ML23286A155

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Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR)
ML23286A155
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 10/13/2023
From: Noval W
Holtec Decommissioning International
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
HDI-OC-23-049
Download: ML23286A155 (110)


Text

Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus, 1 Holtec Blvd., Camden, NJ 08104 Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909 10 CFR 50.71(e)

October 13, 2023 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 Docket No. 50-219

Subject:

Oyster Creek Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR)

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4), Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) is required to report subsequent revisions to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) every 24 months. HDI has not made any changes to the OCNGS DSAR Revision 1 (Enclosure 1) since last submitted via CD-ROM and HDI letter HDI-OC 21-081 on October 15, 2021.

OCNGS DSAR Revision 1 reflects the current plant status which includes permanent cessation of operations, permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, and transfer of all fuel to dry storage on the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) located at the site.

If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Steven Johnston, Regulatory Assurance Manager at OCNGS, at (609) 971-4325.

There are no regulatory commitments in this letter.

Respectfully, William Noval Digitally signed by William Noval Date: 2023.10.13 11:12:28 -04'00' William Noval Director, Regulatory Affairs Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC HDI-OC-23-049 Page 1 of 2

Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus, 1 Holtec Blvd., Camden, NJ 08104 Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909

Enclosures:

Enclosure 1 - OCNGS DSAR Revision 1 Enclosure 2 - Site Plan, JC 19702, Revision 45 cc: NRC Regional Administrator - NRC Region I w/ Enclosures NRC Project Manager, NMSS - Oyster Creek w/ Enclosures NJDEP Manager Bureau of Nuclear Engineering w/ Enclosures HDI-OC-23-049 Page 2 of 2

Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus, 1 Holtec Blvd., Camden, NJ 08104 Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909 Enclosure 1 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Stations DSAR, Revision 1 HDI-OC-23-049

Oyster Creek DSAR Rev. 1

Oyster Creek DSAR Rev. 1 Table of Contents TOPIC PAGE CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT 7

1.1 INTRODUCTION

7 1.2 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION 7 1.2.1 Description of the Site 7 1.2.2 Description of the Facility 8 1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF AGENTS AND CONTRACTORS 12 CHAPTER 2 - SITE CHARACTERISTICS 13 2.1 GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY 13 2.1.1 Site Location and Description 13 2.2 NEARBY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND MILITARY FACILITIES 15 2.2.1 Industrial Locations 15 2.2.2 Other Facilities 15 2.2.3 Evaluation of Potential Accidents 15 2.3 METEOROLOGY 16 2.3.1 Regional Climatology 16 2.3.2 Local Meteorology 18 2.3.3 Onsite Meteorological Measurements Program 22 2.3.4 References 25 2.4 HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING 36 2.4.1 Hydrologic Descriptions 36 2.4.2 Floods 39 2.4.3 Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) on Streams and Rivers 39 2.4.4 Potential Dam Failures 39 2.4.5 Probable Maximum Flood From Hurricanes (PMH) 40 2.4.6 Probable Maximum Tsunami 41 2.4.7 Flooding Protection Requirements 41 2.4.8 Low Water Considerations 41 2.4.9 Dispersion, Dilution, and Travel Times of Accidental Releases of Liquid Effluents in 45 Surface Waters 2.4.6 Ground Water 46 2.4.7 References 53 2.5 GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING 63 2.5.1 Basic Geologic and Seismic Information 63 2.5.2 Vibratory Ground Motion 67 2.5.3 Stability of Subsurface Materials and Foundations 74 2.5.4 References 74 DSAR Rev 1, Page 2

Oyster Creek DSAR Rev. 1 Table of Contents TOPIC PAGE CHAPTER 3 -DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS 78 3.1 DESIGN CRITERIA 78 3.1.1 Conformance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria 78 3.2 MISSILE PROTECTION 80 3.2.1 Missile Selection and Description 80 3.2.2 References 81 CHAPTER 4 - RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 82 CHAPTER 5 - CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 83 5.1 Organizational Structure 83 5.1.1 Qualification of Plant Personnel 83 5.1.2 Safety Review Function 83 5.2 Training 84 5.3 OCNGS EMERGENCY PLAN 85 5.4 PLANT PROCEDURES 86 5.5 SECURITY PLAN 87 CHAPTER 6 - ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 88 APPENDIX A DEFUELED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SUPPLEMENT (AGING MGMT) 89 A.1.19 Fire Protection 89 A.1.20 Fire Water System 89 A.1.21 Aboveground Outdoor Tanks 90 A.1.26 Buried Pipe Program 90 A.1.31 Structures Monitoring Program 91 A.1.32 RG 1.127, Inspection of Water-Control Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants 91 A.2.2 Lubricating Oil Monitoring Activities 92 A.2.5 Periodic Inspection Program 92 A.5 LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENT LIST 93 DSAR Rev 1, Page 3

Oyster Creek DSAR Rev. 1 Table of Contents TOPIC PAGE APP B ADMIN CONTROLS RELOCATED FROM PERMANENTLY DEFUELED TECHNICAL 100 SPECIFICATIONS B.1 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS 102 B.2 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 104 B.3 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL 105 DSAR Rev 1, Page 4

OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 FIGURES TOPIC PAGE Figure 2.1-1 Aerial Photo 13 Figure 2.4-1 Regional Geological Cross-Section OCNGS 55 Figure 2.5-1 Site Specific Spectra, Horizontal Component 5% Damping 72 Figure 2.5-2 Site Specific Spectra, Vertical Component 5% Damping 73 5

OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 TABLES TOPIC PAGE Table 1.2-1 Principal Design Features 11 Table 2.3-1 Total Occurrences of Wind Direction Within A 22 1/2 Degree Direction Sector for 26 Various Wind Speed Ranges, Based on The Oyster Creek Meteorological Tower Data for February 1966 - February 1967 Table 2.3-2 Temperature Data at Pleasantville, New Jersey (1926-1955) 27 Table 2.3-3 Mean Monthly and Extreme Hourly Temperatures Based on Forked River 28 Meteorological Tower Data for The Period 1987-1990: 33 Ft Level Table 2.3-4 Diurnal Variation of Mean Hourly Temperature by Month Based on Forked River 29 Meteorological Tower Data for The Period 1987-1990: 33 Ft. Level Table 2.3-5 Frequency Distribution of Temperatures Based on Forked River Meteorological Tower 30 Data for The Period 1987-1990: 33 Ft Level Table 2.3-6 Mean Monthly and Extreme Hourly Dew Point Temperatures Based on Forked River 31 Meteorological Tower Data for The Period 1982-1983: 33 Ft Level Table 2.3-7 Diurnal Variation of Mean Hourly Temperature by Month Based on Forked River 32 Meteorological Tower Data for The Period 1982-1983: 33 Ft. Level Table 2.3-8 Frequency Distribution of Dew Point Temperature Based on Forked River 33 Meteorological Tower Data for The Period 1982-1983: 33 Ft Level Table 2.3-9 Percent Probabilities of Inversion Duration for Each Season, Based on The Forked 34 River Meteorological Tower Data for January 1990 - December 1990 Table 2.3-10 Seasonal Occurrences of Inversion* Breakdown** Based on The Forked River 35 Meteorological Tower Data for January 1990 - December 1990 Table 2.4-1 Observed Piezometric Surfaces 56 Table 2.4-2 Data(A) For Wells in Oyster Creek Generating Station Area 57 Table 2.4-3 Oyster Creek Typical Well Water Analysis 58 Table 2.4-4 Initial Groundwater Monitoring Network Monitor Well Completion Data 59 Table 2.4-5 Design Basis of Water Table Elevations for Site Buildings/Structures 60 Table 2.4-6 Flood Levels Versus Duration 61 Table 2.4-7 Ground Water Elevations During Probable Maximum Hurricane 62 Table 2.5-1 List of Earthquakes (Intensity Iv Or Greater) Within 250-Mile Radius Of Site 75 6

OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR), formerly known as the Updated Final Safety Analysis Review (UFSAR), is submitted by the licensee in support of the decommissioning for Oyster Creek Power Station in Lacey Township, New Jersey. Holtec Decommissioning International (HDI) owns and is responsible for the decommissioning of Oyster Creek Power Station.

The DSAR is the principal licensing source document describing the pertinent equipment, structures, systems, operational constraints and practices, accident analyses, and decommissioning activities associated with the existing defueled condition of Oyster Creek Power Station. As such, the DSAR is intended to serve in the same role as the Final Safety Analysis Report Oyster Creek Power Station during the periods of power operation between 1969 and 2018. The DSAR is applicable throughout the decommissioning and dismantlement of Oyster Creek Power Station. The decommissioning process is dynamic. The issuance of the DSAR does not alleviate the licensee from continuing to follow all required surveillances, procedures, technical specifications or similar documents, until those documents are officially modified using approved processes.

Drawings and figures of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) included or referenced in the DSAR, are included within the licensing basis of the facility only to the extent that they show SSCs that are described in the text of the DSAR. Other contents of drawings and figures may not reflect the current configuration of the facility and are not maintained.

The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) is a single unit facility. It is in Lacey Township, Ocean County, New Jersey, approximately two miles south of the community of Forked River. Initial criticality was achieved on May 3, 1969 and OCNGS was placed in commercial operation on December 23, 1969 under a Provisional Operating License. On July 2, 1991, the NRC issued a Full-Term Operating License (Facility Operating License No. DPR-16) which superseded the Provisional Operating License in its entirety. This License permitted steady-state reactor core power levels not in excess of 1930 megawatts (thermal) and was in effect until midnight on April 9, 2009 (Technical Specification Amendment 163). The plant was relicensed to operate for an additional 20 years but was shut down 11 years early.

The prime contractor for the plant was the General Electric Company. The General Electric Company utilized the services of Burns and Roe, Inc. for engineering support and construction management. The unit's steam was generated by a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR-2) with a Mark I type Containment designed by the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company under contract to Burns and Roe, Inc.

1.2 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION 1.2.1 Description of the Site The Oyster Creek site is located near the Atlantic Ocean within the State of New Jersey. The site, about 152 acres, is in Lacey Township, Ocean County, New Jersey, about two miles inland from the shore of Barnegat Bay and about seven miles west-north-west of Barnegat Light. The site is approximately nine miles south of Toms River, New Jersey, about fifty miles east of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and sixty miles south of Newark, New Jersey.

An Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) is designated for dry storage of spent fuel and greater than class C waste (GTCC). The ISFSI is licensed under Subpart K of 10 CFR Part 72.

The Barnegat Bay region of New Jersey is a well-known summer resort area, attracting visitors from much of the

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 Middle Atlantic seaboard. The population distribution of the area surrounding the site changes significantly from winter to summer with the influx of summer vacationers during the months of June, July and August. Details on population distribution and expected growth are presented in Section 2.l.

The region within 40 miles of the site encompasses approximately 2,700 square miles of land. At the time of the sites construction, the area had very little industry; in fact, within 40 miles of the site, approximately 75 percent of the land was forest, vacant land, or farmland. Only about 25 percent of the land was developed.

The site is in a meteorological transition zone between the continent and the ocean and the weather at the site is conditioned by this location. The prevailing winds are offshore. Thus, site weather is influenced on the average more by continental than by maritime weather.

The Island Beach peninsula and Long Beach Island provide a barrier between Barnegat Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. This barrier, along with the shallowness of the Bay, minimizes tidal fluctuations in the Bay. A survey immediately north of the Oyster Creek site at Forked River showed a high tide elevation of 4.5 feet above mean sea level (MSL). Grade level at the site is 23 feet above MSL which is well above the 4.5 feet recorded, and there is no record of the site area being flooded or inundated even during storms with high tidal conditions.

Water supplies in the area surrounding the site are derived from wells. Wells in the area generally are 60 to 70 or more feet in depth to preclude contamination from salt water intrusion or the many septic tanks in the area.

The Oyster Creek site lies in an area known geologically as the coastal plain.

Buildings and structures are founded generally in Cohansey sand. Compression tests in the Reactor Building and Turbine Building areas, using 2.5 times the normal design loadings and l.5 times the earthquake design loadings, gave satisfactory deflections.

1.2.2 Description of the Facility Station status is continually changing during decommissioning. Current information on systems, radiological conditions and demolition progress is maintained by the Radiation Protection and Decommissioning organizations respectively. The principal station structure is the ISFSI Operating Facility (IOF) and ISFSI.

The sites legacy buildings include the reactor building, turbine building, intake structure, OCAB, Low Level Radwaste Facility and Site Emergency Building. All are located outside of the Protected Area. Some specific system descriptions have been removed from the DSAR as all spent fuel has been removed from the Spent Fuel Pool to the ISFSI pad and these SSC no longer have a design function.

  • Reactor Building The Reactor Building is constructed entirely of reinforced concrete to the refueling floor level at El. 119'-3".

Above the refueling floor, the structure is steel framework with insulated, corrosion resistant metal siding. The foundation mat is 146 feet by 146 feet and about 10 feet thick. The building housed all the primary systems that supported normal reactor operations and housed the refuel floor. The reactor building no longer has a design function.

o Torus While the Torus will no longer provide its primary containment function, it has become the primary tank for collection and processing radioactive water within the plant and due to its location any leak that may occur on the torus would be retained within the reactor building.

  • Turbine Building The Turbine Building is a reinforced concrete structure directly to the west of the Reactor Building. The building
  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 is about 265 feet long and 171 feet wide. The foundation mat is 6 feet to 8 feet thick and the finished top is at El.

0'-0". The Turbine Building foundation mat overlaps the Reactor Building mat where the two buildings abut.

Concrete walls extend from the basement levels to the operating floor at El. 46'-6" (about 23' above grade). Steel framework and insulated metal siding are used over the Turbine Generator area. The Turbine Building contains the plant Control Room, and electrical equipment. The turbine building no longer has a design function.

  • Office Building The Office Building is a three-story concrete structure between the Turbine Building and the Reactor Building.

The building houses offices, a laboratory area, showers, locker rooms and provides a secondary access to controlled areas. A switchgear room and one battery room are also contained in this building. The office building no longer has a design function.

  • Intake and Discharge Structures The 100-foot-wide discharge canal empties into Barnegat Bay following the general course of Oyster Creek. The discharge canal still allows for the discharge of water from the plant.
  • Transmission System 34.5 kV System Connections The 34.5 kV Oyster Creek substation has two parallel buses (Buses A & B) with a tie breaker between them. Each of the buses can be supplied by a separate line from other JCP&L substations. Startup Transformer Bank No. 5 is powered from Bus B and Startup Transformer Bank No. 6 is powered from Bus A. The Startup Transformers are the normal sources of offsite power for the station. Either of the two startup transformers has been provided with more than enough capacity to carry the auxiliary power load. As site decommissioning proceeds site power will be transferred to the original construction power sources for the site.

The 1E1 Unit Substation at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station receives power from either the 34.5kV line R144, which is the preferred line, or the 19.9kV line J69361, the alternate source, which originate in the Oyster Creek 34.5kV substation. The following facilities receive power from the 1E1 Unit Substation:

Redundant Fire Pump House Various additional loads used during decommissioning

1. Reduce the likelihood and occurrence of fires.
2. Promptly detect and extinguish fires if they occur.

Description In September 2018, Oyster Creek certified to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) that fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor vessel. With this certification, 10 CFR 50.48(f) became applicable to the fire protection

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 program. Subsequently, Amendment No. 295 to the Renewed Facility License DPR-16 deleted the fire protection program as a License Condition. The fire protection program is now maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(f).

These programs address both the site and the ISFSI

  • Potable and Sanitary Water System The objective of the potable and sanitary water system is to provide treated water suitable for drinking and for sanitary purposes.
  • Sanitary Waste System The Sanitary Waste System is designed to collect all plant sanitary drains and direct them to a controlled collection point.
  • Ventilation Systems The plant ventilation systems provide for basic climate control to the site buildings. Heat for the main plant buildings is no longer supplied by a heating boiler but with portable electric heating as required. The plant ventilation systems no longer have a design function.
  • Ventilation Stack The 394-foot reinforced concrete stack (368 feet above grade) is linked by tunnels to the Reactor Building and Turbine Building.

The top of the stack foundation mat is at El. (-)3'-0". Exhaust fans for the ventilating ducts are located outdoors at grade level, and discharge to the stack above the second-floor level.

  • Storage Tanks The largest tanks, used during decommissioning, are the Redundant Fire Water Tank, and Demineralized Water Storage Tank. The locations of these and other yard tanks are shown in Drawing JC 19702.
  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 TABLE 1.2-1 PRINCIPAL DESIGN FEATURES Site Location Oyster Creek, New Jersey Size of Site Approximately 152 acres

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF AGENTS AND CONTRACTORS The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) was designed and constructed by the General Electric Company Atomic Power Equipment Department as a turnkey project. Burns and Roe Inc. is the Architect-Engineer of record.

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 CHAPTER 2 - SITE CHARACTERISTICS ARCHIVED TEXT 2.1 GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY 2.1.1 Site Location and Description The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) is located on the coastal pine barrens of New Jersey in Lacey, Ocean County. U.S. Route 9 divides the property. There are 152 acres west of Route 9. The plant site is located to the west of Route 9, and is bounded on the north by the South Branch of Forked River and on the south by Oyster Creek. Barnegat Bay forms the eastern site boundary and the Garden State Parkway the western site boundary. Figure 2.1-1 is an aerial photograph of the OCNGS site and environs.

Figure 2.1-1 Aerial Photo

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT Oyster Creek is situated approximately midway between Oyster Creek and the South Branch of Forked River and about 1400 feet west of Route 9. Route 9 provides access to the site.

Approximately 352 acres of land onsite were used during station construction. This includes 22 acres for the generating station and auxiliary facilities, 8.5 acres for the emergency fire pond, and 33.5 acres for railroad, transmission right-of-way, and spoil areas due to dredging of the South Branch of Forked River and Oyster Creek.

The site is approximately 35 miles north of Atlantic City, New Jersey and 45 miles east of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. North of the site are several residential communities, Toms River, South Toms River, Bayville Beachwood, Pine Beach, Ocean Gate, Island Heights, Gilford Park and Lacey Township. South of the site are several other residential communities, Waretown, Barnegat and Stafford Township West of the Garden State Parkway the land is undeveloped woodland, and wooded wetlands are found along the banks of small creeks to the north, south, and west of the site. East of the station along the shoreline of Barnegat Bay, the land is residentially developed for year-round and seasonal use. The terrain surrounding the site is relatively flat along the shoreline to gently rolling inland. About 4 miles inland just west of the Garden State Parkway, the terrain rises to heights in the range of 65 to 90 feet above mean sea level.

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT 2.2 NEARBY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND MILITARY FACILITIES 2.2.1 Industrial Locations Within 10 miles of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS), there are over 35 industrial facilities.

An estimated 1,800 individuals were employed there.

2.2.2 Other Facilities

  • Waterways The nearest navigable waterway to the OCNGS is Barnegat Bay. This body of water is relatively shallow. The average depth is less than 5 feet with a range of less than 1 foot to 20 feet at mean low tide. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains the Intracoastal Waterway, which crosses Barnegat Bay at a depth of 6 feet, mean water line.

The Intracoastal Waterway is used by pleasure craft and commercial fishing boats.

  • Airports There are 10 airport facilities within 20 miles of the OCNGS. The closest of these is a seaplane base some seven miles southeast.

Two Restricted Areas are within 20 miles, but none within 10 miles.

2.2.3 Evaluation of Potential Accidents

  • Aircraft Accidents Aircraft strike probabilities were estimated for three size categories including small general aviation, medium sized commercial, and large (heavy) commercial or military aircraft. The nearest airports of significance are at Lakehurst, 16 miles north-northwest and McGuire Air Force Base about 24 miles northwest. At these distances, there is no significant hazard due to landing and takeoff activities. Low level military training routes in the area must be kept more than five miles from the plant by agreement between the military and the NRC. There is little traffic along these routes, and at this distance they represent an extremely low hazard to the plant.

Based on evaluation of the available information on air traffic conditions at the site, it was concluded that the only significant hazard is from the traffic along the V312 airway, as shown on Figure 2.2-2, and general aviation in the area. Probabilities for a strike on the plant were developed for three sizes of aircraft based on available traffic information for each size. The largest mean frequency is from general aviation at 4.0 x 10-7.

  • Explosions Possible sources of explosions are essentially limited to transportation accidents. Explosion of chemicals being transported along Route 9 or the Parkway (the railroad along Route 9 is no longer in use) would present the only significant hazard in this regard. Route 9 is located about 400 meters east at its closest approach and the Parkway is located more than 1,000 meters west. Portions of the Parkway are closed to trucks; therefore, little through truck traffic passes the plant. There are no shipping channels near the plant.

Based on NRC Regulatory Guide 1.91 and information received from the New Jersey Department of Highways, the probability of explosions was estimated at 1.5 x 10-8 (mean frequency).

A commitment has been obtained from the New Jersey State Police (NJ State Police Interoffice Memo, April 13,

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT 1992) which requires their duty officer or hazardous material emergency response personnel to promptly notify the OC Shift Manager (SM) or OC Control Room with the characteristics of an incident involving hazardous material in Lacey or Ocean Township and provide further information on any significant changes. Upon receiving the call from the New Jersey State Police Duty Officer, the SM will reference OC Procedure ABN-33, "Toxic Material/Flammable Gas Release " for appropriate actions.

In 1990, two natural gas pipelines were installed in the vicinity of Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). One pipeline is a 16-inch diameter line which runs parallel to Route 9 on the east side of the plant. This pipeline is outside the plant exclusion zone except where it crosses the intake and discharge canals. The other pipeline is a 16-inch line that branches off the main line at a point North of the plant. The branch line runs roughly adjacent to the north side of the intake canal to the combustion turbines dispatched by FirstEnergy.

USNRC Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topic II-1C for Oyster Creek evaluated the impact of a 6 inch and 8 inch diameter natural gas pipeline also located along Route 9 at one quarter mile from the plant and concluded that the pipelines do not pose a significant hazard to the plant due to the distance involved. While the newly installed gas lines are larger in diameter and were pressurized to higher pressures than those analyzed by NRC, it is reasonable to conclude that the primary factors which influenced NRC's conclusion of no hazard (i.e., distance from the plant and low probability of failure) would result in a similar conclusion for the new installation.

Also, NUREG 0014 comprising the USNRC safety assessment for the Construction of TVA Hartsville Nuclear Plants concluded that the existence of a pipeline in the vicinity represents no undue threat to the safe operation of the proposed facility and that accidents occurring to that pipeline need not be considered in the design of the plant.

This conclusion was based on the extensive research study performed for TVA, "Mechanic's Research Inc. Nuclear Power Plant Risks from a Natural Gas Pipeline, a Research Study Performed for TVA, August 1974".

The differences between the gas line at the TVA plant and the one at Oyster Creek are as follows:

  • The distance from the gas line to the plant is approximately one-half mile versus approximately one quarter mile at Oyster Creek.
  • The diameter of the pipeline is 22 inches versus 16 inches at Oyster Creek.
  • The working pressure is 720 psi versus 350 psi (up to 550 psi in the future, in the main line) at Oyster Creek.

