IR 05000219/2012004

IR 05000219-12-004, on 7/01/2012 9/30/2012, Oyster Creek Generating Station, Integrated Report

ML12312A094
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	11/07/2012
From:	Hunegs G NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To:	Pacilio M Exelon Nuclear, Exelon Generation Co
hunegs, gk
References
IR-12-004
Download: ML12312A094 (34)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 7, 2012

SUBJECT:

OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2012004

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On September 30, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 16, 2012 with Mr. R. Peak, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based upon the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Gordon K. Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-219 License Nos.: DPR-16

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000219/2012004 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I==

Docket No.: 50-219 License No.: DPR-16 Report No.: 05000219/2012004 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Oyster Creek Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Dates: July 1, 2012 - September 30, 2012 Inspectors: J. Kulp, Senior Resident Inspector J. Ambrosini, Resident Inspector F. Bower, Senior Resident Inspector, Hope Creek S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Heinly, Resident Inspector, Three Mile Island B. Dionne, Health Physicist Approved By: Gordon Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000219/2012004, 7/01/2012 - 9/30/2012; Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster Creek

Generating Station, Integrated Report This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Oyster Creek began the quarter at 100% power. On July 23, 2012, an unplanned scram occurred due to a loss of all offsite power. Operators commenced startup on July 26, 2012 and returned to full power on July 28, 2012.

On July 29, 2012, operators lowered power to 70% to perform a rod for flow swap. During the subsequent power ascension, C feed water regulating valve failed at 83% power and operators performed an unplanned power reduction to 67% power to conduct repairs. Oyster Creek returned to full power on July 31, 2012, following repairs to the C feed water regulating valve.

On July 31, 2012, operators lowered power to 70% to perform a rod pattern adjustment and returned the plant to full power on August 1, 2012.

On August 3, 4, 5, 6, and 12, 2012, Oyster Creek performed downpowers to comply with the New Jersey Department of Environmental thermal discharge permit.

On August 8, 2012, operators conducted an unplanned downpower to 90% in response to a trip of the reactor water cleanup system. Oyster Creek returned to full power on August 10, 2012.

On August 16, 2012, operators conducted a planned downpower to 98% to place the reactor water cleanup system back in service and returned to full power later that day.

On September 1, 2012, operators lowered power to 80% to perform a rod for flow swap and returned the plant to full power later that day.

On September 5, 2012, operators conducted a planned downpower to 95% to perform core spray system 1 surveillance testing. Oyster Creek returned to full power on September 7, 2012.

On September 11, 2012, operators conducted a planned downpower to 92% to perform core spray system 2 surveillance testing. Oyster Creek returned to full power on September 12, 2012.

On September 15, 2012, operators lowered power to 70% to perform a rod for flow swap and returned the plant to full power later that day.

On September 28, 2012, operators conducted an unplanned downpower to 70% in response to a salt water leak on the A-north circulating water discharge piping. Following repairs, Oyster Creek returned to full power on September 29, 2012.

On September 30, 2012, operators lowered power to 70% to perform a rod for flow swap and returned the plant to full power on October 1,

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two impending adverse weather preparation sample. The inspectors reviewed Exelons preparations for the onset of hot weather on July 17, 2012 and a tornado watch on September 18, 2012. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during adverse weather conditions. The inspectors, on July 17, 2012, walked down the C and D 4160 volt switchgear rooms and C battery to ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator actions defined in Exelons adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse weather response with operations and work control personnel.

a. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

Augmented spent fuel pool cooling while normal spent fuel pool cooling system out-of-service for relay replacement on July 16, 2012 Isolation condenser A while isolation condenser B was inoperable for surveillance testing on July 3, 2012 Containment spray system 1 and core spray system 1 on July 2, 2012 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Exelon staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On August 27, 2012, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the standby liquid poison control system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, tests, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hangar and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports and work orders to ensure Exelon appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that Exelon controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures. The inspectors verified that portable equipment would operate properly by observing periodic testing of the equipment.

