IR 05000219/2012008
| ML12272A204 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 09/28/2012 |
| From: | Hunegs G NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| To: | Pacilio M Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR-12-008 | |
| Download: ML12272A204 (19) | |
Text
UNITED STATES September 28, 2012
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2012008
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On August 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 31, 2012 with Mr. M. Massaro, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) which involved a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspectors at Oyster Creek Generating Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspectors at Oyster Creek Generating Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Gordon K. Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-219 License Nos.: DPR-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000219/2012008 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION I==
Docket No.: 50-219 License No.: DPR-16 Report No.: 05000219/2012008 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Oyster Creek Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Dates: August 13 - 17, 2012, and August 27 - 31, 2012 Inspectors: S. Barber, Senior Project Engineer, Team Leader A. Patel, Resident Inspector J. Ayala, Project Engineer E. Keighley, Project Engineer Approved By: Gordon Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000219/2012008, 08/13/2012 - 8/31/2012, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station;
Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors identified one finding in the area of problem identification and resolution.
This NRC team was performed by three regional inspectors and one resident inspector. The inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green), which was an NCV.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The cross-cutting aspects for the findings were determined using IMC 0310, Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green, or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors concluded that Exelon was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Exelon personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. In most cases, Exelon appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that Exelon typically implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in the corrective action program in a timely manner. However, the inspectors identified one violation of NRC requirements in the problem identification area.
The inspectors concluded that, in general, Exelon adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to Oyster Creek operations. In addition, based on those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that Exelons self-assessments and audits were thorough.
Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues nor did they identify any conditions that could have had a negative impact on the sites safety conscious work environment.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI,
Corrective Action, for Exelons failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, Exelon did not promptly identify and correct the impact of increased emergency diesel generator (EDG) loading on the committed three day fuel oil supply. Existing procedural guidance requires load management actions after 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> which provides reasonable assurance of EDG operability. Exelon corrective actions include additional load management actions to ensure fuel oil capacity is maintained. This condition has been placed in the Exelons corrective action program.
Exelons failure to promptly identify and correct an inadequate technical evaluation that did not determine the impact of increased EDG loading on the existing three day fuel oil supply was a performance deficiency. Inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the technical evaluation stated that #2 EDG loading could be as much as 2735 KW which translates to approximately 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> of fuel capacity with the storage tank at minimum capacity versus the required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The EDGs remain operable because they are capable of supplying accident loads with adequate load management actions after eight hours of operation. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, the Significance Determination Process for Findings for At-Power, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system or component (SSC) and the SSC maintains its operability. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, because Exelon did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary.
Specifically, Exelons technical evaluations 1145338 and 1365452 failed to adequately evaluate the impact of increased loads on the amount of available EDG fuel oil. Therefore, at the increased loads of 2735 KW, the EDGs would have only had 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> of the required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of fuel oil capacity. [P.1 (c)] [Section 4OA2.1.c.]
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.
.1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described Exelons corrective action program at Oyster Creek. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and Exelons procedure LS-AA-125, Corrective Action Program. For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the stations risk analysis and reviewed issue reports selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process. Additionally, the inspectors attended Station Ownership Committee and Management Review Committee meetings to assess screening and evaluation activities.
The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: operations, maintenance, engineering, work control, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and oversight programs.
1. Effectiveness of Problem Identification In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed corrective and preventive maintenance work orders, completed surveillance test procedures, operator logs, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of various systems on site, such as the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and core spray systems. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of issue reports written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that Exelon entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program, as appropriate.
2. Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of issue reports issued since the last NRC biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection completed in August 2010. The inspectors also reviewed issue reports that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues.
3. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors reviewed Exelons completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walk downs to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed issue reports for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed Exelons timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of issue reports associated with selected NCVs and findings to verify that Exelon personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years to evaluate Exelon actions related to EDG deficiencies and aspects of the work control system.
b.
Assessment 1. Effectiveness of Problem Identification Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that Exelon identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Exelon staff at Oyster Creek initiated approximately 17,000 issue reports between August 2010 and August 2012. The inspectors observed supervisors and managers at the Station Ownership Committee and Management Review Committee meetings appropriately questioning and challenging issue reports to ensure adequate clarification and completion of the issues identified in issue reports. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that Exelon trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in issue reports. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through this review were entered into the corrective action program, as appropriate. Additionally, inspectors concluded that personnel were identifying trends at low levels. In response to several questions and minor equipment observations identified by the inspectors during plant walkdowns, Exelon personnel promptly initiated issue reports and/or took immediate action to address the issues. The inspectors identified one example of more than minor significance where Exelon personnel were not effective in identifying a condition adverse to quality. This finding is documented in Section 4OA2.1.c.
2. Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors determined that, in general, Exelon appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem.
Exelon screened issue reports for operability and reportability, categorized the issue reports by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution.
The issue report screening process considered human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.
Based on the sample of issue reports reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance provided by Exelon corrective action program implementing procedures appeared sufficient to ensure consistency in categorization of issues. Operability and reportability determinations were generally performed when conditions warranted and in most cases, the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causal analyses appropriately considered the extent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue.
However, the inspectors did observe one instance of an inadequate extent of condition review:
Core Spray System II Pump Discharge Check Valve Flange Inadequate Thread Engagement The inspectors identified an issue with the bolting of a core spray system booster pump discharge check valve. Exelons procedure, 2400-GMM-3900.52, Inspection and Torquing of Bolted Connections, states, in part, minimum projection of a bolt through a nut shall be flush with a recommended projection of one or more threads. Previously, on April 11, 2011, Exelon identified that the core spray system I booster pump discharge check valve flange had two bolts which did not have adequate thread engagement because the two bolts were below flush with the nut (Issue Report 01201063).
Subsequently, Exelon completed an operability evaluation and determined that structural integrity was maintained with the two bolts recessed because the other 12 bolts had adequate thread engagement. During their extent of condition review, Exelon conducted walkdowns of other similar flanges within core spray system I and core spray system II.
Issue report 01201063 stated that the walkdowns did not identify any other bolts with inadequate thread engagement. However, during the August 15, 2012 walkdown, the inspectors identified that the core spray system II booster pump discharge check valve had a bolt that did not have adequate thread engagement. It was recessed approximately two threads below flush. The remaining bolts were verified to have adequate thread engagement. Exelon entered the issue into the CAP (Issue Report 01401476) and determined that structural integrity was maintained with the one bolt recessed because the other 13 bolts had adequate thread engagement.
The inspectors independently evaluated this issue for significance in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The inspectors determined that the failure to identify and correct the inadequate thread engagement of a bolt on the core spray system II booster pump discharge check valve flange was a performance deficiency. Although the core spray system II booster pump discharge check valve flange bolt did not meet adequate thread engagement per Exelon procedure 2400-GMM-3900.52, Exelon determined structural integrity and operability was maintained by the other 13 bolts. As operability was maintained and this was not considered to be a programmatic concern, the inspectors determined this issue to be of minor significance, and, as a result, it is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Exelon documented this issue in issue report 01401476.
3. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions
The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, Exelon identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC NCVs and findings since the last problem identification and resolution inspection were generally timely and effective.
However, the inspectors did have some observations related to Exelons corrective action implementation.
Issue Report Closure Documentation During review of closed issue reports, the inspectors identified that some reports did not include the appropriate documentation for closure. LS-AA-125 specifies that closure documentation should stand alone and be clear enough to identify that the corrective action, as intended, was completed satisfactorily. The inspectors independently evaluated this issue for significance in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. Although there was a procedural violation in three identified cases (Issue Reports 1029623, 1164296, 1105414), the licensee was able to provide other documentation to show that all of the intended actions had been completed. Thus, the inspectors determined this issue to be of minor significance, and, as a result, it is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Exelon generated issue report 1401973 to document this deficiency.
c. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for Exelons failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, Exelon did not promptly identify and correct the impact of increased emergency diesel generator (EDG) loading on the committed three day fuel oil supply. Existing procedural guidance requires load management actions after 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> which provides reasonable assurance of EDG operability. Exelon corrective actions include additional load management actions to ensure fuel oil capacity is maintained. This condition has been placed in the Exelons corrective action program.
Description.
Oyster Creek has a 15,150 gallon EDG fuel oil storage tank which was designed to provide three days of fuel supply. Technical Specification 3.7.C.4.A requires that at least 14,000 gallons of fuel oil be available in the EDG fuel oil storage tank. This requirement supports the design basis in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 9.5.4.1, which states, in part, the Diesel Generator Fuel Storage Tank was sized to provide three days of fuel supply. Calculation C-1302-862-5360-002, evaluated the tanks capacity and the usable volume and specified 14,393.2 gallons of fuel oil be available to meet this commitment because 393.2 gallons is considered unusable volume. This calculation indicates that there will be sufficient fuel oil for three days of operation assuming a diesel loading of 2500 KW.