As shown in "Mechanic's Research Inc. Nuclear Power Plant Risks from a Natural Gas Pipeline, a Research Study Performed for TVA, August 1974", (Risk Assessment Summary Table) the probability of a pipeline accident affecting the TVA facilities is of an order of magnitude of 10-7 or less. Taking the above differences into consideration, a qualitative judgement can be made that the USNRC conclusions listed in NUREG-0014 are applicable for the Oyster Creek facility.

2.3 METEOROLOGY 2.3.1 Regional Climatology

  • General Climate The Oyster Creek site is on the Central Atlantic Coast and has a basically continental climate somewhat modified by its immediate coastal location. The characteristics of the climate in the region of the site, as represented by more than 30 years of record at the Atlantic City National Weather Service (NWS) Station located on the coast 35 miles south-
  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT southwest of the site. The data represent monthly averages of temperature, prevailing winds, maximum wind speeds, precipitation and sky cover.

During winter there is a predominance of winds from the northwest. During summer, however, prevailing winds are from the southwest. Often during the summer, the "sea breeze" phenomenon results in onshore circulation during late morning through early afternoon.

The site is subject to some heavy winter storms and in the summer, to tropical storms which move up the coast, usually offshore. The prevailing direction of winds above 40 mph is from the ENE at Atlantic City. The Atlantic City NWS Station reported its fastest speed as 91 mph from the northeast during the month of September 1944. In general, during periods of precipitation, there appears to be a higher frequency of northeasterly winds. The existence of coastal low type storms which travel along the Atlantic Coast towards New England account for a good percentage of these northeast winds, as well as precipitation.

The average annual precipitation is about 42 inches in the region of the site, with monthly averages between three and five inches. Maximum precipitation in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> was about 9 inches for Atlantic City.

  • Regional Meteorological Conditions for Design and Operating Bases o Hurricanes Historic accounts of early American hurricanes affecting the New Jersey - New York area date back to the 17th Century. More than 80 tropical hurricanes or their remnants have affected the coastal area of New Jersey since 1889.

In recent years, some of the more severe storms which have passed over or near the area have been hurricanes Hazel" in October 1954, "Connie" and "Diane" in August, 1955, and "Donna" in September 1960. The "Great Atlantic Hurricane" of September 1944 passed directly over the New Jersey shoreline in its northward movement.

The relative hurricane frequency for the area is roughly one occurrence every 1.8 years. In general, record hurricanes passing over the site study area have had central pressures of from 27.8 to 28.5 inches and peak wind speeds over the ocean approaching 100 mph. The forward speed of the more severe hurricanes, following recurvature in the middle latitudes, has ranged from 15 to 40 knots.

Hurricanes which, at some stage of their development, caused major damage and passed with centers closer than 100 miles to the site during the period from 1935 to 1967, inclusive, were as follows. (Reference 1)

Hurricane Approximate Closest Approach Name Date of Hurricane Center to Oyster Creek Sit None September 14-15, 1944 30 miles SE None October 21, 1944 60 miles SE*

None September 18-19, 1945 70 miles NW*

None August 29, 1948 100 miles NW*

Carol August 31, 1954 50 miles E Edna September 11, 1954 100 miles SE Diane August 19, 1955 40 miles N*

Donna September 12, 1960 40 miles SE Alma June 13, 1966 100 miles E Post hurricane stage when near site.

The Atlantic City NWS recorded its highest wind velocity of 91 mph during the September 1944 storm.

The ASCE Task Committee Report No. 3269 "Wind Forces on Structures", shows the site area as having potentially a fastest mile wind of 100 mph for a 100 year period of recurrence.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT Analysis of the Probable Maximum Flood level as a result of Probable Maximum Hurricane for the site is provided in Reference (13), with results summarized in Subsection 2.4.5.

o Tornadoes National Weather Service records indicate that 33 tornadoes occurred in New Jersey between 1920 and 1967.

Four of these tornadoes were in Ocean County. Two of these passed across the northern corner of the county about 25 miles northwest of the site. The other two occurred at the northern end of Barnegat Bay, near Mantoloking, in June 1958 and July 1960. They are described as follows:

At 4 PM on July 1, 1960, a waterspout developed over Barnegat Bay. It moved across the bridge on State Highway 528 at Mantoloking, then continued across the Bay, passing northward over Bay Head and into the Atlantic Ocean. Two buildings were unroofed, several boats overturned and power lines damaged. The path length was about 2 miles and the width 50 yards. The tornado affected an area of about 0.06 square miles, 16 miles north of the site.

At 5:45 PM on June 13, 1958, five funnel clouds were observed moving eastward over Barnegat Bay near Mantoloking. They joined and hit the narrow strip of land on which Mantoloking is located. There was damage to the windows, roofs and television antennas of a number of buildings. The path length was about one half mile and a width of about 150 yards. The tornado affected an area of about 0.04 square miles, about 16 miles north of the site. (Reference 2)

A total of 25 tornadoes were reported during 23 separate days of the period 1916-1958 (Reference 3). The following is taken from the same reference and represents the occurrence of tornadoes for each month during 1916-1958.

Month: J F M A M J J A S O ND 0 4 6 Total Tornadoes 0 1 4 3 4 1 1 10 0 3 5 Tornado Days 0 1 4 3 4 1 1 10 Refence (10) provides an analysis of Oyster Creek tornado hazard probabilities for the site, based on New Jersey and neighboring state tornadoes of the eight year period 1971 through 1978; then it compares these results to previous other more generalized estimates which have been made for the site.

2.3.2 Local Meteorology This section provides information on the local meteorological conditions which exist at and near the site. These include wind, temperature and temperature inversion data summaries.

  • Winds o Frequency of Recurrence by Speed and Direction Over the five-year period, 1977 through 1981, SSW through NNW wind directions occurred about 50 percent of the time. Calm winds (i.e., winds with speeds less than 3.5 mph) occurred 11 percent of the time. All other wind directions occurred about 30 percent of the time. Note that NE through S winds (i.e., onshore winds) occurred about 25 percent of the time.

The 380 ft level wind rose shows a similar distribution of winds to the 33 ft level annual wind rose. As may be expected, calm winds occur much less often at the 380 ft level (only 1.2 percent of the time).

Forked River Tower wind roses for the most recent available years of data collection are presented in Section 2.2.3.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT o Wind Persistence The duration of time over which the wind continuously blows in a given direction (22 1/2-degree sector) for various wind speed ranges is given in Table 2.3-1. The table includes durations of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and more, as taken from a one-year Oyster Creek tower data base, February 1966-February 1967. (Data from the 400 ft tower level were utilized here, since the elevated release point is about the same height above ground).

There were 127 cases where the wind stayed within a 22 1/2-degree sector for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. The maximum duration of 28 consecutive hours occurred with an average wind speed of over 25 mph. There were no cases with speeds less than 3 mph. In fact, only two cases occurred in the 4-7 mph range, one of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> duration and one of 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> duration. Most of the occurrences were in the 19-24 mph range.

o Sea Breeze The sea breeze is a local circulation induced by density and pressure differences associated with differences in thermal characteristics between land and water surfaces. The sea breeze is also affected by topographical features such as terrain and the shape of the coastline. It is a phenomenon that is strongly influenced by transient weather systems which may entirely negate or amplify its existence. The sea breeze, represented as a mass of marine air (air which takes on the characteristics of air over the ocean), may be only 100-300 feet in depth or possibly as much as about 3,000 feet.

There usually is a seasonal preference for the summer months since the temperature difference between land and water surfaces is at its greatest at this time.

By virtue of its coastal location, the Oyster Creek Site is subject to this sea breeze phenomenon. An analysis of the character of the sea breeze as it occurs at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, based on five years (1977-1981) of Forked River meteorological tower data, is provided in Reference (11).

  • Temperature Table 2.3-2 presents temperature data from the New Jersey Agricultural Station at Pleasantville, New Jersey, located 33 miles south-southwest down the coastline from the Oyster Creek site.

Ambient temperature in the immediate vicinity of the site is continuously monitored at the 33 ft level of the Forked River meteorological tower. Table 2.3-3 provides mean monthly and extreme hourly temperatures observed during the period, January 1982 through December 1983. Data recovery percentages are also included. Table 2.3-4 describes the diurnal temperature variation, averaged by month, as well as annually over the entire 1982 through 1983 period. Table 2.3-5 provides a gross distribution of the occurrence frequency of temperatures at the site during the two year period.

Table 2.3-6 provides mean monthly and extreme hourly dew point temperatures and dew point data recovery rates for 1982 through 1983. The months of lower recovery percentages were, in large measure, due to an occasionally malfunctioning dew point sensor and the self cleaning mechanism of the dew point system. Since late 1982, intensified maintenance has improved the dewpoint recovery rate. Table 2.3-7 displays the month to month diurnal variation in dew point. Occurrence frequencies of dew point temperatures measured during the two year period appear in Table 2.3-8.

Dew point temperature sensors, originally installed in 1974, remained in full service until December 1989. At that time, the dew point temperature sensing monitors failed and because replacement parts were no longer available, dew point temperature monitoring was discontinued. Ambient temperatures from each sensor, however, continued to be monitored.

In June, 1994, the ambient temperature monitoring section of both sensors failed. Because dew point temperature

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT data are neither required nor useful and replacement parts for the instrumentation are out of production and stock, the dew point temperature systems remained out of service and the instrumentation is retired.

  • Fog A five year record from the Atlantic City NWS Station, approximately 35 miles south-southwest of the site, indicates the annual average number of hours in which dense fog occurred was 155 hours0.00179 days <br />0.0431 hours <br />2.562831e-4 weeks <br />5.89775e-5 months <br />. Dense fog is defined as a fog which restricts visibility to less than three eighths of a mile.
  • Temperature Inversion Conditions o Inversion Frequency During nighttime hours, the ground cools more rapidly than the overriding air, forming a nocturnal temperature inversion with its base at the ground.

Inversion frequencies for the coast of New Jersey for each season, as well as annually, have been determined by Hosler (Reference 4). They are as follows:

Winter Spring Summer Fall Annual Frequency: 20% 20% 18% 24% 21%

These represent the percentage of total hours in each season. At the site, however, inversion frequencies are higher than those of Hosler. In fact, based on a one year period of data taken between February 1966 and February 1967 at the former Oyster Creek tower, about 64 percent of the time very stable (i.e., vertical temperature lapse rate greater than 0.8°F per 100 ft) and moderately stable (i.e., vertical temperature lapse rate between -0.3 and 0.8°F per 100 ft) classifications were observed between 12 and 400 feet. This compares with 21 percent for Hosler. Actually, part of this difference is that Hosler defines an inversion as an increase in temperature within 500 feet elevation above the ground. The moderately stable category used above to classify the Oyster Creek data actually includes some data that were in the neutral (slight decrease in temperature with height) category defined by Hosler. This results in a higher frequency of stable cases than that determined by Hosler.

Table 2.3-9 shows the cumulative percent probability of inversion duration for February 1966 through February 1967. The cases considered inversion durations up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Only one case occurs in a day, so that the total cases actually represent the number of inversion days. Vertical temperature gradients of 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25°F in the 12 to 400 ft layer were used to classify inversions with respect to strength. There were 315 days during which an inversion occurred. The inversion with the greatest strength occurred on October 28, 1966 and had a vertical temperature gradient of 26.1°F over the 388 ft layer.

There were four occurrences during the year which had inversion durations longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. One occurred during the fall and lasted 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The remainder occurred during winter and lasted 46, 45 and 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> each.

Inversion in this case is defined as any positive temperature difference in the 12 to 400 ft layer but includes isothermal conditions.

Table 2.3-9 presents this in tabular form for inversion durations of 5, 10 and 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. For example, an inversion of 5°F during spring has a 65 percent probability of lasting at least 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, 42 percent at 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and less than 1 percent for a 15 hour1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> duration.

Table 2.3-9 also shows that inversions persist longer during the fall and winter. This is to be expected since, during the warmer months, the air becomes more unstable due to surface heating and vertical mixing.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT o Inversion Breakdown Definition A stack release into an inversion results in a plume with little or no vertical displacement, but some horizontal meandering. That is, the plume often stays aloft, not reaching ground level for many miles. After sunrise, the ground is heated rapidly with the result that the layer of air near the surface becomes unstable. This unstable layer deepens such that the once surface based inversion has its base lifted.

The condition known as "fumigation" starts when the convection eddies within the mixing layer cause the lower part of the plume to rapidly mix downward. At this point the upper part of the plume is relatively undisturbed.

Fumigation ends when the top of the mixing layer (this is actually the base of the old inversion) passes through the upper side of the plume.

The inversion breakdown occurs over an extensive area due to the solar radiation warming the land surface.

Therefore, the conditions necessary for fumigation occur over this same area. The entire plume, which has drifted downwind in the stable air before sunrise, will be subjected to fumigation at about the same time, even when a considerable distance from the stack.

Duration and Frequency The duration of fumigation depends upon the rate that the mixing layer deepens as the nocturnal inversion is dissipated. The more rapid the rise of the mixing layer, the shorter will be the duration of possible fumigation.

The Oyster Creek site data exhibit conditions that are necessary for fumigation to take place. Existing knowledge on this phenomenon indicates that fumigation may last a few minutes to about 15 minutes.

Prior to determination of fumigation frequency of occurrence, meteorological criteria were determined. Stability change over a certain time period is the most important indicator of fumigation. Once the vertical temperature difference within a layer goes from stable to lapse (unstable), fumigation can occur. But the inversion breakdown must proceed from the ground upward. Table 2.3-10 shows the seasonal occurrences of inversion breakdown:

surface up, top down, and both surface up and top down.

Another factor to consider is the time that the atmosphere takes to switch from very stable to very unstable. The more rapid this change or "crossover", the more significant would be the effect due to fumigation. There were 226 days during the year when an inversion of at least 5°F existed. On 11 of these days, the inversion dissipated very slowly so as to mitigate a possible occurrence of fumigation.

A total of 76 days had an inversion breaking from the surface upwards. Assuming that fumigation lasts for about 15 minutes or less, a total of 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> in the year could possibly experience fumigation. Most of these hours occurred during the spring and summer. A seasonal breakdown is as follows:

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT Winter Spring Summer Fall Hours 2.25 6.5 8.25 2.0 Wind Direction During Inversion Breakdown The wind direction during inversion breakdown was offshore with the predominant direction being WNW. This offshore (land toward sea) wind direction during the inversion breakdown is typical of nocturnal surface based inversions at seacoast locations. However, once the inversion is weakened or broken down, the wind direction is then subject to thermal and pressure gradients consistent with daytime differential heating of land and water surfaces. In the cases examined from the site data, wind direction did not change significantly until after the breakdown period. Of course, this local air circulation is complicated greatly when transient weather systems travel across the area, and, in fact, they usually mask out this effect entirely.

Example of Breakdown of Nocturnal Inversion A review of the time history of meteorological data taken at the 400 foot tower on May 4 and 5, 1966. It includes wind speed and direction at 75 and 400 feet, surface temperature (12 feet) and temperature differences from surface to 75, 200 and 400 feet, respectively.

Several noteworthy features should be pointed out. Looking at the temperature difference traces, the air appears very stable during the nighttime hours followed by instability after sunrise and continuing through the day. The diurnal effect of the vertical temperature structure from the surface to 400 feet is quite apparent.

The vertical wind profile also exhibits a diurnal effect, although not as evident as the diurnal temperature change.

During early morning on May 4, the wind at 400 feet attains a speed more than double that at 75 feet. At sunrise, however, the speeds at the two levels approach the same value and stay about the same during the daylight hours.

Then near sunset, the speeds become similar to those that were observed before sunrise.

These diurnal differences can be explained by a brief discussion of turbulence. During the daytime, the energy due to moving air is transported downwards through the process of convection or turbulent exchange. Usually this results in a decrease of wind speed at the upper level and an increase at the lower level so that the speeds are quite similar. At night, however, the turbulence due to convection (eddy motions of various sizes) diminishes as the air stratifies thermally. This sets up the difference in speeds (wind shear) between the upper and lower levels.

Wind speed during the night of May 4 was typical of very stable air and fairly low wind speeds, which were due to a change in the pressure pattern in the area as a weather system approached. Even though the winds were influenced by the changing pressure pattern during the night of May 4, the thermal stability apparently was not affected very much until early evening on May 5 when the daytime instability approached isothermal stratification. During May 5, the wind speed increased at both 75 and 400 feet as the weather system approached.

The wind direction on May 4 was predominantly northwesterly. On the morning of May 5, the direction backed (moved counterclockwise) to a south-southwest direction with the approach of the transient weather system.

2.3.3 Onsite Meteorological Measurements Program

  • Meteorological Towers The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station was served by the meteorological tower located on the nearby Forked River Plant site to obtain weather related data. Prior to this, during licensing, construction and the early years of operation, meteorological data were obtained from an onsite tower.
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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT o Forked River The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station has obtained meteorological data from the Forked River meteorological tower since July 1976. The tower is 400 feet tall and located west-northwest of the site at a distance of 2529 feet from the Oyster Creek stack.

The meteorological tower is instrumented at three levels: 380 ft, 150 ft and 33 ft above ground. The instrumentation and meteorological variables measured at each level during the 1977-1981 period are shown in Table 2.3-11. The variables are measured every 10 seconds and are averaged for 15 minute periods before being archived.

There are redundant wind speed, wind direction, and temperature sensors at all three tower levels to ensure efficient data recovery and to comply with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.23, Revision 1 requirements. In addition, a processor calculates vertical temperature differentials between the 150 and 33 ft, and the 380 and 33 ft levels. All readings are continuously recorded. In addition, all data are processed via the Plant Process Computer, which is routinely accessed by the Control Room.

The meteorological tower sensors, recorders, and processors are calibrated at least semi-annually as per Regulatory Guide 1.23, Revision 1. Periodic tower inspections are made to insure maximum data integrity. In addition, all data are processed via the Plant Process Computer, which is routinely accessed by the Control Room.

o Oyster Creek From February 1966 through June 1976, data were continuously recorded from instruments mounted on a 400 foot tower, located in relatively flat terrain in a cleared area approximately 1200 feet west-southwest of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Reactor Building. There were no trees for a radius of at least 300 feet and the nearest large structures were about 1000 feet to the east-northeast. Measurements may have been slightly affected by the proximity of structures in the east-northeast direction sector, however, no pronounced effect on speed or direction range measurements were found by inspection of the data.

Table 2.3-12 gives the type of instrument, the instrument accuracy, the instrument location, and the data recorded on the previous meteorological tower (1966 - 1976).

  • Onsite Joint Wind Stability Frequencies Joint frequency distributions of wind and stability conditions measured on both the Forked River and Oyster Creek meteorological towers are provided. Atmospheric stability is classified as A through G, according to the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.23, Revision 1 method given in Table 2.3-13.

o Forked River A summary of annual results of an analysis of wind and stability data taken on the Forked River meteorological tower during 1982 and 1983 is provided in Tables 2.3-14, 2.3-16, 2.3-18, 2.3-20, 2.3-22, and 2.3.23.

Table 2.3-14 provides 1990 annual joint wind stability distributions for each stability class (A through G), utilizing 33 ft measurement level wind data, and 150 to 33 ft temperature difference stability data. Table 2.3-16 gives the 33 ft level wind distributions for all stability classes combined for 1990.

Tables 2.3-22 and 2.3-23 present the combined 1987-1990 monthly and annual occurrence frequency distributions of each stability class as derived from the 150 to 33 ft and 380 to 33 ft temperature difference data sets, respectively.

o Oyster Creek

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 ARCHIVED TEXT Joint wind stability frequency distributions using the Oyster Creek meteorological tower data for January 1968 through December 1968 are shown in Tables 2.3-24 through 2.3-26.

Table 2.3-24 provides joint frequency distributions of wind speed, wind direction and stability for wind data taken at 75 ft and vertical temperature difference between 75 ft and 12 ft. Table 2.3-25 provides the distribution for wind at 75 ft and vertical temperature difference between 200 and 75 ft. Table 2.3-26 provides the distribution for wind at 400 ft and vertical temperature difference between 400 and 12 ft.

Joint data recovery rates for wind and stability data provided in Tables 2.3-24 through 2.3-26 are 84 percent, 84 percent and 92 percent, respectively.

The measured wind speeds have been corrected according to the calibration curves measured for a typical three bladed Aerovane. Wind tunnel tests with this type of anemometer have shown that the indicated speed is lower than the true wind speed when the true wind speed is below 4 miles per hour. The corrections are as follows:

Indicated Wind Speed (mph) True Wind Speed (mph) 0.0 0.00 0.5 2.25 1.0 2.40 1.5 2.50 2.0 2.70 2.5 3.00 3.0 3.30 3.5 3.75 4.0 4.00

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 2.3.4 References (1) U.S. Weather Bureau; Some Devastating North Atlantic Hurricanes of the 20th Century; pub. LS 6303; January 1963.

(2) U.S. Weather Bureau; Storm Data-1959 through 1962.

(3) Tornadoes; AIA Technical Reference Guide 13-2.

(4) Hosler, C.R.; "Low Level Inversion Frequency in the Contiguous United States", Monthly Weather Review, 89(9): 319-339; 1961.

(5) Deleted (6) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.23, Revision 1, Meteorological Monitoring Programs for Nuclear Power Plants.

(7) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.111, Revision 1, Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water-Cooled Reactors.

(8) Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report, and Amendments.

(9) Fuquay, JJ, Simpson, C. L., and Hinds, W.T., Prediction of Environmental Exposures from Sources Near the Ground, Based on Harford Environmental Data, Journal of Applied Meteorology, Volume 3, No. 6 (December 1964).

(10) The Berkley Township Tornado: A reassessment of the Tornado Hazard Probability for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Old Appendix 2.3A)

(11) An Investigation of the Sea Breeze at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Old Appendix 2.3B)

(12) Meteorological Information and Diffusion Estimates Based on Oyster Creek Meteorological Tower Data (Old Appendix 2.3D).