Reactor building (119 elevation) (RB-FZ-1A) on July 18, 2012 Control room (OB-FZ-5) on July 18, 2012 Reactor building (23 elevation) (RB-FZ-1E1) on July 31, 2012 Reactor building (33 elevation) TIP drive area (RB-FZ-1E2) on July 31, 2012 Emergency diesel generator room #1 (DG-FA-15) on August 9, 2012 Portable emergency pump run on August 15, 2012

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training scenario, 2612.885.0.0911A, Manual Reactor Scram after Security Event, on September 13, 2012.

The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the technical specification action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on SSC performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, corrective action program documents, maintenance work orders, and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that Exelon was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2)performance criteria established by Exelon staff was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Exelon staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system boundaries.

Standby liquid poison flow instrument inaccuracy (IR 1363225) on July 5, 2012 Diesel fire pump failures (IR 1374437) on September 18, 2012

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Exelon performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Exelon personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When Exelon performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk.

The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

Core spray system 1 unavailable during planned surveillance testing on September 5, 2012 Containment spray and emergency service water system 1 unavailable for planned surveillance testing on July 10, 2012 Yellow shutdown risk due to high decay heat during forced outage on July 25, 2012 Spent fuel pool cooling leak alarm switch planned unavailability on July 16, 2012 Declaration of maximum emergency generation action on July 17, 2012

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:

C and D 4160 volt switchgear rooms increased room temperature (IR 1069881) on July 17, 2012 D electromagnetic relief valve increased tailpipe temperature (IR 1392048) on July 23, 2012 Abnormal containment spray pump suction pressure (IR 1395902) on August 1, 2012 1-3 emergency service water pump motor cable insulation slit (IR 1415395) on September 20, 2012 Standby liquid poison pump motor power cable clamp broken (IR 1406505) on August 30, 2012 Containment high range radiation detector channel 1 spiking (IR 1393167) on July 25, 2012 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and UFSAR to Exelons evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable.

Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by Exelon. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

.1 Permanent Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated a modification to the low level radiological waste facility implemented by engineering change package 12-000006, Commercial Change by Work Order for Low Radiation Waste Mechanical Equipment Room Changes. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition, the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the design change, including modifications to the mechanical equipment room of the dry active waste compaction area of the low level radiological waste building. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition, the inspectors reviewed modification documents to ensure the abandonment of the ventilation equipment and HEPA filtration system and the addition of sealed radioactive sources did not negatively affect the design functions described in the FSAR.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.

B isolation condenser steam inlet valve (V-14-33) packing replacement (R2157329)on July 24, 2012 Spent fuel pool cooling leak alarm switch replacement (C2025662) on July 16, 2012 Containment system II following component calibrations (R2200896) on July 18, 2012 Service water pump 1-1 after pump replacement (R2196685) on September 20, 2012 Outboard main steam isolation valve, V-1-9, maintenance adjustment after fast valve stroke time (R2188673) on July 25, 2012

1. 2 Emergency diesel generator following troubleshooting for lockout light illumination (C2308788) on July 25, 2012 C Electromatic relief valve pressure switch replacement (R2206650) on September 25, 2012

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the stations work schedule for forced maintenance outage (1F29), which was conducted July 23, 2012 through July 25, 2012. The inspectors reviewed Exelons development and implementation of outage plans and schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific problems, and defense-in-depth were considered. During the outage, the inspectors observed portions of the cooldown processes and monitored controls associated with the following outage activities:

Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth, commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with the applicable technical specifications when taking equipment out of service Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that technical specifications were met Monitoring of decay heat removal operations Activities that could affect reactivity Maintenance of secondary containment as required by technical specifications Identification and resolution of problems related to outage activities Additionally, the inspectors monitored startup preparations as well as portions of the reactor startup following the forced outage.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied technical specifications, the UFSAR, and Exelon procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:

Diesel generator #2 load test on July 16, 2012 Containment spray and emergency service water system 1 pump in-service test on July 10, 2012 B standby liquid control pump and valve operability and in-service test on July 5, 2012 B isolation condenser shell water level instrument calibration on July 3, 2012 Core Spray System 1 Pump Operability and Quarterly In-service Test on September 5, 2012 Electromatic relief valve operability test on July 27, 2012 Reactor coolant system leak rate on July 31, 2012

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Exelon emergency drill on July 10, 2012 to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator, technical support center, and emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures.