On November 12 and 24, 2010, Exelon conducted Loss of Offsite Power/Loss of Coolant Accident (LOOP/LOCA) testing of the #2 EDG and #1 EDG, respectively. The test results indicated certain electrical breakers did not trip as designed or that the breakers were not tested. As a result, Exelon completed a technical evaluation, 1145338, Molded Case Circuit Breaker with Undervoltage Fitted Device Electrical Loading Evaluation, to document the impact of these loads on EDG loading. The inspectors identified Exelons evaluation appropriately documented the impact on EDG loading, but did not identify the impact of increased loading on EDG fuel oil consumption. In response to the inspectors observations, Exelon initiated issue report 1406825 and recalculated the EDG fuel oil consumption. This recalculation determined that 15,338 gallons of fuel oil would be needed to account for the operation of #2 EDG at the new elevated loading of 2735KW. As a result, the minimum fuel oil volume would only provide 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> operation instead of the required three day (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) supply. The EDGs remain operable because emergency procedures require load management actions after eight hours of operation. This condition was not previously identified by Exelon. The inspectors determined that there were previous opportunities available for Exelon to identify and correct the impact of the increased EDG loading on fuel oil consumption from 2010 to 2012. Specifically, the referenced technical evaluation was reviewed and revised by engineers on four separate occasions (Issue Reports 1139345, 1140832, 1145338, and 1365452) during this time period. The effect of the increased loading on fuel oil consumption was not identified in any of these instances.
Exelons corrective actions for this issue include developing a work group evaluation to determine the reason why the technical evaluation did not include the impact of increased loading on the EDG fuel oil consumption; revising plant procedures to ensure the effects of the additional EDG load are appropriately considered after eight hours of EDG operation; and developing lessons learned for this issue.
Analysis.
Exelons failure to promptly identify and correct an inadequate technical evaluation that did not determine the impact of increased EDG loading on the existing three day fuel oil supply was a performance deficiency. Inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the technical evaluation stated that #2 EDG loading could be as much as 2735 KW which translates to approximately 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> of fuel capacity with the storage tank at minimum capacity versus the required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The EDGs remain operable because they are capable of supplying accident loads with adequate load management actions after eight hours of operation. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, the Significance Determination Process for Findings for At-Power, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system or component (SSC) and the SSC maintains its operability.
The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, because Exelon did not thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolution addressed causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. Specifically, Exelons technical evaluations 1145338 and 1365452 failed to evaluate the impact of increased loads on the amount of available EDG fuel oil. Therefore, at the increased loads of 2735 KW, the EDGs would have only had 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> of the required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of fuel oil capacity. [P.1 (c)]
Enforcement.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, on November 28, 2010, Exelon failed to adequately evaluate the impact of increased EDG loading on the three day fuel oil supply. As a result, the #2 EDGs fuel storage tank only had 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> of fuel capacity at the increased loads specified in the technical evaluation (2735KW). Since this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into Exelon corrective action program (Issue Report 1406825) it is being treated as an NCV, consistent with the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000219/2012008-01, Failure to Adequately Evaluate the impact of Increased Emergency Diesel Generators Loading on the Volume of Available Fuel Oil )
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of issue reports associated with review of industry operating experience to determine whether Exelon appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to Oyster Creek and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that Exelon adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that Exelon appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that operating experience was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience was routinely discussed and considered during the conduct of Plan-of-the-Day meetings and pre-job briefs.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, departmental self-assessments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if Exelon entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether Exelon initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.
b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal Exelon assessments were generally critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that Exelon personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. Exelon completed these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. In general, the station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at Oyster Creek. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed the station Employee Concerns Program coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns.
The inspectors reviewed the Employee Concerns Program files to ensure that Exelon entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate, and that concerns that impacted plant safety were adequately investigated.
b. Assessment During interviews, Oyster Creek staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee Concerns Program. Based on these limited interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On August 31, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to M. Massaro, Site Vice President, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- M. Massaro, Site Vice-President
- R. Peak, Plant Manager
- G. Malone, Director, Engineering
- J. Barstow, Manager, Regulatory Assurance
- W. Lopkoff, Manager, Training Support
- G. Flesher, Shift Operations Superintendent
- J. Correll, Operations Shift Supervisor
- P. Olivieri, Supervisor, Operational Chemistry
- J. Graveman, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance
- H. Tritt, Supervisor, Electrical Design Engineering
- M. Sullivan, Work Management Pre-Defined Coordinator
- F. Meyer, Work Management Pre-Defined Coordinator
- J. Fleury, Sr. Operations Training Instructor
- J. Chrisley, Sr. Regulatory Specialist
- D. Moore, Regulatory Specialist
- M. Seeloff, Regulatory Specialist
- C. Holtzapple, Reactor Engineer
- K. Paez, Regulatory Specialist
- M. Mura, Chemist
- M. Basti, Engineering Analyst
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Opened and Closed
- 05000219/2012008-01 NCV Failure to Adequately Evaluate the impact of Increased Emergency Diesel Generators Loading on the Volume of Available Fuel Oil