(13) Flood Level Studies (Old Appendix 2.4A)

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 (14)

TABLE 2.3-1 (Sheet 1 of 1)

TOTAL OCCURRENCES OF WIND DIRECTION WITHIN A 22 1/2 DEGREE DIRECTION SECTOR FOR VARIOUS WIND SPEED RANGES, BASED ON THE OYSTER CREEK METEOROLOGICAL TOWER DATA FOR FEBRUARY 1966 -

FEBRUARY 1967 Wind Speed Range (mph)

Duration (hours) 0-3 4-7 8-12 13-18 19-24 25 Totals 10 - - 6 9 11 1 27 11 - - 5 5 11 6 27 12 - 1 1 5 9 5 21 13 - - - 1 6 2 9 14 - 1 - 3 8 3 15 15 - - 1 2 4 2 9 16 - - - 1 3 2 6 17 - - 1 1 2 - 4 18 - - - - 2 - 2 19 - - - - - 1 1 20 - - - - 1 - 1 21 - - - - 1 1 2 22 - - - - 1 - 1 23 - - - - - - -

24 - - - - - - -

25 - - - - - - -

26 - - - - 1 - 1 27 - - - - - -

28 - - - - - 1 1 Totals 0 2 14 27 60 24 127

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 TABLE 2.3-2 (Sheet 1 of 1)

TEMPERATURE DATA AT PLEASANTVILLE, NEW JERSEY (1926-1955)

MEAN DAILY HIGHEST AND LOWEST TEMPERATURES (°F) EXPECTED ON A MONTHLY BASIS Mean Mean Daily Daily Hourly Hourly Month Maximum Minimum Month Maximum Minimum Jan 43.5 23.7 Jan 76 -23 Feb 44.9 24.8 Feb 80 -11 March 51.2 31.1 March 87 2 April 60.5 39.7 April 93 19 May 71.4 50.8 May 96 28 June 80.1 59.9 June 101 37 July 84.0 64.7 July 106 42 Aug 82.3 62.1 Aug 102 41 Sept 75.7 54.0 Sept 99 30 Oct 67.1 44.4 Oct 94 20 Nov 55.7 33.5 Nov 85 1 Dec 45.3 25.0 Dec 70 -4 Absolute maximum of 106°F in 1936 and absolute minimum of -23°F in 1942.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Rev. 1 TABLE 2.3-3 (Sheet 1 of 1)

MEAN MONTHLY AND EXTREME HOURLY TEMPERATURES BASED ON FORKED RIVER METEOROLOGICAL TOWER DATA FOR THE PERIOD 1987-1990: 33 FT LEVEL Temperature (°F)

Data Recovery Month Mean Maximum Minimum (Percentage)

Jan 33.8 68.9 1.7 99.4 Feb 34.4 80.2 3.9 95.3 March 41.3 83.2 14.0 99.5 April 48.5 82.7 26.1 92.3 May 59.4 91.7 33.5 94.0 June 69.6 94.2 42.6 97.9 July 73.8 96.9 45.4 95.8 Aug 73.1 99.0 46.2 99.5 Sept 65.0 91.6 32.2 98.7 Oct 53.8 85.1 23.4 98.6 Nov 46.8 86.0 11.0 98.7 Dec 34.7 70.6 0.0 97.6 1987-1990 52.9 85.8 23.3 97.3

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.3-4 (Sheet 1 of 1)

DIURNAL VARIATION OF MEAN HOURLY TEMPERATURE BY MONTH BASED ON FORKED RIVER METEOROLOGICAL TOWER DATA FOR THE PERIOD 1987-1990: 33 FT. LEVEL Local Standard Temperature (°F)

Time Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual 0100 31.1 31.9 37.2 44.8 55.3 65.0 69.4 68.9 60.7 49.2 43.5 32.3 49.1 0200 30.6 31.3 37.0 44.2 54.6 64.1 68.7 68.2 60.0 48.7 43.2 31.6 48.0 0300 30.4 30.9 36.4 43.6 53.7 63.7 68.2 67.6 59.4 48.0 42.9 31.3 48.0 0400 30.3 30.5 36.0 43.0 53.3 63.1 67.8 67.1 59.3 47.3 42.7 31.0 47.6 0500 29.9 30.1 35.6 42.4 52.8 62.5 67.3 66.5 58.8 47.0 42.4 30.6 47.2 0600 29.6 29.5 35.3 42.1 52.6 62.2 67.1 66.3 58.2 46.7 41.9 30.1 46.8 0700 29.3 29.2 34.9 42.6 54.0 64.0 68.6 67.2 57.9 46.4 41.6 30.3 47.2 0800 29.2 29.0 36.0 46.0 57.3 67.3 71.7 70.1 61.0 47.8 41.4 29.9 48.9 0900 30.2 31.3 39.8 48.9 60.2 70.3 74.5 73.6 65.5 53.2 44.6 31.0 51.9 1000 32.9 34.2 42.9 50.9 62.1 72.4 76.6 75.7 68.2 57.3 48.5 34.5 54.7 1100 35.6 36.5 44.4 52.4 63.9 74.3 78.3 77.4 69.7 59.9 50.7 36.8 56.7 1200 37.8 38.0 45.5 53.4 64.8 75.5 79.3 78.3 70.3 61.1 52.4 38.6 57.9 1300 39.1 39.2 47.3 53.9 64.9 75.6 79.8 79.0 71.2 62.0 53.2 40.0 58.8 1400 39.8 40.1 47.8 54.3 65.0 76.0 79.9 79.4 71.8 62.2 53.8 41.1 59.3 1500 40.0 40.4 47.9 54.7 65.1 76.1 79.9 79.4 72.0 62.4 53.8 41.2 59.4 1600 39.8 40.6 47.9 54.2 64.5 76.0 79.6 79.3 71.8 61.8 53.1 40.8 59.1 1700 38.9 39.9 47.8 53.6 64.7 75.4 78.9 78.7 71.0 60.6 51.7 39.6 58.4 1800 37.1 38.7 46.4 52.7 64.0 74.4 78.0 77.8 69.5 58.3 49.4 37.7 57.0 1900 35.6 36.7 44.4 51.3 62.7 73.1 76.6 76.1 67.5 55.6 47.8 36.4 55.3 2000 34.1 35.2 42.5 49.3 61.0 71.1 74.8 73.9 65.4 53.5 46.3 34.7 53.5 2100 33.2 34.2 41.2 48.0 59.3 69.1 73.1 72.3 63.9 52.0 45.5 33.9 52.1 2200 32.6 33.5 40.4 47.0 58.0 67.6 72.0 71.1 62.9 50.8 44.9 33.2 51.2 2300 32.1 32.8 39.4 46.2 57.1 66.5 71.1 70.2 62.2 49.9 44.2 33.0 50.4 2400 31.8 32.3 38.4 45.6 56.5 65.7 70.2 69.4 61.2 49.4 43.8 32.9 49.8

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.3-5 (Sheet 1 of 1)

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF TEMPERATURES BASED ON FORKED RIVER METEOROLOGICAL TOWER DATA FOR THE PERIOD 1987-1990: 33 FT LEVEL Interval (°F) Occurrences Percentage 0 2 0.0001 0.1 - 9.9 180 0.5133 10 - 19.9 858 2.45 20 - 29.9 2668 7.61 30 - 39.9 5167 14.74 40 - 49.9 6118 17.45 50 - 59.9 6163 17.58 60 - 69.9 5963 17.01 70 - 79.9 5297 15.11 80 - 89.9 1571 4.48 90 - 99.9 111 0.317 Missing 3946 2.76

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30

OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.3-6 (Sheet 1 of 1)

MEAN MONTHLY AND EXTREME HOURLY DEW POINT TEMPERATURES BASED ON FORKED RIVER METEOROLOGICAL TOWER DATA FOR THE PERIOD 1982-1983: 33 FT LEVEL Dew Point (°F)

Data Recovery Month Mean Maximum Minimum (Percentage)

Jan 20.2 54.2 -14.8 91.9 Feb 23.1 54.2 -8.6 98.7 March 27.3 53.4 -4.1 85.5 April 32.7 58.3 -0.5 96.8 May 47.7 66.7 10.9 91.2 June 57.7 74.4 9.1 90.8 July 62.9 76.1 40.6 65.1 Aug 62.1 75.2 33.0 86.8 Sept 56.1 74.5 29.3 86.9 Oct 45.8 69.5 21.3 89.4 Nov 38.3 66.1 6.0 87.4 Dec 28.8 61.9 -10.2 92.3 1982-1983 41.9 76.1 -14.8 88.6

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.3-7 (Sheet 1 of 1)

DIURNAL VARIATION OF MEAN HOURLY TEMPERATURE BY MONTH BASED ON FORKED RIVER METEOROLOGICAL TOWER DATA FOR THE PERIOD 1982-1983: 33 FT. LEVEL Local Standard Dew Points (°F)

Time Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual 0100 17.9 23.0 26.4 32.9 47.3 57.4 62.6 61.6 55.8 45.9 39.0 28.6 41.0 0200 18.9 23.1 26.1 32.7 47.3 57.1 62.3 61.5 55.4 45.8 39.0 28.6 41.1 0300 18.1 22.9 26.0 32.2 47.2 56.9 62.0 61.3 55.3 45.6 38.9 28.8 40.9 0400 18.9 22.7 26.5 31.7 47.6 56.9 61.9 61.3 55.2 46.5 38.7 27.6 41.2 0500 19.1 22.8 26.4 31.5 47.4 58.2 62.8 61.1 55.3 45.4 38.7 29.4 40.3 0600 19.2 22.8 26.4 31.6 47.6 57.7 62.7 61.4 54.9 45.1 38.4 29.3 41.0 0700 19.2 22.6 26.7 32.4 49.1 58.4 64.2 63.2 56.7 45.4 38.2 29.4 41.6 0800 20.1 23.0 27.2 31.8 49.1 58.1 64.0 65.6 57.8 46.8 38.8 29.6 41.1 0900 21.1 23.2 27.6 31.5 48.5 57.5 62.8 62.3 56.3 44.3 39.3 29.9 41.0 1000 21.1 23.2 27.2 31.7 47.5 57.3 61.1 61.9 56.3 48.3 38.2 26.9 41.3 1100 20.8 22.3 27.3 31.9 47.2 57.0 61.0 61.8 55.5 45.3 38.7 29.9 41.1 1200 21.1 21.7 28.2 32.3 47.0 57.3 61.6 61.3 55.8 45.5 38.2 29.5 41.0 1300 21.7 22.8 28.3 32.6 47.2 57.1 62.1 61.4 55.0 45.5 37.9 29.9 41.4 1400 22.2 23.3 27.5 32.7 47.3 56.9 61.9 61.8 55.7 45.9 37.7 29.3 41.5 1500 21.7 23.5 27.7 32.8 47.4 56.5 62.5 61.9 56.2 46.1 37.7 29.4 41.5 1600 20.8 23.4 27.4 32.3 46.8 57.2 62.3 61.8 55.9 47.7 38.2 28.4 41.3 1700 21.2 23.5 28.0 32.7 47.1 59.1 63.6 61.7 57.1 45.8 38.4 29.1 40.7 1800 21.0 23.9 28.1 33.5 47.2 58.3 63.6 62.5 57.1 46.1 38.2 29.3 41.7 1900 21.4 24.0 27.9 34.6 48.2 59.2 64.4 62.7 57.2 45.7 38.1 29.0 42.0 2000 20.7 23.7 28.3 34.1 48.6 59.0 64.7 65.4 57.4 46.3 37.5 27.7 41.4 2100 20.2 23.6 28.2 33.9 48.7 58.8 64.6 63.1 56.8 43.9 37.6 28.2 41.3 2200 19.8 23.2 28.3 33.8 48.6 58.4 64.3 62.7 56.6 47.2 37.4 25.3 41.7 2300 19.1 22.7 27.7 33.4 47.8 57.9 63.9 62.1 56.2 45.8 37.4 27.9 41.2 2400 19.1 22.3 26.9 33.4 48.1 56.8 63.3 61.8 56.0 45.5 38.5 28.7 41.1

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.3-8 (Sheet 1 of 1)

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DEW POINT TEMPERATURE BASED ON FORKED RIVER METEOROLOGICAL TOWER DATA FOR THE PERIOD 1982-1983: 33 FT LEVEL Interval (°F) Occurrences Percentage

-10 32 0.18 0 207 1.18 0.1 - 9 692 3.95 10 - 19 1467 8.37 20 - 29 2221 12.68 30 - 39 2447 13.97 40 - 49 2379 13.58 50 - 59 3207 18.31 60 - 69 2270 12.96 70 - 79 575 3.28 Missing 2023 11.55

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Table 2.3-9 (Sheet 1 of 1)

PERCENT PROBABILITIES OF INVERSION DURATION FOR EACH SEASON, BASED ON THE FORKED RIVER METEOROLOGICAL TOWER DATA FOR JANUARY 1990 - DECEMBER 1990*

Inversion INVERSION DURATION (HOURS)

Strength T (380-33 Ft.)** Winter Spring Summer Fall (deg F) 5 10 15 5 10 15 5 10 15 5 10 15 0-4.99 45.6 10.0

  • 33.7 7.6
  • 43.0 6.5
  • 46.0 15.6 2.2 5.6 2.2 5-9.99 10.0 1.1
  • 6.5 1.1
  • 26.9 5.4
  • 20.0 4.4
  • 10-14.99 8.9 *
  • 4.4 *
  • 8.6 *
  • 14.4 2.2
  • 15-19.99 * *
  • 1.1 *
  • 1.1 *
  • 5.6 * *

>20 * * * * * * * * * * *

  • For example, an inversion between 0 degrees F and 4.99 degrees F between 33 and 380 feet during the spring has a 33.7 percent probability of lasting at least 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, 7.6 percent chance of lasting at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, and less than 1 percent for a 15 hour1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> duration.

Vertical temperature difference between tower 380 foot level minus 33 foot level.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.3-10 SEASONAL OCCURRENCES OF INVERSION* BREAKDOWN** BASED ON THE FORKED RIVER METEOROLOGICAL TOWER DATA FOR JANUARY 1990 - DECEMBER 1990 Total Inversion Breakdown Occurs (Days)

Season Inversion (Days) Surface Up Top Down Both at Once Winter 50 14 17 19 Spring 42 17 19 6 Summer 40 18 7 15 Autumn 58 8 28 22 Total 190 57 71 62 A temperature inversion is defined here as the 380 foot temperature minus the 33 foot temperature of greater than or equal to 4.47 degrees F before the breakdown occurs. This value is normalized from inversion criteria set forth in the previous version for the defunct Oyster Creek Meteorological Tower.

This total represents 190 days when a complex vertical temperature profile occurred due to an inversion breakdown within 380 feet. A complex stability is where a stable layer exists over (or under) an unstable profile, or the inversion is breaking down from the bottom (top) or even both. Criteria for a stable and unstable layer were also normalized from those set with reference to the Forked River Meteorological Tower.

Note: There were 55 inversion days in which no breakdown trend could be deciphered due to long term inversion, hence, little fumigation possibility.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT 2.4 HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING The design criteria for controlling water levels at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) were based on hurricane storm and tidal action. The stream flow from either the Oyster Creek or the South Branch of the Forked River was considered to be relatively insignificant in terms of the flooding potential of the plant site.

The design basis high water level for the plant was established from a storm which struck New Jersey in 1962 (Reference 1). This storm was the worst ever recorded at the plant site, (NOTE, Superstorm Sandy, 2012, had higher water levels but was not included in the historical data). Flood marks from this storm showed a high tide elevation of 4.5 feet above Mean Sea Level (MSL). The deck elevation of the circulating water intake structure was therefore set at elevation 6.0 ft MSL providing 1.5 feet of free board.

A study conducted in 1970 to establish the Probable Maximum Hurricane flood level east of US Route 9 (Reference

1) determined that a hurricane storm with a 250 year return frequency would produce a flood elevation of about 5.3 ft MSL at the plant site. This 250 year return period is the criterion used by the US Army Corps of Engineers for determining design basis flood levels of waterfront structures. In the absence of specific nuclear regulatory criteria, the OCNGS service water pumps installed at the same deck along with circulating water pumps, are considered safe against the 250 year hurricane flood.

2.4.1 Hydrologic Descriptions

  • Site and Facilities The Oyster Creek site is located at approximate latitude 39° 49' North and longitude 74° 12' West, on the eastern coastline of New Jersey, about two miles inland from the shore of Barnegat Bay and about seven miles WNW of Barnegat Light. It is approximately nine miles south of Toms River, New Jersey, 50 miles east of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and 60 miles south of Newark, New Jersey.

The site, in plan view, is shown in (Drawing JC 19702). Building arrangements, dimensions and elevations are shown in Section 1.2. Site grade elevation is 23' MSL (datum in Section 2.4 is MSL unless noted otherwise).

  • Hydrosphere Barnegat Bay is located along the middle New Jersey coast, extending approximately 30 miles from Point Pleasant on the north to Manahawkin Causeway on the south. The Bay is enclosed by a barrier beach and is a narrow, shallow tidal basin, generally typical in hydrologic characteristics of mid Atlantic estuarine bays. It is interconnected with Little Egg Harbor and Great Bay to the south, and through Barnegat Inlet to the Atlantic Ocean.

The only break in the barrier beach in this stretch is the one at Barnegat Inlet, opposite Waretown, about 20 miles south of Point Pleasant.

The barrier beach does not stop at Manahawkin Causeway but extends another nine miles south to Beach Haven Inlet. However, the basin south of Manahawkin Causeway is considered to be the northward extension of Little Egg Harbor.

The Bay is about 30 miles long; its width varies from about 1.2 to 4.6 miles with a mean width of about 2.4 miles. The average depth of the Bay is less than 5 feet with a range of less than 1 foot to 20 feet at mean low tide. Large areas of the Bay have depths of 1 foot or less; these areas are located mainly in the eastern portions.

The surface area of the Bay is estimated to be over 1.8 billion square feet (16,725 hectares) and the volume is about 8.5 billion cubic feet.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT The Bay receives input from freshwater creeks which border on the western shore as well as from the Atlantic Ocean via Barnegat Inlet, the Point Pleasant Canal and Manahawkin Bay. Freshwater runoff averages 200 cubic feet per second (CFS) from Toms River, 108 CFS from Cedar Creek and 4 and 25 CFS for the South Branch of the Forked River and the Oyster Creek, respectively.

The salinity of the bay varies from 12 parts per thousand (ppt) in the upper reaches to 32 ppt at Barnegat Inlet and lower sections of the Bay; average monthly water temperatures range from 2.8°C (37°F) in winter to 26.7°C (80°F) in summer. Due to low flow and velocity from the freshwater creeks and the limited saltwater inflow, the forces governing water circulation in the Bay are primarily winds and secondarily tidal action.

Depending on meteorological conditions, evaporation from the surface of Barnegat Bay may approach the volume of freshwater entering the Bay.

o Tide Effects Water levels in Barnegat Bay are influenced primarily by winds and tidal actions. Effluents discharged into Barnegat Bay ultimately are mixed with ocean water, with the extent of mixing dependent on the tidal forces, local winds, rainfall runoff, and temperature and salinity gradients. The barrier beach and the shallowness of the bay minimize tidal fluctuations by attenuating the tidal energy.

With the exception of those at Barnegat Inlet, tidal fluctuations in Barnegat Bay are less than 1 foot; at the mouth of Oyster Creek, the tidal range is 0.5 feet. The tidal cycle is 12.7 hr, and the tidal flow is 18,000 acre-feet.

Tide magnitude diminishes progressively north and south from Barnegat Inlet. The intertidal volume, or tidal prism, has been calculated (Reference 2) to be 790 million cubic feet, most of which enters and leaves the Bay via Barnegat Inlet. The tidal currents in the Bay thus are weak and the inflow of fresh water from coastal streams and storms further complicates the weak current system. Tidal changes during storms may be greater than 3.1 feet.

o Ground Water Inflow The surface inflow of fresh water is relatively small, about 2 percent of the intertidal volume (tidal prism) of 790 million cubic feet (Reference 3). The major source is the Toms River drainage basin. The component of ground water seepage has not been determined, but based on salinity measurements of the water in Barnegat Bay (the average salinity in the bay is about 25 ppt which is 30 percent less than normal sea water), it appears that it is a significant part of total fresh water inflow.

o Ocean Water Inflow Ocean derived saline water enters Barnegat Bay by tidal flushing through Barnegat Inlet, and the saline water disperses northward through the Bay. Salinity throughout the Bay varies seasonally, but high salinities always characterize the vicinity of the OCNGS discharge canal and Barnegat Inlet. By contrast, salinities in the vicinity of Toms River, even during low flow periods of high salinity, are near 12 to 16 parts per thousand. To the south of Barnegat Inlet the Bay is constricted by a series of islands, south of which lies Manahawkin Bay where salinities are as high as the ocean salinity. In the Bay's shallower areas, strong local heating and evaporation result in warmer temperatures and higher salinities in these areas than in the rest of the Bay during warm summer days.

o Oyster Creek-Forked River The Oyster Creek and the Forked River are contributing streams to Barnegat Bay. They are situated on the western side of the Bay between the towns of Waretown and Forked River. The Oyster Creek is the more southerly of the two.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT The Oyster Creek has a drainage area of approximately 12.4 square miles, consisting primarily of pine barrens.

The US Geological Survey flow records of 1961 - 1974 reflect a mean daily flow of approximately 28.3 CFS (11,200 gpm) near Brookville, with a maximum discharge of 122 CFS and a minimum of 12 CFS. At least 70 percent of the flow, as well as the others in the vicinity of the site, is ground water base flow derived from the water in the aquifer.

The Forked River is comprised of three branches. Of interest is the South Branch of the Forked River which joins the Middle and North branches at a point approximately 7500 feet east of Route 9. The South Branch has a drainage area of approximately 2.7 square miles, consisting primarily of pine barrens. Definitive flow records for the South Branch are not available, but a sample series between 1968 and 1973 by the US Geological Survey indicated an average discharge of 3.7 CFS (1350 gpm), with a maximum of 5.4 CFS and a minimum of 1.3 CFS.

The intake canal along the South Branch of the Forked River measures approximately 10,500 feet in length, 120 feet at the narrowest cross section, 280 feet at the widest section, and 7 to 12 feet in depth. The discharge canal measures about 11,500 feet in length, 110 feet at the narrowest width, 1000 feet at the broadest width, and 8 to 12 feet in depth.

Under present conditions, there is a tidal fluctuation of between three and six inches west of Route 9 in both the intake and discharge canals. Currents are unidirectional and may vary from less than 1 fps to almost 2 fps depending on the number of dilution pumps in operation. As a consequence, the lower regions of the South Branch of the Forked River and Oyster Creek are more closely related to Bay water. Because the Bay has an average depth of five feet and the discharge canal was dredged to an average depth of 10 feet, turbulence takes place at the canal mouth.

The velocity increase produces momentum jet mixing which substantially increases mixing in the Bay.

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT 2.4.2 Floods

  • Flood History In March 1962, high tides accompanied by a storm which is considered to have been the most severe ever to strike New Jersey, left water marks which were recorded by the United States Geological Survey immediately north of the Oyster Creek site at Forked River. These water marks showed a high flood elevation of 4.5 feet.

In October 2012, a new high flood elevation was experienced due to post-tropical cyclone Sandy (Reference 15).

Oyster Creek reported a peak flood/surge elevation of 7.4 feet from Sandy; there were no wind-generated wave heights recorded. The local precipitation from Hurricane Sandy did not produce major flooding (ponding of a few inches in some areas). The most intense 1-hour period during Sandy was only approximately 0.6 inch in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; total was about 4.2 inches for the whole (24-hour) day (National Weather service, River Forecast Center, Hourly Precipitation Analysis for 10/29/12). The local precipitation from Sandy was well below current licensing bases IPEEE (Ref 16), which states that the Local Intense Precipitation (LIP) value is 18.00 inches in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

  • Flood Design Considerations Hurricane storm surge analysis performed after the completion of the OCNGS has concluded that a Probable Maximum Hurricane (PMH) still water level of +22 feet MSL could occur at the site (Reference 3). During such an event, the buildings and structures at the plant island remain above flood levels.

The plant site is bounded on the south and north by the Oyster Creek and the South Branch of the Forked River, respectively. The catchment areas drainage characteristics are dominated by typical pine barren surface cover and a composite slope which is steep in the upper one third reach and relatively flat in the lower two thirds. The small size of the drainage area of the streams, along with the site topography, preclude the possibility of their flooding any part of the plant site during floods of 100 or even 250 year return frequency.