The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspectors observations with those identified by Exelon staff in order to evaluate Exelons critique and to verify whether the Exelon staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Training Observations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on September 13, 2012, 2612.885.0.0911A, Manual Reactor Scram after Security Event, which required emergency plan implementation by an operations crew. Exelon planned for this evolution to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crews performance and ensure that Exelon evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. Radiation Safety

Cornerstones: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, exposure reduction requirements and measures taken by Exelon to track, trend and reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities to assess performance with respect to maintaining individual and collective radiation exposures ALARA. This inspection will determine whether the licensees ALARA program, including administrative, operational, and engineering controls, is effectively maintaining occupational exposure ALARA.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, technical specification, air sample test results, equipment maintenance and test records, inspection and maintenance procedures, and system operational procedures. The inspectors reviewed procedural guidance for use of installed plant systems to reduce dose and assessed whether the systems are used, to the extent practicable, during high-risk activities. The inspectors reviewed instrument setpoints to verify that in-plant airborne concentrations are being controlled consistent with ALARA to the extent necessary to validate plant operations as reported by the performance indicators and to verify that the practices and use of respiratory protection devices on site do not pose an undue risk to the wearer.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of training and medical records to verify that employees were properly qualified to use respiratory protection devices. The inspectors monitored several employees as they demonstrated the use of respiratory protection devices. The inspectors spot check several respiratory protection devices and verified that they were in acceptable material condition and maintained properly.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the results of Exelon radiation protection program audits related to internal and external dosimetry. The inspectors reviewed the most recent National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program accreditation report on the licensee vendors most recent results to determine the status of the accreditation. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures associated with dosimetry operations, including issuance/use of external dosimetry, assessment of internal dose, and evaluation of and dose assessment for radiological incidents. The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee had established procedural requirements for determining when external dosimetry and internal dose assessments are required. The inspectors waked down and evaluated the onsite storage of dosimeters before issuance, during use, and before processing/reading. The inspectors also reviewed the guidance provided to radiation workers with respect to care and storage of dosimeters. The inspectors reviewed dosimetry occurrence reports or corrective action program documents for adverse trends related to electronic pocket dosimeters. The inspectors reviewed procedures used to assess the dose from internally deposited radionuclides using whole body counting equipment. The inspectors reviewed the documentation for two individuals who had declared pregnancy during the current assessment period and evaluated whether the licensees radiological monitoring program (internal and external) for declared pregnant workers is technically adequate to assess the dose to the embryo/fetus. The inspectors reviewed exposure results and monitoring controls the licensee implemented. The inspectors evaluated the licensees neutron dosimetry program, including dosimeter types and/or radiation survey instrumentation.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed maintenance records, testing records, source check records, calibration records, alarm setpoint calculations and walked down a sample of various radiation monitors including whole-body counters used to detect workers surface and internal contamination to verify proper setup and operation. The inspectors reviewed Exelon and third-party evaluation reports of the radiation monitoring program since the last inspection to look for trends. The inspectors reviewed procedures that govern instrument source checks and calibrations, focusing on instruments used for monitoring transient high radiological conditions, including instruments used for underwater surveys.

The inspectors walked down a representative sample of Exelons effluent radiation monitoring systems and observed Exelon personnel conducting source checks to verify proper operation of the monitors. The inspectors walked down area radiation monitors and continuous air monitors to determine whether they are appropriately positioned relative to the radiation sources or areas they were intended to monitor.

The inspectors reviewed daily performance checks and calibration data to show that the frequency of the calibrations is adequate and there were no indications of degraded performance of laboratory analytical instruments used for radiological analyses.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity and RCS Leak Rate (2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Exelons submittal for the RCS specific activity and RCS leak rate performance indicators for the period of July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6. The inspectors also reviewed RCS sample analysis and control room logs of daily measurements for RCS leakage, and compared that information to the data reported by the performance indicator.

b. Inspection Findings No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

.1 Plant Events

a. Inspection Scope

For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The inspectors communicated the plant events to appropriate regional personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors, for consideration of potential reactive inspection activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Exelon made appropriate emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed Exelons follow-up actions related to the events to assure that Exelon implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance.

