between cast and west steam drum level of 5 - 7 in. While power was
            reduced maintenance personnel verified zero leakage on No. 2                                  '
            recirculation pump seal replaced in May 1985.
            On July 11 the licensee again reduced power to approximately 7 MWe to
            repair VNS-265 after the packing leak resumed. The packing gland was
            sealed with a chemical solution intended to prevent leakage until the
            valve can be replaced during the upcoming outage.                         The unit returned
             to full power operation.
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     b.    On July 19 a gradually increasing temperature in piping downstream
           of the "C" Target Rock RDS depressurization valve (SV-4986) caused
           the licensee to close the "C" bypass valve, RDS-1010. Normally, the
           piping between the Target Rock Valve and the isolation valve (CV-4182)
           upstream is pressurized via RDS-101C, and closing RDS-101C reduces
           that pressure to minimize leakage. Regularly recurring problems with
           Target Rock leakage have resulted from pilot valve erosion, but the
           licensee's evaluation indicates that this leakage is through the
           valve's main seat, which is known to be cracked. The valve is due to
           be removed from the system during the upcoming outage and shipped to
           a vendor laboratory for overhaul and testing.
     No violations or deviations were identified in this this area.
 5.  Generic Letters and Bulletins
     (Closed) IE Bulletin 83002, " Stress Corrosion Cracking in large Drameter
     Stainless Steel Recirculation System Piping at BWR Plants." During the
     inspection period the inspector confirmed that the action requirements of
     the Bulletin had been met. The inspector reviewed the licensee's plans
     to perform IGSCC inspections on 18 welds during the 1985 refueling outage.
     The inspections are to be performed by a vendor using qualified inspectors.
     During the inspection period the licensee was informed by NRR that their
     proposal to perform IGSCC inspections on 18 welds satisfied the requirements
     of Generic Letter 84-11.
     No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
 6.   Licensee Event Reports Followup
     Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
      review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
      that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action
      was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been
      accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
      (Closed) LER 85-005, " Reaction Depressurization System Constant Support
      Hanger Found Improperly Tensioned". This event is described in detail in
      Report No. 50-155/85007(DRP), Section 3.e.
  7.  Licensing Activities
      a.    During the week of July 8 the inspector participated in a series of
            training sessions and meetings designed to familiarize the new NRR
            Licensing Project Manager (LPM), Mr. T. Rotella, with the Big Rock
             facility.   During the sessions the parties reviewed currently
            outstanding Technical Specifications Changes and Exemption Requests,
            and reviewed the details of the highest ranked Living Schedule issues.
            On July 11 the LPM was joined by Mr. J. Zwolinski, Chief, Operating
             Reactors Branch No. 5, Division of Licensing. The visitors toured the
             facility and discussed the progress of regulatory issues of interest
             to the licensee. Both of the visitors stressed to the licensee the
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               nead for comprehensiva and thoroughly documented submittals to NRR to     O
               ensure prompt resolution.
               On July 12 the inspector accompanied Messrs. Rotella and Zwolinski to      f
               Region III offices in Glen Ellyn for a series of meetings dealing with        -
               licensing issues and program definition,                                         s
        b.     On July 1 the NRC issued Amendment 76 to Operating Licensee DPR-6.
               This amendment modifies Technical Specifications (TS) to reflect the        -
               licensee's corporate reorganization.                                       E
        c.     On July 17 the NRC exempted the licensee from the requirements of          :
               10 CFR 50.44 (c)(3)(iii) that require the installation of high point
               vents on the reactor coolant system if the accumulation of                   =
               noncondensible gases would cause the loss of function of any system        L
               required to maintain adequate core cooling. The Reactor                    :-
               Depressurization System (RDS) is the path by which all noncondensibles      -
               would be vented from the reactor vessel and reactor coolant system.         .
               The high point vent requirements of NUREG 0737, Item II.B.1, were
                addressed by this action.
        d.      By letter dated June 10, the NRC issued Amendment 75 to Operating
                Licensee DPR-6. This amendment incorporates new Technical
                Specifications (TS) that address the stack gas monitoring system.           r
                                                                                            
        e.      By letter dated June 13, NRR accepted the licensee's evaluation of
                coatings used within containment that qualified those coatings for           j
                accident conditions. The licensee committed to a coating inspection         ?
                program. These actions resolved Section 4.19.1 of the facility's             j
                integrated assessment (NUREG-0828).
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         f.     By letter dated June 7 the NRC issued Amendment 74 to Operating Licensee     e
                DPR-6. This amenament modifies Technical Specifications to include
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                the recently modified Reactor Enclosure Treated Waste Line Isolation         2
                Valve, CV-4049, in the list of automatic containment isolation valves        3
                to be leak rate tested.                                                       ,
     8.  Spent Fuel Pool Activities                                                            N
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         On June 18-19 the inspector observed maintenance activities in the spent             -
         fuel pool in preparation for a pool cleaning project. Preparation included           =

relocation of spent fuel bundles and control rods, movement of racks, and 7

         replacement of the metal pad placed beneath newly installed racks to
         prevent galvanic corrosion.                                                           j
         During the remainder of the inspection period the inspector monitored the              k
         activities of contractor personnel working in the spent fuel pool area to              -
         package for disposal 79 old channels, source cans, orifices, incores, and              i
         miscellaneous hardware accumulated over the life of the facility. The                  .f
         project has been hampered by crusher equipment malfunctions and packaging                ;
          difficulties. At the close of the inspection period the licensee terminated             =
         work activities and will resume the project following the 1985 refueling               i
          outage.                                                                               4
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     ,    9.     Headquarters Requests
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                 During the inspection period the inspector completed the requirements of
                 Temporary Instruction 2515/67, Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected
                 Safety Issues. The inspector reviewed procedures and training intended
                 to reduce incidents of mispositioned control rods. The inspector noted
                 in his response that Big Rock does not have a Rod Worth Minimizer, Rod
                 Sequence Control System, or any electronic or mechanical means of
                 preventing control rod mispositioning. Accuracy of rod position at Big
                 Rock relies on administrative controls and operator attentiveness. The
                 inspector noted that there have been two recent incidents when inadequate
                 administrative control and/or operator inattentiveness have resulted in
                 rods being mispositioned.    These two occurrences are detailed in Reports
                 No. 50-155/85002(DRP) and No. 50-155/85007(DRP).
          10.    Open Items
                 Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
                 will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action
                 on the part of the NRC or Licensee or both. No new open items were
              / disclosed during the inspection.
          11.    Exit Interview
                 The' inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
                 throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and
             ~ summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The
                 licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the
                 likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to
                 documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
                 The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as
                 proprietary.
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