  • Effects of Local Intense Precipitation The plant site, which is about 10 acres in area and at a grade elevation of 23 feet, is mostly covered with plant buildings, roads, and other structures. Runoff resulting from local intense precipitation partly drains off the site through the existing storm water sewers and partly drains away as overland flow towards the outer periphery of the plant site.

Topography of the plant site is such that the surface drainage flows from the high point in the center of the island towards the intake canal to the north and west, the discharge canal to the south and west, and Route 9 to the east.

Due to the time lag between the runoff and rainfall, some local site ponding occurs but it does not result in flooding of the site. This issue was reviewed during the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) assessment. The flood elevation for the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) was established at 23.5 ft. MSL.

2.4.3 Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) on Streams and Rivers The potential for flooding due to stream flow was evaluated for the OCNGS as part of the SEP. No flooding that would affect safety related structures has been postulated for the site.

2.4.4 Potential Dam Failures Two small dams are located on the Oyster Creek. Incremental flood flows were calculated based on their breaching by any unspecified cause as part of the SEP. No flooding which would affect safety related structures is postulated for the site.

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39

OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT 2.4.5 Probable Maximum Flood from Hurricanes (PMH)

Due to the proximity of the site to Barnegat Bay and the Atlantic Coast, and the relatively small size of the onsite freshwater streams, it was noted in the design stage that storm and tidal flooding should be used as the design basis in establishing the elevations of various plant components.

Several detailed studies of flooding potential due to probable maximum surges and wind wave action have been performed. The two more important were conducted by Eaton and Haeussner, Consulting Engineers, and Dames and Moore Inc. (References 1 and 3). Results of the Dames and Moore report are summarized in the following Subsections.

  • Maximum Water Levels - General Water levels in Barnegat Bay and at the plant site are influenced solely by storm and tidal action. There is no significant stream flow in either the Oyster Creek or the Forked River. Floods or droughts in these streams will not have a measurable effect on the water levels at the plant.

Extreme high-water levels are based on the Probable Maximum Hurricane tide condition. This was established by maximizing the combination of estimated worst possible conditions influencing storm and tide heights. These conditions are as follows for the OCNGS site:

a. Rate of forward movement: A forward translational speed of 12 and 23 knots. Stopping (hovering) the storm resulted in lower flooding values.
b. Direction of storm: Selected so that the wind direction of the maximum isovel would be oriented normal to shore and the offshore depth contours in order to produce:
1. Greatest possible erosion on the barrier beach separating Barnegat Bay from the Atlantic Ocean.
2. Greatest possible pile up of water in Barnegat Bay, along the mainland shore, due to wind stress acting on the free water surface.
c. Central barometric pressure, which fixes the wind intensity: Estimated to have an extreme low value of 27.1 inches Hg. This low pressure results in a maximum wind speed of 133 mph occurring 39 nautical miles from the center of the storm.
d. A bottom friction factor of 0.008.
e. An initial rise in water level of 1.1 feet.
f. An astronomical high spring tide of 4.2 feet above Mean Low Water (MLW), or 2.7 ft MSL.
  • Maximum Tide and Storm Height at the Ocean Shore of Barnegat Inlet Based on the applicable factors presented in Subsection 2.4.5.1, the Probable Maximum Hurricane water level was calculated to be 22.0 feet MSL.
  • Maximum Tide and Storm Height at the West Shore of Barnegat Bay The Probable Maximum Hurricane water level at the entrance to Forked River will be 22.0 feet MSL including effects of wind and wave runup.
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40

OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT

  • Maximum Tide and Storm Height at the Plant Site The Probable Maximum Hurricane still water level at the plant site was calculated to be 22.0 feet MSL. An additional height of less than 1.0 feet represents the maximum wave runup at the plant site.
  • Maximum Water Levels for One-in-250-Year Storm Maximum high water elevation has been determined by consultants Eaton and Haeussner (Reference 1) to be 5.3 feet MSL both in Barnegat Bay and at the makeup water pump structure, based on a one-in-250-year high tide.

The maximum recorded high tide along the Barnegat Bay beachfront is approximately 7 feet MSL, which occurred during the March 1962 storm.

2.4.6 Probable Maximum Tsunami Tsunami events are not typical of the eastern coast of the United States and have not, therefore, been addressed.

2.4.7 Flooding Protection Requirements The plant site has a general grade elevation of 23 ft MSL. The land slopes down gradually towards the north, south, and east.

On the west, the grade meets the top of the intake and discharge canals at an elevation of 23 ft and then drops sharply into the canal bottom elevation of (-)10 ft MSL. The slope at the canal bank is 1:1-1/2. The capability of the plant to cope with the design basis flooding has been reviewed as part of the SEP.

As reported in Subsection 2.4.5, the maximum flood level due to PMH will be at elevation 22 ft MSL. The plant grade, elevation 23 ft MSL, is one foot above the PMH flood level. Therefore, the flood will not find its way into the plant buildings, the floor levels of which are generally six inches above grade at elevation 23'-6".

2.4.8 Low Water Considerations

  • Low Water Levels - Tides and Storm Waters The extreme low tide elevation to be expected on the west shore of Barnegat Bay was calculated to be (-)3.4 feet MSL (Reference 3). With water levels in the Bay this low, the intake canal would be unable to fully support the flow requirements of the plant (Reference 10).
  • Historical Low Water Elevation On December 4-5, 1980, the water level in the intake canal dropped to a point where the screen wash pumps lost suction. The screen wash pumps were restored by turning off the station's dilution pumps. It was found that this unusual event was due to an extreme low water level at the intake of approximately (-)2.0 feet MSL, which corresponded to a water level of (-)0.7 feet MSL on the west shore of the Bay. The probable cause was strong and persistent westerly winds which occurred for several days prior to the incident (Reference 10).

GPU committed to the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities to maintain navigability in these waterways. Portions of both the Oyster Creek and the main branch of the Forked River are dredged periodically for this purpose.

Shoaling problems in both waterways have not been severe and dredging is mostly confined to the lagoons and the access channels from the lagoon mouths to the center of the main channel. Soundings to define the intake and discharge canal bathymetry are performed, east of U. S. Route 9 to Barnegat Bay.

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  • Low Water Levels-Failure of Structures The potential for low water levels at the intake structure for the OCNGS as a result of failure of structures (such as bridges) crossing the canal has been investigated as discussed below.

o Bridge Failure The intake canal for the plant was originally designed to serve as an intake waterway for as many as four nuclear generating stations. The design capacity of 1,260,000 gallons per minute (gpm) is attained at a very low velocity (2.25 feet per second).

The three bridge crossings over the intake canal are all supported on timber piles. The Railroad Bridge has an extremely low profile; should the collapsed structure remain entirely below the free water level, there would still be sufficient sectional canal area remaining to allow a flow of 570,000 gpm. The postulated collapse mechanism for the Railroad Bridge was extremely conservative as it neglects the buoyant nature of the component materials.

Should a more realistic collapse mechanism be postulated for this bridge, it would certainly result in an even larger available flow.

The three bridges are all of articulated construction being of precast, prestressed elements or of timbers; it would be reasonable to assume that severe collapse mechanisms would result in the breaking up of the bridge into smaller units such as timber and precast concrete sections. The smaller sections would thus produce a smaller final blockage than those analyzed.

o Embankment Failure The following failure modes that could contribute to blockage of the canal by bank slides were examined (Reference 1):

a. Earthquake induced slope failures
b. Mass earth slides due to soil liquefaction below the water table For these analyses, the canal was divided into three sections:
c. Section 1: from Route 9 west to a point approximately 700 feet north of the intake structure.

In this section the canal was dredged to elevation (-)10 ft and the adjacent banks vary between approximately elevation 23 and 9 ft.

d. Section 2: from Route 9 east to the Beach Boulevard Bridge. In this section the canal was dredged to elevation (-)6 ft and adjacent banks are at about elevation 6 ft.
e. Section 3: from the Beach Boulevard Bridge east to Barnegat Bay. In this section the canal was dredged to between elevations (-)7 ft and (-)10 ft for a distance of some 500 feet. From that point on, the combined streams (Middle and South Branches of Forked River) maintain an adequate channel.

Insofar as bank slides are concerned, Section 1 (from Route 9 west approaching the intake structure) is the most critical.

The canal banks are dredged to a slope of 1 on 1. These slopes have exhibited no lack of stability. There has been erosion and raveling along the banks due to surface water runoff and the difficulty of establishing vegetation cover.

However, there was no evidence of shear failures along the banks even where they have been over steepened.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT Nevertheless, since the original evaluation was performed, additional canal stabilization measures have been undertaken, thus precluding the possibility of bank slides.

Under earthquake forces, and prior to bank stabilization, some flattening of the slopes could have been expected.

Analysis indicates that under earthquake conditions slopes at 1 on 3 exhibit factors of safety above unity.

Through most of the area the "upper clay" occurs near the base of the slope. Locally, this clay, which outcrops to the northwest, is absent. Therefore, evaluations were made for sections with the clay seam both present and absent.

The condition in which the clay seam is absent. A quasi static analysis was made assuming a sliding wedge driven by its own weight plus a 22 percent horizontal acceleration. The results are summarized below:

a. It is assumed that all soil above the failure plane moves into the canal and comes to rest below the water level. Under this most conservative assumption, using a factor of safety greater than 1 on the failure wedge, over 56 percent of the canal remains unblocked.
b. An examination of more probable failure modes, i.e., modes involving movements of a few feet on the failure plane, indicates that the resulting canal blockage would be insignificant.
c. Another earthquake induced slope failure study was made within the most critical part of the canal (Section 1). This was concerned with slopes in which clay seams are present.

The assumed failure mode was sliding along a circular arc. A quasi static analysis was again made assuming that the soil mass was being driven by its own weight plus a 22 percent horizontal acceleration. The results are summarized below.

d. Using a factor of safety greater than 2 on the failure wedge, and the conservative assumption that all the soil above the failure plane came to rest below water level, over 81 percent of the canal remained unblocked.
e. Examination of a more probable failure mode, i.e., modes involving movements of a few feet, indicated that the resulting canal blockage would be insignificant.

The potential for soil liquefaction in the intake canal was investigated by Dr. Arthur Casagrande of Casagrande Consultants (Reference 4). Ten exploratory trenches which extended from the top of the slope down to the water surface were excavated in the canal banks.

Penetration tests in sand were made by means of a core penetrometer; a pocket penetrometer was used to measure the insitu strength of typical clay. The tests were supplemented with visual inspection within the trenches and comparison of observations and tests to standard penetration borings previously made in the area.

The consultants found that the sand overlying the clay or peat layers along the canal banks is dense to very dense, with the exception of a surface layer not exceeding three feet in thickness. This surface layer was described as between medium loose to medium dense.

The consultants concluded that there is no possibility that the banks could experience liquefication slides. The worst that could happen during a severe earthquake, they explained, would be slumping of oversteep slopes. Most of the slumped material would collect on the flat beachlike berm which has formed within the range of normal tidal fluctuations. The volume of material that might move into the canal prism below elevation 0 ft., they continued, would be of no consequence.

Combination of Natural Phenomena

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT The intake canal banks were analyzed under the following combination of natural phenomena: PMH, the resulting high water; and an earthquake having a horizontal acceleration of 0.11g (Reference 1).

It is not expected that the hurricane itself will have any appreciable effect on the canal banks. Using time/water level relationships (Reference 3), the following conclusions were drawn:

a. The rise in water will, in itself, have a stabilizing effect on the canal banks.
b. Wave action will be minor in the critical areas of the canal, west of Route 9. The substructures of the highway and railroad bridges near Route 9 will cause any significant waves to dissipate and lose form.
c. Wave action on a sand bank, as along a sea shore, erodes by undermining small slip surfaces over long periods of time. Within the short time span postulated, about symmetrical tide cycle, the volume of eroded material will be very small.

The maximum flood water will tend to saturate the canal banks, laterally during the rise cycle and vertically during the period when flooding overtops the banks. The results of this occurrence have been examined (Reference 1).

The findings are summarized as follows:

a. Transient water levels resulting from wave action will not affect the infiltration rate.
b. The rapid infiltration will result in less than full saturation. Some 20% of the voids will be filled with entrapped air.
c. Within the time span of the PMH, the banks will not be partially saturated to their full extent. During the drawdown cycle drainage will be bidirectional; i.e., toward the canal and into the unsaturated zone inland of the canal simultaneously.
d. Assuming the worst possible failure mode, the analysis indicated that the drawdown of the intake canal could block no more than 25% percent of the total canal flow volume.

The examination of the canal banks assuming full saturation and an 0.11 g earthquake reveals the following:

a. The smaller earthquake acting on saturated soils will produce slump zones no greater than the earthquake used in our previous analysis acting on drained soils.
b. The evaluation of the liquefaction potential of the soils in the canal bank considered insitu soil properties only. The analysis is independent of the size of the earthquake or the degree of saturation. Therefore, the occurrence of an earthquake contemporaneously with the hurricane and flood does not alter the conclusions with respect to the safety of the banks with respect to liquefaction.

In considering the effects of combined phenomena on the stability of earth banks it should be recognized that any adjustments in bank configuration are in the direction of increasing stability. Therefore, the effects are not additive. At some point the bank configuration attains a degree of stability that permits it to withstand additional disruptive forces without further alteration.

Silt Modest silt accumulation has been experienced within the pump bays, especially when some circulating water

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT pumps are idle. The accumulation results from settling out sediment in water eddies. This poses no threat to the operation of any of the pumps. Accumulation of silt in front of the intake screens is pumped out as necessary.

2.4.9 Dispersion, Dilution, and Travel Times of Accidental Releases of Liquid Effluents in Surface Waters In 1963 and 1964, Dr. James H. Carpenter conducted tracer experiments in Barnegat Bay and also studied recirculation and effluent distribution for the OCNGS site (References 2, 5). In 1979, GPUN conducted a hydrographic survey of Barnegat Bay (Reference 6).

Results of the first studies showed that a mean density gradient existed across the Bay, west to east. This gradient, in combination with Coriolis forces and hydraulic head associated with runoff accumulation in basins to the north, produce a current to the south. In southern areas, a combination of southerly winds and runoff flowing north produced a well flushed area.

Rates of horizontal turbulent diffusion in the Bay were estimated and found to be much slower than rates which have been observed in deeper waters.

Dr. Carpenter described the general distribution of material flushed from Oyster Creek, as follows:

"Materials discharged near Oyster Creek drift to the south into an area off the Barnegat inlet channel which is rapidly flushed by tidal action. The northward drift of waters in the southern portion of the Bay under the influence of the prevailing winds minimizes the accumulation of material in the southern portion of the Bay. The low rate of turbulent diffusion in the shallow waters of the Bay permits the circulation pattern to efficiently transport the material to the ocean." (Reference 2)

The report concluded that factors influencing the distribution will change with season (other than August) to produce more rapid dispersion of material and increase the rate of exchange of Bay waters with the ocean.

From results of the studies, a recirculation analysis was performed based on tracer results. It was found that the increased concentration in the discharge canal due to recirculation is estimated to be 1.8 times the steady state single pass concentration.

The GPUN study (Reference 6) complimented those of Carpenter. This later study concluded that the northernmost sections of the Bay, near Toms River and above have limited tidal flushing. The dividing line between that area which is dominated by the tidal flushing of Barnegat Inlet and that area which is dominated by Manasquan Inlet is between the outlets to Kettle Creek and Toms River.

The area of the Bay within two to three miles of Barnegat Inlet is a maze of shoals and islands which delays and suppresses tidal flushing through the Inlet, but flows do occur under the influence of pressure head created by meteorological and tidal forces.

The portion of the Bay south of Barnegat Inlet is more conducive to tidal flushing. Despite heavy shoaling around the Inlet and eelgrass in the southern end of the Bay, the close proximity of Barnegat Inlet and the tidal exchanges through Beach Haven Inlet allows for better tidal flushing than the northern half of the Bay.

Dispersion of the discharge plume of OCNGS was mathematically modeled (Reference 7). This study considered dye studies performed by Carpenter in 1963 and 1964 (References 2 and 5) and several other thermal plume studies conducted subsequently. The study showed that the wind induced, vertically averaged net flow in the Bay was 1.85 percent of the prevailing wind speed. Longitudinal and lateral dispersion coefficients were verified against dye distribution (Reference 5). Using this method it was concluded that:

a. In the upper Bay north of Oyster Creek, the longitudinal dispersion coefficients have a constant value of 2.0 square miles per day.
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b. In the lower Bay from Oyster Creek to Manahawkin Bay, the longitudinal dispersion coefficients gradually increase from 2.0 to 3.5 square miles per day.
c. Lateral dispersion coefficients of 0.1 square miles per day can be used in Barnegat Bay.
d. Longitudinal dispersion coefficients in Oyster Creek channel and Double Creek channel varied from 3 square miles per day at the Bay end to 25 square miles per day at the junction of Barnegat Inlet with the ocean.

2.4.10 Ground Water Numerous geological and ground water related studies have been conducted on or near the OCNGS. These studies included the collection and evaluation of site-specific hydrogeologic data and the installation of a groundwater monitoring system on site (Reference 9).

  • Regional Hydrogeology The regional stratigraphy includes beds of sand, gravel, clay, and marl dipping gently to the southeast. These tertiary coastal plain deposits are overlain by more recent sands and gravels. Of direct interest in the Oyster Creek region are three stratigraphic units: the Cape May (Pleistocene), Cohansey (Miocene), and Kirkwood (Miocene)

Formations. A cross-section showing the regional geology in the vicinity of the OCGC is shown as Figure 2.4-1.

Cape May Formation - This is the youngest formation in the Oyster Creek region. Its average thickness is 40 feet and it is comprised of a light gray to tan, medium to fine sand, trace silt, coarse sand. It is poorly compacted and commonly contains a thin, shallow black clay bed in coastal areas.

Cohansey Formation - The Cohansey lies beneath the Cape May Formation. Its average thickness is 60 feet and it is primarily composed of a red-brown and tan, medium to fine sand, trace silt, coarse sand, and some coarse to fine gravel. Lenticular beds of clay are sometimes found and the lower portions are densely compacted.

Kirkwood Formation - Lying below the Cohansey is the Kirkwood consisting of a light gray to yellow-brown micaceous ilmenitic, lignitic very fine to fine grained quartz sand, and some coarse to fine gravel. It is densely compacted and extends from a depth of about 100 feet to at least 250 feet below the surface.

The strike of the bedding of the formations is generally in a northeast direction with a dip to the southeast.

Another aquifer that exists in the area is the Raritan - Magothy which occurs at depths of about 1800 feet near the site. Due to the greater depths of this aquifer and the possibility that it is within the zone of salt water intrusion, it is not widely used in this area.

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  • Regional Ground Water Replenishment The unconfined Recent and Cape May Formations are replenished directly by precipitation. The topography and the porous nature of the sediments exposed in the area are such that most of the precipitation infiltrates into the ground water body with relatively small amounts of surface runoff. Part of the water that sinks into the ground is discharged by evapotranspiration to the atmosphere. Most of the remainder percolates down to the water table and moves in the general direction of the slope of the land surface - from the higher ground in the west toward Barnegat Bay. The upper ground water body intersects the eastward flowing streams in the area (including Oyster Creek and Forked River) and is the source of base flow of these streams. In addition, the unconfined aquifer is in contact with, and discharges directly into Barnegat Bay. Approximately one half of the average annual precipitation (42 inches) is surface stream flow, and the remainder is evapotranspiration, recharge to deeper aquifers and direct discharge to the Bay.

The outcrop areas of the confined aquifers (Lower Cape May Formation, Cohansey Sand and Kirkwood Formations) are generally to the west of the site at higher elevations. The recharge to the confined aquifers occurs primarily from direct rainfall penetration on the outcrops, and from vertical leakage downward from the unconfined aquifer through the confining layers (aquitards) of silt and clay. Recharge of the confined aquifers from areas of higher elevation to the west has resulted in artesian pressures sufficient to cause the water in wells penetrating the aquifers to rise above the elevation at which the aquifers are encountered.

Information on piezometric surfaces of the different aquifer zones at the site was obtained from test borings for foundation investigation and from the deep well used for water supply at the plant. The observed piezometric surfaces for the various pressure aquifers are shown in Table 2.4-1.

Based on test drilling performed at the Oyster Creek, Forked River and other sites in the area, it appears that the clay-silt layers that act as confining layers between the upper aquifers are extensive lenses rather than continuous layers. Thus, at some locations where pumping tests were made in various aquifers there was no apparent hydraulic connection between upper unconfined and upper artesian aquifers, but at other locations there were indications of some degree of hydraulic connection.

  • Regional Sources of Well Water Most water supplies in the area surrounding the site are derived from wells (Reference 8). The wells are reported to range in depth from 34 feet to 350 feet and are used for municipal, industrial, irrigation and domestic purposes. In the past, many wells less than 30 feet deep were used for domestic and irrigation purposes but, due to water quality problems caused by septic tank contamination, the water became unfit for use as a potable water supply. In some cases it was possible to obtain water of satisfactory quality by deepening the wells to about 60 feet in order to tap aquifers of better quality underlying impermeable confining layers.

It is estimated that one million gallons per day (MGD) per square mile is potentially available from the ground water aquifers in the region. Although this amount of water could probably be obtained from the aquifers in the site area under present geohydrologic conditions, it should be revised downward (to about one half MGD per square mile) for a more conservative estimate of long term yield. This conservative estimate depends in part on the proximity of the salt water canals which could be a potential source of salt water intrusion, but principally on the anticipated future public pumpage of ground water from the area which will cause a significant decrease in head on the aquifers.

The locations of some of the wells being used within a radius of about five miles of the site are shown in Reference 18 and listed in Table 2.4-2. The quantity of water being used in Ocean and Lacey Township is about 2.25 million gallons/day. A conservative estimate of the potential for ground water development for aquifers in this 80 square mile area would be on the order of 40 million gallons per day (using the factor of one half million gallons of ground water potential per square mile).

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  • Quality of Ground Water As water flows across and under the ground, quantities of mineral matter are dissolved. The amount and nature of the material dissolved are directly related to:
a. Initial character of the water
b. Length of time the water is in contact with the sediments
c. Solubility of the materials composing the sediments The temperature of ground water below a depth of about ten feet is equal approximately to the mean annual air temperature, which is about 56°F. There is a normal increase in temperature with depth of about 2°F for each 100 feet of depth.

The wells being used at the OCNGS obtain water from the Kirkwood Formation. The typical characteristics of water from these wells are shown on Table 2.4-3.

The base flow of streams in the area is from effluent ground water seepage, mostly from the uppermost unconfined aquifer, and it can be expected that the water quality characteristics of the streams would most closely resemble the quality characteristics of this aquifer.

  • Site Specific Hydrogeology During construction of the OCNGS much of the site was excavated and the ground surface recontoured.

Installation of foundations for the Reactor Building and Turbine Building required excavations of 40 feet and the water intake and discharge canals required excavations of 30 feet. These, as well as other excavations at the plant, have profoundly affected the ground water flow regime at the site.

The principal cause for these ground water alterations has been the removal of sections of the upper clay layer and overlying strata resulting in altered gradients around the deeper foundations and a decrease in water table levels across the site.