Oyster Creek emergency planning zone sirens unreliable due to interference on siren activation radio frequency on July 13, 2012.

Notice of unusual event due to loss of offsite power and scram on July 23, 2012 Reactor water cleanup system isolation on August 8, 2012

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 (Closed) Temporary Instruction 2515/185, Revision 1, Follow-up On the Industrys

Groundwater Protection Initiative

a. Inspection Scope

An NRC assessment was performed on the OCGS Groundwater Protection Program from August 6, 2012 to August 10, 2012 to determine whether Exelon fully implemented the voluntary industry groundwater protection initiative, (Nuclear Energy Institute NEI 07-07 Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative - Final Guidance dated August 2007, ADAMS Accession Numbers ML072610036 and ML072600292). The inspectors interviewed personnel, reviewed applicable documents and performed walkdowns of selected areas. In addition, the inspectors followed-up on status of implementation for the seven deviations to the acceptance criteria in NEI 07-07 that were reported in the NRC integrated inspection report 05000219/2009005, dated January 26, 2010:

1.2.g Establish the frequency for periodic reviews of SSCs and work practices.

1.3.f Establish a long-term program for preventative maintenance of groundwater wells.

1.4.a Establish written procedures outlining the decision making process for remediation of leaks and spills or other instances of inadvertent releases. This process is site specific and shall consider migration pathways.

1.4.b Evaluate the potential for detectible levels of licensed material resulting from planned releases of liquids and/or airborne materials.

1.4.c Evaluate and document, as appropriate, decommissioning impacts resulting from remediation activities or the absence thereof.

3.1.a An independent, knowledgeable individual(s) shall perform the initial self-assessment within one year of implementation. For existing plants, this means no later than December 31, 2008; for new plants this means within one year after initial criticality.

3.2.a An independent, knowledgeable individual(s) shall perform the initial review within one year of the initial self-assessment performed per Objective 3.1.a above.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative has been fully implemented at OCGS.

Two of the NEI 07-07 acceptance criteria were found by the licensee as not being properly implemented. Groundwater protection program improvements are being taken.

Exelon placed these program improvements into their corrective action program (IR 1370473 and IR 1041403).

.2 Temporary Instruction 2515/187 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force

Recommendation 2.3 - Flooding Walkdowns On August 16, 2012 inspectors commenced activities to independently verify that Exelon conducted external flood protection walkdown activities using an NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology. These flooding walkdowns are being performed at all sites in response to Enclosure 4 of a letter from the NRC to licensees entitled, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML12053A340). The results of this temporary instruction will be documented in a future inspection report.

.3 Temporary Instruction 2515/188 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force

Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns On August 20, 2012, inspectors commenced activities to independently verify that Exelon conducted seismic walkdown activities using an NRC-endorsed seismic walkdown methodology. These seismic walkdowns are being performed at all sites in response to Enclosure 3 of a letter from the NRC to licensees entitled, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML12053A340). When complete, the results of this temporary instruction will be documented in a future inspection report.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 16, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Peak, Plant Manager and other members of the Exelon staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

None ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

M. Massaro, Site Vice-President

R. Peak, Plant Manager

M. Ford, Director, Operations

G. Malone, Director, Engineering

J. Dostal, Director, Maintenance

C. Symonds, Director, Training

D. DiCello, Director, Work Management

J. Barstow, Manager, Regulatory Assurance

T. Farenga, Radiation Protection Manager

D. Cherneski, Manager, Environmental/Chemistry

T. Keenan, Manager, Site Security

W. Trombley, Senior Manager, Plant Engineering

H. Ray, Senior Manager, Design Engineering

G. Flesher, Shift Operations Superintendent

J. Chrisley, Regulatory Assurance Specialist

D. Moore, Regulatory Assurance Specialist

J. Kerr, Regulatory Assurance Specialist

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened/Closed

None

Opened

None

Closed

None