The high potentiometric elevations observed in the Kirkwood wells (as high as elevation 22 feet), along with the presence of sandy seams and lenses suggests the presence of an upward gradient between the Kirkwood to the Cohansey and the potential for leakage between the two formations.

Due to the pumping within the Cohansey aquifer (W-73), the piezometric head of the Cohansey is lower than the water table (Cape May) elevation in the vicinity of deeper building foundations. As a result, there is a downward flow potential from the water table aquifer to the underlying Cohansey aquifer. Figures 2.4-X and 2.4-X [GHD figures 5.7 and 5.8] depict the vertical groundwater flow from the Cape May downward to the Cohansey formation in the vicinity of the station o The Flow Regime Direction of flow in the water table aquifer is governed by differences in hydrostatic head which results in gradients.

These gradients can be visualized on a contour map of the hydrostatic head of the body of water, in this case the unconfined water table aquifer of the Cape May Formation. The contours connect points of equal hydrostatic levels.

The map is interpreted much like a topographic map, i.e., water flows down hill. On a hydrostatic head map the "hills" are water levels in the subsurface, and the slopes of these hills are the ground water gradients. An important consideration with such maps is the time elapsed between measurements of each ARCHIVED TEXT

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT data point. Unless measurements at all data points are made at the same time, the map of the water levels will only approximate the actual conditions because water table levels fluctuate day to day.

The contours, gradients and flow lines can be expected to locally shift somewhat in response to precipitation and future construction activities. However, the overall pattern would not be expected to change appreciably.

The water surface in the canals themselves remains at or near sea level. The canal trenches drain ground water from the surrounding upper aquifers. They act as discharge points and barriers to ground water flow across the site. The canals, therefore, are the largest single factor controlling local ground water conditions on the site.

The general flow direction of ground water is from the higher area of the plant itself toward the canal. Reference 18, Figures 5.1, 5.3, and 5.5, depict the groundwater elevation contours for the Cape May, Cohansey, and Kirkwood formations, respectively, from a synoptic round of water levels measured in July 2016. The pierced upper clay layer in the vicinity of the Turbine and Reactor Buildings has distorted the ground water flow paths. The water level where the clay has been pierced is considerably lower than the surrounding water levels when the clay layer is intact and more closely approximates hydraulic head levels in the Cohansey wells near the Turbine and Reactor Buildings. The ground water gradients in the upper Cape May formation are locally in the direction of the Turbine Building.

The ground water flow in the Cohansey formation is also controlled by the canals on the site as evidenced by the direction of ground water flow near wells. Review of construction drawings indicate that the canal excavation has pierced the upper layer at least at some points. However, as the distance from the canal increases, the generally easterly regional gradient begins to deflect the flow paths away from the canal.

o Ground Water Flow Rates Sodium chloride (NaCl) trace tests were conducted in four closely spaced, shallow (20 foot) test wells in October and December 1976. The tests provide data for computing ground water flow rates in the unconfined Cape May aquifer under natural as well as pumping conditions (Reference 9).

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT o Ground Water Velocity Flow velocities in ground water may be estimated using the seepage velocity equation:

V = Kl/n, where V = Velocity in ft/day K = Hydraulic Conductivity in ft/day l = Hydraulic Gradient n = Porosity of Soil Material Assuming:

K = 2.0 x 10-4 ft/sec for Cape May formation

= 2.7 x 10-4 ft/sec for Cohansey formation l = .02 ft/ft for Cape May formation

= .01 ft/ft for Cohansey formation n = 25% for both formations the computed mean velocity is 1.4 and 0.9 ft/day for the Cape May and Cohansey formations respectively. The 1.4 ft/day compares favorably with the 2.6 ft/day computed in a 1977 study of dispersion, dilution and travel time for a hypothetical radionuclides spill performed at the Oyster Creek Site (Reference 9).

o Hydraulic Conductivity During the course of a tracer test conducted in 1976 water levels were also monitored in the four test wells. Standard analyses of the water level decline and recovery data allowed estimates to be made of the aquifer transmissivity, which is given as the product of the hydraulic conductivity and the saturated thickness. The resultant average transmissivity was approximately 6000 gpd/foot, with a saturated aquifer thickness of 12 feet, giving a hydraulic conductivity of 500 gpd/foot2 or 66.8 feet/day.

The pump and tracer test sites were located 1250 feet from the nearest point of the OCNGS discharge canal. The ground water level was approximately at elevation 12 feet based on a land surface elevation of 21 feet. The average ground water gradient, between the test site and the canal was, therefore, 12/1250 = 0.0096. According to Darcy's Law the specific discharge between the test site and the canal, under natural flow conditions, is given as the product of the hydraulic conductivity and the ground water gradient. Assuming a porosity of 25 percent, this results in an estimated flow velocity of 2.56 feet/day.

A 1977 pump test performed on the Kirkwood aquifer at the Forked River site indicated an average transmissivity of 60,000 gpd/foot and a storage coefficient on the order of 10-4. A storage coefficient in this range is typical for an aquifer that is confined. Using a saturated thickness of 250 feet the hydraulic conductivity of the Kirkwood is 240 gpd/ft2 or 32 feet/day.

The ground water gradient in the Kirkwood at the OCNGS (calculated from water levels in salt water intrusion wells) is 0.00033. Again applying Darcy's Law, the specific discharge is 0.011 feet/day. Using an assumed porosity of 20 percent this results in a flow velocity of 0.055 feet/day. Dispersion Coefficient The physical process of contaminant dispersion in ground water can be modeled mathematically. A key parameter for modeling the amount of dispersion is the dispersion coefficient. Dispersion coefficients for near surface conditions were calculated based on data obtained from the field tracer test. The longitudinal and transverse coefficients are 0.235 feet and 0.0211 feet respectively. Using the natural flow velocity of 2.86 feet/day the calculated dispersion coefficients are 0.672 ft2/day and 0.0603 ft2/day.

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  • Dispersion, Dilution and Travel Time for Hypothetical Radionuclides Spill An analysis of dispersion, dilution and travel time for a hypothetical radionuclides spill has been performed (Reference 9). The analysis was carried out using analytical methods which were verified by use of a field testing program using a tracer substance. Results of the analysis were reported as relative to a nonspecific initial concentration. The results of the analysis could be applied, therefore, to any desired concentration of radionuclide.

It was hypothesized that liquid radwaste, stored in a 30,000 gallon nonseismic category I tank, is accidentally released instantaneously at the land surface. Radionuclides could enter the hydrologic environment by infiltration into the local aquifer or by overland runoff into the discharge canal.

This evaluation used representative conservative pathways; the calculated factors and parameters which determine the concentration distributions of the released radwaste were chosen to yield maximum concentrations. Thus, it was assumed that the released liquid in its entirety will reach either the surface water or ground water. To be conservative, losses of radionuclides due to evaporation or adsorption by clay materials were not considered in the computations. Travel distances were minimized and the migration velocities maximized.

Although concentration distributions can be generated at any time or distance along the liquid radwaste hydrologic pathway specific points were chosen for presentation and analysis. These points represent:

a. Ground water
1. Nearest point of seepage into discharge canal, representing the worst case for seepage into surface waters.
b. Surface Water
1. Nearest point of surface entry into discharge canal, representing the worst case for surface runoff to surface waters.
2. The discharge canal at the Route 9 crossing, representing the point at which discharge waters leave the OCNGS site.
3. The discharge canal at the former marinas, representing a near point of concentrated human activity.

Based on the results of the field testing program, the analysis was carried out by determining concentration distributions and peak concentrations (normalized as percentages of initial concentrations) for a mixture of radionuclides representative of typical liquid radwaste and for selected individual radionuclides at the locations of interest as a function of time.

Ground Water Results As a result of a hypothetical spill of liquid containing radionuclides at the OCNGS Radwaste Building, any liquid wastes which might enter the shallow Cape May ground water aquifer would be transported down gradient to the OCNGS discharge canal within about 245 days.

Maximum relative radionuclide concentrations at the point of entry into the discharge canal are expected to range from 0.25 to 0.493 for the nine longest lived isotopes (Cs-137, Sr-90, Co-60, Cs-134, Ru-106, Mn-54, Ce-144, Ag-110m, and Zn-65).

This analysis did not include the retardation of radionuclides motion in groundwater flow due to ion exchange effects. This phenomenon would result in lower predicated concentrations at the point of entry into the discharge canal since the effective radionuclide velocity will be lower and, thus, the travel time will be longer and additional radioactive decay will occur.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT Concentrations of radionuclides will be further reduced once the groundwater has entered the discharge canal. The effects of dispersion in the OCNGS discharge canal were considered and a summary of results is presented below.

Surface Water Results The maximum relative concentration of a single radionuclide is expected to be less than 0.001 at the Route 9 bridge, and less than 0.0005 within the marina area downstream. Under normal and dilution flow conditions in the canal, dispersion is much more significant than radioactive decay in reducing radionuclide concentrations, so that all the radionuclides considered exhibit relative concentrations of the same order of magnitude.

Under shutdown flow conditions, the travel time within the OCNGS discharge canal is long enough that radioactive decay becomes significant, so that the shorter lived radionuclides exhibit peak concentrations as much as four to five orders of magnitude less than the longest-lived radionuclides.

  • Ground Water Monitoring A ground water monitoring network for the OCNGS has been installed (Reference 9, 12 and 13) using the guidance as detailed in NEI 07-07, ANI 07-01, and EPRI 1015118. The system design (number, location and depth of wells) was based on the following criteria: 1) potential spill locations, 2) site stratigraphy, and 3) probable ground water flow directions. Pertinent soil and water tests were performed to obtain the necessary data to define the hydrogeologic model. Also considered in the final design was subsurface obstructions, vehicular accessibility, and recent site development activity (i.e., paving of the Radiologically Controlled Area).

The initial ground water monitoring system consisted of 16 wells. Numerical identification of wells was established during the preliminary investigation stage and remains unchanged; this accounts for the inconsistency in the numbering of the final installations. Table 2.4-4 provides the completion depths and elevations of each of the 16 wells that comprised the initial groundwater monitoring system. The initial monitoring system also included lysimeters, whose purpose was to provide early detection of contaminant transport before it reaches the ground water table. The lysimeters were installed adjacent to the Condensate Storage Tank, Torus Water Storage Tank and Offgas Building at depths of 5 to 7 feet below the ground surface.

Most of these lysimeters were subsequently removed because they were found to be ineffective sampling devices or they were displaced as a result of construction activity.

The extent of the ground water monitoring capabilities at the OCNGS increased substantially during the years following the installation of the above-described initial monitoring network. Numerous additional monitoring wells were installed, primarily as part of an investigation of a leak from an underground diesel fuel pipeline (Reference 11), the Site Investigation-Remedial Investigation conducted in support of the sale of the OCNGS in 2000 (Reference 12), and the Site Investigation associated with tritium leaks in 2009 (Reference 14). As a result of these investigations, there are more than 100 monitoring wells located on the OCNGS site and adjacent properties. These wells were utilized to conduct hydrogeologic investigations of the site in 2006, to determine whether groundwater at and in the vicinity of its nuclear power generating facilities had been adversely impacted by any releases of radionuclides (Reference 13) and in 2009, as part of the investigation of tritium leaks at the facility. Table 2.4-X [GHD Summary of Monitoring Well and Staff Gauge Information] and Table 2.4-X. Summary of Groundwater and Surface Water Elevation Data] are presented as support to the discussion of groundwater flow. . As part of the decommissioning in 2019, the current ground water monitoring network consists of 33 wells, including 14 Background wells, 14 Detection wells, 6 Long-Term Shutdown wells, and three surface water monitoring locations. The OCGS well network in Figure 4.1 of reference 18.

Periodic monitoring of site groundwater is performed on an ongoing basis in order to provide for timely detection and effective response to any radiological impacts to groundwater.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT

  • Ground Water - Hydrostatic Pressures Based on test borings at the site (Reference 3), the ground water levels were found to be less than 10 feet below grade elevation. This means that the ground water table exists at elevation 13 feet. The safety related buildings and some other major structures were designed to withstand the hydrostatic and uplift pressure due to ground water table corresponding to the levels shown in Table 2.4-5.

The ground water table will rise with rising surface water levels. The highest flood water level which can be expected to develop on the plant site is elevation 22 ft MSL. This will happen during the occurrence of a Probable Maximum Hurricane (Subsection 2.4.5). Flood water levels and their corresponding durations, as extracted from the Hurricane Surge Hydrograph of Reference 7, are shown in Table 2.4-6.

The ground water table rise which is expected to occur during PMH floods has been estimated assuming seepage from the flooded canal at the west end of the plant. This postulation is considered to give most severe ground water levels under the plant foundations. The estimated values of the highest ground water level that would occur during PMH are listed in Table 2.4-7.

This assessment was based on the assumption of initial ground water table at elevation 18 ft, extracted from pump test records.

This value is very conservative. Due to the massive weight of the Turbine and Reactor Buildings, these increased uplift and hydrostatic pressure loads would have marginal effect on the stability of these buildings. Most of the other buildings are at grade level, and are not affected by this ground water table rise (Reference 3). The floatation potential of safety related buildings has been assessed under the Systematic Evaluation Program.

2.4.11 References (1) Jersey Central Power and Light Co., 1972 Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Forked River Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-363.

(2) Carpenter, J. H., "Concentration Distribution for Material Discharged into Barnegat Bay,"

Pritchard-Carpenter Consultants, Baltimore, MD. 1963 (3) "Probable Maximum Hurricane Flood Analysis, Oyster Creek Nuclear Unit No. 1," Dames and Moore Inc.,

Cranford, NJ. 1972 (4) Casagrande, A., Forked River Nuclear Station, Investigations of Stability Characteristics of Soils in the Canal Banks. Casagrande Consultants, Arlington, MA. 1972 (5) Carpenter, J. H., "Recirculation and Effluent Distribution for Oyster Creek Site," Pritchard-Carpenter Consultants, Baltimore, MD. 1964 (6) GPU Nuclear, "Hydrographic Study of Barnegat Bay, NJ," Parsippany, NJ. 1979 (7) Lawler, Matusky, Skelly Engineers, "Simulation of the Effluent Plumes from the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," Pearl River, NY. 1978 (8) Jersey Central Power and Light Co., Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No. 50-219.

Environmental Report (9) Woodward Clyde Consultants, "Phase II Report Groundwater Monitoring System," Wayne, NJ. 1984 (10) GPU Nuclear, "Forked River Water Surface Profiles", Parsippany, NJ. 1987 (11) Woodward-Clyde Consultants, Ground Water Contamination Assessment, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Wayne, NJ, 1988

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR (12) URS Greiner Woodward Clyde, Final Report, Site Investigation/Remedial Investigation - Non- Radiological, Volumes 1-19, GPU Nuclear, Inc., Oyster Creek Generating Station, Wayne, NJ, 2000 (13) Conestoga-Rovers & Associates, Hydrogeologic Investigation Report, Fleetwide Assessment, Oyster Creek Generating Station, Forked River, New Jersey, Waterloo, Ontario Canada, 2006 (14) Conestoga-Rovers & Associates, Site Investigation Report, Oyster Creek Generating Station, Forked River, New Jersey, Prepared For: Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 2009 (15) Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Sandy (AL182012) 22 - 29 October 2012; National Hurricane Center 12 February 2013.

(16) OCNGS Reply to RAI on IPEEE 1940-00-20206, 8/17/2000 (ML003743533)

(16) OCNGS Response Letter SEP Topic No. II-3-C Flooding Potential and Protection Requirements, 06/06/1983 (17) Conestoga-Rovers & associates, Hydrogeological Report, Rev. 2, Exton, PA, April 2011.

(18) GHD, Hydrogeological Investigation Report, Exton, PA, October, 2016

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Figure 2.4-1

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Table 2.4-1 (Sheet 1 of 1)

OBSERVED PIEZOMETRIC SURFACES Aquifer Approximate Elevation (MSL of Depth Range Piezometric Surface (feet)

Upper confined* 10 to 30+/- + 8 feet at Oyster Creek Cohansey Sand 10 to 90+/- +14 feet at Forked River Site

+10 feet at Oyster Creek Site

+ 4 feet at Barnegat Bay Kirkwood Formation 90 to 300+/- +20 feet at Oyster Creek Site See Subsection 2.4.11.1

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.4-2 (Sheet 1 of 1)

DATA(a) FOR WELLS IN OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION AREA Number Owner Depth (Ft.) Yield (GPM) Use

1. Lacey Materials 120 325 Industrial
2. Lacey Township 235-265 C Community Water Supply Municiple Utilities (2 wells)

Authority

3. Lacey Township 235-265 C Community Water Supply Municiple Utilities (3 wells)

Authority

4. Lacey Township 235-265 C Community Water Supply Municple Utilities (2 wells)

Authority

5. Ocean Township Utilities 160 D Community Water Supply Authority (3 wells)
6. Ocean Township Utilities 350 D Community Water Supply Authority (1 well)
7. Barnegat Water Co. 148 -- Community Water Supply
8. Oyster Creek/Forked River 100-350 E Industrial (9 wells)

Plant Notes:

(a)

Reference 8

  • Average use of 1.5-2.0 million gallons/day (Total system yield)
  • Average use of 0.75 million gallons/day (Total system yield)
  • Average use of 0.022 million gallons/day
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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.4-3 (Sheet 1 of 1)

OYSTER CREEK TYPICAL WELL WATER ANALYSIS Constituent Parts per Million Calcium 5.82 Magnesium 1.30 Sodium and Potassium (by difference) 16.56 Chloride 19.00 Sulfate 7.50 Nitrate 0.25 Phosphate 1.95 Bicarbonate 0.00 Silica 10.80 Iron (Total) 3.75 Manganese .01 Total Residue 96.0 Suspended Matter .0 Volatile Residue 36.0 Hardness as Calcium Carbonate (CaCO3) 26.6 (Ca, Mg & Fe)

Phenolphthalein Alkalinity (CaCO 3) 0.0 Methyl Orange Alkalinity (CaCO3) 18.0 PH 6.35 Biochemical Oxygen Demand 0

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.4-4 (Sheet 1 of 1)

INITIAL GROUNDWATER MONITORING NETWORK MONITOR WELL COMPLETION DATA Completion Depth Elevation

  • Well # (in Feet) (Feet above MSL)

W-1 50 22.49 W-2 55 22.69 W-3 24 20.49 W-4 52 20.34 W-5 20.5 22.57 W-6 52.0 23.63 W-7 20.0 22.86 (a)

W-8 27.5 23.09 W-9 20.0 23.72 W-10 60.0 23.04 W-12 20.0 23.98 W-13 50.0 24.10 W-14 53.0 23.34 W-15 20.0 23.26 W-16 20.0 23.08 W-17 150.0 20.14 Highest point on PVC pipe (a)

Monitoring Well W-8 was subsequently removed during construction activity.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.4-5 (Sheet 1 of 1)

DESIGN BASIS OF WATER TABLE ELEVATIONS FOR SITE BUILDINGS/STRUCTURES Water Table Elevation Used for Building/Structures Design (Feet above MSL)

Reactor Building 15.0 Turbine Building 15.0 Radwaste Buildings (Both Old & New) No Hydrostatic Loads Applied Circulating Water Intake Structure Foundation 3.0 Pipe Tunnels Connecting the Old & New 22.0 Radwaste Buildings For Structures with Foundation Mat at Grade No Hydrostatic Pressure Elecation 23 ft., e.g., New Radwaste Building, OffGas Building, Boiler House, etc.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.4-6 (Sheet 1 of 1)

FLOOD LEVELS VERSUS DURATION Flood Level (Ft. Above MSL) Duration (Hour) 22 0 21 1.2 20 1.5 19 1.8 18 2.1 17 2.4 16 2.7 15 3.1 14 3.4 13 3.7 12 4.0 Source: Reference 3

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.4-7 (Sheet 1 of 1)

GROUND WATER ELEVATIONS DURING PROBABLE MAXIMUM HURRICANE Distance East of Ground Water Canal Bank Near Table Elevation Seal Well Structure (Ft.) (Feet above MSL) 50 22 150 21 300 20 600 19

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT 2.5 GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING 2.5.1 Basic Geologic and Seismic Information

  • Regional Geology The OCNGS site lies far out on the New Jersey Coastal Plain. The Coastal Plain is underlain by a thick wedge of unconsolidated sediments ranging from Cretaceous to Recent in age. It is an area of low relief extending from the Fall Zone some forty miles west of the site to the Continental Shelf east of the site. The thickness of the Coastal Plain sediments varies from a feather edge at the Fall Zone to as much as 3500 feet at the edge of the Continental Shelf.

The Fall Zone, which forms the northern and western border of the Coastal Plain, follows a northeast-southwest trend, running just west of Wilmington, Delaware, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, thence passing between Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, and terminating just south of New York City. Long Island and Cape Cod represent discontinuous northern extensions of the Coastal Plain.

To the south, the Coastal Plain extends along the Atlantic Coast to Florida and westward along the Gulf Coast. The Plain is interrupted by deep embayments such as the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays. Through this broad range, the relationship of the Coastal Plain sediments with the underlying bedrock is quite variable.

West of the Fall Zone, the Coastal Plain is bordered by rocks of the Piedmont Province, the Trenton Prong, from Trenton, New Jersey, southward through Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, DC. The Piedmont is an eroded plateau of Precambrian and early Paleozoic rocks. These strata extend below the Coastal Plain to form the bedrock below the unconsolidated sediments.

North of Trenton and extending northeast to the tip of the Manhattan Prong, the Coastal Plain sediments are bounded on the northwest by shales, sandstones and diabase dikes and sills deposited in fault bordered troughs of Triassic age. The Triassic deposits in Eastern North America occur in six major and several minor elongate basins found from Nova Scotia to North Carolina. The longest of these extends from the Hudson River near Stony Point, New York, through northwestern New Jersey, Eastern Pennsylvania and Central Virginia. The Triassic trough deposits typically include a basal sandstone sequence, a shale sequence, and diabase or basalt intrusions, and, particularly in the northern occurrences, some basalt extrusions.

Similar deposits occur in a separate basin, in the Connecticut Valley Lowland, some 75 miles north of the OCNGS site.

The development of the Triassic troughs represents the last major tectonic and igneous event in Eastern North America. The forces which caused the faulting and vulcanism have been quiescent for a period in excess of 140 million years.

West of the Triassic Lowlands lies a belt of Precambrian Uplands (the New Jersey Highlands), trending northeast from south of Reading, Pennsylvania, to Danbury, Connecticut. Farther north, similar uplands form the Housatonic-Berkshire Highlands of Western Connecticut and Massachusetts and the Green Mountains of Vermont. These Precambrian Uplands range in width from ten miles to a few tens of miles. Through upstate New York and the New England states to the east, the Precambrian Highlands are bordered by the New England Upland, made up of sediments and meta-sediments of early Paleozoic age. Acidic intrusives are common, especially in Connecticut.

To the west of the Precambrian in New Jersey and the New England Upland to the north, lies the Valley and Ridge Province. This area contains the lower courses of the Lehigh and Delaware Rivers and most of the valley of the Hudson River. The rocks in this area are Paleozoic sediments ranging in age from Cambrian to Devonian. Intense folding and faulting are common throughout.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT Still farther to the west are the Middle and Upper Paleozoic beds of the Appalachian Plateau. These beds show only moderate folding, with the intensity of folding dying out to the east and west of the Appalachian Front.

  • Stratigraphy The New Jersey Coastal Plain is underlain by a sequence of unconsolidated to semi consolidated deposits of Quaternary, Tertiary and Cretaceous age. These sediments lie unconformably on a basement complex consisting of crystalline Precambrian, early Paleozoic rock, and Triassic rocks.

Coastal Plain sediments were deposited in a northwest trending coastal plain "basement depression" which extends from the vicinity of Raritan Bay, New Jersey, to Virginia and westward to the Fall Zone. The center of the broad depression is located in the vicinity of Chesapeake Bay. In the New Jersey Coastal Plain, sediments thicken seaward of the Fall Zone, and southward along the coastline, increasing from 800 feet at Sandy Hook, to 6000 feet at Cape May. In the vicinity of the site, sediment thickness is approximately 3700 feet.

  • Geologic History The sediments which were consolidated to form the basement rock in the area were deposited during the Precambrian and early Paleozoic eras. Before the beginning of the Paleozoic era, the Precambrian sediments were subjected to magmatic intrusion, metamorphism and erosion.

At the onset of the Cambrian period, the region was covered by a shallow inland sea which received sediments primarily from highlands to the east. The materials which form the Chickies Quartzite and the Wissahickon Formation were deposited during early Paleozoic time. The sediments which were to form the Baltimore Gneiss were deposited during the Precambrian period.

Regional metamorphism of these sediments took place during the Taconic Orogeny, which occurred during middle and late Ordovician time. The region was uplifted during this orogeny and provided the sediments which were deposited farther to the west during the remainder of the Paleozoic era.

The Tectonic events that took place during the latter part of the Paleozoic era in the Eastern United States have been grouped into what is known as the Appalachian Revolution. This orogeny occurred as a series of local tectonic disturbances which extended progressively farther southward from Newfoundland to Alabama. In the region west of the site, initial crustal uplift took place in late Ordovician time and again during the Devonian period. The disturbance reached its peak during Permian or early Triassic time, 240 to 200 million years ago. As a result of the Appalachian Revolution the entire region was uplifted, folded and faulted. Faulting associated with the Cream Valley-Huntingdon Valley fault zone postdates the folding and regional metamorphism and represents a final episode of the orogeny.

During the following Triassic Period, an interval of relative crustal quiescence occurred. The newly formed Appalachian Mountains were greatly reduced in elevation with the erosional products spreading onto the Continental shelf. By middle to late Triassic time the mountains were rejuvenated, and a series of depressed basins developed along their eastern flanks through a area of Eastern North America extending from Nova Scotia to North Carolina.

Great thicknesses of sediments were poured into these basins first from the east and later (or contemporaneously) from the west. As the deposition continued, the compressive forces which produced the thrust faulting associated with the Appalachian Revolution relaxed, and normal (tension) faults developed along the borders of the basins.

Thick sedimentary prisms were developed along the faulted edges, up to 20,000 feet along the northwest side of the New Jersey Basin and as much as 15,000 feet along the east side of the Connecticut River Lowland.

Late in the period a series of at least three episodes of volcanic activity occurred. Thick flows of basalt form the Watchung Mountains of New Jersey and thick diabase sills form the Palisades marking the western bank of the

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT Hudson River opposite New York City. These events represent the last volcanic activity recorded in the eastern portion of the United States.

The following period, the Jurassic, is described as "missing evidence - the Jurassic (185 to 140 million years ago)".

In Northeastern North America, no deposits of this age have been identified. The nearest Jurassic deposits are found in deep drillings for oil in Alabama. Obviously, this was a period of profound erosion with the erosional products being carried far out to sea, possibly to be covered by later Coastal Plain deposits.

During the Lower Cretaceous epoch, marine sediments were deposited on the eroded basement rock in the outer portion of the Coastal Plain. At the beginning of the Upper Cretaceous epoch, the streams draining from the Piedmont deposited broad alluvial fans in the vicinity of the Fall Zone.

Farther to the southeast, marine sediments were deposited on the eroded basement rock in the outer portion of the Coastal Plain. At the beginning of the Upper Cretaceous epoch, the streams draining from the Piedmont deposited broad alluvial fans in the vicinity of the Fall Zone.

Farther to the southeast in the Coastal Plain, thick sequences of sand, clay and marl were deposited throughout the remainder of the Cretaceous period. Similar deposits were formed during Tertiary time.

There is no record in the Eastern United States of any major tectonic event in the interval between Cretaceous and present time. This time span is characterized by periodic broad upwarping and regional downwarping of the surface, as evidenced in the stratigraphic record of repeated transgressions and regressions of the sea. Beginning in early late Cretaceous time the strata were subjected to differential subsidence. Downwarping of the southern portion of the New Jersey Coastal Plain, accompanied by differential uplift in the northern part of the Coastal Plain, resulted in progressively easterly shift in strike of the younger formations. Downwarping during deposition caused the strata to thicken to the south and southeast.

During the Pleistocene epoch, the region was subjected to the influence of the multiple advance and retreat of continental glaciers. The maximum advance of the continental ice sheets in this area extended across North Central Jersey some 40 miles north of the site.

During repeated glacial stages, sea level was lowered by as much as 300 feet below its present level, and the region was subject to erosion. During periods of glacial melting, the major streams were choked with large quantities of glacial outwash consisting of sand and gravel. These sediments were deposited along the major streams and their tributaries, and remain today as terrace deposits along valley walls.

During the final interglacial stage, sea level was some 30 to 50 feet higher than present. The resulting estuarine deposits cover islands and many of the lowland regions along the Delaware River and to the east. These deposits are known as the Cape May Formation. After deposition of the Cape May Formation, the sea withdrew and erosion began again. A net rise in sea level during the last 10,000 years, since the shrinkage of the latest continental glaciers, is estimated to be 150 to 300 feet. As a result, the outer part of the Coastal Plain and the lower reaches of streams have been inundated. Recent measurements indicate that sea level had been rising at the rate of 1/100 of a foot per year before 1939 and 2/100 of a foot per year since that time.

  • Site Geology Several geological investigations have been performed on and near the OCNGS site. They include a preliminary study made in 1960, prior to acquisition of the property, investigations for construction of OCNGS, investigations for a potential additional unit immediately north of OCNGS, and to the east and west.

Additionally, borings were made along the route of the circulating water canals. Prior to initiation of investigations for Forked River Unit 1, west of OCNGS, 182 test borings had been performed in the site area.

Fifty two additional borings were made for the Forked River project.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT The discussions below are excerpted from results of both the OCNGS and Forked River Projects (Ref. 1 and 2).

Ninety-seven test borings were made in the site area prior to or during construction of OCNGS. These holes generally covered the plant property and the routes of the intake and discharge canals. The soils to the depth investigated consisted of five distinct strata varying considerably in depth over the area investigated but quite consistent in the area where plant buildings and structures are located. The following is a summary of the information obtained from borings (Reference 1).

The first stratum (Cape May Formation), starting at the surface in the area of the plant buildings and structures (elevation 23 ft. MSL), consisted of approximately 17 feet of generally yellow, fine to medium textured, sand of medium density.

The second stratum (Upper Clay) started at elevation plus 6 feet MSL, and consisted of alternating layers or lenses of clay, silt and dark gray, fine sand which extended approximately 17 feet to an elevation of minus 11 feet MSL. Samples of the clay silt were analyzed for particle size; approximately 50 percent of the material fell in the clay or colloid range.

This stratum varied in thickness over the area investigated and sloped generally downward toward Barnegat Bay to the east and upward to the north so that the stratum generally thins out and disappears along the South Branch of Forked River, which forms the northern boundary of the site. This stratum was found to vary in thickness along a line of borings from the west of the plant southward and eastward to and along Oyster Creek to the Bay. The lower extremity of the clay-silt layer or lens along this line of borings was well below the bottom of the discharge canal dredging (elevation minus 10 ft. MSL).

The third stratum (Cohansey Formation) at the plant location is a dense sand stratum about 65 feet in thickness and generally yellow sand of medium to course texture.

The fourth stratum (Lower Clay) at the plant location was another stratum of layers or lenses of clay, silt and dark gray, fine sand. This stratum started at minus 76 feet MSL and was 8 feet thick at the plant location. The particle size analysis of this material again indicated about 50 percent clay or colloids. This stratum appears to underlie all of the area investigated varying in thickness from 6 feet to 30 feet and starting at elevations from minus 63 feet to minus 98 feet below MSL. There does not appear to be any distinct sloping of this stratum in the area investigated.

The fifth stratum (Kirkwood Formation) from minus 84 feet MSL down is a dense fine to coarse textured sand of a uniformly gray color. The borings showed some local areas with fine and medium to coarse gravel intermingled with the sand.

The two clay-silt strata appear to act as aquicludes and separate the soil below the surface into three water bearing sand aquifers, although there may be some interconnection of these aquifers in local areas.

At the Forked River site (Reference 2), test borings were extended to depths as great as 250 feet. The lowest stratum penetrated can be correlated with the Kirkwood Formation. The Kirkwood at this locality is essentially a fine sand extending from a depth of about 100 feet downward to the limits of the exploration. At the Forked River site, the Kirkwood is overlain by sands of Cohansey age.

The Kirkwood-Cohansey contact is marked by a persistent clay seam about ten feet thick. This seam is made up of interbedded sands and dark gray to black clay. The total thickness of the clay laminae is no more than one third of the interval. A very similar clay stratum, the "deep clay," was encountered 1500 feet northwest of OCNGS at 243 feet below grade.

The Cohansey sands extend from the top of the Kirkwood upward to a depth of about forty feet. The Cohansey Formation is primarily sand, slightly coarser than the underlying Kirkwood.

The upper stratum at the site has been correlated with the Cape May Formation of Pleistocene age. The Cape May beds were deposited on an eroded surface of the Cohansey sands. Their thickness, therefore, is variable, averaging about forty feet over the site. Local thickening of the Cape May beds was encountered in the borings in the form of erosion channels as much as sixty feet in depth. The sands in the upper forty feet and in the channels are coarser than the sands below and are slightly less dense. A significant increase in the shear modulus at a depth of forty feet reported by Weston Geophysical Engineers, Inc., tends to confirm a stratum change at this depth.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT Locally peats and beach sands of Holocene age are encountered. The principal area of Holocene deposits is found along the intake canal northeast of the plant site. These deposits were the subject of a field investigation conducted in April of 1972. The results of this investigation are reported in a letter from A. Casagrande, Reference (7)

At the sites explored to the west of OCNGS, the Cape May-Cohansey contact is marked by a persistent clay seam which is exposed in the circulating water canals just west of the Oyster Creek plant. In the western site area, this marker bed becomes discontinuous.

The clay beds apparently thicken below Barnegat Bay. At Island Beach, the entire Cohansey interval was classified as silty, lignitic clay and it extends to depths of 120 to 150 feet.

2.5.2 Vibratory Ground Motion

  • Structural Geology Coastal Plain Little is known of the structural relationships of the bedrock surface below the Coastal Plain. There is some evidence that the dip on the bedrock surface steepens southeast of Toms River.

The assumption that the early Paleozoic or Precambrian rocks of the Piedmont form the bedrock floor of the Coastal Plain was reinforced by the core of biotite gneiss, typical of the Piedmont, taken in a test well at the Island Beach State Park, some nine miles southwest of the OCNGS site. This would suggest that the macro structural characteristics of the rocks in the Piedmont exist below the Coastal Plain.

The structure of the Coastal Plain formations is essentially homoclinal with gentle dips to the southwest. Studies east of Trenton reveal local reversals of dip and the possibility of domelike structures in the Coastal Plain formations.

The local structures may be related to depositional conditions rather than post depositional deformation. It would be surprising if so thick a sequence of sediments could be deposited without the development of some structure from differential compaction.

Faulting Near the Fall Zone In New Jersey, the Fall Zone represents an erosion and depositional boundary, rather than a tectonic feature (Section 2.5.1.1). Structures in Precambrian and Paleozoic rocks that occur in the vicinity of the Fall Zone west of the site are complex. These strata are extensively folded. Fold axes strike between North 50° East to North 70° East. The most prevalent type of folding is flexural slip folding, in which competent layers have been bent while incompetent layers have yielded by slippage. The amplitudes of folds that may be noted in the field range from small crenulations of about one inch to larger folds of about 100 feet. Most of the faults along the Fall Zone are relatively shallow, low angle thrust faults associated with the Appalachian Orogenies of the late Paleozoic time. A major thrust fault is believed to occur in the southern position of the New Jersey Highlands where the Precambrian rocks have been interpreted as resting on the younger rocks as an eroded nappe. This very old thrust cannot be regarded as a potential source of a modern tectonic event. The same can be said of the other low angle faults in the area. None of the Paleozoic thrust faults involves Mesozoic or younger strata. They have been inactive for over 200 million years.

The Cream Valley-Huntingdon Valley fault extending northwest from West Chester, Pennsylvania, to Trenton, New Jersey is the closest known fault to the site. This fault marks the contact between the Chickies Quartzite and the Wissahickon Formation. Numerous small drag folds are encountered along the fault suggesting that it is a high angle reverse fault. However, the evidence of direction of movement based on these drag folds is not conclusive.

The nearest approach of the Cream Valley-Huntingdon Valley fault to the site is some 45 miles.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT The extensive thrust faulting in the Valley and Ridge Province to the west is even more remote from the site. These faults also are of late Paleozoic age and have not affected post Permian deposits.

Faults in the Triassic Widmer (Reference 3) describes the Triassic border fault as a "nearly straight fault line valley extending southwestward from the Hudson at Stony Point to the vicinity of Boonton and Morristown. South of Morristown the boundary is again abrupt and marked by a fault valley extending to the vicinity of Far Hills and Bedminster."

Smith (Reference 4) describes the Triassic border fault as a "relatively deep seated fault zone of substantial displacement and continuity."

Numerous normal faults are encountered in the Triassic beds. None of these faults involves younger strata; they have been inactive for 140 million years or more.

The most significant of these faults are the Hopewell and Flemington faults which cross the Delaware River within a few miles of each other in the vicinity of Lambertville, New Jersey. The Flemington fault continues to the northwest through Central New Jersey to the edge of the Triassic basin, while the Hopewell fault extends northeast to near the south branch of the Raritan River. Westward, the two faults join south of Doylestown, Pennsylvania, where they become the Chalfont fault. Vertical displacement of the faults varies between 5000 to 15,000 feet. Right lateral strike slip displacement of 12 miles has been measured on the Hopewell fault in New Jersey. Unknown amounts of the lateral displacements have occurred on the Flemington and Chalfont faults. The movement along these faults is believed to have occurred during late Triassic or possibly early Jurassic times. The closest approach of these faults to the site is greater than 50 miles.

The Cornwall-Kelvin Wrench Fault A postulated major east-west fault zone known as the Cornwall-Kelvin wrench fault has been mapped on the basis of subsea topography and geophysical surveys, and has been inferred to extend through the Triassic Lowland of Southeastern Pennsylvania. It has been suggested that this fault may be part of a major east-west continental fault which extends from the mid United States to 300 miles beyond the Atlantic shoreline. A 94 mile, right lateral offset of sedimentary basins and belts of magnetic anomalies has been determined by oceanographic surveys near the 40th parallel in the ocean basin and onto the Continental Shelf and slope.

King (Reference 2) describes the geological and geophysical evidence of a continuation of this feature onto the continent as "seemingly tenuous." He suggests a Pre-Eocene date for the suboceanic portion of the trend. Since the most persuasive evidence for a continuation of this feature onto the continent is the right-lateral displacement in the Triassic troughs in Pennsylvania, the zone of weakness permitting the displacement must have resulted from middle to late Triassic movements, or older.

From the above, even if the reality of this most ambiguous feature is assumed, the dating of the observed phenomena are such as to suggest that this "Tectonic Trend" has not been active for 140 million years, as a minimum.

  • Seismology General Based on more than 200 years of historic record and some 40 years of instrumental data, New Jersey and the surrounding areas are shown to be relatively inactive seismically. As compared to the more active Pacific Coast area, the events on the East Coast are few in number and, for the most part, are too low in magnitude and/or intensity to cause damage to well designed structures.

The epicentral location and Modified Mercalli intensities of all reported earthquakes greater than Intensity V within 250 miles of the site in relation to the major tectonics of the region are listed in Table 2.5-1. Epicentral and intensity data for the earthquakes shown are listed in Table 2.5-1.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT Remote Major Earthquakes in Eastern United States Major earthquakes, Intensity VIII and over, are rare in the Eastern United States, limited to a large degree to the St.

Lawrence Valley and to the vicinity of Charleston, South Carolina.

The seismic activity in the St. Lawrence Region can be related to very old structural features, a rift valley northeast of the Adirondack Dome, and instabilities marginal to the Canadian Shield from the Adirondacks southwest toward Lake Ontario. Major earthquakes in this area include the following:

a. St. Lawrence River (47.6°N, 70.1°W) February 5, 1663. Few details are available on this early event.

However, it was sharply felt throughout New England. The epicentral intensity was probably X.

b. St. Lawrence River, near Montreal (45.5°N, 73.6°W) February 10, 1732. This was a violent earthquake, but somewhat limited in extent. Felt from Boston, Massachusetts, to Annapolis, Maryland.

Intensity IX.

c. Massena, New York - Cornwall, Ontario (44.9°N, 74.9°W) September 4, 1944. This event caused considerable damage to the two cities and was felt through Pennsylvania and Maryland. Intensity VIII.

It was also nearest to the OCNGS site, and was felt at the site with an intensity of about III.

The region surrounding Charleston, South Carolina, has been the locus of no less than twelve reported earthquakes, including the major earthquake of August 31, 1886.

King and Johnson (Reference 2) describe a "transverse spur of epicenters extending southwestward from the Appalachian Belt to the coast of South Carolina, which includes the major Charleston earthquake." On the tectonic map a transverse arch with about the same trend is shown to extend southeastward from the Appalachian across the Continental Shelf into the ocean, but the spur of epicenters lies on the southwestern flank of this feature rather than on its crest. The conditions described by King (Reference 2) serve to differentiate the Charleston, South Carolina area tectonically from the rest of the Coastal Plain.

The Charleston Earthquake (32.9°N, 80.0°W), August 31, 1886, was probably the largest well documented seismic event in the Eastern United States. Felt over an area of some 2,000,000 square miles, its epicentral intensity was X. It occurred as a series of shocks starting at 21:15 on August 31, and extending to 20:00 September 1. A series of aftershocks with the same epicenter occurred on October 22 and November 5.

The Charleston Earthquake was probably felt at the Forked River site with an intensity of III or, as a maximum, IV.

Major Earthquakes Within 250 Miles of the Site Two earthquakes of Intensity VIII have been recorded in the vicinity of Boston in a cluster of epicenters along the coast to the north. For completeness, the Cape Ann, Massachusetts event, which occurred just outside the 250 mile limit is also cited.

a. Newbury, Massachusetts (42.8°N, 70.8°W) November 9, 1727. Intensity VIII.
b. Woburn, Massachusetts (42.5°N, 72.2°W), Intensity VII-VIII.
c. East of Cape Ann, Massachusetts (42.5°N, 70.0°W). A series between November 18 and December 19, 1755. Maximum Intensity VIII. This event is classed as a major earthquake.

The Tectonic Map indicates major faulting concentrated in the Boston area. The above events could be related to the northernmost of the faults shown.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT Closer to the site is the Intensity VIII shock reported at East Haddam, Connecticut (41.5°N, 72.5°W). This occurrence may be related to the eastern border fault of the Connecticut Valley Triassic Basin. This event (the nearest Intensity VIII earthquake to the site) was probably felt at Forked River with an intensity of no more than IV.

Local Seismicity Some of the earthquakes in Western New Jersey, north of Latitude 40°, shown on Table 2.5-1 (Numbers 36, 11, 16, 15 and 20) had their epicenters near the borders of the Triassic Lowland. Numbers 36, 15 and 20 of these epicenters seem to be directly related to the border fault. The maximum intensity reported along this trend is VI.

Other zones of minor seismicity appear bordering the New Jersey Highlands and farther west, along the Appalachian axis. In no case, however, are epicentral intensities in excess of VI reported along these trends within fifty miles of the site.

The largest recorded earthquakes within 50 miles of the site are two Intensity VII events which have occurred to the north:

a. Near New York City (40.6°N, 74.0°W) August 10, 1884. Intensity VII. This earthquake was felt over an estimated 70,000 square miles and had its epicentral location in New York Harbor, between Staten Island and Manhattan. Its location suggests a relationship to an instability marginal to the Manhattan Prong,Cambro-Ordovician or older in age. The greatest damage occurred in Jamaica and Amityville on Western Long Island. It was felt as far south as Atlantic City, New Jersey.
b. Sandy Hook to Toms River, New Jersey (three shocks), 40.3°N, 74.0°W), June 1, 1927.

Intensity VII. The reported felt area for the last of the Intensity VII events was 3000 square miles. This is notably smaller than the felt area for any other Intensity VII event reported. This may be explained in part by the epicentral location proximate to the Atlantic Coast. If the oceanic area were included, the actual felt area would have approached 6000 square miles. This is still a small felt area for an Intensity VII event. For comparison, the two closest events, definitely on the Coastal Plain, are listed in Table 2.5-1 as event Numbers 5 and 19.This comparison suggests that, based on felt area, the 1927 Toms River event was an atypical Intensity VII event. Very probably, its actual energy release was more typical of an Intensity V or VI event.

  • Basis for Seismic Design Criteria The basis for the seismic design criteria at the OCNGS is presented in Section 3.7. The historical seismicity of the site as described in the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey publication "Earthquake History of the United States, Part I" and the "Seismic Probability Map of the United States" (U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey) were examined by Professor George W. Housner of the California Institute of Technology. The results of the study are as follows:
a. Small earthquakes have occurred in the general New Jersey area and others can be expected to occur there in the future.
b. The nearest large earthquakes were centered approximately 500 miles from the site. These were the Charleston, South Carolina shock of August 31, 1886, centered approximately 500 miles southwest of the site and the earthquake of February 28, 1925, near Quebec at 47.6°N, 70.1°W centered approximately 500 miles north of the site.
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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT

c. The seismic probability map assigns New Jersey to Zone 1 with zones being classified as follows: Zone 0 - no damage Zone 1 - minor damage Zone 2 - moderate damage Zone 3 - major damage
d. The nearest known fault is approximately 40 miles from the site at Morrisville, Pennsylvania, and there is no evidence of faulting near the site. It is concluded that the probability of fault displacements occurring in the vicinity of the reactor structure is negligibly small.
e. The seismicity of the general region of the Oyster Creek Site is so low that it would be expected to have a low intensity of ground motion. The shocks in this region are too small to be listed in "Seismicity of the Earth" by Gutenberg and Richter, and the U.S.

Coast and Geodetic survey publication does not give information on the magnitudes of the shocks.

The response spectra, discussed in Section 3.7, are based upon a ground acceleration of 0.11g or 3.54 feet per second. The derivation of this ground acceleration is as follows: The spectrum intensity for California Zone 3 is assumed to be I0.2 = 2.7. Reference can be made to AEC publication TID-7024, Table 1.6.

The corresponding spectrum intensities for other zones may be taken to be:

I0.2 Zone 0 0.33 Zone 1 0.67 Zone 2 1.35 Zone 3 2.70 The seismic probability map (Figure 1.10 of TID-7024) assigns New Jersey to Zone 1.

Professor Housner recommended using an intensity I0.2 = 0.67 x 1.40 = 0.94 as the probable maximum intensity to be expected at the site during the life of the plant.

Table 1.6 in TID-7024 gives the maximum ground acceleration for the May 18, 1940, El Centro earthquake as 0.33g with a spectrum intensity of I0.2. = 2.7. This has been assumed to be equivalent to a California Zone 3 earthquake.

Reducing the acceleration by the factor 0.94/2.70 gives a ground acceleration of 0.11g. The OCNGS response spectrum, corresponds to a spectrum intensity of I0.2 = 0.94 or an intensity of approximately one third that of Zone

3. The application of this spectrum to design was set forth in G.W. Housner's "Design of Nuclear Power Reactors Against Earthquake." A detailed explanation is given in the AEC publication TID-7024. Refer to Section 3.7 for further detail.

In 1992, Weston Geophysical developed a new site specific design input response spectra generated from a suite of 67 horizontal earthquake time history records and the corresponding 34 vertical records. The peak ground accelerations associated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) are obtained from the 84% non-exceedance probability of the data and are equal to 0.184g. horizontal and 0.0952g. vertical. The operating basis earthquake accelerations are one-half the SSE accelerations and are, therefore, equal to 0.092g. horizontal and 0.0476g. vertical. The SSE Site Specific Response Spectra (SSRS) are contained in Reference 6 and are approved by the US NRC in March, 1992, as shown in Reference 5. The peak ground accelerations associated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) are obtained from the 84% non-exceedance probability of the data and are equal to 0.184g horizontal and0.952g vertical. (See figures 2.5.1 and 2.5.2)

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Figure 2.5-1 OCNGS Site Specific Spectra, Horizontal Component 5% Damping

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Figure 2.5-2 OCNGS Site Specific Spectra, Vertical Component 5% Damping

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR ARCHIVED TEXT 2.5.3 Stability of Subsurface Materials and Foundations

  • Building and Structure Foundations Buildings and structures are founded generally in the third stratum (Cohansey sand) described in Subsection 2.5.1.4. After excavation, backfilling and rolling, soil compression tests were made in the Reactor Building and Turbine Building areas, using loads up to 80,000 pounds on a four square foot plate. In the Reactor Building area a loading of 20,000 pounds per square foot gave a deflection of 0.003 inches in eight hours, and in the Turbine Building area the deflection from this loading was 0.009 to 0.14 inches in eight hours. These results were highly satisfactory from the standpoint of safety against overstressing the subsoil, for the 8000 pounds per square foot loadings used and even for the 13,000 pounds per square foot loadings used for the earthquake criteria. So far as settlements are concerned, the increased stresses during earthquakes would have no measurable effects upon the settlements in this type of highly compacted soils.

Observed settlements of the Reactor Building from the start of construction until May 1968 range between 2/3 inch and 3/4 inch.

All available information and test results confirm that the Cohansey sand has a dense to very dense relative density. Results also indicate a marked increase in standard penetration resistance (N-values) at about elevation (-

)30 feet. The direct determination of relative densities from undisturbed samples indicated that the relative density of the Cohansey sand is greater than 70 percent.

2.5.4 References (1) Jersey Central Power and Light Co. 1967. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No.

50-219. Facility Description Safety Analysis Report.

(2) Jersey Central Power and Light Co. 1972. Forked River Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No.

363. Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.

(3) Widmer, K. 1964. The Geology and Geography of New Jersey. D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., Princeton, NJ.

(4) Smith, B.L., Personal Communication.

(5) Letter, A. Dromerick, NRC, to J. J. Barton, GPUN, Review and Evaluation of the Site Specific Response Spectra - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (M68217), October 14, 1992.

(6) Letter, G. C. Klimkiewicz, Weston Geophysical Corp. To A. O. Asfura, EQE, "Site Specific Response Spectra, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," October 14, 1992.

(7) Investigation of Stability Characteristics of Soils in the Canal Banks (Old Appendix 2.5A)

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.5-1 (Sheet 1 of 3)

LIST OF EARTHQUAKES (INTENSITY IV OR GREATER) WITHIN 250-MILE RADIUS OF SITE Distance From North West Area Intensit Reference Site (Miles) No. Date Time Locality Latitude Longitud (mi2) y (See Shts.

0-50 1 3/10/1877 09:59 Delaware Valley 40.3 e 74.9 300 (M.M.)

IV-V 3&4) 2-76, 12 2 1/21/1921 18:40 New Jersey 40 75 150 V 4 3 6/1/1927 07:20 New Jersey 40.3 74.0 3000 VII 7 4 1/24/1933 21:00 ear Trenton, NJ 40.2 74.7 600 V 10 5 8/22/1938 22:36 Central NJ 40.1 74.5 5000 V 10 50-100 6 12/18/1737 23:00 Near New York City 40.8 74.0 - VII 1, 12, 13 7 10/9/1871 09:40 Wilmington, Del 39.7 75.5 - VII 5, 15 8 7/11/1872 05:25 Westchester Co., NY 40.9 73.8 100 V 2-73 9 12/10/1874 22:25 Westchester, NY 40.9 73.8 5000 VI 2-75 10 3/25/1879 19:30 Delaware River 39.2 75.5 600 IV-V 2-80, 5, 11 11 5/31/1884 - Allentown, PA 40.6 75.5 Local V 5, 12 12 8/10/1884 14:07 Near New York City, felt to 40.6 74.0 70,000 VII -

south 13 3/8/1889 18:40 Pennsylvania 40 76 4000 V 9-89, 12 14 3/9/1893 00:30 New York City, NY 40.6 74.0 Local V 5 15 9/1/1895 06:09 New Jersey felt to Northeast 40.7 74.8 35000 VI -

16 5/31/1908 12:42 Allentown, PA 40.6 75.5 Local VI 5, 12 17 6/8/1916 16:15 Near New York City, NY 41.0 73.8 Local IV-V 4 18 5/11/1926 22:30 New Rochelle, NY 40.9 73.9 150 V 7 19 11/14/1939 21:54 Salem Co., NJ 39.6 75.2 6000 V 10 20 9/3/1951 20:26 New York, felt in NJ 41.2 74.1 5500 V -

21 3/27/1953 03:50 Stamford, CT 41.1 73.5 - V 10 22 3/23/1957 14:03 West-Central, NJ 40-3/4 74-3/4 - VI 10 23 9/14/1961 21:17 Lehigh Valley, PA 40-3/4 75-1/2 Local V 10 24 12/27/1961 12:06 Pennsylvania - NJ Border 10-1/4 74-3/4 - V 10 25 5/18/1791 22:00 Connecticut, felt in PA 41.5 72.5 35000 VIII -

00-150 26 8/23/1827 - New London, CT 41.4 72.7 - IV-V 1 27 4/12/1837 - Hartford, CT 41.7 72.7 - V 1 28 6/30/1858 22:45 New Haven, CT 41.3 73.0 1000 V 1 29 8/9/1840 15:30 South Connecticut 41.5 72.9 7500 V 1, 13

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR TABLE 2.5-1 (Sheet 2 of 3)

LIST OF EARTHQUAKES (INTENSITY IV OR GREATER) W ITHIN 250-MILE RADIUS OF SITE Distance From Site North West Area Intensity Reference (Miles) No. Date Time Locality Latitude Longitude (mi2) (M.M.) (See Shts. 3&4) 100-150 30 7/28/1875 04:10 Connecticut 41.8 73.2 2000 V 2-76 (Cont'd) 31 10/4/1878 02:30 Hudson River, NY 41.5 74.0 600 V 2-79 32 3/11/1883 18:57 Hartford Co., MD 39.5 76.4 Local IV-V 2-84 33 5/8/1906 12:41 Delaware 38.7 75.7 400 V 5 34 11/14/1925 08:04 Near Hartford, CT 41.5 72.5 850 VI 7 35 10/8/1952 16:40 Poughkeepsie, NY 41.7 74.0 - V 10 36 1/7/1954 02:25 Sinking Spring, PA 40.3 76.0 - VI 10 37 2/21/1954 15:00 Wilkes-Barre, PA 41.2 75.9 Local VII 10 38 2/23/1954 22:55 Wilkes-Barre, PA 41.2 75.9 Local VI 10 150-200 39 2/27/1883 22:30 Rhode Island 41.5 71.5 - V 4 40 1/2/1885 21:16 Maryland & Virginia 39.2 77.5 3500 V 2-86, 4, 9-85, 14 200-250 41 10/5/1817 11:45 Woburn, MA 42.5 71.2 - VII-VIII 1, 13 42 9/21/1876 23:30 Southeast MA 41.8 71.0 2000 V 4 43 12/18/1897 18:45 Ashland, VA 37.7 77.5 7500 V 4, 14 44 4/24/1903 07:30 Northeastern, MA 42.7 71.0 350 V 5 45 1/21/1903 A.M. East Massachusetts 42.1 70.9 500 V 5 46 1/24/1907 06:30 Schenectady, NY 42.8 74.0 Local IV-V 4 47 4/2/1909 02:25 VA, W. VA, MD, PA 39.4 78.0 2500 V-Vi 5, 6, 14 48 2/2/1916 23:26 Mohawk Valley, NY 43 74 8000 V 4 49 11/1/1916 21:32 Glens Falls, NY 43.3 73.7 300 V 8 50 4/9/1918 21:09 Virginia 38.7 78.4 60000 VI 3-8, 4, 5, 51 9/5/1919 21:46 Virginia 38.8 78.2 - VI 3-9 52 4/24/1925 02:56 Southeast MA 41.8 70.8 1600 V 7, 8 53 3/18/1926 16:09 New Ipswich, NH 42.6 71.8 800 VI 7 54 4/20/1931 14:54 Lake George, NY 43.4 73.7 60000 VII 10 55 7/15/1938 17:45 Southern Blair County, Pa 40.4 78.2 100 VI 10, 12 56 1/28/1940 18:12 Buzzards Bay, MA 41.6 70.8 2000 V 10 57 8/24/1952 19:07 Mohawk Valley, NY 43.0 74.5 400 V 10 58 10/16/1963 10:31 Near Coast of Maine 42.5 70.8 5800 VI 10

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR OCNGS UFSAR TABLE 2.5-1 (Sheet 3 of 3)

LIST OF EARTHQUAKES (INTENSITY IV OR GREATER) W ITHIN 250-MILE RADIUS OF SITE References for Table 2.5-1

1. Memoirs of Boston Society of Natural History, Volume 2, 1871-1878. Volcanic Manifestations in New England, Being an Enumeration of the Principal Earthquakes from 1638 to 1969 by William T. Brigham, pages 1-28.
2. American Journal of Science and Arts (known also as Silliman's Journal of Science),1819-1886.

Inasmuch as all of the references used are in the nineteenth century, only the last two digits of the year are given. Thus 2-86 refers to the volume for the year 1886. This reference contains the important catalogue of C. G. Rockwood which continued from 1872 to 1877.

3. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America. Since this started in 1911 and annual volumes have followed, the year may be obtained by adding 10 to the number of volumes. Reference is by volume number.
4. Monthly Weather Review of the United States Weather Bureau. The earthquakes are always described in the issue for the month in which they occurred and in rare cases in that for the following month so that the general reference to this source is sufficient. In earlier years the amount of earthquake information varies greatly being quite complete for some periods and at other entirely lacking. However, from 1915 to June 1924, during which period the Weather Bureau was charged with seismological investigation, the information is very complete.
5. Unpublished records of Harry Fielding Reid, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD. These include a card index and volumes of newspaper clippings, as well as special correspondence. In many cases where quite complete information is available from other sources, valuable supplementary information regarding area and intensity is given by Reid.
6. Unpublished records of J.B. Woodworth, Harvard University, through the courtesy of Francis A.

Tondorf, S. J., Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

7. Quarterly Seismological Report of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, which began in 1925. The last report for that year also contains information for the second half of 1924 to connect with Weather Bureau publication. Earthquakes are described under the month in which they occurred.
8. The Registration of Earthquakes and Press Dispatches on Earthquakes. Georgetown University publication by Francis A. Tondorf, S. J., Chief Seismologist. Earthquakes found under year and date. Also monthly Seismological Dispatches which give in advance of publication the same information in more detail.
9. Science. References as in case of reference number 2.
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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR CHAPTER 3 -DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS 3.1 DESIGN CRITERIA 3.1.1 Conformance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria The final version of the General Design Criteria was published in the Federal Register February 20, 1971 as 10CFR50 Appendix A. Differences between the proposed and final versions of the criteria included a consolidation from 70 to 64 criteria and general elaboration of design requirement details. At the time of issuance, the Commission stressed that the final version of the criteria were not new requirements and were promulgated to more clearly articulate the licensing requirements and practices in effect at the time.

In a Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-92-223, the NRC approved a proposal in which it was recognized that plants with construction permits issued before May 21, 1971 were not licensed to meet the final General Design Criteria. The memo recognized that while compliance with the intent of the final General Design Criteria was important, back fitting of these requirements to older plants would provide little or no safety benefit.

The design of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) began approximately in January 1964. First concrete was poured in February 1965 and the Reactor Building was completed in November 1967. Fuel loading was started on April 10, 1969 and Commercial Operation achieved on December 23, 1969.

As part of the application for a Full Term Operating License, the design of the station, as of March 6, 1972, was evaluated against the requirements of 10CFR50.34, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, in effect on July 7, 1971 and submitted as Amendment 68 to the original Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report (FDSAR).

Conformance with NRC General Design Criteria (GDC) for the OCNGS was established as part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) as detailed in NUREG-0822, Docket Number 50-219, September 1982.

NUREG-0822 was issued by NRC to document the review of the OCNGS under the SEP. The report provides a description of the topics, as they apply to Oyster Creek, and the resolution or status of each topic. At the time of issuance of NUREG-0822, the detailed review of some of the issues was not completed. Since that time additional analyses have been performed and submitted to NRC. The NRC subsequently issued Supplement No. 1 to NUREG-0822, documenting their review and status of completed and unresolved issues.

In addition, NRC issued NUREG-1382, "Safety Evaluation Report related to the full term operating license for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station". Because much of the review necessary for conversion of the Provisional Operating License is similar to the scope reviewed for the SEP, the major portion of the technical input supporting the NUREG-1382 has come from the SEP topic evaluations. NUREG -1382 provides a description of the SEP topic objectives, and the resolution or status of each topic as of January 1991. Subsequently, all the remaining SEP topics were resolved.

The proposed General Design Criteria that are considered to remain applicable in the defueled condition include the following:

Criterion 1 - Quality Standards and Records The decommissioning quality assurance program (DQAP) is presented in the OC DQAP Manual. The description of the various systems and components includes the codes and standards that are met in the design and their adequacy.

Appropriate records of the design, fabrication, erection, and testing of structures, systems and components important to safety are maintained by or for the licensee and are available for review or recall.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR Criterion 2 -Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena Conformance to the applicable structural loading criteria ensures that those systems and components affected by this criterion are designed and built to withstand the forces that might be imposed by the occurrence of the various natural phenomena mentioned in the criterion, and this presents no risk to the health and safety of the public.

Criterion 3 - Fire Protection The materials and layout used in the station design have been chosen to minimize the possibility and to mitigate the effects of fire. Sufficient fire protection equipment is provided in the unlikely event of a fire.

Criterion 60 - Control of Releases of Radioactive Materials to the Environment The station radioactive waste control systems (which include the liquid and solid radwaste systems) are designed to limit the off-site radiation exposure to levels below limits set forth in 10CFR20.

Criterion 64 - Monitoring Radioactivity Releases The station process and area radiation monitoring systems are provided for monitoring significant parameters from specific station process systems and specific areas including the station effluents to the site environs and to provide alarms and signals for appropriate corrective actions.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR 3.2 MISSILE PROTECTION 3.2.1 Missile Selection and Description This subsection identifies the source/type of postulated missiles internal and external to the plant. The following subsections discuss the criteria used for missile selection.

  • Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena o Tornado Missiles Tornado wind velocity probabilities have been evaluated at Oyster Creek, as presented in Section 2.3.

Further evaluation of tornadoes and tornado missiles at the Oyster Creek site has been conducted as part of the Systematic Evaluation Program. Wind velocity probabilities determined during this effort are presented in Reference 10 of Section 2.3 In the design of the OCNGS, the method of analysis to determine the protective capability of Class I buildings and equipment against various sized missiles and missile penetration at tornado velocities was based on the Modified Petry Formula (Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks NP3726).

The missiles assumed were a wood utility pole, 35 feet long by 14 inches in diameter having a velocity of 200 mph, and a one ton missile, such as a compact type automobile traveling at 100 mph with a contact area of 25 sq ft.

o Floods No missiles associated with floods have been identified for the OCNGS.

  • Missiles Generated by Events Near the Site o External Explosion Missiles Potential hazards due to external explosions have been considered. Possible sources of explosion are essentially limited to transportation accidents (Reference 3). The Systematic Evaluation Program Integrated Plant Safety Assessment (NUREG-0822) concluded that, on the basis of existing State of New Jersey laws and the low probability of explosive shipments in the vicinity of the site, the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.91 is satisfied and that missiles generated by explosions near the site need not be further evaluated.

However, a NRC letter dated May 23, 1990 stated that the NRC staff has concluded, after their discussion with the State of New Jersey, that there is sufficient increase in truck traffic in the vicinity of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, specifically on U.S. Route 9, to warrant a reassessment of the frequency of hazardous material shipments and, potentially, the level of risk associated with the shipment.

GPUN agreed to perform a detailed characterization of traffic and hazardous material shipments, based on more recent data in the vicinity of OCNGS, that would permit verification that the risk due to nearby transportation is acceptably low (Reference 8). Missile sources resulting from accidental transportation explosions in the vicinity of OCNGS have not been characterized or evaluated because of the low probability of such events.

Two natural gas pipelines are installed in the vicinity of Oyster Creek. One is for normal distribution and the other is adjacent to the combustion turbines. In addition to the low probability of an accident occurring, the detonation of an unconfined natural gas dispersal in air is not a credible event o Aircraft Hazards Further evaluation of aircraft hazards is presented as part of the Systematic Evaluation Program.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR 3.2.2 References (1) Thullen - Loads on Spherical Shells, Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.., Oak Brook, Illinois, August 1964. Application for License, Quad Cities Units 1 and 2, Docket No. 50-254/265, Amendment 3.

Ibid, Amendment 4.

(2) Application for License, Browns Ferry, Amendment 6, Question C-8.

(3) An Analysis of Turbine Missiles Resulting from Last Stage Wheel Failure, GE Topical Report TR67SL211.

(4) NUREG-0822, Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program.

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No. 50-219, Final Report. January 1983.

(5) CNGS Procedure 2000-ABN-3200.33, Toxic Material/Flammable Gas Release - No Radiation Involved.

(6) Letter from G. E. (Martin OConnor) to GPUN (Frank Collado), dated June 7, 1996.

(7) LES Calculation No. 72-01-01, Turbine Missile Analysis for New Monoblock Rotor and Blades, October, 1996. Revision 3.

(8) Journal of the Structural Division, Assessment of Empirical Concrete Impact Formulas, By George E. Sliter, Dated May 1980, page 1035-1036.

(9) Letter from GE Power Generation (George Reluzco) to General Electric Company (J. Hess),

Dated March 28, 1996.

(10) NUREG-1382, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Full Term Operating License for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No. 50-219, January 1991.

(11) Letter, A. Dromerick, NRC, to J. J. Barton, GPUN, Evaluation of Upper Reactor Building and Non-Safety Architectural Components Subjected to Tornado-Wind Loading - Items 1 and 11 of SEP Topic III-2 (M79165), Docket No. 50-219, December 7, 1992.

(12) The Berkley Township Tornado: A reassessment of the Tornado Hazard Probability for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Old Appendix 2.3A)

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR CHAPTER 4 - RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT Liquid processing is done by use of temporary skids, the design and usage of these will preclude the unmonitored release of radioactive material to the environment. There will no longer be radioactive solids processing at the site.

Portable drum evaporators are approved for use in selected areas of the plant for evaporation of water with low isotopic concentration. These units are operated in accordance with approved site procedures.

Radwaste liquids are processed on a batch basis. Liquids will be analyzed and released in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Procedural controls are in place to ensure that the activity of processed water after dilution will not exceed 10CFR20 limits.

Material storage space is provided in the LLRWSF. The primary purpose of the facility is to house packaged low level radwaste generated at OCNGS in a retrievable mode during such time that access to low level radwaste burial sites is not available. A secondary function of the facility is to provide for the temporary storage of reusable radioactive contaminated equipment/materials. The facility can store approximately 81,600 cubic feet of waste in liners and 52,920 cubic feet of waste in boxes. Additional storage space is provided elsewhere onsite for radioactive contaminated equipment/material. The locations involved are mostly within the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA). Evaluation of this facility is provided in Plant Safety Evaluation (SE) 402533-001, SER in Support of an On Site Low Level Radioactive Waste Storage Facility, as revised.

The sites GTCC is stored in ISFSI protected area, greater than 50 feet, west of the ISFSI pad.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 5.1 Organizational Structure ORGANIZATION HDI is responsible for the establishment and execution of the DQAP at the decommissioning facilities owned by Holtec and maintained by HDI. These decommissioning facilities have submitted a Certification of Permanent Cessation of Operations and Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii),

respectfully. The titles of managers used in the DQAP are generic, or functional titles and their formal titles may vary. Unless otherwise specifically prohibited, responsibilities of managers described in the DQAP may be delegated to, and be performed by, other qualified individuals 5.1.1 Qualification of Plant Personnel Each member of the facility staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI/ANS 3.1 of 1978 for comparable positions. The Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program, CD-20, as revised describes the essential managerial positions and applicable Human Resources procedures describe comparable ANSI/ANS 3.1-1978 positions for the individuals responsible for programs and systems that ensure the safe and successful operation of the facility. Changes to these documents are evaluated in accordance with the applicable change control process.

  • The management position responsible for radiological controls shall meet or exceed the qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.8 (Rev. 1-R, 9/75). Each other member of the radiation protection organization for which there is a comparable position described in ANSI N18.1-1971 shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications specified therein, or in the case of radiation protection technicians, they shall have at least one year's continuous experience in applied radiation protection work in a nuclear facility dealing with radiological problems similar to those encountered in nuclear power stations and shall have been certified by the management position responsible for radiological controls as qualified to perform assigned functions.

5.1.2 Safety Review Functions The safety review process defines how procedure changes, Technical Specification changes, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), plant modifications, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSF) modifications, Certificate of Compliance changes, and other documents are reviewed, approved and implemented. This process spreads the responsibility for activity in these areas broadly across the organization. The process requires each director or manager to control the preparation, review and reporting activities of each activity in their area which affects nuclear safety. Responsibilities and Qualifications of Preparers, Reviewers, and Approvers are described in the Decommissioning Quality Assurance Topical Report as revised.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR 5.2 TRAINING Station training requirements are located in CD-20, Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program and in site administrative procedures.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR 5.3 OCNGS EMERGENCY PLAN The ISFSI Only Emergency Plan (IOEP) requirements, as submitted to the NRC, are located in the IOEP.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR 5.4 PLANT PROCEDURES Station written procedures requirements are located in CD-20, Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR 5.5 SECURITY PLAN The ISFSI Security Plan requirements, as submitted to the NRC, are located in the Security Plan.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR CHAPTER 6 - ACCIDENT ANALYSIS There are no credible accidents that could result in a release that could exceed 10 CFR 100 limits.

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR APPENDIX A DEFUELED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SUPPLEMENT (AGING MANAGEMENT)

The ISFSI systems used at Oyster Creek have aging management described in their respective SARs and most of the systems that were discussed previously in Appendix A are no longer required to meet Oyster Creek design requirements discussed previously in the UFSAR. The one exception is Fire Protection which will still be needed to meet 10 CFR 50.48(f) requirements A.1.19 Fire Protection The Fire Protection aging management program is a program that includes a fire barrier inspection program and a diesel-driven fire pump inspection program. The fire barrier inspection program requires periodic visual inspection of fire barrier penetration seals, fire wraps, fire barrier walls, ceilings, and floors, and periodic visual inspection and functional tests of fire rated doors to ensure that their operability is maintained. The program includes surveillance tests of fuel oil systems for the diesel-driven fire pumps to ensure that the fuel supply lines can perform intended functions. The program also includes visual inspections and periodic operability tests of halon and carbon dioxide fire suppression systems based on NFPA codes.

The Fire Protection aging management program will be enhanced to include:

  • Specific fuel supply inspection criteria for fire pumps during tests
  • Inspection of external surfaces of the halon and carbon dioxide fire suppression systems
  • Additional inspection criteria for degradation of fire barrier walls, ceilings, and floors
  • Criteria for biennial inspection of clearances for fire doors in the scope of license renewal Enhancements will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

A.1.20 Fire Water System The Fire Water System aging management program is a program that provides for system pressure monitoring, fire system header flow testing, pump performance testing, hydrant flushing, water sampling and visual inspections activities. System flow tests measure hydraulic resistance and compare results with previous testing, as a means of evaluating the internal piping conditions. Monitoring system piping flow characteristics ensures that signs of internal piping degradation from significant corrosion or fouling would be detected in a timely manner. Pump performance tests, hydrant flushing and system inspections are performed in accordance with applicable NFPA standards. A

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR motor driven pump normally maintains fire water system pressure. Significant leakage (exceeding the capacity of this pump) would be identified by automatic start of the diesel driven fire pumps, which would initiate immediate investigation and corrective action.

The program will be enhanced to include sprinkler head testing in accordance with NFPA 25, Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems. Samples will be submitted to a testing laboratory prior to being in service 50 years. This testing will be repeated at intervals not exceeding 10 years.

Prior to the period of extended operation, the program will be enhanced to include water sampling for the presence of MIC at an interval not to exceed 5 years, periodic non-intrusive wall thickness measurements of selected portions of the fire water system at an interval not to exceed every 10 years, and visual inspection of the redundant fire water storage tank heater (tank pressure retaining surfaces) during tank internal inspections.

A.1.21 Aboveground Outdoor Tanks The Aboveground Outdoor Tanks aging management program is a program that will manage corrosion of outdoor carbon steel and aluminum tanks.

The Fire Water Storage Tank is required to support the fire protection intended function so aging management of this tank is required. Paint is a corrosion preventive measure, and periodic visual inspections will monitor degradation of the paint and any resulting metal degradation of carbon steel tanks or the unpainted aluminum tank. The in scope carbon steel tanks are both supported by structural steel and by earthen or concrete foundations. The aluminum tank is supported by an earthen foundation. Therefore, inspection of the sealant or caulking at the tank-foundation interface, and UT inspection of inaccessible tank bottoms apply only to those tanks on earthen and concrete pads. Removal of insulation will permit visual inspection of insulated tank surfaces and caulking. This new inspection program will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

A.1.26 Buried Piping Inspection The Buried Piping Inspection aging management program is a program that manages the external surface aging effects of loss of material for piping and piping system components in a soil (external) environment. The Oyster Creek buried piping activities consist of preventive and condition-monitoring measures to manage the loss of material due to external corrosion for piping, piping system components in the scope of license renewal that are in a soil (external) environment. The program will be enhanced to include inspection of buried piping within ten years of entering the period of extended operation, unless an opportunistic inspection occurs within this ten-year period. The inspections will include at least one carbon steel, one aluminum and one cast iron pipe or component. In addition, for each of these materials, the locations selected for inspection will include at least one location where the pipe or component has not

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR been previously replaced or recoated, if any such locations remain. The program will also be enhanced to include the buried portions of the fire protection system and the piping located inside the vault in the scope of the program. The vault is considered a manhole that is located between the reactor building and the exhaust tunnel. The remaining buried piping that is credited with performing intended functions required during decommissioning is cast iron (Fire Protection) so direct inspections may be required.

External inspections of buried components will occur opportunistically when they are excavated during maintenance. Upon entering the period of extended operation, inspection of buried piping will be performed within ten years, unless an opportunistic inspection occurs within this ten-year period. Program enhancements will be implemented prior to entering the period of extended operation.

A.1.31 Structures Monitoring Program The Structures Monitoring Program is a program that was developed to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 and is based on NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2 and Regulatory Guide 1.160, Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2. The program includes elements of the Masonry Wall Program and the RG 1.127, Inspection of Water-Control Structures Associated With Nuclear Power Plants aging management program.

The program relies on periodic visual inspections to monitor the condition of structures and structural components, structural bolting, component supports, masonry block walls, water-control structures, the Fire Pond Dam, exterior surfaces of mechanical components that are not covered by other programs, and HVAC ducts, damper housings, and HVAC closure bolting. The program relies on procurement controls and installation practices, defined in plant procedures, to ensure that only approved lubricants and proper torque are applied to bolting in scope of the program A.1.32 RG 1.127, Inspection of Water-Control Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants The Oyster Creek RG 1.127, Inspection of Water-Control Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants, aging management program is a condition monitoring program that is a part of the Structures Monitoring Program. The program requires periodic inspection of the Intake Structure and Canal (UHS) concrete for loss of material, cracking, and changes in material properties. Steel components are inspected for loss of material due to corrosion, and the earthen dike and canal slopes are monitored for loss of material and loss of form. The program will be enhanced to include periodic inspection of the Fire Pond Dam for loss of material and loss of form

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OYSTER CREEK - DSAR A.2.2 Lubricating Oil Monitoring Activities The Lubricating Oil Monitoring Activities aging management program is a program that manages loss of material, cracking, and fouling in lubricating oil heat exchangers, systems, and components in the scope of license renewal by monitoring physical and chemical properties in lubricating oil. Sampling, testing, and monitoring verify lubricating oil properties. Oil analysis permits identification of specific wear mechanisms, contamination, and oil degradation within operating machinery, and components of systems in scope for license renewal.

The Lubricating Oil Monitoring Activities program will be enhanced to add surveillance for verification of flow through the Fire Protection System diesel driven pump gearbox lubricating oil cooler. In addition, the program will be enhanced to include sampling and measurement for flash point of emergency diesel generator engine lubricating oil to detect contamination of lube oil by fuel oil. These enhancements will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

A.2.5 Periodic Inspection Program The Periodic Inspection Program is a program that will consist of periodic inspections of selected systems to verify the integrity of the system and confirm the absence of identified aging effects. This program manages aging of Service Water, Emergency Service Water, and Fire Protection equipment required to support the fire protection and spent fuel pool decay heat removal functions.The initial inspections are scheduled for implementation prior to the period of extended operation. The purpose of the inspection is to determine if a specified aging effect is occurring. If the aging effect is occurring, an evaluation will be performed to determine the effect it will have on the ability of affected components to perform their intended functions for the period of extended operation, and appropriate corrective action is taken.

Inspection methods may include visual examination, surface or volumetric examinations. Acceptance criteria are in accordance with industry guidelines, codes, and standards. When inspection results fail to meet established acceptance criteria, an evaluation will be conducted, in accordance with the corrective action process, to establish additional actions or measures necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the component intended function is maintained during the period of extended operation. This new program will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 A.5 LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENT LIST UFSAR ENHANCEMENT SUPPLEMENT OR ITEM NUMBER COMMITMENT SOURCE LOCATION IMPLEMENTATION (LRA APP. A) SCHEDULE Existing program is credited. The program will be A.1.19 Prior to the period of Section B.1.19 enhanced to include: extended operation

1. Specific fuel supply inspection criteria for fire Letter 2130-pumps during tests. 06-20354
2. Inspection of external surfaces of the halon and
1) Fire Protection carbon dioxide fire suppression systems.
3. Additional inspection criteria for degradation of fire barrier walls, ceilings, and floors.
4. Clearance inspection of in-scope fire doors every two years.

Existing program is credited. The program will be A.1.20 Prior to the period of Section B.1.20 enhanced to include: extended operation

1. Sprinkler head testing in accordance with NFPA 25, Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems. Samples will be submitted to a testing laboratory prior to being in
2) Fire Water service 50 years. This testing will be repeated at System intervals not exceeding 10 years.
2. Water sampling for the presence of MIC at an interval not to exceed 5 years.
3. Periodic non-intrusive wall thickness measurements of selected portions of the fire water system at an interval not to exceed every 10 years.
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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 UFSAR ENHANCEMENT SUPPLEMENT OR ITEM NUMBER COMMITMENT SOURCE LOCATION IMPLEMENTATION (LRA APP. A) SCHEDULE

4. Visual inspection of the redundant fire water Commitment storage tank heater (tank pressure retaining Change 09-surfaces) during tank internal inspections. 007 Program is new. The program will manage the A.1.21 Prior to the period of Section B.1.21 corrosion of outdoor carbon steel and aluminum tanks. extended operation The program credits the application of paint, sealant, Letter 2130-and coatings as a corrosion preventive measure and 06-20354
3) Aboveground performs periodic visual inspections to monitor Outdoor Tanks degradation of the paint, sealant, and coatings and any resulting metal degradation of carbon steel or of the unpainted aluminum tank. Bottom UTs are performed on tank bottoms supported by soil or concrete.

Existing program is credited. The program will be A.1.26 Prior to the period of Section B.1.26 enhanced to include: extended operation

1. Inspection of buried piping within ten years of Letter 2130-entering the period of extended operation, unless 06-20354 an opportunistic inspection occurs within this ten-year period. The inspections will include one cast iron pipe or component. In addition, for each of these materials, the locations selected for
4) Buried Piping inspection will include at least one location where Inspection the pipe or component has not been previously replaced or recoated, if any such locations remain.
2. Fire protection components in the scope of the program.
3. Piping located inside the vault in the scope of the program. The vault is considered a manhole that is located between the reactor building and the exhaust tunnel.
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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 UFSAR ENHANCEMENT SUPPLEMENT OR ITEM NUMBER COMMITMENT SOURCE LOCATION IMPLEMENTATION (LRA APP. A) SCHEDULE

5) Masonry Wall Existing program is credited. The Masonry Wall A.1.30 Ongoing Section B.1.30 Program Program is part of the Structures Monitoring Program.

Existing program is credited. The program includes Prior to the period of Section B.1.31 elements of the Masonry Wall Program and the RG A.1.31 extended operation 1.127, Inspection of Water-Control Structures Associated With Nuclear Power Plants aging management program. The Structures Monitoring Program will be enhanced to include: Letter 2130-

1. Buildings, structural components and commodities 06-20354 that are not in scope of maintenance rule but have been determined to be in the scope of license renewal. These include miscellaneous platforms, penetration seals, sump liners, structural seals, and anchors and embedment.
6) Structures
2. Component supports, other than those in scope of Monitoring Program ASME XI, Subsection IWF.
3. The visual inspection of insulated surfaces will require the removal of insulation. Removal of insulation will be on a sampling basis that bounds insulation material type, susceptibility of insulated piping or component material to potential degradations that could result from being in contact with insulation, and system operating temperature.
4. Inspection of electrical panels and racks, junction boxes, instrument racks and panels, cable trays, offsite power structural components and their foundations, and anchorage.
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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 UFSAR ENHANCEMENT SUPPLEMENT OR ITEM NUMBER COMMITMENT SOURCE LOCATION IMPLEMENTATION (LRA APP. A) SCHEDULE

5. Periodic sampling, testing, and analysis of ground water to confirm that the environment remains non-aggressive for buried reinforced concrete.
6. Periodic inspection of components submerged in the water of the fire pond dam,.
7. Inspection of penetration seals, structural seals, and other elastomers for change in material properties.
8. Inspection of vibration isolators, associated with component supports other than those covered by ASME XI, Subsection IWF, for reduction or loss of isolation function.
9. The current inspection criteria will be revised to add loss of material, due to corrosion for steel components, and change in material properties, due to leaching of calcium hydroxide and aggressive chemical attack for reinforced concrete.

Wooden piles and sheeting will be inspected for loss of material and change in material properties.

10. Periodic inspection of the Fire Pond Dam for loss of material and loss of form.
11. The program will be enhanced to include inspection of Meteorological Tower Structures. Inspection and acceptance criteria will be the same as those specified for other structures in the scope of the program.
12. The program will be enhanced to include inspection of exterior surfaces of piping and piping components associated with the Radio
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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 UFSAR ENHANCEMENT SUPPLEMENT OR ITEM NUMBER COMMITMENT SOURCE LOCATION IMPLEMENTATION (LRA APP. A) SCHEDULE Communications system, located at the meteorological tower site, for loss of material due to corrosion. Inspection and acceptance criteria will be the same as those specified for other external surfaces of mechanical components.

13. The program will be enhanced to require visual inspection of external surfaces of mechanical steel components that are not covered by other programs for leakage from or onto external surfaces, worn, flaking, or oxide-coated surfaces, corrosion stains on thermal insulation, and protective coating degradation (cracking and flaking).
14. The program will be enhanced to require performing a baseline inspection of submerged water control structures prior to entering the period of extended operation. A second inspection will be performed six years after this baseline inspection and a third inspection eight years after the second inspection. After each inspection, an evaluation will be performed to determine if identified degradation warrant more frequent inspections or corrective actions.
7) RG 1.127, Existing program is credited. The program is part of the A.1.32 Prior to the period of Section B.1.32 Inspection of Water- Structures Monitoring Program. The RG 1.127, extended operation Control Structures Inspection of Water-Control Structures Associated with Associated with Nuclear Power Plants aging management program will Letter 2130-Nuclear Power be enhanced to include: 06-20354 Plants
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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 UFSAR ENHANCEMENT SUPPLEMENT OR ITEM NUMBER COMMITMENT SOURCE LOCATION IMPLEMENTATION (LRA APP. A) SCHEDULE

1. Periodic inspection of components submerged in the water of the fire pond dam.
2. Periodic inspection of the Fire Pond Dam for loss of material and loss of form.
3. Inspection of steel components for loss of material, due to corrosion.
4. Parameters monitored will be enhanced to include change in material properties, due to leaching of calcium hydroxide, and aggressive chemical attack.

Submerged water control structures will be inspected under the Structural Monitoring Program as follows: A baseline inspection of submerged water control structures will be performed prior to entering the period of extended operation. A second inspection will be performed six years after this baseline inspection and a third inspection eight years after the second inspection.

After each inspection, an evaluation will be performed to determine if identified degradation warrants more frequent inspection or corrective actions.

Existing plant specific program is credited. The A.2.2 Prior to the period of Section B.2.2 program manages loss of material, cracking, and extended operation fouling in lubricating oil heat exchangers, systems, and components in the scope of license renewal by

8) Lubricating Oil monitoring physical and chemical properties in Monitoring Activities lubricating oil. Sampling, testing, and monitoring verify lubricating oil properties. Oil analysis permits identification of specific wear mechanisms, contamination, and oil degradation within operating
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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 UFSAR ENHANCEMENT SUPPLEMENT OR ITEM NUMBER COMMITMENT SOURCE LOCATION IMPLEMENTATION (LRA APP. A) SCHEDULE machinery, and components of systems in scope for license renewal. The program will be enhanced to add Letter 2130-surveillance for verification of flow through the Fire 06-20354 Protection System diesel driven pump gearbox lubricating oil cooler.

Exelon will enhance Oyster Creek Program B.2.2 to include sampling and measurement of flash point of diesel engine lubricating oil to detect contamination of lubricating oil by fuel oil.

Plant specific program is new. The program includes A.2.5 Prior to the period of Section B.2.5 systems in the scope of license renewal that require extended operation periodic monitoring of aging effects and are not covered by other existing periodic monitoring programs. Activities consist of a periodic inspection of

9) Periodic selected systems and components to verify integrity Inspection Program and confirm the absence of identified aging effects.

The inspections are condition monitoring examinations intended to assure that existing environmental conditions are not causing material degradation that could result in a loss of system intended functions.

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated. Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 DSAR APPENDIX B ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS RELOCATED FROM PERMANENTLY DEFUELED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS This attachment provides the administrative controls proposed to be relocated from the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS), Section 6.0, "Administrative Controls," to Appendix B of the Defueled Safety Analysis (DSAR), as described and evaluated HDIs submittal to the NRC requesting a License Amendment and Technical Specification changes to address permanent removal of fuel from the spent fuel pool and final storage in the site Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Installation (ISFSI).

On implementation of the approved amendment, the administrative controls and other requirements shown below will be incorporated into new Appendix B to the DSAR.

Capturing these specifications in the DSAR, ensures the specifications are identified in a licensee-controlled document. In addition, by relocating the following requirements in the DSAR, future changes will be evaluated to under the 10 CFR 50.59 change review process to ensure that adequate controls remain in-place to safely protect spent fuel located in dry casks located on site controlled ISFSI cask storage pads.

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated.

Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 OYSTER CREEK DSAR Appendix B ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TABLE OF CONTENTS B.1 Procedure and Programs B.2 Reporting Requirements B.3 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated.

Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 B.1 Procedures and Programs (formerly section 6.8.1, 6.8.2, 6.8.3 of the OC Techs Specs)

B.1.1 Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the items referenced below:

a. Deleted
b. Surveillance and test activities of equipment that affects nuclear safety and radioactive waste management equipment.
c. Fuel Handling Operations.
d. Security Plan Implementation
e. Fire Protection Program Implementation.
f. Emergency Plan Implementation
g. Process Control Plan Implementation
h. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Implementation.
i. Quality Assurance Program for effluent and environmental monitoring using the guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.15, Revision 1 B.1.2 Each procedure requirement by B.1.1 above, and substantive changes thereto, shall be reviewed and approved prior to implementation and shall be reviewed periodically as set forth in administrative procedures.

B.1.3 Temporary changes to procedures of B.1.2, above, may be made provided:

a. The intent of the original procedure is not altered.
b. The change is approved by two members of the licensees management staff knowledgeable in the area affected by the procedure.
c. The change is documented, reviewed, and approved within 14 days of implementation.

B.1.4 The following programs shall be established, implemented and maintained:

a. Radioactive Effluent Controls Program (formerly section 6.8.4 of the OC Techs Specs A program shall be provided conforming with 10 CFR 50.36a for the control of radioactive effluent and for maintaining the doses to members of the public from radioactive effluent as low as reasonably achievable. The program (1) shall be
  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated.

Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 contained in the ODCM; 2) shall be implemented by operating procedures; and (3) shall include remedial actions to be taken whenever the program limits are exceeded. The program shall include the following elements:

1. Limitations on the operability of radioactive liquid and airborne monitoring instrumentation including surveillance tests and setpoint determination in accordance with the methodology in the ODCM.
2. Limitations on the concentrations of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to the unrestricted area conforming to less than the concentration values in Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2 to 10 CFR 20.1001-20.2402.
3. Monitoring, sampling, and analysis of radioactive liquid and airborne effluents in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1302 and with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.
4. Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses or dose commitment to a member of the public from radioactive materials in liquid effluents released to the unrestricted area conforming to Appendix I of 10 CFR 50.
5. Determination of cumulative dose contributions from radioactive effluents for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least every 31 days.

Determination of projected dose contributions from radioactive effluents in accordance with the methodology in the ODCM at least every 31 days.

6. Limitations on the operability and use of the liquid and airborne effluent treatment systems to ensure that the appropriate portions of these systems are used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses in the 31-day period would exceed 2 percent of the guidelines for the annual dose or dose commitment, conforming to Appendix I to10 CFR 50.
7. Limitations on the dose rate resulting from radioactive material released in airborne effluents from the site to the unrestricted area shall be limited to the following:
a. For tritium, and for all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days: Less than or equal to a dose rate of 1500 mRems/hr to any organ.
8. Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses to a member of the public from tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days in airborne effluents released beyond the site boundary conforming to Appendix I of 10 CFR 50, Appendix I.
9. Limitations on the annual dose or dose commitment to any member of the public, beyond the site boundary, due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from Uranium fuel cycle sources conforming to 40 CFR 190.
  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated.

Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1

b. Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program A program shall be provided to monitor the radiation and radionuclides in the environs of the plant. The program shall provide (1) representative measurements of radioactivity in the highest potential exposure pathways, and (2) verification of the accuracy of the effluent monitoring program and modeling of environmental exposure pathways. The program shall (1) be contained in the ODCM; (2) conform to the guidance of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, and (3) include the following:
1. Monitoring, sampling, analysis, and reporting of radiation and radionuclides in the environment in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

B.2 Reporting Requirements (formerly section 6.9 of the OC Techs Specs)

In addition to the applicable reporting requirements of 10 CFR, the following identified reports shall be submitted to the Administrator of the NRC Region I office unless otherwise noted.

B.2.1 Routine Reports

a. Radioactive Effluent Release Report The Radioactive Effluent Release Report covering the operation of the facility during the previous year shall be submitted by May 1 of each year in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36a. The report shall include a summary of the quantities of radioactive liquid and airborne effluents and solid waste released from the facility. The material provided shall be consistent with the objectives outlined in the ODCM and Process Control Program and in conformance with 10 CFR 50.36a and 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, Section IV.B.1.
b. Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report covering the operation of the facility during the previous calendar year shall be submitted by May 1 of each year.

The Report shall include summaries, interpretations, and an analysis of trends of the results of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program for the reporting period. The material provided shall be consistent with the objectives outlined in: (1) the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM); and (2) Sections IV.B.2, IV.B.3, and IV.C of 10 CFR 50.

  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated.

Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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OCNGS DSAR Rev. 1 B.3 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (formerly Section 6.19 of the OC Techs Specs)

a. Licensee initiated changes to the ODCM shall be submitted to the NRC in the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the changes were made. This submittal shall contain:
1. sufficiently detailed information to justify the changes without benefit of additional or supplemental information;
2. a determination that the changes did not reduce the accuracy or reliability of dose calculations or setpoint determination; and
3. documentation that the changes have been reviewed and approved pursuant to Section B.1.2
b. Change(s) shall become effective upon review and approval by licensee management.
  • DSAR pages labeled as "ARCHIVED TEXT" are pages with text which is not revised or updated.

Information on "ARCHIVED TEXT" pages is A) of historical significant to the original licensing basis of the plant OR B) not meaningful to update.

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Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus, 1 Holtec Blvd., Camden, NJ 08104 Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909 Enclosure 2 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Stations Referenced Drawing JC 19702, Revision 45 HDI-OC-23-049